The White House Briefing Room
September 13, 1999
PRESS BRIEFING BY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SANDY BERGER, NATIONAL ECONOMIC ADVISOR GENE SPERLING, AND PRESS SECRETARY JOE LOCKHART
6:25 P.M. (L)
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
(Auckland, New Zealand)
______________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release
September 13, 1999
PRESS BRIEFING BY
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SANDY BERGER,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC ADVISOR GENE SPERLING,
AND PRESS SECRETARY JOE LOCKHART
Sky City Hotel
Auckland, New Zealand
6:25 P.M. (L)
MR. BERGER: Good to see you in the daytime. This has truly been a
good week for stability and U.S. interests in Asia. Asia at all times
faces challenges, as any large, diverse, dynamic region does. But we have
good reason to feel that developments over the past week have moved the
region in the right direction.
Three key issues warrant particular attention -- Indonesia-East Timor,
the Korean Peninsula, U.S.-China relations. The East Timor issues riveted
the region's and the world's attention. It was a focus of the leaders here
at APEC. This region united, as did the larger world, to act to set the
conditions for an international force under U.N. auspices, which we hope
will provide security to all the citizens of East Timor. The United States
strongly supported the referendum in East Timor and the President worked
very actively both before, on his way, and here, to lay the groundwork for
what we hope will be a resolution of this issue.
The U.S.-North Korean talks in Berlin this week have increased the
potential for reduced tensions in the Korean Peninsula. It is now our
understanding and expectation that the North Koreans will refrain from
testing any long-range missiles
for the duration of our negotiations to improve relations. This is an
important initial step for addressing our concerns about North Korea's
missile program.
For our part, we are considering a number of measures to ease economic
sanctions against North Korea, and expect to make a recommendation to the
President in the near future. This is a process that must proceed step by
step, but I believe a process that is moving in the right direction.
Obviously, all of the people of this region will be safer if we move
farther along on this constructive path.
...................
Q Gene, be a little more specific about the sanctions on North
Korea, which ones would be used first. And also, there's been talking in
Japan today -- or I guess yesterday -- that Japan and the United States
might be using the G-7 meeting coming up -- to coordinate some intervention
on the yen. Can you comment on that?
MR. BERGER: I'll let Gene talk about intervention on the yen.
(Laughter.) You think his answer on the other thing was boring, believe me
-- (laughter.) In terms of sanctions on North Korea, what we're looking at
basically are the basic commercial trade sanctions that affect ordinary
commerce and investment. We're not looking at anything that would affect
sensitive items, dual-use items, munitions list items, but basically the
sanctions that apply to trade in ordinary goods and services and
investment.
...................
Q Could you talk about the incentives that the North Korea
agreement sends? Why should they be rewarded for not doing something that
they shouldn't have been threatening to do in the first place?
MR. BERGER: Well, I would not characterize it that way, John.
(Laughter.) And I'm surprised that you would characterize it, quite
honestly. (Laughter.) Let's understand here that North Korea is not bound
by any international agreements. It's not a member of the MCTR or any
other regime, here. And yet its proceeding with a long-range missile
program would be one of the most destabilizing developments for Asia and
for the United States.
It would have an immediate effect on Japan, which would feel its own
security threatened and might then, therefore, feel it has to develop
certain countermeasures to deal with that, which in turn might lead China
to feel that it has to respond. So that a North Korean missile test would
be I think a very destabilizing event. And that's why we've indicated that
if that proceeded it would affect our relations seriously and we would have
to take action. I believe the Japanese would take action. I believe the
Koreans would take action.
Now, if we're going to embark on a different course, a course which
could conceivably lead to a long-term moratorium on a missile program, that
suggests the possibility of a different kind of relationship with North
Korea. And, obviously, if that's the case, it's appropriate for us to take
some steps which would ease some of the sanctions that we have in North
Korea.
So this is something if we can in fact gain, ultimately, a moratorium
on the North Korean missile program, it's very much in the U.S. strategic
interest and in any negotiation, any discussion, obviously the question is
what is the reciprocal benefit to the North Koreans, and the reciprocal
benefit would be some easing of economic sanctions. But I would say very
-- hasten to add that if they tested, obviously we would be going down a
different path.
If I could just put this back in a little bit of context, as you know,
Dr. Perry, Bill Perry has been working with us over the last eight months
looking at North Korea policy and basically has recommended to the
President that we, in a sense, offer the North Koreans a larger choice here
-- a path that on the one hand ultimately puts further restraints on their
nuclear program, beyond the agreed framework, which already does restrain
it to some important degree, and restrains their missile program in
exchange for which we could envision moving towards a more normal
relationship with North Korea. That's the long-term objective. It's one
we share with South Korea and with Japan.
I think what's happened this week is a first step in perhaps a
constructive direction.
Q -- this promise by North Korea not to test the missile while the
talks proceed, what does that imply for how much longer these talks will go
on?
MR. BERGER: Well, I think this is a long-term process, obviously.
And we ultimately, as I said, would like to see a broader understanding
with the North Koreans with respect to their missile program, with respect
to their nuclear program and during this period it is our understanding and
expectation that they will not test.
Q -- sanctions without legislation --
MR. BERGER: The sanctions we're talking about are ones that are
within the authority of the President. We're not talking about sanctions,
for example, that flow from legislation, because, for example, of their
being listed on the terrorism list. I mean, essentially North Korea would
be in the same status as Syria in terms of what we are talking about here.
Q Is there another round of talks scheduled?
MR. BERGER: There's no specific date for another round of talks, but
we would hope that these talks would continue.
...........
END 7:06 P.M. (L)
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