24 February 1999
TEXT: STANLEY ROTH FEB. 23 WORLDNET ON NORTH KOREA
(U.S. seeks "normal" North Korea) (8680) Washington -- A "normal" North Korea, that is part of the "family of nations," is America's policy goal, according to Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Stanley Roth. Roth expressed that hope in a February 23 USIA Worldnet dialogue with journalists and experts in Seoul, Tokyo and Canberra. While grim famine stalks that country, and its troubling missile testing and "suspicious" underground facilities raise international concern, Roth acknowledged that long-term United States objectives regarding North Korea are quite prosaic. "It has certainly been the long-standing policy of the United States that we would like to bring North Korea into the family of nations," Roth told his Worldnet audience. "We would like to see it become a more so-called normal nation," he added. The United States, Roth said, is seeking to resolve current disputes with the Pyongyang regime through negotiations. "The best means of preserving the security of the United States (is) in trying to work out these issues through the negotiating path," Roth said. If negotiations don't succeed, he added, "you'd consider other options." The United States, Roth told his listeners, is about to begin another round of negotiations on a suspicious underground facility in North Korea. "The situation is that we have grave suspicions about this site," Roth said. "I emphasize the word 'suspicions.' We need to have these suspicions resolved. In order to do that we need access to the site." The United States, he said, is hopeful in the near term of getting North Korea back to the negotiating table on missiles. "The United States," Roth emphasized, "has made it very clear in its negotiations and discussions with North Korean officials that we believe it would be a grave mistake if there were to be a second missile test." Former Secretary of Defense William Perry "is hard at work on his comprehensive review of Korea policy," Roth added. "After the work is further along he hopes to go back to the region and share some views and consult with the countries out there." The effect of famine in North Korea, Roth said, "explains why there is some refugee flow across the North Korea-Chinese border, and indicates that the North certainly has not been effective to date in seriously improving the productivity of its agricultural sector." (begin transcript) WORLDNET "DIALOGUE" UNITED STATES INFORMATION AGENCY Television and Film Service of Washington, D.C. GUEST: Stanley Roth, Assistant Secretary of State TOPIC: Korean Peninsula Issues POSTS: Canberra, Tokyo, Seoul HOST: Rick Foucheux DATE: February 23, 1999 TIME: 20:00 - 21:00 EST MODERATOR: Hello, I'm Rick Foucheux, and welcome to Worldnet's "Dialogue." Today our topic of discussion will focus on Korean Peninsula issues. The division of the Korean Peninsula remains a critical issue for Korea and in East Asia. The U.S. supports the peaceful reunification of Korea, in keeping with the desires of the Korean people and the policies of the Republic of Korea government. However, residual public mistrust of U.S. motives persists. Other issues such as the KEDO light-water reactor project and uncertainty about the intentions ad capabilities of North Korea also affect the U.S., Korea and other nations in the region. To discuss these and other issues concerning Korean Peninsula activities we are joined, and honored today to be joined by Stanley Roth, assistant secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific affairs. Mr. Roth, welcome to Worldnet's "Dialogue." ROTH: Thank you very much, Rick. MODERATOR: A pleasure to have you with us, as always. I understand that before we begin our program with our questioners overseas you might have a few opening comments for us. ROTH: Sure. Well, first, Rick, let me thank Worldnet for organizing this event. I think the timeliness of this session on Korean Peninsula issues is self-evident. We are at a moment when we are about to begin yet another round of negotiations on the suspect facility. We are hopeful in the near term of getting North Korea back to the negotiating table on missiles. Bill Perry is hard at work on his comprehensive review of Korea policy -- I'd say probably in the middle stages. After the work is further along he hopes to go back to the region and share some views and consult with the countries out there. So there is no shortage of activities going on, both here and on the peninsula itself, and I think you'd be hard pressed to come up with a more timely topic. So rather than give a lengthy speech I'd like to just open it up to questions of your listeners. Q: Mr. Roth, I wonder if you could just give us your latest assessment of North Korea's intentions with the underground facility that has been detected they're building. I notice some reports from North Korea angrily protest that this is their sovereign right to dig holes if they want to. What can you tell us about the evidence that there's some malign intent with this facility? ROTH: I think really the question is not intentions, which is one of the hardest things to lead, but rather facts. The situation is that we have grave suspicions about this site. I emphasize the word "suspicions." We need to have these suspicions resolved. In order to do that we need access to the site. And we are no longer in a guessing mode about intentions, but rather we're dealing with hard core facts. And so the issue for us is resolving our concerns through access as many times as necessary in order to make sure that in fact there are no questionable activities going on at that site that would be in violation of the agreed framework. Q: My question is about the William Perry North Korea report. As I understand, Bill Perry, the U.S. policy coordinator on North Korea, is scheduled to present his North Korea report by the end of March, next month. And I heard that some sources are saying that Perry may visit North Korea around this time. My question is: Could you comment on this? And if he visits North Korea, is there a chance to meet Kim Jong Il? And my second question is -- ROTH: Why don't we do one at a time? Q: What is the most important new policy in his North Korea report? ROTH: Well, I think you're way ahead of the event. First let me say that there is no time deadline on Dr. Perry's report, and so it's not a question of being done by March, it's a question of being done when he's done. Second, in terms of his travel plans, he has already gone out to several countries in the region, including your own country, and hopes to make another such trip. But at this time there are no current plans to visit North Korea. And certainly at a time when the work on the report is not yet done, indeed I'd like to say that the study is really in its middle phases right now. It's way premature to talk about any conclusions or recommendations that Dr. Perry might want to make. Q: My question is: North Korea tested what the Japanese government believes are Taepodong type ballistic missiles last August -- and how likely is the second such launch by Pyongyang? ROTH: Well, let me emphasize that the United States has made it very clear in its negotiations and discussions with North Korean officials that we believe it would be a grave mistake if there were to be a second missile test. We have indicated that we believe the first such test was destabilizing and that it would have very serious consequences if this were to be repeated, and in fact it could even jeopardize the funding within Japan -- certainly within the Diet, which must approve the funding for the KEDO project, even though there is no formal relationship between KEDO, the agreed framework, and missiles. So it has very serious implications. We have made this point absolutely clear to the North. Now, at the moment we have no indication that they are preparing for another test. But at the same time there is no indication that they have involuntarily shut down their missile program. So we have to continue to watch this issue and to continue to repeat our warnings about the consequences. Q: Mr. Roth, the South Korean President Kim Dae Jung last week commented that the West were to give North Korea incentives to open their society and perhaps a country more like China and Vietnam. Yet at the same time all the reports from North Korea suggest that there is no sign of any intention or willingness to make any such change. What's your assessment of the possibility of an even slightly more liberal regime in North Korea? And is there roughly the sorts of incentives President Kim was talking about? ROTH: Let me try to deal with several different aspects of the question. First, I think President Kim has gone to great lengths to identify some positive indicators within North Korea itself in terms of changes made to the Constitution that would encourage the opening up of the economy, and some other specific steps that have been taken. Without in any means suggesting that huge change has already taken place in North Korea, I think President Kim has made the point that there is some process of change underway, and he believes we ought to be encouraging that. And I think that basically it has certainly been the long-standing policy of the United States that we would like to bring North Korea into the family of nations. We would like to see it become a more so-called normal nation, and consequently we should be looking for indicators that there are sources of change within North Korea. On your second point, I think that it's important to recognize that U.S. policy already recognizes the prospect that there could be change in North Korea, and that in the context of those changes that the United States would want to be in a position to consider changes in its own policy. The key point for us has been that this needs to be reciprocal. That is a question of North Korea needs to demonstrate that if we take steps they will take steps and vice versa, that in other words you're not simply rewarding bad behavior but rather are rewarding change. And in that context we have made it very clear to North Korea, beginning with the agreed framework itself, that we would like to have a different relationship with North Korea, a less adversarial, more normal relationship, and we hope that steps can be taken on their part that will enable us to reach this situation. Q: Mr. Roth, what's your assessment of just how stable and secure Kim Jong Il is in North Korea? Is there any sign at all of any political opposition or resistance, or is he as entrenched as he would seem to be from this distance? ROTH: Let me start with the caveat that North Korea is not an essentially transparent society, and there are very real limits of what we know about internal developments. But having said that, within the limits of what we know there are no indications that there is any serious organized resistance to Kim Jong Il, and no indications that he is not the preeminent leader. As far as we can tell he is in charge and decisions flow from him. Q: Just flowing from those earlier questions, what's the -- there's a lot of evidence and reports of growing numbers of refugees crossing the border from North Korea into China, and some recent reports that suggest that the famine is just as bad as it was a few years ago. How do you read the famine situation? And is there any sign of reform on the organization of the agricultural sector to deal with that? ROTH: I think clearly there is evidence that the food situation in North Korea remains serious. We have had indications from the World Food Program, from international NGOs that in fact there are very serious levels of malnutrition. We have seen rather horrifying reports of the effects on children of sustained malnutrition. We have more anecdotal or episodic reports of actual starvation in certain regions, although not nationwide starvation. And in fact we've seen estimates -- and I emphasize they're only estimates -- that suggest that the casualties from the food crisis -- and when I say casualties that means not only from starvation but from disease related to the shortage of food -- could actually have reached several million people over the past few years. So this is a very serious situation. It certainly explains why there is some refugee flow across the North Korea-Chinese border, and indicates that the North certainly has not been effective to date in seriously improving the productivity of its agricultural sector. Q: Do you think the -- (inaudible) -- settled in the U.S.-North Korea talks, scheduled for the 27th of this month? I heard some optimistic views over these talks. What is your prospect? And my second question is if Dr. Perry visits North Korea, what will his mission be? ROTH: Well, on the second point, let me simply say no decision has been made, and at this point there are no plans for Dr. Perry to visit North Korea, so there is simply no point in me speculating about what the conceivable mission would be. In terms of your first question about the forthcoming round of negotiations, my personal philosophy is you also going into negotiations expecting success. In fact, we believe there has been some positive momentum in the first few rounds of negotiation. From the United States perspective we certainly believe that there is a basis for resolution of the issue at the next round of negotiations. At the same time, the point is that we are in this as a process, that we want the negotiations to succeed, and we are prepared to stay the course as long as we can ultimately reap success. Q: A high ranking Korean diplomat has recently mentioned the difference in approaches to North Korea policy between the U.S. and South Korea. He thought that the U.S. is more interested in short-term issues like Kumchangyi underground facility and missiles, whereas South Korea has focused on long-term and packaged plans, such as relationships between North and South and the U.S. and North Korea. What do you think about that? ROTH: I don't think there's any difference between our two countries. I was fortunate to be a participant in the talks between President Clinton and President Kim in November that took place in Seoul, and it seemed to me that there was a very good understanding between the two presidents and the two countries. President Clinton made it very clear that he things the engagement strategy is a wise one, that it holds out the prospect for change, that it is a good means of trying to alter the Cold War mentality that has prevailed on the peninsula for decades and that it is well worth trying. At the same time, I think President Kim demonstrated that he shares our concern about the seriousness of some of the issues, and particularly about the absolute necessity of resolving the suspect site. And so I think we each support the other's policies, and each share the other's concerns. I think this issue has been grossly exaggerated. I don't see any difference at all. Q: Recently the Ministry of Korean Foreign Affairs said that Korea will renew its efforts to establish a six-nation security dialogue to ease inner-Korean tensions. And I want to hear how you think about Korea's effort in this? Do you think it's desirable to resolve the Korean problem? And if it is established, what will be the difference between the six-party talks and four-party talks? ROTH: I think basically this is a long-term objective. As you probably know, North Korea to date has refused to participate in six-party talks, even at what we call a track two level, which is mixed academic and government officials in a private capacity. And there is really no reason to believe at the present time that they would be eager to jump into six-party talks. As you know, they have a certain limitation on the number of negotiations they can do simultaneously, and I believe a lot of their energies are engaged in the four-party talks in Geneva, plus the negotiations they're having with us over the suspect facility. But having said that, I think over time the attractiveness of a six-party forum is clear, that in particular if we reach that happy moment when agreement is reached in the four-party talks concerning peace arrangements for the Korean Peninsula, that it would make a lot of sense to have several of the additional countries in the region that have a major role to play -- i.e., Japan and the Soviet Union, Russia now -- participate in the negotiations and perhaps to help serve as outside guarantors for any agreement. So over time I can see this as an objective. But in the short term I don't think there's any intention for this to replace the four-party talks. Q: Japan made it clear that it would return aid to North Korea unless there is more constructive movement from the North on the kidnapping and the missile issue. Do you think it's a good idea when you consider how little leverage the U.S., South Korea and Japan have against North Korea? ROTH: Well, I would like to see a situation where Japan's humanitarian concerns are addressed, and at the same time Japan is able to help alleviate some of the humanitarian concerns involving the North. Obviously the North has a major need for food -- that's clear from what I mentioned before the WFP, World Food Program appeals, plus some of the NGOs. And Japan in the past a few years back was a very generous donor to North Korea. And this would I think be desirable to see Japan get back in that position. At the same time, I think Japanese officials make a strong case that in order for them to be in a position to provide such humanitarian assistance that the North should demonstrate some sympathy and some concern about Japan's very real humanitarian concerns, including the kidnapping and including the wives. So this is an area where I think there is room for progress. Q: Could you explain a little bit about North Korea's economic condition please? ROTH: I think that North Korea's economic condition is, to say the least, extremely difficult, that we have seen significant evidence that the North is not able to feed itself, as evidenced by the statistics I cited earlier from the World Food Program and NGOs. We've seen serious evidence of malnutrition, and in some cases starvation, and have seen some very high estimates of casualties. In and of itself that tells you something about the North Korean economy. There are further indicators that suggest that the North is gravely short of fuel, that industry is only operating in a small percent of capacity, and that this is an economy that is certainly running far short of anything approaching maximum efficiency. It seems clear that North Korea has fallen way behind its southern counterparts, the ROK, in terms of economic strength, and despite the fact that they once started out from a very different position where the North was viewed as having some significant advantages, particularly in terms of natural resources. So obviously the North is facing extreme difficulties. It needs systemic reform. It needs to certainly reform its agricultural sector. It needs to open up and to get access to outside capital, to outside technology, and basically to join the international economic system, which thus far it has been unwilling to do, with the very small exception of the one free-trade zone. Q: I have a question concerning KEDO and financial assistance for the light-water reactor. I understand the completion of the light-water reactor for KEDO will be postponed by about three years, from 2004 to 2007. During that time we are supposed to provide fuel to North Korea. But has the U.S. any will to bear the costs for heavy fuel oil supply to North Korea? ROTH: The obligation of the United States under the agreed framework is to provide heavy fuel oil until such time as the first light-water reactor is operational. Therefore, without seeing how significant or lengthy a delay there might be in construction -- and we all know that on major infrastructure projects it's not uncommon to have delays -- but the point is that for any period of delay the United States will carry out its obligation to provide heavy fuel oil. Q: Mr. Roth, regarding the debate about theater missile defense and the hopes that your allies in the region will join in this project, what's your answer to the criticisms that this could be destabilizing rather than lead to an increase in stability? ROTH: I think you have to start from a position of common sense, that if there is a serious threat to countries that the leaders of those countries are going to try to defend against it. And so there are two different conceptual approaches to a problem. One is to try to deal with the issue of the proliferation of missiles. Obviously if one can reach a negotiated arrangement -- for example, to terminate North Korean exports of missiles, or production of long-range missiles, that then there would be a considerably diminished need in places like Japan for theater missile defense. And so one issue yet is on the question of the supply of missiles and whether there is a need. The other is that if you can't reduce the number of missiles, how do you proceed with defenses? This is actually not a simple calculation. It has to involve issues of workability of systems, which has yet, at least with respect to high altitude don't exist, and may be years away from readiness. It relates to costs and what your opportunity costs are if you are not spending money on other issues on your defense. It relates to the comprehensiveness of defense and whether it could be overwhelmed by the other side. It's just an enormous number of factors that go into the calculation and defy a simple yes or no answer as to whether it makes sense. Q: Does it follow from that that if North Korea and China were to take a more liberal approach or perhaps on their own deployment of missiles that the United States might revise its plans, scale down its ambitions on that front? ROTH: I think what I'm saying is that for all the countries in the region that one of the driving factors behind any decision -- a decision I should say which has not yet been made on TMD -- is the threat. If the threat changes, then the calculations and the response should change. I don't think it's possibly much more specific than that at this point. Q: A question relating back to the earlier question about KEDO. I don't think it's ever been entirely clear just exactly where the full amount of money to be spent on KEDO was all going to come from, which countries where going to contribute which amounts. Are you concerned that it may be difficult to raise sufficient funds to the points where they're needed to meet the commitments under KEDO? ROTH: I think that provided that the basic assumptions under which KEDO was organized hold. That means that the agreement, the agreed framework, seems to be working, and that North Korea is in compliance and that this has in effect constrained the North's production of fissile material and other nuclear-related equipment. Under those circumstances I believe it will ultimately be possible to raise the funds necessary. Obviously it hasn't been easy to date. But at the same time I think we've seen some very significant contributions -- most notably by Japan and Korea. But there are quite a few members of KEDO, I should point out. And again, if the basic assumptions hold, I am optimistic that the funds will be raised. Q: (Inaudible.) Our president, Kim Dae Jung, was again just -- (inaudible) -- package deal on Korean Peninsula issues. What is your opinion on the package deal of Korean Peninsula issues, proposals like of President Kim Dae Jung? ROTH: I think I've already addressed that question. I'm not sure I have very much to add. On the one hand the United States understands the engagement policy that has been advocated by President Kim, and supports the approach. On the other hand, President Kim fully agrees that there are serious issues which have to be addressed along the way, one of the most important of which is the question of resolving suspicions about the suspect facility. So I think that basically there's really no issue there -- nothing significantly new in this approach. It's one that we support. Q: There is a view that the reason why North Korea is trying to develop a nuclear weapon is not because they want to attack the South, but because they feel uncertain about their (regional survival ?). I'd like to hear your opinion about that. ROTH: I'm always leery about trying to explain North Korean intentions. I don't personally feel extremely qualified to speak for the North Korean government. And I think the more important thing is whether we can reach an agreement that protects our interests, which is to basically shut down the North Korean nuclear weapons program. Q: Do you have any recent information about the U.S. soldiers missing in action during the Korean War? I heard some of your soldiers -- (inaudible) -- do you have any recent information about that? ROTH: I'm afraid I really don't. I think it's well known that there are a large number -- thousands of missing in action left from the Korean War. This is not unusual. We have missing in action from virtually every conflict which the United States has been engaged, and from time to time, not just in Korea but elsewhere, there are reported live sightings of individuals which need to be investigated and tracked down. To date we haven't had any success on this. But I am not aware of any new breakthrough that you might be referring to. Q: With regard to inspection for the underground nuclear facilities, does the U.S. government at least how many times of an inspection would you think would be necessary? ROTH: I don't think that's a question you can answer with a number. I think the more important point is the concept that what we need to make sure is that we have access often enough to make sure that there are no -- that our concerns are resolved and that there is no activity going on there that is in violation of the agreed framework, and that the answer to that question will partially depend on what happens at the site and the level of North Korean activity. But for us the principle is ironclad and we must be allowed to go as often as possible to resolve any concerns that we might have. Q: Related to this last question, what is the concrete content of the inspection? In the next round of consultations, what will be the U.S. proposal to the DPRK? ROTH: Well, I hope you'll understand that in advance of a negotiation I'm hardly going to reveal what the U.S. proposals are. I think that is a confidential matter that we will take up with the North Koreans. Q: The agreed framework seems not to be working properly right now. Are you considering some other framework in the future to put an end to their nuclear development? ROTH: I'm really not willing to accept your characterization that the agreed framework is not working well right now. I think we have seen a track record which has shown the shutting down of the facilities at Yongbyon which were on the verge of important new activities at the time we reached the agreement. We have not seen any operation of the nuclear reactor there. We are not seeing the completion of additional reactors. We are certainly not seeing any reprocessing. The canning of the spent fuel has proceeded reasonably well. So I think there have been an awful lot of achievements. Obviously once the discovery of the suspect facility occurred it became necessary to resolve it, and we are hard at work, as I have explained, in trying to do that, with some hope of success. Assuming that we reach an agreement on this site, I would certainly not want to characterize the agreed framework as not having worked very well. I think it's worked quite well. Q: There was a report in the Washington Times a couple of days ago mentioning U.S. concern over Chinese assistance to North Korea's satellite program -- the ostensible purpose of the August missile launch. Neither China nor North Korea are members of the Missile Technology Control Regime. Does the United States see any way to influence North Korea on missiles outside the sort of package included in the Perry review? ROTH: Well, let me first start with saying that as part of our relations with China we are working with them to try to persuade them to join the MCTR as a matter of global policy. So in that sense we are trying to deal with the global proliferation issue. In terms of the North Korean peace, obviously this is one of the issues that can be addressed by the Perry team. But I point out that we have had negotiations with the North Koreans going back several years on missiles, and that we hope to get those negotiations back on track in the near future. So it's not by any means totally dependent on what happens with the Perry mission. And we believe that this is an issue that needs to be addressed by the North, that there are very serious issues, that the recent missile test was destabilizing. We do not want to see them conduct another test, that it would have consequences, and we believe that this is worth talking about with them, which is why we are pursuing negotiations. Q: I've read reports that there's been increasing ties between Korea and Taiwan -- North Korea and Taiwan -- apparently in response to North Korea's annoyance at the growing ties between Beijing and South Korea. What is the intensity in your view of the relationship between Taiwan and North Korea? Is it growing, and is that a matter of concern to the United States? ROTH: I must confess that I am not really aware of any major relationship between Taiwan and North Korea. But you know from time to time one hears about possible commercial transactions. But this is not a major relationship. Q: And going back to a different theme, the question of food aid to North Korea, it's your balancing act to resolve the question between the enormous humanitarian needs given the famine there and the possibility that aid might be diverted to the military, or might in other ways be propping up the North Korean regime. What's your assessment of how much of the food aid is diverted away from the most needy people in North Korea, and what's your view of that argument that humanitarian aid might not be in the long-term interests of North Korea because it props up the regime? ROTH: Well, first, I should emphasize the enormous importance which we attach to international monitoring. It is not as if the international community simply dumps food on the shores of North Korea and says, Do with it as you wish. In fact, we only distribute food in areas where it can be monitored, whether it's by the World Food Program or by international NGOs. We have worked out -- or I should say the World Food Program has worked out rather elaborate arrangements for this monitoring, and we are quite confident that there has not been significant diversion of the food assistance that has been provided through these channels. I think beyond that, in terms of whether it's a good idea to do it, I think it's important to recognize that in any famine or food shortage situation that the first individuals to suffer are generally the elderly, children and pregnant women. And as far as the United States has been concerned, we have considered it basically a moral matter that there's been a humanitarian policy going back to the Reagan administration not to punish the neediest groups within societies for the deeds of their government or misdeeds of the government, but instead to provide food on a purely humanitarian basis, and that is what we have been doing. Q: Does your government have any plan to have high level talks with North Korea, like ministerial level or head of state level? And do you think there will be those kinds of meetings with -- (inaudible) -- in this century? ROTH: Well, there's not much left to this century. At this point we're talking about less than a year. And, as you know, we have our various negotiating tracks with North Korea, and that's the channel which we have been pursuing progress, whether it's in the four-party talks in Geneva, whether it's been in the negotiations on the suspect facility or the missile talks. They also have interactions with the North on the POW/MIA issue spearheaded by the Pentagon. So we have a lot of channels of communication, and for the time being I think we'll maintain them at the same level. Q: Japan has made it clear that it is going to stop its funding to KEDO if there is another missile, another Taepodong missile shooting. I guess if Japan stops its funding it is going to have serious consequences on the agreed framework. Do you support the Japanese government's position on this front? ROTH: I think I have tried to make clear during the course of the program the enormous importance the United States as well as Japan attaches to there not being another missile test, precisely so we can avoid any of the consequences that you have just described. And that's the basic focus of the policy. In the event of another missile test, obviously the Japanese government will have to make very specific decisions about what is the best policy to pursue, and of course try to persuade the Diet accordingly. Q: North Korea last summer said that they would be willing to let the U.S. inspect their facilities if you paid $3 million for that. Since then have they changed their conditions? ROTH: Again, I don't want to go into the details of negotiations, but let me talk about the principle. The United States has made it absolutely clear -- privately and of course publicly -- that we are not willing to pay compensation in order to see North Korea live up to its obligations under an international agreement. And so the whole issue of compensation is not on the table as far as we are concerned, regardless of the amount. This is simply an unacceptable practice. And in effect it would encourage North Korean bad behavior: if you are willing to pay compensation one time to resolve an issue, then why wouldn't you be willing to pay compensation a second time to resolve an issue? So as far as the United States is concerned this is simply a non-starter. Q: One of the most important issues surrounding North Korea's nuclear program seems to be the possibility of a resumption of reprocessing at Yongbyon. What would be America's policy options if this did occur? ROTH: Well, I think it's very clear that the whole purpose of the agreed framework was to shut down the nuclear program at Yongbyon. If there were a decision by the North Koreans to revive it, it would obviously mean at least the temporary end of the agreed framework, and it would mean we would be smack back in the area of confrontation and crisis that we found ourselves in in 1993 and 1994 before the agreed framework was negotiated. We would be back to a period of high tension and high risk -- an extremely undesirable situation, and one that we keep pointing out to North Korea that if they want a normal relationship with the United States, if they want an economic relationship with the United States, if they want to be accepted into the community of nations, that they simply cannot restart the nuclear weapons program at Yongbyon. Q: I understand there is a fairly vigorous debate in the United States over whether or not the administration's approach to North Korea is too conciliatory, and calls from some quarters for massive retaliation if there is a further missile test, and an argument that there should have been such retaliation in the case of the August test. Have you ever considered this kind of approach? What are its merits and demerits? ROTH: I'm not sure I understand what the phrase "massive retaliation" means. It has kind of a Cold War connotation of military retaliation. I don't think really there's much debate in the United States about that at all. I think what there is is a debate about what are the best tactics in light of the recent developments in North Korea, meaning both the missile tests and the suspect facility -- about the best tactics to pursue to resolve those issues. And the administration has taken the position that we would like to try first the path of negotiations to see if we can resolve concerns about the suspect facility by acquiring access to the site as often as necessary to resolve those concerns, and with respect to the missiles that we would like to see the North Koreans cease first of all the missile tests, but also their production of long-range missiles and missile exports. So our view in the administration is that the best means of preserving the security of the United States in trying to work out these issues through the negotiating path, and rather than necessarily the confrontation path which is highly dangerous and involves allies as well. Obviously if negotiations don't succeed you'd consider other options. Q: Mr. -- (inaudible) -- adviser to the deputy of State, has recently talked about the -- (inaudible) -- emergency plans. If North Korea, as they did so many times in the past, maintains so-called deceiving strategies and delaying tactics, what kind of actions do you think would be included in the U.S. contingency plans? ROTH: Well, again, I don't think it's useful to get down to the details of the U.S. negotiating proposals, or to discuss U.S. contingency plans. Let's instead discuss basic principles. There are serious issues which need to be resolved. I think what Ambassador Sherman is referring to is the fact that one can't simply negotiate forever while work continues on programs that we would consider stabilizing. So that while we are perfectly prepared to engage in serious negotiations, that ultimately the negotiations really do have to come to a conclusion in order to resolve the difficulties. And I think that's the basic point that was being made. Q: As a Korean journalist I feel that Washington's North Korea policy is much focused on solving the nuclear and the missile issues, while the Korean government is largely focused on the comprehensive approach and peaceful reconciliation with North Korea. And some Korean people are worried that Washington is more inclined to military action against North Korea rather than a peaceful settlement. How do you explain this gap, and why do you think such a gap is developing recently between the two countries? ROTH: Well, as I've explained twice on this program already, I don't believe any such gap exists. I think in fact the two countries' positions are really identical, that we both want to see resolution of all the problems on the Korean Peninsula. We both prefer a peaceful process, a process based on negotiation. At the same time, we both recognize that there are immediate short-term problems which simply have to be resolved, including the question of the suspect facility. So I don't think there really is a difference between the two countries. Q: There are some observations in the Korean opinions of society that if North Korean high level officials meet Western modernized countries it will help for the change of North Korea. Does your government have any plan or idea to invite the North Korean high level officials to the United States? ROTH: First, let me say that part of the problem till now has been simply North Korea's unwillingness to send its people overseas, except to a few tightly controlled societies. And so unlike most countries in Asia you have not seen thousands or tens of thousands of North Korean students in other countries -- not just the United States, but in Europe and elsewhere in Asia. So partly this is a question of North Korean policy. In terms of high level visits, I think that essentially is a question more of the overall state of the relationship between the two countries, the pace of progress in the negotiations, and that we have seen some fairly significant visits over the years. And this is a possibility in the future again, depending on the current course of the bilateral relationship. Q: You mentioned that in a short while there will be negotiations also conducted with DPRK. Are you thinking in terms of creating a framework like KEDO in terms of the missiles as well? So could you specify what you mean? ROTH: Well, first of all, the negotiations that are resuming, the ones that have been agreed to, are for access to the suspect facility. We do not yet have an agreement on a resumption of missile negotiations. So just as a point of accuracy. And there of course it's not the question of the creation of an international regime like KEDO; it's the question of North Korea abiding by its commitments under the agreed framework in resolving our suspicions. And this of course will revolve around access to the site as necessary. With respect to missiles, I think we have made pretty clear in previous rounds what our position is in terms of our views of the destabilizing impact both of North Korean exports of missiles to certain countries and to their continued development, testing and production of long-range missile that threaten the region, U.S. forces in the region, our allies and others. And so we seek to get these programs under control. Beyond that I don't think we can discuss the details in the negotiations themselves. Q: How do you view North Korea's economic outlook? Is there a possibility of a breakdown? ROTH: I believe that the North Korean economic outlook is quite grim, when you consider the reports that have been received suggesting that there have been enormous numbers of casualties due to famine and famine-related illness that certainly suggest that the situation is quite severe. But at the same time there is a huge difference between difficulties and breakdown, and this is one of the most difficult issues to possibly predict. And in fact the North Koreans have endured for quite a number of years now -- consecutive years of negative economic growth. So I think we are all leery of making predictions of collapse or breakdown. At the same time none of us wants to minimize the degree of economic hardship that it is currently experiencing. Q: How much influence do you think Beijing and Moscow have on Pyongyang? There have been reports recently suggesting that Kim Jong Il has refused to even meet Chinese delegations visiting his country. Is it possible? And would you like to see Beijing and Moscow exercise more influence over Pyongyang? ROTH: I think it's very difficult to measure directly the extent of any country's influence with Pyongyang, including China's. As I indicated before, this is not a particularly transparent regime. But at the same time, common sense suggests that if any country has influence with North Korea, then it would be China. China is the largest provider of food and fuel. There are very important border crossings. There's a lot of traffic across that border, and it's the only country which maintains actually a significant military-to-military relationship, meaning that there are contacts between the militaries of China and North Korea. You don't see that very much with any other country. And so this suggests that China more than any other country should have contacts, it should have clout in that country if it chooses to exercise it. This is not to say that the relationship is necessarily identical to what it has been in the past. It is not to suggest that the relationship with President Kim Jong Il is the same as it was with the late President Kim Il Sung. One can acknowledge the differences, but still it is hard to imagine that Beijing is totally without influence within North Korea. In the Russian case, while it's a long historical relationship, at the same time it's clear that Russia has a much less significant economic relationship. It is certainly not a major provider of aid the way China has been in recent years. So one would suspect that it's a rather different position for the Russians than for the Chinese. Q: What is your government's condition for the starting of the negotiations for the normalization with North Korea? ROTH: Well, in a sense I think you could say that that has already started, since as you know in the agreed framework itself the United States committed over time to try to move towards this goal of a more normal relationship. And in fact we have spelled out to the North over a series of -- over a period of time -- what we are prepared to do provided they were prepared to do things. So I don't think this is something yet to start. I think the North knows what it needs to do, and now it's a question of whether or not they want to do it. Q: Mr. Secretary, Japan's people have felt insecurity after the Taepodong missile launching, which may be equivalent to (shock ?) of the United States. What is your assessment of the position gap among the United States, South Korea and Japan in terms of the threat of North Korea? ROTH: Well, I think that it is quite clear that both the United States and Japan share very serious concerns about the North Korean missile tests and about the overall direction of the North Korean missile program. After all, both of us have very important security interests at stake, including not only the welfare of the Japanese people and the welfare of U.S. forces in Japan, not to mention the welfare of U.S. forces and citizens in the ROK itself that are also within missile range. So I think that the seriousness of this issue is equally acknowledged by both the United States and Japan. So I don't see a major difference. Q: When and if the situation in the Korean Peninsula is eventually resolved, there will obviously be a big change in the -- (inaudible) -- American forward military presence in the region. Do you expect that Seoul and Tokyo will be prepared to accept American forces at something like the current level in the region, and what kind of presence would you expect and hope to have in that situation? ROTH: Well, the normal practice for the State Department for questions like this is to simply say that it's speculative and then refuse to answer. But let me try to do slightly better than that for you. I think the American view is that the forward deployment of U.S. troops in the region is stabilizing, that it goes way beyond the immediate situation on the Korean Peninsula, and that the withdrawal of U.S. forces in totality from the region might well create a power vacuum that could lead to major shifts in the strategic equation in the region. Precisely for this reason I believe that our allies, including Japan and Korea, would want to see us remain, including with our forward deployment, even in the context of the reunification of the Korean Peninsula, and that they don't see that as the sole raison d'etre for the security relationships with us. Q: As you know, there are many North Korean refugees around the border line with China. And the South Korean government is now working hard so that they can get the status of international refugee through the United Nations and other international societies. Does the U.S. government have any intention to help these efforts? ROTH: I must confess that I wasn't aware of this effort to get this kind of refugee status, so I'll have to look into it. It's not an issue that I worked on. Q: Since late last year North Korea has been making a series of provocative statements against the United States and South Korea and Japan through its official Korean Central News Agency. And so far has there been any sign that North Korea is preparing to take any nuclear action or beefing up its military strength? ROTH: Well, let me say first I've been working on North Korean issues for 19 years, and the issuance of such statements is not by any means anything new. It's actually been a constant throughout this period, and actually it's been a constant since the end of the Korean war. So I think one should be careful not to draw any alarming conclusions from the continuation of this propaganda. And while certainly we'd like to see them stop it, it's not an indicator of imminent North Korean military action. In terms of what we actually see in terms of North Korean preparations, in terms of North Korean exercises, there is nothing to suggest that military action is imminent. MODERATOR: We are getting very close to the end of our time together, Mr. Roth. You've answered a number of questions tonight. We appreciate it. I wonder if I might be able to squeeze out of you one final comment. ROTH: I think if I've detected any one theme in the questions tonight it's this notion that somehow there are serious rifts either between the United States and its South Korean ally or between the United States and its Japanese ally over Korean policy. And I would like to emphasize in closing the fact that we spend an awful lot of time coordinating policy both bilaterally with each of these countries at the highest levels, and we also spend a lot of time working trilaterally -- the three of us together -- to deal with these issues and coordinate policy. And I think in fact the successes outweigh the failures, and that the coordination on policy is really quite high. And I don't believe we have any imminent crisis on these issues with either the ROK or with Japan. MODERATOR: And there's the last word. Unfortunately that's all the time we have for today's discussion. We would like to thank our guest, Assistant Secretary Stanley Roth, as well as our participants in Canberra, Seoul, Tokyo, and all of you for being with us today. In Washington, for Worldnet's "Dialogue," I'm Rick Foucheux. Good night. (end transcript)
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