05 April 2000
Text: Senator Fred Thompson on Amending China NTR Legislation
(Thompson says sanction China for proliferation misdeeds) (3090) It is an open question whether engaging China in trade will serve to liberalize that regime, according to Senator Fred Thompson, but one can hope for a democratic evolution, "while at the same time establishing a framework in which the Chinese can be penalized for bad behavior." The Tennessee Republican in an April 4 speech before the Center for Strategic and International Studies made the case that permanent Normal Trade Relations (NTR) status should be approved but with amendments that would stifle China's interest in proliferating weapons of mass destruction to America's enemies. The upcoming vote in Congress on whether to grant permanent NTR status to China offers the United States three ways to go in its dealings with China, Thompson said to his audience at the Washington, D.C. think tank. Congress, intent on making a point about China's record on proliferation, could just vote down the legislation that would end application of Title IV of the Trade Act of 1974 to China. But, Thompson warned, that would be a "one-time lever" over Chinese behavior. "If we then granted (NTR) later, as we probably would, all of our leverage would be gone." Going against the current thinking of supporters of permanent NTR status for China, Thompson also argued against granting that status to China in a simple vote on the issue. "I am convinced," Thompson said, "that continuing to ignore China's consistent pattern of misconduct, which is inimical to our national security, would be a mistake in the long run. It would be folly to be so concerned with economic benefits and our immediate relationship with the current leaders of China that we do nothing to minimize the long-term dangers we face." Instead, Thompson advocated amending the permanent NTR legislation in such a way as to establish an annual review mechanism that would assess China's behavior "with regard to proliferation of weapons of mass destruction technologies, as well as violations of U.S. export control regulations or licenses." Thompson stressed that amending the legislation was feasible, and was not the same thing as amending the bilateral treaty negotiated between China and the United States regarding the terms of that country's accession to the World Trading Organization (WTO). Congress, he added, "should require the President to sanction the People's Republic of China for any violations of international non-proliferation treaties, agreements, or obligations, as well as violations of U.S. export control laws." Thompson also called on Congress to pass legislation that would bring greater transparency to foreign companies that seek to raise money in America's capital markets, citing China's use of front companies that also smuggle arms, engage in spying, and help proliferate weapons of mass destruction. "This is leverage," exclaimed the senator who led the investigation into alleged Chinese influence buying in the 1996 U.S. Presidential elections, "perhaps enough to cause China to reconsider some of those missile sales." Such statutory provisions would be more effective, Thompson said, than the Most Favored Nation trading status debate that Congress would annually hold regarding China. It would, Thompson argued, "be a card we could actively play without damaging ourselves." Following is the text of Thompson's statement: (begin text) "U.S.-China Relations in the 21st Century" Presented Before the Center for Strategic and International Studies By Senator Fred Thompson (R-TN) Tuesday, April 4, 2000 Probably within the next couple of months the Senate will consider the issue of Permanent Normal Trade Relations for China (PNTR). While this is an important trade matter, because of non-trade events it has become much more than that. It comes at an important time in our relationship with the PRC and. I believe it will probably force a long overdue re-examination of that relationship. This has to do with a nation of over a billion people with enormous potential -- a nation that could pose a significant military threat to us in the future. China may choose to exert itself and dominate the Asia-Pacific region, an area which is of great importance to the political, economic, and security interests of the United States and our allies. Forecasting the Future: Optimists vs. Pessimists Many experts are now -focusing on China's prospects in the long run. The optimists point out that China is not an immediate military threat to the United States or our interests, nor is it an ideological threat as the Soviet Union was during the Cold War. China doesn't have the revolutionary zeal of its earlier generations, and Communism is not very attractive around the world these days. Capitalism has changed all that. They point out that there is an evolution going on in China; that there is a growing private sector yearning for freedom. China lifted 200 million people out of poverty in two decades. It doubled its per capita income from 1978 to 1987 and then doubled it again between 1987 and 1996. It took the United States 50 years to do this. President Clinton argues that with the advent of the internet and modem telecommunications, along with free trade, China will become more free and open. He believes that the old guard will not be able to control the changes that will take place in China, much like the Soviets couldn't in the late 1980s. This is what he thinks free trade will bring about. I hope the old guard isn't listening. Pessimists point out that China is an emerging power, and that emerging powers more often than not try to change the realities of the world, around them rather than adapting to the existing international framework, which benefits the status quo states. They point out that there are natural, built-in tensions between democracies and totalitarian regimes that produce different mind sets. They think differently, react differently, and interpret things differently. History has shown us that these differences quite often lead to misunderstandings .... and conflict. Pessimists point to the Communist Party's recently restated 1978 "16--character" policy that guides the country, which states that China's economic initiatives are subordinate to its plan for military modernization and expansion. The Cox Report points out that, over the last two decades, the PRC has vigorously pursued the acquisition of foreign military and dual-use technologies in order to enable it to fulfill its strategic goals and become the dominant power in Asia. In other words, the Chinese have been stealing our technologies because it is a part of their grand plan. Finally, pessimists point out that our reaching out to China and our annual approval of MFN have bore little fruit. Instead, Chinese bellicosity and disregard for U.S. interests have actually increased, particularly with regard to Taiwan. No one can predict how China will evolve, but we do know that we have some very short term and immediate matters-to deal with that may impact upon what that future will be. One has to do with the signals we send the PRC with regard to a host of matters. Whether it is Chinese military money going to the Democratic National Committee, theft of the designs of our most sophisticated nuclear warheads, or threats against Taiwan, the Administration's response has been inadequate. In Shanghai in 1998, President Clinton stated his "three-noes" policy with regard to Taiwan, giving the impression that the Administration was tilting toward the PRC to appease Beijing, and -abandoning Taiwan and established U.S. policy. This was followed shortly thereafter ..with President Lee's remarks seeking a "special state to state relationship" with the PRC 'that drew an angry response from Beijing, and a scolding from Washington. And just recently, the PRC issued a "white paper" that threatened to invade Taiwan if talks on reunification failed to move forward in a timely manner. Our attempts to mollify the Chinese are clearly not working very well. In fact, it seems to me that we are sending all of the wrong signals and making the possibility of confrontation in the Taiwan Strait all the more likely. Accommodating Proliferation But there is another area, a much more important area of immediate concern, wherein the behavior of the PRC has been egregious and the response by the Administration has been irresponsible. I am referring to the PRC's proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology, and its continued diversion of sensitive "dual use" technologies. In July 1998, Congress received the Rumsfeld Report, which stated: "Ballistic missiles armed with WMD payloads pose a strategic threat to the United States. This is not a distant threat....A new strategic environment now gives emerging ballistic missile powers the capacity, through a combination of domestic development and foreign assistance, to acquire the means to strike the U.S. within about five years of a decision to acquire such a capability." Shortly after that, North Korea surprised our intelligence agencies and confirmed the Rumsfeld Commission's conclusions by successfully launching a three-stage rocket over Japan, demonstrating Pyongyang's ability to build an ICBM. In July, 1999, the Deutch Commission concluded that "weapons of mass destruction pose a grave threat to U.S. citizens and military forces, to our allies -and to our vital interest in many regions of the world." Two months later the Intelligence Community released a new national intelligence estimate of the ballistic missile threat. This report concluded that North Korea could deliver alight payload - sufficient for a biological or chemical weapon - to the United States, now. It also said that some rogue states may have ICBMs much sooner than previously thought and those missiles will be more sophisticated and dangerous than previously estimated. The September 1999 estimate also concluded that there is now greater risk of WMD attack upon the United States, our armed forces, and our interests than "during most of the Cold War." The classified briefings are even more disconcerting. This threat to our national security is being fueled in no small measure by the PRC. The Director of the CIA has stated that China is perhaps the most significant supplier of weapons of mass destruction and missile technology to the world. A CIA report provided to Congress in late January said that as late as June of last year. "firms in China provided missile-related items, raw materials and/or assistance to several countries of proliferation concern including Iran, North Korea and Pakistan, And that's just the stuff we know about. Because of China help, some of these rogue nations are now developing their own manufacturing facilities and have started to trade among themselves. Jane's Defense Weekly reports that Iran has now achieved the ability to deploy the medium range Shahab-3 missile, a missile which can strike our NATO ally Turkey, let alone U.S. forces deployed in the region. The success of their February missile test was due in large part to rocket engines obtained from North Korea. With an attitude of engagement at all cost, the Administration has rarely missed an opportunity to excuse or overlook China's behavior. When the Chinese break a promise, the Administration's remedy is to get a new promise. Moreover, the Administration refuses to sanction the PRC even though the law requires it and our intelligence community produces clear and unambiguous evidence of China's proliferation activities. -- We catch the PRC selling M-11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan, but we are told that we only have proof that they transferred missile transport canisters. We couldn't prove, the Administration said, that there were actually missiles inside the canisters. -- The Chinese sell ring magnets to a Pakistani nuclear facility in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but the Administration says we can't verify that China's senior-most leaders approved the sale. The list goes on and on. And as the President himself has said, in order to achieve the Administration's policy goals they have to "fudge" the facts sometimes so that a conclusion of no violation can be the result. There has been, 'in short, a complete disconnect between what is in the United States' long term strategic interest and U. S. policy on one hand, and China's behavior and our responses on the other. This all comes at a time when we have weakened our own export controls. Even now, the Administration and some in Congress would weaken them further with the passage of the pending legislation that re-authorizes the Export Administration Act. And this is on top of the Administration's successful initiative to dissolve COCOM in 1994, which was the only international export control regime with any real control over the sale and diversion of sensitive "dual use" technologies. All of this sends a terribly mixed message. At a time when we are trying to convince our European allies of the necessity for a national missile defense system, we are acting as if we have no fear of future missile launches from rogue nations. China-PNTR: Sending the Right Message This provides the back drop for the upcoming permanent NTR debate and presents a problem for those of us who are avid free traders. It all raises one very important question: What kind of signals are we sending China and the rest of the world by further embracing the PRC under the circumstances I have mentioned? I believe there is a way we can send the right message and, much more importantly, take action that would enhance our own national security with regard to the proliferation problem. If, in fact, China is contributing to a threat to this country's national security, then we must take whatever steps necessary to... 1) encourage a change of attitude by PRC, and 2) demonstrate emphatically to China, our allies, and the rest of the world, that, this Administration's actions notwithstanding, the United States takes proliferation very seriously. I believe that the WTO debate gives us that opportunity. It can raise these national security issues to the level of public attention and Congressional consideration which they have long deserved. More importantly, I believe that this debate gives the United States its first opportunity to get back on course in our dealings with China. Of course, we could just vote down PNTR to China. This would certainly make a statement to the world that we are serious about proliferation. It would undoubtedly shock the Chinese who must think they have a locked deal since they show no hesitancy in threatening to invade Taiwan, embarrassing our high- level diplomatic delegation and reminding us of their ability to lob an ICBM onto one of our cities - all practically on the eve of PNTR consideration. We would still have trade with China, since it would be to their benefit as well as ours, though not under the more preferable conditions agreed to in the bilateral trade agreement. But would denial of PNTR benefit US national security? There is little doubt in my mind that after an initial cooling off period, China would have a powerful incentive to alter its behavior in order to obtain PNTR. However, denial of PNTR would probably be a one time lever. We could make gains with a denial, but if we then granted it later, as we probably would, all of our leverage would be gone. What we really are seeking instead is a sustained ability to influence Chinese behavior. So should we then grant PNTR - straight out? There is little question that the bilateral treaty that has been negotiated is favorable to us in many respects. As I've suggested, there are many potential benefits from expanded trade. However, I am convinced that continuing to ignore China's consistent pattern of misconduct, which is inimical to our national security, would be a mistake in the long run. It is often said that the Chinese think in much longer time frames than we do. It would be folly to be so concerned with economic benefits and our immediate relationship with the current leaders of China that we do nothing to minimize the long-term dangers we face. A third option would be to pass PNTR with amendments that would enhance our nonproliferation efforts. We can't amend the bilateral trade treaty with China, but we can amend the permanent NTR legislation in ways that have nothing to do with trade. I think there may be many good ways to do this. -- First, we can begin by establishing an annual review mechanism that assesses China's behavior with regard to proliferation of WMD and missile technologies, as well as violations of US export control regulations or licenses. -- Second, we should require the President to sanction the PRC for any violations of international." non-proliferation treaties, agreements or obligations, as well as violations of US export control laws. -- Finally, another intriguing idea was implicit in some of the findings of the Cox Committee and the Deutch Commission, which reported that China "is using capital markets as a source of central government funding for military and commercial development." To prevent this, we should pass legislation which brings greater transparency to all foreign companies that use our markets. The SEC provides little information on these companies now, many of whom, in the case of China, are front companies that are also smuggling arms, spying on our country, or proliferating weapons of mass destruction. This would also give Congress, as part of an annual review, a mechanism whereby companies, or even countries, who engage in proliferation activities are denied access to our debt and equity markets. This is leverage! Perhaps enough to cause China to reconsider some of those missile sales. The threat of denying MFN each year was empty and the Chinese knew it. However, these statutory provisions, perhaps along with others, would be a card we could actively play without damaging ourselves. Conclusion It goes without saying that we do not want a shaky relationship with a country as important as China to degenerate farther for any appreciable period of time. It is equally obvious that a policy of turning a blind eye toward activity that is harmful to our interests has not improved our relationship with China; we must demonstrate strength as well as restraint to them and the rest of the world. I believe that involves engaging in trade and hoping for democratic evolution while at the same time establishing a frame work in which the Chinese can be penalized for bad behavior. I do not believe we should take the one approach without the other. Not when our national security is involved. (end text) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State - www.usinfo.state.gov)
|
NEWSLETTER
|
| Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list |
|
|
|
