01 March 1999
TRANSCRIPT: 3/1 BRIEFING BY STATE SPOKESMAN IN BEIJING
(James Rubin: Tough talk on human rights) (5800) Beijing -- Secretary of State Madeleine Albright and Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan engaged in "forceful, tough" discussions on human rights during their 3-1/2 hour discussions, said State Department Spokesman James Rubin. "There wasn't a lot of agreement," he said during a March 1 press briefing in Beijing. Albright also met with Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji, Rubin told reporters. Secretary of State Albright made clear, Rubin stressed, "that the crackdowns, the arrests, the steps in the wrong direction that we talked about in our human rights report -- and the deplorable actions taken as recently as yesterday and the day before -- have caused a substantial and intense reaction in the United States." Rubin noted, however, that while human rights abuses proved the most contentious issue between the two nations, the two sides did manage to discuss the threat North Korea presents to the region; the danger of nuclear proliferation in South Asia; China's goal to gain entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO); Taiwan and theater missile defense. On WTO accession, the State Department spokesman said, "I think there was generally recognition on both sides that it would be very good for both countries if we could achieve such an agreement. There was good intent and good will expressed on both sides." The United States and China were less in sync when it came to Taiwan and theater missile defense (TMD) issues, Rubin acknowledged. The United States position, Rubin said, was that theater missile defense "is inherently a defensive system and therefore should not and need not be perceived as a threat to any country's security." If China wants to avoid the deployment of such a system, Rubin suggested, "then it should work with the United States to prevent North Korea from advancing its missile program." Following is the official transcript of the briefing: (begin transcript) U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE OFFICE OF THE SPOKESMAN (Beijing, China) For Immediate Release March 1, 1999 BRIEFING BY SPOKESMAN JAMES P. RUBIN (Beijing International Club Hotel) MR. RUBIN: Let me start by just briefly running through what has happened so far and then taking your questions. Secretary Albright had roughly three and half hours with the Foreign Minister, most of it in a meeting about two hours plus and an over 11/2 hour lunch. They covered most of the items on our agenda including discussions of the WTO, non-proliferation, human rights, Taiwan. Then she met for about an hour and ten minutes, which was forty minutes longer than planned, with Premier Zhu Rongji. And she is now heading for a meeting and then a dinner with Vice Minister Qian Qichen. As far as the main topics are concerned, I would say that there was a very serious and constructive discussion on two foreign policy matters that concerned both of our countries, including the dangers we face in the Korean Peninsula as well as the prospect of proliferation and South Asia. On the WTO issue, I think there was generally recognition on both sides that it would be very good for both countries if we could achieve such an agreement. There was good intent and good will expressed on both sides. As the Secretary said earlier today, there have been some positive indications, some progress, but in a matter as complicated and detailed as the trade negotiation we obviously have a long way to go. Ambassador Barshefsky will be here to work on that, but the Secretary and the Premier both indicated their joint desire to see whether these negotiations could succeed. On human rights, I would say the discussions were forceful, tough, and there wasn't a lot of agreement. On the U.S. side, the Secretary made clear that the crackdowns, the arrests, the steps in the wrong direction that we talked about in our human rights report -- and the deplorable actions taken as recently as yesterday and the day before -- have caused a substantial and intense reaction in the United States. And that she is deeply disturbed by these detentions, trials, punishment for peaceful political activities -- and made very clear the United States and China cannot have a fully normal relationship so long as these kind of human rights issues remain an area of sharp disagreement. As you heard in the press conference, the Foreign Minister has his different view and expressed that view with respect to issues within China. On that, the Secretary made very clear that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights recognizes fundamental human rights that all human beings enjoy. And the universal nature of these rights makes them a matter of concern to all nations. And that therefore violations of internationally recognized human rights are a legitimate topic of discussion for all nations including the United States. The Chinese raised fairly sharply as well the subject of Taiwan, in particular concerns about reported plans for Theater Missile Defense. The Secretary explained several key points on Theater Missile Defense. First of all that Theater Missile Defense is inherently a defensive system and therefore should not and need not be perceived as a threat to any country's security. That our work on Theater Missile Defense is to protect our troops from growing threats posed by ballistic missiles, especially those carrying weapons of mass destruction. And the investment that we have been making on Theater Missile Defense is therefore designed and reflects the importance we attach to protecting our forward-deployed forces. She also made clear that no deployment decisions have been made and that in particular, with respect to the high altitude systems, that we were some years away from deployment -- and that any future decisions on deployment would take into account a number of factors including the impact on our security interests, cost, foreign policy considerations, and maintenance of peace and stability in the region. And that the fact of the matter is that concern about ballistic missiles in the region is real, and that if China wants to avoid a situation where that concern grows, then it should work with the United States to prevent North Korea from advancing its missile program. And that the more cross-strait relations improve, the less there will be perceptions that might drive such desires and perceptions about missile build-ups are an example of that. So she spoke to them about the importance for China playing a role to try to avoid an outcome that they say they don't want to see happen. More generally, she did not accept the idea that there was somehow some hidden conspiracy in the United States against China, but that when it came to human rights and non-proliferation and other matters, that this was a bipartisan concern of most Americans and wasn't something held by a small group. With those opening comments let me try to take your questions. Q: On TMD, did China in these discussions accept the argument that deployment would only be for U.S. troops -- that is, are they willing to accept that for deployed troops? And secondly are they hinting or threatening in this discussion to go back on pledges to stop export of missile and weapons technology? MR. RUBIN: I didn't hear anything about the second. On the first, I don't think they questioned the issue of forward deployed troop protection. I think they raised questions in the prospect in the Taiwan desire to have their missile defense, but they didn't, in my hearing, express particular focus on forward-deployed American force protection through Theater Missile Defense. Q: I'm sorry, I thought that is what you said she told them. What I'm asking is, did they respond? Did they accept that or just they let it go? MR. RUBIN: I'm trying to be precise in my answer, and my answer is that to the extent they expressed concern about Theater Missile Defense, it was in the context of Taiwan and not in the context of the explanation that she gave about current deployments being for forward deployed troops. Q: On the issue of the discussion on human rights, was this a very tense exchange between Secretary Albright and Foreign Minister Tang, or could you characterize it in some way? Because previously we've heard that over the years U.S.-China exchanges on the issue were very much I-say-my-part, you-say-your-part, and then go on. But in the two years previous, when there was more back and forth dialogue, there was real discussion. Does it look like it's sort of a leap backwards to the I-say-my-part, you-say-your-part, and go on. MR. RUBIN: Well, "leap backwards" sounds like some Chinese term that I'm not sure that I want to buy into. But let me say this, I do not think it was an I-say-my-part, you-say-your-part. I think for those who have been around us for a long time -- they thought it was on the high end of tough exchanges. Q: When you say that the Secretary did not accept the idea that there was a hidden conspiracy in the U.S., did the Chinese actually accuse the Secretary or say that they believe that there was a hidden conspiracy? MR. RUBIN: Well I don't think that -- conspiracy might be my word. I think that he made some public comments to that effect; he made the same point privately. Q: Okay, so that same bit about the anti-China element? MR. RUBIN: Forces and elements and things like that. Conspiracy was my word. Q: Right, can you just go through that again -- that there is not a hidden conspiracy that this was bipartisan? MR. RUBIN: Yes, I think the point the Secretary was making is that they may want to write this off as the views of an anti-China lobby in the United States when it comes to human rights, when it come to concerns about technology, when it comes to concerns about regional security, but that there is bipartisan concern in the United States at a very, very high level on human rights as evidenced by the very strong votes in Congress in recent days. So whether it is that issue or the question of missile proliferation -- that this is not the view of a small group, that these are matters of great concern to the administration and to Congress. Q: The time -- how much was devoted to human rights questions? MR. RUBIN: A big chunk. I didn't do a stopwatch, but, you know, a significant portion. Q: Is there a sense that -- I'm talking about the Secretary and the Administration now -- that relations with China will basically be this way for the foreseeable future? Spats and tensions, and then you have a period of calm, and then you worry about human rights and missiles and so on. Because these are issues also discussed last year and the year before and the year before that. Is there a sense that this is the way it is going to be? MR. RUBIN: I think the point of this visit is that two important countries like the United States and China ought to have regular discussions. And that means that discussions need not take on a crisis character or make-or-break character, but that relationship should be regularized through regular discussions at a very high level. That is what happened with the two summits. This particular trip wasn't designed to make any breakthroughs. It was designed to go through the bilateral issues, the issues of concern to both sides. On the foreign policy issues, the so-called strategic dialogue -- that is where we hope that constant discussion can develop greater and greater cooperation on areas of concern to the United States. And while some of you may focus for obvious reasons on the issues in disagreement, we in the government don't do that. We try to advance our interests by working together with the Chinese on things that really matter to the world like North Korea and India and Pakistan. So even while a lot of attention may be paid to one particular part of the relationship -- human rights for obvious reasons -- that is not the whole sum total of our relationship. In fact, we believe that one of the important reasons to engage with China is to cooperate with them on subjects where they can make a difference to help the world's security, such as using their influence to bring to bear on the North Korean question. And so even while attention is paid to the one and there may not be improvements in that area, in other areas there is cooperation, meeting of the minds, discussion of tactics, and hopefully joint action that makes a difference. On human rights we have said that China and the United States will not have a fully normal relationship because of their practices and policies on human rights, and that is our view and when that changes that will be good for everybody. Q: Would it be fair to characterize the Secretary's comments on TMD as the following: that the U.S. would reconsider any plan to deploy TMD in the case of Taiwan if China basically stopped making threatening moves towards Taiwan, i.e. the deployment of missiles on the Chinese side of the Taiwan Strait, and also if China took a more active role in trying to convince North Korea to slow down its own weaponization program? Second to that, leading on to that -- was there any signal from the Chinese side that there could be some movement on North Korea? MR. RUBIN: I think on North Korea the discussion was quite constructive and they agreed to continue to compare notes and have our Ambassadors work closely together in the Four Party Talks. On your first point I wouldn't put it that way. The way I would put it is that the Secretary explained some realities. The reality is concerns in the region about ballistic missiles is what is driving Theater Missile Defense, and that is the reality. And if China was concerned about someday having such missile defenses deployed, that a way to ease the concerns that might be part of the reason for such a deployment would be to work with us on the North Korean missile problem, and to have the best possible kind of dialogue across the strait. Q: In the past, specifically when Clinton and Jiang Zemin met last July, China linked the U.S. deployment of TMD to -- it seemed to be pretty much a threat related to Chinese exports -- missile exports to Iran. I'm wondering if there is any linkage made this time between TMD deployment and something China might do to retaliate if the U.S. went forward with those plans. MR. RUBIN: Well, I would have to disagree with your characterization. I think we regarded the summit outcome -- it included very new positions that China has taken -- including actively studying, joining the Missile Technology Control Regime that was discussed today in some detail, including a commitment not to assist unsafeguarded nuclear facilities or assistance to any facility in Iran, strengthening of nuclear and chemical exports controls, as well, as I said, of the MCTR. Now I wasn't here at that time, but I don't recall people saying all of these commitments were in jeopardy over something that might one day happen in the future. There is no question the Chinese tend to raise their concerns about Taiwan and Theater Missile Defense in the same subject matter as we raise concerns about proliferation -- as that is something they have done for some time. But even while we've continued to discuss the subject of Taiwan and the subject of Theater Missile Defense with them, they have moved steadily down the path to becoming a more responsible player in the non-proliferation scene, including: by signing a number of treaties and by making the kind of commitments that I just described to you -- which for those of you who actually follow the substance see change from the kinds of policies and practices that China pursued just five, six, seven years ago. So those policies and practices have changed on non-proliferation, and the Chinese have a view on Taiwan and have views on Theater Missile Defense -- and you are all quite familiar with them -- and we try to explain to them why our arms sales are consistent with the Taiwan Relations Act and the 1982 Communiqué. And we explained to them realities connected with Theater Missile Defense as I just explained. But I didn't hear today the kind of threats that you said were made at the summit that I'm unaware of. Q. (Inaudible) link the two? MR. RUBIN: I didn't say that. I said they tend to bring the subject up in the same topic -- when we talk about the one, they talk about the other. That is, as we talk about moving beyond existing commitments on non-proliferation, they point out their concerns about arms sales pursuant to the Communiqué. But to suggest that they have said today that they would walk back from their commitments on arms control, that didn't happen in the several hours of meetings that I sat through. Q: Traditionally on a trip like this one thing that the Secretary of State does is to help convey the mood of the American people, you know, what the visitor should expect. How specific was this conveyance by Secretary Albright? Did she talk about the Cox Report and what kind of emotions would likely result from the revelations of what has been not still been made totally public? Did she talk about, for example, the recent arrest of these, I think it was two Chinese nationals who were accused of trying to steal gyroscope parts that may be used in missiles? Did she talk about the possibility that Zhu will face protests in the States? Did she make any suggestion of how to prepare for that, how to prepare for hostile media questions, that sort of thing? MR. RUBIN: The subject of hostile media questions didn't come up. (Laughter,) Not that I would be very helpful to them for how to prepare for such a thing. On the Cox Committee, let me just say that the government believes it is very important to maintain effective measures to prevent the diversion of U.S. technology and prevent unauthorized disclosure of sensitive military information. We also agree with the Committee that we should support U.S. competitiveness in high tech, consistent with national security. We believe that export controls are something that need to happen across the board and not just with respect to China. On the dissidents, let me simply say that we deplore in the strongest possible terms the kind of crackdowns that have been going on for peaceful--when citizens are trying to engage in their freedom of expression and freedom of association. We believe that China has signed an international covenant but doesn't appear yet ready to put into practice the basic point of that covenant-which would permit these kinds of basic human rights to be exercised. And clearly the Communist authorities of China are not allowing organized dissent that is part and parcel to the international human rights system across the board. And I think Secretary Albright made very clear that the recent arrests are deeply troubling, and that the two arrested are obviously being arrested and fit a pattern of a crackdown on political dissent--the kind of crackdown that we described in great detail in the human rights report that came out yesterday. On the investigation you are referring to in one particular newspaper, I just don't have anything for you on that. But as far your broad question is concerned, yes, I think Secretary Albright gave a very clear picture to the Premier about what the mood is in the United States. There is -- it's not a great mood. The combination of the crackdown, and other concerns that have come about in recent weeks and months, have raised serious questions in the minds of some about China's human rights practices and the commitments they've made to change. And that is a climate that is real, and it's not just the Administration that thinks that, it's others. We made clear to the Premier that in order to really deal with that kind of a climate, that what they needed to look to do is make progress on more than just the WTO, but on the kind of non-proliferation policies that I was just describing, move those a notch forward in terms of working with the United States and on human rights as well. So clearly, it isn't a terrific climate. I think any look at the congressional voting patterns would tell you that. I don't think he necessarily needed to have her tell him that but she did. Q: Did she raise the possibility of anti-China protests when he's there? MR. RUBIN: I didn't hear that. Q: At her briefing today the Secretary said that we determined some time ago that it was not a good idea to link human rights and trade. You've just said that Chinese can not have a fully normal relationship without progress on human rights. But what is it that they can't get? I mean a normal relationship that includes trade. So what is not normal about what they have now if they have the complete right to conduct trade and there's no punishment whatsoever? MR RUBIN: There are two points. First of all, the question was prompted primarily by an erroneous report to the effect that we were linking progress on the WTO to human rights, which was not correct. More broadly, for those of you who have analyzed the different types of relationships the United States has with countries, the type of sanctions imposed during the Tiananmen Square period are not normal. There are a number of them, which relate to the development assistance and other loan insurance and other normal things that we do with other countries. So simply getting a renewed normal trading status does not mean that you have all the aspects of a normal relationship. In addition it's not normal for two countries to continue to disagree publicly and profoundly about an issue as central as human rights. But on a very practical level, there are some very specific programs that are not permitted to proceed that were put in place, that the prohibitions were put in place following the Tianamen Square crackdown. Q: DPA, German Press Agency. Is the United States ready to table a resolution in Geneva in the UN Human Rights Commission? And did the Secretary raise the issue or the possibility of the tabling a resolution? MR RUBIN: Let me say this with respect to the resolution. We believe the UN Commission on Human Rights is an important multilateral mechanism for exchanging views with China and encouraging positive change. The Administration supports the Geneva process and intends to participate vigorously in this year's Commission activities. Last year our government did not sponsor a resolution on China because of positive steps it had taken and an expectation of further positive steps. We made clear that we were keeping our options open for the future. At this time, we are deliberating what approach in Geneva would most effectively promote human rights in China. No decision has been made, and the Secretary therefore didn't signal to the Chinese any decision. Q: Was there any discussion today about China's recent actions in the UN Security Council? If so, who raised it and did the Chinese side acknowledge any connection between the veto and the Macedonian issue and the Taiwan issue? MR. RUBIN: The Chinese principled position on that in public remained the same in private. That is, it was linked to their public comments to the desire to end the peacekeeping operation. That it had served its purpose, a view which we do not share at all. We regret that decision. We indicated to them that the stability in the Balkans is not there now. The operation in Macedonia was important to deter the possibility of a cross border conflict. That we were working very hard on making peace in Kosovo. We've gone through some rather excruciating discussions in recent weeks to try to advance the cause of peace there precisely because we were concerned about the danger of that spillover, and we urged the Chinese to work with us to try to deal with the situation created by their veto. Q: Did their side raise the issue or did the U.S. side raise it? MR. RUBIN: We raised it. Q: Could you give us more specifics about the meeting with Zhu Rongji? How different was it compared with the meeting with Tang Jiaxuan? MR RUBIN: I think the meeting with the Premier was focused primarily on economic issues, including the trade deficit and the WTO issue, while the meeting with the foreign minister was focused on a broad range of foreign policy issues. And that would be the difference. Q: You said that these visits are not really meant to produce breakthroughs. But in the context that this visit is part of the preparations to pave the way for Premier Zhu's visit to the U.S., don't you need to resolve Taiwan issues before the visit happens? Otherwise it will probably be a failure. MR. RUBIN: Well I know the word failure and success are things that some people are more inclined to use than those of us who are actually working. We work our way through these issues. We approach these matters with a sense of realism of what can be expected and what can't be expected. And, we do not see this visit as requiring breakthroughs. I think some years ago the whole idea of having regular visits at this level was impossible, and we took the view that we had an important enough agenda with China to try to have regular high level visits between leaders from China and the United States. And this is what that is. It's a business trip as part of a regularized dialogue with the Chinese on a whole number of issues. Clearly, the Premier would like to have as effective a trip as possible, and what we've made clear to the Chinese is that given the climate that exists in Washington the more progress that can be made and the better off they will be, in that regard. But, we're in the business of having a relationship with China in order to advance our interests. It sometimes moves very slowly. Slow but steady work over a number years, on a number of subjects, with a number of long and extensive meetings, have yielded remarkable advances in the policies and practices of China. On the Comprehensive Test Ban, on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, on missile exports, on exports to Iran, on nuclear materials and assistance, a whole range of issues that in the early nineties were major, major thorns in the side of the U.S.-China relationship have advanced and improved. That's the kind of substance that we do in our business--slowly, steadily, no big heralded breakthroughs, just slowly working to advance the security issues of the United States and the world. As far as this particular trip is concerned, as I said, there are a number of issues being discussed WTO, human rights, Taiwan were issues where there wasn't much agreement at all, with respect to the TMD part. On the WTO there was general agreement that it would be helpful and important if the negotiators could make the necessary progress. On North Korea and South Asia there was a meeting of the minds on the importance of the subject, the need to achieve the common objective, and discussions on the best way to do that. That's the business we've chosen and the business we're in. And we're not here to make breakthroughs. We're here to advance slowly and steadily the relationship. Q: Given the climate in Washington, the sour climate in Washington, has either side considered postponing Zhu Rongji's visit? MR. RUBIN: I haven't heard that. Yes? Q: I'm with Slovenia's newspaper Della. You just mentioned that discussion with human rights was tough. Could you tell me who was tougher, Secretary Albright or Minister Tang? Another question: how long will the USA together with European allies wait for China to rethink their veto on Macedonia before another solution is taken on the matter? MR. RUBIN: Let me just speak for Secretary Albright. She was pretty tough. On the Macedonia issue, we believe this is very important, the peacekeeping operation there, and we ask the Chinese to work with us to resolve the problem created by their veto. I am sure that a lot of thought is being given to various options and I don't care to speculate on those options. But we understand the urgency. Q: I'm from the BBC. I am familiar with what you are saying about human rights and there being not much agreement. Is this making you think that the policy of engagement with China on human rights is not working? And secondly, the Chinese official news agency put out today a detailed attack on America's human rights record. Do you think that that is appropriate? MR. RUBIN: Well, we believe in free expression. And to the extent the Chinese want to make comments on our system, we will read them carefully. I haven't seen them yet. On engagement, engagement is a policy designed to advance the national security interest of the United States. We believe if we didn't work with China on North Korea, if we didn't work with China on drugs, if we didn't work with China on terrorism, if we didn't work with China on non-proliferation, if we didn't work on China on law enforcement, if we didn't work with China on environment, the national security interest of our country and the world would be worse off. That is why we pursue the engagement policy. With respect to human rights, we and China don't agree. And as I said, until we see the kind of normal acceptance of international norms we are not going to have a fully normal relationship with China. But engagement is not about endorsing the human rights practices, its about advancing our national security interests by trying to cooperate on those very dangerous threats the world faces that China can help us work on. Yes? Q: On the human rights side again, did you give them a specific list of dissidents they want? Were there any specifics on what China has to do to normalize relationships on this? MR. RUBIN: I think China knows what we believe in that area. I would rather not be more specific about that kind of diplomatic exchange. Q: Could you just list just what sanctions are still in place from post-Tiananmen? MR. RUBIN: I'll have to get you the list. There are several including TDA and others, OPIC and other insurance and certain military sales and things like that. But I don't have all the details in front of me, but I can try to get you that. We can do a couple more. One in the back. Q: What was the difference in the way the Secretary brought up human rights when she talked to the Foreign Minister and when she talked to the Prime Minister, number one. And number two, how did Zhu Rongji respond? And number three, what is the Secretary planning to say in regard to human rights to Jiang Zemin tomorrow when she meets him? Finally on North Korea... MR. RUBIN: I can't remember all this. Why don't you put them one at a time. Q: North Korea, what specifically... MR. RUBIN: This is basically your four part question? Q: Four part question. What did you accomplish on North Korea this time? MR. RUBIN: On North Korea, which is the only question I can remember, the Secretary and the Foreign Minister discussed in detail the current state of play and the discussions we have been having with the North Koreans on Kumchang-ni facility and the discussions our ambassadors have been having on the four party talks. North Koreans are a notoriously opaque society. And when foreign ministers get together they tend to try to share their best judgments as to what motivates the North Koreans, and what the future might hold with both us and the Chinese. And I think every sensible country knows that there are grave limits on our ability to predict properly and successfully what will go on in that country. So that tends to be the discussion -- what works best, what's going on there, how can we best get them into a situation that joins objectives on missiles and the Agreed Framework. I think you asked me what Zhu said about something. Let me just say that I am not going to quote him from any of these meetings. On human rights in general, the message is the same -- the message to the Foreign Minister, the message to the Premier and presumably the message to the President. The same message. How much detail one gets into depends on time, and the message is the same. Q: You mentioned that in talks with Zhu Rongji, the trade deficit as well as WTO issues came up. First of all, WTO. Is there any indication the US would support China taking part as an observer in some sort of halfway house, if you like, toward full admission? And is there any response from China on that? And secondly about the trade deficit, did you get any indication from Zhu Rongji that there are going to take any meaningful steps to reduce that? MR. RUBIN: On the first question, I don't believe that was the tenor of the discussion. The discussion wasn't about halfway houses. The discussion was about achieving the agreements that you all know about. On the second question, the tendency in these areas is for those to be primarily a discussion of terms, on how large it really is, and how would you define it, and if you include finished products or products through Hong Kong would the numbers go down, and it tended to be more that kind of discussion than a discussion on specific items, which was left for Charlene Barshefsky to discuss. But on the first question that wasn't the stated goal. The objectives were to complete the negotiations for the whole and not some half way house, unless I misunderstood them completely. Thank you. (end transcript)
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