29 October 1999
Text: Think-Tank Report on China's Foreign Military Relations
(Examines country's military exchanges, intentions in Asia) (1140) A Henry L. Stimson Center report entitled "China's Foreign Military Relations" released October 18 says the role of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in shaping and implementing China's foreign policies will likely become even more significant in the future. "The most effective way to ascertain China's military and defense policies," the report concludes, "is to have face-to-face contact at multiple levels with Chinese military personnel over a long period of time." "The United States would be wise," the report adds, "to engage fully in a measured, long-term military-to-military exchange program with China in ways that do not help the PLA improve its war-fighting capabilities." The report also advises the U.S. military to continue conducting regular high-level strategic dialogue through the annual Defense Consultative Talks; exchanging functional-level delegations; and working on confidence-building measures with the PLA such as the Military Maritime Consultation Agreement signed in January 1998. The report was written by Stimson Senior Associate Kenneth W. Allen and Rear Admiral Eric A. McVadon (USN, Ret.) and is available on the Internet at http://www.stimson.org/pubs/cbm/cbmgen/index.html Following is the executive summary of the report: (begin text) The Henry L. Stimson Center China Confidence-Building Measures Project China's Foreign Military Relations Executive Summary The People's Liberation Army (PLA) has always had a significant role in shaping and implementing the People's Republic of China's (PRC) foreign policies. Over the past two decades, the PLA's role has increased considerably, and is likely to become even more important in the future as China develops its military capabilities and casts a broader international shadow. The PLA's foreign relations program has several goals: -- To shape the international security environment in support of key Chinese national security objectives; -- To improve political and military relations with foreign countries; -- To enhance China's military and defense industry modernization; -- To provide military assistance to countries in the developing world; and, -- To acquire knowledge in modern military doctrine, operations, training, military medicine, administration, and a host of non-combat related areas. The PLA seeks to accomplish these goals through its military attaché offices abroad and the use of an elaborate system of high-level exchanges; functional exchanges, which include ship visits, international conferences, educational exchanges, language training, visiting fellow programs, and discussions on operations, logistics and training; technical cooperation, arms sales, and military assistance programs; arms control negotiations; and peacekeeping operations. The PLA has tailored its foreign relations program to maximize benefits for itself, while minimizing the amount of information the PLA provides to other countries. Of these programs, the most visible relations involve high-level visits, arms purchases, ship visits, and functional-level exchanges. The PLA's top six officers each average one trip abroad per year, encompassing a total of twenty to twenty-five countries, and host fifty to seventy-five foreign counterparts. The commander and political commissar of the PLA Navy and PLA Air Force also take one trip abroad and host from three to six counterparts annually. In addition, functional delegations from throughout the PLA's four general headquarters, services, and military regions are now involved in exchanges around the globe. Sino-Russian and Sino-Israeli military relations are of particular importance, serving as a major source of China's weapon systems and defense technology acquisitions. China has also sought defense equipment and technology from several European countries, including France and Italy. Since 1990, China has concluded major purchases and contracts with Russia for helicopters, fighters, transports, tanks, surface-to-air missiles, submarines, and destroyers, as well as various subsystems, such as engines, air-to-air missiles, and antiship missiles. With the exception of agreements for limited co-production of the Su-27 and Su-30 fighters, China has purchased only a few of each of the other types of weapon systems, and must still rely on Russian support as a long-term spare parts supplier. During the 1990s, the PLA Navy paid port calls on over twenty countries and hosted port calls from seventeen countries. These visits have foreign policy value for China, while building the confidence and seagoing experience for Chinese Navy personnel. The PLAN's voyages are very different from carrying out major, sustained naval deployments, and should not be interpreted as major steps toward Chinese development of a blue-water navy. At the same time, however, the PLAN's presence outside Chinese territorial waters provides the perception of an expanding naval capability. While media attention tends to highlight the PLA's high-level visits and arms purchases, there are also numerous unreported functional-level delegations that focus on core military capabilities. Functional-level exchanges concentrate on management, policy, structure, training, logistics, operations, and personnel issues for active and reserve forces. As a result of the PLA's massive downsizing over the past decade, many functional-level delegations have been particularly interested in ideas that can be used to improve the welfare of soldiers and their families. Over the past several years, the PLA has been able to apply the lessons learned in these areas, from experimenting with combined arms operations to changing the length of service time for conscription and establishing a non-commissioned officer corps. One of the most important aspects of the PLA's foreign relations program is educating the next generation of military leaders. Each year, the PLA's exchange program sends approximately 500 officers abroad, providing them with firsthand knowledge of the differences between the PLA and other militaries. Although the number of PLA bilateral exchanges during the 1990s nearly doubled the number of exchanges in the 1980s, there is little prospect for similar growth in the next decade. While China's foreign military relations program is the largest in Asia, it pales in comparison to the United States' worldwide program and even to that of the US Pacific Command. The PRC's relations with Pakistan and Russia are the only ones that even approximate US alliance relationships with countries in the Asia-Pacific region. The most effective way to ascertain China's military and defense policies is to have face-to-face contact at multiple levels with Chinese military personnel over a long period of time. Therefore, the United States would be wise to engage fully in a measured, long-term military-to-military exchange program with China in ways that do not help the PLA improve its warfighting capabilities. It is advisable for the United States military to continue to conduct regular high-level strategic dialogue through the annual Defense Consultative Talks, which were initiated in December 1997. The exchange of functional-level delegations should be approved on a case-by-case basis with clear short and long-term goals in mind. It is also advisable for the United States to continue to work on confidence-building measures with the PLA, building on successes like the Military Maritime Consultation Agreement that was signed in January 1998. (end text) (Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. Department of State)
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