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10 June 1999

TEXT: COX AMENDMENT ON EXPORT, PROLIFERATION CONTROLS FOR CHINA

(Amendment calls for reports, technology security office) (6330)
Washington -- Representative Christopher Cox (Republican of
California) introduced an amendment to the Defense Department
authorization bill June 8 concerning proliferation and export control
matters vis-a-vis the People's Republic of China (PRC).
Cox and Representative Norman Dicks (Democrat of Washington) headed
the House select committee that looked into Chinese espionage at U.S.
nuclear weapons laboratories.
The amendment, which passed in the House of Representatives by a vote
of 428-0 June 9, calls for a series of reports by the Administration
on:
-- compliance (or lack thereof) by China, Russia and other countries
with the Missile Technology Control Regime, including U.S. actions to
enforce the Missile Technology Control Regime with respect to the
People's Republic of China, including actions to prevent the transfer
of missile technology from Russia and other countries to the People's
Republic of China;
-- technology transfers to the People's Republic of China; and
-- implementation of the portion of the Strom Thurmond National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999 that transfers
satellites and related items from the Commerce Control List of
dual-use items to the United States Munitions List.
The amendment also lays out rules for security in connection with
satellite export licensing, reporting of technology passed to China
and of foreign launch security violations, end-use verification of
high-performance computers sent to the People's Republic of China, and
the establishment of an Office of Technology Security in the
Department of Defense.
The amendment also requires the President to submit a semi-annual
report on "the steps being taken by the Department of Energy, the
Department of Defense, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, the
Central Intelligence Agency, and all other relevant executive
departments and agencies to respond to espionage and other
intelligence activities by the People's Republic of China,
particularly with respect to the theft of sophisticated United States
nuclear weapons design information and the targeting by the People's
Republic of China of United States nuclear weapons codes and other
national security information of strategic concern."
The first report under that section is due January 1, 2000. 
Following is the text of the amendment from the Congressional Record:
(begin text)
TITLE XIV -- PROLIFERATION AND EXPORT CONTROL MATTERS 
SEC. 1401. REPORT ON COMPLIANCE BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND
OTHER COUNTRIES WITH THE MISSILE TECHNOLOGY CONTROL REGIME.
(a) Report Required: Not later than October 31, 1999, the President
shall transmit to Congress a report on the compliance, or lack of
compliance (both as to acquiring and transferring missile technology),
by the People's Republic of China, with the Missile Technology Control
Regime, and on any actual or suspected transfer by Russia or any other
country of missile technology to the People's Republic of China in
violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime. The report shall
include a list specifying each actual or suspected violation of the
Missile Technology Control Regime by the People's Republic of China,
Russia, or other country and, for each such violation, a description
of the remedial action (if any) taken by the United States or any
other country.
(b) Matters To Be Included: The report under subsection (a) shall also
include information concerning--
(1) actual or suspected use by the People's Republic of China of
United States missile technology;
(2) actual or suspected missile proliferation activities by the
People's Republic of China;
(3) actual or suspected transfer of missile technology by Russia or
other countries to the People's Republic of China: and
(4) United States actions to enforce the Missile Technology Control
Regime with respect to the People's Republic of China, including
actions to prevent the transfer of missile technology from Russia and
other countries to the People's Republic of China.
SEC. 1402. ANNUAL REPORT ON TECHNOLOGY TRANSFERS TO THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Annual Report: The President shall transmit to Congress an annual
report on transfers to the People's Republic of China by the United
States and other countries of technology with potential military
applications, during the 1-year period preceding the transmittal of
the report.
(b) Initial Report: The initial report under this section shall be
transmitted not later than October 31, 1999.
SEC. 1403. REPORT ON IMPLEMENTATION OF TRANSFER OF SATELLITE EXPORT
CONTROL AUTHORITY.
Not later than August 31, 1999, the President shall transmit to
Congress a report on the implementation of subsection (a) of section
1513 of the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act for
Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-261; 112 Stat. 2174; 22 U.S.C. 2778
note), transferring satellites and related items from the Commerce
Control List of dual-use items to the United States Munitions List.
The report shall update the information provided in the report under
subsection (d) of that section.
SEC. 1404. SECURITY IN CONNECTION WITH SATELLITE EXPORT LICENSING.
(a) Security at Foreign Launches: As a condition of the export license
for any satellite to be launched outside the jurisdiction of the
United States, the Secretary of State shall require the following:
(1) That the technology transfer control plan required by section
1514(a)(1) of the Strom Thurmond National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 1999 (Public Law 105-261; 112 Stat. 2175; 22 U.S.C.
2778 note) be prepared by the Department of Defense, and agreed to by
the licensee, and that the plan set forth the security arrangements
for the launch of the satellite, both before and during launch
operations, and include enhanced security measures if the launch site
is within the jurisdiction of the People's Republic of China or any
other country that is subject to section 1514 of the Strom Thurmond
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1999.
(2) That each person providing security for the launch of that
satellite--
(A) be employed by, or under a contract with, the Department of
Defense;
(B) have received appropriate training in the regulations prescribed
by the Secretary of State known as the International Trafficking in
Arms Regulations (hereafter in this section referred to as `ITAR');
(C) have significant experience and expertise with satellite launches;
and
(D) have been investigated in a manner at least as comprehensive as
the investigation required for the issuance of a security clearance at
the level designated as `Secret'.
(3) That the number of such persons providing security for the launch
of the satellite shall be sufficient to maintain 24-hour security of
the satellite and related launch vehicle and other sensitive
technology.
(4) That the licensee agree to reimburse the Department of Defense for
all costs associated with the provision of security for the launch of
the satellite.
(b) Defense Department Monitors: The Secretary of Defense shall-- 
(1) ensure that persons assigned as space launch campaign monitors are
provided sufficient training and have adequate experience in the ITAR
and have significant experience and expertise with satellite
technology, launch vehicle technology, and launch operations
technology;
(2) ensure that adequate numbers of such monitors are assigned to
space launch campaigns so that 24-hour, 7-day per week coverage is
provided;
(3) take steps to ensure, to the maximum extent possible, the
continuity of service by monitors for the entire space launch campaign
period (from satellite marketing to launch and, if necessary,
completion of a launch failure analysis); and
(4) adopt measures designed to make service as a space launch campaign
monitor an attractive career opportunity.
SEC. 1405. REPORTING OF TECHNOLOGY PASSED TO PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA AND OF FOREIGN LAUNCH SECURITY VIOLATIONS.
(a) Monitoring of Information: The Secretary of Defense shall require
that space launch monitors of the Department of Defense assigned to
monitor launches in the People's Republic of China maintain records of
all information authorized to be transmitted to the People's Republic
of China, including copies of any documents authorized for such
transmission, and reports on launch-related activities.
(b) Transmission to Other Agencies: The Secretary of Defense shall
ensure that records under subsection (a) are transmitted on a current
basis to appropriate elements of the Department of Defense and to the
Department of State, the Department of Commerce, and the Central
Intelligence Agency.
(c) Retention of Records: Records described in subsection (a) shall be
retained for at least the period of the statute of limitations for
violations of the Arms Export Control Act.
(d) Guidelines: The Secretary of Defense shall prescribe guidelines
providing space launch monitors of the Department of Defense with the
responsibility and the ability to report serious security violations,
problems, or other issues at an overseas launch site directly to the
headquarters office of the responsible Department of Defense
component.
SEC. 1406. REPORT ON NATIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF EXPORTING
HIGH-PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS TO THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Review: The Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Defense, and the
Secretary of State, in consultation with other appropriate departments
and agencies, shall conduct a comprehensive review of the national
security implications of exporting high-performance computers to the
People's Republic of China. As part of the review, the Secretary shall
conduct empirical testing of the extent to which national
security-related operations can be performed using clustered,
massively-parallel processing or other combinations of computers.
(b) Report: The Secretary of Energy shall submit to Congress a report
on the results of the review under subsection (a). The report shall be
submitted not later than six months after the date of the enactment of
this Act and shall be updated not later than the end of each
subsequent 1-year period.
SEC. 1407. END-USE VERIFICATION FOR USE BY PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
OF HIGH-PERFORMANCE COMPUTERS.
(a) Revised HPC Verification System: The President shall seek to enter
into an agreement with the People's Republic of China to revise the
existing verification system with the People's Republic of China with
respect to end-use verification for high-performance computers
exported or to be exported to the People's Republic of China so as to
provide for an open and transparent system providing for effective
end-use verification for such computers and, at a minimum, providing
for on-site inspection of the end-use and end-user of such computers,
without notice, by United States nationals designated by the United
States Government. The President shall transmit a copy of the
agreement to Congress.
(b) Definition: As used in this section and section 1406, the term
`high performance computer' means a computer which, by virtue of its
composite theoretical performance level, would be subject to section
1211 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998
(50 U.S.C. App. 2404 note).
(c) Adjustment of Composite Theoretical Performance Levels for
Post-shipment Verification: Section 1213 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 is amended by adding at the end
the following: `(e) Adjustment of Performance Levels: Whenever a new
composite theoretical performance level is established under section
1211(d), that level shall apply for purposes of subsection (a) of this
section in lieu of the level set forth in that subsection.'.
SEC. 1408. PROCEDURES FOR REVIEW OF EXPORT OF CONTROLLED TECHNOLOGIES
AND ITEMS.
(a) Recommendations for Prioritization of National Security Concerns:
The President shall submit to Congress the President's recommendations
for the establishment of a mechanism to identify, on a continuing
basis, those controlled technologies and items the export of which is
of greatest national security concern relative to other controlled
technologies and items.
(b) Recommendations for Executive Department Approvals for Exports of
Greatest National Security Concern: With respect to controlled
technologies and items identified under subsection (a), the President
shall submit to Congress the President's recommendations for the
establishment of a mechanism to identify procedures for export of such
technologies and items so as to provide--
(1) that the period for review by an executive department or agency of
a license application for any such export shall be extended to a
period longer than that otherwise required when such longer period is
considered necessary by the head of that department or agency for
national security purposes; and
(2) that a license for such an export may be approved only with the
agreement of each executive department or agency that reviewed the
application for the license, subject to appeal procedures to be
established by the President.
(c) Recommendations for Streamlined Licensing Procedures for Other
Exports: With respect to controlled technologies and items other than
those identified under subsection (a), the President shall submit to
Congress the President's recommendations for modifications to
licensing procedures for export of such technologies and items so as
to streamline the licensing process and provide greater transparency,
predictability, and certainty.
SEC. 1409. NOTICE OF FOREIGN ACQUISITION OF UNITED STATES FIRMS IN
NATIONAL SECURITY INDUSTRIES.
Section 721(b) of the Defense Production Act of 1950 (50 U.S.C.
2170(b)) is amended--
(1) by inserting `(1)' before `The President'; 
(2) by redesignating paragraphs (1) and (2) as subparagraphs (A) and
(B), respectively; and
(3) by adding at the end the following: `(2) Whenever a person engaged
in interstate commerce in the United States is the subject of a
merger, acquisition, or takeover described in paragraph (1), that
person shall promptly notify the President, or the President's
designee, of such planned merger, acquisition, or takeover. Whenever
any executive department or agency becomes aware of any such planned
merger, acquisition, or takeover, the head of that department or
agency shall promptly notify the President, or the President's
designee, of such planned merger, acquisition, or takeover.'.
SEC. 1410. FIVE-AGENCY INSPECTORS GENERAL EXAMINATION OF
COUNTERMEASURES AGAINST ACQUISITION BY THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA
OF MILITARILY SENSITIVE TECHNOLOGY.
Not later than January 1, 2000, the Inspectors General of the
Departments of State, Defense, the Treasury, and Commerce and the
Inspector General of the Central Intelligence Agency shall submit to
Congress a report on the adequacy of current export controls and
counterintelligence measures to protect against the acquisition by the
People's Republic of China of militarily sensitive United States
technology. Such report shall include a description of measures taken
to address any deficiencies found in such export controls and
counterintelligence measures.
SEC. 1411. OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY SECURITY IN DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE.
(a) Enhanced Multilateral Export Controls: 
(1) New international controls: The President shall work (in the
context of the scheduled 1999 review of the Wassenaar Arrangement and
otherwise) to establish new binding international controls on
technology transfers that threaten international peace and United
States national security.
(2) Improved sharing of information: The President shall take
appropriate actions (in the context of the scheduled 1999 review of
the Wassenaar Arrangement and otherwise) to improve the sharing of
information by nations that are major exporters of technology so that
the United States can track movements of technology and enforce
technology controls and re-export requirements.
(b) Office of Technology Security: (1) There is hereby established in
the Department of Defense an Office of Technology Security. The Office
shall support United States Government efforts to--
(1) establish new binding international controls on technology
transfers that threaten international peace and United States national
security; and
(2) improve the sharing of information by nations that are major
exporters of technology so that the United States can track movements
of technology and enforce technology controls and re-export
requirements. At the end of subtitle A of title XXXI (page 419, after
line 3), insert the following new section:
SEC. 3106. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY COUNTERINTELLIGENCE CYBER SECURITY
PROGRAM.
(a) Increased Funds for Counterintelligence Cyber Security: The
amounts provided in section 3103 in the matter preceding paragraph (1)
and in paragraph (3) are each hereby increased by $8,600,000, to be
available for Counterintelligence Cyber Security programs.
(b) Offsetting Reductions Derived From Contractor Travel: (1) The
amount provided in section 3101 in the matter preceding paragraph (1)
(for weapons activities in carrying out programs necessary for
national security) is hereby reduced by $4,700,000.
(2) The amount provided in section 3102 in the matter preceding
paragraph (1) of subsection (a) (for environmental restoration and
waste management in carrying out programs necessary for national
security) is hereby reduced by $1,900,000.
(3) The amount provided in section 3103 in the matter preceding
paragraph (1) is hereby reduced by $2,000,000.
At the end of title XXXI (page 453, after line 15), insert the
following new subtitle:
Subtitle F--Protection of National Security Information 
SEC. 3181. SHORT TITLE. This subtitle may be cited as the `National
Security Information Protection Improvement Act'.
SEC. 3182. SEMI-ANNUAL REPORT BY THE PRESIDENT ON ESPIONAGE BY THE
PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
(a) Reports Required: The President shall transmit to Congress a
report, not less often than every six months, on the steps being taken
by the Department of Energy, the Department of Defense, the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and all
other relevant executive departments and agencies to respond to
espionage and other intelligence activities by the People's Republic
of China, particularly with respect to the theft of sophisticated
United States nuclear weapons design information and the targeting by
the People's Republic of China of United States nuclear weapons codes
and other national security information of strategic concern.
(b) Initial Report: The first report under this section shall be
transmitted not later than January 1, 2000.
SEC. 3183. REPORT ON WHETHER DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY SHOULD CONTINUE TO
MAINTAIN NUCLEAR WEAPONS RESPONSIBILITY.
Not later than January 1, 2000, the President shall transmit to
Congress a report regarding the feasibility of alternatives to the
current arrangements for controlling United States nuclear weapons
development, testing, and maintenance within the Department of Energy,
including the reestablishment of the Atomic Energy Commission as an
independent nuclear agency. The report shall describe the benefits and
shortcomings of each such alternative, as well as the current system,
from the standpoint of protecting such weapons and related research
and technology from theft and exploitation. The President shall
include with such report the President's recommendation for the
appropriate arrangements for controlling United States nuclear weapons
development, testing, and maintenance outside the Department of Energy
if it should be determined that the Department of Energy should no
longer have that responsibility.
SEC. 3184. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY OFFICE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE AND
OFFICE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.
(a) In General: The Department of Energy Organization Act is amended
by inserting after section 212 (42 U.S.C. 7143) the following new
sections:
`OFFICE OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
`Sec. 213. (a) There shall be within the Department an Office of
Foreign Intelligence, to be headed by a Director, who shall report
directly to the Secretary. `(b) The Director shall be responsible for
the programs and activities of the Department relating to the analysis
of intelligence with respect to nuclear weapons and materials, other
nuclear matters, and energy security. `(c) The Secretary may delegate
to the Deputy Secretary of Energy the day-to-day supervision of the
Director.
`OFFICE OF COUNTERINTELLIGENCE
`Sec. 214. (a) There shall be within the Department an Office of
Counterintelligence, to be headed by a Director, who shall report
directly to the Secretary. `(b) The Director shall carry out all
counterintelligence activities in the Department relating to the
defense activities of the Department. `(c) The Secretary may delegate
to the Deputy Secretary of Energy the day-to-day supervision of the
Director. `(d)(1) The Director shall keep the intelligence committees
fully and currently informed of all significant security breaches at
any of the national laboratories. `(2) For purposes of this
subsection, the term `intelligence committees' means the Permanent
Select Committee of the House of Representatives and the Select
Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.'.
(b) Clerical Amendment: The table of contents in the first section of
that Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section
212 the following new items:
`Sec. 213. Office of Foreign Intelligence. 
`Sec. 214. Office of Counterintelligence.'. 
SEC. 3185. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE PROGRAM AT DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
NATIONAL LABORATORIES.
(a) Program Required: The Secretary of Energy shall establish and
maintain at each national laboratory a counterintelligence program for
the defense-related activities of the Department of Energy at such
laboratory.
(b) Head of Program: The Secretary shall ensure that, for each
national laboratory, the head of the counterintelligence program of
that laboratory--
(1) has extensive experience in counterintelligence activities within
the Federal Government; and
(2) with respect to the counterintelligence program, is responsible
directly to, and is hired with the concurrence of, the Director of
Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy and the director of
the national laboratory.
SEC. 3186. COUNTERINTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AT OTHER DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY FACILITIES.
(a) Assignment of Counterintelligence Personnel: (1) The Secretary of
Energy shall assign to each Department of Energy facility, other than
a national laboratory, at which Restricted Data is located an
individual who shall assess security and counterintelligence matters
at that facility.
(2) An individual assigned to a facility under this subsection shall
be stationed at the facility.
(b) Supervision: Each individual assigned under subsection (a) shall
report directly to the Director of the Office of Counterintelligence
of the Department of Energy.
SEC. 3187. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY POLYGRAPH EXAMINATIONS.
(a) Counterintelligence Polygraph Program Required: The Secretary of
Energy, acting through the Director of Counterintelligence of the
Department of Energy, shall carry out a counterintelligence polygraph
program for the defense activities of the Department of Energy. The
program shall consist of the administration on a regular basis of a
polygraph examination to each covered person who has access to a
program that the Director of Counterintelligence and the Assistant
Secretary assigned the functions under section 203(a)(5) of the
Department of Energy Organization Act determine requires special
access restrictions.
(b) Covered Persons: For purposes of subsection (a), a covered person
is any of the following:
(1) An officer or employee of the Department. 
(2) An expert or consultant under contract to the Department. 
(3) An officer or employee of any contractor of the Department.
(c) Additional Polygraph Examinations: In addition to the polygraph
examinations administered under subsection (a), the Secretary, in
carrying out the defense activities of the Department--
(1) may administer a polygraph examination to any employee of the
Department or of any contractor of the Department, for
counterintelligence purposes; and
(2) shall administer a polygraph examination to any such employee in
connection with an investigation of such employee, if such employee
requests the administration of a polygraph examination for exculpatory
purposes.
(d) Regulations: (1) The Secretary shall prescribe any regulations
necessary to carry out this section. Such regulations shall include
procedures, to be developed in consultation with the Director of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation, for identifying and addressing `false
positive' results of polygraph examinations.
(2) Notwithstanding section 501 of the Department of Energy
Organization Act (42 U.S.C. 7191) or any other provision of law, the
Secretary may, in prescribing regulations under paragraph (1), waive
any requirement for notice or comment if the Secretary determines that
it is in the national security interest to expedite the implementation
of such regulations.
(e) No Change in Other Polygraph Authority: This section shall not be
construed to affect the authority under any other provision of law of
the Secretary to administer a polygraph examination.
SEC. 3188. CIVIL MONETARY PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS OF DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY REGULATIONS RELATING TO THE SAFEGUARDING AND SECURITY OF
RESTRICTED DATA.
(a) In General: Chapter 18 of title I of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954
(42 U.S.C. 2271 et seq.) is amended by inserting after section 234A
the following new section: `Sec. 234B. Civil Monetary Penalties for
Violations of Department of Energy Regulations Regarding Security of
Classified or Sensitive Information or Data: `a. Any individual or
entity that has entered into a contract or agreement with the
Department of Energy, or a subcontract or subagreement thereto, and
that commits a gross violation or a pattern of gross violations of any
applicable rule, regulation, or order prescribed or otherwise issued
by the Secretary pursuant to this subtitle relating to the
safeguarding or security of Restricted Data or other classified or
sensitive information shall be subject to a civil penalty of not to
exceed $500,000 for each such violation. `b. The Secretary shall
include, in each contract entered into after the date of the enactment
of this section with a contractor of the Department, provisions which
provide an appropriate reduction in the fees or amounts paid to the
contractor under the contract in the event of a violation by the
contractor or contractor employee of any rule, regulation, or order
relating to the safeguarding or security of Restricted Data or other
classified or sensitive information. The provisions shall specify
various degrees of violations and the amount of the reduction
attributable to each degree of violation.
`c. The powers and limitations applicable to the assessment of civil
penalties under section 234A shall apply to the assessment of civil
penalties under this section.'.
(b) Clarifying Amendment: The section heading of section 234A of that
Act (42 U.S.C. 2282a) is amended by inserting `Safety' before
`Regulations'.
(c) Clerical Amendment: The table of sections in the first section of
that Act is amended by inserting after the item relating to section
234 the following new items:
`234A. Civil Monetary Penalties for Violations of Department of Energy
Safety Regulations.
`234B. Civil Monetary Penalties for Violations of Department of Energy
Regulations Regarding Security of Classified or Sensitive Information
or Data.'.
SEC. 3189. INCREASED PENALTIES FOR MISUSE OF RESTRICTED DATA.
(a) Communication of Restricted Data: Section 224 of the Atomic Energy
Act of 1954 (42 U.S.C. 2274) is amended--
(1) in clause a., by striking `$20,000' and inserting `$400,000'; and
(2) in clause b., by striking `$10,000' and inserting `$200,000'.
(b) Receipt of Restricted Data: Section 225 of such Act (42 U.S.C.
2275) is amended by striking `$20,000' and inserting `$400,000'.
(c) Disclosure of Restricted Data: Section 227 of such Act (42 U.S.C.
2277) is amended by striking `$2,500' and inserting `$50,000'.
SEC. 3190. RESTRICTIONS ON ACCESS TO NATIONAL LABORATORIES BY FOREIGN
VISITORS FROM SENSITIVE COUNTRIES.
(a) Background Review Required: The Secretary of Energy may not admit
to any facility of a national laboratory any individual who is a
citizen or agent of a nation that is named on the current sensitive
countries list unless the Secretary first completes a background
review with respect to that individual.
(b) Moratorium Pending Certification: (1) During the period described
in paragraph (2), the Secretary may not admit to any facility of a
national laboratory any individual who is a citizen or agent of a
nation that is named on the current sensitive countries list.
(2) The period referred to in paragraph (1) is the period beginning 30
days after the date of the enactment of this Act and ending on the
later of the following:
(A) The date that is 90 days after the date of the enactment of this
Act.
(B) The date that is 45 days after the date on which the Secretary
submits to Congress a certification described in paragraph (3).
(3) A certification referred to in paragraph (2) is a certification by
the Director of Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy, with
the concurrence of the Director of the Federal Bureau of
Investigation, that all security measures are in place that are
necessary and appropriate to prevent espionage or intelligence
gathering by or for a sensitive country, including access by
individuals referred to in paragraph (1) to classified information of
the national laboratory.
(c) Waiver of Moratorium: (1) The Secretary of Energy may waive the
prohibition in subsection (b) on a case-by-case basis with respect to
any specific individual or any specific delegation of individuals
whose admission to a national laboratory is determined by the
Secretary to be in the interest of the national security of the United
States.
(2) Not later than the seventh day of the month following a month in
which a waiver is made, the Secretary shall submit a report in writing
providing notice of each waiver made in that month to the following:
(A) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate.
(B) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(3) Each such report shall be in classified form and shall contain the
identity of each individual or delegation for whom such a waiver was
made and, with respect to each such individual or delegation, the
following information:
(A) A detailed justification for the waiver. 
(B) For each individual with respect to whom a background review was
conducted, whether the background review determined that negative
information exists with respect to that individual.
(C) The Secretary's certification that the admission of that
individual or delegation to a national laboratory is in the interest
of the national security of the United States.
(4) The authority of the Secretary under paragraph (1) may be
delegated only to the Director of Counterintelligence of the
Department of Energy.
(d) Exception to Moratorium for Certain Individuals: The moratorium
under subsection (b) shall not apply to any person who--
(1) is, on the date of the enactment of this Act, an employee or
assignee of the Department of Energy, or of a contractor of the
Department; and
(2) has undergone a background review in accordance with subsection
(a).
(e) Exception to Moratorium for Certain Programs: In the case of a
program undertaken pursuant to an international agreement between the
United States and a foreign nation, the moratorium under subsection
(b) shall not apply to the admittance to a facility that is important
to that program of a citizen of that foreign nation whose admittance
is important to that program.
(f) Sense of Congress Regarding Background Reviews: It is the sense of
Congress that the Secretary of Energy, the Director of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation, and the Director of Central Intelligence
should ensure that background reviews carried out under this section
are completed in not more than 15 days.
(g) Definitions: For purposes of this section: 
(1) The term `background review', commonly known as an indices check,
means a review of information provided by the Director of Central
Intelligence and the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation
regarding personal background, including information relating to any
history of criminal activity or to any evidence of espionage.
(2) The term `sensitive countries list' means the list prescribed by
the Secretary of Energy known as the Department of Energy List of
Sensitive Countries.
SEC. 3191. REQUIREMENTS RELATING TO ACCESS BY FOREIGN VISITORS AND
EMPLOYEES TO DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY FACILITIES ENGAGED IN DEFENSE
ACTIVITIES.
(a) Security Clearance Review Required: The Secretary of Energy may
not allow unescorted access to any classified area, or access to
classified information, of any facility of the Department of Energy
engaged in the defense activities of the Department to any individual
who is a citizen of a foreign nation unless--
(1) the Secretary, acting through the Director of Counterintelligence,
first completes a security clearance investigation with respect to
that individual in a manner at least as comprehensive as the
investigation required for the issuance of a security clearance at the
level required for such access under the rules and regulations of the
Department; or
(2) a foreign government first completes a security clearance
investigation with respect to that individual in a manner that the
Secretary of State, pursuant to an international agreement between the
United States and that foreign government, determines is equivalent to
the investigation required for the issuance of a security clearance at
the level required for such access under the rules and regulations of
the Department.
(b) Effect on Current Employees: The Secretary shall ensure that any
individual who, on the date of the enactment of this Act, is a citizen
of a foreign nation and an employee of the Department or of a
contractor of the Department is not discharged from such employment as
a result of this section before the completion of the security
clearance investigation of such individual under subsection (a) unless
the Director of Counterintelligence determines that such discharge is
necessary for the national security of the United States.
SEC. 3192. ANNUAL REPORT ON SECURITY AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE STANDARDS
AT NATIONAL LABORATORIES AND OTHER DEFENSE FACILITIES OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY.
(a) Report on Security and Counterintelligence Standards at National
Laboratories and Other DOE Defense Facilities: Not later than March 1
of each year, the Secretary of Energy, acting through the Director of
Counterintelligence of the Department of Energy, shall submit a report
on the security and counterintelligence standards at the national
laboratories, and other facilities of the Department of Energy engaged
in the defense activities of the Department, to the following:
(1) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate.
(2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
(b) Contents of Report: The report shall be in classified form and
shall contain, for each such national laboratory or facility, the
following information:
(1) A description of all security measures that are in place to
prevent access by unauthorized individuals to classified information
of the national laboratory or facility.
(2) A certification by the Director of Counterintelligence of the
Department of Energy as to whether--
(A) all security measures are in place to prevent access by
unauthorized individuals to classified information of the national
laboratory or facility; and
(B) such security measures comply with Presidential Decision
Directives and other applicable Federal requirements relating to the
safeguarding and security of classified information.
(3) For each admission of an individual under section 3190 not
described in a previous report under this section, the identity of
that individual, and whether the background review required by that
section determined that information relevant to security exists with
respect to that individual.
SEC. 3193. REPORT ON SECURITY VULNERABILITIES OF NATIONAL LABORATORY
COMPUTERS.
(a) Report Required: Not later than March 1 of each year, the National
Counterintelligence Policy Board shall prepare a report, in
consultation with the Director of Counterintelligence of the
Department of Energy, on the security vulnerabilities of the computers
of the national laboratories.
(b) Preparation of Report: In preparing the report, the National
Counterintelligence Policy Board shall establish a so-called `red
team' of individuals to perform an operational evaluation of the
security vulnerabilities of the computers of the national
laboratories, including by direct experimentation. Such individuals
shall be selected by the National Counterintelligence Policy Board
from among employees of the Department of Defense, the National
Security Agency, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Federal Bureau
of Investigation, and of other agencies, and may be detailed to the
National Counterintelligence Policy Board from such agencies without
reimbursement and without interruption or loss of civil service status
or privilege.
(c) Submission of Report to Secretary of Energy and to FBI Director:
Not later than March 1 of each year, the report shall be submitted in
classified and unclassified form to the Secretary of Energy and the
Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
(d) Forwarding to Congressional Committees: Not later than 30 days
after the report is submitted, the Secretary and the Director shall
each separately forward that report, with the recommendations in
classified and unclassified form of the Secretary or the Director, as
applicable, in response to the findings of that report, to the
following:
(1) The Committee on Armed Services and the Select Committee on
Intelligence of the Senate.
(2) The Committee on Armed Services and the Permanent Select Committee
on Intelligence of the House of Representatives.
SEC. 3194. GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION ON DEPARTMENT
OF ENERGY DEFENSE-RELATED COMPUTERS.
(a) Procedures Required: The Secretary of Energy shall establish
procedures to govern access to classified information on DOE
defense-related computers. Those procedures shall, at a minimum,
provide that each employee of the Department of Energy who requires
access to classified information shall be required as a condition of
such access to provide to the Secretary written consent which permits
access by an authorized investigative agency to any DOE
defense-related computer used in the performance of the
defense-related duties of such employee during the period of that
employee's access to classified information and for a period of three
years thereafter.
(b) Expectation of Privacy in DOE Defense-Related Computers:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law (including any provision of
law enacted by the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986), no
user of a DOE defense-related computer shall have any expectation of
privacy in the use of that computer.
(c) Definitions: For purposes of this section: 
(1) The term `DOE defense-related computer' means a computer of the
Department of Energy or a Department of Energy contractor that is
used, in whole or in part, for a Department of Energy defense-related
activity.
(2) The term `computer' means an electronic, magnetic, optical,
electrochemical, or other high-speed data processing device performing
logical, arithmetic, or storage functions, and includes any data
storage facility or communications facility directly related to, or
operating in conjunction with, such device.
(3) The term `authorized investigative agency' means an agency
authorized by law or regulation to conduct a counterintelligence
investigation or investigations of persons who are proposed for access
to classified information to ascertain whether such persons satisfy
the criteria for obtaining and retaining access to such information.
(4) The term `classified information' means any information that has
been determined pursuant to Executive Order No. 12356 of April 2,
1982, or successor orders, or the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, to
require protection against unauthorized disclosure and that is so
designated.
(5) The term `employee' includes any person who receives a salary or
compensation of any kind from the Department of Energy, is a
contractor of the Department of Energy or an employee thereof, is an
unpaid consultant of the Department of Energy, or otherwise acts for
or on behalf of the Department of Energy.
(d) Establishment of Procedures: Not later than 90 days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Energy shall prescribe
such regulations as may be necessary to implement this section.
SEC. 3195. DEFINITION OF NATIONAL LABORATORY. For purposes of this
subtitle, the term `national laboratory' means any of the following:
(1) The Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California.
(2) The Los Alamos National Laboratory, Los Alamos, New Mexico. 
(3) The Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, New Mexico. 
(4) The Oak Ridge National Laboratories, Oak Ridge, Tennessee. 
(end text)