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Introduction

In September 1944, Nazi Germany launched its first V-2 rocket attack on London[1]. That rocket was the first ballistic missile used in warfare. The V-2 was not a particularly sophisticated weapon, and although the V-2 attacks killed 2,500 Londoners[2], its effect was mainly psychological. The V-2 was a weapon of terror.

Ballistic missiles are designed to deliver conventional, nuclear, biological or chemical warheads over distances between 100 and 15,000 kilometres.[3] They are propelled into the upper atmosphere, or outer space, by a rocket engine burn lasting between tens of seconds and a few minutes. The missile then returns to earth following a ballistic (curved) trajectory with little or no course alteration during flight.[4]

Following WWII, during the Cold War and its arms race, the United States and the Soviet Union initially concentrated on delivery of nuclear weapons by bombers. Eventually, the two superpowers pursued advances in ballistic missiles and Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD). Relations between the superpowers reached a tense equilibrium based on deterrence and Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD): the sound knowledge that a strategic attack by one would be met in kind with a massive retaliatory strike.[5] In North America, Canada and the United States joined forces to form the North American Air Defence Command[6] (NORAD) whose role was to monitor the air approaches to North America for evidence of a Soviet missile or bomber attack.

In 1983, U.S. President Reagan announced that the USA would embark on a research and development (R&D) programme to examine the feasibility of building a missile defence system. That programme was known as the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). The SDI provoked debate around the world as many people felt that an effective missile defence would upset the strategic balance. The debate took on a national dimension in Canada when the U.S. offered several allies, including Canada, the opportunity to participate in the SDI on a government-to-government basis. Eventually, after much study and public debate, the Canadian government declined official participation in SDI.[7]

Reforms of perestroika and glasnost in the Soviet system in the mid-80's and the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 marked warming relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Accompanying these improvements in relations was a reduction of the threat from Soviet bombers and missiles.

However, in 1991, the Gulf War brought ballistic missiles back to the fore when Iraq launched SCUD missiles into Israel and Saudi Arabia. Iraq's SCUD missiles, like the German V-2s, were unsophisticated weapons of terror, but the SCUD missiles threatened to have the strategic impact of dividing the U.S.-led Coalition. Had Israel retaliated to the SCUD attacks, the Arab nations within the Coalition would not likely have tolerated Israeli attacks on another Arab nation. The American Patriot missile defence system was pressed into service and successfully preserved the Coalition in the first operational engagement of a BMD system. The fear that Iraq would use the SCUDs to deliver chemical, biological or nuclear weapons of mass destruction (WMD) had further heightened concerns in the theatre.[8]

The Gulf War renewed American interest in BMD. The SDI, which had already been scaled down and renamed to Global Protection Against Limited Strikes (GPALS), was refocused and the programme office renamed to the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization (BMDO).[9]

Considering the eventual implementation of a BMD system, the U.S. has indicated that NORAD is a logical organization for BMD system control. NORAD already has a surveillance and warning role for protection of North American Airspace and Aerospace and a close organizational relationship with U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM), which will operate some of the assets employed in a BMD system. Canada, as a partner in NORAD, has been offered an opportunity to participate in BMD through NORAD.[10]

The offer to participate with the U.S. in BMD through NORAD is not a repeat of the 1980's offer of SDI participation. It would be a mistake for Canada to dismiss the offer without reflection on the changes in the international situation since the offer of the 1980's. This paper examines the current threat from the American and Canadian perspectives, the American BMD programmes, the role of NORAD in BMD Canadian strategic interests to show that Canada must welcome BMD as a NORAD mission because it is in Canada's national interest.

Threat Considerations

A critical driver for ballistic missile defence is the perceived threat of ballistic missiles, particularly from the American perspective since Canada has been invited to join their BMD programme. While Iraq's action in the Gulf War highlighted the presence and capability of ballistic missiles, the threat is multifaceted. Russia still poses the greatest threat to the U.S. since their strategic missile arsenal still consists of a large number of missiles capable of striking the North American continent. With the reductions in tensions through the 1990's, however, the risk of a deliberate missile strike against the U.S. is now rated low.[11] What causes some American defence analysts and officials concern, however, is the possibility of an unauthorized or accidental firing of a Russian intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).[12]

Russia's doctrine for use of nuclear weapons has changed in recent years. While Russia's conventional forces have declined, its security policy has compensated by shifting to a heavier reliance on nuclear weapons. Russia has maintained its nuclear triad at a higher state of readiness than its conventional forces and has adopted a "launch on warning" posture for its nuclear forces. "Launch on warning" means that a retaliatory strike would be initiated upon detection of an incoming strike, before the attacking missiles arrive. Such a posture requires rapid decision-making and streamlined procedures, which places the nuclear forces in a hair-trigger mode.[13]

The uncertain state of the Russian government adds to Western concerns about control of the Russian nuclear arsenal.[14] In March 1998, President Yeltsin dismissed his Prime Minister and purged the political establishment, the most recent in a string of surprise changes in the Russian government.[15] This sort of instability increases concerns about the possibility of an unauthorized launch, facilitated by the "launch on warning" posture.

China also maintains ICBMs capable of striking North America. Although U.S. officials do not consider the threat of missile attack from China as high,[16] China has demonstrated its ballistic missile capability. In July 1995, and March 1996, China launched ballistic missiles into the waters off the coast of Taiwan in an effort to influence or prevent democratic elections in the state.[17] Furthermore, in a veiled threat taken as a reference to their ballistic missiles, China stated that the U.S. would not intervene on behalf of Taiwan because "American leaders care more about Los Angeles than they do about Taiwan."[18] The willingness of a major world power to use ballistic missiles to attempt to influence events in another state and to intimidate the U.S. is an alarming situation.

The final component of the ballistic missile threat is found in the proliferation of missiles and WMD throughout the world, particularly in areas of unrest such as the Middle East, northern Africa and the Far East.[19] Estimates on the number of states holding ballistic missiles and their capabilities vary; however, the number may be as high as 30.[20] The greatest concerns relate to a group of countries termed "rogue states". These countries: Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya and Syria have not acceded to the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and have active programs for missile development or procurement. The "rogue states" also have nuclear, biological or chemical capabilities, which may be used to produce WMD warheads for their missiles.[21] These programs raise the level of tension in their regions of the world.

The potential of any of these rogue states to threaten U.S. territory in the near future is uncertain. North Korea poses the greatest threat because of its geographical proximity to the U.S. and because its missile development programme is the most advanced. Amongst North Korea's projects is the Taepo Dong-2 Missile, which has an estimated range of 2,480 to 3,720 nautical miles (4,600 - 6,900-km).[22] Alaska and Hawaii are the most vulnerable portions of the U.S. and even the west coast of Canada is more vulnerable than the forty-eight contiguous states. None of the "rogue states" will develop a large ICBM arsenal, but even a small number could be an effective instrument of international blackmail.

The proliferation of ballistic missiles presents two problems to the U.S. First, there is the potential for an adversary to develop ICBMs, even in small quantities, capable of reaching North America. The other concern for American forces is their exposure to Theatre Ballistic Missiles (TBM) on deployments. Since contemporary Western societies have demonstrated an aversion to military casualties, TBMs pose a great threat to governments' abilities to deploy troops.[23] The greatest proliferation of missiles is, naturally enough, in portions of the world where tensions are often high. Consequently, those areas have high potential for United Nations peace support operations. Iraq's use of TBMs during the Gulf War clearly validates this concern.

Canadian Threat Perspective

Many of the reasons the U.S. is interested in BMD apply to Canada as well; however, Canada must assess the situation for itself. The 1994 Defence White Paper, Canada's defence policy, acknowledges the threat of ballistic missiles to Canada and the Canadian Forces (CF). The White Paper says, "Nuclear weapons continue to occupy a central role in Russian military doctrine. The vast majority of Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal remains in place."[24] The White Paper also cites the threat from China's nuclear forces: "China also maintains strategic nuclear forces able to reach North America, and is continuing to modernize its intercontinental systems."[25] Finally, the White Paper recognizes the problem of ballistic missile proliferation: "The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery is another concern. A number of states have acquired, or are seeking to acquire, nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, as well as ballistic missile delivery capabilities."[26]

The 1994 Defence White Paper advises that, "Theatre missile programs cannot be discounted in planning for future contingencies"[27] because "Canada may want to retain the option of deploying forces to areas where they could face such weaponry."[28] The White Paper also expresses concern about proliferation of missile technology and the "rogue states" with the statement: "The transfer of weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missile technologies to so-called 'rogue' regimes is of particular concern."[29] Furthermore, in spite of export controls and treaties like the MTCR, the White Paper concedes that it is "likely that the transfer of resources, skills and technology will be irreversible."[30]

The Strategic Overview in the 1998 Defence Planning Guidance (DPG) continues the theme of concern over "other issues such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and their means of delivery ... [which] also present significant security challenges."[31] DPG 98 identifies three defence missions:

Defending Canada -- protecting Canada's national territory and areas of jurisdiction; helping civil authorities protect and sustain national interests; ensuring an appropriate level of emergency preparedness across Canada; and assisting in national emergencies;

Defending North America -- protecting the Canadian approaches to the continent in partnership with the United states, particularly through NORAD; promoting Arctic security; and pursuing opportunities for defence cooperation with the US in other areas; and

Contributing to International Security -- participating in a full range of multilateral operations through the UN, NATO, other regional organizations and coalitions of like-minded countries; supporting humanitarian relief efforts and restoration of conflict-devastated areas; and participating in arms control and other confidence-building measures.[32]

Each of those missions could face a ballistic missile threat. ICBMs threaten North America now and the threat is growing. CF personnel could face ballistic missile threats assisting a NATO ally in Europe or on peacekeeping duty in many regions of the world. Canada must act now to counter the ballistic missile threat of the future or face the possibility of curtailing its peacekeeping efforts, our greatest contribution to international security and stability.

The White Paper presents the threats, but there is also a remedy. Within the second mission, Defending North America, Canada has a unique opportunity to help mitigate the ballistic missile threat. The U.S., Canada's closest ally and NORAD partner, is currently pursuing systems that will provide it, its allies and friends with the protection of BMD.[33]

American BMD Programmes

The U.S. government, through the Department of Defense (DoD) BMDO, has demonstrated a commitment to developing BMD. In financial terms, the commitment is approximately $3.6 billion (US) in fiscal year (FY) 97. FY 98 and FY 99 estimates are for similar amounts. The programme has three objectives:

...first, develop and deploy increasingly capable Theater Missile Defenses (TMD) to meet the existing missile threat to deployed U.S. and allied forces; second, as a hedge against the emergence of long-range ballistic missile threats, develop options to deploy a National Missile Defense (NMD) for the United States; and third, continue to support research on more advanced ballistic missile defense technologies to keep pace with the threat and improve the performance of theater and NMD systems.[34]

Currently, TBMs pose the greatest missile threat. Consequently, TMD is the first priority and the BMDO is pursuing several different TMD systems to provide "a defense in depth, using multi-tiered defenses against both long and short-range theater class missiles."[35] Defence against ICBMs is the second priority, and is a more complex problem. As a result, NMD development in the BMDO is on a "three plus three" programme: three years to develop a system which could be implemented in an additional three years, should the threat warrant implementation. NORAD, hence Canada, could play a role in TMD and NMD systems.

NORAD and Ballistic Missile Defence

During the Cold War, deterrence was the defence against strategic attack between the two superpowers. Both Russia and the U.S. knew that an attack would precipitate a devastating counter-attack. A critical part of the deterrence posture was the ability to detect and characterize an incoming attack early enough to allow decisions on an appropriate response.[36] In the 60's, Soviet ICBMs emerged as the principle threat to North America, and NORAD's mission evolved to meet the new challenge to air sovereignty. The revised mission became "warning and characterization of nuclear attack by manned bombers and ballistic missiles."[37] The NORAD mission has been updated periodically, and the 1996 renewal of the NORAD agreement sets out the missions as aerospace warning and aerospace control for North America.

NORAD employs "a global web of ... sensors"[38] to detect air and space borne threats to North America. The Defense Support Program (DSP) Satellites operated by USSPACECOM are a critical element in early detection of missile launches. The DSP satellites proved their effectiveness during the Gulf War when they detected Iraqi SCUD missile launches.[39] NORAD warning centre alerts to U.S. Central Command (USCENTCOM) warned Coalition troops and civilians in Israel and Saudi Arabia and cued Patriot missile defence batteries.[40] Destruction of the SCUDs, triggered by NORAD detection, was critical to maintaining stability in the Middle East, where the prospect of a military response from Israel threatened to split the Coalition and create additional conflicts.[41]

Since the Gulf War, NORAD and USSPACECOM have reorganized to separate, but tightly integrated groups responsible for handling strategic missile (ICBM) attack and theatre missile attacks. Missile launches are first analyzed for their potential to threaten North America by those responsible for strategic missile launches. If the missile is not destined for North America the theatre missile analysts then assess the launch for its potential to threaten deployed U.S. troops or allies elsewhere in the world. Canadian forces assigned to NORAD have played an integral role in the strategic missile detection and characterization since the inception of that role. More than a year after the renewal of the NORAD agreement in March of 1996, Canadian forces began employment in the theatre missile detection and analysis area as well. With few exceptions, Canadian forces fill roles throughout NORAD and the combined NORAD/USSPACECOM Missile Warning Centre. In NORAD, Canadian and American personnel cooperate in the essential tasks of defending North America and their allies around the world.

Canadian Strategic Interests

As close allies sharing the world's longest undefended border, Canada and the U.S. have vital mutual interests and security concerns. According to the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the relationship between the two countries "is about shared values and common ideals for democracy, human rights, free markets and peaceful development. Trade and economics are at the centre of the Canada-U.S. partnership....Two-way trade is now over a billion dollars a day."[42] Eighty percent of Canadian exports go to the U.S. and nearly 25 percent of American exports enter Canada. The two nations, especially Canada, have vital economic reasons to ensure that their relationship remains strong and that together they are free of coercion from outside forces.

Not only do the two nations share economic interests; they have built a strong military alliance. DFAIT cites Canada-U.S. defence cooperation as an important dimension of our relation.[43] The 1994 Defence White Paper identifies the U.S. as Canada's most important ally.[44] Military cooperation between the two nations is extensive. Within that context of Canada-U.S. relations and military cooperation, Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy identified "NORAD [as] the most important bilateral security and defence agreement Canada has with the United States"[45] just days before the 1996 renewal of the NORAD agreement.

Military cooperation with the U.S. provides Canada with economic and military benefits. For example, defence industrial trade and R&D aspects of the defence relationship have resulted in approximately $2B in trade annually. The Integrated Lines of Communication Agreement provided the CF with U.S. transport to repatriate CF troops from Somalia. NORAD also provides military benefits to Canada through cooperative efforts with the U.S. For example, the Joint Space Project (JSP) of the Department of National Defence has been established to provide CF with a comprehensive space capability. The JSP expects to leverage its limited resources by "building on existing capabilities and relationships -- specifically, our relationship with the US under the terms of the NORAD Agreement."[46] Canada has a strong commitment to North American defence. Over 600 CF personnel serve in the U.S., mostly in NORAD-related assignments, which reflects the importance of NORAD to Canada and the CF.[47] Participation in BMD with the U.S. would show Canada's continuing commitment to the alliance and the shared values of the two nations.

Against this background of shared values, mutual interest in defence, and particularly the importance of NORAD to Canada, the issue of BMD is becoming very important to Canada. General H. Estes (Commander-in-Chief of NORAD and USSPACECOM) has publicly aired the question of Canadian participation in BMD. In October 1996, he told the Senate Armed Services Committee that "now is the time to work with Canada to determine its interest in participating in the development of a system that would extend the U.S. national missile defense system program to a ballistic missile defense for North America."[48] He further indicated that NORAD could operate such a system subject to decisions by the governments of the U.S. and Canada.[49] He has been quoted as saying that "if we were going to extend NMD [National Missile Defence] to a ballistic missile defense system of North America, the time to get the Canadians involved is not once we deploy it, but, rather in the development ... It's up to the Canadians to look at this issue and decide they want to participate, and, if so, at what level."[50] Finally, speaking at a conference in Winnipeg on July 31, 1997, General Estes "observed that development of modern missile defenses is progressing in the U.S. and that Canada has an opportunity to participate which would bring much more influence now than later."[51] Clearly, Canada has an opportunity to join with the U.S. in a North American BMD system through NORAD.

The current question of Canadian participation in BMD has not caught Canadian officials by surprise. The 1994 Defence White Paper stated Canada's support for expansion of NORAD's missile warning function to NATO and other allies. As to Canadian participation in BMD, the White Paper states that Canada will continue to examine BMD "options focused on research and building on Canada's existing capabilities in communications and surveillance."[52] The DND policy group, headed by the Assistant Deputy Minister (Policy) expects that the issue of Canadian participation in BMD under NORAD will arise in the foreseeable future.[53]

Canada has once before considered participation with the U.S. in active BMD through the SDI, which was intended to provide better than 80 percent attrition of incoming ICBMs.[54] President Reagan announced the SDI early in 1983 and later that year, the U.S. government extended an invitation to NATO partners to participate in SDI research. SDI resulted in great deal of controversy around the world and in Canada, Prime Minister Mulroney received over 5,000 letters only six of which supported participation in SDI.[55] One common line of thinking by opponents was that a shield against ICBMs would shift the strategic balance from MAD to one allowing the U.S. to contemplate a pre-emptive first strike since it would be able to defend against a retaliatory strike.[56]

A major factor in the SDI debate that is still relevant today is the 1972 Anti- Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty between Russia[57] and the U.S. The ABM Treaty was designed to maintain the deterrence posture by permitting only limited ABM forces to be deployed against ICBMs. The treaty does not limit theatre missile defences, nor did it establish criteria for distinguishing strategic missile defence from theatre missile defences.[58] Currently, the U.S. has no strategic ABM defences while Russia has ABM defences deployed to protect Moscow from a strategic missile attack.[59]

The ABM Treaty and the balance it was designed to maintain form part of the background Canada must consider in contemplating BMD involvement. If those issues and others surrounding the SDI debate have not changed, then presumably it would be difficult to justify a different answer to Canadian involvement in BMD today. Another aspect to be considered is the benefit that Canada would derive from the venture.

There are many differences between TMD and NMD. Yet, for Canada, there is a point of convergence - NORAD and the closely affiliated USSPACECOM. The functions of tactical warning and attack assessment deal with the question of whether a ballistic missile launch poses a threat to Canada or the U.S, their deployed forces or their allies. As demonstrated in the Gulf War, TMD can unquestionably serve as a stabilizing influence; hence, CF participation in TMD benefits Canada by directly supporting its third mission - Contributing to International Security. Furthermore, without TMD, Canada may, in the future, decline to send peacekeeping forces to strife-ridden areas of the world for fear of attack by ballistic missiles. Currently, Canada has no plans to acquire active missile defences; hence Canada would look to its allies to provide missile defences. Canada's participation in TMD through NORAD would lend credibility to a request for TMD coverage.

NMD, expanded to cover North America, is the more complex area of BMD for Canada to consider. Should Canada decline to participate in NMD, its continued participation in NORAD could be in jeopardy. That decision could oblige Canada to withdraw from any involvement in missile attack monitoring. That consequence would follow since characterization by a Canadian of a missile launch as a threat to North America would ultimately involve Canada in active defence. For NORAD, BMD will become increasingly important in the future and if an otherwise acceptable role for Canada in NORAD were found, it would be a marginal one. This could ultimately lead to termination of the relationship. The benefits to the CF, and ultimately Canada, of participation in NORAD have been described, but dissolution of the arrangement could terminate those benefits and place other cooperative arrangements at risk.

One of the greatest advantages to Canadian participation in NMD is the protection from attack it would afford Canada, with Canadian input. Without Canadian involvement, through NORAD, Canada must not expect the U.S. to do for it what it has refused to do for itself. Furthermore, it is normally desirable to neutralize an attack as far from domestic soil as possible. Canadian participation would move the boundaries of defence beyond its borders to the extent possible. The 1994 Defence White Paper states that if Canada were to reduce its defence cooperation with the U.S. significantly, it would still require American assistance in protecting its territory and approaches. That "assistance would then come on strictly American terms."[60] Participation would allow Canada input, albeit as a junior partner, into the planning and implementation, if deemed necessary, of a system that would provide for its defence.

Current opposition to NMD and Canadian involvement refer to the SDI and its debates on destabilizing the strategic balance. It is, however, important to realise that circumstances now are different from those times. First, "the adversarial relationship [between the U.S. and Russia] has largely disappeared."[61] While the relationship is not entirely cooperative, the titanic struggle between those social systems is a relic of the Cold War. Whereas the Soviet Union was a global superpower with expansionist ideals, Russia is a now regional power without the expansionist ideals.[62]

Second, the strategic deterrence relationship of the past no longer exists. It is not the presence of strategic nuclear weapons that defines a deterrence relationship, but the political relationship that established the weapons. The relationship between the U.S. and Russia regarding their nuclear forces has been marked by important agreements in recent years. For example, in September 1995, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to a joint exercise of theatre missile defence. Then in September 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to definitions of TMD designations in the ABM Treaty. Although the U.S. and Russia still maintain large nuclear arsenals, the political relationship is not perpetuating the deterrence relationship of the Cold War era.[63]

Canadian government participation in the SDI programme would have given Canadians an active role in the military relations between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Some observers felt that would have demonstrated consent for those relations,[64] a position that Canadians were unwilling to adopt. In spite of clear allegiance with the U.S., the Cold War deterrence posture was not the preference of Canadians. The new global strategic environment offers Canadians an opportunity to take a position in favour of defence rather than offence without the risk to the strategic balance.

In Canada, opponents to BMD have raised other issues such as: why states would resort to expensive missile technology in lieu of less expensive means of delivering WMD, alternate means of missile control, and respecting the ABM Treaty.[65] The threat is questioned by comparing the difficulty of producing a missile system to smuggling a bomb or WMD into a country directly. While smuggling may be less expensive, the number of countries with ballistic missile programmes is growing. Missiles are appealing because they offer a measure of prestige and respect not otherwise afforded.[66] The American government recognizes the threat of smuggling and is taking steps to deny adversaries that option as well.[67] However, ignoring any aspect of the threat will be certain to drive an aggressor to that option; hence it is prudent to address all identified sources of risk.

Alternate means of control, such as storing warheads separate from the missiles are preferable since they greatly lower the strategic tension. Such methods, however, depend on a stable strategic environment to provide confidence of adherence. The persistence of Saddam Hussein in hiding Iraq's WMD and missile capabilities since the Gulf War offers strong caution against control regimes requiring inspection and verification. It is not at all certain that the necessary level of trust could be generated to support a benign control measure. Lack of trust is, in fact, the very reason that BMD is being contemplated.

For Canada, respect of the ABM treaty is an important requirement and the Americans attest that they will adhere to the ABM Treaty or seek amendments to it. The NMD development programme is Treaty-compliant, however, a deployed system may not be. If the NMD is not Treaty-compliant, the U.S. will seek modifications to the Treaty.[68] The treaty was designed to preserve the strategic balance during the Cold War, and the current BMD proposals do not make the U.S. invulnerable to an intentional attack. Canada should accept American statements, get on board immediately, examine the American proposals and, if necessary, wield some of the influence General Estes asserts it would have as a BMD participant. The Treaty should not be treated as unalterable; appropriate modifications should be sought. Concepts such as MAD are Cold War relics and amendments to permit a limited defence would not reintroduce them.

Conclusions

The current threat of an ICBM attack on the U.S. resides in Russia and China. The threat of a deliberate attack is rated low; however, there is concern of an unauthorized or accidental launch. A TBM threat to American and allied forces deployed in an unstable area of the world was demonstrated during the Gulf War. The future contains additional uncertain threats as the number of nations holding ballistic missiles increases, and some are actively pursuing advanced missile capabilities.

In the face of these facts, the U.S. has wisely embarked on a BMD programme. The programme will improve on the TMD capability demonstrated during the Gulf War. Defence against ICBMs is following a "three plus three" programme: three years to develop a defence system, followed, when indications warrant, by a three-year deployment programme.

Canadian defence policy recognizes the threat of ballistic missiles to the country and to its deployed forces. Canada has adopted a wait-and-see attitude to American efforts in BMD; however, it has been offered an invitation to participate in BMD with the U.S. through the NORAD partnership. NORAD made an important contribution to world stability during the Gulf War by alerting Coalition forces of TBM attacks. TMD through NORAD will contribute to international security, the third mission of the CF. The CF's other two missions; Defending Canada and Defending North America will also require missile defence. Through NORAD, Canada can also continue to execute those missions.

Besides the opportunity to advance its missions, BMD through NORAD offers many collateral benefits. Canada's commitment to NORAD would keep the partnership strong and show Canada's interest in maintaining its valuable association with the U.S. armed forces.

The NORAD mission has evolved over its life to meet new threats. BMD is a natural evolution in defending North American and Canadian interests in the world. Canada must seize the opportunity to expand the NORAD mission now, before the offer expires, or progress denies our influence.

NOTES:

     ¹World Wide Web. Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, "Welcome to the BMDO Timeline," [http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/pdf/timeline.pdf], nd. [ return ]

     ²"Circles of Fear," The Economist, January 4, 1997 (Obtained from Proquest UMI). [ return ]

     ³World Wide Web. Centre for Defence and International Strategic Studies, "Selected National Capabilities," [http://www.cdiss.org/david1.htm], 1996. [ return ]

     ⁴World Wide Web. Centre for Defence and International Strategic Studies, "What is a Ballistic Missile?," [http://www.cdiss.org/bmwhat.htm], 1996. [ return ]

     ⁵World Wide Web. Alan J. Parrington, "Mutually Assured Destruction Revisited," Air Power Journal, [http://www.cdsar.af.mil/apj/apj97/win97/parrin.html], Winter 1997. [ return ]

     ⁶NORAD was later renamed to the North America Aerospace Defense Command [ return ]

     ⁷William C. Weston, "Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence: A Challenge for the 21st Century" (unpublished draft Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies Strategic Datalink, c. 1997), p 8. [ return ]

     ⁸World Wide Web. Centre for Defence and International Strategic Studies, "Missile Threats: An Introduction," [http://www.cdiss.org/mintro.htm], 1996. [ return ]

     ⁹World Wide Web. Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, "Ballistic Missile Defense: A Brief History," [http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html/origins.html], c.1997. [ return ]

     ¹⁰World Wide Web. General Howell M. Estes, "Sustaining the Strategic Space Advantage," Defense Issues, [http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/di97/di1215.html], March 13,1997. [ return ]

     ¹¹Ibid. [ return ]

     ¹²World Wide Web. Bruce G. Blair, "Statement to the House National Subcommittee," [http://www.nukefix.org/97-3-13Blair.html], March 13, 1997. [ return ]

     ¹³World Wide Web. Bruce G. Blair, Harold A. Feiveson, Frank N. von Hippel, "Taking Nuclear Weapons off Hair-Trigger Alert," Scientific American, [http://www.sciam.com/1197issue/1197vonhippel.html], November 1997. [ return ]

     ¹⁴World Wide Web. Brigadier-General Alan Johnson, "The User's Perspective," presentation to Advance Planning Briefing to Industry Conference, [http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/apbi/usspacecom/slide22.htm], May 1, 1997. (The full presentation can be found at http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/apbi/usspacecom/slide01.htm). [ return ]

     ¹⁵World Wide Web. Marcus Warren. "Plea for calm as surprise shakes West," Electronic Telegraph, [http://www.telegraph.co.uk], March 24, 1998. See also "Chronology of Key Events, Crises in Russian Gov't" [http://www.russiatoday.com/rtoday/special/dismiss4.html] April 15, 1998 for other changes in the Russian government under President Yeltsin. [ return ]

     ¹⁶World Wide Web. Paul G. Kaminski, "DoD's Ballistic Missile Defense Programs," Defense Issues, [http://www.defense link.mil/pubs/di97/di1214.html], March 6, 1997. [ return ]

     ¹⁷World Wide Web. Graham Hutchings, "Poll to go ahead despite threats," Electronic Telegraph, [http://www.telegraph.co.uk], March 11, 1996. [ return ]

     ¹⁸World Wide Web. Thomas G. Moore, ed, The Heritage Foundation "Defending America: Ending America's Vulnerability to Ballistic Missiles," [http://www.ff.org/heritage/national/security/teamb/welcome.html], 1996. [ return ]

     ¹⁹World Wide Web. "Theater Ballistic Warning," [http://www.spacecom.af.mil/norad/tbm.htm], July 1996. [ return ]

     ²⁰Kaminski, "DoD's Ballistic Missile Defense..." [ return ]

     ²¹William D. Smith, "Principal Rogue Nations are Unrelenting in Their Efforts to Export Terrorism," Sea Power, January 1997, pp 51,53-55. MTCR membership listed at "Commonly Asked Questions on the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)" [http://www.acda.gov/factshee/exptcon/fs.htm], November 26, 1997. [ return ]

     ²²William D. Smith, "Principal Rogue Nations..." January 1997 p 53. [ return ]

     ²³James Fergusson, "From Counter-Proliferation to Non-Proliferation: An Alternative Perspective on Ballistic Missile Defence," in New Approaches to Non-Proliferation. Summer 1996. p 107 [ return ]

     ²⁴Department of National Defence, 1994 Defence White Paper, (Ottawa: DND Canada, 1994), p 20. [ return ]

     ²⁵Ibid, p 20. [ return ]

     ²⁶Ibid, p 20. [ return ]

     ²⁷Ibid, p 21. [ return ]

     ²⁸Ibid, p 21. [ return ]

     ²⁹Ibid, p 7. [ return ]

     ³⁰Ibid, p 7. [ return ]

     ³¹Defence Information Network. Department of National Defence, Defence Planning Guidance 98, [http://vcds.dwan.dnd.ca/VCDS/DGSP/DGP/DGP98/chap1_e.asp], 1997. [ return ]

     ³²Ibid. [ return ]

     ³³World Wide Web. Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, "FY 1998 President's Budget Press Release," [www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html/budget.html], nd. [ return ]

     ³⁴World Wide Web. Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, "Making Ballistic Missile Defense a Reality," [www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html/bmdolink.html], April 30, 1998. [ return ]

     ³⁵Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, "FY 1998 President's Budget..." [ return ]

     ³⁶World Wide Web. "The Evolution of the NORAD Agreement," [http://www.spacecom.af.mil/norad/evolut.htm], nd. [ return ]

     ³⁷Ibid. [ return ]

     ³⁸World Wide Web. Pat McKenna. "The Border Guards," Airman, [http://www.af.mil/news/airman/0196/border.htm], January 1996. [ return ]

     ³⁹World Wide Web. USAF Fact Sheet, "Defense Support Program Satellites," [http://www.af.mil/news/factsheets/Defense_Support_Program_Satel.html], June 1997. [ return ]

     ⁴⁰McKenna, The Border Guards. [ return ]

     ⁴¹Robert W. Morton, "Canadian Security, NORAD and Ballistic Missile Defence," (unpublished draft Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies Strategic Datalink, c. 1997), p 5. [ return ]

     ⁴²World Wide Web. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, "The Canada-U.S. Relationship," [http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/geo/use/cdaus-e.htm], December 1996. [ return ]

     ⁴³Ibid. [ return ]

     ⁴⁴DND, White Paper 1994, p 20. [ return ]

     ⁴⁵World Wide Web. Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Press Release, "Canada and the United State to Renew Defence Agreement," [http://www.dfait-maeci.gc.ca/english/news/press_~1/96_press/96_044e.htm], March 25, 1996. [ return ]

     ⁴⁶Maj R. Sponder D Space D 2-2, "Joint Space Project" (unpublished Briefing Note, Ottawa, 6 Aug 97), p 1. [ return ]

     ⁴⁷Cdr J.B. McCarthy DWH Pol 2, "Canada - United States Defence Relations" (unpublished Briefing Note, Ottawa, 23 Nov 97), p 2. [ return ]

     ⁴⁸Estes, Sustaining the Strategic Space Advantage. [ return ]

     ⁴⁹Ibid. [ return ]

     ⁵⁰Johnson, The User's Perspective. [ return ]

     ⁵¹Fraser Holman, "Canada's Air Force in the New Millennium," Canadian Defence Quarterly, Autumn 1997, p 37. [ return ]

     ⁵²DND, White Paper 1994, p 26. [ return ]

     ⁵³Defence Information Network. Department of National Defence, CC8B Business Plan 1997-2001 ADM(POL) Business Plan 1997/98, [http://diso.dwan.dnd.ca/im_mdp/immdptest/Framework/Library/CCbizplan/PLANS97_98/8BWHOLE.html], nd. [ return ]

     ⁵⁴Weston, Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence..., p 9. [ return ]

     ⁵⁵Ann D. Crosby, "The Media's shaping of the security discourse: cruise missile testing, SDI and NORAD," International Journal, LII (Winter 1996-7), (Obtained from Proquest UMI). [ return ]

     ⁵⁶Weston, Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence..., p 9. [ return ]

     ⁵⁷Originally the Soviet Union [ return ]

     ⁵⁸Weston, Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence..., pp 6,7 [ return ]

     ⁵⁹World Wide Web. Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, "Missile Defense Milestones," [http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html/milstone.html], 1997. In 1967, the Soviet Union deployed the Galosh BMD system and the U.S. began deployment of the Sentinel BMD system. The Sentinel system became the Safeguard system, which Congress ordered closed in 1976, just months after becoming operational. [ return ]

     ⁶⁰DND, White Paper 1994, p 21. [ return ]

     ⁶¹Fergusson, "From Counter-Proliferation to Non-Proliferation..., p 96. [ return ]

     ⁶²Ibid, p 96. [ return ]

     ⁶³Ibid, p 97. [ return ]

     ⁶⁴Crosby, The Media's shaping... [ return ]

     ⁶⁵Bill Robinson, "Ballistic Missile Defence for North America Return of the SDI," Ploughshares Monitor, December 1997, p 5. [ return ]

     ⁶⁶World Wide Web. Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, "BMDO Fact Sheet 97-29 Ballistic Missiles and the World Security Environment," [http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/pdf/97029.pdf], September 1997. [ return ]

     ⁶⁷William D. Smith, "Principal Rogue Nations..." January 1997 p 52. [ return ]

     ⁶⁸Kaminski, "DoD's Ballistic Missile Defense..." [ return ]

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