18 March 1999
TEXT: WHITE HOUSE'S SAMORE ON CHINA NUCLEAR ISSUE
(Samore says U.S. can protect secrets/cooperate with China) (1700) Washington -- The Clinton Administration plans to stick with its policy of engagement with China, despite that country's theft of American nuclear weapons technology, said a top White House official. "We have a strong security interest in engaging with China," National Security Council's Gary Samore said March 17. Samore, special assistant to the president on nonproliferation and export controls, discussed the theft of American nuclear secrets at a special briefing organized by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington, D.C. China, Samore asserted, is cooperating with the United States "on regional proliferation concerns in South Asia and the Korean Peninsula." But, he added, the U.S. policy of engagement with China "is premised on the expectation that China -- like other countries -- will seek to acquire sensitive U.S. information and technology through clandestine means. "It's our responsibility to protect ourselves from this threat," Samore said. The Clinton Administration, Samore said, has done more to strengthen lab security in the past year than all previous Administrations have done over the past 20 years. "We did not duck this issue; we tackled it head on. The process of tightening lab security and strengthening counterintelligence capabilities is not complete, however, and we need to keep focused on this critical objective," he said. All the nuclear weapon states, Samore noted, "use similar techniques to minimize size and weight without sacrificing yield. "It is particularly difficult to disentangle the significance of information China might have acquired from us from what it could have obtained from other countries or developed on its own," Samore told reporters. Following is the text of Samore's remarks, as prepared for delivery: (begin text) China Nuclear Controversy Introduction I'd like to review the U.S. government response to Chinese attempts to acquire sensitive information from U.S. nuclear weapons labs. Of course, this is not a new threat. In 1988, for example, the GAO issued a warning that scientists from China and other sensitive countries were visiting U.S. nuclear labs without appropriate security controls, and DOE responded by requiring background checks for all visitors from sensitive countries. In 1990, it is publicly reported that a Lawrence Livermore scientist was investigated by the FBI for providing classified information to China years earlier that made it possible for China to develop its version of the neutron bomb in 1988. In 1997, a former Los Alamos scientist plead guilty to providing nuclear weapons-related diagnostic information to China in 1985. Investigating the Case The latest case also occurred in the 1980s. In 1995, we learned that China had obtained sensitive U.S. information in the mid-1980's in connection with China's efforts to modernize its nuclear weapons capability. Contrary to what has been reported in some of the media, our information provided a lead, but not a smoking gun. Although we had a rough idea when the compromise occurred, we did not know how the Chinese obtained this information or where it came from. Nor was it clear how much the Chinese obtained from the U.S. or its significance for China's efforts. Nonetheless, there were clearly grounds for concern that a serious compromise had occurred in the mid-1980's, and government reacted appropriately. The immediate priority was to plug the leak and prevent further damage. For more than a year, DOE, assisted by FBI, conducted an internal review to identify possible sources of the information. By mid-1996, DOE submitted the report of this internal review to the FBI, which quickly began an investigation that continues today. The appropriate committees of Congress were briefed on this investigation shortly after it began, and they were kept regularly informed about developments in the case. Throughout this investigation, DOE and FBI have carefully coordinated actions to balance investigative priorities with national security concerns. In particular DOE kept the subject employed so that he would not be alerted to the investigation, but DOE took precautions to restrict the subjects access to sensitive information to minimize the risk of further compromise. Once the investigation became public, the subject became alerted so there was no longer any investigative reason to keep him employed, and secretary Richardson felt there was a strong basis for dismissal. The FBI continues its investigation. Strengthening security at the Labs In addition to the steps that DOE and FBI took to identify and investigate the possible source of the compromise, the 1995 information also prompted DOE and CIA to begin looking at the broader question of Chinese efforts to acquire nuclear information from the U.S. labs and the significance of this information for China's modernization program. This is a difficult and controversial subject, which requires the intelligence community to stitch together bits and pieces of evidence and make judgments without complete or perfect information. It is particularly difficult to disentangle the significance of information China might have acquired from us from what it could have obtained from other countries or developed on its own. In this connection, we should remember that all of the nuclear weapon states use similar techniques to minimize size and weight without sacrificing yield. These issues are currently being examined by a full intelligence community damage assessment, which is scheduled for completion by the end of March. In addition, the results of this assessment will be reviewed by an independent panel of experts headed by Admiral David Jeremiah. Despite the uncertainties of intelligence assessments, however, the analysis conducted by DOE and presented to senior Administration in July 1997 focused attention on the underlying problem of security vulnerabilities at the U.S. labs. As I said earlier, lab security has been a perennial concern, and previous Energy Secretaries have taken various steps to correct perceived problems, but the 1977 DOE assessment rang alarm bells that more needed to be done on a systematic and comprehensive scale. Once senior officials were briefed on DOE's conclusions in July 1997, the Administration took dramatic steps to improve overall lab security. In August, a special working group of the National Counterintelligence Policy Board was formed to review the situation and make recommendations for improvements. In September, the Board submitted their recommendations, and the NSC worked with the appropriate agencies to turn the recommendations into a Presidential Decision Directive. In December, the draft PDD was ready for approval by the Cabinet officers, including the Secretaries of Energy, Defense, and State as well as the Attorney General, the Director of the FBI, and the Director of Central Intelligence. Finally, in February, the President approved PDD-61 on the Department of Energy Counterintelligence program. Once PDD-61 was issued, Secretary Pena took immediate action. He established a Counterintelligence Office in DOE headquarters and recruited a highly respected FBI counterintelligence expert to head the office and develop plans to implement new security procedures. Since Secretary Richardson took over Energy in September 1998, he has vigorously continued this process. DOE has hired counterintelligence professionals to be stationed at the U.S. labs, tightened the screening and approval procedures for foreign scientists seeking access to DOE labs, and instituted more extensive security reviews, including use of polygraphs, for DOE scientists working in sensitive programs. During this process, the DOE counterintelligence budget has doubled twice from $7.6 million in FY98 to 15.6 million in FY99 to 31.2 million in FY2000. In short, this Administration has done more to strengthen lab security in the past year than all previous Administrations have done over the past 20 years. We did not duck this issue; we tackled it head on. The process of tightening lab security and strengthening counterintelligence capabilities is not complete, however, and we need to keep focused on this critical objective. Engaging China I would like to conclude with a few thoughts on the broader issue of our strategy towards China, which has become entangled with the issue of whether the Administration acted properly to investigate leaks and strengthen lab security. Our engagement strategy towards China is premised on the expectation that China -- like other countries -- will seek to acquire sensitive U.S. information and technology through clandestine means. It's our responsibility to protect ourselves from this threat. Accordingly, we have a stricter export control policy and a higher denial rate for export license applications to China than any other major exporting country: -- We export no arms to China. -- We export no dual use commodities for military use or police in China. -- We limit the export of dual use technology to China for civilian use to reduce the risks of diversion. -- We require a license for the export to China of any items on the international controls lists. When we have discovered problems like the diversion of machine tools in 1995 and a computer in 1997, we have fixed them. When U.S. companies have engaged in unauthorized transfers or exchanges, we have investigated and punished those found guilty. We have also strengthened controls. When President Clinton visited Beijing in June 1996, for example, China agreed to a new arrangement that allows U.S. officials to verify the location and use of dual-use exports to China. We are also considering additional measures suggested by a House select committee led by Representatives Christopher Cox and Norm Dicks to study the issue of technology transfers to China. At the same time that maintain strict controls over technology transfer to China, we have a strong security interest in engaging with China. Through our efforts, China has cut off assistance to Pakistan's unsafeguarded nuclear program, terminated nuclear cooperation with Iran, stopped the export of anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran, and strengthened controls over chemical weapons-related exports. China is also cooperating with the U.S. on key international arms control efforts such as the CTBT and CWC, and on regional proliferation concerns in South Asia and the Korean Peninsula. In that connection, I might point out that the CTBT imposes serious technical restrictions on nuclear weapons modernization. In short, our engagement strategy works both ways. Through vigorous investigations, strong security, and strict export controls, we can protect sensitive technology and information. Through cooperation with Beijing, we can advance our critical national security objectives. (end text)
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
