U.S. Still Ahead of China in Military Capabilities, Says Repor
CHINA'S CONVENTIONAL FORCE MILITARY MODERNIZATION
(Senate - October 10, 2000)
Mr. AKAKA. Mr. President, I call attention to a report prepared at my
request by the Library of Congress' Congressional Research Service
entitled `China's Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions: Background
and Analysis.' As ranking member of the Subcommittee on International
Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services of the Governmental
Affairs Committee, I have been keenly interested in the implications
of Chinese conventional force modernization on Asian stability.
I am providing copies of this excellent analysis, which was authorized
by Shirley Kan, Christopher Bolkcom, and Ronald O'Rourke, to all
Senators. I believe my colleagues will find the report useful and
insightful as we assess American policy towards China.
The report examines the major foreign conventional weapon systems that
China has acquired or has committed to acquire since 1990, with
particular attention to implications for U.S. security concerns. It
pays special attention to Chinese air and naval acquisitions and
describes how Chinese leaders began to pay greater attention to
modernizing the People's Liberation Army, PLA, in the early 1990s,
transforming it from a force mainly oriented towards domestic security
to one focused on modern warfare. Since then, China has ranked among
the top 10 leading arms buyers among developing nations.
According to the analysis, the catalyst for PLA modernization,
including the procurement of advanced foreign military equipment, was
China's view that its top security problem was preventing Taiwan's
permanent separation and securing unification as `one China.' However,
additional security goals may be precluding Japan's rise as the
strongest Asian power, ensuring Chinese influence over the Korean
Peninsula, supporting Chinese claims to territory in the East and
South China Seas, subduing India's quest for power, and countering
American power in the region.
As China modernizes its forces, it is clear that arms sales from
Russia are essential, providing advance aircraft, including Su-27
fighters, missile systems, submarines, and surface ships. The report
is unclear as to the strategic advantage derived by Russia in selling
such advanced systems to a country with which it historically has had
difficulty along a shared border.
The report concludes that the operational significance of these major
qualitative upgrades through foreign arms acquisitions remains to be
seen and will depend in large measure on the PLA's ability to
demonstrate an ability to conduct effective joint military operations.
The report also does an excellent job of comparing Chinese new
conventional weapons to American capabilities, suggesting that in most
cases--with some critical exceptions--American forces still retain a
tactical and strategic edge. For example, the report mentions the
potential threat from a nuclear armed SS-N-22, an anti-ship cruise
missile, and the superior capabilities of the Su-27 fighter aircraft.
Obviously, the United States should not be complacent. The Chinese
are, for the first time in modern history, developing a capability to
project air and naval forces beyond their coastal areas. The United
States needs to seek ways to address any threat to American interests
as a result of that capability not only through pursuing our own
military modernization program but also through a strategic dialogue
with China which reassures China that we have a shared desire in
regional stability. Indeed, in many ways, initiating a productive
diplomatic dialogue with China on Asian security may be more difficult
than maintaining our qualitative edge on power projection.
Again, I commend this excellent report by the Congressional Research
Service which was coordinated by Shirley Kan, a specialist in National
Security Policy. It is one of the most comprehensive, unclassified
assessments currently available on Chinese conventional arms
acquisitions.
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