The White House Briefing Room
September 11, 1999
PRESS BRIEFING BY NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SANDY BERGER, NATIONAL ECONOMIC ADVISOR GENE SPERLING, AND PRESS SECRETARY JOE LOCKHART Sky City Hotel Auckland, New Zealand
7:25 P.M. (L)
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
(Auckland, New Zealand)
______________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release
September 11, 1999
PRESS BRIEFING BY
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR SANDY BERGER,
NATIONAL ECONOMIC ADVISOR GENE SPERLING,
AND PRESS SECRETARY JOE LOCKHART
Sky City Hotel
Auckland, New Zealand
7:25 P.M. (L)
MR. LOCKHART: Hello, everyone. Welcome to our first briefing in
Auckland. Glad you could all be here, and we didn't tear you away from too
much wine tasting. Mr. Plante, sorry, that's excluding Mr. Plante.
Joining us today is the President's National Security Advisor Samuel
Berger, who will read out the bilat that was just concluded; and Gene
Sperling, the President's National Economic Advisor. And then I'll come
out after they're done if there are any domestic questions.
MR. BERGER: Let me generally talk about the meeting that just
completed between President Clinton and President Jiang and their
delegations. The President was very pleased with this meeting, as were the
rest of his national security team, economic team. It was -- I would
describe it as a very productive, friendly, non-polemical, and quite
comprehensive meeting between the two leaders.
It is clear that these are two leaders who, after six and a half
years, have learned to deal with each other, through good times and bad.
And as a result, I would consider the relationship between our countries
now back on track, with, of course, many challenges still facing us.
Let me talk more specifically about the discussion. The President
began, indicating to President Jiang that he was very interested in
restoring our relations to the path that they have been on in the past
where we have dealt with problems in a candid way and we've dealt with
issues that we have common interest in a cooperative way.
He started with WTO. I'll let Gene talk about that in more detail.
And he urged President Jiang to resume negotiations on WTO and said that he
thinks we could achieve a -- that we could work through the issues that
remain between us.
He talked about his awareness of the economic challenges not only in
the region, but in China; that he'd been impressed by the way the Chinese
have dealt with those issues and believed that WTO -- a successful WTO
agreement would strengthen China and make it economically -- put it in an
economically improved situation.
Second, the President expressed the hope that the United States and
China can resume the range of arms control negotiations that we have -- the
arms control agenda, I think the President put it -- that we have had over
the past six years: ratification of CTBT, the Chemical Weapons Convention;
he mentioned the North Korean missile tests, problems in South Asia,
resuming military-to-military exchanges and discussing a national missile
defense, which is an issue of interest to China.
Third, the President said that he hoped that we could schedule another
round of human rights discussions to deal with such issues as Tibet,
political and religious freedom, freedom of expression. The President said
we've had very candid discussions about these issues in the past and I
believe we should resume those discussions.
Fourth, the President expressed a hope that we could resume our
dialogue on energy matters, and on issues of growth and energy -- climate
change, in particular -- and finding a way for the developing countries to
chart a different energy path than the developed countries have charted
over the last 50 years, one that is less destructive of the environment.
Finally, the President raised Taiwan. He said that the statement by
President Lee had made things more difficult for both China and the United
States, but that the United States had immediately reaffirmed our
commitment to a one-China policy. He, however, said that to be candid with
President Jiang he must say, and Jiang must understand, that if Jiang were
to resort to military force, there would be grave consequences in the
United States.
He urged China to get back to the -- China and Taiwan
-- to the cross-straits dialogue, and said that our policy would continue
as it has been since the presidency of Richard Nixon, to be based on the
three fundamental pillars of the one-China policy, a peaceful resolution of
the Taiwan issue, and the cross-straits dialogue.
Jiang then started in reverse order with Taiwan. He said that is the
most important of the issues the President raised. He reaffirmed that they
wanted a peaceful resolution based on one China, two systems, which is
their formulation of the relationship. But he also repeated the
traditional Chinese position that if unilateral actions were taken towards
independence they would not renounce the possibility of force.
President Jiang said that he has tried to promote cross-straits dialogue
and in his view, President Lee had made that more difficult.
He raised with the President the question of arms sales, and
particularly the most recent arms sales to Taiwan, and urged the President
to discontinue those arm sales. The President said, I know that you
disagree with us on arm sales to Taiwan, but we will continue to comply
with the Taiwan Relations Act, under which we, on a case-by-case basis,
provide defensive arms for Taiwan.
Jiang ended this by saying, you know, I'm not someone who likes war,
but 1.2 billion Chinese people are concerned about what has happened in
Taiwan and he believes it's very important to resolve the issues.
On WTO I will simply say, and let Gene fill in the details, that they
agreed to resume negotiations towards a WTO agreement. And there was some
rather significant discussion of that.
On the agenda of issues that the President raised in terms of human
rights and arms control and those issues that I listed earlier, President
Jiang said that on all bilateral questions we can work together in a
positive fashion, thereby, in my judgment, suggesting that over time we can
and will be able to resume our discussions on issues ranging from arms
control to human rights.
He specifically singled out working for stability on the Korean
Peninsula, something they have a great interest in, as do we; the arms race
in South Asia, another area where we have a common interest; and perhaps
one or two others. He made reference to the Falun Gong issue, described it
as a cult, said he did not want it to affect our bilateral relations.
I think the meeting was summed up at the end by President Jiang, who,
as the meeting was ending, said that he cherishes our personal friendship,
and appreciates the achievements that he and President Clinton have made
together. And he hopes that they will have a wider road for future
progress.
So I think, all in all, for a 60-minute meeting this accomplished what
we hoped -- which was, as I say, to get the relationship back on track; to
resume the WTO negotiations; to get a strong indication from the Chinese
that they're prepared to resume discussions with us on a range of other
issues, from human rights to arms control. I would say the general
atmosphere of the meeting was productive and harmonious, and as I said
before, non-polemical.
Let me let Gene talk a little bit more about the WTO piece of this.
MR. SPERLING: About two weeks ago, President Clinton sent a letter to
President Jiang asking for a resumption of negotiations on China-WTO as
soon as possible. That letter led to some technical discussions, taking
stock of where we are, over the weekend, with USTR's Bob Cassidy and Bob
Novak. At the APEC trade ministerial, Charlene Barshefsky had a meeting
with her counterpart, Minister Shi, in which they again simply had a very
basic discussion on the need to begin identifying outstanding issues and
the importance of working towards an agreement in time to allow possibility
of China to enter the WTO this year.
We're very pleased with the meeting today. Our hope had been that
today's meeting would lead to the resumption of serious negotiations and
that it would lead to the resumption of serious negotiations immediately.
And that was the result. And the result of the meeting was, indeed, to
bring forth the resumption of negotiations expeditiously. In fact, both
Presidents asked their ministers -- Ambassador Barshefsky, Minister Shi --
to meet, to begin meeting as early as tomorrow, as both of them are here,
and to begin the process of seeing what progress could be made and to
identify what issues would still be outstanding. There was no timeline
set, but I think through the discussions was a serious recognition of the
fact that sooner is better than later, and that there is a need to move
this process forward in a time that makes it viable for China to enter the
WTO this year.
...............
Q What's the volume of the arms sales that were suspended by the
President today? And could you tell us what's involved in the packages?
MR. BERGER: Well, there are two different packages. One is official
arms sales, government-financed arms sales. There are about $40 million in
foreign military sales in that package. There is about $400 million in the
pipeline of commercial military sales.
Now, let me hasten to say that it's very difficult to ascertain
exactly how much of that, at this point, will be affected by the action
today. We should probably have better figures over the next day or so --
how much of that has been delivered, how much of that is in a position in
which it can be stopped. But I would imagine that it would be hundreds of
millions of dollars.
...............
Q Which subjects did they dwell on for the longest period of time?
MR. BERGER: I think WTO and Taiwan. Maybe a close third is just the
general resumption of relations, the kind of ability to deal with issues
ranging from their signing the Human Rights covenant to MTCR, to North
Korea. And this conversation, this dialogue -- again, on issues we
disagree on, issues we agree on -- has been more or less suspended over the
past several months. And I think it is unstuck.
Q What about the North Korean issue --
Q Was there any discussion of the bombing, the NATO bombing of the
Chinese embassy?
MR. BERGER: It was raised by -- it was referenced, I would say, by
President Jiang in what I would call quite a non-polemical way.
Q -- North Korean issue -- anything about North Korean missile
launch?
MR. BERGER: Yes. Not specifically, but generally. That is, they --
both President Clinton and President Jiang specifically talked about one of
the issues where we have a strong interest in cooperation being stability
on the Korean Peninsula. That is a fancy way of saying the North Korean
nuclear missile program.
Q Regarding Taiwan, Sandy, you mentioned -- indicated the
difficulty that President Lee's statement made to U.S.-China relations. Is
it blaming Lee Teng-hui on what he said?
MR. BERGER: I'll let the statement speak for itself.
Q Sandy, on -- or maybe Gene might want to take this -- on WTO --
could you tell us whether President Jiang indicated that the concessions
that were outlined during the April meeting were still in place -- in other
words, whether China is picking up these negotiations exactly where they
were in April, and whether you defined in the course of the discussions
what the areas of disagreement still are?
MR. SPERLING: What was very positive about the discussion was not
only the resumption of negotiations, but that, rather than just leaving the
meeting with a vague sense that negotiations needed to start sometime in
the future, that they would proceed immediately, starting as early as a
meeting tomorrow.
But there was very little from either President Clinton or President
Jiang in the sense of seeking to actually negotiate the specifics at that
point. I think they both recognized that they want their respective trade
negotiators to see how much progress they can make and identify those
issues and then come back with us. Everyone understands in any negotiation
going forward, no one ever is going to get everything they want. There
were certainly issues that needed to be resolved and we'll leave that
negotiation to Ambassador Shi -- I mean, Minister Shi and Ambassador
Barshefsky.
Q Is there a sense right now that you've narrowed the issues enough
that it might possibly be resolved in the two or three days you have here
in Auckland? Or is there a sense that this is something that's going to
take weeks?
MR. SPERLING: The truth, David, is that I think up to this point
there has not been that type of substantive negotiation yet. I think that
the talks so far were really taking stock of where things were. So I would
not want to try to project.
I think one comment the President did make is that whatever issues are
out there he said won't be any easier to resolve a week from now or a month
from now or a year from now, and that it made the most sense for the two
sides to begin the process of trying to come to a satisfactory commercially
viable agreement.
Q Gene, you said it could be done by the end of the year. But is
it feasible to think that China could participate in the talks in Seattle
in November?
MR. SPERLING: All I would say at this point is understanding the
clocks -- one clock is the end of the year in the November ministerial; and
the congressional clock, to the extent that our goal would be not simply an
agreement, but the permanent waiver that would allow congressional
acceptance of the agreement. Both of those clocks suggest that the sooner
that agreement can be reached, the greater the chances that China can enter
the WTO this year.
Considering that this really will be the first time that there's been
substantive negotiations in over four months, I think that there's enough
issues that are on the table that I would not have significant expectations
over the next several days. And I don't want to try to do a timeline.
It is the case, though, that we do have an opportunity to make
progress here. There's an opportunity for further discussions with both
leaders and both teams here. And I think the goal that both Presidents
have was simply to see what progress could be made, and to begin the
process of identifying what outstanding issues will have to be resolved.
Q Gene, following the logic of that statement that these issues
become harder to negotiate the longer you wait, does it --
MR. SPERLING: I think the President's comment was that they don't get
any easier.
Q But following that logic, does the administration regret not
closing a deal when Zhu Rongji was in Washington at that time, when it
apparently was within reach? And could you try another bite at the apple
with David's question of whether the deal that existed at that time is now
the starting point, or whether the Chinese have changed their terms, or,
for that matter, the United States has changed its terms?
MR. SPERLING: As to your first question, significant progress had
been made in April, but there were some very serious issues that had not
yet been resolved and it was our feeling that we could make progress and
come to a satisfactory agreement. Obviously, unforeseen events took place.
In fact, when President Jiang -- the occasion in which he mentioned the
bombing was in the sense that that had certainly made it more difficult to
resume negotiations over the summer.
So one can never roll the clock back. I think that the reasons that
existed for not concluding the deal at that time were ones we feel were
legitimate and correct and we're still very hopeful that we can go forward.
And your second question was whether April is the starting point, and
the answer there is simply that I just don't think it helps the process of
getting agreement here for us to negotiate in public or talk about any
aspects of the negotiations. I think we should try to give Ambassador
Barshefsky and Minister Shi the most leeway they can have in the room to
work this out.
Q Is the President prepared to wage the battle for permanent MFN
status for this, the Congress -- if the negotiators can reach a deal, in
this -- I mean, before this Congress goes home at the end of the year?
MR. SPERLING: Yes, absolutely. We have been committed from the start
not only to reaching a commercially viable agreement, but having permanent,
normal trade relations passed through Congress. We think, we feel that
there is significant support for that. There is no doubt that it will not
be an easy battle, no one expects that. But the President is very
committed to taking whatever efforts are necessary, and both his economic
and foreign policy team are committed to taking whatever steps are
necessary to pass an agreement, if a commercially viable agreement can be
reached.
Q Sandy, -- speculation that the President and Jiang Zemin might
meet again in Christ Church when the President goes there for the official
visit and President Jiang is concluding his state visit. Is that under
consideration at all?
MR. BERGER: There has been no discussion of that, as far as far as
I'm aware. But these two men, along with their 17, I believe, colleagues
will be in a small room with Gene Sperling for the next two days --
(laughter) -- and I suspect that they will have plenty of time for informal
conversations. I mean, one of the real values of these meetings,
seriously, is the opportunity for one-on-one discussions, including -- I
know the President wants to talk to most of these leaders about Timor.
......................
Q -- can you say whether or not President Jiang understands what
the President means when he threatened grave consequences if China were to
move against Taiwan -- since this administration won't define it for the
American people?
MR. BERGER: Well, this administration and every past administration
has not defined that, and I think that ambiguity has served stability well
in the Peninsula. I think it is clear that, as we've said, this would be a
matter of grave concern. And I think the President made it very clear to
President Jiang that he needed to understand that. As I say, President
Jiang said, I'm not a person who wants war, I would like a peaceful
resolution to this.
Q You used to talk about a strategic partnership with China. What
would you call it now?
MR. BERGER: Well, if you're going to be precise about what we said in
the past, it is that we seek to build a strategic partnership. As far as I
know, it's been used as an objective, not as a descriptive state of the
relationship. We seek to build a strategic partnership. I think that's
still an operative phrase.
I would say, listen, we still have plenty of problems between China
and the United States. We have fundamentally different political systems.
We are at fundamentally different stages of economic development. We have
different strategic interests. And so there is a range of issues where we
do not agree with each other.
Now, our view has always been that the best way to deal with those
issues is to deal with them -- is to engage with the Chinese and get them
to sign the comprehensive test ban treaty so they won't test nuclear
weapons, for example; or get them to sign the Chemical Weapons Convention,
as they've done; or get them to cut off nuclear cooperation with Pakistan.
Now, there are also fairly substantial places where we have areas that
our interests converge -- stability on the Korean Peninsula. They don't
particularly want a war in the Korean Peninsula; we don't want a war in the
Korean Peninsula. South Asia. There are large strategic war and peace
issues where our interests also converge. And on those issues, we can work
together.
We can't -- it would be very difficult to really solve the problem of
North Korea without the cooperation of China. If China is not working in
the same direction that we're working in -- if they're not working in
conjunction with us, it will be far more difficult to solve that issue.
So, I would say that this is a complex relationship between the most
powerful country in the world and the largest country in the world who have
a number of -- who have fundamentally different systems and serious
disagreements, but who need to try to work through those for their common
interests.
Q -- the duration of the trip, will the President make public
announcement on cross-strait relations --
MR. BERGER: I'm sorry?
Q Will he make public statement on cross-strait relations that's
unheard of?
MR. BERGER: I still don't understand your question. I understand his
question. Is that the same question?
Q Basically, will the President state that the United States does
not support a so-called nation to nation or special state to state
relationship?
MR. BERGER: We're not going to comment. What every President, again,
since Nixon has done is not to comment, not specifically, on what one
country entity says to the other, but rather to state what our position is.
Our position is that there is one China, and that the issues between Taiwan
and Bejing should be resolved between the two and peacefully through a
cross-straits dialogue. That continues to be our position.
We believe that that policy has served the region very well. Taiwan
has become democratic, prosperous. They're our sixth largest economic
trading partner. The economic activity between Taiwan and China has
exploded and our relationship with China has improved. So all three legs
of this, or three pieces of this triangle have benefited by this policy
that was first articulated back several administrations ago, and we believe
it's a good policy.
...............
Q Sandy, what exactly were the references in the meeting to the
bombing of the Chinese Embassy? Did the President express any regret or
apologize? Did the Chinese ask the United States to punish those
responsible for the bombing? What exactly was mentioned?
MR. BERGER: The answer is, no. This came up only once in the
meeting. The President did not raise it or speak to it. He obviously has
made his views known in the past both directly to President Jiang and
publicly.
In the context of discussing why there had been inability to resume
negotiations on WTO, President Jiang made reference to the unfortunate
incident of the embassy.
Q Did the espionage charges come up at all, Sandy?
MR. BERGER: No. But those have been raised in previous meetings, and
we fairly much know what the Chinese say about them.
Q Sandy, can I get one more question? You said that President
Jiang Zemin felt that the Taiwan issue was a very important issue. Did he
specifically request that President Clinton make any comments directly in
regards to the state-to-state statement made by President Lee? Did he ask
him to denounce those statements? Is this an issue that they will be
working through? If it is so important --
MR. BERGER: He did not. He did take issue with our arms sales to
Taiwan.
Thank you.
MR. LOCKHART: Anything of the domestic variety?
Q Actually, just one more question for Sandy. The wires are saying
that Wiranto has asked for an expedited timetable for peacekeepers. Do you
know anything about that?
MR. BERGER: I don't know any more about it.
Q Sandy, was there any contact for the U.S. with Wiranto today?
MR. BERGER: Yes.
Q Can you say who he's talking to?
MR. BERGER: I believe General Shelton.
MR. LOCKHART: Anything else? Okay.
END 8:07 P.M. (L)
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