30 March 2000
Text: Senator John Kerry March 30 China Speech at Wilson Center
(Calls for "hard-headed" engagement with China) (6090) The United States must not pursue a policy of containment against the People's Republic of China, says Massachusetts Senator John Kerry. Instead, the fourth ranking Democratic member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee says the United States should follow a policy of engagement that is "hard-headed and driven by our own interests." Kerry gave his prescription for policy toward China in a March 30 speech at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington, D.C., where he noted the United States is at a critical crossroad in its relationship with China. Advocates of containment, Kerry suggested, seem intent on creating a "Cold War" with China as a substitute for the one with the former Soviet Union. "The greatest foreign policy challenge we face," Kerry said, "is the dual task of managing the decline of one superpower, Russia, and the rise of China, an emerging power with the potential, and possibly the aspiration, to be a superpower." China, Kerry observed, "cannot properly be deemed a strategic partner or a close friend." But, he stressed, "it is not an enemy." Kerry called for a policy toward China characterized by clarity, consistency, pragmatism, and accountability. Proponents of containment, Kerry said, "see China only as an enemy." He warned that such a misperception "may create a self-fulfilling prophecy and will invite confrontation." Attempting to contain China, he warned, was doomed to failure, and would create "dangerous tensions which do not now -- and need not -- exist." The question for U.S. policy makers, Kerry said, is how to engage China "in a prudent, more effective way that advances our national interest." Kerry chastised the Clinton Administration for the way it has carried out its China policy, saying that it has had the effect of undermining the consensus for engagement with Beijing. The Clinton Administration, he charged, overplayed its hand and raised "unrealistic expectations about the benefits of its engagement with China." By using overblown rhetoric about China as a "strategic partner," Kerry said, the Clinton Administration "fed the public perception -- especially in Congress -- that its engagement policy is naïve and misguided and that it is ill-prepared to pursue a clear-eyed strategy." He tempered his criticism with an acknowledgment of the success of the Clinton Administration policy in de-linking human rights and most favored nation's status for China. Kerry also praised his fellow Democrat for sending China "a clear and firm message by positioning U.S. carriers off the coast of Taiwan" in 1996, and for the administration's efforts in Geneva at the United Nations Human Rights Commission meeting to get a resolution passed on Beijing's human rights record. The next U.S. administration, Kerry predicted, will continue to follow a policy of engagement with China. But, he suggested, the challenge will be to find a way to engage China "more effectively." The United States, Kerry said, must be prepared to hold China accountable for its actions. "This means triggering the enforcement mechanisms within international institutions such as the Geneva Human Rights Commission, the ILO (International Labor Organization) or soon the WTO (World Trade Organization), and enforcing our own domestic laws with respect to issues such as proliferation or human rights." The American public, he warned, "will not continue to support engagement unless we are more honest about China's transgressions." On the other hand, Kerry warned against U.S. actions that would destabilize Taiwan-China relations. For example, he said, Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, passed by the House of Representatives and pending in the Senate, is "an attempt to move beyond the parameters of the Taiwan Relations Act." To pass it now, he cautioned, could increase tensions in the strait, and "destroy the opportunity for resumed dialogue." It could, he added, invite a military response from Beijing, and hence "undermine Taiwan's security, not enhance it." While urging clarity in U.S. policy toward China, Kerry admitted that for the issue of Taiwan's defense, laying down "clear lines as to when we would and would not respond" to Beijing's threats would not be in either our own or Taiwan's interest. Following is the text of Kerry remarks, as prepared for delivery: (begin text) U.S. China Relations: A New Approach to Engagement Woodrow Wilson Center March 30, 2000 I am honored to appear here today at the Woodrow Wilson Center. President Wilson's vision of the world, his idealism and his foresight deserve a living monument, and the work of this Center not only honors his contribution, but it strengthens our nation. It is also a personal privilege to be here at the invitation of Lee Hamilton, whom I have admired greatly since my first days in the Congress and with whom I enjoyed working enormously. The intellect, statesmanship and dignity Lee continues to bring to international affairs are models for policy makers, and they are qualities in short supply in the Congress since he retired -- particularly on the issue of China, about which I would like to speak with you today. Few foreign policy issues are -- or should be -- higher on the US agenda than our often tumultuous but critically important relationship with China. The flash point of this relationship, of course, is Taiwan. And Taiwan, suddenly, has a very different political landscape than it did two weeks ago. The unexpected election of Democratic Progressive Party leader Chen Shui-bian as Taiwan's second democratically elected president did not just end the Nationalist Party's 50 year hold on power. It has initiated a new era of domestic politics in Taiwan. How these events will impact on cross strait's relations remains to be seen. But there is no question that they have created an urgency for us to find a better, more effective way to manage the U.S. relationship with China. Throughout our history, from the early tales of the Orient through the China Trade and Opium Wars of the 1800's to Richard Nixon's and Henry Kissinger's historic opening in 1972, China has never failed to fascinate. The Middle Kingdom has always intrigued us with its mystery, its possibilities and its remarkable contributions to civilization. The truth is, our approaches to China have always been driven by a complex mixture of respect, romanticism, paternalism and wariness, with one or the other attitude dominating as events unfold. Our varied understanding of the world's most populous nation not only enables willing politicians to demagogue the China issue in domestic politics, but it also empowers the Chinese leadership to manipulate the relationship by playing up our perception of China as a "special" power. As a result reaching consensus on China policy is inevitably difficult. The debate on China today offers a false choice, between a Cold War-style containment of China and the current form of engagement at all costs. In fact, containment of China along the lines of the policy we pursued with the Soviet Union is neither necessary, nor prudent. Engagement is the right approach, but it must be hard-headed and driven by our own interests. We are at a critical crossroads in the China relationship. Now that the Cold War has ended, containment advocates seem intent on creating a new one -- substituting China for the Soviet Union. Indeed, in a strange twist of history, the greatest foreign policy challenge we face is the dual task of managing the decline of one superpower, Russia, and the rise of China, an emerging power with the potential, and possibly the aspiration, to be a superpower. Let's be clear about one thing: China today cannot properly be deemed a strategic partner or a close friend, but it is not an enemy. However, misperception and ideological excess have been conspiring to create a dangerous atmosphere of confrontation. We must be careful not to make China the enemy it is not today, even while we cannot assure it will be a friend. That is why we must engage China. But to be effective in promoting our national interests, our engagement must be rooted in four fundamental principles: clarity, consistency, pragmatism, and accountability -- principles to which I will return in a few moments. While many of us believe the current state of US-China relations leaves much to be desired, I am convinced that containment is a counterproductive and dangerous policy. The suggestion that we can contain China or bludgeon it into action is overwhelmingly contradicted by history and by rational analysis. Think about it: Proponents of containment see China only as an enemy, intent on expanding its power in Asia, repressing its people and amassing sufficient power to challenge the United States as a superpower. For them, engagement is a naive approach, driven principally by economic interests. They believe we should link trade to human rights and have less direct interaction with China -- not more -- by eliminating military and scientific contacts and further restricting technology sales. They argue that we should even ignore Chinese concerns about Taiwan's status. I believe their misperception of China as an enemy may create a self-fulfilling prophecy and will invite confrontation. An American attempt to contain the China of today would be certain to fail and create dangerous tensions which do not now -- and need not -- exist. We know from our Cold War experience with the Soviet Union that containment works only if it is implemented multilaterally. But U.S. allies do not see the need to contain China and are not prepared to sacrifice their hard-won trading relationships with a China that boasts an increasingly dynamic market economy. Even our Asian allies, to whom we should listen and who clearly have the most reason to fear China, do not view it as an expansionist power. Undoubtedly, if China took aggressive steps to dominate the region, we would respond, and so would China's neighbors. But, few of them believe such a confrontation is likely. They want us engaged with China, because they believe it will encourage Chinese responsibility and create stability in a region where three powerful players -- the United States, China and Japan -- vie for influence. The containment school also argues that, even if China poses no real threat to us today, that will change over the next decade or so. But the enormous gap between our military capabilities and China's, coupled with the obstacles China faces in terms of political stability and economic strength make it difficult to offer a realistic scenario where China's capacity to challenge the United States will be dramatically increased in 15 or 20 years. The Chinese military has obsolete and inadequate weaponry. It has command and control problems, poorly trained personnel and lacks an efficient communication system. The nuclear match-up is tremendously uneven, with 6000 deployed U.S. nuclear warheads to China's fewer than two dozen. While we must be second to no one in our military capacity, our decisions must never be driven by ideological exaggeration or falsely-inspired fear. We can not ensure that China will not someday be an enemy, but we can minimize that possibility by working to integrate China into the international system on a broad array of fronts. We should not misinterpret their efforts to modernize -- just as we modernize -- as specifically focused on us. In addition, our attempt to contain China could easily feed into their growing nationalism and paranoia, so much in evidence after our planes bombed China's Belgrade embassy. It would strengthen the belief among Chinese officials that they should accelerate their military modernization to counter what they perceive as encirclement from a growing American threat -- a perception reinforced by the Clinton Doctrine of humanitarian intervention and NATO's intervention in Kosovo. In short, with the wrong choices we can secure exactly the outcome we want to avoid and that proponents of containment fear: a hostile China aggressively pursuing an arms race we neither need nor want. So the central issue for thoughtful policy makers is not whether to engage with China, but how to do so in a prudent, more effective way that advances our national interests in this global age -- and there are a number of realities that must guide this effort in the years ahead. As a global power, the United States has a vital national interest in maintaining stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Economic, political and military stability continue to be largely determined by the state of relations between the three major Pacific powers. By virtue of its size, rapidly growing economy, military strength in Asia, independent nuclear status, and position as a veto-holding member of the UN Security Council, China has the capacity to hinder or help us to advance our interests on a broad range of issues, including: nonproliferation, open markets and free trade, environmental protection, the promotion of human rights and democratic freedoms, counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics, Asian economic recovery, peace on the Korean peninsula and ultimately regional peace and stability. It is only by engaging with China on all of these issues that we will make positive progress on any and thereby advance those interests and our security. Despite ongoing concerns, Americans need to be more aware that the last 30 years of engagement have produced change in China and some tangible benefits for our broad range of interests, including trade, arms control and even human rights. The fact is, there are two faces of life in China today: The first face is the disturbing recent crackdown on the Falon Gong, the increase of repressive, destructive activities in Tibet, the restraints placed on key democracy advocates and the harassment of the underground churches. We can speculate about the insecurity which motivates these measures, but our response must be direct -- to raise the issues in Geneva and elsewhere and continue support for VOA and Radio Free Asia. The second face is that of the average citizen who has more economic mobility and freedom of employment than ever before and a better standard of living. While leaders remain intent on controlling political activity, undeniably there are indications that the limits of the system are slowly fading, encouraging political activists to take previously unimaginable steps including the formation of an alternative Democracy Party. China has a long way to go in improving human rights, but on the whole, Chinese society is more open and most Chinese citizens have more personal freedom than ever before. Of course, we must press for further change, but we should not ignore the remarkable changes that have taken place. So, if as I said, the real question about China is not whether we should engage, but how -- would suggest that the current approach to engagement appears too driven by China's concerns, rather than by our own national interests. The consensus for engagement with China has, in fact, been seriously undermined by the way in which the Administration has carried out its policy. To some extent, the criticism has been simply partisan politics, which has led Congress to careen from one hot-button China issue to the next, undermining the serious interests at stake. But beyond the politics, there is genuine disagreement over the way in which the Administration has engaged. On some initiatives, the Administration has had success in dealing with China. It moved quickly to abandon the counterproductive MFN-human rights linkage. In the 1996 strait's crisis it sent China a clear and firm message by positioning US carriers off the coast of Taiwan. It has properly emphasized the importance of Chinese participation in international arms control regimes, with partial success in obtaining Chinese cooperation on arms control norms. And this month it is trying to focus the spotlight on China's human rights violations by sponsoring a resolution at the Human Rights commission in Geneva. However, in its handling of other elements of the relationship, the Administration has had problems. It has raised unrealistic expectations about the benefits of its engagement with China and has underplayed the real differences that separate us. For example, the Administration clung far too long to the idea that China is a "strategic partner". It is not. The common interests we share with China -- whether it's establishing peace on the Korean peninsula, stabilizing Russia, or halting the arms race in South Asia -- make engagement necessary. But the serious differences between us -- over questions from human rights and democracy, humanitarian intervention to American support for Taiwan -- prevent us from being friends. By adopting the "strategic partner" rhetoric, the Administration fed the public perception -- especially in Congress -- that its engagement policy is naive and misguided and that it is ill-prepared to pursue a clear-eyed strategy. Out of an apparent fear of offending Beijing, the Administration has also made decisions that seem to play into China's hand. The Administration's initial refusal to extend a visa to Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui and President Clinton's announcement of the "three noes" while in Shanghai have raised concerns both in Congress and in Taiwan that the Administration is tilting toward Beijing on the critical issue of Taiwan. Those concerns were reinforced by the Administration's attempts to quell Beijing's furor over Lee's July pronouncement that relations between Taiwan and China should be "state to state". The Administration's steadfast refusal to include a stop in Seoul or Tokyo as part of President Clinton's trip to China in 1998 was designed not to offend the Chinese, at the risk of diminishing the importance of American relationships with key allies in the region. By failing to press China more firmly on sensitive issues such as human rights or nonproliferation or trade violations, the Administration has sent a message that engagement is an end in itself. For example, the Administration has repeatedly passed on sanctioning China for the sale of M-11 missiles to Pakistan, as did its predecessor, out of fear of throwing engagement off track. However, its failure to be direct and up front has undermined confidence in Congress about the administration's willingness to hold China accountable. The question, then, is how do we proceed from here? It is clear that the next administration, Democratic or Republican, will maintain the policy of engagement with China. The challenge it will face is to find a way to engage China more effectively in order to better serve our national interests and rebuild a consensus in support of engagement. I believe the next administration needs to do three things to meet that challenge. First, it must recognize that engagement is not an objective in and of itself. Engagement is a process through which the United States and China pursue our respective interests -- some mutual, some not. Given the differences between us, engagement must be long-term, and we must expect bumps along the road. When China takes actions to which we object, whether toward Taiwan or its own citizens, we cannot let fear of disrupting the process of engagement restrain us from responding firmly, in public as well as private. Second, it must reject the idea that our relationship with China is somehow "special." It is not special -- and to operate as if it were only allows Beijing greater opportunity to manipulate our actions and reactions. China has a complex society, and we should try to better understand it But in the final analysis, our foreign policy must be dictated by our own national interests. Third, the next administration must retool our engagement with China to ensure that it is rooted in the four fundamental principles I suggested earlier: clarity, consistency, pragmatism and accountability. Let me begin with clarity. Our national interests with regard to China must be more clearly articulated if we are to do more than simply lurch from one crisis to the next. We need to give Americans a better understanding of why we must engage China and what the stakes are for the United States in that engagement. If Americans fail to understand the range of interests that we have with China, then setbacks in one area, such as human rights or trade, can undermine our ability to maintain the course. By clearly stating our interests and our goals, we can stay focused on the issues of real importance and avoid unnecessary and harmful distractions. We also need to give China a clear sense of our priorities and expectations. Hesitating to publicly and quickly reject Chinas newest white paper threat to use force against Taiwan sent a blurred message to China about the depth of our support for Taiwan. Similarly, speaking with Chinese officials about the importance of human rights or arms control is not enough if we fail to follow-up with concrete policy steps -- such as meeting with democracy advocates in Beijing or imposing sanctions for proliferation violations. Paying lip service to these important issues sends the wrong message to the Chinese about our expectations of progress, and it undermines public confidence in engagement as a policy that serves the interests of the American people. I fully understand the usefulness and nuances of quiet diplomacy. It is a necessary instrument of our approach to any country. But it cannot be the only means of conveying our concerns. We have to be willing to combine words and deeds and to deliver messages publicly as well as privately if Beijing is to grasp the seriousness of our positions. Clarity of message is nearly impossible to achieve without consistency. The next administration must strive to avoid the kind of flip flops that we have seen on controversial questions such as Lee Teng-hui's visit to the US or Zhu Rong-ji's April WTO offer. These kinds of missteps are confusing and lead to misperceptions about what our policy is and where it is headed. Pragmatism must also be a fundamental element of our engagement with China. We must be more realistic about expectations for progress over both the short and long terms. Concluding a WTO agreement with China was a short-term goal. Promoting human rights and change in China is a long term objective, and success or failure is not simply a function of our bilateral relationship. We must realize that China's fractious history and a desire to maintain power has embedded in its leaders a deep-rooted fear of too much change, too rapidly and resistance to anything that might undermine stability and cohesion. Our ability to influence China varies -- a point that policymakers in both the Executive branch and the Congress must convey much more clearly to the American people. For this reason, a pragmatic U.S. approach to China must include multilateral efforts. Working closely with our allies, we must encourage China to become a responsible member of the international community. The more we can tie China into international standards and norms -- be it on trade or arms control -- the greater the stake China will have in abiding by them, and the more accountable China will be to the international community if it fails to do so. We must also be more realistic about the tone we use in dialogue. A dialogue with another powerful nation must be just that -- a dialogue -- not a monologue. The message must go beyond, "Accede to our demands on our schedule." A real dialogue with China should seek to define not only the areas and ways in which we can cooperate but also the areas where we disagree and how we might handle those disagreements. By defining cooperative steps on a host of issues, real dialogue could lead ultimately to a much improved relationship. Realistic dialogue must also embrace a significant increase in personal diplomacy, important in any bilateral relationship but nowhere more than in Asia. Our relationship with China and the range of interests at stake in that relationship can be promoted far more effectively when the President, the Secretary of State and other senior officials build ongoing personal relationship with their counterparts. Improving the clarity, consistency and pragmatism of our approach to China will not produce results if we are not prepared to hold China accountable for its actions. This means triggering the enforcement mechanisms within international institutions such as the Geneva Human Rights Commission, the ILO or soon the WTO and enforcing our own domestic laws with respect to issues such as proliferation or human rights. The international community must insist that China be responsible for full compliance with its commitments. When Chinese actions contradict international norms or the promises it has made to us bilaterally, we must be willing to say so. The American public will not continue to support engagement unless we are more honest about China's transgressions. While unilateral sanctions are a blunt instrument for holding China -- or any nation -- accountable, there may be occasions when sanctions are appropriate. The Tiananmen Square massacre underscores this. But when we consider unilateral sanctions, we must be sure they are a relevant response to the policy against which we are protesting. Change in China will come, not as a result of isolated sanctions, but over years of exposure to the full-range of diplomatic and economic tools at our disposal. Exchanges of students, business leaders, artists and scientists are far more powerful agents of change than sanctions can ever be. Obviously, the most difficult issue in our engagement with China -- and the one that could draw us into conflict with China -- is Taiwan. When President Nixon went to China in 1972, the cornerstone of American policy on the question of Taiwan was laid in the resulting Shanghai communiqué. The US acknowledged that "all Chinese on either side of the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China" and reaffirmed its interests in a "peaceful settlement of the Taiwan question by the Chinese themselves." The so-called "one China" policy reflected the realities at the time; it was the position of both the communists in Beijing and the Nationalists on Taiwan. And President Nixon and Henry Kissinger left little doubt in private meetings with Mao Tse-tung and Chou En-lai that the U.S. supported the one China policy and that we would support no other formulation such as two Chinas, one China-one Taiwan or an independent Taiwan. Today Taiwan is a very different place than it was in 1972, and that complicates the situation for American policymakers. It has a thriving democracy, a robust economy, and as a result of this month's elections, a new untested political leadership from the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) which has espoused Taiwanese independence. Reunification was the overriding objective for the Chinese that Red the mainland in 1949, but it is not for the younger generation of Chinese who have grown up on Taiwan or for the native Taiwanese who have no desire to reunify with China. Let me be clear: the United States will never accept a rollback of democracy and freedom in Taiwan. But to abandon the one China policy and support independence for Taiwan, as some of my Congressional colleagues argue, would be a dangerous move for both Taiwan and the United States. There is no question that reunification of Taiwan is the overriding issue for Beijing. If Taiwan declared independence or if the US took any action to encourage such a declaration, I am convinced China would respond militarily and we would be drawn in. The one China policy serves our interests and enhances Taiwan's security as long as we continue to make it clear to China, as the Administration did during the 1996 straits crisis, that a military solution to the reunification question is unacceptable to the United States. The issue is not whether we should change our basic policy but how we should respond to the situation created by Chen Shui-bian's election as Taiwan's next president. Given the DPP's Taiwanese base of support and its platform calling for independence, some fear that Taiwan will become even more provocative than it was under Lee's leadership and that cross straits tensions will increase further. For them the glass is half empty. I prefer to see it half full. Chen Shui-bian was elected with 39 percent of the vote; his runner-up was James Soong, a long time member of the Nationalist Party who was ousted by Lee and the strongest advocate of reunification with China in the three way race. Chen's election did not provide a clear mandate on the question of reunification. Judging by his actions to date, he understands this. He immediately offered to visit the mainland to meet with Chinese leaders, and his party is moving to remove the clause in its platform advocating establishment of the Republic of Taiwan. Taiwan's legislature, though still controlled by the Nationalist Party, followed suit by ending a 51-year ban on direct trade, transportation and postal links between Taiwan's offshore islands and China. Clearly there are divisions within the DPP on how to handle China and some, including Chen's vice president, are more hard line than he. Whether Chen Shui-bian can maintain the course that he has begun remains to be seen. But just as President Nixon's conservative credentials enabled him to open China to the United States in 1972, Chen Shui-bian's background and political history may enable him to push the dialogue with Beijing further than the Nationalists ever could. But it takes two to tango, and Chen cannot do this alone. The leadership in Beijing must be prepared to respond. So far, Beijing's response to Chen's election and his gestures to reach out have been fairly positive. But if China really wants to solve the reunification issue peacefully, it is going to have to get beyond its emotional and historical attachments, to Taiwan. It has to recognize that Taiwan is a very different place today than it was when the Nationalists fled in 1949. Taiwan is not Hong Kong or Macau, and the one China, two systems approach is a nonstarter in these negotiations. Beijing needs to accept this and think more creatively. The recent white paper issued by China's State Council suggests that Beijing may be beginning to do that. Despite its threat to use force if Taiwan delayed negotiations indefinitely, it did not demand a retraction of Lee Teng-hui's call for "state to state" relations and it suggested that negotiations could proceed on some sort of equal basis. If cross strait's tensions are to be decreased, Taiwan will have to move carefully, calibrating every step to avoid provocation. Beijing, on the other hand, will have to resist the temptation to see every move as provocative and to respond disproportionately, verbally or otherwise. So we are at a pivotal point in cross straits relations. Whether the dynamic of those relations is changed for the better or the worse depends not only on responsible leadership in Beijing and Taipei but also on how the United States responds. It is incumbent onus to respond in a judicious and balanced way. We must use our influence to encourage both sides to resume the dialogue but we must also be careful not to lean more heavily on one side than the other. We must avoid the penchant of the current administration to see Taiwan's actions through Beijing's eyes. Both sides are capable of provocation. We need to judge the actions of both players objectively-not through the lens of one side or the other. We must avoid taking actions that would undermine the opportunity for progress by further destabilizing relations across the strait's. A case in point is the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, which has passed the House and is pending in the Senate. There is nothing that we can do vis-a-vis Taiwan, short of cutting off arms sales completely, that will satisfy Beijing. However, Beijing's reaction to this legislation is not unwarranted. The TSEA, as written, is an attempt to move beyond the parameters of the Taiwan Relations Act and to build a formal military relationship that goes beyond our unofficial ties with Taiwan. To pass the TSEA in this form -- particularly now at this critical juncture -- could increase tensions in the straits, destroy the opportunity for resumed dialogue, and invite some kind of military response from Beijing. In short, it would undermine Taiwan's security, not enhance it. Another tricky issue confronting us is whether or not to accede to Taiwan's request to buy Aegis destroyers. Given Beijing's missile buildup across the strait's and the series of threats issued prior to the Taiwanese, election, including the white paper with its new dictum on force, it is no surprise that Taiwan has asked for more sophisticated systems. We have a longstanding policy, codified in the Taiwan Relations Act, of providing arms to Taiwan to meet its self-defense needs. I support that policy but I also believe that we should assess every sale in terms of its impact on stability and balance in the strait's and Taiwan's capacity to absorb and use any new systems it has requested. Given the enormous gap between Taiwan and China's military capabilities, it is hard to see how the United States could ever provide Taiwan with enough defensive equipment. In the final analysis, balance in the strait is provided by us, by our willingness to come to Taiwan's defense if China attacks. We have been deliberately vague about the circumstances under which we would come to Taiwan's defense, not only to discourage Taiwan from drawing us in by declaring independence but also to deter a Chinese attack by keeping Beijing guessing. Some argue that we should abandon this strategic ambiguity and lay down clear lines as to when we would and would not respond. It's tempting to do this, but I do not believe that it serves our interests or Taiwan's. Any situation which results in the use of force across the straits is unlikely to be black and white and who provoked whom is not likely to be clear. The scenarios which might lead to the use of force and the conditions under which the US might respond are too variable to lend themselves to clear delineation. For example, if China attacks in response to what it sees as Taiwanese provocation, would we respond? If Taiwan declares independence and China responds militarily, would we come to Taiwan's defense? The point is that there could be many scenarios under which force becomes an issue. I do not think that we can come up with a comprehensive list of conditions under which we would defend Taiwan. To try to do so in an effort to remove the strategic ambiguity runs the risk of decreasing Taiwan's security rather than increasing it and of eliminating the flexibility that we will need to determine how to respond in any given situation. Taiwan poses a formidable challenge for the U.S. On the one hand, injecting ourselves directly into the question of Taiwan's future runs contrary to our own interests and increases the risk of conflict with China. On the other hand, it is not in our interest to do anything that diminishes the level of democracy practiced by our example and with our help in Taiwan. On the Taiwan issue, above all others, the next administration must engage China with greater clarity and consistency of message and policy. It must be more realistic about Taiwan's needs and the degree to which Beijing's threats are really serious. It must be prepared to hold Beijing as well as Taiwan accountable for actions that raise the tension level and destabilize the balance across the strait's. And every question raised by the issue of Taiwan must be decided according to our definition of our national interests-not Beijing's. In the final analysis, history and a clear understanding of our national interests mandate that we engage with China, but we must be much more explicit in acknowledging that short-term benefits may be limited and that the long-term challenges are real. We must anchor China in the international community, using economic and political incentives to promote its adherence to international norms on everything from labor practices to nonproliferation. We must balance our sensitivity to China's concerns with a greater willingness to stand firm when Beijing fails to implement promised progress. We can -- and we must -- arrive at a different kind of engagement with China -- one which best serves our national interests in a stable, prosperous Asia and a government in Beijing committed to responsible membership in the world community. And this is a challenge -- and an outcome -- to which the next administration must be fully committed. (end text) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State - www.usinfo.state.gov)
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