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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

USIS Washington File

07 April 2000

Text: Roth Speech on U.S.-China Relations, China WTO Accession

(U.S. objective is "strong, stable, prosperous, open China") (4650)
Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs
Stanley Roth told members of the Washington State China Relations
Council April 5 that they should look at China's WTO accession and the
upcoming vote by Congress on permanent Normal Trade Relations (PNTR)
as a part of the Clinton Administration's "results-oriented engagement
of China."
"As the [U.S.] presidential campaign season accelerates and the
rhetoric heats up, you are hearing increasingly that the
Administration does not have a China policy," Roth said.
"I am here to tell you that this Administration has a clear and
consistent China policy ... our strategy is to encourage the
integration of China with the rest of the world in order to secure our
objective -- that is a strong, stable, prosperous and open China," he
said.
Roth said the Clinton Administration pursues this strategy through
engagement, which he defined as "working with China at every level and
at every available opportunity to manage, if not resolve, specific
differences and identify and expand issues on which we take a common
approach."
"Those who do not understand engagement would characterize it as
'appeasement'", Roth continued, "but I hope it is already clear that
our engagement of China is results oriented."
"If our policy toward China continues to work -- and that means China
enters the WTO and we grant China Permanent Normal Trade Relations --
a prosperous China will be less likely to threaten its neighbors
because it depends on their trade and investment," Roth said.
"It will be more likely to control proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction because they could undermine China's own security
interests ... [China] will be more dependent on the rule of law and
upon the free flow of information," he continued.
"If the Congress refuses to grant permanent NTR, it will be saying
"no" to such a China," Roth concluded. "How can that advance our
interests?" he asked.
Following is the text of Roth's remarks:
(begin text)
A Strategy for the Future --
U.S.-China Relations and China's WTO Accession
A Speech before the Washington State China Relations Council
By Stanley O. Roth
Assistant Secretary of State
For East Asian and Pacific Affairs
April 5, 2000
INTRODUCTION
It is a pleasure to be here with you this evening. Seattle and the
Northwest is where American Asia policy is not simply made, you are
where it happens with business, immigration, and a variety of people
to people contacts. It was therefore no coincidence that the President
chose to open a new chapter in our Asia policy in Seattle seven years
ago when the President invited other Asian and Pacific leaders to
Blake Island for the first annual leaders meeting of APEC, the Asia
Pacific Economic Cooperation Forum. It was a proclamation, loud and
clear that the United States was part of the Asia Pacific region, a
proclamation that folks in Seattle clearly understand. We are here
this evening to discuss another topic that makes sense to Seattle --
the United States commitment to grant Permanent Normal Trade Relations
to China when it accedes to the World Trade Organization.
I would like to begin with an acknowledgement: I agreed to talk to
this audience about China's WTO accession with some reluctance.
Clearly this is a critically important issue for U.S.-China relations.
I have little to say about this accession that you do not know
already, either on the WTO or the economic implications of PNTR for
China or for the United States.
I tried to think what I could share with you to earn this delicious
meal and all of your attention without putting you to sleep on a full
stomach. I decided that, rather than talking trade, I would like to
put China's entry into the WTO and the upcoming vote by the United
States Congress on PNTR into the context of our overall policy toward
China.
A Policy Approach
As the presidential campaign season accelerates and the rhetoric heats
up, you are hearing increasingly that the Administration does not have
a China policy. I am here to tell you that this Administration has a
clear and consistent China policy. I would like to enunciate that
policy at three levels:
-- What is our basic objective in our relations with China?
-- What is our strategy to achieve that objective?  And, finally,
-- What tactics are we using to accomplish our strategy and reach our
objective?
Having done that, I would like to consider briefly why, I believe,
China's accession to the WTO serves the interests of the United States
and why the United States Congress should authorize the President to
grant Permanent Normal Trade Relations as soon as possible.
To put it in a nutshell: Our objective is a strong, stable, prosperous
and open China, one which respects and builds upon the diverse views
and strengths of its own people. Our strategy is to integrate China
into regional and global institutions, helping it become a country
that plays by the accepted international rules, cooperating and
competing peacefully within those rules. "Engagement" is the coherent
set of tactics to accomplish this strategy, working with China at
every level and at every available opportunity to manage, if not
resolve, specific differences and identify and expand issues on which
we take a common approach.
Why do we want a strong, stable, prosperous and open China? 
Since this question is at the heart of U.S. policy, I would like to
take a moment to consider why this kind of China benefits, rather than
threatens U.S. interests.
A strong China is a unified nation, confident of its ability to defend
its borders and its interests. It works with its neighbors and
partners to foster stability in the Asian Pacific region and beyond.
It cooperates with others to counter transnational problems such as
narcotics trafficking and environmental degradation. A strong China
has a dynamic economy, which offers its citizens an improving standard
of living, attracts imports and investments, and exports
competitively. A strong China is not only secure and prosperous
itself, but it increases the security and prosperity of its neighbors.
To ask why we want a stable China almost answers the question by
itself. Just to begin with the obvious, China has the largest
population of any country in the world, over 1.2 billion people, and
it adds over 12 million people - equal to the population of New
England - to the workforce every year. The country stretches from rain
forests in Guangxi to the deserts in Xinjiang to the steppes of Inner
Mongolia. It borders thirteen countries - from Russia to India to
Burma. If you add to that its maritime claims, it touches Japan and
many of the countries of Southeast Asia. This enormous country can be
a tremendous source of stability or chaos which could determine the
future of the Pacific and thereby the peace and prosperity of our own
country.
Why do we want a prosperous China? China is an enormous and growing
economic power. Though many parts of its economy remain backward, it
is already our eleventh largest trading partner. Over the last twenty
years, it has lifted 200 million people out of absolute poverty. China
adds enough phone lines every year to form a new Baby Bell in the
U.S., and it has the largest wireless communications network in the
world. Over the past year, the number of Internet connections in China
has more than quadrupled from 2 million to 9 million. This year, that
number is expected to reach over 20 million. All of this bespeaks
tremendous export and investment opportunities for American technology
companies.
Finally, an open China is one that welcomes diversity and change,
encouraging the best ideas from both its own people and the
international community. It not only respects freedom of thought,
expression and religion, but it also recognizes that these freedoms
benefit both its people and the government by ensuring that the best
new ideas emerge and that old ideas are challenged and reconsidered.
It welcomes new technologies, which expand the development and
exchange of information and ideas. Finally, an open China is one which
celebrates and learns from the diverse strands of its rich history and
culture.
To consider this question in another light, imagine the alternative of
a weak unstable China. Even as China strives to grow stronger and more
stable, the specter of failure is not far distant. China faces
enormous economic challenges. Pervasive rural poverty is fueling a
flood of job-seeking migrants to cities, where many will remain
unemployed, living on the streets and surviving by crime. In these
cities, they will breathe air so dirty that one quarter of all deaths
of Chinese over the age of five comes from chronic respiratory
disease, five times the U.S. rate. If China succeeds, it will become
the center of an increasingly prosperous and stable region. If it
fails, it could flood its neighbors, and even the United States, with
desperate migrants seeking opportunities elsewhere. And, it could feel
the need to engage in military and nationalistic excesses to maintain
internal support in the face of economic and social failure. In short,
it is a weak and unstable China that threatens American interests much
more than a strong and stable China.
What is our integration strategy?
To foster a strong, stable prosperous and open China, we have
undertaken a strategy of encouraging China to expand its integration
into the global community. We are working with China and with other
countries that share this objective, to identify areas where our
interests overlap or conflict. We then identify bilateral and
multilateral venues in which we can encourage China to join the United
States and others in addressing these interests in three broad areas -
"values," economic, and security.
China has a choice in my view. First, it can revert to the traditional
attitudes of the imperial Middle Kingdom, one which makes its own
rules, disdains the rules agreed to by others and which therefore
could be a threat to others. Alternatively, China can be a country
that plays by the accepted international rules, cooperating and
competing peacefully within those rules
Ultimately, this is China's choice. Neither we nor other nations can
make that choice for it. We can influence it only on the margins by
helping to shape the environment in which China chooses. The most
basic, and harmful, way in which we could shape China's environment is
by preemptively concluding that China was an enemy. If we did so, the
results would be self-fulfilling.
It is worth recalling that our country has faced this choice before in
other contexts. At the end of World War I, we got it wrong, and we got
another war. At the end of World War II, Roosevelt and Truman and
Marshall showed the statesmanship to integrate rather than isolate our
former enemies. Today, we have an opportunity to help integrate a
growing power into the network of global institutions without the
devastation of war but with the opportunities of peace.
To do that, we must first encourage a China that is more "open," that
is more welcoming and tolerant of values and concerns of others,
whether those others are its own citizens or other countries and
societies. Improvement of human rights has been, and will remain, a
vital part of our engagement with China. Just last week, the Secretary
of State underscored the importance she attaches to this endeavor by
travelling from the President's trip in South Asia to Geneva for one
day to deliver a speech in support of a resolution, which we
introduced at the United Nations Conference on Human Rights annual
meeting, that expresses the concern of the United Nations members over
human rights abuses in China.
Next, we must integrate China into the community of economies that
agree on the rules of trade and investment. To do that, for over a
decade we have encouraged China to play an active role in the Asia
Pacific Economic Forum, or APEC. Here the Asian Pacific economies
cooperate to expand trade and investment, eliminate barriers, and
improve their capabilities to seize the new opportunities which
technology will offer businesses and workers over the coming
generation. This common endeavor of the Asian Pacific nations is both
making the region more competitive and building momentum for coming
rounds of WTO negotiations. It also serves to enhance the
compatibility of China's economy with WTO norms, a subject I will
discuss in a few moments.
Finally, we want to bring China into the global and regional
institutions that help preserve peace. In this, the security arena, I
would like to mention a forum little known outside of government
circles, the ASEAN Regional Forum or ARF. ASEAN, as some of you may
know, is the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, a grouping formed
by five countries shortly after the Vietnam War, which has now
expanded to ten members, encompassing nations from Burma to the
Philippines and Indonesia. The ARF was formed to enable a security
dialogue between ASEAN and other countries with interests in the
region, including China, the United States, Japan, Korea, Canada and
Australia.
Just to give you some sense of the importance of the ARF in dealing
with China, I would like to explain how this forum has enabled a
reduction of tensions between China and the nations of Southeast Asia
over conflicting claims to the islands and resources of the South
China Sea. These disputes have intensified in the last few years as
China and some Southeast Asian nations have built structures on
various reefs and atolls to strengthen their territorial claims.
In 1995, China built a small facility on Mischief Reef, which is also
claimed by the Philippines. This significantly increased tensions. We
raised the issue at the ARF forum in order to open dialogue to reduce
tensions and discuss the concerns of claimant nations and others like
Japan and ourselves who rely on maritime traffic through the South
China Sea.
Last year, ASEAN and China began to discuss a Code of Conduct to
further reduce tensions in the South China Sea. At the same time, the
Philippines has opened bilateral Negotiations with China to seek a
peaceful resolution to disputes over Mischief Reef and other
activities in areas claimed by both countries.
How do we pursue this strategy through engagement? 
A moment ago, I defined "engagement" as working with China at every
level and at every available opportunity to manage, if not resolve
specific differences and identify and expand issues on which we take a
common approach. Engagement has been an effective tool to advance our
strategy to achieve our objectives. Many critics have belittled
engagement, saying it is no substitute for a full policy. They're
right in that. They just need to broaden their vision to see the
policy "why" behind the engagement "how."
Let me illustrate briefly for you the multiplicity of levels and
topics on which we engage China.
The highest level of engagement is the series of periodic summits
between the President and the Chinese leadership. Such summits can
break deadlocks and achieve progress at critical junctures. To
illustrate the role of summits, I would like to draw your attention to
a meeting you might not have noticed, between President Clinton and
Jiang Zemin at the APEC Leaders Meeting in Auckland last September.
Bilateral relations were at a low ebb. The bilateral agreement on WTO
accession had eluded us the previous spring; the tragic accidental
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade last May had soured the
mood between our two sides. This meeting went a long way toward
putting the bombing behind us. It set the stage for negotiations on
payments for the damage to the Chinese embassy and to our diplomatic
facilities in China. Finally, these talks opened the way for the
successful conclusion of our bilateral WTO negotiations last November.
The next level at which we engage China is in meetings between members
of our Cabinet and their counterparts in Beijing. Over a period of
thirty days beginning last month and continuing through the middle of
April, five members of the Cabinet will have visited China. Each visit
has been targeted to advance U.S. interests in specific areas.
The first of these visits was by our Ambassador to the United Nations,
Richard Holbrooke, who traveled to Tokyo and Beijing to discuss the
need for UN reform, which the Congress has stipulated as a
prerequisite for full funding of our dues to the United Nations.
Last week, National Security Advisor Sandy Berger traveled to Beijing
to discuss overall U.S.-China relations, specific bilateral issues
such as WTO accession and human rights, regional security issues and,
of course, Taiwan.
Secretary of Education Riley also visited China last week in an effort
to deepen our education cooperation with China. In Beijing, he renewed
an agreement on Fulbright and other exchanges that assist a free flow
of ideas between our two societies.
Later this month, Secretary of Commerce Daley and Secretary of
Agriculture Glickman will lead separate Congressional delegations to
China which will enable Senators and Congressmen to better evaluate
the impact WTO accession will have on China and on U.S. interests in
China. At the same time, these two visits will provide opportunities
to advocate for commercial and agricultural sales.
Even when you see no headlines about meetings between U.S. and Chinese
leaders or cabinet officials, there is a continuing series of meetings
occurring at what we like to call the "working level." In each case,
these meetings are targeted to advance specific U.S. national
interests. Let me start by discussing what is sometimes the most
controversial type of meeting - between military officers of our two
countries. So often we see commentaries in various papers about how
China is becoming our next enemy. Why then do we meet with the Chinese
military?
Such visits accomplish two purposes. First of all, they "de-demonize"
the United States. Senior generals of the PLA are perhaps the most
insular element of the Chinese leadership, the most likely to believe
the U.S. has a strategy to achieve hegemony over Asia and to weaken
China. Hundreds of Chinese officers have traveled to the U.S. in
recent years and discovered that their suspicions are not true, that
their counterparts in the United States military have no such
interests. Second, such visits are one of the most effective ways to
improve deterrence. The PLA remains a manpower intensive infantry
force with technology 20 or more years behind the U.S. If you have
ever watched flight operations on the deck of a nuclear carrier or
seen an armor exercise in the California desert, you can imagine the
impression it makes on a Chinese general. It makes deterrence real.
Those who do not understand engagement would characterize it as
"appeasement", but I hope it is already clear that our engagement of
China is results oriented. We are engaging China to advance specific
objectives of the United States, objectives which serve all of our
interests. Sometimes, a meeting will conclude with a dramatic event
that provides results. More often, the results are not immediately
apparent, but dialogue can and does effect change. Let me give you a
few examples.
Nonproliferation
While China once had a policy of proliferating dangerous technologies
to rogue nations, now it is publicly committed to halting
proliferation. Its nonproliferation record is not perfect, but it is
easy sometimes to forget how far it has come. The critical point is
that we have succeeded, through engagement, in beginning to change the
way China thinks about security. China now recognizes that it has a
stake in global and regional security, an interest which is threatened
by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, whatever
short-term commercial interest might be advanced by the sale of these
destructive technologies. As a result, it has signed the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty, and signed and ratified the Nonproliferation Treaty
and the Chemical Weapons Convention.
For that reason, China took a lead among the Permanent Five Members of
the Security Council in opposing the nuclear tests by India and
Pakistan and in urging both sides not to test again but to sign on to
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. China has also agreed to halt the
sale of anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran, missiles that threaten the
safety of U.S. naval ships in the Persian Gulf. This was a decision
which improved the security of the region and advanced U.S. objectives
in the region, but equally important made sense for China, which needs
security in the Gulf because it must import crude oil from the Middle
East to fuel its own growing economy.
Environment
Once China criticized U.S. calls for improved protection of the
environment as a subterfuge to keep China poor. As its own economic
growth has clouded its cities with soft coal smoke from electrical
power plants and with auto exhaust emissions, as its people's health
has deteriorated from polluted water supplies, China has recognized
that it needs to improve its environment.
For that reason it has sought out American expertise. Premier Zhu
Rongji joined Vice President Gore last April to co-chair the third
session of the U.S.-China Forum on Environment and Development. As
part of this effort, we have agreed on a $100 million Clear Energy
Program under which the Ex-Im Bank will finance U.S. environmental
exports to China, particularly in the areas of energy efficiency,
renewable energy and pollution reduction. The EPA and the California
Air Resources Board are providing equipment and technical assistance
for an Urban Air Quality Monitoring Program in China.
Reducing Tensions on the Korean Peninsula
The post-WWII history of the Korean Peninsula illustrates what can
happen in Northeast Asia when the U.S. and China are estranged, and
what can happen when we cooperate to achieve common goals. Fifty years
ago the U.S. and China fought on opposite sides of the Korean War. For
decades afterward, the PRC was regarded as North Korea's staunchest
ally. Even after China established diplomatic ties with the ROK in
1992, China maintained close ties with North Korea.
Despite China's continued close ties Pyongyang, the U.S. and China
have in recent years cooperated to maintain peace and stability on the
Peninsula. Let's be crystal clear here: China pursues its own
interests in this region, but when we share goals and we are willing
to work with Beijing, the PRC can play a helpful role in achieving key
U.S. priorities. It is difficult to gauge the level of Beijing's
influence on North Korea, as well as to know just how the PRC brings
its influence to bear. We nevertheless believe that China, because it
seeks to maintain stability on the Peninsula and avoid conflict there,
supports improved U.S.-DPRK relations and has played a positive role
in seeking to restrain and moderate Pyongyang's behavior in areas of
concern to the U.S. China and the U.S. have also cooperated closely in
the Four Party Talks among the U.S., the ROK, China, and the DPRK,
which are designed to reduce tensions on the Korean Peninsula and to
replace the armistice with a permanent peace treaty.
The WTO - Advancing United States Policy Toward China
Now let me dip my toes gently into trade policy. I will not attempt to
recite the specifics of the WTO agreement which Amb. Barshefsky
reached with China. I suspect some of you know these details far
better than I. Let me simply note two general characteristics of the
agreement:
1. This deal does nothing to improve the access of Chinese companies
to the United States market. Regardless of whether China joins the
WTO, regardless of whether the United States Congress grants Permanent
Normal Trade Relations to China, Chinese companies will have the same
access to the American market which they have had.
2. This deal will significantly advance opportunities for American
companies to export goods and services to China. When China joins the
WTO, China will reduce tariffs on a wide range of manufactured goods
by 50 percent or more over the first five years of its membership in
the WTO, and will either eliminate or greatly reduce other import
barriers. China will make the largest tariff cuts in U.S. priority
goods. Chinese will eliminate export subsidies for cotton and other
agricultural goods, making U.S. goods more competitive against Chinese
exports in other markets. Finally, China will eliminate all tariffs on
computers, semi-conductors and other high-tech products.
In trade terms, then, the case is clear: China's WTO accession
overwhelmingly benefits the United States. There is one large caveat:
we will not enjoy these benefits unless the Congress grants permanent
NTR to China upon its accession to the WTO. If it does not, these
advantages, so skillfully negotiated by Amb. Barshefsky and her team,
will go only to our competitors in other nations. They will be able to
sell their services to China, while we will not. They will be able to
use WTO mechanisms to resolve disputes with China, while we will not.
Clearly, that makes no sense.
Now, let's look at China's WTO accession as a part of our
results-oriented engagement of China. As I said at the beginning, our
strategy is to encourage the integration of China with the rest of the
world in order to secure our objective -- that is a strong, stable,
prosperous and open China. Our objectives can best be met by a China
that is increasingly integrated into the world economy, that benefits
by playing by the rules of the game, by adhering to the rule of law.
This is what I call a "win win win" situation. China and the Chinese
people benefit by WTO entry. The United States and our companies and
people benefit by our interaction with a more stable, open and
prosperous China. Finally, our strategy of integrating China through
engagement wins, because we have shown that we can reach mutually
beneficial agreements even in times of significant difficulties. That
means we will have the prospect of better success as we continue to
work on the rest of our agenda, from nonproliferation to human rights.
Conclusion - Twenty Years From Now  
If our policy toward China continues to work -- and that means China
enters the WTO and we grant China Permanent Normal Trade Relations --
a prosperous China will be less likely to threaten its neighbors
because it depends on their trade and investment. It will be more
likely to control proliferation of weapons of mass destruction because
they could undermine China's own security interests. A prosperous
China, integrated into the global system, will be more dependent on
the rule of law and upon the free flow of information. Both of these
will help in the long run to advance the power and the rights of its
own citizens.
China, by entering the WTO, has agreed to play by the rules. That is
fundamentally in our economic, strategic and values interest. If the
Congress refuses to grant permanent NTR, it will be saying "no" to
such a China. How can that advance our interests?
Not only the government of China, but also the people of China will
benefit from its entry into the WTO. The Chinese people will enjoy new
sources of employment, higher standards of living, more access to
cheaper high quality goods and services. How much influence will the
United States have with the people of China if we try to block their
enjoying these benefits? Conversely, how much greater influence will
we have if American companies, the American government and the
American people take the lead in opening the door for China into this
new world?
Thank you.
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: usinfo.state.gov)



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