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Dubious North Korean-U.S. Missile Negotiations

Editorial: Seoul HANGUK ILBO 30 Mar 96

It is very noteworthy that the United States, which has long remained silent or denied the fact, officially confirmed for the first time that it has been conducting missile negotiations with North Korea. Winston Lord, U.S. assistant secretary of state, said the missile negotiations are a precondition for improving relations based on the Geneva nuclear agreement, and that the United States has been closely discussing the matter with the ROK. However, we are curious to know which areas-- development, production, deployment, or export of missiles-- and which conditions the United States have been negotiating.

As far as missiles are concerned, North Korea can be described as an unheralded power. Prompted by PRC development of the DF61 ballistic missile in the 1970's, North Korea received technological assistance from the PRC and Egypt; it developed the 320 km-range Scud-D missile in the mid 1980's, which was based on the Soviet-made Scud-B missiles, and exported some to Iran. With the further development of the Scud-D, North Korea succeeded in developing the so-called Nodong-1 in 1991 and 1992. The Nodong-1 has a range of 1,000-1,300 km, which could reach Khabarovsk, Beijing, and Tokyo, not to mention the Korean peninsula. It has been learned that North Korea is developing the Nodong-2 (Scud-E) with a range of 1,500-2,000 km, further improving the Nodong-1, as well as the Taepodong missile with a range of 2,000-2,500 km.

Assistant Secretary Lord added that under this grave missile situation, the United States is negotiating with North Korea on ways to stop missile exports to such countries as Iran and Syria. However, since the entire Korean peninsula will soon be within the range of North Korean missiles, we are extremely unsatisfied with the U.S. attitude of focusing only on the export of North Korean missiles rather than on restraining their development. Even more alarming is the fact that in return for stopping missile exports, North Korea is demanding the signing of a peace agreement with the United States to replace the Armistice Agreement and the establishment of a joint military committee replacing the Military Armistice Commission [MAC].

Signing a peace agreement and disbanding the MAC are matters directly connected with stability on the Korean peninsula; needless to say, these matters should not be bargained away for U.S. international interests and convenience.

As far as missiles are concerned, the ROK is in an extremely disadvantageous position. The development of missiles, which we pushed ahead with during the Third and Fourth Republics, was scrapped by the New Military Group in 1980 upon U.S. request, without any objection being made; in 1990, the Sixth Republic committed a foolish mistake of signing an agreement with the United States restricting the development of surface-to-surface missiles to a range of 180 km. Being in the position of being threatened by missiles as well as nuclear bombs, the ROK voluntarily accepted the position of onlooker to the North Korean monopoly of missiles and to North Korean-U.S. bargaining.

The government should collect its mind. In order not to repeat the "alienation" we suffered in the second round of the Geneva nuclear negotiations, we should make it clear to the United States that the missile negotiations with North Korea should concentrate on prohibiting development, and that the peace negotiations should not be part of the bargaining. At the same time, the government should hasten to scrap the agreement that restricts the development of missiles to a range of 180 km.

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