Backgrounder: Modernizing the People's Liberation Army of China
Council on Foreign Relations
Author: Carin Zissis, Staff Writer
December 5, 2006
Introduction
As the commander in chief of the massive People’s Liberation Army (PLA), President Hu Jintao plans to reinforce his leadership with his mandate to stamp out corruption among the force’s ranks. The PLA has already undergone major changes, becoming a more professional, modern force—despite its continued allegiance to the Chinese Communist Party. Beijing now seeks to modernize outdated weapons systems and structures and bring the PLA up to speed with the militaries of other major world powers. But the transformation of the PLA from a large ground force to a multifaceted military capable of projecting power beyond China’s border and coastline prompts concern about Beijing’s strategic ambitions.
What is the People’s Liberation Army of China?
The People’s Liberation Army is the main arm of China’s military and the largest force in the world, with more than 2.3 million active duty troops. Although called an “army” because it originally consisted only of ground forces, the PLA also encompasses the Chinese navy, air force, and strategic missile forces commonly known as the Second Artillery Corps. A conscript force, the PLA is organized into seven military regions and the Chinese Communist Party sets its policy. The other two arms of the Chinese military are the People’s Armed Police and the People’s militia.
Who leads the PLA?
Since its inception in 1927, when it was known as the Red Army, the PLA has served as the military wing of the Chinese Communist Party, and the party’s Central Military Commission exercises authority over the armed forces. The Chinese constitution of 1982 created a state Central Military Commission to increase civilian control over the military and create another layer of oversight. However, the two commissions have the same leadership and the party retains its traditional leadership role.
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Copyright 2006 by the Council on Foreign Relations. This material is republished on GlobalSecurity.org with specific permission from the cfr.org. Reprint and republication queries for this article should be directed to cfr.org.
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