Tracking Number: 456479
Title: "State Department Testimony on US Policy Toward North Korea." Comments by Mark Minton of the State Department in Senate testimony describing US efforts to promote peace
and reunification of the Korean peninsula. (960912)
Date: 19960912
Text:
TEXT: STATE DEPT. TESTIMONY ON U.S. POLICY TOWARD NORTH KOREA
(Diplomacy prepares peninsula for peace, reunification) (2850)
Washington -- The overall goals of U.S. policy toward North Korea are to build a durable peace on the peninsula and to facilitate progress by the Korean people toward national reunification, according to Mark Minton, director of the Office of Korean Affairs at the Department of State.
In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs September 12, Minton said: "Although direct government-to-government contacts between North and South Korea have not yet occurred as envisioned in the Agreed Framework, KEDO's nuclear reactor project has helped foster a growing indirect dialogue. There have been a number of South-North contacts at the technical level, stemming in large part from the selection of a South Korean prime contractor for the project. These business-like talks have been frequent and productive, and will lead to the presence next month, if site preparation work begins as scheduled, of one hundred ROK contractors working side-by-side with DPRK counterparts."
The U.S. and the ROK continue to encourage North Korea to participate in the Four Party talks with the U.S., ROK, and China, proposed by Presidents Clinton and Kim in an April 16 summit meeting on Cheju Island, and the United States remains hopeful that it will, Minton said. "DPRK acceptance of this invitation would complete the agenda embodied in the Agreed Framework," he said.
North Korea's willingness to enter into bilateral talks on its missile program and to begin to address U.S. concerns on terrorism are other positive signs that U.S. diplomatic engagement is producing results, Minton said.
"Perhaps most striking of all," he said, "for the first time in history, U.S. and North Korean military personnel worked together this July to recover remains of American soldiers from the Korean War in DPRK territory. The twenty-day joint mission resulted in the return to the U.S. of the remains of one American soldier. The second joint recovery operation will begin this month."
Future U.S.-North Korea contacts will depend on the degree to which Pyongyang is prepared to move further along the positive path on which it embarked with the signing of the Agreed Framework, Minton said. "In view of this objective, the U.S. eased some economic sanctions against the DPRK in January 1995 as Pyongyang began to cooperate in implementing the Agreed Framework," he said. "Provided that the DPRK continues to uphold its obligations under the Agreed Framework and addresses other issues on the bilateral agenda in a positive manner, I expect that the U.S. would, over time, ease additional sanctions," Minton said.
Diplomacy with the DPRK, he said, has helped to pull the Korean peninsula away from confrontation and the threat of war, prepared the atmosphere for achieving a lasting peace and stability in the region, and created conditions conducive to greater North-South contact, which will eventually allow the Korean people to reunify their land peacefully.
Following is the text of Minton's testimony, as prepared for delivery:
(begin text)
SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE ON EAST ASIAN AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS
SEPTEMBER 12, 1996
U.S. POLICY TOWARDS NORTH KOREA
TESTIMONY OF MARK MINTON, DIRECTOR OFFICE OF KOREAN AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Mr. Chairman,
It is my pleasure to represent the Department of State before this Committee today.
I appreciate this opportunity to discuss our policy toward the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Korean peninsula as a whole. Our overall goals in this policy are to build a durable peace on the peninsula as a key contribution to regional stability, and to facilitate progress by the Korean people toward national reunification.
Before I discuss North Korea specifically, I would like to stress the central place in our policy occupied by close cooperation with our ally, the Republic of Korea. None of our diplomatic achievements with North Korea to date would have been possible without full consultations with, and the firm support of, the government and the people of the Republic of Korea.
Prior to assuming my duties here in Washington in July, I spent the last four years at our Embassy in Seoul. I can tell you, based on my personal experience, that every policy decision regarding the DPRK that was taken during this period was coordinated fully with the ROK.
As members of this Committee know well, our alliance with the Republic has been forged over five decades under the most exacting conditions: war, reconstruction, rapid economic development and the building of South Korea's new democracy.
The Republic's recent history, and the role the US-Korean alliance has played in it, constitute an amazing success story. Today, the ROK has become one of our major international partners: its government and citizens share our interest in promoting and protecting the rights and liberties of people around the world. The ROK is our fifth-largest trading partner with more than $50 billion in annual two-way trade. Bilateral security ties endure and continue to protect our common interests and promote regional stability. This partnership is the strong foundation upon which all of our diplomacy on the peninsula over the last several years has been built.
During the past four years, the combined efforts of the U.S. and ROK have led to a significant foreign policy achievement on the Korean peninsula. To gauge just what a positive change has been wrought, I ask you to look back to the situation four years ago. In 1992, the world community was forced to focus on the North Korean nuclear program as the DPRK denied access to its nuclear facilities to inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency, contrary to its obligations under the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Amid suspicions that it had reprocessed enough plutonium for a few nuclear weapons, the North announced in March 1993 that it would withdraw from the NPT.
In response to a UNSC call for member states to help resolve the growing crisis, the U.S. engaged Pyongyang at the political level. After many arduous months of negotiation, these talks resulted, in October 1994, in the Agreed Framework.
This understanding with the DPRK, which was reached only after very close consultation between the U.S. and ROK, produced almost immediate results. The danger of an active, integrated North Korean nuclear weapons program receded. The alarming atmosphere of military confrontation and international crisis was replaced by a diplomatic process. Under this agreement, the DPRK has wisely taken a series of steps away from isolation that has resulted in an unprecedented opening up of that nation to contact and influence from the outside world.
For almost two years, the DPRK nuclear program has been frozen under international inspection. The North has not produced any additional plutonium. Teams of U.S. technical experts, with continuous access to DPRK nuclear facilities, have made significant progress in safely storing the North's spent fuel for eventual disposal outside of the DPRK.
The Agreed Framework also led to the creation of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO). This organization -- which is charged with implementing the nuclear provisions of the Agreed Framework, including the supply of oil and Light Water Reactors (LWR's) to North Korea -- has grown under American, Korean and Japanese leadership and seed funding into a truly international effort to make our diplomacy work.
Over the past eighteen months, KEDO's fundraising efforts have produced $60 million in contributions from countries other than the founding three. KEDO also has been able to double its country membership from 6 to 12. Furthermore, we are optimistic about securing, later this year, a multi-year commitment from the EU for $20 million per year in funds.
These funds are, to a large degree, used to supply North Korea with heavy fuel oil, on an interim basis until the LWR's are built, as called for in the Framework. To ensure that this oil is used for the intended civil uses, the DPRK has agreed to monitoring procedures proposed by the U.S.
This impressive international effort continues to be premised on strong U.S. leadership within KEDO. That is why it is so important that the Congress fully fund our request for $25 million for KEDO's budget in FY97. I would like to thank the Senate for restoring this full amount to our budget request. With such a show of American support for its own diplomacy, others will follow and do their share. Indeed, the whole endeavor has been structured so that U.S. initiative and seed money will serve as catalyst to generate commitments and the bulk of the necessary funding from the rest of the international community. As is so often the case, there is just no substitute here for American vision and leadership.
Planning for the key element of the Agreed Framework, the Light Water Reactor project, also continues apace. In December 1995, KEDO signed a supply contract with the DPRK in which Pyongyang agreed to the construction of two Korean Standard Nuclear Plants built by the ROK. Subsequently, the North Koreans also signed protocols that will grant unprecedented access to the LWR sites to the foreign engineers and specialists -- including South Koreans -- who are necessary to implement the project. Although the U.S. is not contributing financially to the multi-billion dollar construction costs of the LWR's (the ROK and Japan are shouldering that responsibility), our continued funding of our KEDO obligations remains an indispensable symbol of the viability of the project.
We also have worked to ensure that the IAEA can continue to monitor the freeze on North Korean nuclear facilities effectively as well as move towards instituting full scope safeguards on the North's nuclear program. Our own Department of Energy continues to manage the work of safely storing the North's spent nuclear fuel, which contains material that could otherwise be used for nuclear weapons. This fuel also will be under international monitoring.
Although direct government-to-government contacts between North and South Korea have not yet occurred as envisioned in the Agreed Framework, KEDO's nuclear reactor project has helped foster a growing indirect dialogue. There have been a number of South-North contacts at the technical level, stemming in large part from the selection of a South Korean prime contractor for the project. These business-like talks have been frequent and productive, and will lead to the presence next month, if site preparation work begins as scheduled, of one hundred ROK contractors working side-by-side with DPRK counterparts.
In part to spur the DPRK to directly engage the ROK in dialogue, Presidents Clinton and Kim, in an April 16 summit meeting on Cheju Island in the Republic of Korea, announced a joint proposal inviting the North to participate in Four Party talks with the U.S., ROK, and China to discuss peace on the Korean peninsula.
The U.S. and the ROK continue to encourage the North to participate in the Four Party talks, and we remain hopeful that it will. DPRK acceptance of this invitation would complete the agenda embodied in the Agreed Framework. Seoul recently has made earnest efforts toward improving the atmosphere for such talks. In a major policy speech delivered on August 15, President Kim enunciated three principles regarding the peaceful reunification of the peninsula: the South would not take advantage of the North's present economic difficulties; Seoul wanted Pyongyang to join the international community; and peaceful reunification should be achieved without either side imposing its will on the other. Kim also stated that the ROK would continue to encourage international food assistance to supplement what the South had given already, and work to solve the systemic problems underlying the North's food shortages.
Bilateral relations between the U.S. and the DPRK also have evolved, as Pyongyang has met its obligations under the Agreed Framework, and moderated its behavior to begin to meet international norms.
The North's willingness to enter into bilateral talks on its missile program and to begin to address our concerns on terrorism are other positive signs that U.S. diplomatic engagement is producing results.
Perhaps most striking of all, for the first time in history, U.S. and North Korean military personnel worked together this July to recover remains of American soldiers from the Korean War in DPRK territory. The twenty-day joint mission resulted in the return to the U.S. of the remains of one American soldier. The second joint recovery operation will begin this month. We expect that this humanitarian effort, which personally touches thousands of American families, will continue next spring when weather conditions permit further work.
The U.S. also has made a humanitarian gesture of its own towards the DPRK. In an effort to help alleviate some of the suffering that has resulted from lower crop production over the past year and severe weather in parts of North Korea, the U.S. Government joined the international community in providing humanitarian assistance to North Korea. We have made contributions of emergency relief assistance (medical supplies and food) totaling $8,425,000 in September 1995, October 1995, February 1996 and, most recently, in June 1996. Our humanitarian assistance was given through U.N. agencies, which have staff members operating in North Korea to monitor final distribution of our contribution. We are confident, therefore, that our assistance reached the intended civilian beneficiaries, many of whom are children.
The U.S. did not act alone in providing humanitarian assistance to the DPRK. The Republic of Korea and Japan contributed significant amounts of food as well -- 150,000 and 200,000 tons respectively -- in the summer of 1995. The monetary value of the ROK shipment alone was $243 million. Several months later, we made our first contribution of $25,000 of emergency assistance. More recently, at the time of the latest U.S. contribution of $6.2 million of food assistance, Tokyo and Seoul also made similar contributions of $6 million and $3 million, respectively, to the DPRK. A broad spectrum of other countries also have contributed to this international relief effort.
It is useful to note that the process of trying to move from stark confrontation to dialogue with the DPRK has a bipartisan history of some eight years. In 1988, under the Reagan Administration, the U.S. undertook what was termed a "Modest Initiative" to open the window for greater, if still limited, contact with Pyongyang. The next phase came in January 1992, when, during a period of improved dialogue between South and North Korea, the Bush Administration decided to host the first-ever high-level meeting between U.S. and DPRK officials. Although useful, this did not lead to further high-level contacts. The current phase of diplomacy, which began when Ambassador Gallucci reengaged the DPRK on the nuclear issue in 1993, thus has important antecedents.
As for the future of U.S.-DPRK contacts, the Agreed Framework states that "the two sides will move toward full normalization of political and economic relations." The pace of change will depend, of course, on the degree to which the DPRK is prepared to move further along the positive path on which it embarked with the signing of the Agreed Framework. In view of this objective, the U.S. eased some economic sanctions against the DPRK in January 1995 as Pyongyang began to cooperate in implementing the Agreed Framework. These modest steps permitted direct telecommunications services, contracts for U.S. companies to import magnesite from the DPRK, and licenses for American firms to provide humanitarian goods to the North. Provided that the DPRK continues to uphold its obligations under the Agreed Framework and addresses other issues on the bilateral agenda in a positive manner, I expect that the U.S. would, over time, ease additional sanctions.
In terms of diplomatic representation, the U.S. and the DPRK have continued to work for the establishment of liaison offices in Washington and Pyongyang, subject to the resolution of some technical issues. The establishment of these modest offices would be of practical benefit to both sides, especially inasmuch as more and more American citizens are visiting the DPRK -- as journalists, academics, humanitarian workers or specialists in the canning, remains, or fuel monitoring projects.
In closing, I would like to emphasize again that the positive effect of all of this diplomacy with the DPRK -- the Agreed Framework, KEDO, the Four Party peace proposal, missile talks, joint recovery operations, humanitarian assistance -- has helped to pull the Korean peninsula away from confrontation and the threat of war; to prepare the atmosphere necessary for achieving a lasting peace and stability in the region; and to create conditions conducive to greater North-South contact, eventually allowing the Korean people to reunify their land peacefully.
All this has been achieved, as I said before, in step with our ally, the Republic of Korea. Our partnership has constituted the winning formula for our joint diplomatic success on the peninsula to date. It will continue to guide our diplomacy in the future.
Thank you.
(end text) NNNN
File Identification: 09/12/96, AXF404; 09/12/96, EPF401; 09/12/96, EUR412
Product Name: Wireless File
Product Code: WF
Keywords: KOREA (NORTH)-KOREA (SOUTH)
RELATIONS; KOREA (NORTH)-US RELATIONS/Policy; MINTON, MARK/Speaker; CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY; REUNIFICATION (TERRITORY); KOREAN ENERGY DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION (KEDO); CLINTON, BILL/Foreign Relations
Document Type: TXT
Thematic Codes: 1EA; 2FP
Target Areas: AF; EA; EU
PDQ Text Link: 456479
USIA Notes: *96091201.EPF
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