18 May 2000
Excerpts: Senator Arlen Specter Says Vote "No" on China PNTR
(Cites China's record on arms proliferation) (2760) While the attention regarding the fate of legislation granting China permanent Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status has focused on the House of Representatives, where the vote is expected to be close, senators are also expressing their viewpoints on the merits of granting permanent NTR status to China. Senator Arlen Specter (Republican of Pennsylvania) spoke out against PNTR for China in a May 17 speech to the Senate. "I am opposed, strongly opposed to granting permanent normal trade relations to the People's Republic of China because of their record on nuclear proliferation, of weapons of mass destruction, because of their record on human rights," Specter said. The Pennsylvania Republican said the actions of the Clinton Administration led him to vote "no" on PNTR. "The executive branch," he said, "has not imposed sanctions as required by law to stop or inhibit such nuclear proliferation but, in fact, has taken affirmative action to grant waivers." Following is an excerpt from the Congressional Record of May 17: (begin excerpts) NORMAL TRADE RELATIONS FOR THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Senate -- May 17, 2000) Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I thank the leader for entering the order giving me 30 minutes for a statement this morning. I have sought that time to speak on what I believe to be one of the most important issues which will be presented to the Congress this year; that is, the issue of permanent normal trade relations for the People's Republic of China. The Senate is scheduled to take up this issue sometime next month, depending upon what the House of Representatives does. The House of Representatives is scheduled to consider this matter next week. I thought it appropriate to make this statement at this time, to give my views on important issues of weapons of mass destruction and nuclear proliferation, insights which I gained, in large part, from serving on the Senate Intelligence Committee for some 8 years, including 2 years as chairman during 1995 and 1996, and other insights on related matters which I have seen in my capacity as chairman of the Judiciary subcommittee on oversight of the Department of Justice. My own record has been that of a strong free trader. I have supported NAFTA, the North American Free Trade Agreement. I have supported free trade with the Caribbean nations. I supported, last week, free trade with the African nations. I believe the long tugs and pulls of the economy, both domestic and international, strongly support the notion of free trade. But I am opposed, strongly opposed to granting permanent normal trade relations to the People's Republic of China because of their record on nuclear proliferation, of weapons of mass destruction, because of their record on human rights, and because the executive branch, the administration, has not imposed sanctions as required by law to stop or inhibit such nuclear proliferation but, in fact, has taken affirmative action to grant waivers. So it is necessary for Congress to exercise our constitutional responsibility of checks and balances and congressional oversight of the executive branch, to see to it the national interest is preserved. The Congress has authority under the Constitution. There are some constitutional inhibitions which prohibit the Congress from delegating that authority to the executive branch. I am not necessarily saying that permanent trade with China would be such an unconstitutional delegation, but at the very minimum it is an unwise delegation, based on this state of the record, based on the necessity to impose restraints on conduct of the People's Republic of China, not only as to human rights--fundamental, important human rights--but of greater magnitude, the threat to international peace through their proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. During my tenure on the Intelligence Committee I saw many instances of the People's Republic of China supplying rogue nations, nations which constitute a threat to world order, with weapons of mass destruction. For example, the People's Republic of China provided M-11 missiles to Pakistan back in 1992. Those missiles, now armed with nuclear warheads, are pointed at India, creating a nuclear threat to the subcontinent, the possibility of a nuclear exchange between India and Pakistan, and threatening world peace. The People's Republic of China has assisted North Korea's missile program by providing specialty steel, accelerometers, gyroscopes, and precision grinding machinery. The People's Republic of China is providing assistance to Libya's long-range missile program by assisting in the building of a hypersonic wind tunnel which is useful for designing missiles and cooperating in the development of Libya's Al Fatah missile which has a range of some 600 miles, threatening peace and stability in that area. The People's Republic of China has helped Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, and Libya in a way which is very destabilizing. What has been the reaction of the Clinton administration to these issues? The transfer of M-11 missiles to Pakistan falls under category 1 of the Missile Technology Control Regime, which is set up to establish gradations in seriousness of violations. That is category 1. The 1991 National Defense Authorization Act mandates the President to deny for not less than 2 years certain licenses, and we find not only has the President not taken those steps on sanctions, but has, in addition, moved ahead and granted affirmative waivers to facilitate developing China's ballistic missile capability. Those waivers were granted in a celebrated case on the application of Loral Space and Technology. A series of events, beginning in 1992, involving both Hughes and Loral demonstrates a very serious problem on transmitting to the People's Republic of China high-level technology. On December 21, 1992, a Chinese Long March 2E rocket carrying a Hughes manufactured satellite crashed shortly after takeoff. Without attaining the required State Department license, the Hughes personnel engaged in a series of discussions with Chinese officials, giving them very important information. On January 26, 1995, a Chinese Long March 2E missile carrying another Hughes satellite exploded approximately 50 seconds after takeoff. A 1998 State Department assessment showed that, `Hughes directly supported the Chinese space program in the areas of [accident analysis] . . . .' The Cox committee reviewed these matters and called for a very detailed investigation as to what had actually occurred. On February 15, 1996, the People's Republic of China's Long March 3B missile exploded with a communications satellite on board built by Loral. Following these explosions, Loral and Hughes transmitted to the People's Republic of China their assessments of why the rockets failed. The assessments required a prior license from the Department of State which had not been obtained. In May 1997, a classified Department of Defense report concluded that Loral and Hughes significantly enhanced the guidance and control systems of the People's Republic of China's nuclear ballistic systems. As a result of the Department of Defense report, the U.S. Department of Justice began a criminal investigation of Loral and Hughes. Then Loral applied for a waiver from the Clinton administration to launch another satellite from a Chinese rocket. The Department of Justice weighed in and objected to a Presidential grant of a waiver on the ground that such a waiver would have `a significant adverse impact on any prosecution that might take place based on a pending investigation of export violations by Loral.' Notwithstanding the very serious issue of China having sold M-11 missiles to Pakistan creating a threat of nuclear war, notwithstanding the fact that Loral and Hughes gave an assessment to China which significantly enhanced their nuclear capability system, notwithstanding the fact that there was a criminal investigation pending by the Department of Justice, notwithstanding the fact that the Department of Justice objected to the grant of a waiver on the ground that it would have an adverse impact on their criminal investigation potential prosecution, the President on February 18 of 1998 granted the waiver. It is my view that it is indispensable for Congress to maintain close oversight on the effort by the administration now to grant permanent normal trade relations with the People's Republic of China. The preferable course, by far, in my view, is for Congress to make a year-by-year analysis as to what is happening so we can exert the maximum pressure on the People's Republic of China and not delegate to the President broader authority to initiate action which will grant permanent trade status to China so there is no opportunity for the Congress to impose leverage to try to secure China's compliance with their international commitments. So when Congress has the authority to decide on normal trade relations as to China, on a year-by-year basis, we ought not to give up that very important, that very powerful prerogative. We ought not to give up on the recommendation of the Clinton administration that China should have it. We ought not to give it to China in the face of their flagrant record of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and in the face of the flagrant record by the Clinton administration of not acting with sanctions but even granting affirmative waivers to facilitate the development of Chinese capability for ballistic projection. I believe there is substantial evidence that the People's Republic of China will respond to pressure and to leverage. When we talk about the sanctions, we are talking about something which is really in the hands of the executive branch. But when we talk about granting permanent normal trade relations, that is a power which is in the hands of the Congress. It is very difficult--really impossible--for the Congress to legislate with sufficient specificity to compel the executive branch to impose sanctions. Some of my colleagues are talking about additional legislation. But at the end of every line of public policy, at the end of every line of sanctions, at the end of the rainbow, every time we take up these issues, there is an inevitable grant of authority to the President, as Chief Executive Officer, to grant a waiver under certain circumstances for national security reasons. When we talk about the issue of trusting the administration, trusting the executive branch, I am reminded of President Reagan's comment when dealing with the Soviet Union. There was a lot of wisdom in his comment about `trust, but verify' -- `trust, but verify' -- deal with the Soviet Union, make arrangements with the Soviet Union, but verify to see that it is carried out. There may well be an inherent institutional distrust built into the Constitution with the requirement of oversight and with the requirement of checks and balances. Perhaps `institutional distrust' is a little strong. But in the context of this record, with what China has done, with what Loral has done, to have a waiver granted under these circumstances certainly requires that there be a determination, at the very minimum, on the part of Congress that if we are to trust, we ought to verify, and we ought not to give up any of our powerful weapons to see to it that the People's Republic of China does not proliferate weapons of mass destruction. The condition of normal trade relations with the United States is an item which is very highly prized by the People's Republic of China. And it is one which we ought to maintain in reserve to evaluate their conduct on a year-by-year basis. It is my view that when you deal with the question of weapons of mass destruction, and when China arms Pakistan, and when China arms Libya, and when China arms Iran, when China arms North Korea, those are matters of much greater consequence than the dollar profit to be gained by greater trade with China. When people say, `If we don't sell it, somebody else will,' I respond to that comment emphatically by saying we ought not to sell it. We ought to take a leadership role in the world to try to persuade our allies not to sell it either because the almighty dollar is not worth the risk we run by giving China a free hand to proliferate weapons of mass destruction. If we are to take a cost-benefit ratio relationship, taking a look at our $300 billion defense budget, and apportioning a part to what we have to do with the 7th Fleet in the Taiwan Strait when the People's Republic of China threatens Taiwan and a test missile drops there in their bullying efforts, considering what we have to do by way of defensive efforts, it is a bad deal in dollars and cents for whatever profit we may gain with our trade with the People's Republic of China. Mr. President, the question of human rights is a very important one. The record in China has been deplorable. We have utilized the trade issue to try to impose leverage on China, to try to persuade them to improve their human rights. It is a complex conclusion as to whether, on that issue alone, the people of China might be better off with expanded trade, which would improve the quality of life and living in China, which might move them along the road to democratization which, in the long run, might have an overall beneficial affect on human rights in China. And on a year-by-year basis, I have supported granting most-favored-nation status. In light of the developments on the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, I am not sure that even that ought to be done on a year-by-year basis. When we take a look at the violation of human rights, including religious persecution by the People's Republic of China, it is deplorable. I make reference to that during the course of these remarks to point out the problems of violation of human rights. It happens again and again and again--repressive action taken by the People's Republic of China. That is a factor which should weigh heavily in our consideration of granting of trade relations to the People's Republic of China. In conclusion--perhaps the two most popular words in any speech--I believe that we have to give very sober consideration to the totality of our relationship with the People's Republic of China. In commenting about a nation of 1.250 billion people, with their potential, it is no doubt that they are becoming a superpower, if they are not already a superpower. They may become the dominant superpower with that kind of a population. When they are throwing their weight around by selling weapons of mass destruction to the likes of North Korea, Libya, and Iran, and selling missiles to Pakistan, which threatened world peace with the nuclear exchange between Pakistan and Iran, the United States ought to retain all the leverage and pressure that it can. And it is in that context, from what I have seen on proliferation as chairman of the Senate Intelligence Committee and the dereliction I have seen in my chairmanship of the oversight committee of the Department of Justice, that I urge my colleagues to vote against the granting of permanent trade relations to the People's Republic of China. My eight years on the Senate Intelligence Committee including the chairmanship in 1995 and 1996 and my current chairmanship of the Judiciary Subcommittee on Department of Justice oversight have convinced me that the People's Republic of China (PRC) threatens world peace by flagrantly proliferating weapons of mass destruction to countries like Pakistan, North Korea, Iran and Libya. CONCLUSION The record of the Clinton Administration's winking at the PRC's flagrant proliferation violations, in conjunction with Congress's constitutional responsibility for oversight and checks & balances of Executive Branch excesses calls for our retaining annual review of trade relations with China. Ignoring obvious facts which mandate sanctions calls into question many U.S. laws on sanctions and adherence to the rule of law generally, leaving critical questions of national security to presidential `fudging'. The frequently heard plea `if we don't sell it to them, someone else will' should be forcefully met with U.S. policy not to sell and U.S. leadership to persuade other nations not to sell to rogue countries. The record does show that the PRC responds to pressure to achieve highly-prized trade relations with the United States. Accordingly, we should use PNTR to influence the PRC to honor its international obligations not to proliferate and to conform to fundamental standards of civility and decency of the international community of nations. (end text) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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