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Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)

USIS Washington File

26 May 1999

TEXT: ENERGY SECRETARY RICHARDSON MAY 25 REMARKS ON COX REPORT

(Richardson: Energy Dept. has already strengthened security)  (1030)
Washington -- The recent House Select Committee report on China's
efforts to acquire sensitive U.S. technology, also known as the Cox
Report, underscores the importance of the aggressive actions the
Department of Energy has taken to strengthen counterintelligence and
security at national laboratories, according to Secretary of Energy
Bill Richardson.
In May 25 remarks, Richardson said that the Department of Energy has
been working on a complete overhaul of its counterintelligence program
ever since President Clinton's February 1998 Decision Directive on
counterintelligence.
"President Clinton ordered wholesale counterintelligence improvements
at the Department of Energy in February 1998, before the Cox Committee
was even formed," Richardson said. "We have undertaken a total
overhaul of the Department of Energy counterintelligence program. In
fact, we've made so much progress that the report's six-month-old
findings about the Energy Department's counterintelligence and
security are now outdated."
According to Richardson, the Department of Energy has instituted more
extensive security reviews -- including polygraph tests, expanded
financial disclosures programs and forensic financial investigations
for employees working in sensitive programs -- and has increased the
budget for counterintelligence from $2.6 million in 1996 to $39.2
million in 2000.
The Department of Energy has also "identified and corrected weaknesses
in cyber security, including strengthening firewalls, developing
additional intrusion detection devices, tamperproof devices to prevent
the transfer from classified to unclassified systems and accelerated
these measures by standing down computers for two weeks," Richardson
said.
Other security measures include strengthening the screening process
for foreign scientists who visit labs -- including background checks
on visitors from sensitive countries -- and initiating the
reorganization of security and emergency operations at the Department
of Energy to enhance accountability.
"We support the majority of the recommendations made by the Cox-Dicks
Committee and we are committed to working with the Congress to further
strengthen and ensure adequate funding to implement these measures,"
Richardson said.
Following is the official text of Richardson's remarks, as released by
the Department of Energy:
(begin text)
Congressmen Cox and Dicks have produced an in-depth report that
underscores the importance of the aggressive actions we have taken to
strengthen counterintelligence and security at the national
laboratories. This is a landmark report, and we commend the committee
for their work.
The national laboratories, as the world's premier national security
research facilities will always be a target of foreign intelligence
services. To counter that threat, we are putting in place strong
measures to prevent the kinds of security breaches outlined in this
report.
President Clinton ordered wholesale counterintelligence improvements
at the Department of Energy in February 1998, before the Cox Committee
was even formed. We have undertaken a total overhaul of the Department
of Energy counterintelligence program. In fact, we've made so much
progress that the report's six-month-old findings about the Energy
Department's counterintelligence and security are now outdated.
I want to caution against oversensationalizing the conclusions of the
report. Not every allegation is a proven fact. For example, the report
discusses the possible theft of neutron technology discovered in 1996.
This allegation is based on one piece of intelligence reporting and
the FBI has been unable to identify a logical suspect. The most
detailed intelligence of the PRC stealing neutron bomb data is a
likely loss of classified information in the late 1970s. The Chinese
then tested a neutron bomb in 1988.
I also want to put this report into proper perspective. There is no
evidence of a 'wholesale' loss of information. The intelligence
community has concluded that classified information obtained by China
'probably accelerated its program to develop future nuclear weapons.'
But they don't know whether any weapon design documentation or
blueprints were acquired and they can't determine the full extent of
weapons information obtained.
It is also important to note that despite the potential loss, the
United States still maintains an overwhelming nuclear weapons
superiority; we have some 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads whereas
China has less than two dozen strategic missiles.
The Chinese collection effort has not resulted in any apparent
modernization of their deployed strategic force or any new nuclear
weapons deployment.
It would be a mistake to attempt to use this report for political
gain. The report details suspected espionage that allegedly spanned
over three decades, beginning in the 1970s and continuing into the
1990s. In fact, there are three confirmed instances of theft, one in
the late 1970s, one in 1984-85 and one from 1984-88. And we believe
that China as well as other countries will continue to try to steal
U.S. military secrets.
The committee's report identifies serious issues that require
bipartisan solutions. And despite the fact that we may never know
exactly how much information was compromised, we have based our
remedies on a worst-case scenario.
In February 1998, President Clinton issued a Decision Directive to
bring the full force of the intelligence and law enforcement community
to protect Energy Department labs from espionage. Since coming to the
department last fall, I moved aggressively to strengthen
counterintelligence and security, approving sweeping
counterintelligence reforms.
To date, we've completed 85 percent of the key reforms. We're
instituting more extensive security reviews, including polygraph
tests, expanded financial disclosures programs and forensic financial
investigations for employees working in sensitive programs. We've
increased the budget for counterintelligence from $2.6 million in 1996
to $39.2 million in 2000.
We've identified and corrected weaknesses in cyber security, including
strengthening firewalls, developing additional intrusion detection
devices, tamperproof devices to prevent the transfer from classified
to unclassified systems and accelerated these measures by standing
down computers for two weeks.
We've strengthened the screening process for foreign scientists who
visit the labs, which includes background checks on all visitors from
sensitive countries. And I have initiated the most dramatic
reorganization of security and emergency operations at the department
to bring about more responsibility and accountability.
We support the majority of the recommendations made by the Cox-Dicks
Committee and we are committed to working with the Congress to further
strengthen and ensure adequate funding to implement these measures.
(end text)



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