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Tracking Number:  428341

Title:  Stanley O Roth, director of Research and Studies, US Institute of Peace, testified before the House Internatioanl Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific on the preservation of peace and stability in Korea and US relations with North Korea. (960321)

Date:  19960321

Text:
*PFS405

03/21/96 TEXT: ROTH TESTIMONY AT 3/20 HEARING ON NORTH KOREA (U.S. must focus on key national interests with NKorea) (2030) Washington -- Because there are a lot of key questions that remain uncertain about North Korea -- such as not knowing if Kim Jong Il is "ruling" or "reigning," the United States needs to focus on key national interests as we formulate the elements of our North Korea policy, according to Stanley O. Roth, Director of Research and Studies, U.S. Institute of Peace.

During a testimony before the House International Relations Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific March 17, Roth said "first and foremost among these interests is the preservation of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula."

Following is an unofficial text of Roth's testimony: (begin text) PREPARED TESTIMONY OF STANLEY O. ROTH DIRECTOR OF RESEARCH AND STUDIES U.S. INSTITUTE OF PEACE BEFORE THE HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS COMMITTEE ASIA AND THE PACIFIC SUBCOMMITTEE TUESDAY, MARCH 19, 1996 After serving on the staff of this Subcommittee for more than ten years, it is a somewhat unusual sensation to find myself for the first time seated behind the witness table rather than behind the Chairman. At this stage in the proceedings I can certainly say that it is a pleasure to be here. I commend the Subcommittee for convening this hearing on the important topic of North Korea.

At the outset, I would like to make clear that I am appearing today in my individual capacity and not as an official of the U.S. Institute of Peace. The views expressed are my own.

I think that the best place to begin a hearing about North Korea is to acknowledge what we don't know. First, almost two years after the death of Kim IL Sung we don't know who is in charge in North Korea. While no visible opposition to Kim Jong IL appears to exist, the exceptionally long delay in his formal succession to power makes it increasingly more plausible to suspect that a power struggle of some sorts is taking place. This is not to suggest that Kim Jong IL may not ultimately assume the formal trappings of leadership; indeed, a spate of public appearances recently has created the expectation that this long-awaited event will take place this summer. Maybe yes, maybe no; perhaps the most prudent course is to avoid predictions, since so many previous "deadlines" have proven to be inaccurate. In any case, even after the formal succession process has taken place, the key question will remain: Is Kim Jong Il "ruling" or "reigning"?

Second, we don't know the staying power of the current regime. While experts argue passionately about whether North Korea is heading towardscollapse, either of the government or of the country itself, the truth of the matter is that we have no analytical basis for making an informed judgment. While we know that government and party leaders are determined to avoid the fate of the former Soviet Union and East Germany, what we don't know is whether they have the capacity to do so. Specifically, we don't know how loyal either the troops or the senior officers are to Kim Jong Il nor do we know how effectively the military would respond if the current economic hardship led to sustained food riots or other widespread manifestations of unrest.

Third, there are important gaps in our knowledge about the current food situation in North Korea, despite the important work which the World Food Programme and a handful of NGOs are now doing in the North. Most importantly, we don't know if the current shortfalls, which to date have not resulted in widespread starvation, will ultimately lead to a situation later this year of widespread famine. One of the key variables -- and one which has been of particular interest to the Congress -- are military stockpiles of food. While it appears reasonable to assume that the North Korean military has significant stocks of food, we don't know either the magnitude of the stocks or the extent to which these stocks have already been drawn down. Although Trevor Page, the World Food Programme's representative in Pyongyang, has concluded that at least some military foodstocks have been drawn down, it is impossible to know the totality of North Korea's military stockpiles of food.

Fourth, there are important uncertainties about the North's military capabilities. While on paper the North has impressive quantifies of militaryhardware and the troops to use it, with much of its forces concentrated near the Demilitarized Zone in a destabilizing fashion, we don't really know how effective these forces would be in a conflict. To what extent have food shortages spilled over into the military? To what extent have cutbacks in training impaired readiness? What percentage of the North's armored equipment and aircraft are operational? Does the North have the logistical capacity to sustain an offensive or would it quickly run out of fuel or spare parts? These questions are not intended to suggest that the North no longer poses a serious military threat against the Republic of Korea. But I do think it's important not to make the North Korean military appear ten feet tall, as we did with Iraq's military forces prior to the Gulf War.

Formulating U.S. policy towards North Korea in the face of all of these uncertainties is a formidable challenge. It is difficult enough to calibrate policy to try to influence the behavior of decision-makers in a "normal" country; it is an order of magnitude more difficult when we don't even know who the key decision-makers are or what the decision-making process is.

To my mind, this suggests that we need to focus on key national interests as we formulate the elements of our North Korea policy. First and foremost among these interests is the preservation of peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. Both we and our allies in the Republic of Korea have agreed that a so-called "soft landing" (a gradual process of peaceful reunification over an extended period of time) is preferable to a "hard landing" (trying to make the North's regime collapse as soon as possible).The logic of this policy may, at first, appear counter-intuitive. Why not try to "bring down" the North's regime, which is clearly one of the most despotic and dangerous regimes now extent anywhere? The answer is twofold.

First, there is no assurance that if we succeed in promoting the collapse of North Korea that the collapse will be as peaceful as the collapse of the former East Germany. I believe there is a serious risk that' if the North's economic plight gets sufficiently dire, including widespread starvation, the regime could miscalculate and decide to risk everything in an attack on the South. The goal would not have to be absolute victory; the North might delude itself into believing that it could easily seize a significant piece of territory and then sue for peace on favorable terms, including economic assistance.

It is not far-fetched to suggest that a country as isolated as North Korea could easily miscalculate and persuade itself that such a scenario could succeed. Consider current circumstances. One could envision the North concluding that the South had been gravely weakened by political scandal and the United States was preoccupied by Bosnia and the upcoming election. If famine hits later this summer, as some expects have predicted, the North may find itself with no good options. The danger is that deterrence. will fail, for the reasons described above, and that the North will result to force. While hardly a likely scenario, it is a plausible and dangerous one, and one which both we and the Republic of Korea should seek to avoid.

Second, the economic consequences of even a peaceful soft landing would be devastating for the South's economy. Current estimates of the cost of raising the North's economy to the level of the South range from several hundred billion dollars to more than $1 trillion. In a sense the numbers are irrelevant,for even at the lower levels they exceed the Republic of Korea's resources. All the more worrisome is the possibility that history might repeat itself: just as West German officials were unable to resist the public demands for reunification as East Germany's collapse proceeded, despite an acute awareness of the economic costs, so South Korean officials might not be able to resist public demands for reunification under similar circumstances. The implications for Korea are even greater than for Germany, considering that the South's economy is considerably less advanced than was West Germany's at the time and the North's economy is considerably more impoverished than was East Germany's. Thus, it would be even harder for the South to bear the expenses of immediate reunification.

Even if one accepts the rationale for a soft landing, there is still considerable room for doubt as to whether it can be achieved. Unfortunately, there seems to be virtually no prospect that the best-case scenario will be realized. Such a scenario would include genuine economic reform, a resumption of NorthSouth dialogue and resolution of some of the outstanding bilateral issues between the North and the United States (renunciation of terrorism, progress on POW-MIA issues, restraint on missile sales). To date, the North seems little interested either in serious economic reform or in the resumption of North-South dialogue, and it's willingness to make progress on bilateral issues with us is disappointingly slow. This is not to suggest that we should just give up on the prospect of achieving a soft landing. There have been some hints from the North that it is willing to address some of the bilateral issues of importance to us, and we should pursue these vigorously through appropriate diplomatic channels. Whilethere is less cause for optimism with respect to North-South dialogue, I believe it would still be worthwhile for the Republic of Korea to formulate some type of peace initiative following its April elections. While most such initiatives in the past have not succeeded, it should not be forgotten that an agreement had been reached for a summit meeting at the Presidential level prior to Kim IL Sung's death. The South has little to lose by launching a peace initiative this spring; at the very least it provides a counterpoint to the North's unceasing efforts to negotiate a peace treaty directly with the United States.

Finally, if a hard landing is not in our national interest and if a soft landing appears not to be achievable, both we and the Republic of Korea may have no choice but to embrace a more frustrating option: a "softer hard landing".

This option is based on the premise that in the absence of fundamental reform there is a high probability of collapse in the North. The mutual interest of the United States and the Republic of Korea under this scenario is to put off this collapse for as long as possible, by trying to help keep the North Korean economy minimally afloat. For example, it may become desirable to provide significant quantities of food aid to the North if famine appears imminent, not only for humanitarian reasons but for national security reasons as well. Even in the absence of progress on such issues as NorthSouth dialogue, the United States and its allies, the Republic of Korea and Japan, may well conclude that it is preferable to provide significant food aid than it is to confront a starving North Korea that is prepared to risk war.

To be clear, this option does not envision massive infusions of capital along the lines of a "mini-Marshall" plan to bail out the North Korean economy.North Korea doesn't deserve such assistance, our publics wouldn't support it, and the assistance couldn't be effective anyway in the absence of significant reforms. But far short of a Marshall Plan, the United States, the Republic of Korea and Japan may find themselves in a situation where they decide, after careful consultation, to provide sufficient resources to the North, whether through trade, aid or investment, to prevent a total collapse.

(end text) NNNN

File Identification:  03/21/96, PFS405
Product Name:  Wireless File
Product Code:  WF
Keywords:  ROTH, STANLEY; CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY; HOUSE INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS CMTE; ASIA; KOREA (NORTH)-US RELATIONS; KOREA (NORTH)-KOREA (SOUTH) RELATIONS; KIM JONG IL
Document Type:  TXT
Target Areas:  EA
PDQ Text Link:  428341
USIA Notes:   *96032103.PFS