The White House Briefing Room
November 21, 1998
PRESS BRIEFING BY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SANDY BERGER
5:40 P.M. (L)
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
(Seoul, Republic of Korea)
____________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release November 21, 1998
PRESS BRIEFING BY
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SANDY BERGER
Shilla Hotel
Seoul, Republic of Korea
5:40 P.M. (L)
MR. LOCKHART: Good afternoon, everyone. The President's National
Security Advisor, Samuel Berger, will brief you, give you a read-out on the
President's bilats with President Kim and answer your questions. And then
I'll come up afterwards if you have any other questions. Thanks.
MR. BERGER: Good afternoon. Let me just quickly go through my notes of
the bilat and summarize them for you. President Kim began by talking about
the APEC meeting from which he just returned. He said that he was, of course,
disappointed that the President had not been able to attend but was very
impressed by the contribution of the Vice President to the meeting, and said
that there was a clear consensus at APEC that the American leadership was
indispensable to the solution of the Asian financial crisis.
He expressed disappointment that there was not consensus on the trade
initiative. As you know, there was refusal in the final analysis of the
Japanese to agree with one element of that, but a decision by the ministers to
refer it to the WTO, but he was pleased that the APEC leaders had agreed to
other steps to deal with the crisis.
The President talked in general about his ideas about the international
financial crisis, the need in the short term for both dealing with individual
situations, setting up a
precautionary facility, the work that we've done with Japan in
providing money for Asian businesses and Asian banks that need
work-out assistance.
They talked a bit about Japan and the economic challenges.
President Kim asked President Clinton about the trip to Japan and
the meetings with Obuchi. The President said that they had
talked about the economic challenges laid before Japan and
recounted for President Kim the discussion that they had had
specifically about Korea and KEDO and the North Korea problem.
The discussion then turned towards North Korea. President
Kim laid out what he basically described as the three principles
of the South Koreans towards the North: One, they will not
tolerate provocations that undermine or threaten the security of
South Korea; two, they will not seek to undermine North Korea;
and three, they seek co-existence with North Korea. And he
described his conversations with President Jiang recently and the
convergence between South Korea and China on handling of North
Korea.
The President said he strongly supported the policy of
President Kim -- the engagement policy -- and the challenge was
to continue that policy in the face of actions by the North that
are provocative. He told President Kim, as he indicated at the
press conference, that we have asked former Secretary Perry to be
a special advisor to the administration in dealing with North
Korea, helping us assess our North Korea policy.
Talked about the agreed framework. The President said that
he believed that we had gotten a good deal out of the agreed
framework. Again, as he said in the press conference, that
without the agreed framework, North Korea would have spent the
last several years producing a good deal more plutonium that
would have been available for nuclear weapons than without it,
but that now we needed to deal with the underground site in the
North, the suspect site, where there are suspicions about its
intended use but not conclusive evidence, a view that was shared
by President Kim.
Also talked about the North Korean missile program and the
importance of containing that missile program, which really now
upsets the balance not only in the Korean Peninsula but in the
region, as the Japanese look with apprehension at the launching
of missiles over its head. And clearly indicated, as we have in
our conversations with the Japanese, that these matters are
matters that need to be dealt with very closely between the South
Koreans -- so very disconcerting to watch you all watch
television -- can you just fill me in from time to time what's
going on? I mean, is it a soap opera?
Q It's a fashion show.
MR. BERGER: A fashion show, oh -- I just wanted to know
what I was competing against, that's all. I mean, your eyes are
riveted, particularly the male eyes. (Laughter). I think I've
just undermined my own briefing here, but anyhow.
President Kim said that he agreed with the President 100
percent on what he had said about the North, the importance of
dealing seriously with our concerns about whether the agreed
framework is in fact being complied with, that we must require
access; if it is a nuclear-related site, we should call for it to
be shut down. That he had been briefed on Ambassador Kartman's
recent discussions with the North Koreans in Pyongyang, and while
those discussions did not produce a resolution they also leave
room for further discussions.
President Kim then talked about the positive -- he said,
would you like my assessment of North Korea and gave kind of the
same rack-up that he gave in the press conference, the positive
steps being -- the negative steps being the infiltration of the
Northern submarines into South Korea's waters, the suspected
underground site, the missile launching. Those are all sources
of considerable concern.
At the same time, conflicting signals, the tourism project
that he referred to with President of Hyundai and the North
Koreans now taking South Korean's up to see some natural sites in
North Korea; the fact that Kim Jung-il had specifically been
engaged in the development of that project; the fact that there
were journalists now and more cultural and political leaders who
were going to the North, he saw that as a slight change; the
talks that are going on with the United States, both on missiles
and on the nuclear program; and the changes in the DPRK
constitution, which provide for limited private property and
market economy; and the expanded number of North Koreans that are
now permitted to go abroad for training.
And he basically described this as kind of a mixed picture
that he sees in the north, but that his objective is to promote
security and cooperation at the same time, essentially to offer
the North the kind of choice that the President I thought put
quite starkly at the end of the press conference, either a choice
of trying to -- a fruitless decision to try to dominate the
situation militarily or a choice to try to reach accommodation
with President Kim, who is clearly reaching out to the North
should they be prepared for some kind of reconciliation.
On the bilateral relationship, they both agreed it was in
strong condition, which after six years I've never been in a
bilateral in which the leaders agreed it was in a weak condition.
The President urged completion of the cost-sharing agreement with
the South on the cost of our forces. The strains on the South
Korean economy have caused a delay in completing the cost-sharing
arrangement, renewing it.
And then the conversation went to the economic area. The
President said that he had been very impressed by the economic
recovery program that had been persistently pursued by President
Kim. Don't forget, President Kim arrives in office and finds
that the roof has fallen in before he has had a chance to really
unpack his crates. The President said he hopes that we have been
helpful through the various things that we have done in the IMF,
our bilateral assistance, OPIC, Ex-Im.
They talked about the one remaining -- or perhaps the most
serious remaining problem in the South Korean economy, and that
is restructuring the so-called chaebols, the large conglomerates,
particularly the five large conglomerates. Now, in order to
understand the magnitude of that problem, you have to understand
that 40 percent of the Korean economy are these five companies.
So the restructuring of these five companies and streamlining
them and the economic efficiency and world competitiveness of
these companies is very important to the economic recovery. And
this is an area where I think President Kim agreed they have made
the least progress.
There was some discussion of trade issues -- beef,
pharmaceuticals, steel, the investment treaty. On all of those
issues, President Kim indicated that they would try to be
forthcoming. We then went into an expanded bilateral, which
basically, since the limited bilateral had covered everything,
was somewhat truncated. But there was mainly a discussion of the
economic situation and the desire of the South Koreans now to
begin to attract again foreign investment. We're trying to
negotiate a bilateral investment treaty with the South Koreans.
There was some discussion of Y2K, something that we've been
working on with the South Koreans, and they've now formed a
working level public-private committee. And it's interesting,
this is an issue that really -- totally obscure issue that no one
had even heard about or understood a year ago, which is now
increasingly on the bilateral agenda between the United States
and the countries that we deal with.
Finally, they talked about a Forum on Democracy that was
announced at the press conference. This is a joint project that
will be undertaken between the United States and Korea to start
something which will basically ultimately evolve, hopefully, into
something like our National Endowment for Democracy.
Talked about Burma, where President Kim has been a stalwart
supporter of Aung San Suu Kyi, and a very outspoken critic of the
government; and a bit of a conversation about climate change,
where Korea has signed the Kyoto Protocol, and although it has
not yet agreed to mandatory targets, has agreed to voluntary
targets.
So that's basically not as attractive as the show, but
that's it.
Q Don't sell yourself short.
MR. BERGER: Okay, thank you.
Q Sandy, President Kim used the words -- and you echoed
them today -- will not tolerate these provocations. President
Clinton didn't use those terms. I'm wondering what it means from
the United States' point of view, how far you go in terms of will
or will not tolerate obfuscation on this inspection issue. Would
the United States, for example, consider taking this issue to the
U.N. Security Council seeking some sort of resolution demanding
inspections?
MR. BERGER: These are very serious matters, and I think we
consider them very serious. Let me take first the nuclear issue,
and then the missile issue.
In the nuclear area, we reached an agreement with the North
Koreans in 1994, after a long negotiation and quite a
confrontational period in which we were about to go to the U.N.,
as you will recall, for sanctions against the North, by which the
North Koreans agreed to freeze and ultimately dismantle its
nuclear graphite reactors in Yongbyon, a five megawatt reactor
and a 50 megawatt reactor that it was also constructing, plus a
reprocessing plant. Essentially, this was, from a nuclear
weapons point of view, an engine for nuclear material -- a
factory for nuclear material -- even though it had, presumably,
electrical generating capacity.
Now, that agreement has been complied with. And we know
that because there are IAEA inspectors who are at the site and
who are physically monitoring the site. The five megawatt
reactors have been closed down; the reprocessing plant is under
seal; the spent fuel rods have been canned; the construction has
stopped on the 50 megawatt reactor. So, by and large, that's
been a good thing, because were that not stopped, for the last
three years they would have been continuing to generate these
fuel rods, reprocessing them, presumably creating the fuel that
goes into nuclear weapons.
Now, we have had information more recently on, in particular
one site in the North, the purpose of which is not absolutely
clear, but raises questions, raises serious questions. Serious
enough that we believe that we need to have the opportunity to
inspect the site. And that is the request that we have made to
the North. We need to determine in the first instance whether it
is inconsistent with the agreed framework in which the North
agree that they will not build other nuclear graphite reactors or
reprocessing facilities.
If this turned out to be a facility inconsistent with the
agreed framework, obviously that would be a serious matter and we
would demand the site be closed, but it would call into question
obviously the viability of the agreed framework. But I think
it's premature to reach that conclusion. We need to press
forward with the North Koreans to gain access to the site.
Q Sandy, there has been a published report that plutonium
has been found in the soil and water around these sites in Korea.
Can you confirm that?
MR. BERGER: As far as I know, the report that you're
referring to is a South Korean -- is based upon a South Korean
press report. The South Korean government has said that is an
incorrect report. Beyond that, these are obviously intelligence
matters, and I can't comment.
Q I have a question on the same subject. If that suspect
site is a hole in the ground, as the President just described it,
how would going to inspect it help resolve the question of what
its purpose is -- if there is nothing there?
MR. BERGER: Well, it's a complex hole in the ground -- put
it that way. (Laughter.) It is -- I don't want to describe the
site, but we believe physical inspection of the site would help
us ascertain its purpose, and presumably not only once, but over
a period of time. So let me leave it at that.
Q When the subject is the missile test, the
administration says -- correct me -- that's not covered by the
agreed framework. When it's the challenge inspections to see the
site, that's not covered by the framework.
MR. BERGER: The fact is we don't know what the -- we don't
have conclusive evidence with respect to the intended purpose of
the site. If the intended purpose of the site were to build a
graphite reactor or to build a reprocessing plant, it would be
inconsistent with the agreed framework.
Q I meant the inspection. But the question is, why do
you point to the agreed framework as a centerpiece of all policy
if it doesn't cover these problems -- these additional problems
with North Korea?
MR. BERGER: I'm not sure that I used the term "centerpiece"
of all policy. I mean, let's back up here. North Korea is not a
benign government. We have lots of problems with North Korea.
They have had a nuclear weapons program that we have been
concerned about, that we have controlled at least to some extent.
They have a missile program both with respect to its own
development and with respect to exports, which is destabilizing
-- destabilizing in Asia, destabilizing to the countries to whom
it is selling technology. So we have many problems with North
Korea, and we have to deal with North Korea I think on a
realistic basis.
What President Kim has said, and I think what President
Clinton was agreeing with, is that North Korea now is at a
crossroads. On the one hand, it can seize the opportunity
afforded by the fact that the President of South Korea, President
Kim, is extending a hand to North Korea and is probably more
inclined to engagement and reconciliation than any President in
South Korea's history. It can choose that path, rejoin the
international community, perhaps build an agricultural economy
that is not based on starvation. This is an economy that -- an
agricultural economy that fails year after year. We're the
second largest food donor to North Korea. That's one path. Or
it can continue to be a totally isolated, self-contained entity
which obviously is failing economically and seeks to preserve its
place in the world only through military means.
I think the President was saying, given our security
relationship with South Korea, the latter course is not a
successful course for North Korea -- because we will come to
South Korea's defense. If North Korea believes that it can ever
gain military dominance or somehow prevail against South Korea,
it is ignoring a bilateral security treaty that South Korea has
with North Korea.
So I think the President was saying, here is another option.
It's an option that is embodied in that tourist ship going up the
coast; it's an option of re-engaging with the world; it's an
option of re-engaging with the South; it's an option that has a
lot more promise than the other one.
Q Can you explain why President Clinton supports
President Kim's sunshine policy of engagement when the White
House does not support it for other hostile governments such as
Iraq, or even to a lesser extent, Cuba? And secondly, could you
also explain what is the special relationship between President
Clinton and President Kim that gives President Kim's engagement
policy extra cachet? People have talked about a special trust
that Clinton has.
MR. BERGER: I don't think it's a question of cachet; I
think it's a question of strategic judgment. I mean, President
Kim has made a strategic judgment that he is going to pursue an
engagement policy, but it's an engagement policy undergirded by
strength. It's a policy that basically says, we seek
reconciliation with the North, but we are also not going to
tolerate provocations from the North, and we're also obviously
going to remain strong; we're also obviously going to sustain our
security relationship with the United States. It's a very
sensible policy.
To try to draw comparisons between this and Iraq or Cuba I
think is very difficult. In terms of why does President Kim have
moral authority or -- I'm rephrasing your questions, obviously --
President Kim is a remarkable man. I think we're living in a
time when you look around the world and you look at Nelson
Mandela and Vaclav Havel and Kim Dae-Jung, three men who spent
most of their lives fighting their governments, went to prison
over the authoritarian policies of the government, were brutally
punished for the stands they took, and now these are three men
who are, in fact, the Presidents of their respective countries.
I think that's a remarkable set of stories.
And Kim Dae-Jung is someone who I think deserves respect for
two reasons: one is because of what he stands for, and the
second is because he has been able to make a transition from
being a leader of a movement to a leader of a government under
the most adverse circumstances. I mean, we all know that one of
the hardest transitions for people to make is being leaders of
opposition movements suddenly to be thrust into power. History
is filled with failed episodes -- with people in that situation
that have failed.
Kim Dae-Jung not only has led a life -- a principled life
that has been instrumental in his country obtaining of democracy,
he has then come into the government, ironically, at the time
when the economy collapsed. I'm sure that when he was sitting in
jail he did not think that he was going to spend his first two
years, if he ever got to be in power, trying to rebuild a
collapsed economy. But he's done that. He's taken on some very
hard decisions. And Korea, as with Thailand, as with other
countries, is beginning now to see the benefits of the very tough
decisions that he made. So I think he deserves a lot of respect
for both reasons.
Q Sandy, did the issue of the convicted spy Robert Kim in
the United States come up at all during the bilateral meeting?
MR. BERGER: It did not come up.
Q Sandy, both you and the President have outlined some of
the sticks in the U.S. and the South Korean policy toward the
North, but can you outline some of the carrots that would be
available if North Korea follows the course that you're talking
about?
MR. BERGER: We have a wide range of sanctions against the
North Koreans, the easing of which, I suppose, become carrots.
But those require, obviously -- some of those relate to their
support of terrorism, some of them relate to their human rights
record. In some cases, these derive from particular elements of
the North Korean regime. But I think, clearly, if North Korea
chose a different path -- chose a path of reconciliation with the
South, chose to deal with its missile development program and
export program in a responsible way, chose to forgo clearly and
unequivocally a nuclear weapons program, obviously that would
make it possible for us to improve our relationship with North
Korea.
Q Sandy, North Korea's record for the last four years is
not to choose A or B, but to have a little bit -- sort of salami
tactics of giving a little bit but not as much as you want. What
makes you think that they're going to make this choice?
MR. BERGER: I think there is -- I suppose saying a fork in
the road is a bit, perhaps, too dramatic. But there are some
basic paths here that they can choose. They can choose a path,
essentially, of reconciliation or a path of confrontation. At
the time that they decided to enter into the agreed framework and
give up the programs at Yongbyon, that was obviously a step
towards accommodation with the rest of the world.
But again, this is a very impenetrable government, a very
impenetrable leadership. I think we know less about what really
takes place in Pyongyang than almost any other capital in the
world.
Q What happens next, in terms of our policy to North
Korea? President Clinton has made this kind of public comments
on it, but do we have a diplomatic initiative that's going there?
How do you get off the dime when it comes to North Korea?
MR. BERGER: There are at least three venues here, three
avenues to pursue. Number one are the four-party talks which
President Clinton and President Kim Young Sam launched about
three years ago, which include China, North Korea, South Korea,
and us. We have met several times. At this last meeting there
has been a modest agreement to set up subcommittees to deal with
various issues involved with improvement in relations,
confidence-building measures. So that's one path we want to
pursue.
Second, we've had now, I believe, two rounds of discussions
with the North Koreans with respect to this suspect site.
Ambassador Kartman just completed his last discussions. They
were not -- certainly were not conclusive in terms of progress,
but they will lead to further discussions.
And, finally, there are the missile talks with North Korea
in which we've raised a range of issues relating to their missile
programs.
Q Will the U.S. ever be willing to give millions of
dollars to the North Koreans to allow for the inspection of the
hole in the ground?
MR. BERGER: No, I think we certainly would not pay for the
right to inspect these sites.
Q Sandy, North Korean -- to allow inspections of these
sites. How are you going to selling the agreed framework to
Congress?
MR. BERGER: Well, let me not jump ahead. We've insisted
upon access. We hope and expect the North Koreans to give us
access. And I'm not going to speculate beyond that.
Q Sandy, can you talk a little bit about the difference
in the atmosphere now versus when President Kim was in the United
States this summer? At that point there was lots of talk about
the Korean President pressing the United States to lift
sanctions. Now the talk seems a lot less advanced, or a lot less
about progress and more about pushing back.
MR. BERGER: Well, there was, I think, too much made when he
was in Washington of him pressing us to lift sanctions. But
putting that aside, there was no disagreement whatsoever between
President Clinton and President Kim with respect to the two
elements, essentially, of the policy that President Kim is
pursuing, that we support -- that is consistent with our policy
with respect to North Korea.
Q You described it as a complex, suspicious hole in the
ground in North Korea. What is it about this hole that makes it
suspicious? What is it about this hole that makes it complex?
MR. BERGER: Well, those again are intelligence matters
which I'm not going to get into.
Q Can you give us any guidance as to what it is that
raises your antenna about this stuff?
MR. BERGER: No, I will simply say that there is information
that we have that raised questions that we believe require
answers.
Q Sandy, how much time did the two Presidents spend
relatively on economic issues and on the security -- North Korea
matter?
MR. BERGER: I would say a little more than half the time on
security issues, the rest of the time on economic -- maybe 60/40
security/economics.
.............
Q Sandy, did the North Koreans really just try a blunt
shakedown with relation to this inspection, or was there
something more complicated than that? It almost boggles the mind
that a country would say, give us X million dollars to inspect
this site. Was there some other, more complex system they wanted
to set up, or was it just a blunt shakedown?
MR. BERGER: Can I say "yes"? I'm looking at Ken here to
see whether I start a war if I say "yes." I would not choose
that phrase. (Laughter.) But I don't think there was much more
to it than that.
Q The reported figure of $300 million that North Korea
has demanded coincidentally is similar to the reported figure
that North Korea had been demanding to stop its missile export
program. Is there any relationship --
MR. BERGER: Let me say, having now been engaged for almost
six years in negotiations with the North Koreans, this is not
untypical of North Korean negotiating tactics, but it is not --
there is nothing much more to it than, you know, we'll let you
see the site if you give us $300 million.
Q Sandy, the basic choice that the administration has
presented to North Korea, either gradual steps towards engagement
or continued isolation and the United States pursuing a
containment policy -- that basic choice has been laid out for at
least four years, since '94, right? Wouldn't we know if the
experiment was working?
MR. BERGER: Look what President Kim said. Basically he
said there is a mixed picture here. Again, this is a very
complicated regime with a very complicated leadership picture,
and you see conflicting signals. On the one hand, you see North
allowing South Koreans to travel up to visit North Korea. You
see a greater degree of cultural exchanges. You see the other
things that President King indicated.
On the other hand, recently, in particular, since the launch
of the Taepodong missile and with questions that have been raised
about this site, you see the other side as well. I don't think
you're going to see for some time perhaps a clear picture of
which way North Korea goes.
But ultimately -- listen, ultimately North Korea is a
society, is a country in trouble, a country in internal --
certainly with serious internal problems -- is a country that
can't feed itself, is a country that is isolated from the world.
It is a country whose economy is in miserable shape. It's a
country where tens of thousands of people are hungry, if not
starving, depending on what reports you listen to.
And it's also a country that has roughly a million forces
posed along the DMZ 17 miles from where we're sitting, and that
makes it rather dangerous. And we have to bear that in mind.
We have 37,000 troops in this country. We have a security
relationship with this country. I think this is a problem that
we have to deal with in a very steadfast, deliberate, steady,
firm way.
Q I'm confused by your reticence about talking about the
site that you call suspect. Large elements of your own
intelligence community say that it's not suspect, but that it is
in fact intended to help produce nuclear weapons. The people who
have seen some of this evidence on the Hill -- not just
Republicans -- basically agree with that assessment.
The North knows, itself, what it is doing. Why shouldn't we
conclude that your reluctance to talk about it is essentially
intended to cover up your own embarrassment at what's happening?
MR. BERGER: The fact that there is not conclusive evidence
here is a judgment not only that I have made but is a judgment
that the intelligence community would also concur in.
Q Why can't you share a little bit of this discussion
with us?
MR. BERGER: Because these involve sources and methods, in
terms of how we know what we know. And there's no particular
advantage -- I'm sorry, with all due respect -- to sharing that
information with you.
That's not you, personally. (Laughter.). You I would share
it with, but nobody else.
END 6:13 P.M. (L)
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