[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-68]
NUCLEAR WEAPONS MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS: MILITARY, TECHNICAL, AND
POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE B61 LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM
AND FUTURE STOCKPILE STRATEGY
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
OCTOBER 29, 2013
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] TONGRESS.#13
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JIM COOPER, Tennessee
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOE WILSON, South Carolina JOHN GARAMENDI, California
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana Georgia
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
Drew Walter, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Counsel
Eric Smith, Clerk
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2013
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, October 29, 2013, Nuclear Weapons Modernization
Programs: Military, Technical, and Political Requirements for
the B61 Life Extension Program and Future Stockpile Strategy... 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, October 29, 2013........................................ 27
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TUESDAY, OCTOBER 29, 2013
NUCLEAR WEAPONS MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS: MILITARY, TECHNICAL, AND
POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE B61 LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM AND FUTURE
STOCKPILE STRATEGY
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Garamendi, Hon. John, a Representative from California,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 2
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
WITNESSES
Cook, Dr. Donald L., Deputy Administrator for Defense Programs,
National Nuclear Security Administration....................... 7
Creedon, Hon. Madelyn R., Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Global Strategic Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense........... 3
Kehler, Gen C. Robert, USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command... 5
Hommert, Dr. Paul J., President and Laboratories Director, Sandia
National Laboratories.......................................... 9
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Cook, Dr. Donald L........................................... 51
Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces................... 33
Creedon, Hon. Madelyn R...................................... 36
Hommert, Dr. Paul J.......................................... 59
Kehler, Gen C. Robert........................................ 43
Rogers, Hon. Mike............................................ 31
Documents Submitted for the Record:
Department of Energy and Department of Defense documents
concerning B61 Life Extension Program...................... 73
Letter from former military commanders of U.S. Strategic
Command and Strategic Air Command.......................... 84
Letters from European parliamentarians....................... 85
Mr. Turner August 16, 2013, letter to R.W. Knops M.A., Member
of Parliament, Netherlands................................. 108
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 113
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Brooks................................................... 132
Mr. Carson................................................... 138
Mr. Coffman.................................................. 132
Mr. Cooper................................................... 120
Mr. Garamendi................................................ 134
Mr. Langevin................................................. 130
Mr. Nugent................................................... 138
Mr. Rogers................................................... 117
Ms. Sanchez.................................................. 125
NUCLEAR WEAPONS MODERNIZATION PROGRAMS: MILITARY, TECHNICAL, AND
POLITICAL REQUIREMENTS FOR THE B61 LIFE EXTENSION PROGRAM AND FUTURE
STOCKPILE STRATEGY
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, October 29, 2013.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:30 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Rogers. Good afternoon. I want to welcome everybody to
this hearing of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee and our
hearing on nuclear weapons modernization programs. This
subcommittee has been tracking this program--or these programs
very closely, and this hearing is about digging into one in
particular, the B61 Life Extension Program, or LEP.
Our distinguished witnesses all play important roles in the
B61 LEP from a variety of angles. The witnesses comprise the
key leaders responsible for the policy, military and
operational requirements, program and oversight, and technical
and program execution on the LEP. They will help us understand
the details of the program, the requirements that are driving
it, its history and current status, and its outlook for the
future.
Our witnesses include the Honorable Madelyn Creedon,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs,
U.S. Department of Defense; General Robert Kehler, Commander,
U.S. Strategic Command, also known as short-timer. He has got
about another month before he retires on us. And we are going
to be sad to see you leave, by the way.
General Kehler. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Dr. Donald Cook, Deputy Administrator for
Defense Programs, National Nuclear Security Administration; Dr.
Paul Hommert, President and Laboratories Director, Sandia
National Laboratories.
I appreciate your taking the time to prepare for this
hearing. I know it takes a lot of time and effort, and we do
appreciate it, because it is very helpful to us. We always
appreciate your contributions that each of you make for your
country.
I am going to keep my statement very brief so that we can
have the maximum time possible for questions and answers, but I
do want to take a moment to highlight one issue: the
misconceptions and misinformation that we see in the public
discourse on the B61 LEP. We have seen massively uninformed
editorials and articles out there on the B61; arguments that
NATO [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] should pay for the
LEP, despite this being a U.S. nuclear weapon that we need for
our own strategic deterrent; arguments that the B61 doesn't
need to be rebuilt now, despite clear testimony to the contrary
from our lab directors and military commanders, including
General Kehler and Dr. Hommert; arguments that there is a
reduced scope option for the LEP that would cost less and still
meet requirements, despite numerous statements and documents
from the administration showing the exact opposite is true.
The list goes on and on, and I plan to get into this during
the questioning period. We will engage in a bit of myth-busting
today and lay out the clear, undeniable facts about this
critical program.
For now I would like to introduce for the record a series
of documents provided to the committee by the DOD [Department
of Defense] and DOE [Department of Energy] that clearly shows
reality. And without objections, those will be submitted.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 73.]
Mr. Rogers. It is time to leave aside the misinformation
and fantasy that has seeped into the public debate, and deal
with the real world.
Along the same lines, I offer the reality of military
perspective. I would like to introduce for the record this
letter we received from four commanders--from four former
commanders of U.S. Strategic Command and its predecessor
command. And without objection, those will be submitted.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 84.]
Mr. Rogers. These four retired senior officers eloquently
summarized why cuts to the B61 LEP, as recommended by only one
of the four congressional committees, would not only harm the
U.S. deterrent, but also have major negative impacts on our
allies and our nonproliferation goals.
Thank you again to our witnesses. I look forward to this
discussion. And with that, let me turn to our ranking member
today, Mr. Garamendi of California, for any statement that he
may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the
Appendix on page 31.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JOHN GARAMENDI, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Chairman Rogers, and thank the
witnesses for participating in what is going to be a very
important hearing.
Mr. Cooper could not be here today, and he asked that I sit
in in his chair. I will do so as best I can, and I will read
his statement quickly, or I will stop halfway through and put
it in the record.
``President Obama in the Nuclear Posture Review laid out a
strategy for maintaining a safe, secure, and reliable arsenal,
while pursuing further nuclear weapons reductions and
strengthening nonproliferation. In this context we must
understand what investments are necessary to carry out an
effective strategy and maintain a credible nuclear deterrent to
meet post-cold war threats in an era of constrained budgets.
``First with respect to the B61, there are concerns about
the cost and complexity of the current planned B61 life
extension and whether they are necessary for extended
deterrence in the long-term. The administration is embarking on
a $10 to $12 billion program, the most expensive life extension
ever undertaken. This cost includes the warhead life extension
program done by the National Nuclear Security Administration
[NNSA], estimated to cost $8.1 billion to $10.1 [billion], and
the Department of Defense's cost estimate of the program
evaluation office, CAPE, added $1.6 billion required a new tail
kit for the Air Force, bringing the total cost over $10
billion.
``We must better understand why a less expensive
alternative, notably the 1E LEP option, is not being pursued.
How long do we plan to keep the B61s deployed anyway? What
constitutes credible political reassurance for our allies, and
what reductions in the number of nuclear weapons are planned,
and what safety risks are associated with forward-deployed B61?
Former Secretary Sam Nunn recently wrote that today tactical
nuclear weapons in the Euro-Atlantic region are more of a
security risk than an asset to NATO. Is he correct?
``Second, more generally, we cannot consider the B61 in a
vacuum. We must prioritize. And how do we plan for affordable,
yet strong and effective nuclear deterrence?''
I think what I will do is to stop there and put the rest of
it in the record. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the
Appendix on page 33.]
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
And now we will go to our witness statements, and we will
remind you we would like you to summarize your statement for 5
minutes. And we will start with the Honorable Secretary Madelyn
Creedon. You are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF HON. MADELYN R. CREEDON, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL STRATEGIC AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE
Secretary Creedon. Thank you very much, Chairman Rogers,
Ranking Member Garamendi sitting in for Mr. Cooper,
distinguished members----
Mr. Garamendi. I thank you.
Secretary Creedon [continuing]. Distinguished members of
the Strategic Forces Subcommittee. Thank you for the
opportunity to testify today about the importance of the B61-12
Life Extension Program and the integrative part it plays in the
administration's long-term modernization strategy for both the
nuclear forces and the supporting nuclear infrastructure. I am
pleased to join Deputy NNSA Administrator Dr. Cook, Sandia
National Lab Director Dr. Hommert, and General Kehler for this
discussion.
In the June 2013 nuclear employment guidance, the President
reiterated and clarified two key policy elements that rely upon
the successful completion of the B61-12 Life Extension Program
and execution of the long-term modernization strategy. The
first is the commitment that the United States will retain a
credible nuclear deterrent, supported by the nuclear triad,
including the capability to forward-deploy nuclear weapons with
heavy bombers and dual-capable fighter aircraft anywhere in the
world. The second is the approach to hedge, so that we maintain
the ability to hedge against technical and geopolitical risk
that will lead to more efficient management of the nuclear
weapons stockpile. This approach will allow, in time,
reductions in the total number of weapons, while still
maintaining the nondeployed weapons needed to ensure the U.S.
stockpile is well positioned to provide the needed flexibility
to respond to any contingency.
The joint NNSA and DOD long-term plan to manage and sustain
the nuclear stockpile and associated infrastructure programs is
presented in NNSA's Fiscal Year 2014 Stockpile Stewardship
Management Plan. This plan provides the framework around which
the new guidance will be implemented. At its heart is the
baseline modernization strategy, also known as the ``3+2''
strategy. This strategy, if successful, will allow the
consolidation of the 12 unique warhead types used today into 3
interoperable warhead designs for use on a submarine and land--
for use on submarines and land-based missiles and 2 aircraft-
delivered weapons, the B61-12 gravity bomb and the follow-on
standoff cruise missile replacement.
This modernization strategy will permit hedging between the
land and sea-based legs of the triad, reduce the size of the
stockpile, and still maintain a sufficient hedge capability.
The tremendous benefit of the 3+2 strategy is that over
time, it would reduce our stockpile life--stockpile life cycle
sustainment costs and reduce the strain on our surveillance
resources, while simultaneously increasing the safety,
security, and effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent with fewer
weapons.
The B61-12 is the first component of the 3+2 modernization
strategy. A successful B61-12 Life Extension Program
facilitates consolidation of four B61 types into one variant,
and it also allows the eventual retirement of two other
strategic air-delivered gravity bombs, the B61-11 and the B83.
To be sure, modernization work of this kind is expensive,
but there is no doubt that the investment, which directly
enables our commitment to effective nuclear deterrence and
nonproliferation, is necessary. As you know, very early cost
estimates of the B61-12 have grown as we sought to exercise
national nuclear weapon engineering and design skills that had
atrophied.
Having now finished the costing and developed a good
baseline, we expect that any future cost growth is less likely
to stem from technical or production costs than from difficult
choices made by the Department of Defense and Energy to deal
with ongoing budgetary uncertainty. Sequestration cuts, for
example, have already delayed the design, development, and
production schedules by several months.
These budgetary constraints led the Department to a quick,
prudential analysis of a possible alternative to the B61-12
that would provide the military and deterrent characteristics
of a gravity bomb. This analysis was not intended to substitute
for the previous efforts in judgment of the Nuclear Weapons
Council, but to take an objective look at other options during
a period of at least short-term budgetary churn. If nothing
else, this study served to validate the Department's commitment
to the program, and, in fact, it quickly demonstrated that
there is not a cost-effective alternative that meets military
requirements and policy objectives of the B61-12 LEP.
Both Departments and the administration remain firmly
committed to the 3+2 strategy and the long-term fiscal and
national security benefits that it presents.
Finally, let me make an important comment about the B61's
roles. As I previously mentioned, under the current
modernization strategy, the B61-12 will become the only gravity
bomb in the U.S. inventory for both the strategic bomber and
the dual-capable aircraft fleets. The B61-12 will also be a
critical part of NATO's nuclear deterrent, and it is equally
important to our allies in Asia. This LEP will reassure our
nonnuclear allies and partners that their security interests
will be protected, leaving no need for them to develop nuclear-
deterrent capabilities of their own.
I cannot emphasize this point enough. The B61-12 is
critical to U.S. nuclear deterrence and is viewed by the
administration and others as the cornerstone of our extended
deterrence commitment to allies around the globe.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Creedon can be found
in the Appendix on page 36.]
Mr. Rogers. Secretary Creedon, I very much appreciate that
statement.
General Kehler, you are up. Five minutes.
STATEMENT OF GEN C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Kehler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Garamendi, distinguished members of the subcommittee. I am
pleased to be here as well with all of you today and my
colleagues to discuss the B61 Life Extension Program and how it
fits within a broader operational and stockpile strategy.
Mr. Chairman, our Nation's nuclear forces perform three key
functions. First, they deter potential adversaries via credible
nuclear capabilities and effective plans; second, they assure
our allies and partners of our extended deterrence commitments
to them; and third, in the unlikely event deterrence fails,
they achieve national security objectives as directed by the
President.
To accomplish these functions, the Nation requires a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear force composed of well-trained
people, modern nuclear delivery systems and warheads, an
assured command-and-control network, and the highly specialized
infrastructure necessary to sustain them.
I am 100 percent confident in the ability and dedication of
our people and the operational viability of today's nuclear
force, but aging issues exist, and I remain concerned that the
force requires significant investment in the midst of a very
difficult financial period. The investments we request are
guided by a policy-based, long-term strategy and implementation
plan that will allow us to sustain the nuclear triad of
delivery vehicles, enable critical improvements to our national
command-and-control systems, and systematically extend the life
of essential weapons in the stockpile to meet our military
needs.
The 3+2 strategy that Secretary Creedon mentioned, which is
so named because it will ultimately result in three updated
ballistic missile warheads and two updated air-delivered
warheads, allows us to retain a highly effective and
sustainable nuclear stockpile to address 21st century threats
and uncertainty. From my military perspective, the 3+2 strategy
underpins all of our initiatives to meet the new national
guidance issued by President Obama last June, and the B61 Life
Extension Program is the next critical step within that
strategy.
There are several reasons why I believe this is to be true.
First, our recently updated nuclear employment guidance directs
us to retain a triad of nuclear delivery vehicles, and that is,
of course, a construct that continues to provide the Nation
with a deterrent that is responsive, survivable, and flexible.
The current and future nuclear bomber force is a key component
of the triad, and arming that force with a life-extended B61
and eventually with a follow-on to the air-launched cruise
missile is a top priority.
Second, the life-extended B61-12 is envisioned to be the
only nuclear gravity weapon in the future arsenal. The B61-12
LEP will extend the weapon's safety, security, and
effectiveness for decades and consolidate multiple variants
into a single design, which offers opportunities for
significant stockpile reductions, while maintaining national
security objectives and extended deterrence commitments.
Third, the meaningful work being done on the B61 can be
leveraged for future life extension programs and provide the
impetus to develop and retain the critical workforce skills the
United States needs to sustain its deterrence force.
Importantly, the B61-12 Life Extension Program has been
optimized in both scope and timing to match the throughput
capacity of the nuclear industrial complex. Failure to conduct
this life extension now will discard that leverage and increase
costs of future life extension programs.
Finally, the B61 is the only weapon in the stockpile that
can arm both the B-2 bomber and dual-capable fighter aircraft
deployed by the U.S. and NATO in Europe. As such, it
contributes greatly to the foundation of U.S. extended
deterrence around the globe. Extending the life of the B61 will
reassure our allies and partners and will further our
nonproliferation efforts.
I continue to endorse the 3+2 strategy and give my
strongest support to the B61-12 Life Extension Program, but I
remain concerned that these substantial modernization efforts
come in the midst of this difficult financial period. In my
view, the need for sustained investments increases as we
decrease the number of deployed weapons to New START [Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty] levels. From a military perspective,
smaller numbers of weapons means that the quality and
reliability of each weapon must be high.
As we face budgetary constraints, we will examine and
pursue every possible alternative to drive costs down, but we
must stay the overall course that we have set to the maximum
possible extent. The B61 LEP is the next step to sustain our
deterrent force, and I ask for your continued support.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Kehler can be found in
the Appendix on page 43.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. Very well done.
Dr. Cook, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DR. DONALD L. COOK, DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR FOR
DEFENSE PROGRAMS, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Dr. Cook. Chairman Rogers, Mr. Garamendi, and distinguished
members of the subcommittee, I also thank you for having me
here to discuss the President's plans for nuclear weapon
modernization that are focused on the B61 Life Extension
Program and the NWC [Nuclear Weapons Council] strategy, 3+2, as
has already been described.
I am also pleased to be here with my colleagues. And I want
right off to thank you for your continuing and ongoing support
of the men and women of the National Nuclear Security
Administration across the country, the work that they do, and
your bipartisan leadership of some of the most challenging
national security issues of our time. This support has helped
keep the American people safe, it has assured our allies, and
it has enhanced global security.
I am here today to state how critically important it is for
the United States to have an unambiguous and effective strategy
to achieve the goals articulated very clearly by the President,
first at Prague in 2009, again in the 2010 Nuclear Posture
Review, and most recently in Berlin this June, to ensure a
safe, secure, and effective deterrent, while reducing the
number and types of nuclear weapons. That national strategy is
the 3+2 strategy advocated by U.S. Strategic Command, endorsed
by the Nuclear Weapons Council, and with congressional support,
will be implemented by the NNSA and the DOD services.
I would like to take a moment to discuss an integral part
of the 3+2 strategy, which is the B61, and why your continued
support is essential to achieve a significant reduction in our
stockpile of nuclear bombs, while meeting the President's
commitment to maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to
deter any adversary and to guarantee that defense to our
allies. I will not go through further details on the 3+2
strategy, because that has already been covered.
I would like to emphasize the United States has already
reduced the size of our nuclear stockpile very substantially,
by more than 80 percent since its peak during the cold war.
Today we have the smallest stockpile since the Eisenhower
administration. The interoperability provided by implementing
the 3+2 strategy you have heard discussed will allow the United
States to reduce further its hedge against technical failure
and geopolitical surprise, while maintaining an effective
deterrent through a balanced and flexible stockpile.
So on the B61, the B61 is one of the oldest nuclear weapons
in a stockpile that has never been older, and it requires the
refurbishment of some of its components in order to remain
viable for years to come. The B61 has major strategic and
tactical requirements, to which the DOD will speak further, and
from the NNSA perspective, we are charged with maintaining the
health of the B61 variants currently in the active stockpile
and also conducting the life extension program on this
important aspect of our nuclear deterrent.
On February 12--I am sorry, February 27, 2012, the NWC
authorized the U.S. Air Force and NNSA to begin Phase 6.3
engineering development for the B61-12 LEP. This LEP will
consolidate all of the existing B61 variants, also known as
mods 3, 4, 7, and 10, into the mod 12 to provide both strategic
and extended deterrence for an additional 20 years following
the first production unit in 2020.
Regarding the NWC process that led to the decision to
choose the final scope of the 61-12 LEP, I would like to be
very clear that the resulting decision supported the lowest-
cost option that meets threshold military requirements. For 3
years, from 2010 to 2012, the NNSA, in consultation with the
NWC, evaluated four major options for the 61 LEP, with many
suboptions beyond that, before selecting the current 61-12
design approach. The chosen option, known as Option 3B,
maximizes the reuse of both nuclear and nonnuclear components,
while meeting the needed design life. The option foregoes the
newest surety technologies and instead improves security and
safety of the bombs using somewhat older, but proven
technologies.
And although two of the other options had lower initial
costs, their life cycle costs were higher, not as--as a result
of not addressing all known aging concerns. Because of this,
these two options would necessitate starting another life
extension program after initial alterations in order to address
the remaining concerns.
Now, lastly, I would say the 61-12 LEP is really making
good progress. We are in the second year of full-scale
engineering development. The program has met its development
milestones, it is on schedule, and it is on budget. Today the
most significant risk the program faces is not technical risk,
but uncertainty of consistent funding. However, because of the
demonstrated success we have had to date, confidence from U.S.
Strategic Command and the Nuclear Weapon Council has been
sufficient to expand planning for the consolidation of nuclear
bombs by including the future retirement of the B83 in the
overall strategy.
This allows, in summary, for a reduction in the total
active and inactive number of U.S. nuclear gravity bombs by a
full factor of two within a few years after completion of the
61-12 LEP. And the reduction in numbers of bombs and the
decision to use the lowest-yield variant from today's stockpile
can reduce the total amount of special nuclear material in the
total active and inactive number of gravity bombs by more than
a factor of six. That is 80 percent.
So in summary, I want to thank you for your support thus
far and get on to the questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Cook can be found in the
Appendix on page 51.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you very much, Dr. Cook.
Dr. Hommert, you are recognized for 5 minutes.
STATEMENT OF DR. PAUL J. HOMMERT, PRESIDENT AND LABORATORIES
DIRECTOR, SANDIA NATIONAL LABORATORIES
Dr. Hommert. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Garamendi, and
distinguished members of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee,
thank you for the opportunity to testify here today.
First I would like just to take a moment to congratulate
General Kehler on his upcoming retirement and thank him for his
leadership of the Strategic Command. He has been a great
partner for those of us in the nuclear security arena. Thank
you.
My testimony today will focus on the B61 warhead system and
the B61 Life Extension Program. In this regard I would like to
make the following key points. In order to sustain high
confidence in the safety, security, and reliability of the B61
into the next decade, it is our technical judgment that we must
complete the life extension program currently being executed. I
make this statement for reasons that have been documented in
annual assessment letters by me and my predecessor for a number
of years now, all having to do either with technology
obsolescence or aging, not surprising for a system the oldest
units of which were manufactured and fielded in the late 1970s
with some components dating to the 1960s.
Second, we are well into the full-scale engineering
development phase of the life extension program, with the
baseline design review now scheduled for September 2015. This
program addresses all known aging or technology obsolescence
issues, as I can illustrate by a comparison of 1960s vintage
vacuum tubes now in our stockpile to be replaced by modern
integrated circuit technology in a radar now tested
successfully, and is the minimum program that addresses the
threshold requirements that have been provided to us by the
Department of Defense and the NNSA.
To date, we have costed $253 million of the $2.65 billion
estimated incremental costs for Sandia on the B61 LEP through
the completion of production, which was specified in the weapon
development cost report provided in June 2012. Furthermore, at
Sandia we met all major fiscal year 2013 program milestones for
the B61 LEP on or under cost, although sequestration caused
some of the work scope to be deferred to fiscal year 2014.
We have put in place rigorous project management expertise
to ensure ongoing adherence to the plan for all our
modernization efforts. We have drawn upon resources and
expertise nurtured through our interagency work on broader
national security challenges at our laboratory to meet the
urgent demands of our core nuclear weapons mission, most
notably staffing; however, the impacts both to schedule and
life cycle costs of ongoing fiscal year 2014 budget decisions
have yet to be established. And I have to say, from what I know
now, it is likely they will have impact on schedule and
potentially on cost.
Finally, let me just end with more of a personal note. In a
professional career now spanning some 37 years, I have had the
extraordinary privilege to work at three institutions whose
core responsibility is nuclear weapons: the Atomic Weapons
Establishment in the United Kingdom, the Los Alamos National
Laboratory, and, of course, Sandia National Laboratories. In
that time I have worked with many exceptional individuals who
have dedicated their professional lives to the innovation,
science, and engineering excellence required to ensure that
these unique devices of mankind are safe, secure, and reliable.
I fully recognize the fiscal environment in which we are
operating, and throughout my written testimony I have indicated
our focus on cost management and cost efficiency; however, my
experience deeply reminds me that nuclear weapons are the last
place for half measures or corner cutting.
Thank you for your support, and I look forward to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hommert can be found in the
Appendix on page 59.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you very much, Dr. Hommert, for that
comment and for your service.
We are moving into questions now, and I want to start with
my questions. You heard me make reference in my opening
statement to some misinformation in the public discourse about
this, and one is a New York Times editorial from May, and which
I will read without objection. The editorial says, ``. . . many
experts doubt that the B61 warheads need to be rebuilt now, if
at all. Government-financed nuclear labs have a rigorous
program protecting them to make sure that they still work,''
close quote.
Dr. Hommert, you are the director of one of those
government-financed labs, and the government pays you to be the
expert to inform us as to whether or not we can ensure the
safety, security, and reliability of these weapons. Do you
agree with the New York Times observation in that editorial?
Dr. Hommert. I agree that we have a rigorous program to
attest and evaluate these annually. We certainly do that. And
it is, in fact, that program that has provided the basis of
information that leads me to make the statement I made. There
are physical processes occurring in these weapons that we see
across a number of arenas, from decay, isotopic decay, to
polymers, to HE [high explosive], that all together require
that we execute this life extension program.
Mr. Rogers. So you are saying that you don't agree with
their observation that we don't need to take action on the B61
now, if at all?
Dr. Hommert. Absolutely. I categorically disagree with that
statement.
Mr. Rogers. Great.
Dr. Cook, let's briefly discuss the editorial statement
that ``when all is said and done, experts say the cost of the
rebuilding program is expected to total around $10 billion--$4
billion more than an earlier projection.'' You provided us a
written explanation in the documents I previously introduced
for the record, but please walk us through the cost history
here. What figure do you stand behind for what this LEP will
cost? We hear a lot of misinformation on what the LEP is going
to cost.
Dr. Cook. Sir, I stand behind the first baseline provided
under my signature formerly to the Congress, which is called a
selective acquisition report. I entered that in May of 2013,
just this year, and that was once we are into full-scale
engineering design and after some time, this is a legal
requirement. I have updated that once already in a following
quarter and am ready to do that in the second quarter.
With regard to the costs, the $4 billion number is often
thrown around as some kind of a baseline. That was never a
baseline. We had a very initial position in a budget several
years ago that said we believe that the cost will be at least
in the $4 billion range, and we prepared, as we usually do
then, to undertake the work. At that point, no engineering work
had been done, no design work had yet been--begun on the B61,
and with a predecessor system, the W76, we were not yet into
stable manufacturing. So it was a placeholder, and nothing more
than that.
As we went through the Nuclear Weapon Council
deliberations, and over the course of the years which I
mentioned, 2010, 2011, and 2012, we evaluated quite a number of
options. The council ultimately selected Option 3B. The weapon
design and cost report came out after we moved from the
consideration of alternatives and Phase 6.2 into engineering
development, which is Phase 6.3. That report was issued, and
aside from the costs that were in that report, we have added
only management contingency. The details remain the same.
One additional effect, though, was caused by sequestration,
and that struck in March of this year. That caused the first
production unit to be slid out in schedule by 6 months, from
2019 to March of 2020, and it caused us to increase the cost
estimate by $244 million simply because of that single
sequestration event.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. General Kehler, is there a ``reduced
scope'' option that meets minimum military requirements and
costs less than the B61-12 design that is currently being
pursued in this LEP?
General Kehler. Mr. Chairman, I don't think there is any
longer. At one time we looked at some options in the Nuclear
Weapons Council. Early on it appeared that there might be a
lower-cost option that these gentlemen to my left are more than
prepared to discuss. The farther we have gone down the road in
investigating the scope of work that needs to be done, as I
look at this today, there is not a minimum option that is going
to fulfill all the military requirements that we have laid on.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you.
Secretary Creedon, the editorial calls the administration's
decision to pursue the B61 LEP, quote, ``a nonsensical
decision, not least because it is at odds with Mr. Obama's own
vision,'' close quote. It further states, quote, ``Mr. Obama
advocated the long-term goal of a world without nuclear arms
and promised to reduce America's reliance on them. He also
promised not to build a new and improved warhead.''
Secretary Creedon, what do you think of this statement by
the Times? Is the B61 contradictory to the President's visions
and goals?
Secretary Creedon. No, sir. It is absolutely consistent
with the President's goals. It is very important to remember
that there are sort of two--two points to all this. One is that
he has been very strong that the stockpile remain safe, secure,
and reliable, and that that remain that way as long as there
are nuclear weapons.
That said, he clearly has indicated that he would like to
entertain reductions, and that he would like to entertain these
reductions along--along with Russia, but until such time as
that happens, it is absolutely consistent, the B61-12 is
absolutely consistent, with the President's goals as well as
our commitments to our allies.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. And thank all the witnesses.
I yield now to the ranking member for any questions he may
have.
Mr. Garamendi. We are going to spend a considerable amount
of money on the B61-12 program, but before we get into that,
why do we need the B61? General Kehler.
General Kehler. Sir, our requirement to deter nuclear
attack is a military mission. This B61 weapon arms the B-2, it
will arm the future long-range strike platform, it arms the
current dual-capable aircraft that are forward-stationed in
Europe as well as those of our NATO allies that maintain dual-
capable aircraft, and it is the candidate weapon to arm the F-
35 in that dual-capable aircraft role.
It is about deterring, it is about assuring our allies of
our extended deterrence commitment to them, and, from a
military standpoint, it is about being able to offer the
President a series of options that include nuclear options in
extreme circumstances as among those from which he can choose.
Mr. Garamendi. Are there other gravity bombs available to
achieve this same task?
General Kehler. There is another gravity weapon today. It
is the B83 gravity weapon. It is different than the B61. We
have looked very carefully at whether--and technically you
could use the B83, so don't let me mislead you. You could
certainly use the B83 to arm the B2, and we have looked at
that, but on balance, when we look at the combinations of
features that are associated with both of these weapons, and we
look at the appeal of the B61 as a candidate to incorporate all
the best features as we go forward, we have come to the
conclusion that both from a military standpoint and from a
standpoint of future safety, security, and surety in the
stockpile, that the B61 is the best of the choices to go
forward.
Mr. Garamendi. So there is another bomb, the B83; is that
what you said?
General Kehler. There is.
Mr. Garamendi. That could achieve the same purpose?
General Kehler. It is a gravity----
Mr. Garamendi. What are its shortcomings?
General Kehler. It is a gravity weapon, but over the long
term, we think that it has some shortcomings that----
Mr. Garamendi. Which are?
General Kehler. Well, one, is it has a very high yield, and
we are trying to pursue weapons that actually are reducing in
yield, because we are concerned about maintaining weapons
that--that would have less collateral effect if the President
ever had to use them, which may sound----
Mr. Garamendi. Yes, it does sound like a strange way to use
collateral effect on a nuclear weapon, but go ahead.
General Kehler. Well, however, there is a direct
relationship between yield and collateral damage.
Mr. Garamendi. I am sure there is.
General Kehler. And so----
Mr. Garamendi. And with a lot of collateral damage at the
outset.
General Kehler. Without getting too ``Strangelove-y'' in
here, I think that the fact of the matter is that for the B83
and the B61, when you stack them next to one another, and you
look at both their current capabilities to meet military
requirements and their future potential to be the investment of
choice as we go to the future, the B61 has come out on top.
Mr. Garamendi. Does the B83 need to be--have life
extension?
General Kehler. It will eventually, but not in the same
pace as the B61. It is not necessary immediately.
Mr. Garamendi. When would it have to have the same kind of
extension?
General Kehler. I will defer to my colleagues down the
table.
Dr. Hommert. There will have to be some--how could I say
it--a smaller adjustment to its subcomponent system in the next
decade involving generators and gas transfer. That is a much
smaller-scope activity, but that has to occur. A full-scale
LEP, at least of the magnitude here, would not be needed for
over a decade.
Mr. Garamendi. There is some information that the B61 would
be scheduled for a new LEP in 2033; is that correct?
Dr. Cook. That comes directly out of the Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Plan, which we have issued regularly
and did so this year. The logic here is that it takes about 10
years to conduct a life extension program, and if you look at
the B61, by the time we get to first production unit, it will
be about 10 years.
The lifetime of the weapons that we put in the arsenal is
about 20 years, and so about 10 years after one weapon is
inserted into service, a life extension program would be needed
to begin to put new systems in, replace systems in 20 years
after the initial one. That is what the logic comes from.
Mr. Garamendi. Dr. Hommert, when would the B83 have to be--
have its life extended?
Dr. Hommert. Well, again, it will have--it has a couple of
components that we would have--we have to do work on in this
decade, right? At some point it will begin to face some of the
same aging issues we now see in the 61, but that is certainly
not for another decade or more. All right?
Mr. Garamendi. So going at this from the beginning, like
asking the question why, I am going to pursue it a bit. If I
understand, General Kehler, there is another gravity bomb
called the B83 that has a deficiency in that it is too
powerful. Are there any other deficiencies?
Mr. Garamendi. It is about flexibility for us as we look to
the future. The weapon is not as flexible as the B61.
Mr. Garamendi. What does ``flexible'' mean?
General Kehler. In terms of our ability to use various
yields that would be matched to the targets.
Mr. Garamendi. Does the B61 have variable yield?
General Kehler. It does at the lower end, yes, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. And the B83, Dr. Hommert, does it have a
variable yield?
Dr. Hommert. Yes.
Mr. Garamendi. So both have variable yield, but one is at a
higher variability, and the other is at a lower variability. So
flexibility has to do with the size of the explosion; is that
right, Dr. Cook?
Dr. Cook. Let----
Mr. Garamendi. Or wherever else you want to go, so----
Dr. Cook. Let us see. I am trying to provide some
information to answer your question.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you.
Dr. Cook. So in my remarks I said that we have agreement
that a B61-12 LEP suitably conducted could replace the B83,
which is the last megaton gravity bomb. So I am supporting what
General Kehler said. There is considerable difference in
collateral damage between the yield of a much smaller weapon.
And these yields are classified, so we cannot describe them
here.
Mr. Garamendi. I understand.
Dr. Cook. But I should also emphasize that the B83 is not
currently compatible with NATO aircraft nor with fighters of
the U.S., and so if one wanted to go down a different path, and
my recollection says that the life extension for the B83 comes
due to begin in a period of about 15 years or less.
Mr. Garamendi. The B61, is it compatible with the----
Dr. Cook. It is compatible.
Mr. Garamendi. The LEP on the B61 is to make it compatible
with future bombers and the F-35; is that correct?
General Kehler. Right. Right. The B61 is compatible with
all of the aircraft that I mentioned, and it will be made
compatible with the future aircraft as well. The B83 is not.
Mr. Garamendi. So the B83 could not be used for the F-35?
General Kehler. I would have to get that answer
specifically for the record for you. I think I know the answer,
but I don't want to speculate.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 113.]
Mr. Garamendi. I think you know where I am going with the
questions. I am going to a $12 billion question here. Do we
really need the B61 modified? Does the B83 suffice? Presumably
this entire discussion has to do with deterrence, not with the
tactical.
General Kehler. Well, yes, sir, except I would offer
deterrence is about the credibility of the military force that
is used to carry it out, and so we have always made sure that
our deterrence statements are backed with credible military
forces. That includes reliable weapons, that includes trained
people, plans to use them if we needed to, et cetera. And so
just having the weapons isn't enough, we don't think, to say
that we have a credible deterrent.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, thus far in the discussion--excuse me,
Mr. Rogers. I am going to wrap up in just a very few seconds
here.
The discussion thus far would indicate that we do have a
B83 bomb that works. It is going to need some modifications
that are apparently not terribly expensive and achievable in
the short term; is that correct, Dr. Hommert?
Dr. Hommert. Yes. Those modifications are planned, yes.
Mr. Garamendi. I am sorry. They are?
Dr. Hommert. Yes. They are planned to be executed over the
next decade, yes.
Mr. Garamendi. So they are already in the process of being
determined.
The question has to do with the deterrent. Apparently the
B83 can be delivered by the current strike bombers?
General Kehler. Can be delivered by the B2.
Mr. Garamendi. B2.
General Kehler. I am not 100 percent sure. We will get for
the record whether it can be delivered, for example, by the F-
15E. I don't believe it can, but I don't know that for sure. I
need to get that for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 113.]
Mr. Garamendi. I think I have gone about as far as I can go
in this format.
General Kehler. And if I could add another thing. Yes, we
are currently planning to do some things to the B83. Until we
get to the point where we have gone far enough in the B61 LEP,
we intend to reduce the numbers of B83s and then eliminate the
B83. That is what we will do. So we are not spending money
twice here.
Mr. Garamendi. I understand that would be wise, but on the
other hand, if the B83 is good with some repairs over the next
decade or more, why do we need the B61? Dr. Cook.
Dr. Cook. From a technical perspective, since NNSA and its
labs and plants design, develop, qualify, manufacture, certify
these weapons and then place them into the hands of the DOD.
Let me emphasize that the intent with the B61-12 is to replace
the current mods 3, mod 4, mod 7, mod 10, and because we are in
the second year of full-scale engineering, about to enter the
third, we have built sufficient confidence among the nuclear
weapon complex member units to retire the B83. If we did not do
that, and we will need to do a life extension of the B83, I--
you know, I said it will be not sooner than 10 years, but not
longer than 15 years. It will be a larger life extension. It
will be more expensive. We will have to do compatibility with
aircraft which don't currently fly it, and we will not have the
basis to do that at anywhere near the cost of the B61-12. All I
can say right now is it would be considerably more expensive,
in my opinion, my technical opinion.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. We are going to be--call for votes
in about 10 or 15 minutes, so----
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Mr. Garamendi asked a great question, and I thought
everybody covered it in their opening statements, but I want to
give each one of you a chance to restate it. In your
professional opinion, do we need to move forward with the B61
LEP, yes or no? Ms. Creedon.
Secretary Creedon. Yes. And I want to add a policy take on
this----
Mr. Rogers. Okay.
Secretary Creedon [continuing]. For just a second. One of
the things with respect to the B83 is it is--it truly is a
megaton-class weapon. It is the relic of the cold war. And when
we look at the forward-deployed B61s and what a B61-12 would
provide for us, particularly in Europe, the B83 is not
compatible with the European aircraft, and the idea of
introducing a megaton warhead into Europe is almost
inconceivable to me at this point. So----
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Secretary Creedon [continuing]. We need the 61.
Mr. Rogers. General Kehler, your professional opinion. Do
we need to move forward with the B61?
General Kehler. We do need to move forward with the B61. We
have looked across the B61 and B83 and come to the conclusion
that that is the best way forward.
Mr. Rogers. Great.
Dr. Cook.
Dr. Cook. Yes.
Mr. Rogers. Dr. Hommert.
Dr. Hommert. Yes.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Obviously you all aren't lawyers. The
lawyer has to expound upon it. Thank you very much.
The gentleman from Colorado is recognized for 5 minutes.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And you all have a key role in helping to maintain our
deterrent, and I want to thank each and every one of you for
the work that you do. And, General Kehler, you in particular,
you are about to retire. I met you first in Colorado Springs,
and you went on to Omaha from there, and I just want to say I
appreciate your career and your service to our country. Thank
you.
General Kehler. Thank you.
Mr. Lamborn. And I will come back to you for a question, if
I can, but first, Dr. Cook, I would like to ask you briefly
about the production plants being brought in with the fiscal
year 2014 budget requests, including Y-12 and Pantex. And these
two plants have been operating under short-term contract
extensions for nearly 3 years. There have been some bid
protests. This must be distracting for the workforce there.
So are you concerned about the plants being able to retain
and attract quality personnel under these uncertain
circumstances, and do you think the Department will consider
cancelling the RFP [request for proposal] and taking the time
to redo the contract?
Dr. Cook. You had two parts of a question. First part, yes,
I am concerned about the health and well-being of the workforce
no matter where they are, the labs, the plants, and Nevada.
Second part of the question, with regard to contractual
things, I cannot answer. I could say there was a statement
yesterday about the timing in which NNSA intended to award a
contract. I would refer you to that, but I don't have any
personal knowledge.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay. Thank you.
And, General Kehler, let me ask you and Secretary Creedon
about--and this builds on a question that the chairman asked a
few minutes ago about the B61-12. I know one of the options
that was considered, and I--it is displayed on this posterboard
over here was the ``Triple Alt'' [alteration] option. How do
those two compare? How does the Triple Alt compare to the B61-
12 option, especially looking at cost and important factors
like that? Either one of you, or both. Both of you.
General Kehler. I will start, sir, and then ask, again, my
colleagues from NNSA to really describe the differences. But,
again, when we entered the conversation about what we had to do
with the B61 initially, there was an alternative that was
proposed that would have done only the most critical things
that we thought existed, the problems that we thought existed
at the time. One of those--and this is an unclassified hearing,
so we can provide more details for the record--but one of those
was radar, and----
Mr. Lamborn. Is that on the Triple Alt line, that row on
the top there?
Dr. Hommert. Radars, yes.
General Kehler. It is. Don, if you want to----
Mr. Lamborn. Can you see that okay?
Dr. Cook. May I just address a couple--some comments on the
chart for everybody here? The Triple Alt covers three critical
components that do need to be improved. Dr. Hommert can speak
more about each of these. The first is radar, second is the
power supply, and the third is neutron generators. Although
there is no immediate life-threatening--meaning in the next
year--issue on B61 in these components, they all have long-term
issues. So if you look at all of the other categories of the
decisionmaking, you can see that falls in red block.
There are issues with that specific LEP that are not
resolved, and one of those is there is a degradation in warhead
electronics internal to the bomb in its present radiation
environment.
If you look at the next option, the 1E option would solve
what I just mentioned, that is, internal electronics, but it
would be constrained only to nonnuclear life extension program.
And so we would not do any fixes to the nuclear explosive
package, primary, secondary or interstage, and we would have to
come back and address those units in a separate LEP. So with a
1E, first we would do, you know, a nonnuclear LEP, and then we
would have to come back to do a nuclear LEP. That would be a
more expensive approach. If you look at the nonnuclear portion,
the first portion only, well, that is less expensive than the
3B. But if you look at both, it is more expensive, so that is
why I address the full through-life cost.
You can see option 3B is the first option that meets all of
the requirements. And when we said meets minimum requirements,
you can see option 2C. Anywhere there is a B or a C, you can
imagine there were A's, there were other variants. This is just
a short rendition of the options. Option 2C, though, made step
improvements in safety by having direct optical initiation, so
no electrical connection to the detonators, and multipoint
safety, too detailed for this hearing. We chose, though, not to
take that option because it was more expensive.
Mr. Lamborn. So it is your opinion that of all the four
options, 3B is the best one by far? Well, it addresses all of
the issues after detailed and extensive analysis?
Dr. Cook. That is correct. Not only that, it has the lowest
through-life cost of all of these options listed.
Mr. Lamborn. And you all would agree with that?
Dr. Hommert. Absolutely.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you.
General Kehler. Yes.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you very much.
Mr. Rogers. The gentlemen's time has expired.
The gentlelady from California, Ms. Sanchez, is recognized.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
So first, Mr. Chairman, I would like to submit for the
record some letters, I know that you have already received
them, from a lot of other Parliamentarians from other
countries, in particular our allies, who are asking us that the
modernization for the deployment of the B61 is a waste of
resources for both the U.S. and the particular countries they
come from, many of them. I would like to put it into the
record.
Mr. Rogers. Without objection, so ordered.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 85.]
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Turner. Will the gentlelady yield for just one moment,
kindly? I had received a similar letter when the members of the
NATO Parliamentary Assembly were in from--Raymond Knops, a
member of Parliament from the Netherlands, to which we
responded, detailing the specific issues that related to the
letters that you are entering into the record.
With the chairman's consent, I would like to introduce that
letter.
Ms. Sanchez. Sounds great.
Mr. Turner. Also as--as----
Ms. Sanchez. Sounds great. I would like to have it into the
record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
beginning on page 108.]
Mr. Turner. Thank you. And then we would also----
Ms. Sanchez. Now reclaiming my time, please.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. Mr. Chairman----
Mr. Rogers. Your choice.
Ms. Sanchez. Okay. Because I didn't give him the time, you
did. You gave away my time, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. We all have our faults.
Ms. Sanchez. So I want to talk about the deterrence value
and the military value, because I remember General Cartwright
saying something to the effect of we lose no military value if
we don't have the B61.
So my question to the general and to Secretary Creedon is
how much have our allies contributed to the cost of the B61
Life Extension Program? Has potential withdrawal or other
measures to provide reliable extended deterrence been discussed
in consultation with NATO capitals? Why or why not? Is it
possible to provide reliable extended deterrence without
forward-deploying the B61? And have you discussed NATO
contributing to the B61 LEP programs?
And this all comes from the whole issue of Cartwright
saying we have other military things that take care of this
whole spectrum--basically, that is what he has said to us--and
this is more of a political value. So can you speak to the
three or four questions I put forward before you?
Secretary Creedon. Thank you. First let me take the value
of the 61 to our NATO allies.
I have the privilege of chairing what is referred to as the
High Level Group, which is an interesting name, but it is a
senior NATO group that deals with nuclear policy in the context
of NATO, and it reports to the defense and foreign ministers
sitting in what is referred to as the Nuclear Planning Group
format. And it is a long-standing NATO committee, and one of
the things that that committee looks at is nuclear policy
within NATO, including political guidance.
And the High-Level Group just completed, over the course of
the last year and a half, a whole review on what exactly
nuclear policy in NATO should be. It was initially reflected in
the NATO Defense Posture Review, which was----
Ms. Sanchez. So you are eating up my time here.
Secretary Creedon [continuing]. 2012, but it said NATO will
remain a nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist.
Ms. Sanchez. Are they providing money----
Secretary Creedon. Yes, they are.
Ms. Sanchez [continuing]. For this life extension?
Secretary Creedon. So not----
Ms. Sanchez. How much? What percentage?
Secretary Creedon. So not for the life extension itself.
Ms. Sanchez. No. Have they provided money for the----
Secretary Creedon. It is a----
Ms. Sanchez [continuing]. Life extension?
Secretary Creedon. The life extension----
Ms. Sanchez. This is what we are concerned about here.
Secretary Creedon. The life extension, it is the life
extension for a U.S. weapon. As a U.S. weapon, the U.S. pays
for the life extension program.
Ms. Sanchez. So they are not; so they are not putting their
money where their mouth is.
Secretary Creedon. NATO contributes and has contributed
over 170 million euros, and NATO provides for the security. The
host bases provide for the security, and also they also provide
all their own aircraft. So there is a----
Ms. Sanchez. Ms. Creedon----
Secretary Creedon [continuing]. Substantial NATO
contribution.
Ms. Sanchez. Ms. Creedon, I would like to ask you another
question since you kind of ate up my time there, and I am now a
minute or under. Also Mr. Chairman did, or actually----
Mr. Rogers. The gentlelady is allowed 38 seconds to make
up----
Ms. Sanchez. Do you know exactly how much the Department of
Defense spends for maintaining and deploying nuclear weapons?
Would including personnel costs in understanding which bases
are counted provide a more accurate estimate of the full costs
of nuclear? Can you give us a cost estimate of what it costs to
do these things?
Secretary Creedon. We can give you the personnel costs, we
can give you O&M [operation and maintenance] costs. We have
done over time various estimates as the cost for DOD of
maintaining the nuclear weapons and delivery systems.
Ms. Sanchez. Because I asked for this in fiscal year 2013.
It was taken out. I have asked for it in fiscal year 2014. NDAA
goes forward. Would you support figuring how much it is really
costing us to do this?
Secretary Creedon. We can provide those figures. I mean, we
can certainly provide the figures.
Ms. Sanchez. Perfect.
I will end on time, because I know we have got votes on the
floor, Mr. Chairman. Thank you. Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
The chair now recognizes the gentleman from Louisiana, Dr.
Fleming, for 5 minutes.
Dr. Fleming. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you, panel.
I am going to turn the question around a little bit, and I
will start with General Kehler, but others can answer. What if
we de-scoped or cancelled? And I get what you say about the
flexibility, and that makes perfect sense to me about the B61
LEP program, but what if we didn't do that? What would be the
result? What would we find in the following years for not
moving forward with that?
General Kehler. Sir, the reliability of the deterrent
continues to decline. As you heard our colleagues from the
Department of Energy say, these, the weapons, almost across the
board now, are approaching 20-plus years of lifetime, some of
them older than that. In some cases they are based on
components and designs that are older than that. And so from my
perspective, what we watch very carefully is the reliability
when we do nonnuclear explosive testing on the weapons and
component surveillance testing, the things that the labs do to
talk to us about the weapons that provide us with an annual way
to look at the viability of the stockpile.
The trend is for reliability to continue to decrease unless
we take the actions that we are laying out here in our
strategy. So in every case here, there are components in our
weapons that must be addressed. If we don't address those, then
we have reliability issues. At some point in time, we will have
to--we have weapons that what we call ``turn red.'' That is not
a safety issue, but that is a performance issue. So we don't
want to put the country in a place where, as long as we are
asked to provide the nuclear deterrent, that we can't do that
with weapons that are credible.
Dr. Fleming. Yeah. General, would that then create a
situation where a future President in outyears and when that
reliability begins to decline, in a certain situation certain
options would be taken off the table, and he or she may have
less choices; we might even have to choose a conventional
solution that might be inadequate simply because we don't have
the flexibility of that upgrade and the modernization?
General Kehler. Sir, I think that that is clearly an issue,
and I do agree with what you just said. I think that you
could--you could be removing options and flexibility from a
future President.
I also think that there is impact on our ability to deter
those kinds of uses to begin with. The ultimate objective of
the nuclear deterrent is to make sure that the weapons are
never used, and yet we use them every day----
Dr. Fleming. Yes.
General Kehler [continuing]. To do that. It is almost
counterintuitive, from people who aren't informed, but we use
those weapons every single day. The credibility of our
deterrent depends on the credibility of the weapons and the
forces and the people that are associated.
Dr. Fleming. Okay. Well, then, let me ask this, and, again,
anyone on the panel is welcome to answer this question. In
moving forward with our LEP and what we learned from doing
that, the technology developed, how can that be expanded to
other modernization programs or other programs in general?
Yeah. Dr. Hommert.
Dr. Hommert. Yeah. From the outset as we have gone into
this LEP, we have looked at as many components that we can do
here. The radar is an example. This radar will go into two
additional LEPs. There are also devices that--you can think of
them as switches, but highly specialized switches, which assure
safety. Those that will go into the 61 will also be options for
us in future LEPs.
So there is a fair amount of cost buy-down implicit by
going through the very admittedly thorough and therefore costs
associated with qualifying these components now in the 61, but
we expect to reap benefit from that on future extension
programs, life extension programs.
Dr. Fleming. Okay. Thank you.
And, finally, how would this affect the follow-on cruise
missile, long-range standoff missile that will replace the air-
launched cruise missile?
Dr. Cook. I will provide a technical answer. As we are
looking at options for the long-range standoff, as Dr. Hommert
has just said, we have found that we would be able to apply
considerable reuse of the nonrecurring engineering expense; in
other words, they would be less expensive. So the things like
arming and firing the safety switches that Dr. Hommert
addressed, in the terms of the nonnuclear elements, a great
deal of leverage is applied.
Dr. Fleming. Right. Yes, go ahead, General.
General Kehler. Sir, I would just add that today in the
strategic force, we have two gravity weapons, the B61 and the
B83, as Mr. Garamendi mentioned. We want to eliminate the B83.
And we also have a cruise missile today. Our view is that for
the future we would like to keep that mixture, a gravity weapon
and a cruise missile, because of the military capabilities that
they give us, and because of the problems that would present to
any adversary.
Dr. Fleming. Great. Thank you so much, and I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentleman.
The gentleman from Georgia, Mr. Johnson, is recognized for
5 minutes.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Cook, the fiscal year 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Plan confidently proclaims that the 3+2 strategy is
an executable plan; however, the report also notes that many of
the plan's proposed life extension programs are in the early
study phase, and the cost estimates are not complete. It also
notes that NNSA is unlikely to be able to complete the scope of
work it planned to complete in fiscal year 2013 due to budget
reductions, to say nothing about future years.
Given these and other caveats presented in the report, how
can NNSA proclaim that 3+2 vision achievable?
Dr. Cook. Thank you for the question. I will be direct in
the answer.
I have already mentioned the applicability of the B61
component development and how that will carry across to the
long-range standoff missile. There is similar applicability to
the first interoperable of three that are in the 3+2 strategy.
Decisions have been made and endorsed by the Nuclear Weapon
Council with regard to improvements in safety and security, and
we are on a path of technology development and component
maturation. So the fact that we developed confidence in the
development and can actually have metrics that tell us where we
are, that is where part of the confidence comes from.
I will also say, however, 2013, fiscal year 2013, is over.
We are into fiscal year 2014. It would be wonderful to have a
budget, it would be wonderful not to have sequestration, but we
are where we are.
Mr. Johnson. Well, let me ask this question, Dr. Cook: What
is the impact on other LEPs if the B61 schedule slips?
Dr. Cook. The short answer is if the 61 slipped, and the
other LEPs did not slip, then the--more of the early
development costs would be borne by the other LEPs, and so
their cost would increase.
Mr. Johnson. General Kehler and Ms. Creedon, are you
concerned about potential schedule slips?
Secretary Creedon. Absolutely. And as we have covered, the
greatest risk to the B61-12 and, frankly, to the entire 3+2
strategy at the moment doesn't appear to be technical risk, it
really is budgetary risk. And it is the ongoing implications of
sequestration.
Mr. Johnson. General Kehler.
General Kehler. Sir, I agree with that. Yes.
Mr. Johnson. All right. Dr. Cook, how does NNSA plan to
manage four to five concurrent LEPs without cost increase and
schedule delays?
Dr. Cook. I could give you many details, but I don't have
the time. So first I will say these LEPs are in different
stages, ranging from stable production where we are with the
life-extended ballistic system for the Navy, 76-1, to very
early considerations where we are with the long-range standoff
option. The B61 is in between: at engineering development. So
being very clear about the interdependencies is the first
point.
Secondly, we are applying the rigor of earned-value
management systems across the board. We are using industry-
standard tools, like Primavera, and we are basically providing
resource-loaded schedules that give us the confidence that we
can execute these in detail.
Mr. Johnson. All right. Dr. Cook, one last question. The
currently proposed B61 LEP appears to be premised on a number
of assumptions that may be outdated. For example, the program
seems to assume that the United States would continue to
forward-deploy tactical versions of the B61 in Europe, even
though President Obama has stated his desire to negotiate with
Russia to remove these weapons. In addition, the new high-level
nuclear weapons policy guidance signed by President Obama in
June could reduce the number of strategic gravity bombs that
are required for deterrence.
How might changes to the existing deterrence requirements
alter the currently proposed scope of the B61 LEP?
Secretary Creedon. Sorry, sir. Since that is more of a
policy question than a technical question, if you don't mind.
Mr. Johnson. All right.
Secretary Creedon. So at the moment the President has been
very clear that he would like to entertain conversations with
Russia and with NATO allies to look at possible reductions. In
the meantime, however, the B61 is, in fact, forward-deployed at
NATO, and our NATO allies, as I mentioned earlier, have
reaffirmed the need for that.
But it is not just the ability to forward-deploy in Europe.
I mean, when we look at the 61, it is the total package. It is
the strategic as well as the ability to move forward not only
in Europe, but also in the Asia-Pacific region should we need
it.
Mr. Rogers. Gentleman's time has expired.
Chair now recognizes the gentleman from Florida, Mr.
Nugent, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Nugent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I appreciate this
panel's candor in regards to where we stand on the LEP as
relates to B61.
I do want to make a comment. I know where my good friend
Mr. Garamendi was coming from, I think I do at least, trying to
say, hey, listen, if we have something that works, why are we
repairing something that needs to be repaired today?
Mr. Garamendi. Very conservative thought.
Mr. Nugent. Conservative thought. I appreciate that from
the gentleman on the left there. But I also--it is not
impossible.
But I also have heard you loud and clear, particularly as
it relates to the B61 and the flexibility that that gives you
versus the 83, and particularly in regards to launch platform,
and, secondly, the yield that it would do or collateral damage
that it would do.
So I want to make sure that I am clear, particularly from
the forward-deployed standpoint. That is part of our posture,
is it not, in how we are dealing with possible belligerent
countries? Is that important to you?
Secretary Creedon. That is correct.
Mr. Nugent. And I would suggest that, you know, we talk
about Europe, but we also have an issue as relates to North
Korea that is threatening one of our allies in South Korea. So
I think you have all answered this very clearly is that you
feel that it is imperative that we follow the strategic advice
of the experts in this particular issue, Dr. Cook and Dr.
Hommert, in regards to moving forward with the transition of
the B61; is that correct?
Dr. Hommert. Yes. Absolutely.
Dr. Cook. Yes.
Mr. Nugent. And what is the negative consequence if we
don't? What position does that put us in?
Dr. Hommert. Well, if we don't execute the life extension
program, then we will observe the gradual decay of reliability
of this weapon over the next decade, and it will reach a point
somewhere, in my view, technical judgment, in the next decade
in which it will simply not have the sufficient reliability to
do something that General Kehler could have confidence as part
of his force.
Dr. Cook. I am going to give the other perspective. If we
do not do the 61-12 LEP, we will not be able to retire the B83,
the last of the megaton-class weapons. We will not be able to
reduce the number of nuclear weapons by a factor of two, nor
will we be able to reduce both the amount of special nuclear
material in air-delivered bombs because of the number of
reductions in numbers and the B83, and--or the destructive
power by 80 percent. Those are the nonproliferation, arms
control, and very important aspects of conducting the 61 LEP.
None of those would be achieved if we don't do the 61-12.
General Kehler. Sir, investing in the B61 sustains a
military capability for us that will go away if we do not.
Secretary Creedon. And investing in the B61 also provides
the extended deterrence to our allies around the world. And in
the absence of that reliable extended deterrence, there is a
real concern that some of those allies who have the ability to
develop their own nuclear weapons would, in fact, do so.
Mr. Nugent. I appreciate all of your comments, and I will
yield back my time.
Mr. Rogers. Thank the gentleman.
The chair recognizes the gentleman, Mr. Bridenstine, for 5
minutes.
Mr. Bridenstine. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will be quick;
I know we are voting right now.
Just one quick question for you, General. You talked about
the credibility of our weapons being necessary for the
credibility of the deterrence. And, of course, we are reducing
our--the number of our weapons, and we are reducing our hedge.
Do you see any value in proving the credibility of our weapons
by maybe doing an underground test of one?
General Kehler. Sir, not at this time. We consult with the
experts, and we are asked annually to assess for the President
whether we think that it is necessary to conduct a nuclear
explosive test. They do extensive testing on these weapons, not
to include nuclear explosive testing. And at this point in time
I don't think we gain something that I believe is militarily
necessary by doing a nuclear explosive test.
Mr. Bridenstine. So you are comfortable, given the data you
are provided, that the hedge is sufficient and our bombs will
work?
General Kehler. Yes, sir. I am very confident of that.
Mr. Bridenstine. Okay. Thank you. That is all I wanted to
know. Thanks.
Mr. Rogers. Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. Dr. Cook, you made a statement, your last
statement, and you laid out the nonproliferation scenarios. We
don't have time now because we are going to go to vote. I would
appreciate a detailed explanation of each one of the issues you
raised.
Dr. Cook. I would be happy to provide that. It is also in
my written testimony and backed up by a number of classified
briefings we have done.
Mr. Garamendi. Then let us do both.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 113.]
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman.
Before I go to my colleague from Arizona, General Kehler,
do you believe the B61 nuclear bombs serve a military purpose
in Europe?
General Kehler. I do. Nuclear deterrence is a military
mission, and we--what we would offer is options that--military
options in extreme circumstances that that would be available
for the President. I believe all of that is a military mission.
Mr. Rogers. Great. Thank you.
I recognize my friend and colleague from Arizona, Mr.
Franks, for 5 minutes.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And thank all of you.
General Kehler, I also want to single you out. I consider
you a friend and consider you a friend to human freedom. And I
would suggest to you that, as I often have, that my 5-year-old
twins have a better chance to walk in the light of liberty
someday because men like you lived and wore those stars. And I
really appreciate you very, very much.
And with that, I am going to move on to somebody else and
ask a question here.
Dr. Cook, how much has been spent to date on the B61 LEP?
Dr. Cook. Just a bit over $1.2 billion.
Mr. Franks. And how much of that work that has been done to
date would be scrapped in the event that we de-scoped options
pursued for the B61?
Dr. Cook. Most of it, but not all of it.
Mr. Franks. And now that we are already in engineering
development, component qualification, the LEP, would it be easy
to de-scope the program?
Dr. Cook. No, it would not. If we did so, it would set us
back about 2 years, and any of the path options that we have
identified would be more expensive than continuing with the 61-
12.
Mr. Franks. So it wouldn't save us any money.
Dr. Cook. It would not.
Mr. Franks. Do any of the witnesses think it makes any
sense to reduce the scope of this LEP?
Secretary Creedon. No.
Dr. Hommert. No.
General Kehler. No.
Mr. Franks. Mr. Chairman, I have other questions, but I am
going to stop right there and thank the panel and thank the
chairman for the time.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you very much. Thank all of you very
much. It has been very helpful. You did a great job. And we are
now adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:49 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
October 29, 2013
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
General Kehler. That is mainly correct. As it stands today, the B83
is not compatible with the F-35 or any other dual-capable fighter
aircraft. The F-35 is being fielded as a survivable platform with a
modern, digital-only weapon control system. To make the B83 work on the
F-35 would require significant and extensive modifications to the
weapon, the supporting infrastructure and perhaps the platform itself,
all at a much higher cost than the planned B61 program. For example,
the B83 would require a complete replacement of its outdated analog
technology as well as an overhaul of its security features. Such a full
scope, nuclear and non-nuclear re-design would require extensive
testing and certification before deploying on the F-35. Finally, all
overseas storage vaults and maintenance equipment would need
modification to support the B83. [See page 14.]
General Kehler. The B83 can be delivered by the B-2 and B-52. It is
not certified for delivery on any other current aircraft. [See page
15.]
Dr. Cook. The B61-12 LEP with guided tail kit assembly will replace
four of the five current variants of the B61, resulting in a single
variant after the B61-11 is retired. U.S. Strategic Command determined
that with the accuracy provided by a tail kit, the yield provided by
today's lowest yield B61 variant would be sufficient to meet all of the
strategic and non-strategic requirements for gravity systems. Having a
single variant will enable a reduction in the number of deployed and
non-deployed air-delivered nuclear gravity weapons in the stockpile,
while increasing the safety and security of this aging system.
Additionally, by balancing reduced yield with improved accuracy, this
LEP would allow us to pursue retirement of the B61-11, and the B83
gravity bomb, once confidence in the B61-12 stockpile is gained; as
provided in the FY 2014 NNSA Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan.
All of these aspects above allow the majority of the air delivered
gravity weapons to be removed from the U.S. nuclear stockpile (active
and inactive), a very large reduction in the total amount of nuclear
material utilized by air delivered gravity weapons in the U.S. nuclear
stockpile, and a significant reduction in the total nuclear yield
(i.e., mega-tonnage) produced by air-delivered gravity weapons in the
U.S. nuclear stockpile. Additionally, information can be provided in a
classified forum upon request. [See page 25.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
October 29, 2013
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Rogers. Secretary Creedon, you are the U.S. representative to
NATO's High Level Group, which discusses nuclear weapons aspects of
NATO defense posture. What are the consequences to NATO and our
relationship with our NATO allies if we fail to deliver on the B61 Life
Extension Program (LEP)?
a. We've heard some people say that NATO should pay for part of the
B61 LEP. Does the Administration think it is appropriate for a foreign
country to pay for sustainment of U.S. nuclear weapons? Would that
violate any treaties? Does it violate common sense?
b. Do you anticipate NATO changing its policy on nuclear weapons
any time soon?
Secretary Creedon. a. NATO contributes to the Alliance's nuclear
posture in two ways. First, through the NATO Security Investment
Program, NATO allies provide funding for security and infrastructure
enhancements and upgrades at European nuclear weapons storage sites.
Second, NATO allies burden-share in the nuclear mission by assigning
pilots and dual-capable aircraft to the mission, and by supporting the
nuclear mission with conventional operations (such as the SNOWCAT
program--``Support of Nuclear Operations with Conventional Air
Tactics''). I do not think it is appropriate for a foreign country to
pay for sustainment of U.S. nuclear weapons because it would subject
classified U.S. nuclear data to be disclosed to foreign nations and
will open contributing nations to charges of proliferation. Moreover,
these are U.S. weapons and the U.S. must remain responsible for their
sustainment.
b. The 2012 Deterrence and Defense Posture Review concluded that
nuclear weapons are a core component of NATO's overall capabilities for
deterrence and defense, alongside conventional and missile defense
forces; and that the Alliance's nuclear force posture currently meets
the criteria for an effective deterrence and defense posture. Moreover,
the DDPR states that, as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will
remain a nuclear Alliance. Since the security environment since 2012
has not changed appreciably, I do not anticipate NATO changing its
policy on nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future.
Mr. Rogers. What is our non-NATO allies' interest in the B61 LEP?
a. What do you foresee as potential impacts on some of our Asian
allies, in particular Japan and South Korea, if we fail to execute the
LEP?
b. Wouldn't we be endangering the credibility of our extended
deterrent if the B61 LEP isn't funded?
Secretary Creedon. The B61 plays a critical role in the U.S.
nuclear posture in East Asia because it serves both as an assurance and
deterrence function for Japan and South Korea. The B61 assures our
allies by providing them with a tangible demonstration of the
seriousness of the U.S. extended deterrence commitment.
Mr. Rogers. Do you believe our extended deterrent assurances to
allies lose credibility if we continue to slip deadlines for
modernizing our stockpile?
Secretary Creedon. In the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review report, the
Administration stated that it was committed to the full scope life
extension of the B61. Both the Administration's 2013 nuclear employment
guidance and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's 2012 Deterrence
and Defense Posture Review rely, in part, on this commitment. The U.S.
nuclear employment guidance states that the United States will maintain
the capability to forward-deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons (i.e.,
the B61) with heavy bombers and dual-capable aircraft in support of
extended deterrence and assurance of U.S. allies and partners.
Similarly, as the only U.S. nuclear weapon assigned to NATO, the B61
supports the Alliance's commitment in the DDPR that NATO will remain a
nuclear alliance for as long as nuclear weapons exist and to maintain
the current nuclear posture. Based on these commitments, it is critical
that the United States complete the B61 LEP as scheduled.
Mr. Rogers. If we decided tomorrow to withdraw all B61s forward-
deployed in support of NATO, would we still need to execute the B61
LEP?
a. Is the need for the B61 LEP driven by our NATO Alliance
commitments, or by our own nuclear deterrent needs?
Secretary Creedon. Both the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review and the
June 2013 U.S. nuclear employment guidance state that the United States
will maintain a nuclear Triad consisting of intercontinental ballistic
missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and nuclear capable
bombers--including heavy bombers and dual-capable aircraft. Further,
this guidance states that the United States will retain the capability
to forward deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNW), like the B61.
Additionally, as a result of the retirement of the B83, the B61 will be
the only gravity weapon to support the B-2 mission. Retaining all three
legs of the Triad best maintains strategic stability at reasonable cost
while hedging against potential technical problems or vulnerabilities.
To maintain an effective and credible Triad--which includes the ability
to forward deploy NSNW--the B61 LEP is necessary whether or not it
remains a component of NATO's deterrence and defense posture.
Finally, benefits of the B61-12 LEP are not limited to commitments
to NATO. The technical work performed for this LEP will be leveraged
for future LEPs, providing potential cost savings to other programs.
Mr. Rogers. We have heard from various disarmament advocates that
the B61 LEP is premised on a number of assumptions that may be
outdated. This includes an assumption that the U.S. will continue to
forward-deploy B61s in Europe, even though President Obama has stated
his desire to negotiate with Russia to remove these weapons. Also,
President Obama has said he believes we can reduce the number of
nuclear weapons further, so maybe we just don't need the B61 going
forward. So, do you think deterrence requirements are changing, and
therefore we should reexamine the scope of the B61 LEP or its existence
altogether?
Secretary Creedon. The role of U.S. non-strategic nuclear weapons
(NSNW) in Europe was recently re-evaluated by the NATO Alliance in May
2012 as part Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (DDPR). As part of
the DDPR all NATO members agreed that ``Nuclear weapons are a core
component of NATO's overall capabilities for deterrence and defence
alongside conventional and missile defence forces''; that ``As long as
nuclear weapons exist, NATO will remain a nuclear alliance''; and
``While seeking to create the conditions and considering options for
further reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons assigned to NATO,
Allies concerned will ensure that all components of NATO's nuclear
deterrent remain safe, secure, and effective for as long as NATO
remains a nuclear alliance.''
The President has stated his desire to further reduce the amount
and role of nuclear weapons and the B61-12 LEP is an important step
towards achieving those objectives. Once the B61-12 LEP program is
completed and confidence in its capabilities are established the U.S.
will be able to reduce the number of nuclear gravity bombs by over 50
percent and the amount of nuclear material utilized in those gravity
bombs by over 80 percent. The B61-12 LEP is a key component of the
Administration's requirement that the U.S. retain the capability to
forward deploy nuclear weapons on tactical fighters and heavy bombers,
most recently expressed in the revised nuclear employment guidance in
June 2013 and also in the Nuclear Posture Review in 2010.
Mr. Rogers. a. NNSA's final cost estimate for the B61-12 LEP came
in at around $8 billion. I understand that DOD's CAPE office has put
forward an estimate of over $10 billion. Please describe the level of
rigor and effort that went into developing this estimate.
Dr. Cook. a. NNSA used a high level of rigor and effort to develop
the B61-12 cost estimate. The current cost estimate for the B61-12 life
extension program (LEP) reported in the September 2013 Selected
Acquisition Report to Congress is $8.1B which includes $7.3B in direct
B61-12 funding and another $0.8B in other NNSA funds. The estimate is
based on the Weapon Design and Cost Report (WDCR) published in July
2012 and has not changed with the exception of the impacts due to the
FY 2013 sequestration cuts.\1\ NNSA submits quarterly updates to
Congress on cost and schedule and will formally update the cost
estimate following the Baseline Design Review to establish an
Acquisition Program Baseline in FY 2016. The WDCR cost estimate is the
initial cost estimate for the weapon program. NNSA used a bottom-up
cost estimating approach involving more than 40 product realization
teams with representatives from each of the NNSA design and production
agencies. The WDCR cost estimate followed the GAO cost estimating
guidance using three-point estimates, risk based contingency analysis,
and included management reserve. Component level costs are directly
linked to the life extension option and comprise both direct costs
associated with design, development, procurement, and testing as well
as system level integration and testing costs. The estimate was
internally, but independently, reviewed and represents a formal
commitment by each site on expected costs for the weapon program. The
estimate will be updated in the Baseline Cost Report following
completion of the Baseline Design Review and prior to entry into Phase
6.4 in FY 2016.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ As a result of sequestration, NNSA slipped the First Production
Unit (FPU) from September 2019 to March 2020 and added $244M to the
management reserve to offset the potential increased costs and
associated risks with delaying the program by six months. The first
B61-12 Selected Acquisition Report to Congress, which formally
documents weapon program cost and schedule, included the sequestration
impacts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Mr. Rogers. b. Would you please describe how CAPE arrived at this
number?
Dr. Cook. b. The DOD CAPE developed their cost estimate
independently. NNSA must defer to the DOD to answer questions on the
process they used. One major difference between the CAPE estimate and
that provided by the NNSA WDCR was an extended schedule. CAPE assumed
an additional three years of development work.
Mr. Rogers. c. What is your professional opinion of this number by
CAPE?
Dr. Cook. c. CAPE developed their cost estimate independently.
Therefore, NNSA cannot offer an opinion.
Mr. Rogers. d. Which number do you stand by?
Dr. Cook. d. The NNSA stands by the $8.1 billion cost estimate
published in the September 2013 Selected Acquisition Report.
Mr. Rogers. a. What are the impacts to the B61 LEP if sequestration
is allowed to continue for the duration of FY14?
Dr. Cook. a. The impact of additional sequestration cuts to the
program schedule is being assessed but is expected to be less than 3
months to the March 2020 first production unit (FPU). If funding for
the B61-12 and related activities is restored to the President's Budget
Request (PBR) level, the LEP would be able to maintain its current
March 2020 FPU commitment reported in the September 2013 Selected
Acquisition Report (SAR). Funding at the $537M PBR level versus the
$561M B61-12 SAR estimated requirement will increase risk to the FPU as
less funds will be available for risk mitigation. In addition, funding
for NNSA infrastructure investments is also limited. This could cause
system- or facility-level failures in the nuclear security enterprise
that would preclude safe and secure operations, causing unplanned
delays in the B61 LEP and other programs.
Mr. Rogers. b. If a continuing resolution is passed for much of
FY14, what are the effects if the B61 LEP does not receive an
``anomaly'' that enables it to spend at the level of the President's
budget request?
Dr. Cook. b. Under the current CR, the B61-12 is being held to
$369M as opposed to the PBR of $537M or the Selected Acquisition Report
estimated requirement of $561M. If the program is held at the $369M
level through FY 2014, it would significantly impact NNSA's ability to
meet the B61-12 LEP FPU date. The reduced funding would require a
reduction in the current B61-12 technical staff levels, elimination of
development hardware procurements, and cancellation of joint test
activities with the USAF. The lack of new hardware also impacts
component development activities and testing for FY 2015. The FPU in
March 2020 could not be achieved and could possibly slip into FY 2021.
Mr. Rogers. As the principal design agent for this LEP, Sandia did
the bulk of the work that led to the final cost estimate of around $8
billion. Please describe the level of rigor and effort that went into
developing this estimate. I understand that DOD's CAPE office has put
forward an estimate of over $10 billion. Would you please describe how
CAPE arrived at this number? What is your professional opinion of this
number by CAPE? Which number do you stand by?
Dr. Hommert. When NNSA provided to Congress the B61-12 Weapon
Design and Cost Report (WDCR), the overall estimate of approximately $8
billion over 12 years for the full program included the production and
deployment of the required number of nuclear bombs. Within that cost
estimate, Sandia's portion is $2.65 (note, this is the design agency
cost) billion estimated total incremental cost for work on the B61 LEP
specified in the WDCR.
The rigor of this estimate met my expectation for capturing the
uncertainty and risks associated with a program in the conceptual
design phase. This estimated cost includes an appropriate amount of
risk informed contingency. Sandia's estimate includes a task based
estimate of cost for each major component and sub-systems in the life
extension program and was developed by our nuclear weapons experts. A
high level of confidence in the cost estimate was achieved through
close coordination with both NNSA and DOD staff, resulting in a mature
understanding of negotiated threshold and programmatic requirements. We
also complied with NNSA direction to utilize the Government
Accountability Office standards for cost estimating. Sandia conducted
internal management and independent reviews of our estimate before
forwarding it to NNSA. Our review process also included external
experts who concluded that SNL's estimate met the NNSA-directed WDCR
criterion that the estimate be accurate, repeatable, auditable, and
defensible.
CAPE completed a program risk assessment of the entire NNSA B61-12
WDCR rather than a detailed independent cost estimate. CAPE's review
was requested by NNSA. The WDCR is the only definitive cost estimate.
The primary driver for the differential in CAPE's assessment was
reducing Sandia's schedule overlap for the B61-12 which meets the
Nuclear Weapon Council's requirement to complete weapon first
production in fiscal year 2019. CAPE also used a different cost
assumption for its labor rates for its assessment instead of utilizing
the NNSA labor rates in the WDCR.
With respect to technical risk, I have the highest level of
confidence that technical issues will NOT cause impact to Sandia's
schedule performance, as we demonstrated through progress in FY13. I
say this for two reasons. First, we do not view this program as
inherently high technical risk, especially when compared with other
product development programs conducted at Sandia. Second, we manage our
contingency funds ( 10%) in a manner that continuously buys down risk
against a formalized risk register. Our FY13 and FY14 labor rates were
at or below the labor rates included in the WDCR.
With respect to budgetary changes, FY13 sequestration impacts
caused some technical activities to be moved into FY14. We estimated
the schedule impact of those shifts to be relatively small--on the
order of 2 to 3 months over the life of the program (within overall
schedule contingency). However, at the time of this testimony, we are
operating against a FY14 resource allocation that, on an annual basis,
is at least 23% below the FY14 requirement, as contained in the most
recent NNSA-approved Baseline Change Requests to the Selected
Acquisition Report, approved in October 2013. Obviously, unless
addressed, budgetary changes of this magnitude will have significant
schedule impact. As with any large program activity, schedule slip will
result in an increase in overall program cost.
As noted, CAPE completed a risk assessment of the entire NNSA B61-
12 estimate rather than a detailed independent cost estimate. The CAPE
team, working collaboratively with NNSA and Sandia, acted within the
severe time constraints assigned to it by the Nuclear Weapons Council
to complete the risk assessment and the unique characteristics of a
nuclear weapon program which operates differently than conventional
Defense Department acquisition process. Sandia benefited from the CAPE
engagement and their review. We share their goal of wisely and
appropriately managing the program to the WDCR estimate to meet the
schedule and expected labor rates. The major drivers leading to a
significant difference in the CAPE prediction from the SNL estimate are
consistent as previously explained. If these drivers are experienced,
cost will increase.
Sandia National Laboratories made a commitment to deliver the B61-
12 to the estimate provided to NNSA as our portion of the Weapon Design
and Cost Report (WDCR) which included contingency funding, and
leveraging other NNSA programs The Laboratories continue to stand by
that estimate. Assuming all the WDCR obligations are met, including
contingency and NNSA programs supporting the B61-12, I expect to
continue to meet the commitments. At the time of my testimony, we had
costed $253 million of the $2.65 billion. Against those expenditures,
we have met all major milestones on (or under) cost. These milestones
include system-level mechanical environment tests, radar flight
performance tests, and functional electrical compatibility tests.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
Mr. Cooper. Are there expected cost-savings from doing the B61-12?
Secretary Creedon. Yes. The B61-12 will become the only gravity-
dropped nuclear weapon in the U.S. nuclear stockpile. It will fulfill
both the strategic and non-strategic requirements of the airborne
component of the U.S. nuclear Triad. It will allow the retirement or
consolidation of six different types of nuclear gravity weapons that
are currently maintained in the U.S. nuclear stockpile significantly
reducing the costs associated with stockpile, surveillance and testing,
and eliminating the need to perform additional, costly life-extension
programs (LEP) for these weapons that would otherwise be required
within the next decade. Without the B61-12 LEP these cost savings
cannot be realized.
Mr. Cooper. What drives the requirement of approximately 500 B61s?
What dries the requirement for the number of forward-deployed B61s? Has
the Administration considered performing a LEP on a lower number of
B61s?
Secretary Creedon. The requirements for the numbers and types of
weapons in the stockpile come from the recommendations of Commander,
U.S. Strategic Command, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.
Their recommendations reflect the amount and types of weapons needed to
defend our nation and our Allies, and to deter other nations that might
use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against the United States or our
Allies. Roughly 80 percent of the cost of the B61-12 LEP is needed to
produce the first weapon and the remaining 20 percent of the costs are
associated with the follow-on weapons produced. As such, any reduction
in the number of B61-12s produced would result in very little cost
savings. The current number of B61-12s planned still allows for a more
than 50 percent reduction in the total number of nuclear gravity bombs
in the U.S. nuclear stockpile and a more than 80 percent reduction in
the total amount of nuclear material contained within those remaining
bombs.
Mr. Cooper. Are you confident that NNSA can manage a workload which
includes 4-5 concurrent life extension programs?
Secretary Creedon. We are confident that NNSA can manage the
current scope of work required to meet long-term requirements.
Concurrency of work remains a concern, and therefore our plan is
structured not to exceed the capacity of NNSA facilities by sequencing
programs and by utilizing reuse of components where possible to
minimize both costs and infrastructure utilization.
Mr. Cooper. The administration has pledged that it would not
develop new capabilities. Specifically on the B61, the lower yield is
being compensated by higher accuracy provided by a new tailkit.
However, if you now have approximately 500 B61-12s which could
theoretically all be used as strategic assets, would this provide new
capability?
Secretary Creedon. The B61-12 tail-kit assembly (TKA) does not
provide a new capability to the weapon. The TKA simply improves the
reliability of the bomb. This improved reliability permits us to
utilize a design with a lower maximum yield, one that is already in the
active stockpile, to address both strategic and non-strategic targets.
Mr. Cooper. What is status on the plans for the three interoperable
warheads?
Secretary Creedon. The interoperable warheads are still an
essential element of the long-term modernization strategy for the
nuclear deterrent. Current fiscal constraints are causing us to
consider delaying the development of the first interoperable warhead.
Even though there may be a delay in obtaining these warheads, the plan
is still to pursue an interoperable warhead capability.
Mr. Cooper. Is there a risk that new interoperable warheads planned
under the 3+2 plan will increase the likelihood that the United States
might need to return to testing? What is the risk of having 3 new (and
unproven) interoperable warheads account for most of the U.S.
stockpile?
Secretary Creedon. We have a suite of computational and
experimental tools that we currently use to certify the stockpile, and
those tools would be used to certify the interoperable designs. We see
no increased risk in the interoperable designs because we plan to reuse
current design and underground-tested assets.
Mr. Cooper. Could the Long-Range Stand Off (LRSO) cruise missile
and warhead be carried on the F-35?
Secretary Creedon. We conducted an abbreviated review of this
option and determined that it is both technically infeasible and
impractical. We could physically attach the missile with the warhead
onto the F-35 aircraft if we made a shorter version of the missile. The
missile would have to be carried externally and would cause the F-35 to
lose all stealth capability, greatly diminishing aircraft survivability
and the probability of successful weapon delivery.
Using LRSO in place of a B61-12 would create significant treaty
compliance, Alliance, and infrastructure issues.
Mr. Cooper. Are there expected cost-savings from doing the B61-12?
[Question #16, for cross-reference.]
Dr. Cook. The cost of the B61-12 LEP versus an alternative strategy
that maintains the current family of B61s and the B83 is estimated to
be approximately half the cost in both the 25-year planning window as
well as the 50-year planning window. The alternative strategy requires
NNSA to maintain the current B61 Mod configurations and the B83-1 bombs
to meet military requirements for U.S. strategic and extended nuclear
deterrence missions. The cost for the alternative strategy includes two
B61 alterations, a B83 alteration, and full LEPs for both bombs to
ensure capability over the two planning windows assessed. There are
additional benefits beyond cost savings enabled by the B61-12 LEP
including:
The majority of the air delivered gravity weapons will be
removed from the U.S. nuclear stockpile (active and inactive).
A very large reduction in the total amount of nuclear
material utilized by air delivered gravity weapons in the U.S. nuclear
stockpile.
Significant reduction in the total nuclear yield (i.e.,
mega-tonnage) produced by air-delivered gravity weapons in the U.S.
nuclear stockpile.
These planned reductions in the numbers of weapons, amounts of
nuclear material, and total yield are dependent upon the successful
completion of the B61-12 LEP. They are a key part of the
Administration's long-term plan to demonstrate that we are making
progress on our Non-Proliferation Treaty Article VI obligations.
Mr. Cooper. What is the updated cost difference between the B61
option 1E and B61 option 3B? [Question #17, for cross-reference.]
Dr. Cook. Switching to the B61 1E today is not a lower cost option.
Because the B61-12 is in the second year of engineering development
using the current requirements, making a dramatic change now would
require major component redesign and a restart of most systems
engineering. This would delay the program for 1 to 2 years. Further,
NNSA's Defense Programs, Office of Program Integration completed a B61
Alternatives Analysis in FY 2013. The analysis considered the current
mod consolidation strategy versus an alternative that would maintain
the current family of B61s and the B83 without the B61-12 LEP. While
the analysis did not specifically call out option 1E, sufficient
similarities exist to make this comparison applicable. The analysis
compares the costs to maintain the B61-12 versus the existing gravity
bombs stockpile (B61 family and B83) over 25-year and 50-year planning
windows. For the B61-12 LEP the analysis assumed a 20 year stockpile
life and a second LEP is required in the 50 year planning window. For
the existing bombs stockpile the analysis assumed non-nuclear
alterations on the B61-3, B61-4, B61-7 and B83-1 would be performed
prior to 2030 and full LEPs on both bomb families before 2040. This
analysis demonstrated that the costs of the B61-12 LEP approach are
approximately half as much as maintaining the existing bombs stockpile.
The B61-12 LEP, as currently authorized by the Nuclear Weapons Council
and requested in the Administration's FY 2014 budget request, is the
lowest cost option that meets military requirements. Any other
alternative would not meet military requirements and would drive-up
lifecycle costs for these modernization activities, which are necessary
to realize the President's nuclear security vision.
Mr. Cooper. a. How did the government shutdown affect the schedule
of the B61 Life Extension Program?
Dr. Cook. a. A combination of the government shutdown and the CR
funding level is expected to result in a 3-month slip to the Baseline
Design Review from FY 2015 to FY 2016. Further delays were mitigated
through the use of carry-over funding. If funding is restored to the
PBR level of $537M by January, the program would be able to maintain
its current March 2020 FPU but at increased risk because funding is
below B61-12 SAR estimated requirement of $561M. The reduced funding
will result in less-than-planned program contingency to reduce risk. In
addition, funding for NNSA infrastructure investments is also limited.
This could cause system- or facility-level failures in the nuclear
security enterprise that would preclude safe and secure operations,
causing unplanned delays in the B61 LEP and other programs.
Mr. Cooper. b. Are any additional costs expected because of the
shutdown?
Dr. Cook. b. While the CR funding level of $369M will have an
impact as noted above, there are no additional costs attributed
specifically to the shutdown.
Mr. Cooper. c. And what will the impacts be if sequester remains in
FY14?
Dr. Cook. c. The impacts of additional sequestration cuts to the
program is being assessed but is expected to be less than 3 months to
the March 2020 FPU.
Mr. Cooper. What is the NNSA's current estimated total cost for the
B61 Life Extension Program?
Dr. Cook. The current cost estimate for the B61-12 life extension
program reported in the September 2013 Selected Acquisition Report to
Congress is $8.1B, which includes $7.3B in direct B61-12 funding and
another $0.8B in other NNSA funds. This estimate is based on the
Weapons Design and Cost Report published in July 2012 and has not
changed with the exception of the impacts due to FY 2013 sequestration
cuts.
Mr. Cooper. a. Since NNSA B61 costs rose from $7.9 billion to $8.1
billion due to sequestration impacts, can we expect a similar cost
increase (and further delay occur) if sequestration continues into
FY14?
Dr. Cook. a. If sequestrations cuts extend the program, there will
be an increase in the estimated total program cost. Current analysis
indicates if the B61-12 receives funding at the President's Budget
Request (PBR) versus the B61-12 Selected Acquisition Report (SAR)
estimated requirement of $561M, the program would be able to maintain
its current March 2020 first production unit, albeit at a higher risk.
Funding below the request due to sequestration may result in an
additional 1-3 month delay. Schedule assessment is underway along with
the re-planning effort resulting for the 3 month CR at $369M. The
analysis is also assessing how other programs that support the B61 12,
such as the science and engineering campaigns, would also be affected
by FY 2014 sequestration.
Mr. Cooper. b. Assuming no sequestration in FY14 and full funding,
can you guarantee that the B61-12 will be delivered by FY 2020 for
under $8.1 billion?
Dr. Cook. b. NNSA is confident we can meet a 2020 first production
unit if the program is fully funded as defined in the B61-12 Selected
Acquisition Report (SAR) in FY 2014 and subsequent years. NNSA has high
confidence in the cost estimate developed in the B61-12 Weapons Design
and Cost Report and reported in the B61-12 SAR. Our initial cost
estimate was developed using sound principals, reasonable assumptions,
and was independently verified. However, it is an initial estimate that
NNSA will update in FY 2016 as part of the Baseline Cost Report prior
to authorizing Phase 6.4 when the LEP design is approximately 90%
complete and the program is beginning final design, pre-production, and
system qualification activities. The estimate in the Baseline Cost
Report will be the Acquisition Program Baseline. Currently the program
is on schedule with the greatest risk being funding uncertainty and not
technical challenges. This response also assumes that limited
infrastructure funding does not result in any operational impacts due
to safety or security concerns.
Mr. Cooper. c. What is the risk of delay or cost increase if NNSA
does not receive full funding for the B61 not only in FY14 but in the
next five years?
Dr. Cook. c. The risk of sequestration cuts over the next five
years is unplanned cost growth by extending the development and
production periods. This will also complicate maintaining schedule
alignment with the USAF, potentially driving additional DOD costs as
well. In Fiscal Year (FY) 2013 the impacts of sequestration reduced
NNSA's total resources by 7.8 percent and stressed the nuclear
enterprise's ability to support the long-term aspects of the ``3+2''
modernization strategy in order to try to protect its near-term
commitments like the W76 LEP. Sequestration has already resulted in a
roughly six-month delay to the first production unit of the B61-12 from
2019 to 2020. Without a solution to the current fiscal crisis in FY
2014 the DOD and DOE will be forced to make even more difficult
decisions that could reduce the long term financial benefits of the
``3+2'' strategy. In addition, funding for NNSA infrastructure
investments is also limited. This could cause system- or facility-level
failures in the nuclear security enterprise that would preclude safe
and secure operations, causing unplanned delays in the B61 LEP and
other [Editor note: answer as sent was incomplete.]
Mr. Cooper. How does the cost per unit for the B61-LEP compare with
previous LEP costs?
Dr. Cook. Cost per unit is dependent on the total production
quantity, which is classified and available in the classified addenda
of the B61-12 and W76-1 Selected Acquisition Reports. These unit costs
are consistent between the programs in terms of the relative complexity
and total production quantities.
Mr. Cooper. Do you agree with CAPE's conclusions that cost will
reach $10.1 billion and schedule could slip to FY22?
Dr. Cook. I am confident that B61-12 FPU can be achieved by FY 2020
provided the program is fully funded at the SAR estimated requirement
of $8.1B. Today, the greatest risk to holding schedule is annual budget
uncertainty rather than technical risk. Our estimate for the program is
$7.3B in direct B61-12 funding with an additional $0.8B leveraged from
other NNSA science and engineering campaigns. This cost estimate has
not changed, with the exception of sequestration impacts, from the
original cost estimate in the B61-12 Weapon Design Cost Report
published on July 25, 2012.
Mr. Cooper. What is status on the plans for the three interoperable
warheads?
Dr. Cook. In November 2012, the Nuclear Weapons Council selected a
baseline stockpile life extension plan that implements the ``3+2''
vision in which three interoperable warheads for ballistic missiles is
an integral part. The baseline plan was detailed in a Nuclear Weapons
Council memorandum dated January 15, 2013. The Nuclear Weapons Council
plan establishes the framework to develop more detailed implementation
plans for deployment of interoperable warheads. Over the coming months,
NNSA and the Department of Defense will work together to continue to
analyze cost, scope, schedule and other implications of this vision as
means to inform future decisions regarding the nuclear weapons
enterprise.
Mr. Cooper. The FY 2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
states that the ``3+2'' strategy is ``an executable plan.'' However,
given the costs of the interoperable warheads and budget constraints
does NNSA still believe the ``3+2'' vision is still achievable?
Dr. Cook. Yes, we believe the vision is achievable, but it may
require some modification and/or delay. NNSA is working with the
Department of Defense, through the Nuclear Weapons Council, to analyze
cost, scope, schedule and other implications of the current baseline
plan as means to inform future decisions regarding the nuclear weapons
enterprise. Among the factors the two departments are analyzing are
affordability, feasibility, and synchronization with delivery platform
modernization plans.
Mr. Cooper. a. Is there a risk that new interoperable warheads
planned under the 3+2 plan will increase the likelihood that the United
States might need to return to testing?
Dr. Cook. a. No. LEPs developed to enable interoperable warheads
will not result in an increased likelihood of an underground test. On
the contrary, all LEPs (past and future) are intended to reduce the
likelihood of a need for a return to testing. By eliminating effects of
aging and increasing performance margins, LEPs result in a stockpile
that will continue to be safe, secure, and reliable without a need to
return to testing. In particular, all of the design and manufacturing
changes proposed for the W78/88-1 LEP are subject to intense peer
review and evaluation by all three labs. The use of modern stockpile
stewardship tools allows all LEP changes to be thoroughly vetted and
understood through modeling and experiments without a need for nuclear
explosive testing.
Mr. Cooper. b. What is the risk of having 3 new (and unproven)
interoperable warheads account for most of the U.S. stockpile?
Dr. Cook. b. Certification of interoperable warheads will be based
on simulations, experiments tied to previous underground tests (UGTs),
and expert judgment. Improvements in simulations and experiments
provide confidence that there will not be a need to return to UGTs.
Mr. Cooper. Do you agree with CAPE's conclusions that cost will
reach $10.1 billion and schedule could slip to FY22?
Dr. Hommert. There has been considerable discussion about schedule
slip or cost growth on the B61 LEP. With respect to this topic, I can
only address Sandia's role; however, as the predominant design agent
for the LEP, we recognize the impact of our work on the overall
enterprise schedule.
Regarding schedule, there are two overarching causes for slip:
technical issues and budgetary changes. With respect to technical risk,
I have the highest level of confidence that technical issues will NOT
cause impact to Sandia's schedule performance, as we demonstrated
through progress in FY13. I say this for two reasons. First, we do not
view this program as inherently high technical risk, especially when
compared with other product development programs conducted at Sandia.
Second, we manage our contingency funds ( 10%) in a manner that
continuously buys down risk against a formalized risk register.
With respect to budgetary changes, I cannot be as sanguine. In
FY13, sequestration impacts caused some technical activities to be
moved into FY14. We estimated the schedule impact of those shifts to be
relatively small--on the order of 2 to 3 months over the life of the
program (within overall schedule contingency). However, at the time of
this testimony, we are operating against a FY14 resource allocation
that, on an annual basis, is at least 23% below the FY14 requirement,
as contained in the most recent NNSA-approved Baseline Change Requests
to the Selected Acquisition Report, approved in October 2013. Until the
final FY14 Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill is enacted,
NNSA does not have the authority to provide a definitive funding level
for the program. Obviously, unless addressed, budgetary changes of this
magnitude will have significant schedule impact. As with any large
program activity, schedule slip will result in an increase in overall
program cost. In addition to the points above, Sandia is aware of the
fiscal challenges this program imposes on Congress. To further
adherence to the schedule and cost, we are aggressively implementing an
increased level of project management rigor to the B61-12 program. Our
technical experts are partnered with project management professionals,
skilled practitioners using a suite of formal tools, such as resource-
loaded schedules, requirements tracking systems, and sophisticated risk
management and mitigation methods. We are moving to an Earned Value
Management System (EVMS), which is a way of quantitatively measuring
where one is in the execution of a project regarding schedule and cost.
While these approaches add to execution overhead, they provide
essential insights and early indicators for a project of this scope and
duration. With EVMS, we can use tailored assessments to look at cost
and schedule performance indicators on a monthly basis, examine each
subsystem, and track more accurately how each team is doing in
developing those subsystems--and we can make immediate, early changes
if necessary, applying more or fewer resources to each particular
element of the project, as required.
We believe Sandia has an achievable plan and the technical risk is
manageable under the WDCR, and at the time of my testimony we continued
to be on schedule and on budget relative to the March 2020 first
production unit (FPU) documented in the Selected Acquisition Report. We
are adjusting our plans as the fiscal situation evolves and are
confident that we have the expertise and tools in place to effectively
manage the program going forward.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ
Ms. Sanchez. Secretary Creedon, you noted that only after rigorous
and thorough evaluation of each possibility did the Nuclear Weapons
Council unanimously conclude that the B61-12 full-scope LEP was the
least expensive long-term option that could meet military requirements.
Was a detailed cost study done for the 1E option and presented to the
Nuclear Weapons Council?
Secretary Creedon. Yes a detailed cost study was done for the 1E
option, it was presented to the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) and they
rejected it in favor of the B61-12 LEP (3B option). The NWC rejected
the 1E option primarily because it did meet all threshold requirements
established by the NWC and it would require a second life extension
program over its planned service life, significantly increasing the
overall long-term cost. Option 1E also failed to consolidate any of the
non-strategic variants of the B61 preventing significant reductions in
the nuclear stockpile and any long-term cost savings this could
provide.
Ms. Sanchez. What is the reason for consolidating the B61 mods? Is
there a reason other than simplicity/streamlining the stockpile? Does
it save NNSA or the Air Force money? If so, how much?
Secretary Creedon. Consolidation of the B61 modifications provides
cost savings over the long-term associated with simplifying and
streamlining the surveillance, maintenance, and training requirement
for the National Nuclear Security Administration and the Air Force, and
this was a factor in the decision. Consolidating also meets the
President's goals of reducing the numbers of nuclear weapons in the
U.S. inventory by ultimately allowing a more than 50 percent reduction
in the numbers of nuclear gravity bombs, and more significantly a more
than 80 percent reduction in the amount of nuclear material contained
within those bombs.
Ms. Sanchez. What are the expected cost-savings from doing the B61-
12?
Secretary Creedon. The largest and most substantial cost savings
realized from completing the full scope B61-12 Life Extension Program
(LEP) will be derived from other LEPs that will not be needed. It
allows us to retire the B83 warhead, avoiding a refurbishment roughly
estimated by the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to
cost between $4 and $5B. By completing a single, full-scope LEP of the
B61 instead of two separate, limited scope refurbishments, it will save
roughly an additional $2B during the service life of the bomb. In
addition, a limited amount of cost-savings will be found in the reduced
requirements for NNSA surveillance, and Air Force training and
maintenance due to retirement and consolidation of current gravity
bombs into the single B61-12 bomb.
Ms. Sanchez. Since our allies are not contributing any funds to the
$10-$12 billion cost of the B61 life extension program, have other
measures to provide reliable extended deterrence been discussed in
consultations with NATO capitals? Why, why not? Has the Administration
discussed NATO contributing to B61 LEPs?
Secretary Creedon. NATO Allies have not been asked to contribute
funds to the cost of the B61 LEP, which is a U.S. weapon. Alliance
members do contribute to the nuclear mission both with conventional
support and with regard to NATO's nuclear posture. In this latter
respect, through the NATO Security Investment Program, NATO allies
provide funding for security and infrastructure enhancements and
upgrades at European nuclear weapons storage sites. Moreover, NATO
Allies burden-share in the nuclear mission both by assigning pilots and
dual-capable aircraft to the mission, and by conventional support
operations, such as the SNOWCAT program (``Support of Nuclear
Operations with Conventional Air Tactics''). It would not be
appropriate to ask NATO Allies to contribute to the cost of the B61 LEP
both because it would subject classified U.S. nuclear data to
disclosure to foreign nations, and because it could subject nations to
charges of proliferation.
Ms. Sanchez. How much funding does NATO contribute to enabling the
deployment of nuclear weapons in Europe?
Secretary Creedon. NATO Allies contribute to deterrence through the
NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP), which funds security and
infrastructure enhancements and upgrades at European nuclear weapons
storage sites. There have been four NATO weapons storage-related
upgrades (Capability Package upgrades) since the original NATO
Capability Package was approved in 2000:
Project Total (M)\1\
Initial WS3 Installation approx. $215M USD
Basic Capability Package (Jul 2000) 12.8M EUR
Addendum 1 (Feb 2005) 17.9M EUR
Addendum 2 (Apr 2006) 13.0M EUR
Addendum 3 (Mar 2009) 13.0M EUR
Addendum 4 (Aug 2011) 108M EUR
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ NATO common funding derives from U.S. and other contributions. The U.S. burden-share costs are generally 24
percent of the NATO budget. The U.S. burden-share is generally 22-24 percent of the total NSIP costs. As a
result, the NATO funds above include the U.S. contribution to NATO.
Additionally, bilateral agreements require the host-nation to
provide ``mission-related facilities, services, supplies and other
logistical support'' for our units at each of the six sites. These may
generally be scoped down to facilities and utilities, but the type and
level of services, as well as funding for services provided, vary at
each location.
Ms. Sanchez. In the medium term, would it be possible to provide
reliable extended deterrence without forward-deploying B61s?
Secretary Creedon. The B61 warhead serves a unique and important
role. It is the only non-strategic nuclear weapon in the U.S. arsenal,
which means it can be delivered by tactical fixed-wing aircraft, such
as F-15, F-16, and future F-35 jet fighters--including aircraft flown
by our Allies in NATO. As such, it is one of the few areas where Allies
can burden-share in the nuclear deterrence mission. The inability to
forward deploy B-61s will undermine important U.S. assurance and
deterrence commitments set forth in both the 2010 Nuclear Posture
Review and the June 2013 nuclear employment guidance.
Ms. Sanchez. Senator Sam Nunn recently suggested that forward-
deployed B61s in Europe are becoming more of a security risk than an
asset for NATO. What is the security risk of having B61s forward-
deployed? Are B61s currently safe and secure?
Secretary Creedon. U.S. nuclear weapons deployed in Europe are safe
and secure. The Weapon Storage and Security System (WS3), security, and
custodial forces all combine to meet the Nuclear Weapon Security
Standard. The NATO High Level Group Vice-Chair for Safety, Security,
and Survivability oversees the efforts to ensure the security standards
are continuously met--the same standards as the U.S.-based systems.
Under the HLG authority, the Joint Theater Surety Management Group
(JTSMG) manages the day-to-day nuclear surety mission in NATO. The
security system is continuously evaluated to identify opportunities for
further enhancement. Currently, there are several NATO-funded security
enhancement projects in progress to enhance security force detection
and awareness capabilities, and improve security response effectiveness
at all storage sites in Europe. Additionally, all contributing nations
continually work together to improve command and control, and security
force techniques, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) through semi-annual
modeling and joint force-on-force exercises. As a result, the B-61s
assigned to NATO are safe and secure.
Ms. Sanchez. Where are we on the 3+2 strategy? Is this on track to
be funded? What are the discussions to date? If the 3+2 plan is
pursued, when would nuclear reductions occur?
Secretary Creedon. We remain committed to the strategy and want to
see it implemented in order to obtain its benefits, which include
nuclear reductions. Our first Life Extension Program (LEP) implementing
this strategy is the B61-12, and we won't know if that funding is on
track until Congress completes its Fiscal Year (FY) 2014 budget work.
The reductions from sequestration and delays in fiscal year 2013
funding from the continuous resolution have already caused a slip for
first production unit from FY 2019 to FY 2020.
Reductions in the number of nuclear weapons resulting from the B61-
12 deployment would begin in the mid to late 2020s, dependent upon when
confidence is achieved in the B61-12 through surveillance testing.
Nuclear reductions would typically occur about 7-9 years after first
production unit of a modernized weapon depending upon the number of
surveillance tests performed and the results of those tests.
The 3+2 strategy is at risk due to current budget constraints.
Inter-operable 1 and the long-range stand-off weapons may also be
delayed to fit within current budget constraints.
Ms. Sanchez. As part of the currently proposed plan for the B61
LEP, it appears the assumption is that the United States will continue
to forward-deploy tactical versions of the B61 in Europe for the next
50 years. In addition, the new high-level nuclear weapons policy
guidance signed by President Obama in June could reduce the number of
strategic gravity bombs that are required for deterrence. How might
changes to existing deterrence requirements alter the currently
proposed scope of the B61 LEP? And what is the assumption for the
timeline for forward-deploying these weapons in Europe?
Secretary Creedon. Both the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review report, and
the Administration's 2013 nuclear employment guidance acknowledged the
fact that the international security environment has changed
dramatically since the end of the Cold War. Even with this change,
however, the guidance set out in both documents acknowledged the
importance of extended deterrence--both to send a credible signal to
adversaries that any perceived benefits of attacking the United States
and its Allies and partners are outweighed by the costs that our
response would impose; and to assure Allies and partners that the
United States is committed to their defense. Together, these documents
demonstrate the U.S. nuclear posture--including current plans for the
B61 LEP--is suited to the current security environment and, by
extension, to existing deterrence requirements. Currently, the First
Production Unit for the B61-12 is scheduled for 2020 to support
commitments. That said, we will continue to seek the goal of a world
without nuclear weapons.
Ms. Sanchez. Would the planned surety enhancements that require
changes to the nuclear package be required if B61s were kept in the
U.S. rather than forward-deployed in NATO countries?
Secretary Creedon. There are no planned changes to the nuclear
package of the B61-12. The planned security enhancements would still
need to be included as part of the B61-12 Life Extension Program
regardless of the status of weapons based in NATO countries because of
the Administration's stated requirement to retain the capability to
forward deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on tactical fighter-bombers and
heavy bombers outside of the continental United States.
Ms. Sanchez. a. What is the reason for consolidating the B61 mods?
Dr. Cook. a. The consolidation of the B61 Mods is an opportunity
afforded by the Air Force Tail Kit, which eliminates the need to extend
multiple B61 modifications and associated Air Force integration and
sustainment costs. Additionally, there are significant benefits that
will be gained by completing the B61-12 LEP, including:
The majority of the air delivered gravity weapons will be
removed from the U.S. nuclear stockpile (active and inactive).
A very large reduction in the total amount of nuclear
material utilized by air delivered gravity weapons in the U.S. nuclear
stockpile.
Significant reduction in the total nuclear yield (i.e.,
mega-tonnage) produced by air-delivered gravity weapons in the U.S.
nuclear stockpile.
These planned reductions in the numbers of weapons, amounts of
nuclear material, and total yield are dependent upon the successful
completion of the B61-12 LEP. They are a key part of the
Administration's long-term plan to demonstrate that we are meeting our
Non-Proliferation Treaty Article VI obligation to make progress towards
disarmament.
Ms. Sanchez. b. Is there a reason other than simplicity/
streamlining the stockpile?
Dr. Cook. b. As stated above, there is a strong arms control
component to Mod consolidation. Further, the use of the Air Force tail
kit eliminates the need to re-establish production of the unique
parachutes used by today's B61.
Ms. Sanchez. c. Does it save NNSA or the Air Force money? If so,
how much?
Dr. Cook. c. Yes. Beyond reducing long term project Alt and LEP
costs by approximately 50% (see answer to Question 16 & 17), there is a
reduced sustainment cost to NNSA for a single B61-12 and no B83. Any
reduced cost for the Air Force will have to be answered by the service.
Ms. Sanchez. What are the expected cost-savings from doing the B61-
12?
Dr. Cook. NNSA's Defense Programs, Office of Program Integration,
completed a B61 Alternatives Analysis in FY 2013. The analysis
considered the current B61-12 mod consolidation strategy versus an
alternative that would maintain the current family of B61s and the B83.
The analysis demonstrated that the costs of the B61-12 LEP approach are
approximately half of what would be required to maintain the existing
bombs stockpile without Mod consolidation. The analysis compared the
costs to maintain the B61-12 versus the existing gravity bombs
stockpile (B61 family and B83) over 25-year and 50-year planning
windows. For the B61-12 LEP, the analysis assumed a 20 year stockpile
life and a second LEP is required in the 50 year planning window. For
the existing bombs stockpile, the analysis assumed non-nuclear
alterations on the B61-3, B61-4, B61-7 and B83-1 would be initially
performed prior to 2030 and full LEPs on both bomb families before
2040. The B61-12 LEP, as currently authorized by the Nuclear Weapons
Council and requested in the Administration's FY 2014 budget request,
is the lowest cost option that meets military requirements. Any other
alternative would not meet military requirements and would drive-up
lifecycle costs for these modernization activities, which are necessary
to realize the President's nuclear security vision.
Ms. Sanchez. How does the cost per unit for the B61-LEP compare
with previous LEP costs for other nuclear weapons?
Dr. Cook. Cost per unit is dependent on the total production
quantity, which is classified and available in the classified addenda
of the B61-12 and W76-1 Selected Acquisition Reports. These unit costs
are consistent between the programs in terms of the relative complexity
and total production quantities.
Ms. Sanchez. We've known about many of the aging issues regarding
certain critical non-nuclear components in the B61 for at least a
decade. Why have we waited to address the highest priority aging issues
in the B61 and why have we not replaced aging non-nuclear components
such as vacuums tubes earlier?
Dr. Cook. NNSA prioritized stockpile modernization in accordance
with funding, capacity, and assessed stockpile reliability. Replacement
of the radars was originally planned to be addressed in conjunction
with a non-nuclear life extension program (NNLEP) with a target FPU
date in 2012. The target date was aligned with other limited life
component (LLC) expirations. Due to competing priorities on the W76-1
program, the ability to field LLC expirations and other stockpile
sustainment commitments the NNLEP and associated study was delayed.
With the Phase 6.2/2A study conducted between 2009 and 2011,
refurbishment of the nuclear explosive package was deemed necessary to
avoid a second costly LEP in the near future. The consolidation of non-
nuclear and nuclear work also limits the movement of weapons to and
from deployed locations, minimizing any vulnerability associated with
the movement of weapons.
Ms. Sanchez. Where are we on the 3+2 strategy? Is this on track to
be funded? What are the discussions to date? If the 3+2 plan is
pursued, when would nuclear reductions occur?
Dr. Cook. In November 2012, the Nuclear Weapons Council selected a
baseline stockpile life extension plan that implements the ``3+2''
vision of which three interoperable warheads for ballistic missiles is
an integral part. The baseline plan was detailed in a Nuclear Weapons
Council memorandum dated January 15, 2013. The Nuclear Weapons Council
plan establishes the framework to develop more detailed implementation
plans for deployment of interoperable warheads. Over the coming months,
NNSA and the Department of Defense will work together to continue to
analyze cost, scope, schedule and other implications of this vision as
a means to inform future decisions regarding the nuclear weapons
enterprise. The FY 2015 President's Budget Request is under
development. The budget requests will describe funding plans for the
``3+2'' vision for the next several years. Per the FY 2014 Stockpile
Stewardship Management Plan, the vision is achievable, though it may
require some modification and/or delay in the current funding
environment. Stockpile quantities are determined by the Department of
Defense.
Ms. Sanchez. As part of the currently proposed plan for the B61
LEP, it appears the assumption is that the United States will continue
to forward-deploy tactical versions of the B61 in Europe for the next
50 years. In addition, the new high-level nuclear weapons policy
guidance signed by President Obama in June could reduce the number of
strategic gravity bombs that are required for deterrence. How might
changes to existing deterrence requirements alter the currently
proposed scope of the B61 LEP? And what is the assumption for the
timeline for forward-deploying these weapons in Europe?
Dr. Cook. Uncertainty in the existing deterrence requirement
reinforces the current B61-12 LEP option. The current option provides
global flexibility in the strategic and tactical employment of the B61-
12 and optimizes our hedging options. Assumptions for the timeline of
forward deploying weapons must be addressed by DOD.
Ms. Sanchez. Would the planned surety enhancements that require
changes to the nuclear package be required if B61s were kept in the
U.S. rather than forward-deployed in NATO countries?
Dr. Cook. Yes. Even without the requirement to forward deploy the
B61, this scope would be required.
Ms. Sanchez. The CAPE cost study noted Sandia's view that the B61
is 3 or 4 times more complex than the W76 LEP. Do you still agree? What
are the challenges for Sandia related to the planned work scope for the
B61?
Dr. Hommert. Following direction from the B61-12 Project Officers
Group, chaired by the U.S. Air Force, the B61 LEP will consolidate four
of the current versions, or Mods, of B61 bombs (the B61-3, B61-4, B61-
7, and B61-10) into a single Mod, the B61-12. The result will be
reduced U.S. Air Force nuclear weapon management complexity, as well as
reduced U.S. Air Force cost for ongoing maintenance, training, and
stockpile evaluation. This Mod consolidation is made possible through
use of a Tail Kit, which is the responsibility of the U.S. Air Force
and is designed to maintain existing military capability.
Complexity suggested in the question needs to be answered in
relative to the technical work scope. I have the highest level of
confidence that technical issues will NOT cause impact to Sandia's
schedule performance, as we demonstrated through progress in FY13. I
say this for two reasons. First, we do not view this program as
inherently high technical risk, especially when compared with other
product development programs conducted at Sandia.
At the system level complexity between the B61-12 and W76-1,
Sandia's scope in the B61-12 involves more components and has the
additional challenge to make the B61-12 compatible with five aircraft
platforms
Sandia is applying documented lessons learned from our design work
for the W76-1 and incorporating it to the B61-12 program throughout
component work and system design. And, as we learn lessons from the
B61-12 program, they will be utilized for the other programs underway
and planned. The B61 LEP does not involve significant changes to
environmental or functionality requirements; therefore, the inherent
technical risk is lowered and will not impact the March 2020 FPU if the
WDCR funding profile is sustained.
Challenges Sandia has faced and addressed are the impacts of the
FY13 sequestration. We managed sequestration by moving some technical
activities into FY14. Additionally, staffing up for the B61-12 was also
a challenge. The staffing requirement for these modernization efforts
exceeds 1,000 people. I am pleased to report that, despite numerous
periods of budget uncertainty over the past two years, we have been
extremely successful at staffing the program against a very aggressive
staffing plan. Two staffing approaches have allowed us to achieve the
required staffing levels for the modernization programs: (1) internal
staff movements from other Sandia programs that require skills
synergistic with those for the nuclear weapons program and (2) external
hiring. Since 2010, we have hired some 500 advanced-degree scientists
and engineers. The overall number of members of the workforce at the
Laboratory remained essentially flat through this period. Of those we
hired new to Sandia, approximately 58% are early in their professional
careers. The modernization program provides opportunities for these new
technical staff to work closely with our experienced designers: from
advanced concept development to component design and qualification, and
ultimately to the production and fielding of nuclear weapon systems.
We believe Sandia has an achievable plan and the technical risk is
manageable under the WDCR, and at the time of my testimony we continued
to be on schedule and on budget relative to the March 2020 first
production unit (FPU) documented in the Selected Acquisition Report. We
are adjusting our plans as the fiscal situation evolves and are
confident that we have the expertise and tools in place to effectively
manage the program going forward.
Ms. Sanchez. The technology for many of the LEP components were at
TRL 3 or 4 as of August 2012. Are you on schedule and when do you plan
to have most components at TRL 6 or higher?
Dr. Hommert. Yes, we are on plan for the technology maturation for
the B61-12 components. The qualification plan for each major component
includes a technology readiness forecast describing the required
technological demonstrations required for the remaining TRL steps and a
projection of when those steps will be reached. Based on the documented
criteria for Technology Readiness Level 6, the components must
demonstrate performance in the B61-12 flight conditions. Based on the
schedule at the time of the testimony, these flight tests were planned
for fiscal year 2015 prior to baseline design review assuming full WDCR
funding.
Ms. Sanchez. Do you agree that NNSA and DOD must prioritize what it
needs from the labs and sites over the next several years? And are the
LEP schedules realistic from a lab perspective?
Dr. Hommert. The B61 LEP is the first and most urgent in a series
of LEPs and ALTs required to sustain the U.S. nuclear stockpile into
the future. We will support the Nuclear Weapons Council to maintain the
stockpile for sustained deterrence for the coming decades.
Accomplishing this work will require prioritization to achieve the
appropriate strategy set by policymakers. Sandia will be poised to
provide cost efficient, innovative, and successful strategies to future
stockpile work based on the B61-12 and other programs. Our successful
record of using common technologies and components across multiple
systems that have been deployed in the U.S. stockpile has helped reduce
development risk and manage development costs. We are extending this
approach to development of the Arming, Fuzing, and Firing (AF&F)
system. Today, a modular AF&F design is being developed for the W88 ALT
370, the Mk21 Fuze Replacement, and potentially for the W78/88-1 LEP.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. Under the current modernization plan, what happens to
the B-83s? Will they be dismantled or kept in reserve?
Secretary Creedon. Our plan is to retire the B83 warhead in the
late 2020s and then dismantle it. It is the last megaton weapon in our
stockpile, and we plan to eliminate it because we no longer need that
much output from a weapon to meet our security needs. If we were to
keep it, it would require a Life Extension Program to start within the
next few years.
Mr. Langevin. What role does the B-61 play in deterrence that
cannot be achieved by ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, or other
means, particularly in extended deterrence in Europe?
Secretary Creedon. The B61 warhead serves a unique and important
role that cannot be achieved by other means, including ballistic or
cruise missiles. It is the only non-strategic nuclear weapon in the
U.S. arsenal, which means it can be delivered by dual-capable (i.e.,
tactical fixed-wing) aircraft, such as F-15, F-16, and future F-35 jet
fighters--including ones flown by NATO. Moreover, unlike a nuclear
weapon in an underground silo or in an underwater submarine, it assures
Allies and partners by providing them with a visible and tangible
demonstration of the seriousness of the U.S. extended deterrence
commitment. Finally, it is flexible in that, even after being
dispatched on a mission, the aircraft can be recalled any time before
delivering its ordnance. Based on these differences, the B61 plays a
vital role in U.S. extended deterrence.
Mr. Langevin. Are there military missions filled by the B-61 that
cannot be met by other systems? Would the requirement for the B-61
persist if gravity weapons were removed from Europe? How would
development of the LRSO affect the need for the B-61?
Secretary Creedon. There are still some military missions that
cannot be filled by conventional weapons or other components of the
nuclear Triad and require a nuclear gravity bomb. The requirement for
the B61-12 Life Extension Program would remain regardless of the status
of U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe. The Administration requires that the
DOD maintain the capability to forward deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on
tactical fighter-bombers and heavy bombers and the B61 is the only
nuclear weapon currently capable of being carried on a tactical fighter
bomber. Development of the long-range standoff weapon would not change
the need for the B61-12 LEP as both air delivered weapons provide
distinctively different and complementary capabilities and employment
options.
Mr. Langevin. NNSA has a very aggressive modernization portfolio to
manage, with 4-5 concurrent life extension programs for many years into
the future. How does the NNSA plan to manage these without cost and
schedule issues, particularly given the complexity of the B-61 LEP?
Dr. Cook. The 4-5 concurrent LEPs referred to are in different
phases that place different demands on the nuclear security enterprise.
Phase 6.2/2A (Feasibility and Cost Study) activities tend to be focused
on technology maturation and computationally supported analysis and
mostly involves the weapons laboratories. Phase 6.3 (Development
Engineering) is focused on the design and testing of components and
subsystems that make use of design and computational capabilities along
with testing facilities at the laboratories and preliminary production
engineering at the potential production facilities. Phase 6.3 continues
as Phase 6.4 ramps up as decisions on specific technologies and designs
are decided upon and the production facilities perform process prove-in
to ensure war reserves (WR) quality parts can be reliably produced.
Laboratory involvement in the LEPs tends to peak just prior to FPU
after which their support is required to resolve production issues.
Production facilities carry most of the workload/effort following Phase
6.5 (FPU) and into Phase 6.6 full rate production. The W76 LEP is
currently in full rate production to be completed by FY 2019. The B61
LEP will reach FPU in FY 2020 with Phase 6.3 activities currently
underway. The cruise missile and IW-1 LEPs have FPUs in FY24 and FY25,
respectively so most of their Phase 6.3/6.4 activities will occur after
Phase 6.5/6.6 activities have commenced for the B61. The scheduling of
these LEPs has been subject to enterprise modeling to establish the
feasibility of their concurrent execution and to identify and resolve
potential ``choke points'' in capability. Additionally, the recent
workforce prioritization study conducted by NNSA determined that the
NNSA sites were capable of staffing these activities in addition to
staffing other ongoing critical activities such as surveillance and
assessment (contingent on the provision of sufficient funding).
Critical to planning and integrating all these activities will be
federal leadership. Defense Programs recently reorganized to establish
the Office of Major Modernization Programs (NA-19) to focus management
of LEPs and major construction projects in support of modernization of
key capabilities separate from the day to day maintenance of the
stockpile. Defense Programs also established the Office of Systems
Engineering and Integration (NA-18) to put systems engineering and
integration tools in place to better apply these tools to the LEPs,
major construction efforts, and the overall program. In addition, the
Office of Infrastructure and Operations was established to focus on
maintaining, operating, and modernizing the National Security
Enterprise. It is critical to remember that funding for NNSA
infrastructure investments is also limited. Funding for NNSA
infrastructure investments is also limited. This could cause system- or
facility-level failures in the enterprise that would preclude safe and
secure operations, causing unplanned delays in the B61 LEP and other
programs.
Mr. Langevin. Under the current modernization plan, what happens to
the B-83s? Will they be dismantled or kept in reserve?
Dr. Cook. Defense officials have stated that once the B61-12 LEP is
completed, and the Department of Defense has sufficient confidence in
the resulting warhead, the Defense Department would be in a position to
pursue retirement of the B83 gravity bomb. Retired warheads are no
longer part of the stockpile and are eventually dismantled.
Mr. Langevin. Dr. Cook, in November 2011, the cost estimate for the
B-61 was $5 billion. In July 2012, it was $7.9 billion, and now it is
at $8.1 billion, and reports are that the 2012 CAPE estimate is over
$10 billion. What accounts for these increases? If sequestration
continues in FY14, can we expect further increases in cost? And
frankly, why should we have faith in the current estimates?
Dr. Cook. NNSA reported a $4B number in the FY 2012 Stockpile
Stewardship Management Plan (SSMP) and stated that the ``definitive
estimate'' would not be established until after the completion of the
Weapon Design and Cost Report (WDCR) and Phase 6.2A study in 2011. By
``definitive'' NNSA meant an official cost estimate for the program
using formal criteria based cost estimating process. This $4B number
reported in the FY 2012 SSMP was based on a parametric estimate
developed in 2009 prior to the establishment of the B61-12 product
teams, documentation and assessment of military requirements, and
completion of the feasibility and cost study. Following the 6.3
decision, NNSA and the U.S. Air Force finalized the requirements for
the selected LEP option, and finalized the B61-12 WDCR in July 2012.
After further work on risk mitigation and schedule integration, the
NNSA submitted the initial cost estimate for the B61-12 LEP to Congress
in May 2013, with the first formal Selected Acquisition Report (SAR).
Other than to account for the added schedule driven by sequestration
cuts in FY 2013, that baseline cost estimate has not deviated from the
WDCR from July 2012. The current cost estimate reported in the
September 2013 Selected Acquisition Report to Congress is $8.1B which
includes $7.3B in direct B61-12 funding and another $0.8B in other NNSA
funds. NNSA is submitting quarterly updates to Congress on cost and
schedule and will formally update the cost estimate following the
Baseline Design Review to establish an Acquisition Program Baseline in
FY 2016. The official WDCR estimate is founded on firm military
requirements and a disciplined approach to product realization informed
by historical data. This is a significant investment consistent with
other major weapon-system acquisitions. To keep the program on schedule
and to control cost, NNSA has implemented rigorous systems engineering
and program management practices. As required each quarter, NNSA will
submit to Congress our continued progress in subsequent Selected
Acquisition Reports.
Mr. Langevin. What cost components to the B-61 LEP will have to be
incurred as part of future LEPs, regardless of any changes to the B-61
LEP?
Dr. Cook. The $811M ``other program funds'' that are reported in
the B61-12 Selected Acquisition Report are enabling technologies and
production capabilities that will be utilized by future LEP and ALTs.
Additionally, many of the component designs and technologies being
deployed on the B61-12 will support other programs. Examples include:
Common radar and associated testers and tooling is a
common technology that is shared between the W88 ALT 370 and expected
to be deployed on future LEPs
B61-12 stronglink technologies and associated testers and
tooling are common with the W88 ALT 370 and expected to be deployed on
future LEPs
B61-12 weapon control unit, system II interface and
aircraft integration testing will support future air delivered LEP and
ALTs including a cruise missile warhead for the Air Force Long Range
Standoff program.
Qualification and certification of PBX9502 Insensitive
High Explosives (IHE) production capabilities will support future LEPs.
Mr. Langevin. What cost components to the B-61 LEP will have to be
incurred as part of future LEPs, regardless of any changes to the B-61
LEP?
Dr. Hommert. Regarding the B61, in recent years, my annual
assessment letters have documented concerns related to technology
obsolescence and aging. While the B61 is currently safe and secure,
these concerns continue to increase. For example, in the past three
years, we have observed time-dependent degradation not seen before in
electronic, polymer, and high-explosive components. This observation is
not surprising given the age of the B61 weapon system, the oldest units
of which were manufactured and fielded in the late 1970s with some
components dating back to the 1960s. To sustain the B61 into the next
decade and beyond requires these known issues to be addressed as
planned and being executed by Sandia. The program is also addressing
technology obsolescence. Electronic components of the B61 were designed
and manufactured decades ago. Outdated technologies, such as vacuum
tubes, are exhibiting performance degradation and are difficult to
evaluate and assess with confidence.
Any scope changes to the B61-12 have a cost impact on the other
programs currently underway. Wherever possible, component technologies
have been selected to facilitate incorporation into emerging designs
for the W88 ALT 370, Mk21 Fuze replacement, and other additional
potential modernization efforts.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COFFMAN
Mr. Coffman. Given that the B61 LEP is an extremely expensive life
extension program, do you believe that our NATO allies should bear a
financial burden for their security, especially in light of the current
budget environment in the U.S.; and the fact that one of the most oft-
stated rationales for the LEP is to support U.S. commitments to NATO?
Secretary Creedon. NATO Allies already bear a financial burden for
Alliance security both with their conventional forces and in regard to
NATO's nuclear posture. In this latter respect, through the NATO
Security Investment Program, NATO allies provide funding for security
and infrastructure enhancements and upgrades at European nuclear
weapons storage sites. Moreover, NATO Allies burden-share in the
nuclear mission both by assigning pilots and dual-capable aircraft to
the mission, and by supporting the nuclear mission with conventional
operations (such as the SNOWCAT program--``Support of Nuclear
Operations With Conventional Air Tactics'').
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS
Mr. Brooks. I understand the Senate Appropriations Committee has
proposed cutting the B61 LEP by 31% for FY14 and is encouraging NNSA to
reduce the scope of the LEP. For all of our witnesses, what would be
the impact of this cut, were it to be become law? a. If the B61 LEP
were canceled or de-scoped to the ``triple-alt'' today, what would be
the short term cost savings? What would be the long-term cost
increases? b. The Senate Appropriations Committee has also cut all
money for the Air Force's tail kit portion of the B61 LEP. If the tail
kit is not funded, what are the impacts on the LEP? What are the cost
impacts? Is it possible to do the LEP without doing the tailkit?
Secretary Creedon. To cut the B61 LEP to such an extent this year
would significantly delay its delivery, and dramatically increase the
overall cost to complete any LEP of the bomb. a) There would be
absolutely zero short-term cost savings achieved by canceling or
``descoping'' the B61-12 LEP. There would be several long-term cost
increases, many of which would be transferred to future planned LEPs
that had intended to leverage cost savings by utilizing many of the
same non-nuclear components being developed for the B61-12.
Additionally, we would be unable to retire the B83 warhead, forcing us
to begin a costly LEP of that bomb roughly estimated by the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) to cost $4-$5B, and we would
also need to start planning a second LEP of the B61 to refurbish those
components that were not included in the ``triple-alt.'' That second
B61 LEP is roughly estimated by NNSA to cost $5-$6B dollars. b) If
funding for the B61-12 tail kit assembly (TKA) were cut, the B61-12
would not be possible, and this would not be the only nuclear gravity-
dropped weapon in the nuclear stockpile. Without the TKA the currently
planned consolidation of four versions of B61 and the planned
retirement of the B83 could not happen. As mentioned previously, if it
is not possible to retire the B83 it will need a separate LEP estimated
by NNSA to cost roughly $4-$5B. The Air Force and NNSA could conduct an
LEP on the various variants of the B61, but in the absence of the TKAS
the consolidation would not happen.
Lastly if either the B61-12 LEP is de-scoped/cancelled or the B61-
12 TKA is cancelled, it will be impossible to achieve the planned 53
percent reduction in total nuclear gravity weapons or the 83 percent
reduction in total nuclear material contained within the nuclear
gravity weapons in the U.S. nuclear stockpile.
Mr. Brooks. a. I understand the Senate Appropriations Committee has
proposed cutting the B61 LEP by 31% for FY14 and is encouraging NNSA to
reduce the scope of the LEP. For all of our witnesses, what would be
the impact of this cut, were it to be become law? What would be the
long-term cost increases? The Senate Appropriations Committee has also
cut all money for the Air Force's tail kit portion of the B61 LEP. If
the tail kit is not funded, what are the impacts on the LEP? What are
the cost impacts? Is it possible to do the LEP without doing the
tailkit?
Dr. Cook. a. The Nuclear Weapons Council in December 2011 selected
the Option 3B with an FPU in 2019 as the program for the B61-12 LEP.
This option was chosen to satisfy the threshold (minimum) requirements
at the lowest life cycle cost. The B61-12 LEP is now in its second year
of full scale engineering development and is no longer a study. Any
significant change in scope requires NNSA to renegotiate military
requirements with the DOD and develop a new Weapon Design and Cost
Report, cost estimate and schedule. There would also be impacts on
component designs carried forward into the new scope which would
require re-design to make them backwards compatible with multiple
legacy B61 modifications. The renegotiation of requirements, new
schedule and re-design effort would delay any new scope for 1-2 years.
If the B61 12 LEP were not able to maintain its current schedule, then
the program would face delays and increased costs. The B61-12 LEP would
continue, but the savings from consolidations and retirements would
also be delayed, further increasing future costs.
Mr. Brooks. b. If the B61 LEP were canceled or de-scoped to the
``triple-alt'' today, what would be the short term cost savings?
Dr. Cook. b. Although there may be some initial savings, NNSA would
need to begin a new life extension study effort to address aging in
components not addressed by the smaller scoped ``triple alt.'' There
will be additional costs to NNSA and the DOD to sustain the multiple
modifications over the next two decades and NNSA would not be able to
plan for the retirement of the B83. The life cycle costs are roughly
double with the piece meal approach. In summary, canceling the B61 12
LEP would offer few, if any, short-term budgetary advantages while
creating significant long-term strategic and budgetary challenges
Mr. Brooks. c. The Senate Appropriations Committee has also cut all
money for the Air Force's tail kit portion of the B61 LEP. If the tail
kit is not funded, what are the impacts on the LEP?
Dr. Cook. c. In the early 2000s, the U.S. made the decision to
discontinue the capability to produce the special parachutes used in
the legacy nuclear bombs. The last technician with experience making
these parachutes retired years ago. Additionally, some of the delivery
modes that used the parachutes were the most challenging to certify and
the most dangerous for our Air Force pilots. The decision to use an Air
Force-provided tail kit improves the survivability of our pilots,
reduces the certification challenge for our laboratories, and
eliminates the need for a parachute. As an additional benefit, U.S.
Strategic Command determined that with the accuracy provided by a tail
kit, the yield provided by today's lowest yield B61 variant would be
sufficient to meet all of the strategic and non-strategic requirements
for gravity systems. As a result, there is no longer any need to
design, develop, certify, or maintain multiple variations of the B61.
Mr. Brooks. d. What are the cost impacts?
Dr. Cook. d. The scope of the LEP or LEPs would need to be re-
negotiated without Mod consolidation. Costs will also increase to
sustain the four nuclear explosive packages (NEP) types versus one to
meet another 20-year service life. The magnitude of the increase is
dependent on what is deemed adequate for reuse and what must be
remanufactured. Many non-nuclear components can be common but unique
NEP designs require some different electronics and components to meet
specific fuzing modes and surety themes. The renegotiation of
requirements, qualification programs, and redesigns would take up to 24
months to implement and push FPU to 2021-2022.
It is difficult to assess how much the total costs will increase
without the re-negotiation of requirements, re-design and assessment on
component reuse or remanufacture, including parachutes, as part of a
new Phase 6.2A study and development of a Weapon Design and Cost
Report. However, it is clear that this new scope will delay FPU and
increase overall costs. Also, by not consolidating and producing
quantities consistent with Nuclear Weapon Council decisions, DOD will
still require the B83 1. Based on current aging trends and limited life
component data, additional life extension work on the B83-1 will be
required with a FPU as early as 2027. This cost is above and beyond the
costs of performing multiple LEPs on the various B61 modifications.
Mr. Brooks. I understand the Senate Appropriations Committee has
proposed cutting the B61 LEP by 31% for FY14 and is encouraging NNSA to
reduce the scope of the LEP. For all of our witnesses, what would be
the impact of this cut, were it to be become law? a. If the B61 LEP
were canceled or de-scoped to the ``triple-alt'' today, what would be
the short term cost savings? What would be the long-term cost
increases? b. The Senate Appropriations Committee has also cut all
money for the Air Force's tail kit portion of the B61 LEP. If the tail
kit is not funded, what are the impacts on the LEP? What are the cost
impacts? Is it possible to do the LEP without doing the tailkit?
Dr. Hommert. For a cut of this magnitude, significant schedule
slips would be expected to the Sandia portion of the B61-12 development
scope planned for FY14.
Although the final FY14 budget is not finalized, there are risks
from FY14 funding lower than requested by NNSA. In FY13, sequestration
impacts caused some technical activities to be moved into FY14. We
estimated the schedule impact of those shifts to be relatively small--
on the order of 2 to 3 months over the life of the program (within
overall schedule contingency). However, at the time of this testimony,
we are operating against a FY14 resource allocation that, on an annual
basis, is at least 23% below the FY14 requirement, as contained in the
most recent NNSA-approved Baseline Change Requests to the Selected
Acquisition Report, approved in October 2013. Until the final FY14
Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill is enacted, NNSA does
not have the authority to provide a definitive funding level for the
program. Obviously, unless addressed, budgetary changes of this
magnitude will have significant schedule impact. As with any large
program activity, schedule slip will result in an increase in overall
program cost. We recognize the overall fiscal environment in which we
are operating and will work at all times to minimize cost growth as a
result of budget-induced schedule slip.
First, it is my strongly held view that the current scope for the
B61 LEP is the minimum necessary to meet the threshold requirements for
the B61 provided by the Department of Defense and NNSA. (Any change to
the current scope being executed at Sandia will have a short term cost
increase. Sandia would have to halt its current work and initiate a
6.2/6.2A design definition and cost study which is a lengthy process
required for work such as LEPs.
Second, NNSA has not conducted a comprehensive WDCR on a different
scope program so I cannot assess the fiscal impact of a different
program. However, any scope changes must be jointly agreed to by NNSA
and DOD; specifically STRATCOM which must review the strategic
deterrence needs of the U.S. and how a reduced scope would affect that
capability. While DOD and the U.S. Air Force can provide further
information, based on our work sustaining the legacy B61 stockpile, the
U.S. Air Force would have to maintain the current variants of the B61
stockpile and lose the benefit of consolidation. Furthermore, there may
higher costs because the Triple Alt does not forestall the need for a
B61-12 Life Extension Program in the near future to address drivers not
accounted for in the limited program.
Lastly, any scope reduction has the potential to require Sandia to
jettison the previously completed design and qualification work
underway for the current LEP. Sandia will have to start its work all
over because of the change in design. There will also be concurrent
impacts to the W88 ALT and Mk 21 fuze which currently utilize several
B61-12 LEP components. Schedule slips to the B61-12 due to rescoping
will ripple to these programs as well and could increase their costs.
Although it is possible to complete a life extension without a
tailkit, to do so would result in a weapon system that either fails to
meet the mod consolidation or military effectiveness requirements
sought by the Nuclear Weapons Council and STRATCOM. The limitations of
this approach would need to be reviewed with the DOD (particularly
STRATCOM) to consider implications on long range strategic planning and
extended deterrence. DOD experts would better be able to speak to these
implications.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. GARAMENDI
Mr. Garamendi. How does the nuclear long-range strike stand-off
(LRSO) missile contribute to extended deterrence? Do we need both the
B61 bomb and the nuclear LRSO if the LRSO contributes to extended
deterrence?
Secretary Creedon. Both the LRSO and the B61 will contribute to
extended deterrence in support of our Allies. The LRSO, once fielded,
will be a significant contributor to the U.S. strategic and regional
deterrence missions. The LRSO will be able to provide enhanced standoff
capability against adversaries with more advanced air defense, anti-
access, or area denial capabilities. The B61 is the visible, tangible,
forward deployed weapon for extended deterrence; while the LRSO
provides a reinforcing strategic bomber alternative that further
enhances our support to Allies and Partners.
Given the spectrum of modern day threats and the growing problem of
nuclear proliferation in the 21st century, the President has directed
that the U.S. will maintain both a strategic nuclear triad and non-
strategic nuclear force capabilities to deter adversaries and assure
allies and partners. By developing and deploying an LRSO capability,
and retaining the B61, the U.S. will enhance the credibility and
effectiveness of strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces even as we
transition to lower numbers in the stockpile. These systems coupled
with the land-based and sea-based legs of the triad, and U.S
conventional capabilities will ensure the President has a wide-range of
options, at his disposal, in times of crisis. Retaining the B61 and
deploying an LRSO capability reinforces the U.S. commitment to defend
vital national interests and those of our allies and partners.
Mr. Garamendi. How many B61-12 nuclear weapons will be produced,
and how many rebuilt B61-12 bombs does the U.S. need for deterrence?
How many are required for tactical use and how many are required for
strategic use? How many nuclear weapons will be eliminated as a result
of the B61-12 mod?
Secretary Creedon. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Garamendi. Can the B83 yield be increased and decreased (dialed
up or down)? Please provide yield options (in classified format if
necessary). If so, could it serve as the deterrent in place of the B61-
12?
Secretary Creedon. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Garamendi. Could the B83 or B61-7 be carried by fighter
aircraft?
Secretary Creedon. The B61-7 and the B83 warhead could be carried
on fighter aircraft although there may be some compatibility issues to
be resolved. However, they could not be used by fighter aircraft in
forward-deployed operations because they lack a required security
feature.
Mr. Garamendi. Could the B61-7 only serve as a deterrent in place
of the B61-12?
Secretary Creedon. No. The B61-7 is facing significant aging issues
and would require an extensive Life Extension Program (LEP) to remain
in the stockpile. Its LEP scope would be the same as the B61-12 unless
the tail kit was eliminated. In addition, the yields on the B61-7 would
not meet military needs as effectively as those on the B61-12.
Not having a tail kit would prevent stockpile reductions because it
would prevent modification consolidation.
The B61-12 is more than a single weapon modernization. It is part
of a plan to maintain an effective deterrent, provide an acceptable
extended deterrent solution our Allies, and enable significant
stockpile reductions. We cannot achieve those objectives with any
single bomb in our current arsenal or with a cruise missile.
Mr. Garamendi. Can the B61-12 be used on any existing cruise
missiles and future cruise missiles?
Secretary Creedon. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Garamendi. What is plan B if the currently planned B61-12 LEP
does not get full funding or is delayed, in either FY14 or in the
following years? Is a contingency plan being considered? What are the
contingency plans for refurbishing the B61 and to maintain our
commitments to NATO if the delay for the first production unit slips
past 2020?
Secretary Creedon. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Garamendi. Ms. Creedon, you noted that, ``The B61-12 LEP will
consolidate multiple variants into a single design, which offers
opportunities for significance stockpile reductions while maintaining
national security objectives and extended deterrence commitments.''
When will these reductions occur? Is consolidation a military
requirement?
Secretary Creedon. We would begin consolidating B61 warhead
variants as soon as production begins in Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 and
complete the consolidation of the four B61 variants at the completion
of B61-12 production, currently scheduled in FY 2024. As soon as we
achieve confidence in the B61-12 LEP, at this time estimated to occur
around FY 2029 we would retire the B83 and the last remaining B61
variant. The consolidation is a military requirement that offers
prudent stewardship of tax payer dollars.
Mr. Garamendi. Secretary Creedon, are you confident that NNSA can
manage the 4-5 concurrent LEP workload?
Secretary Creedon. We are confident that NNSA can manage the
current scope of work required to meet long-term requirements.
Concurrency of work remains a concern, and therefore our plan is
structured not to exceed the capacity of NNSA facilities by sequencing
programs and by utilizing reuse of components where possible to
minimize both costs and infrastructure utilization.
Mr. Garamendi. Is the plan still for a first production unit of the
W78/88 in 2025? Are there considerations of delaying or canceling the
W78/88 in the near-medium term?
Secretary Creedon. The current plan still has the W78/88-1 first
production unit (FPU) in 2025. Given the expected budget during the
next five years, there are ongoing discussions about delaying this
program. Delaying the W78/88-1 would be a difficult decision.
Mr. Garamendi. How many B61-12 nuclear weapons will be produced,
and how many rebuilt B61-12 bombs does the U.S. need for deterrence?
How many are required for tactical use and how many are required for
strategic use? How many nuclear weapons will be eliminated as a result
of the B61-12 mod?
Dr. Cook. That information is available and can be provided in a
classified format or through a classified presentation.
Mr. Garamendi. Can the B83 yield be increased and decreased (dialed
up or down)? Please provide yield options (in classified format if
necessary). If so, could it serve as the deterrent in place of the B61-
12?
Dr. Cook. Table 2-1 in Chapter 2 of the classified annex to the FY
2014 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan has yields for all
current U.S. nuclear warheads. Roles and missions for our nuclear
warheads are determined by the Department of Defense.
Mr. Garamendi. a. What is plan B if the currently planned B61-12
LEP does not get full funding or is delayed, in either FY14 or in the
following years?
Dr. Cook. a. To the extent possible, NNSA is committed to providing
the funding necessary to complete the B61-12 by FY 2020.
Mr. Garamendi. b. Is a contingency plan being considered?
Dr. Cook. b. Contingency is always part of our planning process and
any further delays will require close coordination with the DOD in
order to maintain the necessary deterrent.
Mr. Garamendi. c. What are the contingency plans for refurbishing
the B61 and to maintain our commitments to NATO if the delay for the
first production unit slips past 2020?
Dr. Cook. c. These contingency plans consider both the B61-12
production and the sustainment of the B61-3, -4, -7, and -10s to gap
any additional delays to the B61 12 program. A classified report was
provided as part of an addendum to the FY 2013 Selected Acquisition
Report (SAR), dated May 2013. The classified addendum outlines the
mitigation strategies and timelines and can be provided if requested.
Mr. Garamendi. Dr. Cook, you noted that ``Other strategies to
extend the life of the many current variants of the B61 and the B83
would likely be double the cost compared to continuing progress on the
B61-12.'' Please provide a detailed cost assessment comparing the costs
for the current path (including the currently planned B-61 LEP (3B
option) and the planned 2033 B61-12 LEP) to (1) the costs for less
ambitious B61 LEP (1E option) and any required follow-on LEP in the
2020s (that might take the place of the planned 2033 LEP), and (2) to
the cost of a B83 LEP.
Dr. Cook. A detailed cost assessment is not available and would
require additional time, resources and engagement with the DOD to
assess requirements and possible alternatives. However, the NNSA's
Defense Programs, Office of Program Integration recently completed a
B61 Alternatives Analysis in FY 2013 using rough order of magnitude
estimates. The analysis considered the current mod consolidation
strategy versus an alternative that would maintain the current family
of B61s and the B83 without the B61-12 LEP. While the analysis did not
specifically call out option 1E, sufficient similarities exist to make
this comparison applicable. The analysis compared the costs to maintain
the B61-12 versus the existing gravity bombs stockpile (B61 family and
B83) over 25-year and 50-year planning windows. For the B61-12 LEP the
analysis assumed a 20 year stockpile life, and that a second LEP would
be required in the 50 year planning window. For the existing bombs
stockpile the analysis assumed non-nuclear alterations on the B61-3, -
4, -7 and B83-1 would be initially performed prior to 2030, and full
LEPs on both bomb families before 2040. This analysis demonstrated that
the costs of the B61-12 LEP approach are approximately half as much
than to maintain the existing bombs stockpile. The B61-12 LEP, as
currently authorized by the Nuclear Weapons Council and requested in
the Administration's FY 2014 budget request, is the lowest cost option
that meets military requirements. Any other alternative would not meet
military requirements and would drive-up lifecycle costs for these
modernization activities necessary to realize the President's vision.
Mr. Garamendi. Dr. Cook, please provide details on how much has
NNSA spent to date on engineering work for the option 3B option (costed
versus obligated funds).
Dr. Cook. As reported in the September 2013 Selected Acquisition
Report, NNSA has expended $385M of direct program funding for
Engineering Development. In the B61-12 Report to Congress dated July
2012, NNSA reported a total of $634M in study and technology maturation
cost prior to the start of Engineering Development. Including $90M of
Other Program Money, the total as of September 2013 is $1.1B.
Mr. Garamendi. Dr. Cook, how does NNSA plan to manage 4-5
concurrent LEPs without cost increase and schedule delays?
Dr. Cook. The 4-5 concurrent LEPs referred to are in different
phases that place different demands on the nuclear security enterprise
Phase 6.2/2A (Feasibility and Cost Study) activities tend to be focused
on technology maturation and computationally supported analysis and
mostly involves the weapons laboratories. Phase 6.3 (Development
Engineering) is focused on the design and testing of components and
subsystems that make use of design and computational capabilities along
with testing facilities at the laboratories and preliminary production
engineering at the potential production facilities. Phase 6.3 continues
as Phase 6.4 ramps up as decisions on specific technologies and designs
are decided upon and the production facilities perform process prove-in
to ensure war reserves (WR) quality parts can be reliably produced.
Laboratory involvement in the LEPs tends to peak just prior to FPU
after which their support is required to resolve production issues.
Production facilities carry most of the workload/effort following Phase
6.5 (FPU) and into Phase 6.6 Full rate production. The W76 LEP is
currently in full rate production to be completed by FY 2019. The B61
LEP will reach FPU in FY 2020 with Phase 6.3 activities currently
underway. The cruise missile and IW-1 LEPs have FPUs in FY24 and FY25,
respectively so most of their Phase 6.3/6.4 activities will occur after
Phase 6.5/6.6 activities have commenced for the B61. The scheduling of
these LEPs has been subject to enterprise modeling to establish the
feasibility of their concurrent execution and to identify and resolve
potential ``choke points'' in capability. Additionally, the recent
workforce prioritization study conducted by NNSA determined that the
NNSA sites were capable of staffing these activities in addition to
staffing other ongoing critical activities such as surveillance and
assessment (contingent on the provision of sufficient funding. Critical
to planning and integrating all these activities will be federal
leadership. Defense Programs recently reorganized to establish NA-19
(Office of Major Modernization Programs) to focus management of LEPs
and major construction projects in support of modernization of key
capabilities separate from the day to day maintenance of the stockpile.
Defense Programs also established NA-18 (Systems Engineering and
Integration) to put systems engineering and integration tools in place
to better apply these tools to the LEPs, major construction efforts,
and the overall program.
In addition, the Office of Infrastructure and Operations was
established to focus on maintaining, operating, and modernizing the
National Security Enterprise. It is critical to remember that funding
for NNSA infrastructure investments is also limited. Funding for NNSA
infrastructure investments is also limited. This could cause system- or
facility-level failures in the enterprise that would preclude safe and
secure operations, causing unplanned delays in the B61 LEP and other
programs.
Mr. Garamendi. a. Is the plan still for a first production unit of
the W78/88 in 2025?
Dr. Cook. a. Yes, the current estimated FPU for the W78/88-1 is FY
2025. The W78/88-1 LEP is the first interoperable warhead concept
supporting the ``3+2'' nuclear strategy of three ballistic missile
warheads and two air-launched warheads to reduce the numbers and types
of nuclear weapons, consistent with the Nuclear Posture Review. The
military requirements, cost and schedule promulgated by the Nuclear
Weapons Council include requirements derived from both Air Force and
Navy applications and improve the safety and security of the resulting
warhead. The feasibility study has been developing options to meet
these requirements.
Mr. Garamendi. b. Are there considerations of delaying or canceling
the W78/88 in the near-medium term?
Dr. Cook. b. NNSA is working on contingency planning which ranges
from maintaining the current scope and schedule of the W78/88-1 to
extending the FPU.
Mr. Garamendi. What is plan B if the currently planned B61-12 LEP
does not get full funding or is delayed, in either FY14 or in the
following years? Is a contingency plan being considered? What are the
contingency plans for refurbishing the B61 and to maintain our
commitments to NATO if the delay for the first production unit slips
past 2020?
Dr. Hommert. To reiterate, my annual assessment letters have
documented concerns related to technology obsolescence and aging. While
the B61 is currently safe and secure, these concerns continue to
increase. For example, in the past three years, we have observed time-
dependent degradation not seen before in electronic, polymer, and high-
explosive components. This observation is not surprising given the age
of the B61 weapon system, the oldest units of which were manufactured
and fielded in the late 1970s with some components dating back to the
1960s. As planned, the B61 LEP we are currently executing addresses all
known aging-related issues and meets the minimum threshold requirements
Regarding extended deterrence, officials in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense are suited to provide a reply to the question.
Sandia can provide additional information related contingency plans in
a closed briefing for Representative Garamendi and the Subcommittee
staff.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. CARSON
Mr. Carson. There has been significant investigations conducted by
my colleagues in the SASC on counterfeit microelectronics. I was
pleased to see the significant work done in my home state at Crane
Naval Surface Warfare Center to ensure trust in strategic weapon
systems. As you know, one of the difficulties we face is in identifying
manufacturing facilities or foundries that produce the counterfeit
parts and put them into the DOD and DOE supply chain. Could you explain
the DOE and DOD efforts currently under way to ensure trust in our
microelectronics for the nuclear weapon modernization program?
Dr. Cook. DOD and DOE participate in monthly meetings of the
Trusted Systems Network Roundtable where DOD agencies and commands
address issues associated with threats to military hardware and
software, including information technology systems. In addition, the
NNSA is coordinating with the DOD on Program Protection Plans for the
B61-12 LEP and the bomb tailkit, respectively. Recently, NNSA has
expanded efforts to address this vulnerability to the W88 Alt 370 fuse
replacement. NNSA is coordinating with the Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence to address the any threat to the supply chain
perpetrated by nation state or other adversaries with intent to subvert
the NNSA mission. DOE/NNSA is also mandated to participate in the
Government-Industry Data Exchange Program (GIDEP). Counterfeit items
identified by DOD and, other participating agencies, which are reported
to GIDEP, are reviewed within the DOE Office of Health Safety and
Security (HSS). Any counterfeit item reports deemed to potentially
affect Program(s) across the DOE, including the NNSA organization, are
disseminated to the DOE/NNSA Sites and their M&O contractors. DOE/NNSA-
identified counterfeit items are also required to be reported to HSS
and, if substantive, may also be reported to GIDEP for information
exchange.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. NUGENT
Mr. Nugent. Dr. Cook, what impact will a FY14 full year continuing
resolution have on the B61 LEP?
Dr. Cook. Under the current CR, the B61-12 is operating at $369M as
opposed to the PBR of $537M or the Selected Acquisition Report
estimated requirement of $561M. If the program remains at the $369M
level through FY 2014, it would significantly impact the ability to
meet the B61-12 LEP first production unit (FPU) date. The reduced
funding would require a reduction in the current B61-12 technical staff
levels, elimination of development hardware procurements, and
cancellation of joint test activities with the USAF. The lack of new
hardware would also impact component development activities and testing
for FY 2015. The FPU in March 2020 could not be achieved, and could
possibly slip into FY 2021. In addition, funding for NNSA
infrastructure investments is also limited. This could cause system- or
facility-level failures in the nuclear security enterprise that would
preclude safe and secure operations, causing unplanned delays in the
B61 LEP and other programs.
Mr. Nugent. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review states that the B61
Life Extension Program would deliver a First Production Unit to the Air
Force in FY17. Last year, the Administration proposed delaying that
until FY19. Now it appears that sequestration has delayed First
Production Unit until FY20.
Dr. Hommert, in your professional technical judgment at what point
does further delay result in too much risk? Do you believe the B61 LEP
schedule can be slipped again without impacts to the safety, security
and reliability of the weapon? What are the primary drivers that might
cause the schedule to slip again? Is it technical problems,
programmatic problems or budget uncertainty?
Dr. Hommert. As described in my annual classified assessment
provided to Congress (and briefed to the Subcommittee earlier this
year), known end-of-life component issues and uncertainties in other
aging mechanisms significantly increase risk with any additional
schedule slips beyond an FY2020 FPU consistent with the current
Selected Acquisition Report commitments. However, it is my opinion the
B61-12 needs to remain aligned with the planned first production near
the end of FY2020 to assure confidence in the ongoing safety, security,
and reliability of the weapon in the face of continuing degradation of
components.
Regarding schedule drivers, there are two overarching causes for
slip: technical issues and budgetary changes. With respect to technical
risk, I have the highest level of confidence that technical issues will
NOT cause impact to Sandia's schedule performance. With respect to
budgetary changes, I cannot be as sanguine. In FY13, sequestration
impacts caused some technical activities to be moved into FY14. We
estimated the schedule impact of those shifts to be relatively small--
on the order of 2 to 3 months over the life of the program (within
overall schedule contingency). However, at the time of my testimony, we
are operating against a FY14 resource allocation that, on an annual
basis, is at least 23% below the FY14 requirement, as contained in the
most recent NNSA-approved Baseline Change Requests to the Selected
Acquisition Report, approved in October 2013. Until the final FY14
Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill is enacted, NNSA does
not have the authority to provide a definitive funding level for the
program. Obviously, unless addressed, budgetary changes of this
magnitude will have significant schedule impact.
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