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U.S. Department of State

Daily Press Briefing

NORTH KOREA

15-16 Issue of Compensation/North Korea Missile Program

16 Prospects for Resumption of Talks

................ QUESTION: We've heard reports that the North Koreans are asking for $1 billion. Earlier we heard reports, $1 billion paid out over three years; today we hear reports, $1 billion per year for three years. Can you clarify the number?

MR. RUBIN: I'm certainly not going to clarify the North Koreans claim or statements that have been made in private discussions. If they want to clarify it, they're welcome to. We continue to have serious concerns about North Korea's development, testing and export of missiles and missile technology. We are seeking tight constraints on these questions. With regard to your question from yesterday, we have made clear that we oppose further North Korean launches of long range missiles. This includes launches intended to orbit satellites.

As is recognized by the MTCR, the Missile Technology Control Regime, space launch vehicles and their technology are virtually interchangeable with ballistic missiles. Any rocket capable of putting up a satellite is also inherently capable of delivering weapons of mass destruction.

As far as compensation is concerned, our policy remains the same. We're not going to provide compensation to stop them from doing what they shouldn't do.

QUESTION: (Inaudible.)

MR. RUBIN: I gave a report yesterday. There's nothing new to report today.

QUESTION: Any word on the talks resuming -- any sort of time frame?

MR. RUBIN: No, I have no new day for you, other than an intention to continue the talks.

QUESTION: Is it a violation of the MCTR for a country, even though it's not a signatory, to launch a communication satellite?

MR. RUBIN: No, the MTCR deals with capabilities. As my somewhat educated layman's understanding of this is, the standard used is a payload of 500 kg going 300 km. That payload size, regardless of whether it's a satellite or a mock weapon of mass destruction or a real weapon of mass destruction, what you're trying to do is get at the ability of countries to deliver a payload large enough to carry a weapon of mass destruction 300 km.

QUESTION: It's your concerns about the North Korean intentions itself that make you concerned about them attempting to launch a communication satellite, because that's not generally something that one country will (inaudible) on another. I mean, doesn't every country have a right to launch communications satellite?

MR. RUBIN: We believe that in the case of North Korea, which is not a member of the Missile Technology Control Regime, that they should not be testing missiles of this range with this payload. That is our view because it's destabilizing.

QUESTION: But just to launch a satellite, a communications satellite?

MR. RUBIN: Because of inherent ability to interchange satellites with weapons of mass destruction; that is the reason.

(The briefing concluded at 1:30 P.M.)

[end of document]