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U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

US Special Envoy for the Korean peace talks, Ambassador Charles Kartman will lead a delegation of US officials to meet with DPRK counterparts in Berlin September 7-11. Ambassador Kartman will meet with DPRK Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan to resume discussions begun in June in Beijing and continued August 3-9 in Geneva. The two sides have been exploring ways to improve relations while addressing the concerns of both sides.

I'll go to your questions.

QUESTION: This doesn't say a whole lot about their talks, does it?

MR. FOLEY: Not atypical for this particular subject matter.

QUESTION: No, I know, let's see if we can add a few words on that. How is this discourse going; is it leading to anything?

MR. FOLEY: I would look at these talks as part of the framework of ongoing bilateral talks that we've had with officials from the DPRK. We have used a series of meetings to continue discussions on the range of issues that we have with the DPRK. As in the past, we intend to use this meeting in September in Berlin to stress the advantage to the DPRK of taking steps to improve its relations with the United States and the international community based on the ideas discussed during former Defense Secretary Perry's visit to Pyongyang.

We also intend to use the meeting with the DPRK to reiterate the concerns we had previously raised concerning the DPRK's missile program, including the question of another long-range missile launch. We hope to continue our dialogue with them on this and on other subjects.

QUESTION: Whatever concerns you might have, the agreement that you reached some years ago stands? I mean, all the concerns about the missile program has no real bearing -- does it? -- on the US' commitment to provide energy and --

MR. FOLEY: Well, I answered that question yesterday in terms of the heavy fuel oil.

QUESTION: Yes, you're raising - obviously reminding us that there are concerns at this end. I'm wondering what leverage you have. You say you're concerned; they say, gee --

MR. FOLEY: This is, of course, not the first time that we've discussed this issue and we still have the concerns. The fact of the matter, though, is that the agreed framework has been a concrete success from our point of view. It has succeeded in freezing North Korea's nuclear weapons program of plutonium development, which is critical to that program. We've also had success, as you know, in achieving access to the suspect site at Kumchang-ni; and, indeed, being able to allay our suspicions through the on site visit.

So we have, as you know, though, the possibility of a different kind of relationship between ourselves and, indeed, the international community with North Korea. That was laid out in former Secretary Perry's visit to Pyongyang. Some of the potential for better relations on the economic and political front were inherent also in the agreed framework, as well. But at the same time, we have some very serious concerns that we've not made light of in these past few months, particularly involving North Korea's missile program. That certainly will be a matter for discussion in Ambassador Kartman's meetings in Berlin, as well.

QUESTION: The timing of this strikes me as interesting because it's right around the time when - the 9th of September is North Korea's National Day, and this time between now and kind of then have been thought as the prime time when they might launch a second missile. Is there anything related to that in the timing of these talks, or has this been an ongoing invitation for talks anytime?

MR. FOLEY: Well, I believe -- subject to being corrected later -- that the idea of a meeting between Ambassador Kartman and Vice Foreign Minister Kim Gye Gwan has been a possibility since they last met.

QUESTION: Which was?

MR. FOLEY: Well, I gave you that; that was August 3-9 in Geneva.

In terms of the timing as it relates to North Korean activities, you'd have to ask them; I can't really answer that for you. On that particular issue we've never spoken, I think, publicly about what we knew or suspected concerning intelligence matters involving their missile program and possible future tests. The question in our mind was not when they would test but, rather, whether they would. I think it wasn't a question of capability but of actual intention and acting.

So we've raised those concerns publicly and privately. But I would point again, as I did yesterday, that what Dr. Perry laid out in his visit to Pyongyang is the possibility of a different kind of relationship on a different basis in which the concerns of the United States and the international community are allayed, but in which North Korea and the United States and other members of the international community have the chance to exploit the window of opportunity that Secretary Albright talked about in Singapore; to have a different kind of relationship -- one that is better for the people of North Korea and better for the people of the region and certainly better for the security interests of the United States.

QUESTION: Last week the State Department saw signs that the North Koreans may be thinking hard about the missile tests. You talked about a window of opportunity. Have you seen any more signs since then, or on the contrary have you seen signs that --

MR. FOLEY: Well, I'm not sure that we formulated our statement exactly the way you put it. I think we were asked about certain public declarations and whether we saw those as positive or not, the declarations themselves. I think Mr. Rubin said that one could be hopeful based on what they said. So I wouldn't go farther than that.

I'm not able to report to you any substantive news or progress or movement in that regard. But that would be a matter for diplomatic channels in any event.

QUESTION: The US has lived with a number of adversaries over the years who have tested missiles and who had potentially far more threatening possibilities than the North Koreans. Why are there such dire warnings that the US continues to give about further missile tests in this case?

MR. FOLEY: Well that's a big question. That probably goes back many years in terms of its genesis and importance. Why were we so concerned about North Korea's nuclear program? Why did the Administration engage in intensive diplomacy back in 1993 and 1994 to achieve a successful freezing of North Korea's nuclear program? We believe -- I think the President has said this, the Secretary of State has said this -- that the Korean Peninsula is one of the most dangerous, if not the most dangerous, flash point in the world today. So the idea that nuclear weapons could be introduced onto the Korean Peninsula, that you could have long-range missiles introduced on to the Korean Peninsula, could be profoundly destabilizing not only for peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, but with a much wider impact, as well. I think the testing of that long range missile last summer obviously had a very unsettling effect throughout Asia and beyond. And so we have, in addition, proliferation concerns regarding North Korea's missile program.

So there are a whole range of concerns we have, which we believe we have an opportunity to allay if we're able to move forward on a different footing with the North Koreans, and that's what we're endeavoring to do.

QUESTION: Why Berlin?

MR. FOLEY: I don't have the answer why Berlin. It was mutually convenient; we've met in Geneva previous. I wouldn't read a striking significance into Berlin over Geneva or any other city.

QUESTION: Are you expecting some sort of - are you waiting for some sort of answer from North Korea on Perry's recommendations? Is that what you're going to be getting at this meeting?

MR. FOLEY: Well, again, I don't have anything substantive to report in the way of news about progress. We'll have to let the meeting take place. I am not forecasting any particular results. This would not be the last meeting we'll have with the North Koreans. That's a very important bilateral channel and I would expect there to be further meetings. So I don't want to forecast what might come out of the meeting.

We don't meet for the sake of meeting, merely, though. We believe that it is a positive sign that we and North Korea decide to meet bilaterally, and we have such meetings because we believe progress can be achieved. But I don't want to predict any particular results.

QUESTION: Does Dr. Perry's offer require a response, or is it just a matter of seeing how events unfold over time?

MR. FOLEY: Technically, I believe not. He's finalizing his review. I think there have been some revisions made to it in recent weeks, as he's been updating and, as I said, finalizing the review. I have not a date - we've been over this many times - as to when it will be complete. But the results of his visit to Pyongyang and any subsequent developments could be factored into his review; but it's not necessarily a requirement.

QUESTION: Does the offer stay out there forever? I mean, is this an open-ended offer?

MR. FOLEY: Well, I think I wouldn't want to comment on that until he's actually completed the review and made his report to the President. I don't think we're in a position to say that at this point. But, I mean, clearly, developments as may occur could have an impact - negative developments as well as positive developments.

QUESTION: On the Perry report, do you intend to make it public?

MR. FOLEY: I believe we will be in a position to describe it publicly. Whether we're going to issue a report which could easily be a classified report, I don't know that for a fact. But it's just in the nature of our work, in the government we don't always provide you texts of internal documents, classified or not. We will be reporting to Congress, certainly, in full on his report and we will be in a position to talk about the report.

QUESTION: Well, since the main points have already been made known to the North Koreans and the South Koreans and the Japanese and the Chinese, it can't be very highly classified, can it?

MR. FOLEY: That doesn't mean that we release every document that we possess internally. I'm sure we'll be in a position to talk about it publicly.

QUESTION: Can I ask you about Colombia?

QUESTION: I know we've already hit this so much, but let me just ask you this, Jim. Are you able to say that the US is hopeful as a sign of these talks that the North Koreans have put off plans, at least for the immediate future, of taking part in this second missile test?

MR. FOLEY: Well, I think Mr. Rubin indicated a week ago that some of the statements coming out of Pyongyang that gave an indication of a willingness to meet and discuss the concerns of the international community and, indeed, as I said to meet them, was deemed a hopeful sign. So I don't think we're pessimistic or optimistic. We're looking forward to the potential of making progress and of establishing a different, better kind of relationship with North Korea, one in which our concerns are allayed.

...................

(The briefing concluded at 2:15 P.M.)

[end of document]