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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

USIS Washington File

05 April 2000

Text: Senator Fred Thompson Decries Administration China Policy

(U.S. too ready to excuse Beijing's role in proliferation) (3550)
China has been active in proliferating weapons of mass destruction,
says U.S. Senator Fred Thompson, while the Clinton Administration has
been passive to this national security threat.
The Tennessee Republican made that assessment in a speech March 3 in
Washington, D.C. at the Heritage Foundation.
"It must amuse and baffle the Chinese," Thompson said, "that we are so
casual with regard to our sensitive military-related technology in
dealing with them, at the same time they are supplying terrorist
nations with the ability to reach the United States with weapons of
mass destruction."
Due to the Clinton Administration desire to see its "engagement"
policy with China succeed, Thompson said, "we clearly face a dangerous
and increasing threat to our national security; China is making
significant contributions to that threat; and the United States is
acting as if the threat doesn't exist."
By "turning a blind eye to China's proliferation, dismantling the
international export control regime, and emasculating our own export
controls, we are jeopardizing our national security in many ways,"
Thompson said.
Citing China's role in sending technology and weapons of mass
destruction to countries in Asia, Africa and the Middle East, Thompson
asked what had been the Clinton Administration's response "to this
unbroken pattern of reckless activity producing a real and imminent
danger to the United States?"
The Clinton Administration, he asserted, has responded "with an
incredible amount of negligence and naivete."
With an attitude of "engagement at all cost," Thompson said, Clinton
Administration officials "have rarely missed an opportunity to excuse
or overlook China's behavior."
The Chinese, Thompson said, "sell ring magnets to a Pakistani nuclear
facility in violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but the
Administration says we can't prove that China's senior-most leaders
approved the sale."
There has been, Thompson said, "a complete disconnect between U.S.
policy, China's behavior, and our response."
One way to correct the problem, Thompson suggested, would be to amend
the legislation that would grant permanent Normal Trade Relations
status to China, by "adding or incorporating parts of the Taiwan
Security Enhancement Act into such an amendment."
Following is the text of Thompson's remarks:
(begin text)
Balancing Trade and Security in the 21st Century
Statement of the Honorable Fred Thompson (R-TN)
Chairman, Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
Presented at The Heritage Foundation
March 3, 2000
Washington, DC
Good afternoon. I want to talk to you for a few minutes about the
convergence and the upcoming clash between two areas of vital concern
to the United States: trade and national security.
With regard to national security, the central fact is this: because of
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the world is a more
dangerous place in many respects than ever before. I remember a couple
of years ago tuning into C-Span late one Saturday evening. Former
Senator Sam Nunn was speaking to the University of Houston. He spoke
of what he considered to be the most dangerous threats to our country.
First on his list was the proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction.
Several evenings later, I tuned into the Charlie Rose show. His guest
was former Secretary of State Warren Christopher. He listed his
threats to the future security of the United States. Number one on his
list was the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. They had
seen the problem from the inside. Since then, there has been a steady
drum beat of warnings.
Congress received the Rumsfeld Report, published in July 1998, which
stated:
"Ballistic missiles armed with WMD payloads pose a strategic threat to
the United States. This is not a distant threat. A new strategic
environment now gives emerging ballistic missile powers the capacity,
through a combination of domestic development and foreign assistance,
to acquire the means to strike the U.S. within about five years of a
decision to acquire such a capability."
Since it is almost certain that rogue states made such a decision
years ago, the conclusion is that states like Iran and North Korea may
be able to strike United States' territory in under five years, if
they cannot already do so. Certainly they, along with Iraq, Syria,
Libya, and others today can strike our allies and our troops stationed
abroad.
Shortly after that, North Korea surprised our intelligence agencies by
successfully launching a three-stage rocket over Japan, essentially
confirming the Rumsfeld conclusions.
In July, 1999 the Deutch Commission concluded that "weapons of mass
destruction pose a grave threat to U. S. citizens and military forces,
to our allies and to our vital interest in many regions of the world."
Last September the Intelligence Community released a new national
intelligence estimate of the ballistic missile threat. This report
asserted that, "during the next 15 years, the United States most
likely will face ICBM threats from Russia, China and North Korea,
probably from Iran and possibly from Iraq." The report concluded that
North Korea could deliver a light payload - sufficient for a
biological or chemical weapon - to the United States, now. It also
said that some rogue states may have ICBMs much sooner than previously
thought and those missiles will be more sophisticated and dangerous
than previously estimated. The September 1999 estimate also concluded
that there is now a greater risk of WMD attack upon the United States
or US forces or interests than "during most of the Cold War." The
classified briefings are even more disconcerting.
So we have been told in numerous ways on numerous days of this threat
facing our country. And, although it has amazingly received little
attention in the media and has been met with little action by our
nation's leadership, this direct and growing threat to our national
security has to be at the very top of our priority list. The writers
of the Constitution understood that protecting national security is
our first priority.
The second point I would like to make is that this threat to our
national security is being fueled in no small measure by the Peoples
Republic of China.
The Director of the CIA has stated that China is perhaps the most
significant supplier of weapons of mass destruction and missile
technology to the world. Countries around the world from Asia to
Africa to the Middle East are rapidly building up their nuclear and
missile capabilities and are being supplied all or in part by China.
The Rumsfeld Commission reported that:
"China also poses a threat to the U.S. as a significant proliferator
of ballistic missiles, weapons of mass destruction and enabling
technologies. It has carried out extensive transfers to Iran's
solid-fueled ballistic missile program. It has supplied Pakistan with
a design for a nuclear weapon and additional nuclear weapons
assistance."
The CIA report provided to Congress in late January said that as late
as June of last year, "firms in China provided missile-related items,
raw materials and/or assistance to several countries of proliferation
concern" including Iran, North Korea and Pakistan. And that's just the
stuff we know about.
Because of China's help, some of these rogue nations are now
developing their own manufacturing facilities and have started to
trade among themselves.
What has been the Administration's response to this unbroken pattern
of reckless activity producing a real and imminent danger to the
United States? They have responded with an incredible amount of
negligence and naivete. With an attitude of engagement at all cost,
they have rarely missed an opportunity to excuse or overlook China's
behavior.
They refuse to sanction the PRC even though the law requires it and
our intelligence community produces clear and unambiguous evidence of
their proliferation activities. When the Chinese break a promise, the
Administration's remedy is to get a new promise.
We catch the PRC selling M-ll ballistic missiles to Pakistan, but we
are told that we only have proof that they transferred missile
transport canisters. We couldn't prove, the Administration said, that
there were actually missiles inside the canisters.
When sales of missiles or nuclear-related equipment or technology have
been discovered, the Administration has raised the standard of proof
required by our intelligence community to almost unreachable heights.
As the President himself has said, in order to achieve the
Administration's policy goals they have to "fudge" the facts sometimes
so that a conclusion of no violation can be the result.
The Chinese sell ring magnets to a Pakistani nuclear facility in
violation of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty but the
Administration says we can't prove that China's senior-most leaders
approved the sale. The list goes on and on.
There has been, in short, a complete disconnect between U.S. policy,
China's behavior, and our response.
Not content to turn a blind eye toward China's proliferation
activities, the Administration has actively contributed to the problem
by weakening export controls.
First, the Administration helped dissolve COCOM in 1994-and fashion a
feckless substitute---so that there was no longer any international
regime with any real teeth to control the sale of dual-use
technologies.
Then they proceeded to weaken our system for the benefit of Ron Brown,
the Commerce Department and political contributors. In the six years
since the Export Administration Act expired in 1994, the
Administration:
-- Approved export licenses over the objections of the Departments of
State or Defense;
-- Gave the Secretary of Commerce greater authority and discretion to
manage the export licensing program;
-- Reduced the amount of time available for agencies to conduct
application reviews by 25%;
-- Oversaw a Post Shipment Verification process that has dismally low
inspection rates. For example, out of the 191 high performance
computers shipped to China in 1998, only one post shipment
verification occurred;
-- According to testimony before our Governmental Affairs Committee,
Clinton Administration officials - even within the Pentagon - have
ignored, hassled and pressured technical experts who had the temerity
to raise questions about proposed export licenses. The Defense
Technology Security Agency, or DTSA, was even marginalized physically,
its office having been literally moved out of the Pentagon.
Lest we forget, this is the same Administration that transferred all
commercial satellites from the U.S. Munitions List to the Commerce
Control List so that if the Administration were ever forced to impose
missile proliferation sanctions on China, at least we would still be
free to do satellite deals with them.
And, of course, we know at least some in the Pentagon believe that
satellite technology transfers have already damaged our national
security, since the same technology necessary to place a satellite in
orbit also place ICBMs into space.
It must amuse and baffle the Chinese that we are so casual with regard
to our sensitive military-related technology in dealing with them, at
the same time they are supplying terrorist nations with the ability to
reach the United States with weapons of mass destruction.
In August 1998, after many of the Administration's various export
control problems had come to light, I wrote to the Inspector Generals
at six federal agencies: Commerce, Defense, State, Treasury, Energy,
and the CIA. I asked them to undertake a comprehensive review of US
export control practices, and then report their findings back to the
Governmental Affairs Committee -- which I chair.
Their reports and testimony revealed a system full of holes -- one
clearly favoring trade over national security. For example:
-- Although the law requires it, not one of the six agencies has a
formal program for training licensing officers;
-- Commerce does not properly check to see if the conditions imposed
upon export licenses are complied with, so they don't know if product
diversion is taking place;
-- Pre-license checks and post shipment verifications are often
canceled by Commerce without notice to other agencies;
-- There are no effective procedures in place to control or monitor
sensitive dual-use technology information shared with foreign
nationals who visit the US, despite the fact that export licenses are
required for these information transfers;
-- Finally, even though the law requires it, our government has no
overall system for analyzing the cumulative effect of our exports to
other countries.
The net effect of all these changes, poor administration, and general
lack of concern for security, has been the loosening of important
export control restrictions, and the markedly increased availability
of important technologies.
This has damaged America's national security by allowing potential
adversaries to advance their WMD and missile programs, as well as
close the technological gap when it comes to military hardware,
precision munitions, advanced communications, overhead surveillance,
and so on.
Therefore, we have the following situation:
1) We clearly face a dangerous and increasing threat to our national
security;
2) China is making significant contributions to that threat; and
3) The United States is acting as if the threat doesn't exist.
By turning a blind eye to China's proliferation, dismantling the
international export control regime, and emasculating our own export
controls, we are jeopardizing our national security in many ways --
most importantly our plans for a national missile defense system.
I recently returned with a Congressional delegation from Munich where
we met with our European allies. The question of whether there is
really a rogue nation threat to the U.S. was clearly an important
issue to them in determining if they were going to support our
national missile defense plans.
The Administration's actions, however, would indicate that we have
very little concern about WMD threats. This mismatch between rhetoric
and action regarding the threat and export controls sends a mixed
message to our allies, and frustrates our attempts to build support
for our strategic goals.
This is the background from which we will soon be dealing with the WTO
matter and the Senate consideration of permanent normal trade
relations with China. I believe that this debate must bring these
national security issues into play. In light of what we have just
recounted, how can we consider this as simply a trade issue? If, in
fact, China is contributing to a threat to this country's national
security, and if, in fact, up until now we have misguidedly sent
signals to them and the rest of the world that we do not take the
matter seriously, then we must take steps to:
1) avail ourselves of any opportunity to encourage a change of
attitude by PRC, and
2) demonstrate emphatically to China, our allies, and the rest of the
world, that, this Administration's actions notwithstanding, the United
States takes the matter of proliferation very seriously.
I believe that the WTO debate gives us that opportunity. It can raise
these national security issues to the level of public attention and
Congressional consideration which they have long deserved.
We should not complicate an opportunity to expand trade, however,
without good reason. Trade liberalization has been of great benefit to
the United States. Generally speaking, I believe we should do
everything that we can to help open up markets. Expanding trade makes
for market economies, which the world is now enjoying in record
numbers. Market economies lead to greater economic freedom, which may
lead to political reform.
But arguments for free trade alone don't resolve the tensions between
trade and security. It is time that the Administration and other
supporters consider the fact that permanent NTR may not pass unless,
in conjunction with its passage, certain other things happen that will
help change the PRC's behavior regarding proliferation.
Of course, we could just vote down PNTR to China. This would certainly
make a statement to the world that we are serious. It would
undoubtedly shock the Chinese who must think they have a locked deal
since they show no hesitancy in threatening to invade Taiwan,
embarrassing our high-level diplomatic delegation and reminding us of
their ability to lob an ICBM onto one of our cities -- all practically
on the eve of PNTR consideration. We would still have trade with
China, since it would be to their benefit as well as ours, though not
under the more preferable conditions agreed to in the bilateral.
But would denial of PNTR benefit US national security? There is little
doubt in my mind that after an initial cooling off period, China would
have a powerful incentive to alter its behavior in order to obtain
PNTR. However, denial of PNTR would probably be a one time lever. We
could probably make gains with a denial, but if we then granted it
later, as we probably would, all of our leverage would be gone. What
we really are seeking instead is a sustained ability to influence
Chinese behavior.
Other down sides are obvious -- both to our commercial interest and
the risk of seriously unraveling a relationship between the two
countries that is not doing too well as it is. Chinese reformers have
put their reputations and credibility on the line.
So should we then grant PNTR -- straight out? There is little question
that the bilateral that has been negotiated is favorable to us in many
respects. As I've suggested, there are many potential benefits from
expanded trade. However, I am convinced that continuing to ignore
China's consistent pattern of conduct, which is inimical to our
national security would be a mistake in the long run. It is often said
that the Chinese think in much longer time frames than we do. It would
be folly to be so concerned with economic benefits and our immediate
relationship with the current leaders of China that we do nothing to
minimize the long-term dangers we face.
A third option would be to pass PNTR with amendments that would
enhance our anti- proliferation efforts. We can't amend the bilateral
treaty with China, but we can amend the permanent NTR legislation in
ways that have nothing to do with trade. I think there may be many
good ways to do this.
-- First, we can begin by establishing an annual review mechanism that
assesses China's behavior.
-- Next, we need strong principled leadership from the President and
Congress on these national security matters. We can start by passing
an Export Administration Act that balances trade with national
security-as opposed to the current proposed legislation that would
further loosen export controls.
-- Third, the United States should work with the other industrialized
countries, beginning with our Allies, to establish a new multilateral
export control regime. This will not come easily or quickly, but given
time, effort and the right initiatives, I am confident that we can
achieve this end.
-- Fourth, we should look at adding or incorporating parts of the
Taiwan Security Enhancement Act into such an amendment. Perhaps
conditioning or triggering parts of that Act on China's behavior.
Finally, another intriguing ideas was implicit in some of the findings
of the Cox Committee and the Deutch Commission. The Cox Committee
reported that "the (PRC) is using capital markets as a source of
central government funding for military and commercial development."
Let me expand on this.
According to recent estimates, the PRC is presently involved in U.S.
bond markets to the tune of approximately $14.5 billion. I believe
that this may be an economic lever that could be used. We already know
that we are financing some bad actors, including a notorious PRC arms
dealer. In fact, the PRC, itself, is the largest Chinese borrower of
dollars in the United States -- some $3.2 billion in sovereign bond
offerings. We have no idea what these funds were used for.
That is why we should also pass legislation which brings greater
transparency to all foreign companies that use our markets. The SEC
provides little information on these companies now, many of whom, in
the case of China, are front companies. We need to require more
detailed information in prospectuses regarding the specific identity
and activities of foreign government related firms applying for entry
into our capital markets.
This would give pension fund managers something to look at in order
for them to develop their own national security criteria for
investments. This would also give Congress, as part of an annual
review, a mechanism whereby companies, or even countries, who engage
in proliferation activities are denied access to our debt and equity
markets.
This is leverage. Perhaps enough to cause China to reconsider some of
those missile sales.
The threat of denying MFN each year was empty and the Chinese knew it.
However, these statutory provisions, perhaps along with others, would
be a card we could actively play without damaging ourselves.
In conclusion, it goes without saying that we do not want a shaky
relationship with a country as important as China to degenerate
further for any appreciable period of time. It is equally obvious that
a policy of all carrots and no sticks, has not improved our
relationship with China; we must demonstrate strength as well as
restraint to them and the rest of the world. I believe that involves
engaging and trading and hoping for the best while at the same time
establishing a frame work in which the Chinese can be penalized for
bad behavior. I do not believe we should take the one approach without
the other. Not when our national security is involved.
Thank you
(end text)
(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State - www.usinfo.state.gov)



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