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Before commenting further, I first want to compliment Senator Boschwitz for his sincere and long standing commitment to the goal of halting the global spread of nuclear weapons. Let no one doubt the level of bipartisan support that exists in this Congress for the NPT, an agreement that the preamble of this resolution rightfully declares `is the most widely adhered to and successful multilateral arms control treaty in history and is central to international security and stability.'

NPT: A FOUNDATION, NOT A PANACEA

The NPT cannot be expected to eliminate forever the risk of nuclear proliferation. No treaty can enforce itself--a treaty is only as good as the support it has from its parties. Until nuclear weapons disappear from the face of the Earth, and probably even thereafter, there will always be the risk that additional nations will seek to obtain the bomb. There are risks today that even some existing treaty members might harbor ambitions to become nuclear weapon nations.

Here is how Adm. Thomas Brooks, the Director of Naval Intelligence, summarized this particular problem in unclassified testimony before the House Armed Services Committee's seapower subcommittee on March 14 of this year:

Several Third World states, including Iraq and North Korea, have advanced nuclear weapon development programs. Libya's nuclear program has been focused on basic research * * * but Qadhafi clearly wants nuclear weapons. Iran, with an eye toward Iraq's well-advanced program, is seeking its own nuclear weapons capability * * *.

Yet having correctly diagnosed a serious potential problem relating to the future of the treaty, Admiral Brooks, in looking over the shady records of these four NPT parties, came to the following conclusion in his testimony:

Efforts to control proliferation--such as the Missile Technology Control Regime [MTCR] and various nuclear non-proliferation treaties--have been largely ineffective, and are likely to remain so.

There are few here who will take issue with Admiral Brooks' diagnosis of an important threat to the NPT system; but I hope that there are many here who will disagree with his conclusion that the NPT has been ineffective in accomplishing its stated objectives.

Would we all be better off it these four nations left the NPT? Would stability in the Middle East be enhanced if Iran, Iraq, and Libya refused to agree to open all of their nuclear facilities up to international inspection, as required by the NPT? Would our security interests and those of our allies in East Asia be served if North Korea broke off its safeguards negotiations with the International Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], left the NPT, and pursued its nuclear program entirely free from international inspections? Is it somehow the fault of the treaty, or is it rather some weakness in the national policies of the individual nuclear weapon nations or other countries with advanced civilian nuclear industries, that is to blame for the lack of international action against possible violations of the treaty by these four nations?

The NPT provides only a foundation--a solid foundation--for sustained international efforts to halt nuclear proliferation. Being no guarantee against proliferation, it should not be criticized for the failures of the national policies of the treaty's would-be defenders.

Instead, the treaty should be praised for what it has accomplished. It has helped create a strong international norm against the acquisition of nuclear weapons and the expansion of existing stockpiles. It has served to promote international commerce and scientific inquiry involving the peaceful uses of atomic energy. It has served as a confidence builder in regions known for chronic instabilities. It provides a common framework of reference for judging progress toward reducing the global spread of

nuclear weapons. Clearly, it does a lot, but it does not do everything, and no one should expect it to do so.

CHALLENGES AHEAD

No treaty can escape the effects of time and changing events. I see the biggest challenges to the NPT as technological, economic, and political.

Various nuclear technologies are now evolving--such as those involving large-scale uses of nuclear weapon materials for commercial uses--that will make it extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the IAEA to detect the loss, diversion or theft of several bombs' worth of nuclear material. Someday, production of such materials may be possible by virtually any nation and even some terrorist groups.

This technological challenge to the NPT will grow even worse if nations, including most especially our own, do not come up with greater funding for IAEA safeguard activities. If a race is on between the development of better safeguards technology on the one hand, and more efficient means of producing bomb-grade materials on the other, all NPT parties must work to ensure the victory of the former.

We had better be sure that safeguards technology keeps the edge over the technology for producing plutonium and highly enriched uranium. The NPT and is system of international safeguards will not survive on rhetorical support alone.

Economic pressures will also continue to threaten the NPT. The recent decisions by China, the Soviet Union, and France to offer nuclear reactors to both India and Pakistan without any requirement for either NPT membership or agreement to full-scope international safeguards almost certainly had their roots in domestic pressures for export markets and the old political practice of using nuclear technology as a sweetener for bilateral diplomatic objectives. The Soviet Union--the only one of these three nations that is an NPT party--has also offered nuclear reactors to North Korea and Iran, notwithstanding widespread international concerns about the nuclear weapon aspirations of these nations. Its recent offers of reactors to two non-NPT nations in South Asia, nations that may now be poised for yet another war, seems particularly hard to square with the lofty official support the Soviet Union normally gives to the NPT and the IAEA safeguards system.

My colleagues Senators Boschwitz and Pell have joined me as original cosponsors of a concurrent resolution--Senate Concurrent Resolution 113, now before the Foreign Relations Committee--addressing these South Asian nuclear sales and placing the Congress fully on record in support of full-scope international safeguards and the key objectives of the NPT. I have asked that Senators Gore, Bingaman, Boren, Simon, and Wirth be added as cosponsors of that resolution.

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CONCLUSION

Yes, there are challenges ahead. Yes, there are continuing risks of nuclear proliferation.

But most importantly--yes, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty is serving our national security interests, and yes, international society as a whole is far better off with such a treaty than without it. It is a remarkable achievement indeed that 140 nations can come together and agree to commit themselves to an arms control accord so vital to their national security. The NPT is a remarkable treaty and it deserves our support today and for as long as it takes to realize its noble objectives.

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