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Tracking Number:  462381

Title:  "A/S Lord 10/12 Press Conference in Korea." Comments by Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord regarding North-South dialogue and permanent peace on the peninsula. (961017)

Date:  19961017

Text:
TRANSCRIPT: A/S LORD 10/12 PRESS CONFERENCE IN KOREA (North-South dialogue key to peace on Korean peninsula) (4570)

Seoul -- Permanent peace on the Korean peninsula depends upon improved dialogue between the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of Korea (ROK), according to Winston Lord, assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs.

""There will be no peace on this peninsula of a permanent basis until there is North-South dialogue and negotiation. That remains a bedrock principle," Lord said at an October 12 press conference in Seoul.

Lord presented a five-point U.S.-ROK joint press statement that expressed concern over the recent North Korean incursion and threats of retaliation against South Korea, affirmed the strength of the alliance between the United States and the ROK, and reemphasized the need for improved dialogue between North and South Korea.

"We do not wish to isolate North Korea," Lord said. "Indeed, our joint efforts have been directed at getting North Korea to talk to the South, opening up to the outside world, becoming a responsible member of the world community."

One possible forum for dialogue would be the Four-Party Meeting proposed by President Clinton and South Korean President Kim in April, Lord said. The proposal would involve North Korea, South Korea, the United States and China in talks to replace the Armistice Agreement of 1953 with a permanent peace treaty for the Korean Peninsula.

Following is the official transcript of the news conference:

(begin official transcript)

Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord Press Conference Seoul, Korea October 12, 1996

MODERATOR: Good morning, ladies and gentleman, my name is Patrick Linehan, I am the American Embassy Press Officer. We have Assistant Secretary Winston Lord with us here this morning for an on the record press conference. Seated at the table are Assistant Secretary Lord, Deputy Chief of Mission at the Embassy in Seoul, Mr. Christenson, and the embassy translator, Miss Bae Yu Mi. The Secretary will make a short statement and then he will take your questions. When asking questions, please identify yourself and your organization. Thank you.

LORD: Good morning. It's nice to meet with all of you. You notice I'm wearing a suit and tie. I've put aside my sweater and dressed up in celebration of the very successful discussions I've had with the South Korean Government. I would like to begin by thanking the South Korean officials with whom I've met for their customary cordial hospitality, not to mention the importance of their perceptions which I came to get.

Many of you may be familiar with my schedule but let me quickly review what I've done in a very intensive and a very productive visit. I met with Vice Minister Song of the Foreign Ministry and then with the Foreign Minister yesterday. I also met with members of our Embassy staff and our outstanding Ambassador (James) Laney and DCM Mr. Christenson and his colleagues. I met with the Deputy Prime Minister for Unification, Mr. Kwon, the National Security Advisor, Mr. Yoo. I then had a working dinner with Vice Minister Song and his colleagues. This morning I met with a wide range of members of the National Assembly from various major parties, and I met again with Foreign Minister Gong for a concluding discussion. We have agreed on a joint press statement that I believe our South Korean colleagues will be issuing about now. We have copies for all of you, but let me read through it to set the context for your questions.

1. Both the Republic of Korea and the United States, after holding consultations during Assistant Secretary of State Winston Lord's visit to Korea, expressed deep concern over the recent North Korean incursion and its threats of retaliation against the Republic of Korea. Both sides reconfirmed the importance of maintaining the strength of the alliance and its joint defense readiness.

2. The U.S. side expressed deep condolences for the bereaved families of the Republic of Korea soldiers and civilians who have been killed during the course of this incident, reaffirmed the steadfastness of its security commitment to the Republic of Korea, and agreed to continue the closest possible policy coordination between Seoul and Washington. The ROK side highly appreciated the U.S. position.

3. Both sides agreed to pursue ongoing action in the U.N. Security Council against the North's violation of the Armistice Agreement and to remain vigilant against any further provocation from the North.

4. The two sides shared the view that permanent peace on the Korean peninsula is the responsibility of the Korean people. In this regard, they agreed to continue urging the North to resume the inter-Korean dialogue, pursue the Agreed Framework, and to accept the Four-Party Meeting jointly proposed by two Presidents of the Republic of Korea and the United States.

5. The United States and the Republic of Korea affirm the steadfastness of our alliance and refute reports in the media of policy differences between us.

Q: I have three basic questions. In this statement number five you do say that there are no policy differences between the U.S. and Korea, but I'm wondering if there is a perception difference. Obviously, President Kim Young Sam has very often lately mentioned the word "war," whether it is a possibility or the threat it is not really clear, but he has been repeatedly using the word "war," and that's very, very serious vocabulary to use at this point.

So the question is, do you also, does the U.S. also see that there is a possibility of escalation of tensions leading to war. Is this one source of perception differences? And also, the Korean reports and the President himself have been declaring that the South Korean government in the future will be reinforcing the North Korean policies to be standing more on the side of the hard line posture. Obviously, from the Korean government point of view, it seems like the U.S. has been taking up on the more softer side of the posture. Is there any pressure on the U.S. to change the so-called posture of softness toward some hardening of the posture for any reason that we don't know? And thirdly, is this situation right now, the rising tensions and exchanges of propaganda warfare, is this situation going to further isolate North Korea, and is this is what is desirable at this point from the two governments' point of view. The U.S. is going to support South Korea to declare some resolution in the UN, and there is a report in a South Korean paper saying that the U.S. is willing to take up a more firm position in this resolution, whereas China is sort of declining to stand on firmer but more flexible position in this resolution. That's all, thank you.

LORD: Let me take each of your questions in turn and pause so that our hard-working translator can keep up with us. First, there is no difference in perception, just as there is no difference in policy, between our two governments. I came here to reaffirm that, to reconfirm it in our talks, and to try very vigorously to make that clear to both our publics and both our media, because there have been no rifts in our alliance, there have been no basic tensions, and as our statement said today jointly, we want to make clear to everyone that media reports to the contrary are highly exaggerated, misleading, and can only tempt the North to try to drive a wedge between us. This will never happen. So it is not only important to have a unity of approach, which we do have, but that this be apparent to all our audiences, because only when North Korea understands our solidarity is it apt to change its attitude, and we have to get beyond this crisis and to a more positive situation.

As far as your specific question, we agree with the South Korean government that this is a serious situation, it does carry some risks and danger, but the best way to make sure it does not escalate is to maintain constant vigilance and readiness, which we do, which we will continue to do, as we are doing in the recently announced Foal Eagle exercise.

This leads me to your second question about alleged U.S. softness versus firmness by the ROK. There has been no pressure on me or on our government to be less soft because we haven't been soft. This is a fallacy. Our policy has been firm, it has been consistent with the Republic of Korea. The media misleading commentaries about alleged U.S. softness and ROK hardness or differences between us are not only inaccurate, but they make a tense situation more dangerous by potentially misleading North Korea. Thus, far from pressuring us, Korean officials have been applauding a series of U.S. statements and actions which demonstrate our firmness. As our joint press statement says, the ROK side highly appreciated the U.S. position. And our record is very clear. I will not go into every detail for purposes of saving time, but let me just reveal to you the highlights of what we have been doing in recent weeks.

As a result of the submarine incident, we immediately canceled a trip by our congressman to North Korea with his full agreement, we have engaged in vigorous diplomatic and public affairs statements to make clear that the North Korean actions were unacceptable and to warn against further escalation. The Secretary of State and our press spokesman have issued several statements concerning North Korea's actions and denouncing them. The President cited North Korea's actions in his UN speech. We have, through a variety of channels and various capitals, directly and indirectly, conveyed to the North Koreans our firm attitude and our solidarity with the South. We have just successfully reached agreement in New York with all the countries of the UN Security Council on a presidential statement which expresses serious concern over North Korean actions. We have issued strong statements from our command here. General Tilelli gave a very firm speech. We are carrying out the Foal Eagle exercise. We have rejected any attempts by North Korea to link the American who they now hold and who they charge in a ludicrous assertion as being a spy -- and anyway, we reject any linkage to any other subject -- and we urge his immediate release and humanitarian treatment. We have stressed the principle of North-South contact. And we have helped the South Korean government in other ways, both through statements and in actions. So the record is clear, and I was here to reaffirm this posture and, I must say, our Korean hosts welcomed very strongly, as I've suggested, all that we have done, contrary to allegations in the media.

Finally, with respect to your last question, we do not wish to isolate North Korea, South Korea does not wish to isolate North Korea. Indeed, our joint efforts have been directed at getting North Korea to talk to the South, opening up to the outside world, becoming a responsible member of the world community. And thus, if there is any isolation, if there is any danger of that, it is caused by North Korean actions and rhetoric. And so we call upon North Korea to change course, to change its attitude. It's not too late to reengage with the outside world. It is time for them to talk to South Korea.

The UN resolution was worked out with the cooperation of many countries, you mentioned China. It is true, and China would be the first to acknowledge, that they have sought to make the resolution somewhat more moderate, but they have been helpful. They just wish to preserve, obviously, their influence in Pyongyang, and they believe a more moderate resolution might be more effective. But it's still a firm resolution, it's got unanimous support, we think it will be effective.

Finally, to underline the fact that we do not seek North Korea's isolation, I would point you to the joint statement in which we said that there should be inter-Korean dialogue, that we've agreed to pursue the Agreed Framework, and that we urge the North Koreans to accept the four-party meeting jointly proposed by our two presidents. So that remains our policy, we hope we can return to that course, but it is up to North Korea to make it possible for us to do so. From now on I'll keep both the questions and answers much shorter, so you all have a chance.

Q: President Kim last week warned North Korea of the danger of all out war if North Korea continued to provoke South Korea. In light of your statement that there are no policy differences between Seoul and Washington, does the U.S. endorse that view, and also you mentioned that you did not want to do anything that would tempt the North to drive a wedge between us. Do you think the arrest of Robert Kim was a mistake because it sent a wrong signal to North Korea because it created the impression that there was a rift in the alliance?

LORD: First let me say on the first question that we have great empathy for the South Korean people and government and their reaction to recent events. We expressed our condolences and we understand the emotions and we understand the need to maintain vigilance. President Kim is seeking to make sure that there is no miscalculation by the North and the best way to assure peace and to prevent escalation is to make sure there is no miscalculation. We share that objective. It is a serious situation. I think we are in a very strong position defensively. We call upon North Korea to change its attitude. So I don't wish to inflate the present situation, but we share a sense of concern and seriousness. The North Korean rhetoric and threats are very serious. But as Secretary Perry just said in the last twenty-four hours, we haven't detected any particularly unusual North Korean troop movements. But nevertheless, we have to continue to keep great vigilance, and of course if there were to be any action, we would dearly hope not and hope to head that off, we and our South Korean allies would consult very closely on the response.

The Robert Kim case was not on my agenda. I did not raise it during our consultations. Any government must pursue investigations of this sort as we did. The timing was strictly up to the FBI and so was totally coincidental. We have made it very clear on several occasions that although this is a disturbing development, we will not let it effect the solidarity of our alliance and we will keep it in perspective so that it will not send any wrong signals to North Korea. I have listed all the actions we've taken together to make clear our coordination and solidarity.

Q: After their meetings with you, Mr. Lord, the South Korean government announced that after the search effort is over, they will ask for a satisfactory measure on the part of North Korea. The South Korean explanation was that the American side also agreed to this position taken up by South Korea. The satisfactory measure that the South Korean government is thinking about asking North Korea, of course, means that only if there is a satisfactory measure fulfilled by North Korea will there be a normalization of the projects such as the light water reactor. Would you make it clear for us here if such a request for a satisfactory measure actually is a prerequisite for the resumption of the light water reactor project and even the Four-Party talks?

LORD: Well, clearly given what has been happening in recent weeks, it is up to the North Koreans to indicate a change in attitude through some satisfactory measures or gestures, and we are working very closely with our South Korean allies to determine what we think is appropriate. Because we need this both to make sure that they have a more constructive attitude in the North and, very frankly, to muster the domestic support in both our countries for resuming a more positive track.

As for continuing on the Agreed Framework, KEDO, and so on, our very similar views are reflected, again, in our Joint Statement in which in addition to vigilance and a cooling off period we both agreed that its important for the North to resume inter-Korean dialogue, pursue the Agreed Framework, and accept the Four-Party meeting proposal set forth by our two presidents. So of course in the current climate it cannot be business as usual. And obviously the current climate, until changed, will affect the pace of various activities, but at the same time the South Korean government and we recognize, for example, that the nuclear freeze is clearly in our national interest, that the Agreed Framework is clearly in our national interest. Although the North-South dialogue part of it has not been implemented, and must be implemented. We both recognize that keeping the Four-Party proposal on the table is in our national interests.

So what we hope for is indications from the North Koreans that they are willing to pursue these more positive tracks. Put another way, we want to preserve these long-term assets, even as the current climate require us both to have vigilance and a pause in the pace of our activities and some requirement for North Korea to make gestures. But we have both said that we don't wish to lose the freeze or lose the Framework. And I would note that just recently, after many months of encouragement, the Europeans for example, have just come through with an agreement to negotiate accession to KEDO and to provide as much as 20 million American dollars a year for several years. We certainly don't want to loose that kind of momentum, even as we have to adjust to the current climate.

Q: First of all, I would like just to say that, Mr. Lord, you are very often coming here signifies the importance the United States administration has in this region. We understand that. But what I would like to ask you is, hasn't the time come for the two plus two club membership to be extended? That is one question. And the second question is, we see the concern of the United States here on the Korean peninsula, but if we go further in the region we will see some signs of the mounting of tensions between some countries -- Japan and Korea, China and Japan -- regarding territorial disputes. My question is, doesn't the United States have other concerns beyond the Korean peninsula, and if it has, what is your idea how to diffuse them if they are happening, maybe at this particular moment or maybe a little bit later, if it is not too late. Thank you. Of course I have forgot to mention Russian-Japan territorial dispute question, that is for sure.

LORD: First, the two plus two proposal was a joint one by our two presidents. It was the South Koreans, however, who took the lead, as they should, and it was their suggestion that we have these four countries initially involved. But we and the South Koreans both recognize the responsible role and the great interest that Russia and Japan, for example, have in this question and in Asia generally, of course. So, we welcome Russia's constructive efforts, and they have been on this issue. We have maintained close consultations. I've been to Moscow several times. I'll be talking with our Russian friends on Asia this December again. We have welcomed them into the ASEAN Regional Forum. We believe that they have a role to play, and we will stay in close touch on Korea and on Asia generally.

With respect to territorial disputes, of course, in the first instance these must be settled between the parties themselves, including the examples you cited. But of course we share a concern for stability, and our contributions include the maintenance of our force levels here, which I think are welcomed by almost everyone in the region as a stabilizing presence, the maintenance of our alliances, our participation in regional security dialogues, and anything we can do to encourage a peaceful resolution among the parties most directly concerned. But of course we have concern about these issues and about regional stability, and that is why, among other reasons, that I am going on to China and Japan on this trip. I've decided that since I'm out here in the area anyway it would make sense to go to these other countries to talk about my discussions here in Korea and the situation we have been discussing today, and to get into other regional security and economic issues.

Q: You called the detainment of the American in North Korea as 'ludicrous,' therefore is the U.S. government planning any further actions to facilitate his release? And secondly, there have been reports of a poll taken recently in Korea saying that most Koreans believe that their nation's policy toward North Korea needs an overhaul. In light of the infiltration incident and the North's arrogance in responding to the situation, what would you say to someone who says that maybe the U.S.'s attitude toward North Korea also needs an overhaul?

LORD: On the question of the detained American, clearly an innocent incident, and we made that clear. We have called upon his humanitarian treatment and immediate release. We are working through our representative in Pyongyang, the Swedes, who have been very helpful and indeed the Swedish representative has, we believe by now, once again contacted the detained American. I have not yet received a report on what he has learned, but we are working primarily through them. But we have also relayed our concerns at the working level in New York City to the North Koreans. So I repeat our wish that he be released immediately and that these ludicrous assertions be dropped.

With respect to public opinion in this country and an overhaul, I'll leave this to the South Korean people and their government. With respect to the U.S., we see no reason to overhaul our opinion because it has been consistently balanced and firm throughout many decades. Our approach has never been based on naivete or eagerness. It has been based on firm foundations of close security alliance with South Korea, our general presence in the region, close as possible coordination and consultation with our allies. But also in our self-interest to see whether North Korea can take a more constructive course. That is the strategic vision behind the Agreed Framework. That is why it is so important that the North talk to the South. We are distressed of course, deeply distressed, by recent North Korean actions. We have been distressed in the past by even uglier incidents. The objective we now have which has been reaffirmed in my consultations here these last couple of days is to show the kind of vigilance and deterrence necessary as well as to remind the North Koreans of a much more attractive course, namely the Agreed Framework Four-Party discussions. Thus this has been our consistent attitude, there is no need to overhaul it.

Q: There have been very many visits of American officials ever since the Geneva Agreed Framework. Every time the high level officials came they said to the Korean public that they would strongly call for direct South-North dialogue toward North Korea. But if you ask if there has been some South-North dialogue since the Geneva Framework I think many would say that they are rather skeptical. Today even on your visit, Mr. Lord, you have also emphasized the need for the North to talk directly to the South. I would like to know if you have any concrete and detailed plans of ideas as to what would make North Korea actually come up and talk to the South?

LORD: Since this is the last question and answer, let me make a couple of general comments. First to repeat how pleased I am with my visit and I believe our South Korean hosts are pleased as well. Secondly, there have been positive developments just the last couple of days. We congratulate Korea's successful accession to the OECD, which the U.S. strongly supported. We are pleased that we have reached agreement in New York on a statement by the President of the U.N. Security Council. I have relayed President Clinton's proposal to President Kim that they get together in Manila, and I very much expect that to happen. Our South Korean hosts indicated that they thought President Kim would welcome that chance, so we've relayed their proposal. So I think there's a lot of positive developments in addition to the success of this trip.

I want to reiterate today what we have said for decades. Namely there will be no peace on this peninsula of a permanent basis until there is North-South dialogue and negotiation. That remains a bedrock principle. It is a principle of justice, it is a principle enshrined in agreements reached in the early 1990's, and it is a principle which is in the Agreed Framework. Indeed, it was the last issue to be negotiated. The U.S. was prepared to see the whole Framework be dropped unless the North Koreans agreed to that principle. And so that will continue to be our position. We have consistently stated and our actions have consistently reflected the principle that U.S.- North Korean relations can only go so far without progress in North-South Korean relations. That has also been the principle of the Japanese government. And they have followed that course.

To answer your question, we will be able to generate North-South dialogue when that day comes when Pyongyang finally understands that they cannot drive a wedge between us and our South Korean friends or between the Japanese and the South Koreans. That they must talk to the South, and that is why our two Presidents put forward the Four-Party proposal which preserves the principle of North-South dialogue even while indicating U.S., and hopefully, Chinese, support for that process. This has been the strategy of North Korea for decades, it's nothing new to try to talk to us directly about peace and to shunt aside South Korea. It has never worked, it never will work. So once again, we repeat to Pyongyang, let us get this situation under control. Let us have a new attitude. Let us be able to resume forward momentum. We are still prepared to have better relations with North Korea at an appropriate moment. But there must be progress in North-South dialogue, and so once again we call upon Pyongyang to change its ways, change its attitude, accept the joint briefing, and begin to let the Korean peoples decide the destiny of this peninsula. Thank you for your patience and for your excellent questions.

(end official transcript) NNNN

File Identification:  10/17/96, EPF403; 10/17/96, AXF403; 10/17/96, EUR408; 10/18/96, AEF510
Product Name:  Wireless File
Product Code:  WF
Keywords:  LORD, WINSTON/Speaker; KOREA (NORTH)-KOREA (SOUTH) RELATIONS; REUNIFICATION (TERRITORY); PEACE TALKS; NORTH-SOUTH DIALOGUE; NEGOTIATIONS
Document Type:  TRA
Thematic Codes:  1EA; 2FP
Target Areas:  EA; AF; EU
PDQ Text Link:  462381
USIA Notes:  *96101703.EPF