UNITED24 - Make a charitable donation in support of Ukraine!

Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

Index

State Department Noon Briefing

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
DAILY PRESS BRIEFING
DPB #117
TUESDAY, NOVEMBER 21, 2000, 1:05 P.M.
(ON THE RECORD UNLESS OTHERWISE NOTED)
 

MR. BOUCHER: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I'd like to start out
with a statement on China and missiles. And I'll try to go through this
very carefully for you and then answer what questions you have, and then
we'll have somebody available at the end of the briefing who can further
explain, as necessary, the areas that I may not be precise on.

First of all, we welcome the People's Republic of China Foreign Ministry
Spokesperson's statement of November 21 regarding China's clear policy
commitment not to assist in any way other countries to develop ballistic
missiles that can be used to deliver nuclear weapons and to further improve
and reinforce its export control system, including by publishing at an early
date a comprehensive export control list of missile-related items, including
dual-use items.

This development can strengthen cooperation between the United States and
China to achieve our common objective of preventing the spread of ballistic
missiles that threaten regional and international security. In
consideration of China's commitment to strengthen its missile-related export
control system, we have decided to waive economic sanctions required by US
law for past assistance by Chinese entities to missile programs in Pakistan
and Iran.

Given the relationship between missile nonproliferation and peaceful space
cooperation, the United States will now resume the processing of licenses
that are necessary for commercial space cooperation between US and Chinese
companies, such as launching US satellites in China. In addition, the
United States and China will resume discussions as soon as possible on
extending the 1995 US-China agreement regarding international trade and
commercial launch services.

The US stands ready to continue to cooperate and hold consultations with
China and other countries on the issues of nonproliferation with a view to
strengthening their respective export control systems for missile-related
equipment and technology.

If I can just add at this point, this has been a subject of ongoing
discussion with the Chinese for quite some time, many years in fact. I know
there have been reports about China's missile-related activities in the
past. What we have done here is to work out an arrangement that commits
China not to assist other countries in the development of Missile Technology
Control Regime Class ballistic missiles in any way, and to put in place
comprehensive missile-related export controls. In exchange, the US side has
decided to waive sanctions under US law for past Chinese assistance to
missile programs in Pakistan and Iran, and to resume certain commercial
space interactions with China. Sanctions have been imposed upon Pakistani
and Iranian recipients of the Chinese assistance.

The effective implementation of China's new commitments would be another
important step by China to join the international nonproliferation
mainstream, and it would promote international security and further US-China
cooperation.

China's statement includes broad new commitments on nonproliferation and
security importance, but its value ultimately will depend on whether those
commitments are implemented fully and conscientiously. In that connection,
while the United States is waiving sanctions that would otherwise be imposed
for past transfers to missile programs in Pakistan and Iran, the waiver does
not apply to any transfers that might occur in the future. We are confident
that the next Administration will follow this question closely.

These discussions with China have been ongoing for some time. I think most
recently we had a team go to Beijing after the talks with North Korea in
Kuala Lumpur about a month ago. The team went up to Beijing and held some
further discussions. This was certainly a topic of the Secretary's
discussions and the President's discussions in Brunei, where they confirmed
the understandings and emphasized the importance of full and complete
implementation of the understandings that have been reached.

So with that introduction, I will be glad to take your questions.

QUESTION: Do you have any more information on the sanctions which are being
waived?

MR. BOUCHER: Let me try to go through that as much as I can. There is a
limit to the amount I can go into this because of the kind of information we
have and where we got it. We do have an ongoing process that reviews very
carefully all the available information on potentially sanctionable
activity. The missile sanctions law imposes a number of requirements that
must be met with high confidence in order for the legal standard for
sanctions determination to be met.

Moreover, because we do take seriously our responsibility and because of the
serious national security foreign policy and economic consequences of
imposing sanctions, we have always insisted on a high standard of evidence.
These factors contributed to the amount of time necessary to make these
sanctions determinations.

On the activities itself, some Chinese entities and Pakistani entities were
involved in transfers of Missile Technology Control Regime Category I items;
that is, complete missiles, their major subsystems, or their production
facilities, and of Missile Technology Control Regime Category II items,
components and materials used to make Category I missiles and subsystems to
Pakistani entities that contributed to Missile Technology Control Regime
Class Missile Programs in Pakistan.

With regard to Iran, some Chinese entities and Iranian entities were
involved in transfers of Missile Technology Control Regime Category II items
to Iranian entities that contributed to Missile Technology Control Regime
Class Missile Programs in Iran. But that is about as much detail as I can
give you in describing the transfers

QUESTION: But is it - I take it that the waiver is allowed under the
statute as the President's prerogative, so Congress does not have to approve
the waiver?

MR. BOUCHER: I'm assuming that's true. I'll have to reconfirm that for
you.

QUESTION: Do you know - leaders in Congress that may be critical of this,
have they been consulted? What kind of congress notification -

MR. BOUCHER: We've been doing congressional consultations this morning.

QUESTION: This morning?

MR. BOUCHER: This morning. So I don't have a readout yet.

QUESTION: The first thing is, do you know how it is that Xinhua actually
announced this about 45 minutes ago?

MR. BOUCHER: Do I know how it is? We agreed that we'd do it more or less
simultaneously, and they wanted to do it before the morning came.

QUESTION: And the second thing is, are there sanctions against Pakistani
and Iranian companies that are being lifted, or is this strictly on Chinese
entities?

MR. BOUCHER: No, the sanctions are being imposed upon the Pakistani and the
Iranian entities.

QUESTION: They're being maintained, or were they being newly imposed?

MR. BOUCHER: Hang on a sec. I've got the entities listed somewhere here.
Okay. We determined under US law that a number of Chinese entities
transferred missile-related equipment and technology to entities in Iran and
Pakistan; that those transfers contributed to so-called Category I missile
programs in Iran and Pakistan; and that all of the entities knew they were
involved in Category I missile activities.

Therefore, under our law, sanctions against these Chinese and Iranian and
Pakistani entities are required to be either imposed or waived, as permitted
by the sanctions law. In consideration of China's commitment not to assist
the development of MTCR-class ballistic missiles in any way and to
strengthen its missile-related export controls, we are waiving the sanctions
required against the Chinese entities.

We are imposing sanctions against the Iranian and Pakistani entities, and
those sanctions will be announced in the Federal Register shortly. The
sanctioned entities in Iran are the Defense Industries Organization, the
Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces Logistics, and their sub-units and
successors. The sanctioned entities in Pakistan are the Ministry of Defense
and the Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission, and their sub-units
and successors.

QUESTION: Can you go through this one more - the Ministry in Iran is -

MR. BOUCHER: In Iran, it's the Ministry of - sorry, the Ministry of
Defense Armed Forces Logistics, I guess, Agency, Armed Forces Logistics
Command, or whatever, and the Defense Industries Organization, and their
sub-units and successors. In Pakistan, it's the Ministry of Defense, the
Space and Upper Atmospheric Research Commission, and their sub-units and
successors.

QUESTION: What, in effect, do these sanctions mean? What happens? I mean,
do you stop dealing with the Ministry of Defense or put a hold on defense
purchases?

MR. BOUCHER: What they mean is that, for a two-year period, all new
individual export licenses for Commerce- or State-controlled items and all
new US Government contracts are denied to the Pakistani Ministry of Defense,
Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission, and their sub-units and
successors. In addition, for a two-year period, all imports into the US of
products produced by the Pakistani Ministry of Defense and its sub-units and
successors will be denied. Finally, for a two-year period, all new
individual export licenses for Commerce- or State-controlled MTCR Annex
items and all new US Government contracts related to MTCR Annex items are
denied to the Iranian entities, the Defense Industry Organization, the
Ministry of Defense, and their sub-units and successors.

Because of the ongoing US embargo against Iran and preexisting US sanctions
against Iran and Pakistan, the new sanctions will actually have very limited
economic effect, but they do send a strong signal that the United States
opposes these countries' missiles programs.

QUESTION: Well, what are the current sanctions against Pakistan right now?

MR. BOUCHER: I'd have to look those up for you, but what they generally
cover is the area of military and dual-use items.

QUESTION: Can you elaborate on what you mean by an entity and whether in
fact, specifically with regard to China, because so much of the defense
industry is run by the government, if in fact the Chinese Government itself
was aware of these sales?

MR. BOUCHER: It is a hard question to answer because we all know that there
are Chinese entities that have close government connections, including being
part of ministries and things like that, so I don't think at this point I'm
able to answer it. What happened was, because the Chinese Government itself
committed to impose and publish a set of controls that were of the same sort
as the Missile Technology Control Regime and agreed to implement these
restrictions for the future, we were able to waive the sanctions that might
be applied to Chinese entities generally.

QUESTION: Could I just follow up on that? Why does the US think that China
felt it necessary to essentially duplicate part of the MTCR and sign that,
rather than just signing on to the MCTR? What distinction is there?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, I mean, first of all, membership in the Missile
Technology Control Regime is taken by consensus of the members; there are
currently 32 countries. China's new commitments, if they are implemented
fully, certainly would constitute major steps towards Chinese membership in
the regime in the future. But, at this point, what is important is getting
control of the activities that might be considered proliferating, and for
China to do this we think is a major step forward.

QUESTION: I'm sorry, does that mean that China would like to join the MTCR
but is not eligible right now?

MR. BOUCHER: No, I think you have to ask China what their considerations
are with joining or not joining. What is important to us is that China
control its missile-related exports, and what we have done here is reached
agreement with the Chinese, through many months of very detailed discussion
on the items and the controls and the publication of rules and the means of
control, to make sure that China will impose a set of controls that are
largely equivalent to the Missile Technology Control Regime ones.

QUESTION: Richard, from your understanding of what the Chinese are
proposing in this, how difficult would it be for there to be any leakage of
this kind of technology from China now, if the rules were applied? Are you
pretty confident that this is hermetically sealed?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, if the rules are applied, there won't be any leakage.
How difficult is it to apply the rules? We believe that the Chinese
Government is capable and indeed is committed to applying these new rules
and to implementing thoroughly their decisions not to assist other countries
in developing missile technology - ballistic missiles of this class. And
that is why, I think as I noted, the Secretary's discussions with the
Chinese Foreign Minister or the Vice Premier, the President's discussions of
this topic with the Chinese President in Brunei, focused on the issue of
implementation and the need to thoroughly implement the commitments that
China is making here.

QUESTION: You mentioned, I believe, if I heard you correctly, that Iran
won't suffer very much economically because of the current situation. What
will the economic effect be on Pakistan?

MR. BOUCHER: I think I put both economic - both Iran and Pakistan in the
same sentence there; that because these duplicate other sanctions, the
direct economic effect may not be large, but it certainly makes it very
clear our position against the development of missiles in these places.

QUESTION: Can I go back to Jonathan's question? Can you get into any kind
of discussion about what sort of verification - have you set up any sort of
verification steps on this?

MR. BOUCHER: I don't have anything for you on that, except that both China
and the United States said that we would remain ready to continue to
cooperate in consultations with each other on these matters, and therefore
on the complete and full implementation of these restrictions. And
obviously that is something that we have done all along, and now we will be
continuing to do it in terms of the rules that China is putting in place.

QUESTION: You said this statement came from the Spokesman's office. Where
should we attribute it in terms of government agency, or government official
from China?

MR. BOUCHER: It's the Chinese Foreign Ministry's Spokesman's statement.
And I not only have it for you in Chinese, but I also have a translation,
which some of you might appreciate. We'll give Andrea the Chinese. And
then we'll have copies of my statement available by the end of the briefing.

QUESTION: I actually have another question. Sorry. Can you say in terms
of what will now this allow US companies in terms of what kind of business
would it be allowed to do in just plain terms, with China now that you have
looked at the sanctions?

MR. BOUCHER: Okay. I think I mentioned in the statement that we will
resume processing certain licenses and resume some discussions with the
Chinese on missile launches. Let me go back to more detail.

If the sanctions had been imposed upon the Chinese entities, one consequence
would have been to preclude commercial space interactions, like launches of
US satellites on Chinese rockets. We decided several months ago not to
begin negotiations on the new US - on a new US-China space launch agreement
to replace the 1995 agreement that expires next year, and not to conduct
normal processing of export licenses for commercial space interactions until
the sanctions process has concluded.

Now that the sanctions process has been concluded, and due to the fact that
China is imposing its own set of controls on exports that contribute to
ballistic missile programs, we have been able to make this decision to waive
sanctions that otherwise would have been required against Chinese entities;
therefore, we have decided to resume discussions on the launch agreement and
to resume the normal processing of commercial space licenses involving
China.

Now, that doesn't require US approval for any specific exports to China.
All applications for these export license continue to be subject to
case-by-case review on the merits of the individual license. They also
remain subject to normal requirements for technology transfer restrictions
and other things like that. But we will simply be lifting the suspension
that has been imposed and return to a case-by-case review.

QUESTION: I'm sorry, but could you - you said you're resuming discussions
on a launch agreement? I mean, I don't know - have we ever helped the
Chinese launch any satellites, and would this be launch discussions on
launching a satellite in China?

MR. BOUCHER: This has taken place in the past where US-made satellites have
been launched on Chinese boosters subject to rigorous technology safeguards
that are administered by the Department of Defense. And so companies can
apply to us to have their satellites launched on Chinese rockets, basically.
 

QUESTION: I believe it was - was it Hughes that caused the original
problem about passing technology that was not allowed?

MR. BOUCHER: Well, Chinese exports of missile technology is a problem that
we've dealt with here. The relation to satellite launches, yes, there were,
I think, several companies that were being looked at for the way they had
handled the technology safeguards that are required. Those issues continue.
Obviously our licensing takes into account any legal issues that are related
to the specific companies. Those aspects are not affected by the new
arrangements with China.

QUESTION: So will these companies be allowed to deal with China again for
satellite launches? Is that what you're saying?

MR. BOUCHER: That would depend on a specific case-by-case review. I don't
have a blanket approval of all licenses or of any specific company's
license. That will depend on the specific applications and how we see the
situation. With regard to the company, it's the legal situation as well as
its ability to apply the required technology safeguards.

QUESTION: But they can apply, like anybody else?

MR. BOUCHER: They can apply.

QUESTION: One final question on this so that we don't torture Barry too
much longer. Is it fair to presume at this point, Richard, that with this
now taken care of on Class I MTCR missiles, that the US doesn't have any
other proliferation concerns with China?

MR. BOUCHER: Proliferation is a broad area. I would have to check it. But
certainly on the missile issue we think that this takes care of the need for
-- of the need for China to have a system to control exports that contribute
to ballistic missile programs. They are instituting a comprehensive set of
controls. We think that's important and we welcome that; and, in return,
we're waiving sanctions.

But as I've stressed, I think several times, the key to this is going to be
implementation and making sure that implementation is thorough and that all
Chinese entities, be they government-associated or not, adhere to this, and
that the system works. So I'm sure there will be individual instances that
we might raise from time to time in order to make sure that these rules are
fully implemented.

QUESTION: Would you take the question under whatever it is you do and see
if there is an answer?

MR. BOUCHER: I'd have to check on the nuclear area, the missiles and all
that other stuff. I'll check and see if we have a broad statement on
Chinese proliferation.

(The briefing was concluded at 2:10 P.M.)



NEWSLETTER
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list