Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

 Introduction

I am very pleased to have this opportunity of speaking to such a distinguished audience on "The European Union and Cuba." As we have seen from the case of Elian Gonzalez, Cuba remains a sensitive issue for many Americans. But Cuba, with its historic ties to Europe, is also a country of considerable interest to the EU. It is also a country that has led to serious policy differences between the US and EU. Hence the importance of an open dialogue on how best to achieve our shared interest in promoting democracy, human rights and a market economy in Cuba.

Cuba remains the only Latin American country that has not signed a co-operation agreement with the EU. The framework for the relations of the EU with Cuba is thus the Common Position that was adopted in December 1996.

The main objective of the common position is to encourage a peaceful transition to pluralist democracy, respect for human rights and other fundamental freedoms as well as a sustainable recovery and improvement in the living conditions of the Cuban people.

Although we thus share with the US the vision of a free and democratic society in Cuba, we have chosen a different approach to attain this goal. The common position distances itself from the use of coercive measures that could increase the economic hardship of the Cuban people. Instead it gives priority to a constructive dialogue with the Cuban authorities and civil society.

The common position leaves open the possibility of negotiating a co-operation agreement as the Cuban authorities make progress towards democracy.

To fulfil these objectives the common position foresees the following four means:

- an intensified dialogue with the Cuban authorities and different sectors of Cuban society

• an evaluation of Cuban internal and foreign policies according to the same standards that apply to EU relations with other countries, in particular the international human rights conventions
• the provision, by Member States and the Commission, of "ad hoc" humanitarian assistance , to be distributed mainly through NGOs

- the engagement of Member States and the Commission in economic co-operation in support of the opening and liberalisation of the Cuban economy

In my view, the common position represents a rather balanced approach:

As mentioned earlier, the human rights situation in Cuba is a top priority for the EU. We continue to closely follow the situation in Cuba and to remind the Cuban government of its responsibilities in this field. For example:

- in March, last year, the EU issued a declaration on the outcome of the trial against the four members of the internal dissidence group, appealing for their release

- following recent measures adopted by the Cuban regime tightening the penal code, the EU adopted in June last year a "declaration on the death penalty in Cuba," regretting that Cuban authorities had enlarged the scope of the death penalty and recalling the European position on this issue. [n. b.: EU also criticises use of death penalty in US];

- the European Parliament adopted a critical "resolution on the human rights situation in Cuba" in March 1999;

- and a human rights working group composed of the EU heads of mission has been established in Havana to monitor the situation;

It is worth adding that human rights in Cuba are also an important part of the agenda of the EU/US dialogue on Cuba. The constant EU pressure on Cuba over human rights has had some effect. Cuba has signed a number of international conventions on human rights and has improved its record in the past year. For example, EU leaders were allowed to meet with prominent dissidents during the Ibero-American summit. The Catholic Church has been granted more freedom to operate. And according to Amnesty International 1999 report, the human rights situation in Cuba is no better or worse than a number of other central or south American countries.

Let me now turn to the limited EU co-operation with Cuba. These activities largely provide for ad hoc humanitarian aid and support of the economic opening and have been carried out through the following four instruments:

• first, humanitarian and emergency aid through the EC humanitarian office ECHO (9.8 MEURO in 1998 and approximately the same in 1999). The aim of this type of aid, distributed by European NGOs, is to assist the most vulnerable segments of the Cuban population (children, elderly people, disabled, etc.)
• second, aid through co-financing with NGOs. This instrument allows the Commission to co-finance projects presented by European NGOs in collaboration with Cuban counterparts. This type of co-operation is currently expanding from 1.0 MEURO in 1997 to 2.4 MEURO in 1998. Apart from the specific results of the projects co-financed it encourages the creation of a civil society

• third, traditional economic co-operation. Activities here focus on support to institutional reforms, support to private sector development as well as initiatives that promote the familiarisation of Cubans with European democratic, cultural and socio-economic values. Some examples include a course in business administration given by well-known European universities in Havana, technical assistance for the reform of the tax system, participation of European firms to the Havana fair, etc. There were 2.1 MEUROs allocated for this in 1999 and 5MEUROs are foreseen for 2000.

• fourth, food security. This instrument has provided assistance amounting to 7.2 MEUROs since 1996.

• and finally, regional co-operation. Cuba participates in programmes of de-centralised co-operation such as ALPHA (university exchanges), URBAL (co-operation among cities), ECIP, AL-INVEST for private investment or co-operation in the field of energy or research.

For many years the EU has been supporting regional integration around the world. The EU believes that its own experience demonstrates that regional integration is compatible with a progressive economic opening and integration in the world economy. Moreover, regional integration processes have proven a powerful means of political stability and economic prosperity. Cuba, for its part, has been trying to diversify its foreign relations with a particular emphasis on regional contacts. This has allowed for the development of contacts in a number of regional fora, in particular:

• the participation of Cuba to the first EU-Latin American and Caribbean summit last year;

• the Ibero-American Summit which was held in Havana last fall;

• the participation of Cuba in regional co-operation programmes like ECIP and AL-INVEST, which I have already mentioned.

It is also worth mentioning the observer status granted to Cuba in CARICOM (Caribbean community) and CARIFORUM, two organisations which have close relations with the EU in the context of the Lomé convention which covers trade and aid to developing countries.

At the request of the ACP countries, the EU accepted in June 1998 that Cuba would participate as an observer in the current negotiations for a successor agreement to the Lomé convention. However, this does not mean that that Cuba will automatically join the new agreement, even though the ACP countries have recently voted unanimously to support Cuba’s membership. Membership will be regarded on the light of the provisions set up under the new Lome Convention which include strict provisions on human rights and the rule of law.

The origin of the present situation goes back to 1996 when the US adopted the Helms-Burton Act which seeks to restrict, by extraterritorial sanctions, the investment of foreign firms in property expropriated by the Castro regime from US nationals. The EU responded by bringing a WTO Panel against the Act and by adopting a "Blocking Statute" preventing EU companies from complying with the Act.

A truce was found on 18 May 1998 at the EU-US summit in London. The essential elements were (a) the granting by the US (following Congressional amendment of the Act) of a waiver to Title IV of the Act (refusal of entry to the US to key executives and shareholders of companies which have invested in confiscated – including Cuban-American – property in Cuba; and (b) the application by both sides of a set of investment disciplines aimed at inhibiting investments in property expropriated in violation of international law (including properties in Cuba).

It seems that many Americans and American companies share this view. According to one recent poll in Business Week, 67% of Americans are opposed to the embargo. The growing interest of American firms in Cuba was evident from the visits last year of the President of the Chamber of Commerce and the Governor of Illinois. This year, nearly 100 healthcare companies, including Baxter, Eli Lilly, Eastman Kodak and Pfizer, participated in a trade fair in Havana at the end of January. John Block, who was the US Secretary for Agriculture during the Reagan administration and who now heads a food company, also visited Cuba in January in the company of Monsanto, Dow AgroSciences, Premium Standard Farms and Archer Daniels Midland. Mr. Block said on his return, "Here we are standing and watching everybody else developing markets and doing business in Cuba while we sit and twiddle our thumbs."

The Cuban government, for its part, seems keen to attract US investment. It recently opened up a 112,000 sq. km. area in the Gulf of Mexico for deep-water oil exploration by foreign companies – including American.

It is important not to exaggerate the FDI possibilities in Cuba. Vice President Carlos Lage, said in a January TV interview, that accumulated actual foreign investment in Cuba was a little more than $2bn out of $4bn formally pledged. This presence ranges from tourism and mining to financial services and manufacturing. Spain and Canada are the leading foreign investors followed by Italy, France and Britain. Total European investment in Cuba during the period 1990-98 was just over $640 million.

Given that the embargo has failed to bring about a change of regime in Cuba is it time to change track? Indeed many dissidents inside Cuba and neutral observers, such as Carl Groth, the UN rapporteur on Cuba, believe that it has actually strengthened Castro’s position. Even the US Congress has expresed concern over the impact of the embargo on the population and passed the 1997 Cuban Humanitarian Act to allow for the export of some foodstuffs and medicines to the island.

Soon after the Ibero-Latin America summit, the Portugese Prime Minister, Antonio Guterres, expressed his concern at the US embargo in a letter to President Clinton in which he stated his belief that its ending would favour an opening of the Cuban regime and national reconciliation.

In conclusion, I would agree with those who suggest that American policy towards Cuba is counterproductive. It merely serves to strengthen Castro who skillfully uses anti-Americanism to consolidate control. Helms Burton is an unnecessary irritant in relations between the EU and US; and disputes arising from this act can only serve Castro’s interests.

Commissioner Chris Patten has been very clear on our aims in Cuba – and explained our position to Senator Helms last November. We also want a free and democratic society in Cuba. We also believe that the respect for individual rights, including the sanctity of private property, is fundamental to such a society. But we do not believe that you, or we or anybody else, have a right to impose on others a certain vision of how this is best achieved in Cuba. There are no quick solutions in seeking to change the situation in Cuba but we believe that a policy of constructive engagement has more chance of success than one of isolation and embargoes.

Thank you very much.