Tracking Number: 439414
Title: "Ambassador Laney 5/28 Remarks on North Korea at NPC." Comments by US Ambassador to South Korea James Laney at the National Press Club calling on the US and South Korea to
move from confrontation to cooperation in dealing with North Korea. (960528)
Date: 19960528
Text:
*EPF205
05/28/96 TEXT: AMBASSADOR LANEY 5/28 REMARKS ON NORTH KOREA AT NPC (U.S., ROK should move beyond deterrence of N. Korea) (2100)
Washington -- The United States and South Korea should move beyond a policy of deterrence to one of confidence-building and cooperation in their interactions with North Korea, according to James Laney, U.S. Ambassador to the Republic of Korea.
"Deterrence is not an end in itself, but one means of achieving stability," Laney said at a May 28 National Press Club Newsmaker. "Since deterrence alone does not address the factors that most threaten stability on the peninsula today, it must be augmented with -- not replaced by -- confidence-building assurances and positive inducements to cooperation."
Although a policy of deterrence remains necessary as long as North Korea poses a military threat, Laney maintained that "the main challenges to stability now are North Korean weakness and despair, and these cannot be overcome by simply doing more of what we have been doing."
Citing the Geneva Agreed Framework of 1994 as an example of a cooperative effort, Laney said: "In order to maintain stability on the peninsula, we need to begin now to build an edifice of positive relationships that can complement and take us beyond deterrence."
Laney added that he hoped North Korea would agree to participate in the Four-Party Meeting proposed at the Cheju-do summit between Presidents Clinton and Kim in mid-April. This proposal would involve North Korea, South Korea, the United States and China in talks to replace the Armistice Agreement of 1953 with a permanent peace treaty for the Korean Peninsula.
Following is the official text of Laney's remarks, as prepared for delivery:
(begin official text)
"NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA: BEYOND DETERRENCE"
JAMES T. LANEY, U.S. AMBASSADOR TO THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA
NATIONAL PRESS CLUB MORNING NEWSMAKER
MAY 28, 1996
Thank you very much, Mr. Hickman, for your kind introduction and for the invitation to appear in Morning Newsmakers here at the National Press Club. I'm delighted to see all of you -- some old friends, some new acquaintances.
I want to talk about the situation on the Korean Peninsula, with a brief historic overview as to how we got here and our policy there and what we might look forward to in the months ahead. I think many of you will recall how the U.S. first got involved in Korea to disarm a defeated foe in 1945, how the peninsula was divided in a way that continues to this day, and how we came to the aid of the Republic of Korea only to have that bitter fight end in an Armistice that did not resolve that division. Since then, for nearly half a century, relations between North and South Korea and U.S. policy toward the peninsula have been based on the principle of deterrence. Renewed conflict here as in the larger global Cold War standoff was averted because both Korean governments, and their outside allies, knew that an attack by either on the other would produce catastrophic consequences for the aggressor as well as the victim.
This deterrent relationship has proven remarkably stable. It has endured severe crises, including the attack on the Blue House, the Rangoon bombing, and other terrorist atrocities, the Pueblo seizure and, most recently, the confrontation over North Korea's nuclear program in 1993-94. It successfully provided a shelter from war under which both parts of Korea were able to recover from the devastation of the Korean conflict and rebuild their countries. More dramatically, it provided a shield for the astonishing economic and democratic development of the ROK in recent years. It is simple common sense that any policy that has achieved so much should be modified only with great care and for the most pressing reasons.
Deterrence provides stability in the absence of trust and is most effective in a state of equilibrium. It requires a rough balance of power -- not necessarily an equality of military strength, but a balance by which each side realizes that it cannot act with impunity because the costs of aggression would far outweigh any possible benefits.
Since the end of the Cold War, however, the equilibrium on the peninsula has become less stable. North Korea lost its chief sponsor, ally and trading partner when the Soviet Union disintegrated. Both Russia and China virtually ended the aid programs on which the North Korean economy had relied. This threw it into a steep decline and dramatically widened the already large gap between Southern and Northern economies.
While this shift was in its early stages, however, another destabilizing factor emerged, namely the revelation that North Korea was on the brink of developing a nuclear weapons capability. Had that program continued, it would have had profound consequences for deterrence on the peninsula, as well as for security in the Northeast Asian region and beyond. Fortunately, a tense and arduous series of negotiations, leading to the Geneva Agreed Framework of 1994, effectively removed DPRK nuclearization as a threat to regional stability.
Resolution of the nuclear crisis, however, brought the North's steady economic decline back into focus. By late 1995 it was clear that the balance was again unstable. The problem this time, however, was not North Korea's strength, but its eroding power, based on its lack of reliable friends and its refusal or inability to adapt to the post-Cold War world. This was in stark contrast to South Korea's remarkable economic and diplomatic successes, which have produced an objective strength of unprecedented level.
Today, North Korea is in serious trouble. Its critical shortages of food, energy and foreign exchange all are mutually reinforcing, driving the economy downward and potentially creating enormous social problems. Its government appears to realize that its current course unchecked can lead only to irreversible decline. But fear of the consequences of change -- the fate of East Germany, Romania and the Soviet Union -- makes it wary of taking the kind of steps needed to reverse that decline. And its recognition of the overwhelming advantages enjoyed by South Korea -- a booming economy, steadfast allies and technologically advanced defense capabilities -- makes it reluctant to engage seriously with an adversary it suspects of wanting to humiliate it or planning to absorb it.
There are serious risks in this situation. People here are conscious of the fact that, in the absence of other tools with which to change its circumstances, the North may look for other ways of using the only remaining asset it possesses which commands international respect -- its military might. Even though its conventional military capability has declined relative to that of the combined forces of the ROK and U.S., it is still formidable. And though the common view is that it can have no hope of successfully prosecuting a war with the South, the unpalatability of other alternatives could increase the relative attractiveness of military options. For instance, DPRK leaders might be tempted to divert attention from their own problems by staging an escalating series of provocative border incidents. There is also the risk that further economic and social deterioration in the North could lead to factional conflict that could spill over beyond the DPRK borders.
Deterrence, while it may prevent intentional armed conflict, does little to reduce hostility or provide a basis for a relationship. In an atmosphere of enmity and suspicion, communication tends to consist primarily of warnings. But warnings only work when deterrence is effective. It is the erosion of the effectiveness of our warnings that requires us now to look for new ways of communication and interaction between North and South, and to convince Pyongyang it has better options than its military one.
For some years, North Korea has proposed talks leading to a permanent peace treaty to replace the 1953 Armistice Agreement. However, it has been willing to talk only with the U.S. The U.S. agrees that the Armistice should be replaced, but both our policy and common sense rule out negotiations that exclude the ROK.
The Four Party Meeting proposed at the Cheju-do summit reflects the judgment of Presidents Clinton and Kim that this negotiating architecture offers the best prospect for success. It meets the demand of the North that it have the U.S. as a participant, while preserving the fundamental ROK/U.S. principle that the future of the Korean Peninsula must be shaped primarily by the Korean people. We believe it offers North Korea the best chance it will have to escape from the downward path it is on -- not a guarantee of success, certainly, but at least a reason to hope -- and we will continue to urge it to accept the proposal.
In order to maintain stability on the peninsula, we need to begin now to build an edifice of positive relationships that can complement and take us beyond deterrence. One part of this edifice, the Agreed Framework, is already being implemented. Work on another large part can begin as soon as North Korea accepts the Four Party proposal. Along the way, it should be possible for North and South to work out interim and side arrangements that meet important needs of both sides. And as confidence is built, little by little, there will be openings to establish the kind of sustained economic and social interaction that provides the real underpinning for peace.
If this process is to succeed, we in the ROK and U.S. will need to be willing to rethink the approach we have historically taken toward the DPRK. We should tone down our rhetoric and the lurid language we have used to characterize the North. For purposes of policy formulation, it does not matter whether we trust the intentions or "sincerity" of North Korean leaders. If we listen closely to their rhetoric -- however bellicose and offensive it may be -- and carefully analyze their actions -- even provocative ones like the recent incidents on the DMZ -- we will realize that they are driven not by arrogance but by insecurity. DPRK leaders are unlikely to play the negotiating game seriously as long as they see no way to survive except by repeatedly playing their military card.
For our part, we do not need to act strong because we are strong. South Korea has grown so fast and achieved so much that there is inevitably a lag between reality and perception. A hard-eyed, realistic analysis would leave no doubt that the ROK is strong enough and important enough to be magnanimous without risk. The notion that today's South Korea could be "isolated" or "marginalized" is not taken seriously by anyone outside the Korean Peninsula. We should, of course, avoid complacence. But a little realistic confidence would go a long way in clearing away the psychological underbrush that impedes our view of the real situation.
In evaluating policy options, when one is unquestionably strong, one should judge them not on the basis of whether they are "tough" or "soft," the conventional cliches, but whether they are "smart" or "dumb~." If a policy is in U.S. and South Korean interests, we should pursue it; if it also accords with North Korea's interests, so much the better. This should no longer be a "zero-sum game." It is not in our interest for the DPRK to lash out militarily, or to descend into chaos. Everyone's interests are served by economic assistance to the North, reduction of tensions, and comprehensive North-South engagement.
If we subscribe to these principles, then the implications for our policy are clear: we should focus our efforts on persuading North Korea not only that its current path is a dead end, but also that there is a better alternative. We should foster its confidence that it can survive, compete, and even prosper if it picks up the offer now on the table. We should strive to demonstrate that we have no desire to invade or destroy the DPRK, and that we have no interest in unification through any means other than negotiation and agreement between the South and the North.
By the criteria we have traditionally used, our deterrent strategy has been working just fine. And it has by no means outlived its usefulness; as long as there is a military threat from the North, it must and will remain in place. But the main challenges to stability now are North Korean weakness and despair, and these cannot be overcome by simply doing more of what we have been doing. Deterrence is not an end in itself, but one means of achieving stability. Since deterrence alone does not address the factors that most threaten stability on the peninsula today, it must be augmented with -- not replaced by -- confidence-building assurances and positive inducements to cooperation.
This was the underlying message of our presidents on Cheju-do. We now await a sign that the leaders in Pyongyang understand the message, and accept it as a means to address the North's needs. I hope they will.
Thank you.
(end official text) NNNN
File Identification: 05/28/96, EPF205; 05/28/96, AXF204; 05/28/96, EUR207; 05/29/95, LEF307
Product Name: Wireless File
Product Code: WF
Languages: Russian
Keywords: LANEY, JAMES/Speaker; KOREA (NORTH)-KOREA (SOUTH) RELATIONS; KOREA (NORTH)-US RELATIONS/Policy; INTERGOVERNMENTAL COOPERATION; SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
Document Type: TXT
Thematic
Codes: 1EA; 2FP
Target Areas: EA; AF; EU
PDQ Text Link: 439414
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