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- [Begin insert]
I have reviewed that report in depth, and I believe that it is responsive to the changing security environment in Asia and to the growing pressures on our defense budget. I also believe that it proposes steps that will ensure that the United States' vital interests in the Asia-Pacific region continue to be protected.
This proposed strategic framework establishes a viable program for reducing the level of U.S. forces in Asia, it seeks the right kind of military commitments from our allies, and it represents a major effort by the Bush administration to obtain the kind of added contributions to the common defense that are needed from Japan and South Korea.
The Bush administration's strategy is based on a search for regional peace and stability that will allow us to reduce our forces in Asia in three carefully planned phases. The first phase will steadily thin out our existing force structure, and begin rearranging our security relationships over the next 1-3 years. This will lead to some significant savings to the United States taxpayer, involve reductions in our bases and facilities in Asia, and withdraw 7,000 men from South Korea, 5,000-6,000 men from Japan, and 2,000 men from the Philippines.
This represents a reduction of roughly 10-12 percent of our forward deployed manpower in these countries. At the same time, it enables us to continue to play the role of honest broker in Asia and exert a stabilizing influence in what is still a very unstable region.
Looking further into the future, if our search for improved regional peace bears fruit, we could then significantly reduce and reorganize our forces in a second phase over the next 3 to 5 years. Finally, the third phase would allow us to consider major force cuts in the mid to late 1990's--depending upon the changes in regional conditions.
The proposed reductions also take account of the fact that maintaining our presence in Asia is an `economy of force operation' for the United States. The report points out that only 135,000 men, or 6.3 percent of our total force structure is forward deployed in Asian countries. This compares with 16 percent which are forward deployed in the far more geographically compact European theater. In fact, the European theater has over two and a half times the number of forward deployed American forces despite the fact that the Asian-Pacific rim and Indian ocean, all of which come under the Pacific command, represents about half of the Earth's surface.
Equally important, more drastic rapid cutbacks would invoke serious unintended consequences. They could fuel Asian perceptions of a major decline in U.S. strength. We must not inadvertently communicate to Pyongyang, Beijing, Moscow, or other countries that we have lessened our commitment to the region.
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THE STRATEGIC SITUATION IN THE PACIFIC
The United States is a Pacific power and must remain so. Five of our seven mutual security commitments are in the Pacific. We have fought three major wars in the Pacific region in the past 45 years. Our current trade across the Pacific amounts to $300 billion annually. This is 50 percent more than our volume of trade with Europe. The United States and Japan, our primarily bilateral partner in the region, together account for about 40 percent of gross worldwide production.
U.S. forces in East Asia have played--and must continue to play--a crucial stabilizing role in the region. Neither we nor the overwhelming majority of states in the Pacific view our military presence as a source of tension. Indeed, our presence is welcomed by all nations in Asia, with the exception of North Korea; and possibly the Soviet Union.
We cannot risk precipitate force cuts in a region where our very presence is a key force for stability. We cannot hope to establish a new and more stable partnership with our Asian allies if we act without consulting them. We cannot hope to establish a stable pattern of trade if we deprive ourselves of strategic credibility. I fully agree with the Bush administration that it would be unwise to withdraw more than the proposed 14,000 to 15,000 troops until we have a clearer picture of what the future holds.
Mr. President, events in Europe are advancing at an incredible pace. Asia, however, has not experienced the same dramatic political changes. The overall strategic situation is changing far more slowly.
CONSIDERING SOVIET CAPABILITIES AS WELL AS SOVIET INTENTIONS
Soviet intentions in Asia are no more threatening than those in Europe, but we cannot afford to focus solely on intentions and ignore capabilities. The Soviets are restructuring their forces in Asia. It is true that they have plans to remove a number of ships from their Pacific fleet over the next few years, and reduce their forces along the Sino-Soviet border.
Nevertheless, we must consider Soviet capabilities as well as Soviet intentions. The Soviets unquestionably feel that they must remain a major military power in the Pacific to protect their vital interests in Siberia, and their far eastern provinces. As a result, they are modernizing the remainder of the Soviet Pacific fleet and its supporting forces. The Soviets are building their first real naval aircraft carriers and maritime power projection forces.
These improvements affect a massive mix of Soviet forces. The Soviets still have 48 maneuver divisions and 3 artillery divisions in Asia, equipped with some 11,500 tanks, 12,500 artillery weapons, and 1,100 helicopters. Their air forces in Asia include some 215 bombers, 890 fighters and fighter attack aircraft and 590 air defense fighters. Their Pacific fleet includes some 575 ships and craft, include 26 SSBN's and SSN's, 94 other submarines, two carriers, 11 cruisers, 8 destroyers, 56 frigates, 21 amphibious ships, 345 additional combat aircraft and helicopters, and a full naval infantry division.
Given current Soviet policy, I do not believe we face a serious threat from these Soviet forces. Nevertheless, we cannot ignore their existence and the fact that a precipitous United States withdrawal from the Pacific would increase the strategic significance of these Soviet forces. Potentially, it could yield the Soviets increased influence in the political and economic affairs of the region.
Such an increase in Soviet capability and influence simply is not in our interest, nor is it in the interest of the progressive elements within the Soviet leadership. It is still tempting for at least some elements in the Soviet Union to try to exploit any power vacuum in northeast Asia or the Pacific.
We also are likely to face a significant political challenge from the U.S.S.R., either this year or next. The U.S.S.R. may offer to return the four islands in the Kuriles which it has held since the end of World War II in return for some form of demilitarization or reduction of Japanese and United States Naval Forces.
Under some conditions, this offer could lead to a stable mix of improved economic relations, confidence building measures, and arms control. It is not, however, likely to have such positive effects if Japan feels it cannot trust American strength or American sensitivity to Japan's security needs.
THE CONTINUING RISKS IN THE KOREAN PENINSULA
We also need to take account of the fact that Asia is not Europe. In Europe, two alliances face off against each other on land. This environment has lent itself to relatively straight forward negotiations, and mutual force reductions designed to eliminate tensions. In Asia, many of the major conflicts and tensions that shape politics, military balance, economics, and national interests have never been dominated by a similar confrontation between the superpowers. Indeed, most countries in Asia do not see the Soviet Union as the principle threat to their interests. Instead, they focus on regional competition as the prime source of instability.
This competition is most severe in terms of North and South Korea. The presence of United States forces has acted as a powerful force in preventing a renewal of conflict between the two Koreas--a conflict that would at least peripherally involve Japan, China, and the Soviet Union.
There is still a threat of conflict on the Korean peninsula despite the progress made by our South Korean allies in their defense forces. Unfortunately, the North Koreans continue to add to their combat capabilities by acquiring more sophisticated weapons from the Soviet Union, by a massive investment in domestic production, and by aggressively seeking to manufacture nuclear weapons.
The Department of Defense has recently published figures that show North Korea has nearly twice the uniformed army manpower of South Korea, more than twice as many tanks, roughly two and one half times as many artillery weapons, far more antiaircraft weapons, twice as many combat aircraft, and roughly twice as many combat ships. I have provided these figures in more detail in a table for the record.
These figures make clear that North Korea is still building up its military forces, and remains one of the most threatening military dictatorships in the world. While forgoing social and economic development.
North Korea spends more on military forces than South Korea although its military manpower costs are only a small fraction of the price of similar manpower to South Korea, and the GNP of
North Korea is less than one-quarter of the South's. North Korea forces nearly three times as much of its total population into military service. Kim Il-Sung does not care if his people only get meat once a month--or if there is enough rice to go around--only that his million-plus army has guns and bullets.
It is also interesting, Mr. President, to note that even the U.S.S.R. now admits North Korea has consistently played the role of agressor. Mr. President, I request that a recent interview with Soviet historian Mikhail Smirnov in the Moscow International Service be made part of the Record. This interview shows that even the U.S.S.R. now recognizes that it was North and not South Korea that must assume the blame for the Korean war.
Our military presence in South Korea is already limited, and the Secretary of Defense had made it clear that cuts are possible. At the same time, our military presence plays a critical role in persuading North Korea that it cannot safely attack the South, or continue its current efforts to develop nuclear weapons.
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THE OTHER THREATS AND PROBLEMS IN ASIA
The Koreas, however, are only part of the story. Ever since the end of World War II, United States forces in Asia and the Pacific have played a power role in deterring conflict and the escalation of regional tensions. The People's Republic of China still has dangerous tensions with Vietnam and the Soviet Union. Many nations in Asia suffer from serious internal instability, and some--like Cambodia and Burma--are in a constant state of low level civil war.
Our overall military position in Asia and the Pacific plays an important role in assuring Vietnam and Cambodia that they cannot resolve their internal problems by launching foreign adventures, and in assuring Japan and Taiwan that they can remain secure without a massive expansion of their military forces or resorting to some form of proliferation.
There are conflicting territorial claims over the potentially oil-rich Spratly Islands in the South China Sea. We must not let the dispute escalate into a conflict that could adversely affect the economic interests of the United States and allied countries in the region. There are a host of latent racial and ethnic conflicts that could erupt into fighting that could involve some of our major partners in trade.
Leadership will soon pass to a new generation in many countries including North Korea, Vietnam, Cambodia, and China. This may lead to an increased emphasis on democracy, human rights, and economic development. It also, however, could lead to internal instability in selected countries that could spread beyond local borders. The resulting changes in the security and economic environment could easily give rise to new regional powers with national interests that could come in conflict with the United States.
Equally importantly, our Pacific command forces--which also deploy to the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf--guarantee the security of critical lines of communication in the region for the United States and its allies. We must remember that the peace between Iraq and Iran consists of a one-sided cease-fire. The gulf is still the source of over 50 percent of the world's proven oil reserves and 70 percent of the free world's proven oil reserves. Our ability to project power into the Persian Gulf is not only vital to our own interests, but to those of every major industrial power in the free world.
THE IMPACT OF INCREASED JAPANESE AND SOUTH KOREAN EFFORTS ON OUR FORCE LEVELS
These strategic requirements do not, however, mean that our current force levels must be frozen in place or that we must continue to bear the current heavy financial burdens of deploying them in Asia. As I have already noted, one of my major goals in requiring the department of defense to develop its new strategic framework for Asia was to determine whether we can make limited near term reductions in our support and headquarters strength without affecting our impact on regional stability, and whether our Asian allies understand that the time has come for them to bear a proper share of the burden of regional defense.
The Department's report clearly shows that Japan and South Korea are beginning to respond to their changing economic position by expressing a willingness to take up more of the burden of regional defense and economic aid. It shows that they want to be full partners in our efforts to ensure the security of Asia.
Increases in Japanese and South Korean efforts have already helped us to plan limited reductions in our own forces and to ease the financial strain of deploying the United States forces that must remain in Asia. I believe that both nations can still do far more, but I am encouraged that both the Department of Defense and our new Ambassador for Burden Sharing Report that Japan and South Korea are willing to provide more funding for the maintenance of United States forces deployed in their countries.
Hopefully, Japan now understands that our ability to maintain the kind of deployments called for in the Department's strategic framework are heavily dependent on Japan initiating major new burdensharing initiatives during the course of the present Japanese fiscal year and Japan understands it should set out a clear plan for assuming all yen-based costs of United States forces over the next 3 to 5 years. Hopefully, South Korea understands that it should provide a similar package of initiatives for assuming all won costs--especially those of Korean labor and military construction--if we are to maintain the required deployments in South Korea.
Hopefully, both nations now understand they must take the initiative to provide contributions that directly offset the cost of such deployments to the U.S. taxpayer and the U.S. budget. The political realities of the situation are simple; the United States can only maintain a stable presence in the region if Japan and South Korea take advantage of their growing economic strength to help offset the cost of the disproportionate military efforts of the United States.
I am less sanguine about our ability to remain in the Philippines. I agree that our deployments in that country are of great strategic value, and I share the Department of Defense's hope that we will not be forced out of the Philippines by unrealistic demands for aid. This is an area, however, where I am worried that the Philippine Government doesn't understand that Congress simply will never grant it that major increases in aid that it sought in the past. Also, that the strategic value of such bases is heavily dependent on the government's willingness to create a stable political climate by such measures a major steps in land reform and reductions in corruption.
SUMMARIZING THE IMPACT OF THE PROPOSED STRATEGIC FRAMEWORK FOR THE PACIFIC RIM
In summary, the strategic framework outlined in the Bush administration's Report on the Asian Pacific Rim provides an excellent initial response to the amendments I helped draft to the fiscal year 1990 Defense Authorization Act. It shows that our forward deployed presence in Asia is important and must continue, and that we have too much at stake as a Nation to do otherwise.
At the same time, the framework takes account of greater Japanese and South Korean contributions to our mutual security, but insists that they must do still more in the future. It calls for limited immediate reductions in our present forces and significant near term increases in allied efforts to offset the cost of deploying United States forces.
Finally, the administration's strategic framework provides for a phased, incremental approach to sensibly modify our force structure in Asia. It not only encourages finding alternatives to military force, it demands it. It demonstrates American willingness to take every feasible step to reduce tension in the region. It leaves the door open to further adjustments if other powers are willing to respond with significant changes of their own.
Mr. President, we are in a period of global transition and we should not risk the chances we have to attain a more peaceful world by acting hastily and unwisely. Our primary opponents are not the Soviets, but, as President Bush has said, unpredictability, uncertainty, and instability. In Asia, as elsewhere in the world, we must meet these three challenges with resolution and conviction.
The material requested to be inserted into the Record follows:
NORTH KOREAN-SOUTH KOREAN MILITARY COMPARISON--JANUARY 1990
North Korea South Korea
Ground Forces:
Personnel 930,000 550,000
Infantry Divisions 30 21
Independent Infrantry Brigades 4 3
Truck Mobile Divisions/Brigades 1/20 2/0
Armored Brigades 15 1
Reserve Infantry Divisions 26 23
Medium and Light Tanks 3,500 1,500
Armored Personnel Carriers 1,940 1,500
Artillery (Tubes) 7,200 4,000
Multiple Rocket Launchers 2,500 37
Surface-to-Surface Missile Launchers 54 12
Antiaircraft Artillery 8,000 600
Surface-to-Air Missile Sites/Missiles 54/800 34/210
Air Force:
Personnel 70,000 40,000
Jet Fighters 750 480
Bombers 80 0
Transports 275 34
Helicopters (Including Army) 280 280
Navy:
Personnel 40,000 60,000
Attack Submarines 23 0
Destroyers 0 11
Frigates 2 17
Corvettes 4 0
Missile Attack Boats 29 11
Torpedo Craft 173 0
Coastal Patrol 157 79
Mine Warfare 40 9
Amphibious Craft 126 52
Total personnel 1,040,000 650,000
[Footnote] Personnel figures shown here are those published in 1989 by the International Institute of Strategic Studies.
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Soviet Historian Views Who Started Koren War
[Interview with Soviet historian Mikhail Smirnov by an identified reporter; passages between quotation marks are recording of Smirnov in Russian fading into Korean translation by announcer]
We will carry the talk by Soviet historian Mikhail Smirnov. While expressing his completely personal view on the situation leading up to the 1950-1953 Korean War and a lesson from this war, Mikhail Smirnov said:
`Positive military construction based upon partisan units started in North Korea right after the country was liberated. Pyongyang Military School and Central School charged with training security personnel and similar institutes opened in 1945 and 1946. They became the foundation of the Korean People's Army, which was founded on 8 February 1948.
Similar events also took place on the southern half. A law on founding the national armed forces composed of approximately 100,000 was adopted on 30 November 1948 in the ROK. As a result, new military units and combined units were founded with the direct assistance of Americans. President Syngman Rhee did not express any hope for constructive dialogue with Kim Il-song. Rather, he declared on 30 September 1949:
I firmly believe that, from a psychological perspective, now is the most appropriate time to take aggressive measures. We must drive Kim Il-song's personnel into mountainous areas, where we will gradually starve them to death. At that time, our defense line must be strengthened along the Tuman River and the Yalu River.
These events took place in the wake of a military and political confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The two Korean states exercised the jurisdiction of their respective regime upon the other side's territory [as heard]. Also, confrontational spirits prevailed. What served as an indirect momentum that endorsed the assertion that problems be solved militarily was the victory of the Chinese revolution.'
Regarding the reporter's question of what he could say about outside forces' role in the preparations of the Korean War, Mikhail Smirnov said:
`It is clear that outside forces played a role. Just like the Soviet Union gave assistance to North Korea in founding its army, the United States gave similar assistance to South Korea. Without such assistance, neither of the Korean states would have been able to found their armed forces. Therefore, this means that the powers got indirectly involved in the preparations of the Korean War. In addition to this, as a result of the withdrawal of the Soviet and U.S. forces from the Korean peninsula, the political groups in the North and South, which were hostile to each other, could act freely in essence. I think that this is one of the most important factors that helped in the start of the war. Also, I would like to stress that the leaders of the two Korean states respectively had a certain degree of political connections with Washington and Moscow. I think that as a result of the 1950 visit to Moscow by Kim Il-song, the Korean leadership may have come to believe that we supported a military solution to the reunification problem. It may have come to believe so also because of the fact that, in carrying out his activities, Stalin had used such a method.'
Foreign historic documents on the Korean War doubtlessly prove the notion that the North Korean sides' acts hastened the start of this war. However, Soviet historians have a completely different view. What do you think of this?
Regarding this question, Mikhail Smirnov said:
`The (?Pyongyang) side prepared this war. Over this issue, the study of history in the Soviet Union has had the following view, that is, approximately 10 divisions of the South Korean armed forces launched a surprise attack across the 38th parallel against the North Korean territory early on the morning of 25 June 1950. I think that all of this is contrary to fact. I think the fact that we have persistently maintained this view for many years can only be explained by the fact that ideology has played an excessive role in the overall aspects of the study of history and, in particular, Soviet-Korean relations. If, believing their power, [alleged] aggressors had started the war, how can it explain the fact that the North's forces occupied Seoul as early as 28 June and later occupied almost 90 percent of the territory of the southern half?'
Regarding the question of whether there is a danger of a breakout of a new war on the Korean peninsula, Mikhail Smirnov said:
`As long as there remains a difference in the political attitudes of the two Korean states toward the division of Korea and how to solve this problem, there will exist such a danger. However, a fundamentally different approach to resolving regional disputes in view of the overall political atmospheres of the world has drastically reduced such a threat. I think that an important lesson from the Korean War is that no dispute can be resolved through means of force [sillyoguibangboburonun]. If there is anything that is solved through means of force, a serious and, at times, tragic accident will not be avoided. Big countries had walked painful roads through Vietnam and Afghanistan for a long time until they realized this truth. It will be a dangerous illusion in the future, too, to continuously adhere to means of force. History has proven to us that we cannot ignore the principle of history and that of social developoment. There is only one way out, that, is dialogue. The earlier the dialogue starts, the less painful it will be for the reformist procedure participants in such dialogue.'
- [End insert]
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