01 June 1999
TRANSCRIPT: EXPORT-CONTROL AMENDMENT ADOPTED IN SENATE
(Lott package aims at tightening rules on China) (1590) Washington -- The Senate has adopted a broad package of measures -- mostly aimed at China -- that would tighten restrictions on exports of sensitive technology and increase security at U.S. nuclear laboratories. The package was added to the defense authorization bill, passed 92-3 May 27, as an amendment written by Senator Trent Lott, Republican majority leader. For the bill to become law, it still requires final passage in the U.S. House of Representatives and the Senate and signature by the president. The Lott package would require the president to notify Congress about any investigation of alleged violations of export-control laws concerning U.S.-made satellites. It would require the administration to improve its monitoring of launches in China and elsewhere of U.S.-made satellites. The amendment would urge review of current policy allowing exports of U.S.-made commercial satellites for launch in China. It would also express strong support for eliminating barriers to expansion of a commercial space launch industry in the United States. Senator Carl Levin, the senior Democrat on the Armed Services Committee, submitted a summary of the Lott amendment for the record after it was approved by voice vote. Following are acronyms and terms used in the text: -- FBI: Federal Bureau of Investigation. -- DOE: Department of Energy. -- DOD: Department of Defense. -- DCI: director of central intelligence. -- OPM: Office of Personnel Management. Following is the transcript of Levin's remarks as published in the May 27 Congressional Record: (begin transcript) Mr. LEVIN. I want to put in the RECORD at this time the summary of the amendment that we adopted here today. Senator LOTT offered an amendment earlier today. It was modified somewhat. In essence, it does some of the following things: First, it requires the President to notify the Congress whenever an investigation is undertaken of an alleged violation of export control laws. It would require the President to notify Congress whenever an export license or waiver is granted on behalf of any person who is the subject of a criminal investigation. It would require the Secretary of Defense to undertake certain actions that would enhance the performance and effectiveness of the Department of Defense program for monitoring so-called satellite launch campaigns. It would enhance the intelligence community's role in the export license review process. It proposes a mechanism for determining the extent to which the classified nuclear weapons information has been released by the Department of Energy. It proposes putting the FBI in charge of conducting security background investigations of DOE laboratory employees. These are a long list of actions which are now in this bill, that started off in this bill from the Armed Services Committee that had been improved on the floor today. To suggest that we are not doing anything relative to trying to clamp down on espionage activities which have been going on for 20 years at these labs, it seems to me, is a total misstatement of what is in this bill that we will be voting on in a few minutes. I ask unanimous consent that a summary of the Lott amendment, again, slightly modified since this list has been prepared, but that a summary of the Lott amendment be printed in the RECORD at this time. Mr. WARNER. Reserving the right to object -- I do not intend to -- could you describe who prepared the summary? Mr. LEVIN. This was prepared by Senator LOTT's staff. Again, there were some slight modifications in this, which Senator LOTT agreed to, which I proposed prior to the adoption of the amendment. This, in essence, is the summary of the Lott amendment. This, plus the numerous provisions in the Senate bill that came out of the Armed Services Committee, a commission on safeguarding security, counterintelligence at the facility, background check investigations now going on that had not been taking place, polygraph examinations, monetary penalties to be added to the criminal penalties, moratorium on laboratory-to-laboratory and foreign visitors in assignment programs, counterintelligence and intelligence program activities being organized, whistle-blower protection, notification of Congress of certain security and counterintelligence failures at these labs. This is a significant effort on the part of the Armed Services Committee. It was supplemented by the full Senate today. I don't think we ought to denigrate this effort on the part of the Armed Services Committee or of the Senate in adopting the amendment we adopted today by just suggesting we are not doing anything because in a few hours prior to a recess, without one hearing on the subject, we are not reorganizing the Department of Energy without even hearing from the Secretary of Energy. I think that suggestion is a denigration of what is in this bill, which was thoughtfully placed in this bill by the Armed Services Committee, and a denigration of the amendment of the majority leader, which we adopted here this morning on this floor. We should not characterize these kinds of efforts and diminish these kinds of efforts by sort of saying we are not doing anything before we are going home on recess. We are doing an awful lot, and there is more to be done. But we ought to do it in a way that will do credit to this institution, the Senate. We ought to do it promptly after the recess. We ought to do it after a hearing, where the Secretary of Energy is heard. The head of the Department should at least be heard. We received a letter from him today. Do we not want to hear from him prior to reorganizing the Department? That is not thoughtful. That is not the way to proceed to close the hole. That is a way of precipitously trying to do something and trying to get some advantage from the refusal of others to go along with that kind of precipitous action. But more important, I believe it would denigrate the significant steps that are in this bill, both as it came to the floor and as it was added by the majority leader with modifications, which I suggested, and that work is significant. It will close, we hope, most of the holes that have been in these labs in terms of trying to protect against espionage for 20 years, where nothing was done until finally last year the President issued a Presidential directive that started the process of tightening up the security at these laboratories. We should be proud of these efforts. They were done thoughtfully in committee by the majority leader, by Senators on the floor. We should not denigrate them and simply slough them off because there is not a precipitous reorganization of the entire Department 2 hours before the recess, without even having a hearing on the subject and hearing from the Secretary of the Department. That is more than 1 minute, Mr. President. I ask unanimous consent that the summary of the Lott amendment be printed in the RECORD. The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there objection? Without objection, it is so ordered. There being no objection, the material was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows: LOTT AMENDMENT SUMMARY First, this amendment would require the President to notify the Congress whenever an investigation is undertaken of an alleged violation of U.S. export control laws in connection with the export of a commercial satellite of U.S. origin. It also would require the President to notify the Congress whenever an export license or waiver is granted on behalf of any U.S. person or firm that is the subject of a criminal investigation. Second, this amendment would require the Secretary of Defense to undertake certain actions that would significantly enhance the performance and effectiveness of the DOD program for monitoring so-called "satellite launch campaigns" in China and elsewhere. Third, this amendment would enhance the Intelligence Community's role in the export license review process and would require a report by the DCI on efforts of foreign governments to acquire sensitive U.S. technology and technical information. Fourth, this amendment expresses the Sense of Congress that the People's Republic of China should not be permitted to join the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) as a member until Beijing has demonstrated a sustained commitment to missile non-proliferation and adopted an effective export control system. Fifth, the amendment expresses strong support for stimulating the expansion of the commercial space launch industry here in America. This amendment strongly encourages efforts to promote the domestic commercial space launch industry, including through the elimination of legal or regulatory barriers to long-term competitive-ness. The amendment also urges a review of the current policy of permitting the export of commercial satellites of U.S. origin to the PRC for launch. Sixth, this amendment requires the Secretary of State to provide information to U.S. satellite manufacturers when a license application is denied. Seventh, this amendment also would require the Secretary of Defense to submit an annual report on the military balance in the Taiwan Straits, similar to the report delivered to the Congress earlier this year. Eighth, the amendment proposes a mechanism for determining the extent to which classified nuclear weapons information has been released by the Department of Energy. Ninth, the amendment proposes putting the FBI in charge of conducting security background investigations of DOE laboratory employees, versus the OPM. Tenth, the amendment proposes increased counter-intelligence training and other measures to ensure classified information is protected during DOE laboratory-to-laboratory exchanges. (end transcript)
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