The White House Briefing Room
March 15, 1999
PRESS BRIEFING BY JOE LOCKHART
1:20 P.M. EST
THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary
_____________________________________________________________________
For Immediate Release March 15, 1999
PRESS BRIEFING
BY
JOE LOCKHART
The Briefing Room
1:20 P.M. EST
...............
Q Republicans continue to complain about the China
business. The latest one is one of them, Senator Inhofe. Today, on
the floor of the Senate he said, for years, Mr. Clinton covered up
the theft of top secret data, didn't report it to Capitol Hill. It's
the worst example of this President acting in his own self-interest.
Some may quibble a bit over the characterization, but what do you
have to say about it?
MR. LOCKHART: I think Senator Inhofe is not very well
informed on this issue. I think we moved very quickly and decisively
to deal with the problem when it came to our attention. This is a
problem that took place in the mid-1980s and when it was brought to
our attention, investigations started and we have moved and taken a
series of steps to increase counterintelligence and to address the
vulnerabilities at the national labs.
As far as informing Congress, I think there were some 17
separate briefings over the last three years. So the appropriate
committees in Congress were informed.
Q It's still hard to understand, is it not, that when
a particular scientist, who has now been fired, was investigated,
beginning in 1996, why it took until now to decide he was someone who
ought not to be in a sensitive job.
MR. LOCKHART: I think you're short-circuiting the facts
here, so let me take a minute on this. The investigation was begun
by the FBI, and the CIA also looked into this, and it was the
determination of those investigators that the best way to do this --
because these sorts of cases are not easy to investigate,
particularly those that go back 10 and 15 years, and that's the
allegation here, that information, nuclear information was somehow
transferred during the 1980s -- so that the best way to go ahead and
try to build a case was to allow the gentleman in question to stay in
the particular job he was in, under surveillance. And that's what
they did. And we have no reason to second-guess that decision.
Q How long has he been under surveillance, Joe?
MR. LOCKHART: Well, the investigation began sometime in
1996. I'd refer you to the FBI for the actual start dates.
Q Well, then he continued it all the way -- I mean,
whatever he was supposed to be doing?
MR. LOCKHART: Well, there were various steps taken and
security clearances -- at certain points they limited his ability to
get at certain information. But, again, these were decisions that
were made by those charged with the investigation in order for them,
in their judgment, to build the best case they could.
Q Joe, how confident are you that China actively
engage in espionage -- dismissed allegations of a spy as a farce.
MR. LOCKHART: Well, I think, as others have said, there
is information that nuclear-related information was transferred.
There is an assessment going on now, a damage assessment -- this,
again, happened in the mid-1980s, but we do believe that it did
happen.
Q The fact there was a transfer, does that mean that
the Chinese actively sought it out, or could it have been handed over
the --
MR. LOCKHART: Well, that is part of the assessment
that's going on now. As far as the actual investigation, I'd refer
you to the fbi.
Q So you're not sure who instigated this transfer?
MR. LOCKHART: The very particulars in the
investigation, I'd refer you to the FBI.
Q Berger said it was a significant loss --
MR. LOCKHART: I'm not disputing that.
Q Is that suspect free to leave the country if he
wants to? He's not been charged, but he's been dismissed, so he
could leave, right?
MR. LOCKHART: I don't know the answer to that.
Q A follow-up on --
MR. LOCKHART: Yes.
Q Do you understand why the law enforcement
authorities couldn't wiretap him during these three years?
MR. LOCKHART: Do I understand why? There are basic
regulations that cover the permissibility of wiretaps, I assume.
Again, I don't know the details of this. I assume that the
guidelines were followed.
Q When is the Cox Committee report going to be made
public?
MR. LOCKHART: We are working very seriously and in an
aggressive manner with the committee trying to get this done. We've
got the first information to them by their deadline, we're trying to
get things -- things that normally can take years, we're trying to
get done in months here, so when the process is finished from around
the government, we will work with the committee to release what's
appropriate to release.
Q The Chairman does not agree that you're working as
expeditiously as he thinks you should.
MR. LOCKHART: Well, I can assure you and I can assure
the Chairman that we are.
Q Is it the White House position that as much of the
report as possible should be made public?
MR. LOCKHART: Sure. I think as much should be made
public with an eye towards those protecting sections that go to
sources and methods and go to ongoing investigations. There's no
reason in the world to jeopardize an ongoing investigation now.
Q Cox says that he believes, and others say, that the
problem persists; it wasn't settled with the dismissal of this
scientists. He believes that there is an ongoing problem of a
leakage of secret material.
MR. LOCKHART: I'm not aware of any particular instance
that he is referring to. I can tell you that when we took a look at
the labs, we saw that there were vulnerabilities at the labs, and the
President took decisive action, passing the PDD, or issuing the PDD
in February of 1998. We've brought on new people, we've doubled the
counterintelligence budget. When we realized the issues at play
here, we moved decisively to make sure that these vulnerabilities
were addressed.
Q They never turned up during the Reagan era? This
was all through the '80s you say it was going on and nothing
happened?
MR. LOCKHART: Helen, I can only tell you what we know,
which is that this was brought to the attention in a comprehensive
way in 1997 to the White House, and we've moved quickly to address
the problem.
Q We've talked about serious damage, substantive
damage. Would the Chinese have a W-88-style warhead today if it
wasn't for the American information?
MR. LOCKHART: Well, again, this goes back to the 1980s,
and an alleged improper transfer of information. That is something
that is currently being looked at in the damage assessment and I
can't preclude -- I can't look forward to know what the experts who
are looking at this will conclude.
Q What new panel will Admiral David Jeremiah head?
MR. LOCKHART: One of the things that the Cox Committee
recommended was doing a comprehensive damage assessment, which we are
in the process of doing now, and then in furtherance, further have an
independent panel of experts look at the damage assessment. So my
understanding is that he will head that panel, though will
independently review the damage assessment that the CIA is doing to
make sure that they have covered all the bases.
Q Sources in the Department of Energy have told me
not only that security has been a joke for years, but that the
museum, especially at Los Alamos, are very explicit, and any
scientist who walks into that museum in Los Alamos can virtually
learn about miniaturization just by looking at it. Did you look into
that situation?
MR. LOCKHART: Well, on a very specific question like
that I'd refer you to the Department of Energy. But I can tell you
in a broad way, the vulnerabilities at the Department of Energy are
something that have existed now for many years. When this was
brought to our attention, the President moved aggressively to address
them and we think we have addressed them.
Q But the specific problem -- apparently is a very
serious problem. And these Chinese groups that are going to be able
to --
MR. LOCKHART: Again, short of countries we don't trade
with, we have the toughest export standards with the Chinese. We
take very great care to make sure that the information we'd like to
keep to ourselves is kept to ourselves.
Q But this is worth looking into, because you're
talking about an academic situation.
MR. LOCKHART: I understand that, and I'm certain that
the Department of Energy can help you with that.
Q Joe, the Chinese Prime Minister said today that
this will cast a negative environment for his trip to Washington next
month. Do you think that this casts a cloud over his trip and does
the President intend to raise these allegations with the Chinese
Prime Minister?
MR. LOCKHART: Well, I certainly believe that this issue
will come up as part of the broad relationship we have with China.
This is an important issue and it's important that we've addressed it
the way we have. But we have a national interest in engaging with
the government in China and we're going to continue to do that on a
broad range of issues, from security to nonproliferation to trade to
human rights. So I believe all of these issues will be on the table.
Q By repeatedly suggesting that the alleged espionage
occurred in the '80s, do you mean to suggest that your predecessors,
the Republican administrations, were somehow lax in dealing with
security at these labs?
MR. LOCKHART: No, I think we'll have to look at the
assessments that are going on. We are learning from these -- you
know, from this incident we are learning that the security should
have been tighter and we have addressed that.
But I do think it's important to understand the context
and the timing of this, because there are those who are arguing that
somehow that this President was responsible for something that
happened back then. And that's not the case. But it is our
responsibility to make sure that we actively and aggressively address
the counterintelligence needs of the labs, and we've done that.
Q Joe, with the dismissal of this scientist, is it
possible to say to the American people that the problem is now
isolated? Or is there a broad-based investigation now to determine
whether there are other spies in the national labs?
MR. LOCKHART: Certainly we will take any steps
necessary if there's information that leads us to believe that there
is espionage going on. We have a very serious counterintelligence
there. We are very involved in a damage assessment. So we will take
whatever steps we need. We believe we've addressed the basic
vulnerability of security at the labs and we have done that
effectively. But this is an issue that you can never rest on and we
will continue to be vigilant.
Q So as of this afternoon there is no reason to
believe there is ongoing espionage in addition to this case?
MR. LOCKHART: I don't have any specific information
about ongoing espionage at the labs.
Q Beyond that, after the alleged incident in 1985,
was this suspect not engaged in any kind of espionage over a 14 year
period before he was fired?
MR. LOCKHART: I can tell you that the FBI has watched
closely and looked at this person for three years and they haven't
brought charges. So they are continuing to work on this case. They
will continue to develop information as need be, but as of this point
in time they do not have the ability right now to bring charges.
Q How do you know it goes back to the '80s?
MR. LOCKHART: Because that's what, in looking at the
information when we went in and looked, I mean, that's what the
investigators turned up, that this was something that happened -- I
don't know if we have a precise date on it -- but information that
leads us to believe it was sometime in the mid-'80s.
Q Is the e-mail problem fixed?
MR. LOCKHART: As far as I know. My understanding on
the e-mail is there are two separate types of e-mail. One is
classified and one is unclassified. Unclassified obviously a lot of
people have access to, and classified e-mail is something that only
very few people with top clearance have.
Yes, just like here, there are different e-mail systems
all around our government that are separate and apart. My e-mail is
unclassified and you could all tap into it and you would be very
bored. But there are certain people in sensitive positions --
Q Follow you around, should we?
MR. LOCKHART: Yes.
Q -- says that we have many Chinese exchange students
at Los Alamos and they are --
MR. LOCKHART: We obviously have exchanges,
government-to-government, with a number of people. But as far as the
specifics of that, I'd refer you to the --
MR. LEAVY: -- the labs do nonclassified work like
climate change and arms control --
MR. LOCKHART: There is -- this goes to both questions,
the e-mail -- that there is an enormous amount of work to be done.
Climate change is one, where this is not classified, where sharing
information is essential to the kind of work that's going on.
Q I'm a bit confused about -- he was fired from his
job on mere suspicion, or is there anything firmer than that?
MR. LOCKHART: My understanding in talking to the
Secretary of Energy, he was fired for being noncooperative with the
investigation.
Q You haven't concluded yet that he's the leaker?
MR. LOCKHART: I'd refer you to the FBI that's running
an investigation on this subject as we speak.
.....................
Thank you.
END 1:44 P.M. EST
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