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Introduction

The assessment made within the Canada's 1994 Defence White Paper of the new threat environment since the break-up of the former Soviet Union has not changed significantly. Although the realignment in the global balance of power has led to a situation where the risk of global war has been reduced, the uncertainties and unpredictability associated with smaller, rogue states has now replaced the original fear of global war. Rogue nations face a formidable foe in western alliances and realise all too well the consequences they would suffer if they attempted to take on the forces of a western coalition in an air or ground war. They do, however, see a potential advantage in maintaining a capability in weapons of mass destruction, as well as the long- and short-range delivery systems for those weapons. In their estimation, these weapon systems give rogue states a means of equalising the odds against stronger nations, as well as a means of backing up their threats.

Such states do not have to look too far to acquire these systems. Unfortunately, many of the weapon systems developed by the former Soviet Union still exist, and they exist under a severely reduced security scrutiny than before. China, under the pretence of self-protection from its formerly Soviet and now Russian neighbour, has also done little to address the dangers of weapon proliferation. Although China has improved its record by tightening nuclear transfers and pledging to halt sale of anti-ship cruise missiles to Iran, Chinese defense industries are under increasing pressure to become profit-making organizations. According to CIA Director George J. Tenet, Beijing was looking to technology-related sales of weapons of mass destruction primarily to Pakistan and Iran to make up for lagging sales of their conventional arms.[1]

The net result is that although the Cold War threat of an ICBM war is not likely under the current circumstances, the possibility of deliberate launch by a rogue state that does not subscribe to international convention, or indeed the accidental launch of missiles from Eastern Europe or Russia that no longer fall under the tight security measures of the past, does exist. In the event that such an occurence should take place, the defence structures necessary to successfully detect and defend against an attack, either against North America or against Canadian troops deployed on UN missions, do not exist. This issue is currently being addressed by the U.S., who have tasked the Ballistic Missile Defence Office (BMDO) to develop strategies, as well as seek participation by other interested western nations, to resolve this shortfall. Although Canada has shown an interest in Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) development, she has decided to remain on the periphery due to risk of being associated with offensive weapon systems and the risk of not living up to commitments made in the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The time has come, however, to bring policy up to the present, not only for the sake of addressing this gap in continental defence, but also to ensure that Canada does not miss an excellent opportunity to expand its industrial and economic horizons.

The aim of this paper is to prove that Canada must involve itself in the development of ballistic missile defence with the U.S. in order to meet its strategic goals.

Background

Ballistic missile defence, from a national or continental perspective, has always been an element of the tasks assigned to the North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD). NORAD is a bi-national command that is responsible for safeguarding the sovereignty of Canadian and U.S. airspace. It accomplishes this through the monitoring of man-made objects in space, and the detection, validation and warning of attack against North America, whether by aircraft, missiles or space vehicles. It is also responsible to provide appropriate response against attack through the effective use of the forces assigned by the two countries for air defence.

Initially signed in 1958, the NORAD Agreement addressed the concerns of the Soviet strategic bomber threat from the Cold War. NORAD accomplished this deterrence by employing both a sophisticated ground radar system and a distributed fighter umbrella that covered the approaches to the two countries. The threat evolved in the 1960s when the U.S. spotted the first Soviet Intercontinental Ballistic Missile (ICBM), changing NORAD's focus to that of ICBM warning and Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) and significantly reducing the fighter interceptor role.[2] As a consequence, Canada reduced its interceptor fighter strength from 200 to 36 in the late 1970s, but continued its support of NORAD and supported the employment of Canadian air force personnel in selected areas of missile warning and the tracking of objects in space.[3]

Thus the roles of NORAD have evolved over the past thirty years. The emphasis has changed from air defence in the 1950s, to deterrence through warning and attack assessment during the Cold War, and finally to our present post-Cold War posture of air sovereignty and the detection and monitoring of aircraft carrying illegal cargo.[4] In all of these roles, however, a common, essential thread provides the fabric that enables NORAD to achieve its objectives: an integrated tactical warning and attack assessment capability. It is this thread that provides an excellent basis upon which Canada and the U.S., through NORAD, can provide a valuable contribution to a global warning system to address the threat.

Current Strategic Assessment

Threats to North America. The new threat environment, particularly with respect to North America, has changed dramatically since the Cold War. Efforts to address the proliferation of nuclear and chemical weapons have been made by a majority of the players, starting with the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) in November 1969. Reductions in the number of weapon systems, especially those with the necessary range to reach North America, have resulted from these efforts, but a formidable array of weapons continues to exist. The "Missile Club", as it is referred to by Robert Morton,[5] currently has 36 members that have some form of ballistic capability, while approximately 73 countries maintain a cruise missile capability. Although a majority of theses systems are limited to short-range deployment, the trend in development programs is to extend the range to intercontinental capabilities. The current threat may appear to be small from a risk assessment perspective, but the potential that exists from a proliferation perspective is not one that must not be ignored.

Threats to Forces In-theatre. Canada has and will continue to contribute to multi-lateral security co-operation efforts internationally.[6] It is difficult to define exactly what the anticipated threat will be across these various theatres, but based upon past experiences, the likelihood of stability in these locations is slim. One of the most prevalent missile systems that compose this threat is the SCUD B missile employed by the Iraqis during the Gulf War. Canadian troops are deployed into these areas with no means of self-defence against this type of threat, and certainly have earned at least a commitment from the government to provide them the protection that is their due. As recommended by Robert Morton,

"Canadians should begin to pay heed if only because our European NATO allies and trading partners are showing signs of nervousness; in the end, a concern for one is a concern for all NATO members."[7]

Recent conflicts in Afghanistan, the Iran/Iraq war and the Gulf war are a dramatic reminder of the real threat in these theatres, which unfortunately, have no legitimate countermeasure so far.

Countermeasures to Ballistic Missiles. Current defence measures against the more immediate threat, that of ballistic missiles, are for the most part in development and quite limited in performance. Although many claims were made of the perceived successes of the Patriot Air Defence System against the 600-km range al-Husayn missiles (a longer-range version of the Russian-developed Scud-B missile) during the Gulf War, subsequent studies show that the real picture is not as promising. The modifications made to the Scud-B missiles, specifically the added fuel and smaller warhead, reduced its stability and caused it to stumble and eventually break up upon re-entry into the earth's atmosphere. The resulting trajectories were difficult to track, and approximately 30% of the Patriots were fired at debris.[8] However, as pointed out by Robert Morton, the presence of the Patriot system and the sense of protection it afforded the Israeli population, made it an important strategic success, as it was critical in maintaining the unity of the coalition.[9] The experience of the Gulf War provides ample proof that the confidence and stability that would be provided by a truly successful BMD system merits the investment in current BMD research and development programs that Canada has an opportunity to participate in.

BMD Development. Recent emphasis upon developing effective BMD stems from the early 1980s and the initiation of the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) in 1984. SDI was initiated to address the perception that the Soviets were then in a favourable "first-strike" situation, with the capability to cripple U.S. strategic forces. It consisted of six major sub- systems: a space-based interceptor, a ground-based interceptor, a ground-based sensor, two space-based sensors and a battle management system.[10] In response to the emerging "new world order" described by President Bush following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and the seemingly daunting task of designing a seamless BMD, the U.S. changed its focus from SDI to developing defences against limited attacks. The proposed system was named Global Protection Against Limited Strikes, and comprised three elements: a ground-based National Missile Defence (NMD), a ground-based Theatre Missile Defence (TMD) and a Space- based Global Defence. In 1993, the Strategic Defence Organisation was changed to the Ballistic Missile Defence Organisation (BMDO).[11]

The BMDO realigned its focus over the past few years to Theatre Air and Missile Defence (accounting for $2.121B (US), or 59 per cent of the FY 1999 BMDO budget), National Missile Defence ($962.7M, or 27 per cent) and Advanced Technologies ($253M, or 7 per cent).[12] This change in focus represents US concern regarding the optics of their formerly titled "Space-Based Global Defence" element of the BMDO, and its association with the SDI Program. It also reflects the emphasis the US government places on fielding both a theatre- and a national-based system as soon as practicable in light of the perceived threat.

The Theatre Air and Missile Defence Programs comprise a configuration of interoperable systems capable of joint operations and flexible in response to the varying situations and missile threats which the BMDO claims can be prosecuted during all phases of flight. The way in which they intend to guarantee success in this demanding environment is to provide a layered and integrated land- and sea-based defence system. Elements of this program include the Patriot PAC-3, which had its genesis in the Gulf War, the Theatre High Altitude Area Defence (THAAD), planned for interim capability employment in 2001 but no full deployment until 2006. The concept here is to fully exploit the joint defence capability, where for example, "space-based assets could provide the cueing, THAAD the detection and tracking radar, and a Navy Area interceptor could be launched to counter a threat."[13]

The National Missile Defence (NMD) System has, as its prime mission, the "defence of the United States against a limited ballistic missile threat by a rogue nation" in addition to "some capability against a small accidental or unauthorised launch of a ballistic missile from more nuclear-capable states." The concept used to ensure "just-in-time" technology to prosecute these threats is called "3 plus 3". In this concept, the development program would be in a position to make a deployment decision in the year 2000 if warranted by the threat, and if the decision is indeed taken, an initial system would be ready for deployment in 2003. In the event that a decision to deploy is not taken, then research and development of NMD component technologies continues, always ready to deploy within a three-year period.

The shear size and expense of this development effort by the United States is not only indicative of the seriousness placed in the assessment of the potential threat, but also the confidence that they will achieve their design goals. Other allies share this opinion, such as the Germans and Italians, who have embarked on a co-operative development program called the Medium Extended Air Defence System (MEADS). Intended as a replacement for the Hawk and Patriot PAC-3 air defence systems, MEADS will provide area and point defence capabilities against both tactical missiles, which include tactical ballistic, air-to-surface, and Anti-Radiation Missiles, as well as air-breathing threats, which consist of fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft, cruise missiles, and unmanned aerial vehicles.[14]

Current Political Direction and Constraint

Arms Control/Non-proliferation Agreements/Treaties. The issue most often cited by critics of ballistic missile defence is the possible violation of existing international agreements limiting strategic defence. The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty, signed by the United States and the former Soviet Union,[15] restricts ballistic missile defence to one area with no more than 100 launchers. It also restricts the development, testing or deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-based or mobile land-based ABM systems.

1994 Defence White Paper. The 1994 Defence White paper clearly states that, despite the reduced threat of global war, it would be prudent to "plan for a world characterised in the long term by instability."[16] As outlined previously, the threat of belligerent nations employing ballistic missiles to achieve their aims is certainly a large component of that instability. The Canadian government further states that it "supports ongoing discussions with US, Nato allies and other partners on the possible expansion beyond North America of missile warning function currently discharged by NORAD."[17] The government's major concern, however, continues to be the possibility of violation of the 1972 ABM Treaty. If the United States decides to field systems that are in violation of the ABM Treaty, Canada would be very reluctant to have a hand in a potentially destabilising situation. However the emphasis should not be on watching the proceedings of the BMDO from the sidelines, but rather on trying to shape and influence the direction taken by the United States from the inside. The way to accomplish this is by fully disclosing her intentions from the outset regarding the primacy of increasing stability rather than decreasing it, and launching into an R&D participatory role that will get her a seat at the table.

Impact upon National Power and Achievement of National Goals

Canada's strategic situation, and hence its national security policy, has traditionally been based upon a number of "invariants",[18] described by Paul Bateux as those characteristics, or foundations, that continue to shape policy even in times of immense geopolitical change. Several of these foundations, such as Canada's geography, her defence relationships with the United States, her status as a relational power and her interest in global stability, are relevant to the argument for BMD. In particular, they relate to how Canada relates both to the United States continentally, and to her allies internationally.

First of all, Canada's geographic situation poses considerable challenge in the area of sovereignty and defence. This has led to a continental approach to defence, given the technical and resource issues that need to be addressed to cover such a great, thinly-populated land mass. The resulting defence relationship with the United States, initiated by the Ogdensburg Agreement of 1941, continues to be of great importance today, as both countries benefit from not only the economies of mutual defence, but also the advantages of a mutual defence-industrial base. This relationship has also provided the basis for Canada's inherent "relational"[19] power, that is, the amount of influence Canada has, with respect to both the United States and to other countries internationally. This is in contrast to the "structural power" that the United States is endowed with, based on its wide-ranging wealth and power projection capabilities.

The relational power enjoyed by Canada, however, is rapidly diminishing in strength. The demise of the former Soviet Union, and the reduced threat of attack across the North Pole, has removed much of the importance of Canada's geographic importance to the United States. Canada's defence budget cutbacks, although parallel with similar trends across the Western alliance, have meant that Canada brings much less to the table when discussing defence matters with the U.S. This is also the case for Canada's relationship with NATO countries:

"Canada has indicated that European security is still a major interest. Canada is both a member of the CSCE and of NATO, and such membership conforms to Canada's longstanding interest in the politics of European security. However, it has been made clear by its allies in many ways and on many occasions that the price of the pursuit of Canada's interests in Europe includes substantive, if not substantial, military commitments."[20]

Canada will not be able to maintain many of the privileges she has enjoyed in the past if the current course is not changed. An example of this trend can be seen in access to space data in the U.S. As a result of shutting down its two optical Baker-Nunn camera sites in 1992 due to obsolescence, and not replacing its commitment with newer technology, Canada was gradually eased out of its direct participation in collecting and analysing space data.[21] It is clear that this is not a trend that will benefit Canada in attaining its national goals.

Conclusion

The changes in the geostrategic environment as a result of the end of the Cold War in 1991 have not resulted in as many peace dividends as originally thought. Although the threat of global war has been reduced, weapon systems continue to proliferate among rogue nations as weapons-capable countries use arms sales to bolster their economies. It is for this reason that the United States has now placed increased emphasis on both its theatre, and national, ballistic missile defence development and capabilities.

The North American Aerospace Defence Command (NORAD) has had ballistic missile defence on its agenda since the early 1960s, when the United States first spotted Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles. NORAD's focus has evolved in concert with the threat, but a common thread throughout its evolution has been its integrated tactical warning and attack assessment capability. The threat that it faces is not one of direct conflict with one particular country, but one of weapon proliferation, with some 36 countries having some form of ballistic missile capability, and 73 having a cruise missile capability.

The threat is not only confined to a continental one; it also faces Canada's forces in theatres of operation as it deploys on peacekeeping and peacemaking missions on behalf of the UN or NATO. Canada does not have the capability to address this threat in-theatre, and so must rely on the benevolence of other nations to provide for what she lacks. Canada should not ignore the fact that her European and NATO allies and trading partners are showing signs of nervousness on this issue, and are increasingly getting involved in ballistic missile defence programs.

The current ballistic missile countermeasure technology is not encouraging. Many claims were made of the successes of the Patriot Air Defence System against the Iraqi al-Husayn missiles during the Gulf War, but post-conflict evaluation was not as complimentary. The inherent instability of the al-Husayn missiles as a result of modifications to increase its range caused them to stumble and break up upon re-entry into the earth's atmosphere. The resulting trajectories proved difficult to track, and point out the engineering challenges facing the successful design of any countermeasure system. The important fact to remember, however, is the stabilising effect the Patriot system had upon the Israeli population, and the value that will be afforded by striving to perfect countermeasure systems.

The United States has certainly taken seriously the lessons learned from its Gulf War ballistic missile experience in establishing the mandate for the Ballistic Missile Defence Office (BMDO). It has three major areas of focus: Theatre Air and Missile Defence, National Missile Defence and Advanced Technologies. The systems currently being developed include an advanced version of the Patriot Air Defence System, the Theatre High Altitude Area Defence system, as well as the Airborne Laser system. It is a program that has a budget of approximately $3.5B (US), and thus reflects the importance and urgency placed by the United States on an area of defence that should also be addressed by Canada. In fact, the United States has openly invited international participation in the development of global defence systems. An example is the Medium Extended Air Defence System (MEADS), where the Germany and Italy have entered into a co-operative development program with the United States. The broad range of possibilities for co-operative defence development programs in the various aspects of BMD represent an opportunity that Canada can ill afford to miss.

A number of constraints will affect Canada's participation in any future co-operative BMD development endeavour. A significant one is the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972, which attempted to prevent the destabilising effect (i.e. the removal of the mutual self- destruction factor) of one country possessing effective countermeasures to ballistic missiles. The United States has openly interpreted that treaty as not applying to her current programs, but the opinion is not entirely shared by the international community. The 1994 Defence White Paper recognises the relevance of BMD to Canada, but has limited its participation to shared discussions with her allies. It is time, however, to change her role from being a bystander to participation in the development of BMD in order to have a say in shaping and influencing decisions by the United States.

Canada has traditionally used her position with respect to the United States to her advantage in both domestic and international affairs. This "relational" power resulted from a number of factors, including her geographically strategic position, her mutual defence relationship with the United States, and her contributions to lateral defence organisations such as NATO and the UN. The current trends adopted by Canada in cutting her defence commitments and the changing geostrategic importance will ultimately diminish her relational power, and thus her national power in international circles. It is time to change the trend, not only to regain the influence and advantages she formerly enjoyed with the United States, but also to maintain her standing internationally. A major contributor to accomplishing that goal will be a decision to immediately enter discussions with the United States with the aim of active participation in ballistic missile defence initiatives.

ENDNOTES

     ¹[missing] [ return ]

     ²William C. Weston, "Canada and Ballistic Missile Defence." (Unpublished essay, Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies Datalink Series, 1997 (estimated)), p 4. [ return ]

     ³Ibid, p 5. [ return ]

     ⁴United States, "Options for Canada-US Cooperation in Aerospace Defence", Report directed by the NORAD Renewal Steering Group, October, 1994, p 14. [ return ]

     ⁵Robert W. Morton, "Canadian Security, NORAD, and Ballistic Missile Defence." (Unpublished essay, Datalink Series, Canadian Institute of Strategic Studies, 1997 (estimated)), p 5. [ return ]

     ⁶Canada, The 1994 Defence White Paper, (Ottawa, Supply and Services Canada. 1994), p 27. [ return ]

     ⁷Morton, "Canadian Security, NORAD..., p 5. [ return ]

     ⁸George N. Lewis and Theodore A. Postol, "Future Challenges to Ballistic Missile Defence." IEEE Spectrum, September, 1997, p 68. [ return ]

     ⁹Morton, "Canadian Security, NORAD...", p 6. [ return ]

     ¹⁰Dr. Donald R Baucum, "Ballistic Missile Defense: A Brief History." [http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html/origins.html], 1997 (estimated), p 2. [ return ]

     ¹¹Ibid, p 3. [ return ]

     ¹²LGen Lester L. Lyles, USAF, "Statement Before the Subcommittee on Strategic Forces, Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate." [http://www.acq.osd.mil/bmdo/bmdolink/html/lyle24mar.html], 1998, p 3. [ return ]

     ¹³Ibid, p 5 [ return ]

     ¹⁴Philip E. Coyle, Director Operational Test and Evaluation, US DOD, "FY 97 Annual Report." [http://www.dote.osd.mil/reports/FY97/army/97meads.html], 1998 (estimated), p 1. [ return ]

     ¹⁵The Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan agreed to abide by the terms of the original ABM Treaty under the Lisbon Protocol, signed in 1993 and now ratified in these CIS states. [ return ]

     ¹⁶Canada, The 1994 Defence White Paper, (Ottawa, Supply and Services Canada. 1994), p 8. [ return ]

     ¹⁷Ibid, p 25. [ return ]

     ¹⁸Paul Buteux, "Sutherland Revisited: Canada's Long-term Strategic Situation." Canadian Defence Quarterly, September, 1994, p 5. [ return ]

     ¹⁹Ibid, p 6. [ return ]

     ²⁰Ibid, p 9. [ return ]

     ²¹United States, "Options for Canada-US Cooperation..., p 50. [ return ]

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