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What the Charts Show
The two charts together reveal, among other things:
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A systematic, well planned effort by the Chinese military at the highest
levels to target and acquire technology for military modernization.
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That the targeting effort and financing to acquire the technology
and buy influence at the highest levels of US Government were planned and
implemented by Chinese military Intelligence through the second department
under the General Staff Department (GSD).
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That the Chinese military acquired many of the technologies over the past
seven years, although many of them had been targeted for acquisition
for more than a quarter century.
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That the Chinese military set up a series of front companies and cut-outs
to mask its technology targeting efforts and to launder money to hide its
origin. Chinese military intelligence even resorted to the use of
companies and bank accounts of the infamous Macau and Hong Kong Chinese
Triad for this purpose.
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That even after the US Government learned of the diversion of the W-88
nuclear warhead design in late 1995 into 1996, the Clinton Administration
continued to liberalize export controls on such sensitive technologies
as computers, encryption, machine tools, telecommunications, stealth technologies,
space launch technologies, satellites, the array of hot section technologies
to improve the performance and life of Jet engines, and high temperature
furnaces essential for the production of components for missiles and nuclear
weapons.
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Despite knowledge of the U.S. designs for nuclear warheads, for example,
the Clinton Administration still undertook a serious
effort to redefine supercomputers to allow for increased exports of high
performance computers to China. Rationale was not based on strategic
criteria. Instead, it was governed by economic considerations of
a few companies whose executives had supported President Clinton in 1992
and again in 1996.
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A September 1993 letter from President Clinton to
Silicon Graphics CEO Edward McCracken, for example, promised to liberalize
export controls of computers, machine tools, and telecommunications technologies
(attached).
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In another instance, one National Security Council official in March 1998
-- some two years after knowledge of the W-88 and other U.S. nuclear warhead
design diversions -- had proposed blanket waivers for satellite sales to
China in exchange for China joining the Missile Technology Regime.
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That the Clinton-Gore Administration certified China in January 1998 to
receive nuclear technology for being in compliance with non-proliferation
regimes, even though there was strong evidence that the Chinese government
was continuing its proliferation activities with Iran, North Korea, Syria,
Pakistan, and Libya. Such proliferation activities, which were
contrary to U.S.-Chinese understandings, continue unabated to this day.
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That the cumulative impact of these targeted technologies now permit China
to:
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Develop reliable Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles with insights into
MIRVing that ICBM force.
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Miniaturize nuclear warheads.
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Implement a command and control structure for its growing ICBM force.
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Develop an integrated command, control, communications, computer and intelligence
encrypted network to enable better military command and control over vast
areas, even beyond China itself.
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Improve power projection for its surface fleets, submarines, and long-range
cruise missiles capable of hitting not only Taiwan, but also Japan from
mainland China.
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Produce more proficient fighter and bomber aircraft capable of greater
distances and speeds.
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That the administration as early as 1994 systematically dismantled its
system of monitoring the influx of Chinese and other foreign nationals
visiting U.S. high technology companies, including our nuclear weapons
labs. As a result, there are many tens of thousands of Chinese in
the United States and we don't know where they are or what they are doing.
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In fact, it wasn't until this year just prior to public revelations
of alleged Chinese espionage in our nation's nuclear weapons labs that
the Energy Department decided to seek export licenses from the Commerce
Department for foreign national visits. Yet, the requirement had
always been law. And where was the Commerce Department in not forcing
the issue with the Energy Department?
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The notion that Chinese and other foreign nationals would be allowed access
to information or to the facilities where U.S. nuclear weapons were developed
is unconscionable. It is seriously doubtful that the Chinese labs
would allow U.S. scientists into their nuclear weapons labs.
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