RED CHINA'S MILITARY THREAT (Senate - September 10, 1992)
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Mr. HELMS. Mr. President, at a March 31 Foreign Relations Committee hearing, I asked a State Department official about the growing military threat posed by Communist China, particularly the Chinese projection of military power into the East Asia region. Frankly, I did not find the State Department's answers very satisfying. Nothing unusual about that.
Now others are sharing the concerns that I expressed last March. I have here recent cover stories in the leading English-language news magazines published in Asia--one is the publication Asia Week. I hope the camera can pick that up. The other is Far Eastern Economic Review, a magazine published by Dow Jones. And just yesterday morning, the editors of the Wall Street Journal pointed to the emerging military threat from Communist China.
The fact that this issue was so prominent in all these periodicals and others is just one clear indication that people in the region are getting nervous--and justifiably so to anyone who recalls that the same political elite which came to power in Communist China in 1949 is still running the country. This same group has directed border wars against all their neighbors for the last 40 years. In 1950, the Communist Chinese invaded and still occupy their peaceful neighbor, Tibet.
And most of us in this Chamber have visited, on many occasions, with the Dalai Lama. He is one of my close friends. And I feel sure that the distinguished occupant of the chair feels the same way about him, as well as the Senator from Vermont. He comes here often, and he seeks only peace.
And it was in 1950 that the Communist Chinese combined with the North Korean Communists to wage war against the forces of the United Nations and thereby enslave half of Korea. In the 1960's, the Communist Chinese conducted a border war against the Soviet Union and against India; and in the 1970's, they attacked Vietnam. In the 1990's, they are the sole military supporters of the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia and the scourge presently ruling Burma.
Now, if the camera can pick up this map, it may help to orient in terms of the geography.
So, when earlier this year the rubber-stamp parliament of the Communist Chinese reasserted its claim to the Spratly Islands, almost 1,000 miles off the coast of the mainland, people in the region took notice. Of course they did. Their understandable concern is heightened by reports of the delivery of SU-27 Flanker aircraft to Communist China.
Not only that but now, in its September issue, the highly regarded publication Naval Proceedings claims that the Chinese have already purchased an aircraft carrier from the now-defunct Soviet Union. Whether the papers for the aircraft carrier have been signed or they are only in the final stages of negotiations, it is clear that Peking has further ambitions.
The September 3 issue of the Far Eastern Economic Review reveals that the Chinese have Mig-31's, IL76 airborne warning and control systems--known as AWACS--stealth technology, supersonic Tu22M bombers, and over-the-horizon radar on their wish list as well.
If the purchase is finalized, China will be the only country in East Asia to possess an aircraft carrier. Now, with news like that, small wonder that the people of other East Asian countries are highly concerned. Who can blame them? Certainly, Japanese defense planners would have been derelict in their duty if they had not pointed to the security threat posed by Communist China's military buildup in their latest Defense white paper.
Since, as yesterday's editorial in the Wall Street Journal points out, there is no military threat to the Communist Chinese regime, it is obvious that these military arms purchases are designed for an aggressive assault, not for deterrence of a threat.
The question, then: What to do about these alarming circumstances?
Mr. President, with the example of inadvertent Western assistance to the Iraqi war machine prior to the invasion of Kuwait in mind, I have asked the Defense Intelligence Agency to conduct a review of all levels of dual-use technology goods now being imported into Communist China from the United States and other Cocom countries.
In addition, the DIA report should include an assessment of where this technology fits into the Communist Chinese military-industrial complex.
It is important that we know this. It is important that the world knows this. My concern is with both the threat this equipment poses when in the hands of the Communist Chinese military and also with the possibility that this technology, used to produce weapons for modern warfare, may be sold by the Communist Chinese to the antidemocratic regimes of the Middle East.
Also, I have asked CIA Director Robert Gates to have his agency produce a threat assessment of the Communist Chinese military buildup and the potential political repercussions on our friends and allies in East Asia.
Certainly our long-time allies, the people of the Republic of China on Taiwan, must be considered on the front line of this issue.
Under the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act, the United States must be prepared to sell the Taiwanese whatever they reasonably need for their defense. That is the law of the land. A lot of people try to forget it or ignore it but that is the law of the land. The 1982 declaration regarding military sales to Taiwan was a unilateral decision that contradicted directly the terms of the Taiwan Relations Act. I protested at the time. So did others. The 1982 declaration by then Secretary of State Haig made no sense then, and it absolutely makes no sense today. It is long past time that it should be acknowledged to have been a policy blunder, and discarded for being precisely that.
So, in light of all this, certainly President Bush's correct decision, and it is correct, to sell F-16 aircraft to Taiwan is a welcome improvement in our national security policy towards East Asia. The Republic of China on Taiwan was our close ally in the fight against tyranny in World War II and deserves no less than our support now that it is again threatened by its communist neighbor.
Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that an August 7 article in AsiaWeek, an article from the September 3 issue of the Far Eastern Economic Review, and an editorial in yesterday's Wall Street Journal be printed in the Record.
There being no objection, the articles were ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:
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From Asiaweek, Aug. 7, 1992
Security: Worries About China
`China is against such acts of hegemonism and power politics as the big bullying the small, the strong lording it over the weak, trampling on other countries' sovereignty and interfering in internal affairs.' So declared Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen just before the 25th ministerial meeting of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations in Manila July 21-22. Many in the audience shared Qian's disdain for powerful countries throwing their weight around. The danger seems greater these days. U.S. military clout, which may have deterred would-be aggressors, is seen to be receding in post-Cold War Asia.
But to many listeners, Qian's words also struck an ironic chord. Of late, China's moves have prompted charges that it is bullying the neighbours. In recent months it has occupied a disputed isle, exploded a nuclear test bomb, authorised oil exploration in waters claimed by Vietnam, and fired on Japanese trawlers. In early July, Chinese troops reportedly planted a territorial marker on another isle claimed by Hanoi in the increasingly volatile Spratly islands in the South China Sea. In February, China put into a law its verbal claims on the Spratlys, the equally contentious Paracels further north and Diaoyutai island--Senkaku to its other claimant, Japan. The legislation also allows the military to enforce Beijing's territorial claims.
`China is in a position to flex its muscles,' said outgoing Philippine Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus, who retired after the ASEAN conference. `China is a big country [with] the resources.' Its submarine fleet is the world's third largest. By 2050 it hopes to have a mighty ocean-going armada with nuclear subs and at least one aircraft carrier--which might come a lot sooner. Some fear Beijing aims to control the South China Sea, already a minefield of conflicting claims. Most converge on the Spratlys and the Paracels. China, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam each occupy or claim all or some of 500 islets and reefs.
Such undeclared concerns about China laced the main topic of discussion at last week's ASEAN meeting. Participants sought to outline a new security balance for East Asia and the Pacific. Many governments had feared that the end of the Cold War might lead the U.S. to scale back its forces in Asia and leave a destabilising power vacuum which other countries might seek to fill or exploit. Small conflicts are the biggest immediate danger. Last week's meeting addressed South China Sea tensions in particular. That effort became a test of whether the annual ASEAN consultations could be the main cog of a mechanism to discuss security issues and resolve disputes.
In early July, Japanese Prime Minister Miyazawa Kiichi suggested precisely such an arrangement in his seminal Washington speech on Japan's new Asian policy (Asiaweek, July 24). Last week ASEAN not only ended its taboo against discussing defense issues, but also brought in China and Russia as Miyazawa urged. Vietnam, too, joined past dialogue partners: Japan, South Korea, Australia, New Zealand, the U.S., Canada and the European Community. The focus was unprecedented in the 25 years of ASEAN, which had always been careful not to be seen as a defense alliance. The presence of Russian and Chinese foreign ministers as observers, said Singapore's Wong Kan Seng, was `ASEAN's pragmatic response to a changing environment.'
The grouping's concept to regional security is `to keep a balance of forces' among the U.S., Russia, China and Japan, said Ali Alatas of Indonesia. `A new equilibrium will be achieved at a lower level of armament and tension' than the Cold War's. The ASEAN position suggested acceptance of Miyazawa's push for Japan to use not only economic might but also political and security clout to help keep Asia peaceful and prosperous. At the conference the ASEAN concept gained ground. America and Russia vowed to remain Pacific powers (see story below).
As if to completely dispel any lingering taboos, Alatas said: `Security and political issues are now going to be increasingly discussed. Such dialogue will contribute to better understanding and enhanced security.' Malaysian Foreign Minister Abdullah Badawi agreed that with more talks on security `ASEAN
will become more secure.' That was probably no better demonstrated than by the meeting's handling of the potentially explosive South China Sea tensions.
At first, there were doubts that ASEAN would take the plunge into the contentious issue. A toothless initial communique noted global changes and the need to create a new Asian order to avoid conflicts. In carefully chosen words the grouping urged `restraint' and a peaceful resolution of Spratlys disputes. But the foreign ministers doubted that China and Vietnam would heed the call to talks rather than arms. The communist neighbours fought a sea battle over disputed islands in 1988. They renewed their friendship last November but it has since cooled. `So we finessed the Chinese,' said a minister.
ASEAN drafted a two-page Declaration on the South China Sea to be signed by countries with territorial claims. It called on them `to apply principles contained in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia as the basis [for] international conduct over the South China Sea.' Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Manh Cam quickly supported the negotiations-not-guns declaration, which he said, conformed with `policies Vietnam has been pursuing.' Taken by surprise, the Chinese burned the wires between Manila and Beijing through the night. In the morning China gave qualified backing, saying it appreciated `some basic principles' in the declaration.
Initiated by Manglapus and backed by Indonesia's Alatas, the declaration was touted as a master stroke which left the Chinese little room to manocuvre. If they opposed it, they would have raised fears that China had no qualms about using its military in the Spratlys and Paracels. `The communique wouldn't have been enough to provoke a reaction from Vietnam and China,' said Manglapus. But giving up the military option would have deprived China of its trump card in any territorial dispute. That consideration seemed to have been outweighed by Beijing's need to reassure its neighbours at a time when it hopes to tap their ethnic Chinese communities for business.
Thus, says Manglapus, `for the first time claimants have signed . . . a document to form the basis for negotiations--a very useful beginning.' Alatas sees two `not wholly comparable' models for resolving disputes. In Antarctica various claimants temporarily shelved sovereignty claims and collaborated in research. In the Timor Gap, Indonesia and Australia are jointly exploring for oil and gas in the areas of overlapping claims. China too has proposed setting aside disputes and getting on with joint development. `We're ready for negotiations when conditions are ripe,' said Minister Qian. In short, make money not war.
For now. But China's long-term intentions still cause concern, especially with its continuing military build-up. It is reportedly eyeing a half-built. Tbilisi-class aircraft carrier now in a Ukraine shipyard. Hongkong professor Lee Ngok, an expert on China's military, says the 60,000-tonner has ramps and catapults to launch MIG-29s, the top Russian fighter-bomber. It would be able to project China's air power 4,000 km from its shores--as far as Africa, Australia and the mid-Pacific. But Beijing would need an estimated $2 billion and Moscow's willingness to sell it the carrier's electronics and MIGs. In Asia, only India has carriers; two much smaller British-made vessels. `If the Chinese bring in a carrier,' reckons Lee, the Japanese will re-arm.
China has just completed a one-kilometre jet runway in the Paracels. Despite its much-trumpeted one-million-man troop cut in recent years, China has increased its defence budget by 12% last year to $5.5 billion, or 9% of GNP--mainly by boosting weapons spending and research. Two big thrusts, says Lee, are fast-action special forces and high-tech command & control--possibly a reaction to the Gulf War. To pay for all that, the People's Liberation Army has been expanding its businesses, including weapons exports. Last year it sold Burma $1.2 billion worth of fighters, landing craft, anti-tank missiles and machineguns. A 50-man Chinese delegation to a 1990 arms fair in Bangkok showed off short-range missiles, submarines and other weapons.
Other Asian countries have also been augmenting their forces, but recent incidents involving the PLA have made China's build-up disconcerting. Since March last year there have been fifteen attacks on foreign boats and ships, including one on a 42,407-ton Japanese trawler 220 kms from disputed Diaoyutai. In May a firefight erupted when, by Hanoi's account, Chinese troops were caught moving boundary markers along Friendship Pass on the Vietnam border. And China's ultimate goal? Some argue that it is no different from that of the U.S. and the former Soviet Union. Says a Beijing insider: `China is working on all fronts--economic, social, political and military--priming itself as a superpower.'
Last week ASEAN ministers to a man told American Secretary of State James Baker that their countries want the U.S. to maintain its military presence. `We don't want any more bases,' Baker replied. `We want access' to facilities. At the meeting Washington got exactly that. With new arrangements, Baker said, `our ships and aircraft remain capable of achieving their missions.' The U.S. has a logistics command in Singapore for refuelling and ship repair, and an access pact with Thailand. For maintenance, Malaysia has offered the Lumut shipyard, and Indonesia its Surabaya facility. But Manila could lose U.S. Navy business unless it allows U.S. servicemen to accompany their ships and planes even without a treaty as required by its constitution.
For all the pleas for America to stay in Asia, many doubted that Washington would sent troops to aid a strategically insignificant nation bullied over a few reefs. Hardly reassuring is recent U.S. inaction over Bosnia's dismemberment. Hence, many see the ASEAN-Japan initiative for security dialogue as equally important to peace. `ASEAN,' said Manglapus, `is perceived internationally as a stabilising factor.' China's Qian offered his own proposal for a security forum, which would be `multi-level and multi-channel.' Clearly, all sides have to build trust. Malaysia's Abdullah summed up ASEAN sentiments. Said he: `China has its perceptions. We have ours. We'll take [China's] word and continue to watch developments.'
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From Far Eastern Economic Review, Sept. 3, 1992
Loaded Weapons: China on Arms Buying Spree in Former Soviet Union
Lured by the offer of cheap arms from the former Soviet Union, China--to the consternation of many of its regional neighbours--is moving rapidly to acquire advanced weapons to replace its outdated arsenal. Russia's willingness to accept a substantial part of the payment in barter is an added attraction.
China's shopping list includes several types of aircraft, an aircraft carrier, long-range radar systems and armoured vehicles. Of greater strategic significance is the possibility that Russia may help upgrade China's defense industries by transferring technology and production facilities.
China has already signed several arms contracts, including one worth more than US$1 billion for 24 Su27 fighters. Mikhailov Konstantin, a senior official in the Russian Foreign Ministry's special commission on disarmament, says 12 aircraft have already been delivered and the rest are expected to be sent within the next few months.
According to Russian sources, the 12 fighters are now permanently stationed at an air base 120 kilometres south of Shanghai, though they are expected to be routinely deployed down to airfields in southern China to provide coverage over the South China Sea.
More Su27 sales to China are expected soon, with negotiations taking place on at least another eight of the aircraft, diplomatic sources in Moscow said. Further, Russia has provided two additional aircraft virtually free as a goodwill gesture. Military analysts also confirmed that a contract has recently been signed for the purchase of MiG31 Foxhound interceptor fighters.
There are indications the Su27 and MiG31 sales may include the transfer of assembly facilities to produce both aircraft, according to Western intelligence officials. In addition, they said the Russians may be willing to provide other important technologies, notably aircraft engines and radar-evading stealth technology for China's next generation F10 fighter.
While Russian officials declined to give specifics of Sino-Russian arms sales, Maj.-Gen. Sergey Karaoglanov, chairman of Oboron-Export--the Russian Government's chief arms trade organisation--said that `full-scale cooperation on production is possible for China and other countries in the future.'
Such a development would have a major impact on China's effort to overhaul its outdated defence industries and armed forces, which are both heavily dependent on copied Soviet technology acquired in the 1950's. The People's Liberation Army (pla) has been trying hard to acquire the modern weapons needed to fulfil its long-sought ambition of becoming a regional military power.
The MiG31s may eventually fit into a comprehensive air defence network China is also looking to purchase from Russia. Lieut-Gen. Valeriy Manilov, chief of the information department of the Commonwealth of Independent States' supreme command, confirmed that discussions are taking place for a `radar location station.' The deal is believed to include an over-the-horizon radar system and tactical ground-to-air missiles. There have also been talks on China purchasing a small number of 1176 Airborne Warning and Control System aircraft, and sources indicate that a deal for three aircraft maybe signed next year.
Manilov said the most important criteria in selling arms to China was that `they are purely for defensive purposes.' But other military analysts and Foreign Ministry officials are concerned that Russia's defence industries' desperate need to earn hard currency has relegated security considerations to a secondary priority. `The definition of defensive arms, especially over aircraft, is a bogus one as they can easily be used or modified for offensive operations,' one Foreign Ministry official argued.
Several items on offer or under discussion clearly have an offensive role. Russian arms manufacturers are believed to have offered the supersonic Tu22M bomber to Peking, which would substantially increase China's military `reach.' The Tu22M has a range of more than 4,000 kilometres, has air-refuelling capabilities, can carry heavy bomb and missile loads.
China has also expressed great interest in acquiring the 67,500-dwt Varyag aircraft carrier now being fitted out at the Chernomorsky shipyard in Nikolayev in Ukraine. Although there have been reports that the Ukrainian Government has offered the Varyag to China, Valeriy Kazakov, deputy Ukrainian defence industry minister, told the Review that `there has been no concrete proposal from the Chinese or anyone to buy it.' He added, however, that `we want to sell the vessel' as it has become a serious financial liability for the shipyard.
Diplomatic sources in Moscow and Peking say a series of talks between Chinese and Ukrainian officials over the Varyag have stalled over the high price being asked by Ukrainian negotiators. Nevertheless, one well-informed observer maintained the Chinese remain interested in the carrier and are preparing to make another bid for the vessel. A Chinese naval delegation is believed to have visited the Chernomorsky shipyard in June to inspect the ship.
Japanese newspaper reports estimated the carrier would cost at least US$2.4 billion, though Kazakov said the final price would depend on the equipment involved. Analysts point out that heavy additional costs would be incurred in making the Varyag fully capable, including the purchase of suitable aircraft and warships and logistics vessels to defend and support the carrier.
If China were to acquire the Varyag and attendant equipment, analysts say it would swallow up most of the PLA's procurement budgets for the next few years. China's defense budget this year totalled Rmb 32 billion (US $6 billion), and only a small proportion of this has been set aside for buying weapons.
But in their eagerness to win deals to support their near-bankrupt defense industry, Russian arms dealers are willing to accept barter goods as partial payment for their weapons. For example, Karoglanov said China would pay 65% of the US $1 billion contract for the Su27s in barter of consumer products and the remaining in hard currency.
From the Wall Street Journal, Sept. 9, 1992
Fighters by Bush
In its relief over finally being allowed to buy F-16 jet fighters from the U.S., Taiwan has been too gracious to point out the irony that Texas jobs had a lot more to do with President Bush's decision than Taipei's needs. We are not so forbearing. While we are delighted that Taiwan is finally able to upgrade its middle-aged air force, we wish Mr. Bush's change of heart had been accompanied by a forceful vote of confidence in Taipei.
Selling F-16s to Taiwan is not just a good deal for General Dynamics; it makes good sense for regional stability and enhances Taiwan's chances of consolidating a Chinese democracy that could one day be a model for the mainland.
The People's Republic, of course, don't see it quite that way. In a purple bit of bluster, Vice Foreign Minister Liu Huaqiu said the sale of F-16s `grossly interferes in China's internal affairs, seriously jeopardizes Sino-U.S. relations, and obstructs and determines the great cause of China's peaceful reunification. . . . The Chinese side is shocked and outraged by this decision.'
Outraging China is something Mr. Bush has always been reluctant to do, and it's good he's tweaking Beijing's tail over something worthwhile, instead of worrying about imports of Teen-Age Mutant Ninja Turtle dolls or the like. But as long as he knew he was being outrageous, Mr. Bush should have gone a step further and laid the groundwork for a more active relationship with Taiwan and a more assertive one with Beijing.
In the past six months alone, China has ought 24 top-of-the-line Russian SU-27 fighter-bombers, boosted its defense budget, played chicken in the Spratlys and conducted the biggest nuclear test in its history. Where is the threat China is girding against, we wonder?
Its only real enemy, the Soviet Union, has disintegrated and Russia is far too busy watching the ruble implode to think of much else. India is learning how much fun it is to make money and has reined in its expansionist impulses. Vietnam's army is a fraction of the size it was even five years ago. China's other neighbors--Burma, Laos, North Korea, Mongolia,
Nepal, Bhutan and Pakistan--can't be striking fear into Beijing's heart. Still, the military beat goes on. It's not surprising that Taipei was a little concerned about the prospect of defending itself with aircraft that pre-date the Beatles.
It's never made sense that the West was happy to sell arms to totalitarian China but wouldn't take orders from democratizing Taiwan. Unlike China, which is driving U.S. trade negotiators half-mad over its obstructive attitude to opening markets, Taiwan has been cooperative. Taiwan has no political prisoners. Taiwan has renounced the use of force for reunification. And unlike China, Taiwan keeps losing friends for these efforts. Just last month, South Korea announced that it would be switching recognition to Beijing, leaving Taiwan without a single embassy in Asia. This is a new world order?
The U.S. is in the best position to provide succor for Taiwan's diplomatic wounds. China needs the U.S. more than the U.S. needs China these days. This gives America room to maneuver; China's reaction to the F-16 sales which included a threat not to cooperate with U.S. initiatives at the U.N., was oratorically dramatic but practically ineffectual.
The U.S. can do a lot more to break the straitjacket China has long imposed over relations with Taiwan. If the U.S. pushed for Taiwan's early inclusion in GATT, it would be easier for other countries to set up trade missions. If Mr. Bush invited Taiwan's President Lee Teng-hui to dinner, other countries might also figure out a way to get together with him. Sure, China would sputter and fume, but it would not risk its most important trading partner over a dinner date; it managed to endure, remember, the U.S. visit of the Dalai Lama.
Like President Bush, we don't think it makes sense to isolate China. But it also doesn't make sense to keep Taiwan, the world's 13th largest trading entity, on the outside looking in. The sale of F-16s is good news. It would be even better if it meant that the U.S. is going to take the lead in loosening China's veto power over how other countries conduct their affairs with Taiwan.
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