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Normal Space Commercial Cooperation Between China and US Must Not Be Jeopardized

January 7, 1999

Recently, citing shaky and groundless evidences, the US House select committee alleged in a report that US national security had been threatened by the "help" offered by American companies for the improvement of Chinese missile technology when China-made Long March rockets were used to launch US-made satellites. This absurd and irresponsible conclusion tarnished the image of the Long March rocket, and undermined the international reputation of its manufacturer and launch services provider. At the same time, it brought unwarranted damage to normal space commercial cooperation between China and the United States.

1. Facts should be respected

It is a well-known fact that China became a provider of commercial launch services as a result of the country's reform and opening policy adopted some 20 years ago. It is also an important step taken by China to promote peaceful uses of space technology.

In the past two decades, China's top leadership and three successive American Administrations have worked energetically to facilitate a smooth cooperation in commercial satellite launch services between the two countries. To this end, the two sides signed three agreements, including the Memorandum of Agreement on Satellite Technology Safeguards. These documents reflected a heightened sense of responsibility, mutual understanding and mutual accommodation on the proposed launching of US-made satellites aboard China-made Long March rockets.

In accordance with the aforementioned memorandum, both sides adopted a series of strict control and security measures which required among others: (a) Round-the-clock surveillance by American security personnel between the satellite's arrival in China and its launch into space; (b) Presence of American government officials at all satellite/launch vehicle technical coordination meetings; and (c) Prior approval of US government of all data and information provided to the Chinese side by American satellite manufacturers.

Despite the transit nature of US-made satellites earmarked for launch by China-made rockets, an export license issued by the US government must be obtained for each and every launch services contract, including a permit for satellite/launch vehicle technical coordination even before the satellite is shipped out of the United States. Clear and explicit stipulations on the control and security of satellite technology are provided for in these documents.

In addition, the two governments sent their delegations to meet annually to review the implementation of the various agreements.

Since 1985 when China's Long March rocket series was first made available for international commercial launch services, and 1990 when the first foreign-made satellite was successfully launched by a Long March rocket, China has always adhered to established international practices, upheld the principle of fairness and openness and consistently observed to the letter the three governmental agreements with the United States. The security of US technology, consequently, has never been called in question.

2. China's rocket technology

China's courage to allow its launch vehicles to enter the highly competitive international market was derived from the confidence it had in the maturity and reliability of its rocket technology. As far back as on 24 April 1970, China launched its first satellite, the DFH-1, with a Long-March 1 rocket. By the time it offered services for international commercial launches, China had already possessed the tested capacity to launch a variety of satellites into high, low and medium earth orbits. In addition, it had mastered the technologies of launching multiple satellites by a single rocket, satellite recovery, satellite positioning in geostationary orbit, as well as satellite tracking control technologies. China's overall launch success rate was comparable to or even better than that of similar launch vehicles of other providers.

Over the past 8 years since a Long March 3 rocket successfully put the AsiaSat-1 into space, the Long March rocket series has sent 11 commercial communications satellites into geostationary orbits. With 5 consecutive successful launches by the Long March rockets, 10 Iridium satellites are now in the low earth orbits.

China has stated many times that it has no intention, nor does it see any necessity, to seek US technology through commercial launch services of American satellites. No one doubts that the United States has possessed advanced space technologies, particularly in the areas of manned space flight and deep-space probe. China's rocket technology, on the other hand, has also attained maturity after four decades of sustained development. It can be said with candor that there is nothing in American rocket technology that can alarm Chinese space experts. If China could succeed in developing its missiles, launch vehicles and satellites under the very backward economic and technical conditions of the 1950s and 1960s, it is entirely within its capacity to investigate and resolve its launch failures and improve its technology self-reliantly. In this connection, Chinese space experts have neither asked for any "tutorial", nor received any help, from anyone outside China.

3. Some important concepts must not be confused

For some time, some people in US media and Congress have raised a hue and cry against Chinese launch services for US-made satellites. They pointed their fingers particularly at China's handling of its commercial launch failures which was carried out in strict accordance with international practices. Inadvertently or deliberately, they confused the concept of a launch vehicle with that of an ICBM. Inadvertently or deliberately, they blurred the distinction between needed and innocuous technical coordination and illegal divulging of sensitive technologies. What is more, they looked at this fully legitimate commercial cooperation between the two countries with colored spectacles of ideological bias and politically motivated self-fulfilling prophesy. What they have done has not only undermined the interest of China's space industry, but also brought great harm to the interests of American satellite makers and users, hurting American national interest in the final analysis.

True, the technology basis of China's launch vehicles has been derived from its long-range missiles. Yet the two have major differences. To begin with, the direction of a missile launch is random whereas that of a launch vehicle tends to be fixed. Missiles need an all-weather capacity since their time of launch cannot be predicted or negotiated. In comparison, launch vehicles may allow greater selectivity in launch time. If weather is less than desirable, a scheduled launch can be postponed or canceled altogether. These differences in characteristics have made the design of missiles far more stringent than that of launch vehicles.

As for multiple satellites launching technology, it is also a derivative development of the MIRV technology. Yet the latter is far more difficult to achieve than the former.

In response to consumer demands at the international launch market, the Long March rocket manufacturer has developed from the existing mature technologies a solid upper stage and a dispenser for multiple satellites at low and medium earth orbits. During the R&D of the dispenser, the manufacturer encountered no major, insurmountable difficulties. It will be absurd to assume that the R&D of this dispenser will lead to improvement of the higher MIRV technology China has already mastered. In fact, before launching the Iridium satellites, China had already conducted multiple satellites launches on many occasions.

In the process of implementing the launch services contract, the satellite party and the launch vehicle party are required to exchange technical data so as to ensure maximum compatibility and launch success. To find out if the satellite can tolerate the mechanical environment during the flight, it is necessary to perform a stress analysis to the launch vehicle loaded with the satellite, i.e. a load coupling analysis. However, to accommodate concerns of the satellite party for technology security and minimize the volume of data exchange, the common practice is to convert the physical structure of the satellite into a set of generalized dynamic parameters, which can in no way be reverted back to the physical structure of the satellite. This has been a fact proved time and again in international launch services. The charge that by providing such data to the Chinese side, the American satellite manufacturer has divulged technological secrets simply does not hold water. In fact, the technical data the Chinese launch vehicle party asked for from the satellite party has never gone beyond what has been provided for in the document, which is exactly the same as asked by the US or any other service providers.

4. China relies on its own efforts to achieve consecutive launch successes

Between 1990 and 1996, China introduced three new types of launch vehicles, namely, the Long-March 2E, the Long-March 3A and the Long March 3B. The Long-March 2E failed to launch the Optus-B2 and APSTAR-II respectively and the Long-March 3B failed in its maiden flight to launch the Intelsat 708. These failures sent shocking waves throughout China's space industry. To regain initiative, China Aerospace Corporation decided to step up management by issuing and implementing a series of new quality-control measures. As a result, there was an across-the-board improvement in the quality and reliability of the Long March rockets. This is the fundamental reason why the Long March rockets have achieved a 100% success rate in the last 13 launches. Some ill-informed people insisted on calling it the result of an alleged "tutorial" by American satellite makers. But nothing could be further from the truth.

There is an inherent law in the R&D of any carrier rocket, and no country can bypass such a course of frequent failures followed by frequent successes. With only 7 failures during its first 50 flights, the Long March rocket series achieved an overall success rate of 86%, which was slightly higher than the world average.

China has the capability and resources to pin down the cause of any launch failure when it occurs, take corrective measures and solve the relevant technological problems. This has been illustrated by its handling of the failures involving the Long March 2E and Long March 3B. Some suggested that in investigating the Long-March 2E failure, Chinese experts benefited from the assistance of American satellite makers, and the report by the "Independent Review Committee" may have also helped the Chinese improve their technology with the Long March 3B. The reality is that Chinese rocket scientists, they alone, came up with the failure model, designed and conducted various tests and produced correct conclusions. The effectiveness of their remedial measures has been fully proved by the 4 consecutive successful launches of the Long-March 3B since then.

The international commercial satellite launch market is an arena where nations compete with each other on the basis of their material, financial, technical and overall industrial resources. This is a place for normal, well-regulated commerce and trade between nations. For over a decade, China and the United States have shared joy and sorrow as they worked together to send one's satellites into space with the rockets of the other. Such a normal commercial activity in the high-tech field serves the national security, political and economic interests of both countries. It also helps the building towards a constructive strategic partnership between the two countries.

One would hope that US Congress and American people in general will bear in mind the shared interest in such a partnership, cherish the long-term bilateral economic cooperation, protect the interests of the satellite users in Asia-Pacific and help maintain a normal regime in world commerce by acknowledging China's positive role in commercial launch services. One would also hope that the US side will act in strict accordance with the agreements signed between the two governments, carefully handle the problems as there may be and make a wise judgment in this regard.

--END

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