11 May 2000
Text: Rep. Levin May 10 Remarks on China Commission to House Panel
(Levin proposes Congressional-Executive Commission on China) (1810) The United States "cannot rely on economic contact and exchange alone to lead automatically to more democracy, greater freedom, and greater respect for human rights and enforcement of core worker rights," according to a supporter of permanent Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status for China. The United States "must engage with China and we must confront it," Sander Levin (Democrat of Michigan) said May 10 in testimony before the House International Relations Committee. To do that, he suggested, Congress should consider granting permanent NTR status to China within a framework that would "maximize the benefits to U.S. businesses, workers, and farmers," and "minimize the potential downside from growing and more intense competition with a country where free markets and the rule of law are still in the early stages of development." The framework must also keep pressure on China to improve its human rights record, he said. To achieve those ends, he said, the Congress should consider legislation to create a U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China "to monitor and report on human rights, labor market issues, and rule of law in China." Levin is the Ranking Member of the House Ways and Means Subcommittee on Trade. Following is the text of Levin's remarks, as prepared for delivery: (begin text) Testimony of the Honorable Sander M. Levin Before the Committee on International Relations May 10, 2000 Hearing on China It is appropriate that Congress and the American public use the debate over China's integration into the world trading system to shine a spotlight on China, its future, as well as our future economic, political and strategic relationship with this increasing important nation. China presents both tremendous challenges and important opportunities. The agreement negotiated with China would open to the U.S. one of the fastest growing markets for American goods and services. It would draw China, with its weak rule of law, into an international rules-based system. But, it is clearly not that simple. China is the world's largest state-controlled economy, where free markets and the rule of law are still in the rudimentary stages of development. During a ten day trip to Beijing and Hong Kong in January, I saw graphically that change is irreversible, but its direction is not inevitable. There is certainly more economic freedom, but Chinese leaders still describe their course as "market socialism." And while there is more political freedom than twenty years ago, there remains tight one-Party control. China's contradictions are manifested in this last decade that started with the violent crackdown in Tiananmen Square and ended with what is likely a futile effort to control the Internet for over 5 million, and growing, users. As stated in this year's State Department Human Rights Report, the "Government's poor human rights record deteriorated throughout the year [1999], as the Government intensified efforts to suppress dissent, particularly organized dissent." As the President said in the State of the Union address: "We need to know we did everything we possibly could to maximize the chance that China will choose the right future." Maintaining the status quo does not effectively meet this call. It has the major disadvantage of foregoing potential economic benefits negotiated in the WTO accession agreement with China, while allowing our competitors to receive these benefits, in order to retain through annual review the threat of withdrawing MFN. It is a threat that has never been used in relation to China since we re-opened trade in 1979, without a plan for its use; an instrument unlikely ever to be used, barring a threat to national security (in which case, WT0 rules permit withdrawal of MFN). I believe we can do better than the annual review; we can find concrete mechanisms, multiple points of pressure, to move China in the right direction. Over the last months, the questions have come into sharper focus. The United States cannot block China's entry into the World Trade Organization. The United States cannot receive the full benefits of the agreement without granting PNTR. We cannot simply say no. At the same time, just increasing trade does not adequately address the complex challenges presented by China. We cannot rely on economic contact and exchange alone to lead automatically to more democracy, greater freedom, and greater respect for human rights and enforcement of core worker rights. We cannot simply say yes. In my judgment, the only course is to actively shape globalization. We cannot escape it, nor can we ignore it. We must engage with China and we must confront it. We should consider PNTR within a framework that has the following three goals: (1) Maximize the benefits to U.S. businesses, workers, and farmers from China's accession to the World Trade Organization; (2) Minimize the potential downside from growing and more intense competition with a country where free markets and the rule of law are still in the early stages of development; and (3) Keep the heat on China when it comes to human rights and other dimensions of the U.S.-China relationship. I have been working closely with the Chairman of the Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, Congressman Doug Bereuter, and other Members to develop a bipartisan framework of proposals that complements the extension of PNTR to China. That framework has three legs: First, the creation of a U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China to monitor and report on human rights, labor market issues, and rule of law in China; second, enactment of legislation implementing the anti-import surge safeguard provision that the U.S. Trade Representative negotiated in the November 1999 U.S.-China Agreement; and third a series of provisions designed to closely monitor and enforce China's compliance with its trade-related obligations. Today, I would like to focus on the first leg of the framework -- a special U.S. Congressional-Executive Commission on China. The Commission is designed to address the goal of keeping pressure on China in the areas of human rights, worker rights, and rule of law. It is modeled on the Helsinki Commission -- a U.S. congressional-executive commission that is familiar to many on this Committee. The Helsinki Commission has demonstrated that benefits can be gained from bringing two branches of government together in a single institution to pursue a common, focused objective. That Commission was born after conclusion of the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1975. Over the past 25 years, it has played a significant role in U.S. participation in the CSCE process. Notably, the Helsinki Commission has worked closely with the State Department and other executive branch agencies in preparing for and participating in international CSCE meetings. Particularly in the area of human rights, the Commission's role has complemented that of the State Department. It has provided additional expertise, focused attention on priorities that reflect its unique institutional perspective, and provided a forum for legislators and executive branch representatives to work together on issues of mutual concern. The Commission's achievements include putting pressure on the former Soviet Union to release prisoners of conscience and (more recently) putting pressure on the newly democratic Eastern European countries to adopt citizenship laws that respect the rights of ethnic minorities. I believe that a similar commission focused on China can achieve a comparable record of effective pressure. Like the Helsinki Commission, the China Commission will consist of Members of both Houses of Congress and Presidential appointees representing the executive branch. The scope of the China Commission will consist of three "pillars" (1) human rights; (2) labor market issues; and (3) development of the rule of law. The Commission will have a permanent professional staff with expertise in areas including law, worker rights, economics, and Chinese politics and history. It will develop a rich intelligence network, including contacts with non-governmental organizations and, to the extent possible, persons in China. In this way, it will accumulate an institutional memory that will inform its analysis and recommendations. The Commission will report once a year to the President and Congress on developments in the areas within its jurisdiction. It also will make recommendations for congressional and/or executive action that may reinforce or help to bring about positive changes in these areas. Following the successful example of the Helsinki Commission and various NGOs, the China Commission also will maintain lists of persons subjected to human rights abuses and other abuses in China. The Helsinki Commission used this device through the darkest days of the Cold War to draw attention to repression of outspoken dissidents, including Elena Bonner and Vaclav Havel. The Helsinki Commission regularly brought its lists to the attention of Soviet Bloc governments and, by the Vienna meeting of the CSCE in 1989, numerous cases raised had been resolved. As I see it, a commission of the sort I have described has four strengths: First, it will put a permanent, concentrated spotlight on human rights, worker rights, and rule of law in China. This is in stark contrast to the sporadic and diffuse attention paid to these issues during the annual review of China's NTR status. Second, the Commission will serve as an effective base from which to mobilize bipartisan pressure on China for improvements in particular policies and practices. And the priorities that the Commission identifies should capture the attention of officials in China, as they will represent the concerns of both the legislative and executive branches of the U.S. government. Third, as people in China gain greater access to the Internet and other modes of communication, the Commission will be an important point of contact between Chinese citizens, on the one hand, and the U.S. Government and public, on the other. Fourth, the Commission will be an important contact point between the Administration and Congress. It will be a forum in which congressional representatives will be able to highlight for the Administration issues of particular concern in U.S.-China relations. I have no illusions that establishing a special Congressional-Executive Commission will transform China overnight. But it will place an ongoing and focused spotlight on China, rather than the temporary and diffuse spotlight of an annual review and help to re-enforce the evolution of China's economic, social and political institutions in a positive direction. As I said earlier, my ten days in January of person to person interchange with people from various walks of life in Beijing and Hong Kong, demonstrated to me that change is irreversible, but its direction is not inevitable. We must persistently and continuously strive to impact that change. There is no realistic choice but a step by step activist approach. This type of reinforcement is not only in China's interest it is in our vital economic and national security interest as well. (end text) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State. Web site: http://usinfo.state.gov)
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