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08 March 2000

Text: Pacific Forces Commander March 7 on Asia-Pacific Security

(Blair stresses peace efforts to Senate committee) (11,460)
The United States must diligently pursue its interests for a more
peaceful Asia-Pacific region, according to Admiral Dennis Blair,
commander-in-chief of the U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC), U.S. Navy.
The benefits of a peaceful Asia-Pacific region would mean greater
prosperity for Americans, he said, while a region poised on the edge
of conflict would bring crisis and danger.
Blair offered that assessment March 7 to members of the Senate Armed
Services Committee in a hearing on military strategy and operational
requirements as part of a review of the Department of Defense's fiscal
year 2001 budget authorization.
"A secure and peaceful Asia-Pacific region presents tremendous
opportunities for greater prosperity in America," Blair told the
Senate panel.
Conversely, the Defense Department official warned, "an Asia poised
for armed conflict, uncertain of the intentions of neighbors and
regional powers, and subject to a rising wave of nationalism as a new
generation of leaders comes to power, will present only crises and
dangers."
"As the principal guarantor of global peace, the United States, by its
actions and omissions, will strongly influence, if not determine, the
outcome," Blair said.
The U.S. Pacific Command, Blair said, enhances security and promotes
peaceful development in the Asia-Pacific region "by deterring
aggression, responding to crises and fighting to win."
Blair said he had no reservations about the Pacific Command's ability
to do its job today, but added he did have doubts "about its ability
to do so in the future," unless it better addresses structural
readiness issues.
Blair said a new generation of Asian leadership has arisen that is
reassessing security relationships with "a new nationalism" that is
replacing the anti-colonialism movement.
"Balance of power and nationalism will compete against the more
enlightened views of greater security and economic cooperation to
drive the future of Asia," Blair said.
Security threats to the region include long-standing tensions that
threaten serious conflict in Korea, the Taiwan Strait, and Kashmir,
according to Blair.
Separatist movements and ethnic disputes in Burma, China, India,
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka, he added, "set up vicious
cycles of terrorism and repression within countries and threaten the
region with refugee flows, export of terrorism, and crises between
neighboring nations."
As a result of a series of provocative actions by North Korea, Blair
said, the United States, Japan and Korea have worked to enhance policy
coordination and "close trilateral consultation."
The coordinated approach to North Korea, Blair said, "has resulted for
the moment in improved behavior by that regime. The inspection of the
suspected nuclear production site at Kumchangni has allayed concern
over that particular facility."
The most dangerous incident over the past year, Blair said, "occurred
when a fleet of North Korean fishing boats, escorted by patrol craft,
repeatedly crossed the Northern Limit Line, established by the United
Nations Command and treated by [South Korea] as a de facto maritime
boundary."
"Several days of confrontation resulted in a significant naval battle
between the two countries," Blair said.
In contrast to North Korea's provocative actions in the region, South
Korea is seeking to engage its northern neighbor peacefully, according
to Blair.
"South Korea President Kim Dae-jung's forward-looking, visionary
approach exemplifies a clear path to regional security," Blair said.
"President Kim's government," he said, "has increased security
dialogue and cooperation with Japan and high level defense-related
visits with China."
Change, manifested by globalization, is ascendant in the region, Blair
said. Blair cited China as an example of a country affected by this
trend, saying, "the teachings of Marx, Lenin, and Mao no longer guide
the Chinese."
In a year in which China's embassy in Belgrade was accidentally bombed
and a House Select Committee released a report on Chinese espionage
efforts in the United States, China's leadership has "wrestled with a
strategy for balancing internal stability and the Taiwan issue with
the need for outside investment and trade," Blair said.
China's leaders, he said, appear to have adopted a strategy of opening
the country's economy and maintaining good relations with the United
States "while continuing to suppress internal dissent and pressuring
Taiwan."
While both China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) and Taiwan's
military forces improved their capabilities in the last year, the two
sides "did not significantly alter the balance of power across the
Taiwan Strait," Blair said.
Taiwan's military, he said, "maintains a qualitative edge over the
PLA, and its combat capabilities should improve steadily over time as
it incorporates new weapons into its war fighting doctrine and
training."
The PLA, Blair emphasized, "still lacks the capability to invade and
control Taiwan."
Following is the text of Blair's remarks:
(begin text)
STATEMENT OF ADMIRAL DENNIS C. BLAIR, U.S. NAVY
COMMANDER IN CHIEF U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND
BEFORE THE SENATE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE
ON FISCAL YEAR 2001
POSTURE STATEMENT 7 MARCH 2000
INTRODUCTION
Mr. Chairman and members of this Committee, on behalf of the men and
women of the United States Pacific Command, thank you for this
opportunity to present my perspective on security in the Asia-Pacific
region. Having served as USCINCPAC for just over a year, I believe
that steady and focused efforts are required to ensure the region
develops in ways favorable to American interests. A secure and
peaceful Asia-Pacific region presents tremendous opportunities for
greater prosperity in America, and in the world, as we enter into this
century.
Alternatively, an Asia poised for armed conflict, uncertain of the
intentions of neighbors and regional powers, and subject to a rising
wave of nationalism as a new generation of leaders comes to power,
will present only crises and dangers. As the principal guarantor of
global peace, the United States, by its actions and omissions, will
strongly influence, if not determine, the outcome.
The economic, political, and military contours of the Asian landscape
are evolving rapidly. Most Asian economies are now enjoying economic
recovery. But one of the lessons learned from Asia's financial
turbulence in 1997 and 1998 is that we cannot take Asia's economic
prosperity for granted. A durable recovery and economic security in
the region can only come when the financial and corporate
restructuring process is complete. We also see reasons for economic
concern in a number of key Asian countries. For instance, Japan
remains trapped in slow growth.
China's economy is also struggling with weak demand and severe price
deflation. We are hopeful Jakarta's promising new budget and the
recent agreement with IMF will help President Wahid turn Indonesia's
economy around. But this will be no easy task.
Similarly, fractious Indian politics make it difficult for Prime
Minister Vajpayee's new Indian government to implement the kind of
bold economic reforms needed to reduce high levels of poverty.
Sustainable economic growth in the region is in the interest of all.
It provides a favorable setting for diplomatic and military
initiatives to build a security framework for the region.
There are many flash points in the region. Long-standing tensions
threaten serious conflict in places such as Korea, the Taiwan Strait,
and Kashmir. Violent separatist movements and ethnic disputes in
Burma, China, India, Indonesia, the Philippines, and Sri Lanka set up
vicious cycles of terrorism and repression within countries and
threaten the region with refugee flows, export of terrorism, and
crises between neighboring nations. Rapid economic development has
created huge gaps in the distribution of wealth within many countries
in the region. Combined with corruption and privilege, this
development has caused citizens to challenge the legitimacy of ruling
political regimes and has further inflamed violence between ethnic and
religious groups.
Security relations among the states in the region are fluid. Fifty
years after the end of World War II, the victory of Mao in China, and
the beginning of independence from colonial rule, a new generation of
national leaders is coming to power in Asia. Many of these leaders are
reviewing the premises of their international security relations. Many
bring a new nationalism based upon culture, ethnicity, and religion
rather than anti-colonialism.
The teachings of Marx, Lenin, and Mao no longer guide the Chinese.
India has turned its attentions outward and expects to play a greater
role in international politics in the coming years. Indonesia is
emerging from almost four decades of authoritarian rule. Globalization
increases wealth, but often offends ethnic sensitivities. Balance of
power and nationalism will compete against the more enlightened views
of greater security and economic cooperation to drive the future of
Asia.
The role the United States plays is critical to the future of Asia. In
the 20th century, America fought three major wars and lost more lives
in Asia than in any other theater of conflict.
We need to do better in the 21st century.
U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND MISSION
Ready today and preparing for tomorrow, the U.S. Pacific Command
enhances security and promotes peaceful development in the
Asia-Pacific region by deterring aggression, responding to crises and
fighting to win.
Over the past year, the men and women of the Pacific Command have been
carrying out our mission. To deepen your appreciation for the region
and our efforts to promote security, I would like to summarize key
events from the past year and highlight the progress we made towards
the priorities I described in my testimony last year.
EVENTS THAT SHAPED THE REGION OVER THE PAST YEAR
Since I last testified to you, numerous events have shaped security
developments in the region. Let me begin with a key ally, Japan.
Japan
Despite recent setbacks, Japan remains the second largest economy in
the world with a level of technology comparable to the United States.
It is the country with the greatest economic impact on the
Asia-Pacific region. Japan enjoys a thriving democratic system, with
strict civilian control of the Self-Defense Forces and a tradition of
close security cooperation with America. About half of American forces
forward deployed in the Western Pacific operate from bases in Japan.
Without these bases, it would be much more difficult for the U.S. to
meet commitments and defend American interests throughout the
Asia-Pacific region.
Over the past year, we made important progress in deepening and
strengthening our alliance with Japan. Shortly after I testified to
you last year, Japanese Self-Defense Forces chased two North Korean
boats from Japanese territorial waters across the Sea of Japan. This
was the first time in 46 years Japanese forces have ever fired even
warning shots a foreign flagged vessel. This provocation, combined
with North Korea's launch of the Taepo-Dong missile over Japan the
previous summer, added urgency for the Japanese Diet to pass new
Defense Guidelines legislation. These guidelines will help formalize
cooperation for logistical support of U.S. operations and other
support to U.S. forces in response to situations in areas surrounding
Japan that have an important impact on Japan's security.
Additionally, this Taepo Dong launch stimulated greater Japanese
cooperation with the U.S. in developing missile defense and satellite
surveillance capabilities. North Korean provocations have resulted in
close trilateral consultation and policy coordination among the U.S.,
Japan, and South Korea beginning under the leadership of former
Secretary of Defense Perry. This coordination aligned our nations'
policies regarding North Korea and is contributing to unprecedented
security cooperation between Japan and South Korea, establishing a
pattern for future cooperation and policy coordination.
The focus with our most important ally Japan must always be on
advancing and promoting the future security of the region.
We must continue to tackle the tough issues that could impede
strengthening this essential alliance. Over the last year, we have
made progress in resolving a number of these issues. We are working
with the GOJ to eliminate pollution from the Shinkampo waste disposal
incinerator that affects Americans stationed at the Atsugi Naval Air
Station and Japanese baseworkers and citizens, although progress is
slower than both sides would wish. We also are making progress on
agreements to relocate bases in Okinawa from the populated southern
part of the island to the north. Other issues we are working include
negotiations this month on the new Special Measures Agreement that
expires March 2001, a key element of Japan's Host Nation Support.
Because of Japan's economic problems, funds spent by the Government of
Japan to support U.S. Forces have come under increased scrutiny. We
have urged the Japanese to think in terms of the strategic importance
of Host Nation Support to the security and prosperity of Japan and the
entire region. We will continue to work with the Japanese so the
alliance emerges as strong in the future as it has been in the past.
North and South Korea President Kim Dae-jung's forward-looking,
visionary approach exemplifies a clear path to regional security.
While unwavering in his commitment to deter North Korean aggression,
President Kim has reached out to current and historical enemies to
build a more secure future for Korea. He strongly supported U.S.
efforts led by Dr. Perry and shares responsibility for successful
trilateral consultations. His government has increased security
dialogue and cooperation with Japan and high level defense-related
visits with China. Under President Kim's leadership, Korea is coming
to peace with the past in the expectation of a more prosperous future.
Recognizing the obligation of all nations to contribute to collective
security, his government provided substantial forces to peace
operations in East Timor.
The coordinated approach to North Korea has resulted for the moment in
improved behavior by that regime. The inspection of the suspected
nuclear production site at Kumchangni has allayed concern over that
particular facility. The most dangerous incident over the past year
occurred when a fleet of North Korean fishing boats, escorted by
patrol craft, repeatedly crossed the Northern Limit Line, established
by the United Nations Command and treated by the ROK as a de facto
maritime boundary. Several days of confrontation resulted in a
significant naval battle between the two countries. U.S. Pacific
Command sent ships and surveillance platforms to Korean waters in the
vicinity to help monitor events and deter escalation. Since that
incident, North Korea has been strident in its rhetoric, but has
continued to abide by its verbal commitment not to launch missiles as
long as negotiations resulting from the Perry Policy Review continue.
Though tensions on the Korean peninsula have eased recently, North
Korea remains unpredictable and a serious threat to peace. It
continues to enhance its military capability by forward deploying
additional long-range artillery, building additional midget
submarines, conducting infiltrations, and developing missiles. The
scale of operations during the winter training cycle exceeded what we
have observed over the past several years, demonstrating North Korea
remains willing to expend sizable resources to maintain readiness to
resume war with the South. Their economic plunge appears to have
bottomed out, albeit at a low level. Sustaining our deterrence posture
in South Korea is essential to the success of the strategy we are
pursuing with North Korea.
China
Since I testified last year, a confluence of events drove U.S.-China
military relations to a new low. The Cox Commission Report,
investigations of Chinese efforts to influence the U.S. domestic
political arena, and analyses of the military balance across the
Taiwan Strait captured headlines early in the year.
They were quickly followed by China's crackdown on Falun Gong
followers and Prime Minister Zhu Rongji's failed efforts during his
U.S. visit to reach a World Trade Organization agreement.
In May, relations reached their nadir with the accidental bombing of
the Chinese embassy in Belgrade and the resultant severing by China of
military contacts between our two countries. Finally, in July Taiwan's
President Lee further exacerbated both cross-strait and Sino-U.S.
relations with his "state-to-state" formulation.
These events clearly challenged China's leadership as it wrestled with
a strategy for balancing internal stability and the Taiwan issue with
the need for outside investment and trade.
China's leaders now appear to have adopted a strategy of opening and
marketizing its economy -- and maintaining good relations with the
U.S., while continuing to suppress internal dissent and pressuring
Taiwan. Military relations are slowly mending. The U.S. has negotiated
a settlement regarding Chinese lives lost in Belgrade and the damage
to our respective diplomatic properties; a solid agreement was reached
as a step towards entry into the WTO; the STENNIS battlegroup recently
visited Hong Kong without incident; and, I have just returned from a
useful trip to China where we exchanged views on security developments
in Asia and discussed future interactions between our armed forces.
From a military perspective, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) has
made significant structural and organizational changes in all branches
of service this last year. It has made noticeable increases, however,
in the military capabilities of its Air Force, its Navy, and its
rocket forces. These capability changes included increasing combat
aircraft inventory, fielding fighter-bomber aircraft, and improving
air defenses across the Taiwan Strait. Changes in the PLA Navy (PLAN),
PLA missile force, and PLA ground forces focused on improving future
capabilities. The PLAN continued sea trials for eventual fielding of
additional surface and subsurface ships, continued testing of
anti-ship missiles, improved naval helicopter training, and received
the first of two Russian destroyers. The PLA missile force continued
testing and fielding newer inter-continental and short-range ballistic
missiles (SRBM) and is building additional SRBM launch sites, while
the PLA ground force continued downsizing to both reduce its force
structure and increase mobility.
The Taiwan military also made significant changes during the last
year. The Taiwan Air Force increased its combat aircraft and
surface-to-air missile inventories. Once assimilated, these systems
should improve the island's air-to- air, anti-ship, and air defense
capabilities. The acquisition of two KNOX-class frigates and the
commissioning of additional coastal patrol boats should also improve
future naval capabilities. The only significant change in the Taiwan
army was downsizing some divisions into combined arms brigades.
These changes in PLA and Taiwan military forces did not significantly
alter the balance of power across the Taiwan Strait. Taiwan's military
maintains a qualitative edge over the PLA, and its combat capabilities
should improve steadily over time as it incorporates new weapons into
its warfighting doctrine and training. The PLA still lacks the
capability to invade and control Taiwan. It maintains a quantitative
edge in all branches of service, but does not have an adequate power
projection capability to quickly overcome Taiwan's more modern air
force and inherent geographical advantages, which favor the defense.
It does, however, have the ability to inflict significant damage to
Taiwan with its military forces.
We expect China to accelerate its pace of military modernization
somewhat by increasing the PLA budget over the next several years.
However, this will not decisively alter the military situation across
the Strait within that time. Indonesia and East Timor Events in
Indonesia and East Timor have also been a focus of our attention over
the past year. The national elections in June, the first free
elections in over 40 years, were conducted in a peaceful atmosphere,
surprising many observers and giving renewed hope to a democratic
process for Indonesia. Fear of violence and danger to foreign
residents of Indonesia proved unfounded. However, events in East Timor
kept Pacific Command, in conjunction with our regional allies and
security partners, busy planning for a wide variety of possible
contingencies.
Following a massive turnout in an open, transparent ballot in the face
of militia intimidation, 78.5 percent of the people voted to reject
continued ties to Indonesia. Following the vote, the pro-Indonesian
militias began a reign of terror, harassing pro-independence leaders
and other East Timorese, destroying large portions of the cities and
towns, killing people and driving several hundred thousand into West
Timor in an apparent attempt to reverse the results of the election.
The Indonesian Army, despite assurances by its leadership, did not
intervene to stop the violence. Instead, local army elements
frequently assisted the militias in the destruction. Following more
than a week of violence, President Habibie consented to allow an
international force to enter and restore the peace.
The Australian-led, U.S.-backed, coalition operations in East Timor,
which included major contingents from Thailand, New Zealand, the
Philippines, South Korea, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Italy plus
smaller forces from 11 other nations, brought security to the area.
East Timor today is secure from the militias, but the work has just
begun to establish a fully functioning society. Our Australian allies
did a great job in leading this UN-mandated peace operation and
providing 5,500 troops that were the backbone of the coalition.
East Timor was not the only trouble spot in Indonesia. The country
continues to face communal violence in the Maluku Islands and
separatist elements in Aceh and Irian Jaya. Though the new government
faces many challenges, its continued political transition and
accounting for human rights crimes and abuses are noteworthy and, in
conjunction with military reform, are necessary steps for the eventual
restoration of full U.S. military relations.
The pace of any military-to-military re-engagement with Indonesia will
also be determined in part by legislative provisions which prohibit
certain activities until specific conditions --including
accountability on East Timor human rights abuses and return of
refugees from West to East Timor --are met.
Philippines President Estrada and his ministers provided strong
leadership and after a healthy debate, the Philippine Senate ratified
the Visiting Forces Agreement (VFA) on May 25, 1999.
This major legislation provides the legal framework to protect our
Armed Forces while on duty in the Philippines.
Additionally, it allows us to restart exercises, such as BALIKATAN,
and resume port visits that have been suspended since 1996. In July
1999, the USS BLUE RIDGE, 7 th Fleet's flagship, was the first ship to
visit the Philippines after the VFA ratification. Since then we have
had about one port visit per month and look to gradually increase the
number of visits in the future. In February we conducted BALIKATAN,
our largest joint and combined exercise with the Philippines.
Operations with and assistance from the United States cannot
substitute for an adequately funded armed force, and the Philippines
have not yet made the necessary investments. As a consequence,
military operations against domestic insurgents have not been
decisive, and the Air Force and Navy cannot exercise air and sea
sovereignty. The United States is looking at ways to help improve its
capabilities. Through Secretary Cohen's initiative, a consultative
group was established between OSD and the Philippines Department of
National Defense last year. The talks are designed to address
innovative ways to help the Philippines increase their readiness and
become a more active contributor to regional security.
Despite its handicaps, the Philippines has taken a leading and
responsible role in East Timor, contributing ground forces to the
International Force in East Timor (INTERFET) coalition, and taking
responsibility as the leading nation for the military force of the
United Nations Transition Authority for East Timor (UNTAET).
South Asia Relations between India and Pakistan, which generally
deteriorated over the year, drive security in South Asia. India also
has significant though less immediate concerns about China.
Shortly following promising reconciliation talks at Lahore, Pakistan,
fierce fighting erupted along the line-of-control in Kashmir. The
subsequent military coup in Pakistan and hijacking of an Indian
Airlines flight on Christmas Eve further heated the rhetoric and
dangerously strained relations between the two countries. Meanwhile,
there is great and potentially dangerous uncertainty about the nuclear
programs and policies of both countries. I visited India earlier this
year, the first USCINCPAC visit since 1997. Overall, my discussions
with Indian leaders were very constructive; they expressed interest in
gradually increasing security cooperation with us, initially to
counter terrorism and illegal drugs. Once India responds to our
nonproliferation concerns, I believe that a gradual strengthening of
military interaction is in the interests of both countries. Both of us
have many common international interests, and the more we work with
India the better we can defuse tensions by supporting productive
relations between that country and Pakistan.
Elsewhere in south Asia, violence continued unabated in Sri Lanka as
the Tamil separatists launched suicide bombings against government
officials and achieved military successes. Nepal faces a smaller scale
insurgency in remote valleys. Neither Sri Lanka nor Nepal has yet
fashioned the right combination of negotiations, economic development,
and military/ police operations to turn the tide of these
insurgencies.
Smaller South Asian nations such as Nepal and Bangladesh have a proud
and distinguished tradition of participation in U. N. peacekeeping
operations (PKO). Pacific Command provides some support for these
capabilities. U.S. forces participated in a very successful
multi-platoon training exercise designed to improve peacekeeping
skills. Commander U.S. Army Pacific sponsored the event and the Royal
Nepalese Army hosted the nations involved. In addition to the U.S. and
Nepal, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka contributed platoons and 18 other
nations, including India and China, sent observers.
POW/MIA Efforts in Southeast Asia
Joint Task Force Full Accounting (JTF-FA) continues to make progress
on achieving the fullest possible accounting of Americans unaccounted
for as a result of the conflict in Southeast Asia. Last year, we
identified and returned 41 remains to their loved ones. Currently
2,031 Americans still remain unaccounted for. JTF-FA conducted 11
joint field activities (JFAs) in fiscal year 1999 -five each in
Vietnam and Laos, and one in Cambodia. The JTF-FA field teams
investigated 351 cases and excavated 61 sites. 37 remains believed to
be unaccounted for Americans were repatriated as a result of these
field activities. JTF-FA will continue to maintain its demanding pace
of operations in fiscal year 2000, with 11 JFAs scheduled -- five each
in Vietnam and Laos, and one in Cambodia.
These JFAs last 30-45 days in duration. Achieving the fullest possible
accounting of Americans is a U.S. Pacific Command priority and we will
continue to devote the necessary personnel and resources to obtain the
answers the POW/ MIA families so richly deserve.
U.S. PACIFIC COMMAND PRIORITIES
The priorities for the Pacific Command are as I testified last year:
readiness, regional engagement, Revolution in Military Affairs, and
resources.
(1) Readiness Overall, the warfighting capabilities of American armed
forces have leveled out after recent declines, but there are many
critical readiness areas that continue to cause concern.
While I continue to have no reservations about the Pacific Command's
ability to do its job today, I do have doubts about its ability to do
so in the future unless we make more progress in addressing structural
readiness issues. My issues are focused in eight areas: people,
operations and maintenance funding, mobility infrastructure, real
property maintenance, housing, Army prepositioned stocks, preferred
munitions, and medical support.
People. Readiness starts with people. First, I would like to express
the appreciation of the men and women of the U.S. Pacific Command for
the pay and compensation measures taken this past year. These
initiatives show senior leaders and officials in both Executive and
Legislative branches are taking action to meet the needs of our
personnel and their families. I strongly applaud the funding in the
fiscal year 2000 budget for a base pay increase, elimination of the
REDUX retirement system, returning to 50 percent base pay after 20
years of service, and pay table reform that rewards achievement more
than longevity.
These actions demonstrate the interest of our nation in equitably and
fairly compensating the men and women of the armed forces both on
active duty and in retirement. I also very much endorse the Congress's
commitment to keep pay raises above the Employment Cost Index for the
next several years to continue to ensure competitive compensation.
Pay and retirement are not the only areas of concern. To attract and
retain highly motivated, qualified people, we must continue to
emphasize quality medical care, education, and housing while providing
the opportunity to live in a secure and safe environment. We must
increase our efforts to pursue improvements in TRICARE so customer
satisfaction, particularly at military treatment facilities, meets the
national standard.
This is critical to taking care of our personnel and families.
I appreciate the ongoing efforts in the area of dependent education;
however, I must emphasize we need to continue our efforts so
educational standards in DoD schools offer programs and services that
meet or exceed the national average. We should be especially attentive
to revitalizing all housing assets. Current funding gaps and delays in
privatization have endangered our goal to fix the housing problems by
2010.
An important QOL issue in my AOR is the pet quarantine requirements in
Hawaii and Guam. This is a very expensive undertaking for military
families and reimbursement for the costs of bringing pets will
significantly reduce the stress involved in family relocation. Quality
of life activities and programs still require constant and aggressive
attention. We must continue with improvements in these areas so
Americans perceive the military of this new century as a career choice
just as rewarding and challenging as America's world class businesses.
Operations and Maintenance Funding. The next most important component
of readiness is funding for operations and maintenance. These funds
provide spare parts, fuel for aircraft, ships, and tanks, funds to
train, and upkeep for our bases. Here the news is not positive. The
Pacific component commands gained only marginally from FY99 & 00
Emergency/ Readiness Supplemental Appropriations. Further, the funds
provided were only sufficient to prevent further declines in readiness
rather than assist in any measurable increase.
Accordingly, the readiness of our component commands is not expected
to reflect any significant increase this fiscal year from supplemental
funding. Forward deployed forces and forces deploying to contingencies
are at a high state of readiness.
Non-deployed and rear area forces are at lower readiness.
Camps, posts and stations continue to deteriorate.
The US ARMY PACIFIC (USARPAC) total operations and maintenance budget
was $594 million in FY98, $566 million in FY99, and $659 million in
FY00. Most of the FY00 increase was $56 million for Real Property
Maintenance (RPM) which will help reduce the rate at which USARPAC
facilities will deteriorate and thereby help improve soldier quality
of life. Further, USARPAC received an increase of $10 million for
environmental remediation to support the close-out of
chemical-demilitarization operations on Johnston Atoll. USARPAC
OPTEMPO funding also increased by $18 million, almost all in the
Flying Hour Program (FHP) to cover higher per hour costs and to
improve aviator proficiency. USARPAC did not benefit significantly
from the FY99 Emergency/ Readiness Supplemental Appropriations. Of the
$10.67 billion Emergency/ Readiness Supplemental, USARPAC received
$19.4 million.
Our current assessment of USARPAC facilities readiness is "substandard
and eroding." Facilities maintenance backlog for Army forces in the
Pacific has grown to over $1.7 billion despite aggressive efforts to
demolish excess Army infrastructure. Fixing this problem will require
a long-term commitment of both RPM and military construction funding.
PACIFIC AIR FORCES (PACAF) receives primarily operations and
maintenance funding to improve readiness and sustain operations.
During FY98-FY00, PACAF did not benefit from any significant O& M
funding increase associated with readiness.
PACAF's O& M funding has remained relatively flat at approximately
$1.3 billion ($ 1,219 million FY98, $1,291 million FY99 & $1,245
million FY00). The FY99 increase reflected higher flying hour costs
and increases in operations support. FY99 dollars also included
funding for Kosovo support. This funding totaled $2.8 million, which
went to support additional aircraft positioned to defend Korea when
the USS KITTY HAWK and PACAF forces deployed to support ALLIED FORCE.
PACAF's FY99 Real Property Maintenance (RPM) funding actually
decreased by $28.4 million last year (from $210.6 million FY98 to
$182.2 million FY99). FY00 funding includes an additional $55.2
million (to $237.4 million). However, there is little gain as some $22
million worth of FY99 projects migrated to FY00. These dollars go to
support and maintain infrastructure and facilities.
In facilities construction, funded projects totaled $57.2 million in
FY98, $41.5 million in FY99, and $174.2 million in FY00. $73.8 million
of the FY00 funding was for the Elmendorf, Eielson and Andersen AFB
Hydrant Refueling Systems, improving airlift capacity across the
Pacific. Other FY98-00 funded projects included runways, parking
ramps, enlisted dormitories, and mission support facilities.
U.S. PACIFIC FLEET (PACFLT) operations and maintenance funding totaled
$5.7 billion in FY98, $5.8 billion in FY99, and $5.8 billion in FY00.
In FY99, PACFLT received $151 million in O& M Emergency/ Readiness
Supplemental funding. $65 million was spent for spare parts and $86
million for depot maintenance, two key components of fleet readiness.
These expenditures covered the expenses incurred in the high tempo
contingency operations.
In FY00, PACFLT received $113 million in O& M Emergency budget
declaration funding. $85 million will be applied to spare parts, $23
million to depot maintenance and $5 million to Real Property
Maintenance (RPM).
PACFLT began FY00 with essentially the same constant dollar purchasing
power as the year before ($ 5.8 billion). The Navy continues to pursue
cost savings initiatives like activity consolidations and outsourcing
to manage costs. However, I believe essential requirements to maintain
fleet readiness are increasing at a faster rate than available
funding.
MARINE FORCES PACIFIC (MARFORPAC) operations and maintenance budget
(which includes Navy funded aviation) was $1,305 million in FY98,
$1,324 million in FY99, and $909 million in FY00. The FY00 amount does
not reflect additional Navy and Marine Corps funds expected later this
year. MARFORPAC did receive supplemental funding in FY99 and 00 for
readiness.
However, this funding only served to satisfy emerging deficiencies or
sustainment operations and did not result in a measurable change in
readiness.
In operations and maintenance Emergency Supplemental/ Readiness
funding, MARFORPAC gained $14.8 million in FY99 and $38.3 million in
FY00. To sustain readiness, MARFORPAC applied most of the funds
received to maintenance and repair of equipment, ADP systems, training
support, and combat operations infrastructure.
MARFORPAC's Maintenance of Real Property (MRP) funding in FY00
declined to $198 million from $208 million in FY99. Over the past four
years, MARFORPAC's Backlog of Maintenance and Repair (BMAR) has
steadily risen from $281 million to the current $449 million, a 60
percent increase.
For facilities construction, MARFORPAC funding increased to $100
million in FY00 from $81.6 million in FY99. The current MARFORPAC
facilities construction requirement backlog is over $1 billion. Given
an annual investment level of $100 million, the backlog will remain
high and continue to grow.
SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND PACIFIC (SOCPAC) O& M funding totaled $4.8
million in FY98, $4.1 million in FY99, and $3.4 million in FY00.
SOCPAC received $1.2 million in readiness related supplemental
operations and maintenance funding in FY99 from Special Operations
Command, Pacific Command, and Supplemental Appropriations. The
additional money funded deployable computer workstations, Y2K systems
requirements, communications equipment for the Pacific Situation
Assessment Team, and body armor.
Mobility Infrastructure. Of particular concern is the transportation
infrastructure required to deploy forces across the Pacific in support
of conflict in Korea or other operations.
The problem centers on aging fuel systems in Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, and
Japan, specifically, fuel hydrant distribution systems and storage
tanks, which in many cases are nearly 50 years old and nearing the end
of their useful service life. These existing systems are not only very
costly to maintain, but their age reduces our capacity to speed
strategic airlift across the Pacific. We have been working closely
with USTRANSCOM, the Defense Logistics Agency, and the Service
components to program fuels infrastructure costs across the Future
Years Defense Program, and, as a result of these efforts, are
beginning to see improvements. During this past year, we completed a
major pipeline replacement project in Guam and several new storage
tanks in Alaska. Our forward deployed and forward based forces, as
well as those forces that would deploy in support of a major theater
war or contingency, will ultimately reap the benefits from the
incremental readiness improvements generated by each of these
projects. These initiatives clearly represent a solid start to
improving theater throughput; however, sustained funding is still
required. The continued appropriation of resources is absolutely
essential to maintain this upward trend and complete the necessary
repairs of our aging mobility infrastructure.
Real Property Maintenance. Real property maintenance is showing the
combined effects of aging facilities and cumulative underfunding. The
result is a maintenance backlog that will continue to grow unless the
Services can program more funds.
These programs must reflect a commitment to having first-rate
facilities that are on a par with the quality of our people and
weapons systems. Our components require approximately $3.6 billion
over the next five years to fix this backlog. This amount is above
what is needed to maintain the status quo on our bases and
infrastructure. The shortfall in real property maintenance affects
readiness, quality of life, retention, and force protection, and can
no longer be ignored. Our people deserve to live and work in
first-class campuses. We have not yet reached this standard.
Housing. Safe, adequate, well-maintained housing remains one of my top
quality of life concerns. In the Pacific AOR, the latest assessment
shows military family housing (MFP) units totaled 79,471 with
shortfalls of over 11,000 on the west coast and Hawaii, 4,000 in
Japan, and 2,650 in Korea. We are working hard to correct the housing
problems with projects ranging from whole barracks renewals at Fort
Richardson, Alaska, and Schofield Barracks, Hawaii, to new family
housing at Pearl Harbor and Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii. However, much more
remains to be done and I need your continued support for these very
important programs which are vital to retaining the quality people
that are the cornerstone of our military strength.
Army Prepositioned Stocks. A key logistics and sustainment shortfall
remains the Army Prepositioned Stocks 4 (APS-4) Brigade Set located in
Korea. Army heavy forces deploying to fight on the Korean Peninsula
would fall-in on this equipment.
Although we are happy with the status of the Brigade Set, crucial
shortages exist in sustainment stocks that impact our ability to
replace combat losses. I fully support CINCUNC/ CFC's requirement to
have this set of equipment become a Korean version of the capability
that exists in Kuwait to support Central Command.
Preferred Munitions. Another logistics shortfall in the Pacific
Command is preferred munitions. Operations in Kosovo severely depleted
worldwide stocks of Navy and Air Force precision guided munitions,
including many types designated in our plans for use in Korea.
Although service programs have received supplemental funding that will
alleviate some of the shortfalls over time, critical shortages exist
now. Theater plans can still be executed successfully, but only by
substituting less effective munitions early in the conflict.
The result is additional high-risk sorties by combat crews, a longer
conflict, and higher casualties.
Medical Support. Finally, we may be accepting some risk in the area of
medical support. Although funding has been programmed to meet
pre-positioned medical supply shortfalls, and a test will be made of
the shortages of pre-positioned medical supplies, an initial shortfall
in the number of hospital beds, the movement of additional hospitals
and personnel from CONUS-based hospital facilities, and the untested
ability of the industrial base and medical logistics programs to
support massive deployment and initial in-theater requirements, makes
our ability to provide adequate force health protection uncertain.
In summary, Pacific Command can do the job today. However, we need
continued investments to attract and retain quality personnel,
maintain both our equipment and facilities, build stocks of the most
modern munitions and equipment needed to sustain combat operations
most effectively, and provide medical support during a major theater
war.
(2) Regional Engagement The character of U.S. military engagement will
be a significant determinant in the future security situation in the
Asia-Pacific region. Current circumstances provide both the
opportunity and the necessity to develop more mature security
arrangements among the nations of the region. Regional engagement is a
process to achieve national objectives, not an end in itself. Our
program improves the ability of regional partners to defend
themselves, strengthens security alliances and partnerships, increases
regional readiness for combined operations, promotes access for
American forces to facilities in the region, deters potential
aggressors, and promotes security arrangements better suited to the
challenges of the 21 st century.
Let me review the key components of our program.
Regional Exercises. To improve regional readiness for combined
operations, we have overhauled our exercise plans. We are working
closely with our security partners to merge bilateral exercises into
regional exercises using updated scenarios that develop the skills we
expect our combined forces will need. Next month we will conduct an
initial planning conference to bring together four of our larger
exercises in Southeast Asia into one exercise called TEAM CHALLENGE,
scheduled for next year.
Foreign Military Officer Education (FMOE). Underlying our engagement
initiatives is the need for sustained exchanges of officers for
military education. The experience of American officers who have
attended foreign military colleges provides an unparalleled
understanding of how foreign armed forces see their role and approach
operations. Similarly, foreign officers who attend American military
colleges develop an understanding of the value of professional armed
forces, removed from politics and subordinate to government authority.
They come to appreciate that reliance on force to resolve internal
disputes, rather than political accommodation and economic
development, stokes the fires of rebellion and drives away investment
needed for national growth. They also acquire a deeper appreciation of
America's interest in maintaining international security so all may
prosper. The contacts they develop with Americans and officers from
their region establish a network for dialogue and become particularly
valuable as they assume leadership roles within their armed forces.
The recent report from the National Defense University, "The
Importance of Foreign Military Officer Education", makes a strong
argument for these programs: "Critics of FMOE programs often fail to
grasp that much of the value of FMOE deals with subtle, attitudinal
changes that are extremely difficult to measure in quantifiable terms.
This is akin to an accident prevention program, which relies heavily
on attitudes and awareness. The number of accidents avoided is the
key. If some FMOE graduates have been responsible for criminal acts,
then they failed to learn or chose to ignore the principal
non-technical lessons they were taught. On the other hand, we rarely
hear about the real success stories of FMOE ...of unnamed graduates
who learn these lessons and adopt changes in their countries quietly
and professionally for the greater good of their nations and citizens.
"In a number of non-NATO countries, including several of critical
importance to the US such as Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Thailand,
Republic of Korea, and Argentina, officers trained in US military
schools have for a decade or more held most of the top command
positions. This has been especially important in facilitating
acceptance of US forces operating out of their territory and ensuring
their willingness to join the US in coalition operations. This
occurred in the Gulf War and Gulf contingency operations, ROK
contingency operations, Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti, and
IFOR/ SFOR in Bosnia as well as elsewhere.
The FMOE experience also has improved cooperation with the US in
support of its diplomatic objectives, such as the Middle East Peace
Process and policy toward Iraq, Iran, and North Korea." International
Military Education and Training (IMET).
Education is a long-term investment and the IMET program, a main
source of funding for FMOE, is our primary tool in this effort.
I believe unrestricted IMET programs are fundamentally in the national
interest. Some say military education is a reward for countries that
behave according to international standards. On the contrary, I
believe IMET suspensions and E-IMET restrictions limit our ability to
influence future leadership. Many top military leaders in the
Asia-Pacific region today are IMET graduates who strongly advocate a
continued U.S. presence and engagement in Asia. Examples include the
Supreme Commander, Royal Thai Armed Forces and the Chief of Defence
Force, Singapore. IMET is a modest, long-term investment to help build
a secure, peacefully developing Asia-Pacific region. Dollar for
dollar, IMET is unmatched in engagement value. However, level funding
for the past three years combined with increasing course costs and
living allowances, means we are educating fewer students each year.
Even though USPACOM country ambassadors are requesting more IMET
funding each year through their Mission Performance Plans (MPPs),
actual funding for Pacific Command nations has decreased over the last
three years, from $6.962 million in FY98 to $6.525 million in FY00.
Our proposed amount in the President's FY01 Budget is $7.17 million. I
urge this committee to strongly support this much-needed increase in
funding for a vital engagement program.
Security Communities. My vision of the way ahead for military
cooperation in the Asia Pacific is the promotion of a concept that I
call security communities --groups of nations that have dependable
expectations of peaceful change. They genuinely do not plan or intend
to fight one another. They are willing to put their collective efforts
into resolving regional points of friction; contribute armed forces
and other aid to peacekeeping and humanitarian operations to support
diplomatic solutions; and plan, train, and exercise their armed forces
together for these operations. Security communities may be treaty
alliance signatories, participants in a non-military organization such
as the ASEAN Regional Forum, or groups of nations joined by geographic
considerations or common concerns.
They are committed to policy coordination, including combined military
cooperation on specific regional security issues, to advance peaceful
development over time without major conflict.
The effectiveness of security communities derives from adherence to
principles, and the willingness and capabilities to cooperate.
Military dialogue and rudimentary exercises on common tasks, from
search and rescue to peacekeeping operations, promotes understanding
and builds needed trust and confidence to foster the formation of
security communities. The information sharing and procedures developed
through these interactions prepare armed forces to work side-by-side.
I would like to thank the Congress for providing the $10 million in
funding for Asia-Pacific Regional Initiative (APRI).
The initiative will support security communities by enhancing regional
cooperation, military training, readiness, and exercises. The
abilities of our Asia-Pacific neighbors to plan and conduct regional
contingency operations, such as East Timor, is critical to security
and peaceful development as well as conducive to reducing the U.S.
role in responding to these crises. Unlike other theaters with robust
multi-lateral coordination measures, Asia-Pacific nations lack a
coherent set of guidelines and procedures, and in some cases,
deployable capabilities to respond effectively. Our initiative focuses
on regional cooperation, military training, readiness, communication
improvement and intelligence sharing, and exercises as methods to
enhance the ability of countries to respond to contingencies in the
region. Efforts in these key areas will enhance U.S. access in the
region and improve the readiness of U.S. and foreign militaries to
handle regional crises.
East Timor Operations. The approach that the U.S. used in East Timor
demonstrates the potential of security communities and provides a
model for future U.S. involvement in coalition operations. Previously,
the U.S. has followed two modes of involvement in international
peacekeeping operations --either being large and in charge, or
standing aside. East Timor demonstrated the value of having the U.S.
in a supporting role to a competent ally, providing unique and
significant capabilities needed to ensure success without stretching
the capability of U.S. forces and resources to conduct other
operations worldwide. The U.S. provided essential planning support,
communications systems, intelligence, logistics, strategic airlift,
helicopter lift, and civil affairs support, while coalition partners
provided the majority of the forces.
East Timor operations also demonstrated the value of coalition
operations to the nations of the Asia-Pacific region.
These operations have spurred greater interest in standard procedures
for planning and conducting humanitarian and peacekeeping operations,
better communications among the armed forces of the region, and
improving training and equipment. A key objective of Pacific Command's
regional engagement program is to increase the readiness of the armed
forces in the region to contribute to combined peacekeeping and
humanitarian operations, which also builds trust and confidence needed
to form effective security communities.
China. The US has important interests in all corners of Asia, as does
China by virtue of its central geography. The pressing question is how
China will approach security issues in the region.
There are both hopes and fears in the region over China's future
development. China's leaders threaten force should Taiwan authorities
declare independence, or violate other conditions they have
stipulated, using the justification that this is an internal matter
and interference is a violation of their sovereignty. Chinese
authorities have also claimed sovereignty over the South China Sea.
The resulting uncertainty over Chinese intention of using force to
resolve territorial claims creates concerns throughout the
Asia-Pacific region.
The past year has seen a mixture of contradictory words and actions
from China. On the positive side: -No new military moves in the South
China Seas and participation in discussions over a Code of Conduct for
the area.
-- General respect for Hong Kong's autonomy.
-- Restrained actions in the vicinity of the Taiwan Strait following
President Lee Teng-hui's remarks regarding "state-to-state" relations.
On the negative side:
-- Continued military presence to dissuade other claimants, especially
the Philippines, from construction in the Spratly Islands and
Scarborough Shoal.
-- Vociferous rhetoric in response to President Lee Teng-hui's
statements, including veiled threats of attack and invasion.
A major objective of our engagement program with China is to develop
areas where it can play a constructive, responsible role in promoting
security and peaceful development in the region, rather than
approaching the region through zero-sum, balance of power policies.
Summary. We have made progress this year in better structuring our
engagement programs in the Asia Pacific.
Through continued emphasis on education, dialogue, transparency,
exercises and coordination on matters of common interest, we will
continue to strive to achieve security communities that are inclusive
of all willing parties in the Asia Pacific.
(3) Revolution in Military Affairs
The phrase Revolution in Military Affairs denotes changes in
operational concepts and organizational schemes that take advantage of
technology to provide decisive advantages in warfare. The armed forces
of the United States are committed to leading that change in the 21 st
century. At Pacific Command, we maintain frequent communications with
Joint Forces Command, the Department's executive agent for joint
experimentation. Through these communications we share ideas, learn
common lessons, identify shared opportunities and resources for new
concepts, and coordinate exercises.
Since I last testified to you, Pacific Command has established a
Deputy for Joint Experimentation to develop concepts, refine plans,
and participate in Advanced Technology Concept Demonstrations (ACTDs).
Our efforts focus on strategic and operational-level problem solving
using an array of resources ranging from Pacific Command forces and
coalition partners to test ranges in Southern California, Nevada and
Alaska. We are working a concept called Joint Mission Force, a
seamless Joint/ Combined Pacific Theater response package capable of
exceptional flexibility and reaction to contingencies.
Though still in its infancy, this concept is a bellwether of our
efforts to revolutionize our future force.
In addition to the Joint Mission Force concept, Pacific Command has
the lead on two of the larger and more significant ACTDs, Extending
the Littoral Battlespace and CINC 21. The former is developing the
capability to extend an Internet protocol-based wide area network over
a battlespace covering thousands of square miles of land and sea. The
effort seeks to establish a dominant information sphere to increase
force lethality and enhance force protection. CINC 21 will develop
decision aids and displays to improve and share situational awareness
and speed decision making for commanders up to the Unified CINCs.
Our efforts to take advantage of new technology are also part of our
regional engagement. Australia, Japan, Korea, and Singapore all have
the technological resources to work with the United States in
developing advanced warfare capabilities. We share information with
these countries on our efforts and work together to improve coalition
interoperability at the high end of military technology.
Transforming our armed forces to maintain their leading edge and
interoperability with coalition partners are essential to protecting
American security interests in the 21 st century.
Several members of Congress have been active in pushing us to pursue
this program and we need your continued support and leadership.
(4) Resources Pacific Command's ability to carry out its mission
depends upon the resources Congress, and ultimately the American
taxpayers, provides us. In this section, I will discuss resources in
several key areas that are important to Pacific Command's mission
accomplishment.
Command, Control, Communications, and Computers (C4) Capabilities. Our
top warfighting deficiency is the inability to quickly plan and
execute to the full extent of our capabilities because of inadequate
theater C4. Basic classified network access, capacity in routers and
servers, bandwidth, and updated applications all fall short of what we
need for small scale contingencies (SSCs), and well short of major
theater war (MTW) requirements. Using manpower rather than technology
for gathering and formatting data, slows the speed of command at all
levels -- Joint Task Force, CINC, Joint Staff and National Command
Authority -- and overextends staffs. With its heavy demands on
detailed information that must be shared at all levels of command and
among coalition partners, our information infrastructure must be
funded and kept up to date for effective operations in the information
age. Management of networks, to include spectrum, bandwidth, and
information dissemination, is a mission of the warfighting CINCs. A
robust C4 capability is a proven force multiplier --funding for
Theater C4 modernization is critical to achieving this capability.
In a vast area of operations dominated by Pacific and Indian Oceans,
USPACOM forces rely heavily on strategic satellite communications. I
strongly support either the acceleration of the Advanced Extremely
High Frequency (AEHF) Pathfinder satellite or a Milstar Flight 7 as
the option to overcome the loss of Milstar Flight 3. The Pathfinder
option makes the most sense if the resources must come from the AEHF
program. Otherwise, if the resources come from a supplemental
appropriation, I support a Milstar Flight 7 while leaving the AEHF
program intact.
Finally, our deployed tactical forces must have access to the
strategic defense information infrastructure. This capability is
critical to providing our Joint Task Force commanders with vital
command, control, and intelligence information. The Standardized
Tactical Entry Points (STEPS) that provide access for deployed
tactical forces today have limited capacity. In the long term, DoD
Teleports promise fully integrated, theater-wide, terrestrial and
satellite, military and commercial communications. The relay and
crossbanding capabilities of DoD Teleports will provide flexibility to
our JTFs, a more efficient use of the entire transmission spectrum,
and promote interoperability. I consider DoD Teleport a key component
to achieving the information superiority and conducting the network
centric warfare envisioned in Joint Vision 2010. DoD Teleport,
however, is still in the requirements definition phase and we need a
solution to our shortfall today. An initiative called "Enhanced STEP"
or "E-STEP" has been considered as a migration path from today's STEP
to tomorrow's DOD Teleport, to expand the capacity and flexibility of
STEP sites and strengthen the foundation for Teleport as a follow-on.
Unfortunately, E-STEP procurement has not yet been funded. In the
absence of E-STEP, our forces will continue to experience serious
shortfalls in communications connectivity until Teleport is
operational.
Infrastructure in Japan and Korea The Host Nation Funded Construction
(HNFC) programs in Japan and Korea are substantial and demonstrate a
commitment to our mutual security interests. U.S. funded MILCON that
supports HNFC equates to only 2 percent of the approximately $1
billion (FY99) spent by these two nations. Our portion funds the
criteria development, design surveillance, and construction
surveillance services for these programs. These services are vital to
ensuring HNFC facilities meet U.S. quality and safety standards and,
most importantly, our operational requirements.
The Army's request for $20.5 million in FY01 for these services
supports a HNFC program of $1 billion, a return on our investment of
about 50 to 1.
However, HNFC programs cannot provide for all our requirements in
Japan and Korea. We require MILCON funding to support emergent
requirements like the relocation of Patriot Batteries and MH-47
bed-down in Korea. Additionally, other projects and services are
needed such as airfield and fuels infrastructure improvements the host
nations will not fund. For example, runway repair and the construction
of a fuel tank farm at Yokota AFB are critical for force mobility and
sustainment, and demonstrate how these projects must complement each
other.
New Headquarters Building Pacific Command is in the procurement stage
of the process to construct our new headquarters. Construction
funding, for which we are extremely grateful, was provided in the Navy
MILCON program beginning in FY 2000. The associated C4I systems
planned for the new headquarters will allow us to incorporate and
employ the C4I concepts outlined in Joint Vision 2010.
Although $5 million was provided through reprogramming from Marine
Corps to Navy Other Procurement Funds, funding for the C4I systems is
still $20.3 million below requirements. I ask for this committee's
continued support for the new headquarters project and its supporting
C4I systems.
Surveillance, Reconnaissance and other High Demand/ Low Density
Platforms Improvements were mixed over the past year with respect to
High Demand/ Low Density (LD/ HD) assets, as well as signals, human
and imagery intelligence collection capabilities, and the capability
to exploit and disseminate information. U.S. Pacific Command's EA-6B
requirement continues to be only partially satisfied. Worldwide
shortages of aircraft and the absence of any follow-on program have
forced us to rely on aircraft based in the continental U.S. to meet
our OPLAN requirements. The recent decisions to fund the addition of a
fifth expeditionary squadron will help, but this unit is not expected
to be operational until FY03. For the long term, I urge Congressional
support for efforts to develop alternatives for a replacement to the
EA-6B aircraft.
PACOM's number one ISR readiness concern remains shortfalls in
Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR)
capabilities. Shortages, of both pilots and aircraft continue to
impact readiness. The Services have provided funding for additional
platforms, however, the theater still requires one RC-135, one EP-3E
and one Navy special collection platform, with associated personnel
and maintenance requirements, to address collection shortfalls. USN is
adding three collection platforms to the worldwide fleet in FY00-05,
but modernization of aging and inadequate equipment remains a critical
shortfall. Also, the Services must ensure sufficient crews are
available to man these additional platforms. USFK deficiencies cannot
be fully resolved until the Air Force solves the problem of pilot
shortages. As the UAV programs prove their worth, they may complement
manned aircraft in many of these missions.
Intelligence Advances in global telecommunications technology continue
to place enormous pressure on the need to modernize both national and
tactical cryptologic capabilities. Current National Security Agency
modernization efforts are vital. NSA must continue to transition to
the 21st century environment of the global information infrastructure
(modern signals, networks, encryption, and requisite analytic and
language skills); at the same time it must continue to protect US
networks.
Direct cryptologic support provided by regional assets continues to be
key to intelligence production in the Pacific.
While required renovations have continued throughout the last 20
years, the Kunia Regional SIGINT Operations Center (RSOC) is an aging
facility, built in 1945 and renovated for cryptologic operations in
1979. In the future, a new facility will be required to sustain the
level of support needed in PACOM.
JICPAC's physical facility is not as distressed as the Kunia RSOC;
rather, operational efficiency suffers because almost 100 JICPAC
personnel must work in a revamped hangar at Hickam AFB, due to space
limitations in the main building near Pearl Harbor.
These split-based operations cost well over $500 thousand per year for
the separate facility, as well as lost time and efficiency. JICPAC
should be in one building, collocated with a new RSOC building. This
would improve intelligence exchange, analytical dialogue, and
efficiencies in infrastructure. Also important is the force protection
dimension for the current JICPAC building: it is located in a
vulnerable location near a major highway.
More capable, joint tactical cryptologic systems are needed. Standards
and common architectures will be available in the near term. The Joint
Tactical SIGINT Architecture, the Joint Airborne SIGINT Architecture,
and the Maritime Cryptologic Architecture hold the promise of
interoperability and flexibility. However, service programs could be
better enhanced to support operations in the joint environment.
Increased HUMINT capabilities are critical to support collection
against strategic and operational requirements in the Pacific,
particularly on hard target nations, nations in transition, and in
historically denied areas. Congressional support is required to
continue improving the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) structure (ADP and
manning) to support USPACOM requirements. The Defense HUMINT Service
(DHS) plans to provide information technology enhancements to improve
USDAO communications capabilities with unified commands. However,
these anticipated improvements will be delayed because of recent
funding cuts. The budget cuts result in complicating delays since the
initial DHS improvements must ultimately be expanded to include
bandwidth upgrades to allow USDAO access to INTELINK-S.
Also, Congressional support is needed to continue the initiative to
provide additional Defense Attaché System (DAS) and other DHS assets
to PACOM.
The Nation's future imagery and geospatial architecture will deliver
unmatched capability--but inadequate ability to use the information
collected. Congressional attention is needed to ensure modern Tasking,
Processing, Exploitation, & Dissemination (TPED) capabilities,
commensurate with new collection capabilities, are developed and
fielded. TPED modernization must encompass all collectors; national,
airborne and commercial -end to end, and Services and Agencies must
properly program for TPED. The implications for the intelligence
community are huge. The recent Intelligence Program Decision
Memorandum (IPDM) applied significant dollars to TPED, but this only
amounted to a down payment. Many requirements remain unfunded, and the
funding requirements for TPED associated with other intelligence
disciplines are yet to come.
Pacific Command's linguist shortfalls are acute. Asian linguist
deficiencies are documented in PACOM's Joint Monthly Readiness Report
and recurring, persistent shortages of Asian linguists to meet OPLAN &
CONPLAN requirements are well recognized. Also, shortages of low
density linguists in support of probable Noncombatant Evacuation
Operations (NEO) continue to be problematic. Significant Service
recruiting and retention shortfalls, coupled with the inherent
difficulty of the language and the longer training period for Asian
linguists, aggravate these deficiencies. Some improvements have been
made. Student slots at the Defense Language Institute have increased
and services/ agencies are reviewing options like the possibility of
increased use of reserves. However, more must be done such as on-duty
distant-learning language training and implementation of recruiting/
retention bonuses.
Headquarters Personnel I am concerned about a potential 15 percent
Headquarters reduction. USCINCPAC supported the Secretary's Defense
Reform Initiative in recent years, reducing joint activities by 260
people, about 10 percent. Much of the reduction was accomplished
through transfer of work and manpower to components.
Another 15 percent reduction will result in elimination of functions.
Combatant Commander headquarters plan for and conduct military
operations. Eliminating functions means plans will be less timely and
complete, and operations will be less responsive and efficient.
Because current operations must be accomplished, we will have to take
substantial billet reductions in functions related to planning for the
future, resulting in missed opportunities and more crises.
Security Assistance As we begin the 21st century, Security Assistance
and International Arms Cooperation will play a larger, more important
role than ever before as part of our security strategy. They are
crucial to building and maintaining solid security relationships and
the military interoperability necessary for successful coalition
operations. Security assistance programs such as Foreign Military
Sales and Financing (FMS/ FMF), and International Military Education
and Training (IMET) provide our friends and allies in the Asia-Pacific
region with equipment, services, and training for legitimate
self-defense and participation in multinational security efforts.
These programs are essential to our efforts to shape and develop
Security Communities capable and willing to conduct operations from
peacekeeping to humanitarian and disaster relief operations. The
relationships forged through our security assistance programs enhance
our access, improve understanding, and help lay the necessary
foundation for building these Security Communities in the Pacific
Theater.
Foreign Military Financing. Foreign Military Financing (FMF) enables
our friends and allies to improve their defense capabilities by
financing the acquisition of U.S. military articles, services, and
training, so they can share the common defense burden in the region.
In conjunction with OSD, I have requested new FMF programs for FY01.
Due to the Asian economic crisis and reduced military budgets, the
Philippines current operational readiness is reduced to a point where
their Armed Forces may be unable to adequately defend their country.
FMF funding will enable the Philippines to purchase critically needed
support for their aviation and naval equipment, and improve the
Philippine's capability to monitor their Economic Exclusion Zone.
Mongolia is a developing country with problems securing its vast
borders. FMF funding would be used to provide communications equipment
for its border troops and would help reduce cross-border violations.
Finally, FMF funding for Fiji would allow the acquisition of
medium-lift vehicles, small arms, and communications equipment, and
would enhance Fiji's capability to contribute to international
peacekeeping operations and respond to natural disasters. The
President's budget includes $2 million each for the Philippines and
Mongolia. I request your support in funding these much-needed
programs.
CONCLUSION
In summary, Asia-Pacific issues are growing in importance on the
American security agenda. The coming year will continue to present
challenges for the United States in the Asia-Pacific region. We
neglect developments in the region at our peril, but with sustained
attention we can help build a region which will support American
interests over the long term.
APPENDIX A
Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies The Asia-Pacific Center for
Security Studies (APCSS) is a regional studies, conference, and
research center located in Honolulu. Established in September 1995 as
a preventive defense and confidence-building measure, its mission is
to enhance cooperation and build relationships through mutual
understanding and study of comprehensive security issues among
military and civilian representatives of the U.S. and other
Asia-Pacific nations. The cornerstone of the Center's program is the
College of Security Studies, which provides a forum where future
military and government civilian leaders from the region can explore
pressing security issues at the national policy level within a
multilateral setting of mutual respect and transparency to build trust
and encourage openness. Central to the College's effectiveness is the
relationships forged between participants that bridge cultures and
nationalities. Full and unobstructed participation by all nations in
the region, to include such countries as Indonesia and Cambodia, is
essential to achieving this. Complementing the College is a robust
conference and seminar program that brings together current leaders
from the region to examine topical regional security concerns,
including peacekeeping, arms proliferation and the role of nuclear
weapons in the region, and energy and water security.
The Center directly serves to further our regional engagement goals in
several ways. First, it serves as a resource for identifying and
communicating emerging regional security issues, within the
constraints of non-attribution.
Secondly, the Center functions as an extremely effective "unofficial"
engagement tool to continue critical dialogue in cases where official
mil-to-mil relations are curtailed. Recent conferences and regional
travel involving contact with or participation by prominent
representatives from China highlight this role. Additionally, the
Center frequently coordinates or hosts conferences addressing topical
issues of interest to the U.S. Pacific Command or the region. Finally,
the Center serves as a forum for articulating U.S. defense policy to
representatives from the region. Passage of pending legislation is
crucial to the continued success of the Center, by allowing certain
expenses to be waived as an incentive for participation, and by
expanding authority to accept domestic as well as foreign donations to
help defray costs.
Center of Excellence in Disaster Management and Humanitarian
Assistance Since its beginning in 1994, the Center of Excellence in
Disaster Management and Humanitarian Assistance has bridged the gap
between civil and military activities related to humanitarian
emergencies. Collaborating the resources and strengths of governmental
and non-governmental organizations, the Center of Excellence has
helped bring order to chaos following floods in Vietnam and Venezuela,
earthquakes in Turkey and Taiwan, and population displacement in
Kosovo and East Timor. The Center's unbiased approach to response,
education and training, research, and consulting for disasters has
become the model for successful interaction between the military and
private humanitarian organizations. I urge the committee to continue
supporting this important contributor to regional and international
security.
U.S. Pacific Command Counterdrug Efforts Illegal drug trafficking is a
significant threat to stability in the Asia-Pacific region. I am
particularly concerned with heroin and methamphetamine trafficking in
Southeast and Northeast Asia. My counterdrug Joint Task Force, Joint
Interagency Task Force West, is involved in multiple activities that
counter this threat and supports the President's National Drug Control
Strategy. These counterdrug efforts include: intelligence analyst
support to the Drug Enforcement Administration's (DEA) international
operations, disrupting the East to West heroin flows, providing
training to Thai, Malaysian, and Philippine counterdrug units.
Additionally, PACOM had significant success disrupting the North/
South cocaine flow in the Eastern Pacific, seizing over 28 metric tons
of cocaine last year.
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(Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S.
Department of State. Web site: usinfo.state.gov)