• Military

• WMD Menu                           

• Introduction
• Systems
• Facilities
• Agencies
• Operations
• Countries
• Hot Documents
• News
• Reports
• Policy
• Budget
• Congress
• Links

• Intelligence
• Homeland Security
• Space

Beijing leaders still clinging to policies of the past

Publish Date:01/21/2000

Story Type:Issues;

Byline:Dennis Hickey

The political, economic and strategic considerations of the Cold War conflict are hardly relevant to the current state of affairs involving Taiwan, the Chinese mainland and the United States. But while Taipei and Washington have adapted their respective positions to accord with changed circumstances, Beijing is clinging to outmoded ways of thinking and patterns of behavior. Dennis Hickey, associate professor of political science at Southwest Missouri State University, explains.

The Republic of China, the People's Republic of China and the United States have each experienced dramatic economic and political transformations in recent years. In the last two decades, the ROC has managed to transform itself from a poor, authoritarian state into an economic powerhouse and a multiparty democracy. The PRC has also changed profoundly.

Economic reform has swept the mainland; it is experimenting with democratic reforms in the countryside and now enjoys one of the fastest growing economies in the world.

As for the United States, it has emerged as the undisputed leader of the information revolution and high-technology age. Speculation during the late 1970s that America might be best viewed as a declining power has proved to be an exaggeration.

In most instances, numerous changes in relations among the three states have accompanied these developments. A case in point is Washington's relationship with Taipei. In 1979, the United States severed diplomatic relations with the ROC. With respect to America's "unofficial" ties with Taipei, however, there has been significant movement in recent years.

President George Bush cleared the way for high- ranking officials to visit Taiwan when he sent then U.S. Trade Representative Carla Hills to Taipei in 1992. Perhaps more significant, during the early 1990s, the Clinton administration conducted a comprehensive interagency review of U.S. policy toward Taiwan.

After more than a year of study, the State Department announced several adjustments in policy: High-level U.S. officials would be allowed to visit Taiwan; ROC leaders could make transit stopovers in the United States; Taipei could change the name of its representative offices in the United States; and Washington would support Taipei's membership in international organizations where statehood is not an issue.

In addition to these adjustments in the political sphere, there have been numerous changes in the U.S.-ROC security relationship. In the early 1980s, the United States pledged to reduce arms sales to Taiwan. Since that time, however, arms sales have increased dramatically. Recent sales have included warplanes, missiles, early warning aircraft, torpedoes, tanks, warships and a derivative of the Patriot missile air defense system.

Moreover, despite the lack of formal diplomatic ties, U.S.-ROC military contacts remain intact. Since 1979, Taiwan has sent hundreds of military officers, pilots and technicians to the United States for training. For its part, the United States has sent personnel to Taiwan to inspect military installations and exchange views with their Taiwan counterparts on the island's defense needs. American defense officials have expressed a strong interest in increasing such ties.

Since the late 1970s, U.S.-PRC relations have gone through a complete cycle. During the Carter and Reagan administrations, Beijing came to be viewed as a desirable counterweight to Moscow. Human rights concerns were largely stifled. Rather than criticize the mainland for its human rights violations or other disdainful practices, the United States sought to arm it.

The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union deprived the United States and the PRC of a common enemy. Tensions between Washington and Beijing escalated quickly. Trade disputes, human rights violations and arms sales--issues once overlooked for the sake of national security--emerged as major points of contention.

The Tiananmen Incident of 1989 led Washington to impose sanctions and suspend military contacts with Beijing. Relations plummeted even further when the PRC initiated a series of provocative military exercises and missile tests off Taiwan's coast in March 1996.

Following the missile crisis, the Clinton administration has sought to forge a "constructive strategic partnership" with the PRC and insists that it plays an important role in American security strategy. Rather than act as if the PRC is irrelevant in the post-Cold War era, U.S. officials now advise that Beijing's cooperation is essential if Washington wants to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, the South China Sea, Southeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, U.S. officials believe that Washington needs Beijing's support in the United Nations and argue that Beijing has played a positive role in efforts to stabilize financial markets in East Asia.

As might be expected, Taipei also has changed its position toward Beijing since the 1970s. For roughly three decades, the ultimate goal of the ROC was to take back the Chinese mainland by force. Negotiations with Beijing were out of the question. In the realm of international relations, the ROC viewed diplomatic ties as a "zero sum" game. In keeping with the "one China" policy, Taipei severed relations with foreign governments that recognized Beijing. The ROC also refused to negotiate or otherwise establish meaningful linkages--travel, communications, mail--with the mainland.

Taipei adhered to this rigid position for more than three decades. However, changes in the ROC government's approach toward the PRC have accompanied the sweeping political changes that have occurred in Taiwan. The ROC now acknowledges that the PRC exercises "de facto authority" over mainland China.

Moreover, the ROC no longer competes with the PRC for the right to represent China in the international arena. It also has signaled its willingness to accept the principle of "dual recognition" and to participate in international forums by using titles other than its official designation. Perhaps equally significant, Taipei has formally and unilaterally renounced military force as a means of national unification and has adopted a three-stage peaceful unification formula.

Finally, the ROC has granted unprecedented freedoms to its citizens. They may travel, trade and invest in the mainland.

According to ROC statistics, Taiwan residents have made more than 14 million visits to the mainland since restrictions on travel were lifted in 1987 and cumulative trade between the two sides from 1987 to July 1999 exceeded US$1.7 billion.

But Beijing has not reciprocated. Changes in the PRC's approach to Taiwan have been comparatively modest. Despite the dramatic transformations that have occurred on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, there has been little movement in Beijing's position since Deng Xiaoping advanced the so-called "one country, two systems" unification formula. PRC officials have elaborated on some points of that proposal, but Beijing continues to insist that all unification negotiations be held on a party-to-party basis or, more recently, a party-to-parties basis. The central government in Beijing refuses to negotiate with the central government in Taipei because it contends that the ROC ceased to exist in 1949.

Furthermore, Beijing will not tolerate any unification formula that violates its own narrow interpretation of the "one China" principle or leads to the creation of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." Officials also warn ominously that the unification issue cannot be drawn out indefinitely and refuse to rule out the use of force against Taiwan.

During the early 1990s, the editor of a prominent foreign policy journal remarked that, "The world has arrived at one of those rare periods in history when everything seems to change." This observation applies with special force to the cataclysmic transformations that have occurred in Taiwan, the mainland and the United States.

On one critical issue, however, Beijing appears to be peculiarly rigid and immobile--namely, its approach toward Taipei. It refuses to budge from its position that the only solution to the 50-year cross-strait deadlock is the "one country, two systems" unification formula.

Lord Salisbury, the noted British statesman, once warned that the most frequent mistake in politics is the tendency for government officials to cling to the carcass of a dead policy. But the PRC has failed to heed Salisbury's advice. Rather, Beijing continues to cling to its moribund "one country, two systems" scheme and it remains an open question as to when, or if, it will make major and meaningful adjustments in policies toward Taiwan.

Some analysts speculate that the present leadership cohort in Beijing lacks the political capital to unravel this Gordian knot. But if a lasting peace between Beijing and Taipei is ever to be realized, the PRC will have to craft policies that are based in reality, not ideological rhetoric. In sum, only if Beijing makes some significant changes in its policy toward Taiwan will real progress be made towards a peaceful resolution of the unification question.