The White House Briefing Room
July 2, 1999
PRESS BRIEFING BY SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
The Briefing Room
- -
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
_____________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release July
2, 1999
PRESS BRIEFING BY
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIALS
The Briefing Room
4:50 P.M. EDT
COLONEL CROWLEY: Okay, shifting gears to a different theater, we
now have Senior Administration Officials Number 2 and 3, who will talk
about today's discussions. Senior Administration Official Number 2 will
start with a brief statement.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Thank you. President Clinton
met today with President Kim Dae Jung of the Republic of Korea for an
official working visit at the White House. During the two hours of
meetings, the two Presidents discussed ways in which the allied nations can
advance our strong political, security and economic relationship.
President Clinton and President Kim affirmed that the U.S.-ROK
security alliance is strong and healthy. The United States supports
President Kim's policy of engagement with North Korea. At the same time,
the United States and the Republic of Korea -- Republic of Korea, South
Korea, that is, of course -- share concerns about recent actions by North
Korea.
Both sides agreed that a missile test would pose a serious
obstacle to peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, and have serious
consequences for improvement in relations with North Korea. President
Clinton expressed his hope that the North Korean leaders will respond to
ROK initiatives, and use the channels of communication already in place for
our talks about the future of Northeast Asia.
The two leaders also discussed economic matters during a working
lunch. President Clinton congratulated President Kim on the ROK's progress
with economic reform and restructuring. The ROK's experience sends two
powerful messages: opening markets leads to economic growth; and open
societies are resilient in dealing with the challenges of globalization.
The opening of the ROK's markets and society is not complete,
however, and President Clinton affirmed his support for President Kim's
continued reform and restructuring efforts to accelerate the ROK's economic
recovery. The Republic of Korea's long-term prosperity will be built on
the foundations that are laid in the coming year.
Free and fair trade is essential to economic prosperity and to
maintaining support for open markets here and abroad. President Clinton
noted the importance, in particular, of reversing the surge in steel
imports, and guarding against unfair trade practices.
The United States and the Republic of Korea share a commitment to
democratic values. In this connection, President Clinton warmly
congratulated President Kim on receiving the Philadelphia Liberty Award, a
fitting tribute to a lifelong championing of democracy. President Kim will
travel from Washington to Philadelphia to receive the award on the Fourth
of July.
That concludes the prepared remarks. Both I and high
Administration Official Number 3 will be happy to take any comments or
questions you've got.
Q I note in your statement you refer to a missile test, and
not to a North Korean missile test.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Oh, I'm sorry. I meant a North
Korean missile test. I thought that was obvious from the context. It
referred to a North Korean missile test.
Q Could you tell us about any discussions about South Korea's
own missile program?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: No, I can't.
Q Did the President ask President Kim to exercise some
restraint as far the South Korean missile tests, given what's been going on
with the North Koreans?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There may be some confusion
here. The concern has been about a North Korean missile test. The media
has been full of speculation about that -- the possibility that they would
test a long-range missile, as they did last August 31st. I'm not sure
exactly what kind, but something like that. And there was discussion about
U.S. and South Korean efforts to deter the North Koreans from doing that,
or to respond to the North Koreans if that deterrent should fail. That
discussion also included coordinated efforts with Japan and reflects
discussions that all three countries have been having over a period of time
about that issue.
Q I guess my question is, did the President, in order to
ratchet down tensions, encourage the South Koreans to show restrain as far
as their own tests in order to not antagonize the North Koreans?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: There was no discussion of a
South Korean missile test.
Q You've gone from "very serious consequences" to "serious
obstacle to peace" in describing what would happen if the North Koreans
tested -- the "very serious consequences" was in recent days, and now
you've just used the phrase "serious obstacle to peace." Can you say why
the change in wording -- things don't happen automatically. And, number
two, was there any discussion about what response the two countries would
take in the event of a test?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I would not attribute
significant meaning to the change in wording; there were different authors
of these, different wordings, so they came out of different bureaucracies.
They were intended to convey the same message.
In terms -- your second question was?
Q Did they talk about the response of two governments, Seoul
and Washington, in the event of a test?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: They did at the level of
principle. There was not a discussion of concrete measures. That kind of
discussion tends to take place at a more specialized level and, in fact,
has been taking place at a more specialized level. This was more a matter
of leaders indicating that they thought very much the same way on the need
to have a coordinated response, a response that would be taken as serious
and strong, and yet -- but that did not extend to a discussion of the
actual measures that would be taken.
Q When you got into this discussion of how they might respond,
was there any specific discussion of whether a missile test would result in
either delay or cancellation of the KEDO project, and was there any
discussion whether or not the North Koreans were being informed of that in
advance?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Again, the discussion remained
at a general level. I think it is fair to say that the U.S., South Korean
and Japan, all three governments recognize the value of the agreed
framework of which the KEDO project is an integral part, and would not wish
to do anything to disrupt the implementation of the agreed framework,
including the construction of the light water reactors. So I think that
you should keep that in mind, centrally, when you think about how we would
respond to a North Korean missile test.
There are a lot of other things that can be done that would not
violate the agreed framework. I do not think that any of the three
governments would wish to take steps that would violate the agreed
framework.
Q At the spray at the top, the President said he wanted to
wait until after the meeting to make a decision or to say what he felt
about the request for a longer-range South Korean missile. What is his
decision on that?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I don't know the answer to that.
I don't think, frankly, to be serious, I don't think there was a specific
decision -- there wasn't a decision to be made at this meeting. I think he
was asked some question about the South Korean missile development. He
indicated that that would be discussed and he, therefore, didn't want to
give a response now. If asked at this point after the meeting, I don't
know whether he would choose to give a response or not, but I am not.
Q But you just said it wasn't discussed.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I'm sorry?
Q The South Korean missile program. If I understood you
right, before you said it did not come up.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think -- how did you phrase
your question, about a South Korean missile test or something?
Q If we're not talking about the missile test, let's talk
about the missile program for a second. Discuss the South Korean missile
program?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me be very clear, concise
and full in my response. I am not prepared to discuss anything about a
discussion of the South Korean missile program, period.
Q What role, if any, is China playing in trying to dissuade
the North Koreans from the missile test?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: One of the top officials of
North Korea, a man by the name of Kim Young Nam, just visited China in the
last few weeks. That was the highest-level official visit between those
two countries in quite a few years. The Chinese, during that visit,
endorsed the South Korean policy of engagement to the North, encouraged the
North to avoid raising tensions on the Peninsula, and encouraged tension
reduction.
They announced all of that publicly to be sure that everyone
understood where China stood on those issues. The north did not suggest
that China's public stance differed from its private stance. I think that
was yet another indication that the Chinese do not wish to see the North
raise tensions on the Peninsula through another missile test or through
other kinds of very provocative activity. They would like to see tensions
reduced on the Peninsula and be stable. And their public, and I believe
their private, positions support that set of objectives.
Q You had mentioned that if North Korea was to go through with
a test, that you would not want to do anything that would disrupt the
agreed framework. To maintain the agreed framework, you have to maintain
relations, you have to maintain aid, you have to maintain oil shipments to
North Korea. What other things -- as serious consequences, what other
things could be done to show serious consequences to North Korea if they
were to go through a missile test?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, let me -- I want to turn
to my colleague here to answer part of this. But let me just broadly say
that I don't want to get into a discussion here of particulars of a
response. I think that is to be laid out at an appropriate time, through
appropriate channels. But it seems to me that there are a wide array of
things that can be done, that do not directly violate the agreed framework.
We have a lot of other kinds of things that we, the Japanese, and the South
Koreans discuss with the North Koreans, and do with the North Koreans. But
let me ask whether my colleague has a comment to add to that.
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me just clarify. You made
some broad, sweeping statements about what the agreed framework does or
does not call for.
Very specifically, on the United States' part, for its
obligations, it is to provide 500,000 metric tons of heavy fuel oil each
year, until the light water reactors come on-line. Now, we would intend to
continue that. That's part of the obligation.
In the general scope of keeping, as best that we can, to the
construction schedule that the South Koreans, the Japanese and we are
responsible for, that would continue. You may have noticed that the
Japanese, in the last week, have passed the KEDO funding through the Upper
House, with only one dissenting vote. The South Koreans, likewise, are now
prepared to move on through the National Assembly for the funding of that.
We would anticipate that that would continue.
So those are the parameters that we're talking about. There is a
natural inclination to talk about in terms of relationship, but the
specifics of that are the heavy fuel oil and the light water reactor
construction schedule. For their part, the North Koreans should be
wrapping up very soon the very last cleanup for the fuel rods that are
being canned at Yongbyon.
Q With regard to the role of China, they obviously have a
separate track, vis a vis the DPRK, and that somehow there's a -- you
obviously have means of understanding something of what they're doing as
well as they're following what we're doing here. I wonder if those mutual
relations, whatever they may entail, have been affected negatively in the
hiatus between the U.S. and Chinese relations, more generally, on this
issue?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Good question. The answer is
no, they have not. So that we continue to talk with the Chinese about
North Korea, our perspectives on it, what our concerns are, they continue
to talk to us about it. That channel has not been disrupted.
Q At the beginning of the pool spray -- not at the beginning,
but President Clinton invited President Kim to make a statement, and during
that statement, President Kim cited the close U.S.-South Korean ties and
said that this should send a message to North Korea. Can you amplify on
what the message is and why this forum was chosen to do that?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I can't tell you why President
Kim chose to make that statement here; you'd have to ask his party. But
broadly speaking, it is our belief that a recognition by the North that the
U.S., South Korea, Japan and let me add China in parallel fashion, all seek
similar goals on the Korean Peninsula at this point in time. Tension
reduction, do not want to see an arms race develop, do want to see a
process that will lead to normalization of relations, do want to see the
people of North Korea able to live at a higher standard of living. We
think the fact that North Korea can observe us standing together on that
array of issues may enhance the chances that North Korea will move on that
path.
The fact that North Korea knows that all of us, or at least the
U.S., South Korean and Japan -- I won't speak for China -- would respond
negatively if North Korea were to engage in large-scale provocations or
launch a missile, do something quite dramatic, hopefully helps to deter
them. That is different from if we had very different views on the North,
could conceivably find some daylight between us.
Q Maybe I stumbled over my question, but really, what I meant
was, what is motivating the need from the North Koreans, from our
perspective, to make this statement? What are the North Koreans doing? Do
you have signs that they're going amount to a major provocation, as you put
it?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, we don't have signs that
they are going to announce a major provocation, but I do think that there
is a broad concern about North Korean missile development. And without
getting into details, as Secretary Cohen and others have stated very
clearly, we do not want to see a long-range missile test by North Korea,
and we would react very negatively to that.
Q Is it solely focused on that?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: In broad terms -- again,
remember a review of policy by former Defense Secretary Perry has been
under way for sometime. In broad terms, we would like to both encourage
the North to move toward a more positive set of relations throughout the
region and give them incentives not to go in the other direction and try to
use muscle in order to extort, whatever term you want to choose, but in
order to elicit concessions from others in the region.
And so I think the highly consultative approach that Secretary
Perry has taken, a consultative approach that's maintained outside of the
Perry initiative itself, I think helps to focus that deterrence, make it
more credible to the North. That is, in part, aimed at deterring a North
Korean missile test, but it's much more broadly aimed at encouraging North
Korea to do the right thing.
Q But there is no indication whatsoever that they are
responding to these incentives that are being offered by the U.S. and by
South Korea. There are a number of people this time who view the North as
a bunch of shakedown artists who today, are trying to milk the South
Koreans for 200,000 tons of fertilizer and who point out that they got
400,000 tons of food aid in May from the U.S., and at the same time make no
concessions themselves. How do you respond to that?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me do a little bit of a
review if I can, go back just a few years, two or three years down the
road, and the situation that we faced then. Channels of communications
were not open with the North Koreans. The previous South Korean
administration had a different policy than President Kim Dae Jung has now.
So we have, in the last couple of years, particularly since President Kim
came to office, is a new approach in terms of engagement with the North
Koreans, not only by the Japanese and their attempts to revise their
bilateral contacts -- although it is going slow.
The Republic of Korea has reengaged, they've had talks a year ago
in April in Beijing, didn't go anywhere. They have been able, though, to
maintain the contacts to develop what has been going on in Beijing in the
last couple of weeks, at the vice ministerial level, still slow going. But
that's the nature of dealing with North Korea.
We, on the other hand, have had a series of contacts with the
North Koreans. But it is very painstaking to lay the groundwork for that.
It took us, well, almost a year after the former Republic of Korea
President, Kim Young Sam, and President Clinton offered in April of '96
four-party talks. I mean, that took excruciating negotiating with the
North Koreans just to be able to get them to agree to come to those. We
have now had five complete rounds of four-party talks.
You're asking, what's the tangible progress? Well, I would point
to, we're moving in that direction. And with the North Koreans, it is not
a turn-on, turn-off situation.
But the contacts are greater. The communication channel is more
open. The possibilities exist there. And we are suggesting, I believe, as
President Kim did in the statement at the pool spray, there's opportunities
out there. We're inviting the North Koreans to take hold of them.
Q You mentioned the Perry initiative. Do you mind just taking
this opportunity to tell us where that stands right now? Where do things
stand with Secretary Perry?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: I think he's in the latter
stages of reaching the recommendations that he'll present to the President.
Keep in mind that this has involved, among other things, extensive
consultations in the region, including a trip to Pyongyang. And this was
to hear ideas, to float some concepts and see what kinds of responses they
got, in order to refine his own recommendations.
I do not have a date certain for him to submit those
recommendations. But I would imagine that it will not be terribly long
from there.
Q Are you talking weeks or months or days?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, I don't want to speculate
how long. But I can guarantee that it's before the end of the year, and I
think very much before the end of the year. (Laughter.)
Can you record that I smiled when I said that, please? Thank
you. (Laughter.)
Q -- in the event of another missile test, what would be the
status of this integrated and complicated -- in the event of the missile
test? That is the first question. And the second question is, last year,
after the first long-range missile test, Japanese government suspended the
KEDO funding and in the event of another missile test if, suspension of the
KEDO funding is acceptable or sanctioned for the U.S. administration --
this is a Japanese government decision. Is this acceptable for the U.S.
administration?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Well, you're very right -- let
me take your second question first. You're very right that the approach to
KEDO is done government-by-government. The Japanese Diet has approved KEDO
funding. It is now up to the Japanese Ex-Im Bank to work out the actual
agreement to provide that funding, and that will be done, I presume, over
the course of this summer.
It is our position -- I believe it is also the position of the
Japanese government, although it is up to them to state their posture --
that if there is another long-range missile test we still would not wish
the response to that to be one that undermines the agreed framework. Let
us keep in mind what the agreed framework accomplishes. It shuts down
North Korea's ability to produce fissionable material suitable for nuclear
weapons. And it remains a high priority goal of the United States, I
believe of Japan, and of South Korea to prevent North Korea from acquiring
nuclear weapons, from producing nuclear weapons.
So we don't want to give up that goal in response to something
that North Korea does outside of the agreed framework. The agreed
framework does not extend to missiles, so that's an additional item and
we'd like to respond outside of the agreed framework.
Q Have you gotten clear assurance from the government of Japan
that they will continue to honor the agreed framework, even after another
missile test by the North Koreans?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: We've had ongoing consultations
with the Japanese government and we have sought to reach a coordinated
position on this. I'll leave it to the Japanese government to state
exactly what their position is.
Q Was it a mistake not to include missile tests within the
agreed framework and if so -- if not, why?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: That predates my time in
government by so many years that I don't feel that I can fairly give you a
judgment on that.
I think the agreed framework was designed to respond to what was
a very pressing, immediate need in 1994. And that was our perception that
North Korea was reaching an ability to have enough plutonium to build a
nuclear weapon. And the situation was eroding rapidly, in terms of whether
we could maintain peace on the peninsula, given that developing reality.
And the agreed framework was designed, I believe, to call an immediate halt
to that, and then to work on other aspects of the relationship.
Do you want to expand on that?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Just briefly. I think the point
is, in hindsight you can lay anything down that you'd like. But in
reality, at the time, the focus was on the North Korean capability to
produce and reprocess plutonium. That's what the agreed framework was
designed to do. And quite frankly, that's probably the extent for which we
would have been able to reach any kind of an agreement with North Korea at
that point in time.
It did not include conventional weapons, nor biological or
chemical or missiles or anything else. It took care of the most pressing
problem. And that's what it's designed to do, and is still doing today.
COLONEL CROWLEY: Alex, last question.
Q Are you confident that the North Koreans are not working
outside of this agreed framework, to develop a secret nuclear program?
Because there was this underground facility, that's my first question. My
second question is, are you confident they did not, before they shut down
the facility that was underneath the KEDO agreement, they did not reap
enough plutonium to build four or five nuclear weapons, before they went
into this agreement?
SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me just say, without going
into any detail at all -- and I'll let you take any of this speculation up
with a different agency, on what the Koreans do or do not have -- but the
thrust of your question is, as an example, at Kumchang-Ri, where we had
suspicions that we needed to clarify, we were able to meet with the North
Koreans, and over almost a six-month period, maybe a little bit longer,
negotiate, that allowed us to eventually visit that facility, which in
their words was a sensitive military facility. It did not contain the
material. We've got a press statement out on that.
So the point being is that we have no credible evidence at this
point that there is a secret nuclear program or anything going on. And the
counterpoint to that is, the United States, if and when we have any
concerns at all -- as we did with the Kumchang-Ri area -- would bring that
matter up with the North Koreans. It's not one in which there's some
degree of blind-eye, and we're sticking strictly to the agreed framework.
That's not that case.
COLONEL CROWLEY: Thank you very much.
Q Thank you.
END 5:16 P.M. EDT
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