05 June 2002
State Department Reaffirms Cuba Has Biological Warfare Research Effort
(Official says Cuba providing biotechnology to rogue states) (790)
A State Department official has reaffirmed the Bush administration's
belief that Cuba has a "limited, developmental, offensive biological
warfare research and development effort" and that the Caribbean nation
has provided "dual-use biotechnology to rogue states."
Testifying June 5 before a Senate subcommittee, Carl Ford, assistant
secretary of state for intelligence and research, said the United
States is "concerned that such technology could support biological
warfare programs" in those rogue nations.
Ford said Cuba has several facilities involved in biological-related
efforts in agriculture, medicine, and veterinary science, "which, as
in any country, could be used for illicit purposes." This "dual-use
problem," Ford said, "presents all who are committed to combating" the
biological warfare threat "with the dilemma of how best to assess the
capabilities of any given facility against the intent to develop
biological weapons."
The nature of biological weapons makes it "difficult to procure clear,
incontrovertible proof that a country is engaged in illicit biological
weapons research, production, weaponization, and stockpiling," Ford
told an open session of the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on
Western Hemisphere, Peace Corps, and Narcotics Affairs. A closed
session was scheduled to follow the open forum.
Ford added that Cuba's "sophisticated denial and deception practices
make our task even more difficult." But he added that the State
Department has a "sound basis" for making its judgment about Cuba's
effort in illicit biological weapons research.
Ford said he was "necessarily limiting" his public comments on the
subject to the subcommittee because of the need to protect sensitive
intelligence information. He said he was prepared to discuss the
evidence in a closed session.
Following is the text of his prepared remarks:
(begin text)
INTELLIGENCE STATEMENT BY
ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR INTELLIGENCE AND RESEARCH
CARL W. FORD JR.
BEFORE THE
SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE
ON WESTERN HEMISPHERE, PEACE CORPS, AND NARCOTICS AFFAIRS,
SENATE COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS
June 5, 2002
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It is my pleasure to come before the Subcommittee today to discuss the
issue of what we in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research assess to
be Cuba's efforts to date in the area of biological warfare. My
remarks in this open forum will necessarily be limited owing to the
need to protect sensitive intelligence information, but I would
welcome the opportunity and am prepared to give classified remarks in
a closed session.
On March 19, in my statement in front of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, I stated INR's judgment that:
The United States believes that Cuba has at least a limited,
developmental, offensive biological warfare research and development
effort. Cuba lass provided dual-use biotechnology to rogue states. We
are concerned that such technology could support BW programs in those
states.
That assessment and our concerns have not changed in the intervening 2
and half months.
Among the various weapons of mass destruction (WMD) disciplines,
biological warfare (BW) is perhaps the most difficult to clearly
identify, absent unambiguous reliable intelligence information, owing
to the dual-use nature of the technology and materials used to support
a BW program. In today's world, many nations, including Cuba, have in
place robust biotechnology infrastructures, as some of the world's
best scientific talent has turned to this avenue of modern science to
promote medical and agricultural advances in their countries.
Distinguishing legitimate biotech work from work that is pursued to
support either offensive or defensive BW efforts or programs continues
to be a difficult intelligence challenge. In a nutshell, since basic
BW production does not require large, sophisticated programs or
facilities it makes the intelligence assessment function more
complicated.
Cuba has several facilities involved in biological-related efforts in
agriculture, medicine and veterinary science, which, as in any
country, could be used for illicit purposes. This dual-use problem
presents all who are committed to combating the BW threat with the
dilemma of how best to assess the capabilities of any given facility
against the intent to develop biological weapons.
What then can I say about the evidence for our assessment? The nature
of biological weapons makes it difficult to procure clear,
incontrovertible proof that a country is engaged in illicit biological
weapons research, production, weaponization and stockpiling. Cuba's
sophisticated denial and deception practices make our task even more
difficult. That said we have a sound basis for our judgment that Cuba
has at least a limited, developmental, offensive biological warfare
research and development effort. I am prepared to discuss the evidence
we do have in a closed session or leave behind a classified statement
for the record.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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