[House Hearing, 113 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 113-21]
THE U.S. NUCLEAR DETERRENT:
WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS
FOR A STRONG DETERRENT IN AN
ERA OF DEFENSE SEQUESTER?
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED THIRTEENTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 19, 2013
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama, Chairman
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona JIM COOPER, Tennessee
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
MIKE COFFMAN, Colorado JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama RICK LARSEN, Washington
JOE WILSON, South Carolina JOHN GARAMENDI, California
MICHAEL R. TURNER, Ohio HENRY C. ``HANK'' JOHNSON, Jr.,
JOHN FLEMING, Louisiana Georgia
RICHARD B. NUGENT, Florida ANDRE CARSON, Indiana
JIM BRIDENSTINE, Oklahoma MARC A. VEASEY, Texas
Tim Morrison, Counsel
Leonor Tomero, Counsel
Eric Smith, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2013
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, March 19, 2013, The U.S. Nuclear Deterrent: What Are the
Requirements for a Strong Deterrent in an Era of Defense
Sequester?..................................................... 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, March 19, 2013.......................................... 27
----------
TUESDAY, MARCH 19, 2013
THE U.S. NUCLEAR DETERRENT: WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A STRONG
DETERRENT IN AN ERA OF DEFENSE SEQUESTER?
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Cooper, Hon. Jim, a Representative from Tennessee, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces....................... 2
Rogers, Hon. Mike, a Representative from Alabama, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
WITNESSES
Blair, Dr. Bruce G., President, World Security Institute......... 6
Krepinevich, Dr. Andrew F., Jr., President, Center for Strategic
and Budgetary Assessments...................................... 4
Payne, Dr. Keith B., Professor and Head, Graduate Department of
Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University....... 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Blair, Dr. Bruce G........................................... 69
Cooper, Hon. Jim............................................. 34
Krepinevich, Dr. Andrew F., Jr............................... 49
Payne, Dr. Keith B........................................... 35
Rogers, Hon. Mike............................................ 31
Documents Submitted for the Record:
``Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure and
Posture,'' a May 2012 Report by the Global Zero U.S.
Nuclear Policy Commission (Gen (Ret.) James E. Cartwright,
Chair; Amb. Richard Burt; Sen. Chuck Hagel; Amb. Thomas
Pickering; Gen (Ret.) Jack Sheehan; and Dr. Bruce Blair,
Study Director)............................................ 85
``Senior Military and Defense Officials Who Disagree with
Global Zero,'' a Subcommittee Staff Paper.................. 126
Testimony of Gen (Ret.) James E. Cartwright.................. 111
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Cooper................................................... 147
Mr. Rogers................................................... 131
THE U.S. NUCLEAR DETERRENT: WHAT ARE THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A STRONG
DETERRENT IN AN ERA OF DEFENSE SEQUESTER?
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 19, 2013.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 4:09 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mike Rogers
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MIKE ROGERS, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
ALABAMA, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Rogers. The House Armed Services Committee's
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces will come to order. This
rescheduled hearing has been delayed a week, but I do
appreciate the patience of our panelists for the storm that
didn't happen, but we tried.
It is on an important topic, ``The U.S. Nuclear Deterrent:
What Are the Requirements for a Strong Deterrent in an Era of
Defense Sequester?'' And we have a distinguished group of
experts to help us consider the subject. They are Dr. Keith
Payne, Professor and Head, Graduate Department of Defense and
Strategic Studies, Missouri State University; Dr. Andrew
Krepinevich--did I say that correctly--President, Center for
Strategic Budgetary Assessments; and Dr. Bruce Blair, Co-
founder of Global Zero.
This Nation has some key decisions ahead of it. We find
ourselves in the position of having to recapitalize our entire
deterrent at exactly the time that every other nation is
growing or modernizing its nuclear forces, but we have absorbed
reductions in our defense budget of $487 billion and we are now
18 days into President Obama's defense sequester that will take
another half-trillion dollars out of our defense budget over
the next decade.
Our nuclear deterrent is the most cost-effective and proven
means of promoting peace for the American people and their
allies, but we have not been investing in it in a responsible
way. Our real and potential adversaries and competitors
understand this. Russia, for instance, has tested three new
ICBMs [intercontinental ballistic missiles] during the New
START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Treaty entered into
force 2 years ago. The People's Republic of China is preparing
to put to sea a ballistic missile submarine and sea-launched
ballistic missile and it appears to be readying three new long-
range ballistic missiles capable of attacking the United
States. I note that Russia's Vladimir Putin tells his people
that, ``nuclear weapons remain the main guarantee of Russia's
sovereignty and its territorial integrity. It plays a key role
in maintaining global and regional stability and balance.''
President Obama, however, says in the State of the Union
Address last week or last month that, ``we will engage Russia
to seek further reductions in our nuclear arsenals . . .
because our ability to influence others depends on our
willingness to lead.''
Are they both right? I think General Welch, former
Strategic Air Command commander and former Chief of Staff of
the U.S. Air Force, had it right when he said, ``the only basis
for the idea that drastically reducing the number of nukes we
had would magically make us safer and help eliminate other
nuclear weapons is hope, but hope is not a plan and hope is not
a basis for security. Hope does not defend us. Leading the
world to zero nuclear weapons is at best a fairy tale.''
There is a rising consensus from General Scowcroft,
Secretaries Perry, Schlesinger, Shultz, and Senator Nunn that
the one-time frenzy of a world without nuclear weapons is
little more than a fantasy, and a dangerous one at that. For
example, the so-called Gang of 4's recent Wall Street Journal
piece is a dramatic shift from the original 2007 piece. This is
welcome. We are at a crisis point where we must focus on
eminent threats from North Korea and Iran.
So, I look forward to examining these matters today. They
are important to the Nation's security and they are important
matters as we will tackle in our markup of the Fiscal Year 2014
National Defense Authorization, and with that, I yield to my
friend and colleague from Tennessee, Mr. Cooper, for any
opening statement that he may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Rogers can be found in the
Appendix on page 31.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JIM COOPER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TENNESSEE,
RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the
distinguished witnesses. What we have here today is like a
battle of the Ph.D.s, so I look forward to the different
testimonies.
Mr. Chairman, I, too, saw the article in the Wall Street
Journal from Secretary Shultz, Secretary Perry, Foreign
Secretary Kissinger, and Former Senator Sam Nunn, and I had a
little more positive interpretation of it. First of all, I saw
four very distinguished Americans who were agreeing on a
bipartisan basis that we should at least look at reductions,
and these, granted, need to be done in a balanced and
responsible way, but I thought overall they were very bullish
on the prospect that we could lead the world to a better place,
and I look forward to hearing the expert testimony of the
witnesses on this subject.
Mr. Chairman, with your consent, I would like to insert my
statement for the record as well as the testimony of General
Cartwright, who is unable to be with us today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Cooper can be found in the
Appendix on page 34.]
[The prepared statement of General Cartwright can be found
in the Appendix on page 111.]
Mr. Rogers. Without objection, so ordered.
Other members of the committee are advised that they can
offer their opening statement for the record, and with that, we
will go to Dr. Keith Payne for his opening statement that will
be summarized in five minutes. Dr. Payne.
STATEMENT OF DR. KEITH B. PAYNE, PROFESSOR AND HEAD, GRADUATE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES, MISSOURI STATE
UNIVERSITY
Dr. Payne. Thank you, Chairman Rodgers and Ranking Member
Cooper. It is a pleasure and honor to be here. I need to start
out by saying I am speaking as an individual and not for any of
the institutions with which I am associated.
Let me start by noting that there are numerous proposals
for deep U.S. nuclear reductions. They typically are based on
an approach to deterrence known as minimum deterrence, and the
basic contemporary argument is that a small number of U.S.
nuclear weapons is adequate for deterrence because nuclear
threats from China and Russia no longer are plausible and
because nuclear weapons are irrelevant to the priority threat
we face; that is, nuclear terrorism.
Consequently, so the argument goes, the U.S. can, with
little or no risk, undertake deep nuclear reductions that will
reduce nuclear dangers, advance U.S. nonproliferation goals,
and save many billions of dollars.
My examination of these and other minimum deterrence claims
suggests that they are dubious at best. For example, the claim
that nuclear deterrence is irrelevant to terrorism is false.
Terrorists can be deterred in some circumstances, including by
deterring their state sponsors, and nuclear deterrence
certainly may help in that regard.
In addition, the promise of substantial savings from
nuclear reductions is again false. In fact, the minimum
deterrence recommendation that the U.S. deter with conventional
forces in place of nuclear would likely require a net increase
in spending.
Similarly, the claim that U.S. nuclear weapons are of
little relevance to U.S. relations with Russia and China misses
the facts that Russia and China both point to us as enemy
number one, make explicit threats against close U.S. allies and
emphasize the great military and political value that they
place on nuclear weapons. They are not following our
antinuclear lead.
It also is impossible to claim with any credibility that
deterrence will work reliably at low nuclear force levels, nor
that U.S. conventional threats can substitute reliably for
nuclear weapons. No one knows if the first of these claims is
true, and all evidence suggests the second claim is false.
Further, deep U.S. nuclear reductions would encourage some
of our allies to go nuclear themselves. While emphasizing our
advanced conventional forces leads some opponents to emphasize
more the great need that they see for nuclear weapons.
Consequently, my conclusion is that minimum deterrence is
likely to promote nuclear proliferation coming and going. And
the claim that nuclear reductions will reduce the prospect for
nuclear accidents is contrary to the abundant available
evidence, over five decades, that there is no historic
correlation between the number of weapons and the number of
accidents.
Finally, deep U.S. nuclear reductions would degrade those
U.S. force characteristics likely to be most important for
deterrence. Those characteristics are the force flexibility,
diversity, and resilience.
The ability of our force to adapt as necessary for
deterrence across many plausible scenarios and surprising
threats depends on their flexibility and their diversity.
Moving to a much reduced nuclear arsenal that degrades those
qualities is precisely the wrong way to go for deterrence.
In short, the deep reductions recommended by minimum
deterrence would not likely lead to the promised benefits but
instead would degrade our capability to adapt our deterrence to
new and future threats, encourage some opponents towards
nuclear arms buildups and to challenge our deterrence
strategies and encourage some allies to acquire their own
nuclear deterrence and thereby potentially inspire a possible
cascade of nuclear proliferation.
The same evidence that demonstrates the serious flaws of
minimum deterrence suggests three contemporary and I believe
more realistic guidelines. One, U.S. nuclear forces must be of
sufficient size and diversity to provide the flexibility and
resilience necessary for deterrence across a wide and shifting
array of threats. Two, this flexibility and diversity and
resilience of U.S. forces is threatened as the nuclear arsenal
becomes ever smaller. Along these lines, former STRATCOM [U.S.
Strategic Command] Commander General Chilton said in 2010 that
to preserve flexibility, we should not move below the 1,550
deployed warhead ceiling of the New START Treaty. And three,
assuring our allies is as important as deterring our foes and
depends again on our possession of the diverse and flexible
nuclear capabilities that many allies deem necessary for their
assurance.
Let me conclude by noting that my emphasis on the need for
a U.S. nuclear arsenal that is large enough and diverse enough
to provide flexibility and resilience is completely consistent
with the conclusions of the bipartisan Congressional Strategic
Posture Commission that was headed by Dr. Perry and Dr.
Schlesinger, a commission that was created with help of the
House Armed Services Committee.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Payne can be found in the
Appendix on page 35.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you.
Dr. Krepinevich.
STATEMENT OF DR. ANDREW F. KREPINEVICH, JR., PRESIDENT, CENTER
FOR STRATEGIC AND BUDGETARY ASSESSMENTS
Dr. Krepinevich. Chairman Rogers, Ranking Member Cooper,
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify here today on the subject of U.S. nuclear requirements.
First, let me applaud the subcommittee. This issue, to me, is
extremely important. The U.S. nuclear arsenal is a strategic
asset of the United States. It has been a strategic asset for
nearly 70 years now, and any decision to make major changes in
the size or composition of that arsenal merits thorough
consideration and study.
From my perspective, the requirements in terms of looking
at reductions to the arsenal, they should be examined in terms
of our security objectives, which I view as two overarching
objectives. One is to prevent the use of nuclear weapons in
general, and specifically, against ourselves and our allies and
partners, and also to prevent the use of nuclear weapons as
instruments of coercion, sometimes referred to as nuclear
blackmail.
And second, in the event that this fails and that nuclear
weapons are used, to terminate the use of such weapons as
quickly as possible in a manner that best serves U.S.
interests.
Now, both the Obama administration and a number of experts,
as you have mentioned, have made the point that these
objectives can best be achieved by significant reductions
beyond those to which we are committed in the New START Treaty.
Based on the analysis I have seen, my belief is that this
assertion is open to question, and my testimony examines two
overriding questions with respect to this issue. First, I am
skeptical that a reduction in U.S. nuclear forces will lead
other nuclear powers to reduce their arsenals or aspiring
nuclear powers to forego acquiring nuclear weapons, and I would
cite four observations.
First, so far, there hasn't been a phenomenon of follow-
the-leader. Both United States and Russia dramatically reduced
their nuclear arsenals since the end of the Cold War, and as
Dr. Payne pointed out, many nuclear powers are modernizing and/
or expanding their nuclear arsenals.
Second, to the extent that we reduce our nuclear forces,
the issue of extended deterrence or the nuclear umbrella comes
into question, which is to say to what extent can allies and
partners rely on a diminishing U.S. nuclear arsenal to provide
the kind of protection in terms of deterrence and also
protection against coercion?
Third, we, as my colleagues have pointed out, have an
enormous advantage in conventional forces, something we didn't
have during the Cold War, and of course we took the lead in the
1950s and relied on nuclear weapons to help offset that
conventional inferiority. Well, now, others are following the
leader in a different way. We have the Russians and the
Pakistanis, in particular, increasing their emphasis,
increasing their reliance on nuclear forces, not just for
deterrence but for warfighting purposes as well.
And finally, the problem of unintended consequences. You
know, there is a question that, you know, at what point in
terms of force reductions do we go, and the issue is, do we at
some point encourage others to follow us and is that a good
thing, or do we encourage others to build up to our level and
create a more complicated situation than the one we have right
now.
The second issue is, is would a reduction in U.S. nuclear
forces discourage the use of nuclear weapons, and I cite an
observation by a former French Foreign Minister, Hubert
Vedrine, who says the country that possesses the bomb does not
use it and automatically enters the system of deterrence and
doesn't take absurd risks.
I have four observations with respect to this issue, which
is to say a reduction in U.S. nuclear forces would discourage
the use of nuclear weapons.
As I mentioned first, other countries see a use in nuclear
weapons beyond deterrence, and specifically, the cases are
Russia and Pakistan, which have integrated nuclear use into
their doctrines.
Second, not all decisionmakers who control nuclear weapons
are, I think, what we would consider to be rational or
necessarily rational, and in my testimony I cite a number of
instances ranging from Adolf Hitler to Saddam Hussein, Fidel
Casto, Nikita Khrushchev, where their behavior would not quite
equate to what I think we would consider to be mature, rational
behavior that was not prone to taking absurd risks.
Third, there is the issue of structural instability, and I
will just briefly mention here, the point that there are some
areas in proliferation where even if both sides desire to avoid
nuclear use, they risk, quite frankly, a very unstable
situation, crisis and stability, and finally, an end-player
competition. The lower we go to the extent that we bring others
along with us, we have a competition among many states, and in
that situation, we have to rethink the dynamics given that
during the Cold War we had a two-state competition.
So, very briefly, it seems to me that while there is
general agreement on the basic security objectives that we
ought to be pursuing, the devil is in the details, and there is
a great divergence of opinion as to how best to achieve these
objectives, and what I see is a remarkable lack of thinking
about prospective real-world situations. A lot of abstract
thinking, very little real-world thinking, what I would call
thinking that is associated with what the Defense Department
would call it an assessment, and it is this kind of thinking, I
think, that is really needed before we take big steps in terms
of altering the size and structure of our nuclear forces.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Krepinevich can be found in
the Appendix on page 49.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Dr. Krepinevich.
Dr. Blair is recognized 5 minutes to summarize his opening
statement.
STATEMENT OF DR. BRUCE G. BLAIR, PRESIDENT, WORLD SECURITY
INSTITUTE
Dr. Blair. Thank you, Congressman Rogers and Congressman
Cooper, and other distinguished members, for inviting me here
today. I am very honored and pleased to testify before you.
My bottom line judgment is that continuing U.S. nuclear
reductions would produce substantial benefits and carry no
risks.
The Global Zero Commission report issued last year by
General Cartwright and others, including Senator Hagel,
recommended a force of 900 total nuclear weapons, an 80-percent
reduction from the current stockpile, and assessed that force
to be more than adequate to meet strategic requirements. As
General Cartwright put it, ``this would not be a small nor
humble force designed for minimal deterrence. It would hold at
risk all of the major categories of facilities in all countries
considered to pose a potential WMD [Weapon of Mass Destruction]
threat to the United States.''
Nine hundred total weapons is not a small arsenal.
Sometimes we lose perspective on these things. Nine hundred
weapons possess enormous destructive power, far more than
necessary to impress any potential rational foe. For the
irrational foes, such as fanatical terrorists, the level of
American nuclear armaments would make little or no difference
at all.
So why are these deep cuts possible and what are the
benefits? First and foremost, obviously, the Cold War ended 20
years ago. The requirements of deterrence are obviously much
lower between countries that are no longer enemies and that no
longer believe either side intends to attack the other.
The decline of mutual threat in our primary relationship
over the last 25 years has enabled our two countries to achieve
unprecedented levels of cooperation and mutual benefits in a
multitude of areas, including cutting their nuclear stockpiles
by 75 percent since the end of the Cold War, but these legacy
arsenals remain still very large and there is ample room for
further cuts.
Second, reducing the nuclear stockpiles feeds on itself in
a positive way. As both sides reduce their nuclear arms,
nuclear-related targets go away along with the need to hold
them at risk, so this is a dynamic that has resulted in massive
reductions in weapons and targets and greatly undercut the
rationale for new weapons.
Gentlemen, we have literally reversed the arms race.
Third, smart targeting has made further nuclear possible
cuts without sacrificing any coverage. I will give you just one
example. Not very long ago, our nuclear targeteers were
planning to lay down 10 weapons on one very high value command
and control target, command post. Today, they have, as a result
of an intelligence breakthrough, managed to figure out how to
target that facility with two weapons.
As it was noted, we also have conventional superiority that
has reduced our reliance on nuclear weapons. They have given us
useable options, much more useable than nuclear weapons,
increasing our credibility in dealing with threats that
previously required a nuclear response and created yet more
room for further reductions.
Fourth, this conventional rebalancing has really
strengthened the credibility of our extended deterrence to
allies such as South Korea. Remember, South Korea, up until the
1980s, needed help from U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to deal
with the North's artillery threat. Today, South Korea has
conventional superiority over the North, and the need for U.S.
nukes for warfighting on the Peninsula has essentially gone by
the boards.
The North's fledgling threat has, of course, revised
somewhat the need to wave our nuclear umbrella over the allies,
but don't forget, we just possess overwhelming nuclear
superiority over the North, and even after deep cuts, that will
remain.
Fifth, the continuing reduction presents opportunities for
reconfiguring our strategic forces and our posture in ways that
really strengthen stability. Let me give you an example. A key
benefit is that cyber warfare threats, which are growing, can
be mitigated as a result. By eliminating forces that have to be
maintained on once ready alert, like the Minuteman [LGM-30
intercontinental ballistic missile] forces, and by eliminating
our reliance on launch on warning to protect those forces, we
can completely eliminate the danger that exists today that
unauthorized actors could trigger a launch that was not
intended or block the execution of a legitimate launch ordered
from the President.
Six, continuing reductions, even deep cuts, are not
expected to stimulate China or other countries to rush to
parity. That is, I think, the prevailing assessment of the
intelligence community. In the case of China, General Kehler
recently testified that, ``I do not see, nor has the
intelligence community reported to me that China is seeking to
have some kind of numeric parity with the United States or with
Russia.''
Of course, you know, an effort to rush to parity is
possible, though very unlikely. In such an event, it would be
easily detectable, would take many years, and we could adjust
accordingly.
It would be extremely beneficial if continuing reductions
in the U.S. and Russian nuclear arsenals bring China and the
other nuclear weapons countries to the negotiating table. That
is an important goal for this country. A multilateral
negotiations must be initiated soon to address the multitude of
nuclear dangers that exist outside the U.S.-Russia relation in
places like South Asia.
Seventh, and I am coming to the end here, continuing U.S.
nuclear arms reductions would affirm the U.S. support for the
Non-Proliferation Treaty, which continues to be, in my view, an
indispensable tool in the international community's effort to
prevent and roll back proliferation.
The days of U.S. and Russian lip service to the disarmament
clause of the treaty are over if they hope to preserve and
strengthen this treaty in the face of growing proliferation
pressures around the world.
Mr. Rogers. Dr. Blair, you need to wind it down. You have
gone about 2 minutes over.
Dr. Blair. Okay. Thank you. I just have one paragraph.
Last, this hearing seeks to set priorities for the U.S.
program under sequestration. I would argue that the size of the
U.S.--that we have plenty of time and margin here, that the
size of the U.S. arsenal and scale of its reduction or
modernization are less important than the operational postures
today of the forces and the cohesion of the system of command
and control.
My first priority would be to ensure a full-scale, thorough
review of cyber security of all nuclear networks to identify
and remove cyber warfare threats that could compromise the
integrity of these networks, that is my first priority. It is
essential not to sacrifice this on the altar of sequestration.
And lastly, my second priority under sequestration would be
to secure and dispose of excess surplus, weapons-grade nuclear
materials around the world.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Blair can be found in the
Appendix on page 69.]
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Dr. Blair.
We now turn to questions. Each member will be allowed 5
minutes, and I will start with the questions myself.
Dr. Blair, you just made reference to General Kehler's
testimony in which he said that China was not, based on his
exposure to intelligence, ``rushing'' to parity with the United
States. Would you acknowledge that China is expending a larger
percentage of their GDP in missile system technology than we
are?
Dr. Blair. I don't know.
Mr. Rogers. Would you acknowledge that their volume of
tactical regional weapons far exceeds our capacity?
Dr. Blair. Yes----
Mr. Rogers. China's.
Dr. Blair [continuing]. I would dispute that. I think the
total size of the Chinese arsenal is in the range of--there is
a debate on this, I think, but the debate is whether the total
arsenal is----
Mr. Rogers. How about Russia's?
Dr. Blair [continuing]. Low hundreds or mid hundreds.
Mr. Rogers. How about Russia's?
Dr. Blair. 150. So we have 700 tactical nuclear weapons.
China has far fewer than that.
Mr. Rogers. What about Russia's?
Dr. Blair. Russia probably has on the range of 1,500 to
2,000----
Mr. Rogers. Compared to ours.
Dr. Blair [continuing]. Deployed tactical nuclear weapons
compared to our 700. We have a comparable advantage in reserve
strategic weapons.
Mr. Rogers. Would you agree that Russia is spending a
larger percent of their GDP on missile system technology than
we are, capability?
Dr. Blair. I would question that.
Mr. Rogers. The answer is ``yes.'' The answer is ``yes'' on
China and answer is ``yes'' on Russia.
Dr. Blair. I still would question that. I would have to go
back and study that. Let me make a point about that. The United
States spends more on intelligence alone every year than the
entire Russian defense budget.
Mr. Rogers. My point in talking about the percentage of GDP
spent on missile capability----
Dr. Blair. But, sir----
Mr. Rogers [continuing]. Is certainly an indicator of their
intent and their seriousness about the technology.
Dr. Blair. I don't think that is very good indication.
Mr. Rogers. Dr. Blair, your report that you made reference
in your testimony, you say, was based on considerable detailed
analysis. Would you make this detailed analysis available to
this committee?
Dr. Blair. Sorry, detailed analysis of?
Mr. Rogers. For your report that you referenced in your
testimony. You say it is based on considerable detailed
analysis. Would you make that analysis available to this
committee?
Dr. Blair. I think the report itself, which is 22 pages
long, is fairly detailed.
Mr. Rogers. So that is the analysis you are making
reference to. You say in the report itself it is based on
analysis. I would assume that means a body of evidence.
Dr. Blair. The report is based on analysis and the
deliberation of a distinguished group of authors, including
former head of strategic command, including Senator Hagel now
Secretary of Defense.
Mr. Rogers. The reason why I am asking is because when I
look at your report, about half the footnotes are footnotes
referencing your own writings. Why is that?
Dr. Blair. Because I have done the most analytical and
scholarly work in this area.
Mr. Rogers. Are there other experts that you relied on?
Dr. Blair. Well, those footnotes refer to many, many other
experts' analyses.
Mr. Rogers. That supported your views, the other experts?
Dr. Blair. Some do, some don't.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Dr. Blair, general officers from the
current Commander of STRATCOM, General Kehler, to the former
Commander of STRATCOM, General Kevin Chilton, Lieutenant
General Kowalski to retired Major General Chambers and many
others who are recently part of the senior leadership of the
Department of Defense have rejected Global Zero's
recommendations, and I will insert a staff paper into the
record on that point without objection.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 126.]
Mr. Rogers. What do you know about the subject matter that
these general officers don't know?
Dr. Blair. I think the argument stands on its face,
Congressman. You can read through it. I just gave my testimony.
If you find that the logic and the arguments and the points
don't stand up to your scrutiny or anyone else's, I am happy to
have that debate, but I made the case for why, and General
Cartwright and others subscribe to this, why a 900-nuclear-
weapons force is not a small minimal deterrent force.
Mr. Rogers. Dr. Payne, would you care to comment as to why
you believe those commanding generals differ with the findings
of the report?
Dr. Payne. Well, because I believe that they are in
consensus that they need to protect the flexibility, the
resilience, the adaptability of the nuclear arsenal, and going
down to very low numbers, such as is recommended in that
report, has a number of casualties, but one of the casualties
of going down to very low numbers tends to be exactly the
flexibility and the resilience of the U.S. nuclear arsenal. And
even if one can claim rightly that the U.S. nuclear arsenal can
deter today at some set number, even if you grant that, the
question is whether you can deter next year, the year after
that, and 10 years from now. And the need for flexibility and
resilience in the arsenal comes exactly from that. We need to
be able to deter over the next two decades, and those
characteristics of the arsenal are directly related to its size
and its diversity. So I believe that the commanders of STRATCOM
are interested in preserving the diversity of the U.S. arsenal
so that we can safeguard our ability to deter war.
Mr. Rogers. Dr. Krepinevich, do you care to comment as to
why those commanding generals would differ with their findings
of the report?
Dr. Krepinevich. Well, Mr. Chairman, I don't know why they
would. On the other hand, I would like to think that perhaps
their logic included considerations along the lines of it is
probably a lot easier to reduce the size of nuclear forces than
to build them back up again. I think there will be a real
prejudice against that, particularly given our financial
situation right now and the fact that it is not likely to be
resolved anytime soon.
Second, as Dr. Payne said, I think you have to look long-
term. We don't make changes in our nuclear arsenal overnight,
and when you are thinking about what kind of a nuclear force
you need, 5 or 10 years out into the future is not a long way
to look.
And I would say the third has to do with what kind of
contingencies do we see our nuclear forces being brought to
bear, and we are so far away from the Cold War, and you know,
during the Cold War, we eventually got to the point where it
was us and the Soviets and it was Armageddon, and you know,
once it started, there wasn't, you know, much sense thinking
about a world after or a day after.
Now, I think you can look at a range of plausible
contingencies, and certainly that's been my experience in
talking with senior military leaders and senior officials both
in this Administration and the last administration. There is
a--there are a range of contingencies, and it is not
Armageddon, it is not us and the Russians, and until you think
through those contingencies and until you think through the
fact that, as Dr. Blair, I think, pointed out in his study,
there is some--I wouldn't go as far as he would, but there is
some potential substitutability of precision conventional
weapons and cyber weapons for targets that we used to reserve
for nuclear weapons. Missile defenses are much more capable now
than they were a generation ago.
We have things like directed energy where remarkable
progress is being made, and until you really think through
those contingencies and look at the dynamics, the steady state
dynamics, the crisis dynamics, and even the warfighting
dynamics, because there can be conflicts between other
countries, think India-Pakistan, God forbid, Israel and Iran,
where we would have to look at that as a third party and try
and determine how to keep maybe a crisis from getting out of
control, and if it does, how to stop the bleeding, and also,
quite frankly, what the world looks like the day after.
So, I would like to think, having talked most recently to
General Kehler about these kinds of scenarios, that, you know,
that is where the effort is right now, and if so, then I
applaud it.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you very much. The Chair now recognizes
the ranking member for any questions he may have.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I know that this
subcommittee, as currently constituted, is in its early days,
but I am somewhat disappointed in the adversarial tone that I
heard in your comments so far in this hearing. I hope this is
not an indication of forthcoming behavior because I know we are
both from the same region, we know what good manners are like,
and all of these witnesses have been kind enough to come, some
on short notice, and there was a rescheduling involved as well,
so I hope that we can approach these vitally important national
issues with an air of civility and calm as we approach some
very serious decisions here.
I am curious because I think this Global Zero cause has
been misnamed. It sounds like it should have been called like
Global 900, and the cause on the other side should perhaps be
called, I don't know, what Global 30,000 or Global 20,000 or
Global 10,000, you know, some much larger number. The number we
are at right now, given the curious counting rule, seems to be
1,550, and surely no one thinks that is a perfect number.
So, as Dr. Krepinevich just mentioned with the advances in
conventional, cyber and missile defense technologies, we need
to continually revise the effectiveness of what arsenal we
have, and he also noted, I thought quite wisely, that whatever
arsenal we have, maybe we should pay for. So, our adversaries
are not unaware of that defense sequestration or inability to
pay for even the recent wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.
So, I think a comprehensive and calm look at this would
indicate that let's figure out whether 900 or 1,000 or 1,100 or
some number like that is an appropriate number. And it is a
little bit awkward to have these hearings in an open setting,
but I am kind of curious, I thought Dr. Blair gave an excellent
list of possible uses for the weapons we have got, and I would
like to ask Dr. Payne and Dr. Krepinevich which targets, in
addition to those that Dr. Blair mentioned, are essential to be
targeted and unable to be targeted with an arsenal of 900
weapons.
Dr. Payne, do you want to go first?
Dr. Payne. Yeah, let me start off by saying that the
counter or the opposite poll of 900 weapons certainly doesn't
need to be 10,000 or 30,000.
Mr. Cooper. Well, what number do you propose?
Dr. Payne. Well, when I was in the Pentagon, the range that
we reached, following a good bit of analysis, was 1,700-2,200,
which became the basis for the Moscow treaty.
Mr. Cooper. Was there any opposition to that reduction when
you made that recommendation?
Dr. Payne. It became a formal treaty and received----
Mr. Cooper. But there was some opposition to it.
Dr. Payne. The opposition was not great, let's put it that
way. So that the distinction between those who are favorable
towards nuclear zero and those who are skeptical isn't the
difference between 900 weapons and 10- or 30,000 weapons.
Mr. Cooper. Why don't we call it Nuclear 900 at least
during my questioning?
Dr. Payne. Yes, sir. And let me also add that General
Chilton in 2010 gave a number that he said he would be more
comfortable with to preserve flexibility of the U.S. arsenal
and that was 1,550, so those are the ranges that folks are
talking about at this point, sir.
And then you asked the question about what kind of
capability might the United States need for deterrence
purposes.
Mr. Cooper. I said what additional targets.
Dr. Payne. Yeah. Well, in a sense, the answer to that
question is, it depends on what kind of threat is necessary to
deter opponents, and those kind of threats, that kind of
information can change over time. Harold Brown, back during the
Cold War, said the kind of capabilities we need to deter the
Soviet Union happened to be political leadership, military
capabilities. Those included very deeply buried targets. So the
kind of weapons that were necessary to threaten in those days
had to be able to threaten those kind of targets. In the future
there may be any number of different types of targets that need
to be threatened for deterrence purposes.
Mr. Cooper. Dr. Krepinevich, do you have a more specific
answer?
Dr. Krepinevich. I am not a nuclear targeteer, Congressman,
but what I would say, and I think this is where Dr. Blair has
been trying to help, is I am reminded of a quote from a British
admiral, Jackie Fisher, who once said a lot of folks want to
know how big the British Navy ought to be and what kind of
ships we ought to have in it. He said the first thing you have
to do is make up your mind how you are going to fight. He said,
how many of us have made up our mind how we are going to fight?
And then he said, how many of us even have minds? So he was
being pretty sarcastic at the moment. But the point here is how
are you going to deter, and if deterrence fails, how are you
going to fight?
And Dr. Payne points out that deterrence lies in the eye of
the beholder, so on the one hand you have to--and we devoted an
enormous amount of effort and thinking during the Cold War to
understanding how the Soviet leadership calculated cost and
benefit and risk. In fact, Kissinger in the late '60s and early
'70s, when he was the NSC [National Security Council] advisor,
the thing that he was most interested in getting from the
intelligence community were the psychological profiles of the
Soviet leadership. So that is point number one.
And do we, you know, do we have that understanding, and you
know, if you have the understanding of China in 2009, well,
there is a new leadership in today, and as we know from our own
leadership, you know, every leader is different, so have we a
good understanding of how other nuclear powers calculate cost,
benefit, and risk so we have a good idea of what is required to
deter them, first.
Second, if you look at Dr. Blair's report and the targeting
list, again, I would be interested to know is that the target
list for March 2013, because if we look at China, for example,
China may have 100 nuclear weapons, they may have 500. The
former commander of the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces,
General Yesin, says he thinks they have 750 but maybe over
1,000. So how confident are we that we know how many targets
there are in China that we need to hold at risk, and how easy
is it to hold a Chinese mobile missile launcher at risk? We
played that game at close range in the first Gulf War and
didn't have much success, so there is that issue.
There is the issue of breakout. We used to worry a lot
about breakout during the Cold War, which is why the SALT
[Strategic Arms Limitation Talks] treaties limited launchers
because we knew we couldn't count the warheads. Well, the
Chinese have not only a lot of launchers but a lot of missiles
that now carry--or are armed with conventional warheads. Do we
worry about whether they can swap those out in place of nuclear
warheads and in effect what during the Cold War we describe as
breakout?
So, again, I really do think, you know, it is a case of
really sitting down and trying to think through the problem in
a very careful way, given the stakes that are involved, not
only in terms of security, but as you point out, Congressman,
in terms of resources that are increasingly scarce before we
decide, even within a ballpark figure, you know, what kind of
nuclear posture we want and of course what kind of risk we are
willing to take that is associated with that posture.
Mr. Cooper. My time is limited. The chairman has already
been very indulgent, but Dr. Kissinger said, I think, that even
paranoids sometimes have real enemies, but he just joint-
authored this article which said that Washington--this is a
quote, ``Washington should carefully examine going below New
START levels of warheads and launchers.'' So that sounds like
an indication that we should carefully examine this issue. The
perfect number isn't determined yet, but here is Dr. Kissinger
on record with George Shultz saying we should seriously
consider this, so that is what this subcommittee is trying to
do, and I think the more specific answers we can get on
targeting and capabilities the better.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate your indulgence.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman. Gentleman, Mr. Nugent,
is recognized for 5 minutes for any questions he may have.
Mr. Nugent. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate it. I
thank the panel for being here. It is always good to hear
divergent ideas. It is not a bad thing for all of us. But to
Dr. Blair, I know that you mentioned in your report,
particularly as it relates to Senator Hagel, then-Senator
Hagel, and in particular with regards to the presidential
directives negotiated in another round of bilateral arms
reduction talks were implemented unilaterally, and Secretary of
Defense, then Senator Hagel stated during his confirmation
hearing, ``I don't agree with any recommendation that would
unilaterally take any action to further reduce our nuclear
warheads and our capability. Every option we must look at, a
reaction we must take to reduce warheads or anything should be
bilateral and should be verifiable and negotiated.''
Do you agree with that?
Dr. Blair. I do, and as a matter of fact, the analysis that
we went through, which by the way, involved Tom Pickering, who
was ambassador to Russia who knows a fair amount about the
Russian leadership and the scene in Russia, that analysis
proceeded on the assumption that we really needed to tighten up
our treaty process to include all nuclear weapons so that some
of these unknowns that are floating out there, tactical weapons
owned by China or by Russia that have completely escaped
previous regulation are now put in the basket, negotiated,
verified, and monitored. You know, all these dramatic
reductions that we have achieved since Ronald Reagan started
the process in the 1980s have dropped from 70,000 weapons
between us and the Soviets, down to about 16,000 between us
today, have all been--the vast bulk of those reductions have
been achieved unilaterally. There has never been any arms
control agreement that has regulated the total stockpile of
weapons in any country.
Mr. Nugent. If I could----
Dr. Blair. So these dramatic reductions have been based on
unilateralism. What we are trying to do in this report is say
let's put all the weapons into a basket----
Mr. Nugent. Well, if I could claim my time.
Dr. Blair [continuing]. And all the rest, and negotiate
their reductions and closely verify and monitor them.
Mr. Nugent. That is the key, verification. Are we in fact
verifying our last treaty with Russia?
Dr. Blair. Of course.
Mr. Nugent. There has been no slip on verification.
Dr. Blair. The last testimony I heard from authorities in
this area, including General Kehler and Rose Gottemoeller who
negotiated the treaty have been that there have not been--there
have been intensive verification and no--and no significant
lapses----
Mr. Nugent. You cite presidential nuclear initiatives
several times as an example of how further reductions and
actions like de-alerting could be affected or effectuated, but
you know, Russia is not in compliance with those initiatives.
So, if they are not in compliance, are they cheating?
Dr. Blair. Are you telling me that they are cheating on the
New START agreement?
Mr. Nugent. I am asking you are they cheating.
Dr. Blair. You have more access to the authoritative answer
to that question than I do.
Mr. Nugent. Well, I would like to direct that--if you don't
have an answer, I would like to direct that to Dr. Payne.
Dr. Blair. As I said, recent testimony by authorities said
no, they have not.
Mr. Nugent. Dr. Payne.
Dr. Payne. Yes, sir. The Russians, by their own statements,
are in violation of the presidential nuclear initiatives of
1990 and 1991, which includes continued Blackjack [Tupolev Tu-
160 strategic bomber] production which is in violation of the
PNI [Presidential Nuclear Initiatives]. It includes retained
battlefield nuclear weapons, atomic demolition mines in
violation, it includes deployment of their Iskander [NATO
designation SS-26 Stone] missile as a nuclear capable weapon by
Russian statements, includes nuclear artillery by Russian
statements, it includes routine deployment of nuclear weapons
on naval ships other than SSBNs [ballistic missile submarines].
These are all open Russian statements claiming that they are in
fact doing this. These are all violations of the PNI. So when I
hear this is a model of how we should go in the future, I
think, you know, maybe we ought to fix this one first before we
decide to take this up as a model in the future.
Mr. Nugent. And I think verification, obviously, is--and
Dr. Blair, you agree that verification is the important
component in all this, no matter what you agree to, if we can't
verify and----
Dr. Blair. The Global Zero report did not recommend
following the route of PNI.
Mr. Nugent. By Dr. Payne's testimony and by Russia's own
admissions in regards to what they have and what they have in
their stockpile, they are clearly not in compliance.
Dr. Blair. I thought you were asking about compliance with
New START.
Mr. Nugent. I am sorry that I am out of time and I yield
back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentleman yielding back, and the
Chair now recognizes Mr. Garamendi for 5 minutes for any
questions he may have.
Mr. Garamendi. Let's finish this last conversation. It
seems as though the discussion between Mr. Blair and Mr. Payne,
were dealing with two different treaties and understandings, so
let's get a clarification here.
Dr. Blair. That is correct.
Mr. Garamendi. Dr. Payne, you were talking about a 1990,
1991. Could you quickly explain that?
Dr. Payne. Yes, sir. I was talking about the PNI agreements
of 1990 and 1991.
Mr. Garamendi. Well, maybe somebody will be listening to
the rest of this conversation then. And Dr. Blair, you were
talking about?
Dr. Blair. The New START Treaty.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay. So, I think we pretty much know what
New START is, so let's talk about what the 1990, 1991 and why
it is relevant to the question that was asked.
Dr. Payne. Sure. The PNI, as I recall, were intended to be
reciprocal agreements between the United States and Russia to
draw down nonstrategic nuclear forces. It wasn't a treaty. It
didn't have a verification package, but it was an attempt to,
essentially, provide those kind of reductions outside of a
negotiated treaty with a verification package, and so given the
fact that that is an approach that is talked about a good bit
today, I think it is useful to go back and look at the PNIs and
see how the Russians now are doing with regard to compliance to
that, and what we know now by the Russians' own statements in
their own press, they are in fairly substantial violation of
it.
Mr. Garamendi. The PNI were agreements, mutual agreements
between the United States and Russia?
Dr. Payne. These are political agreements between the
United States and Russia, correct, sir.
Dr. Blair. They were tacit agreements. They were not
stipulated in any kind of written agreement between the two
countries.
Mr. Garamendi. I think we need to be really, really careful
because this kind of a discussion gets out there and used for
an argument, but its relevancy to the formal treaty structures
is somewhat removed.
Now, there may have been an understanding, but I will
guarantee you that what was said here is going to find its way
outside the door, and bingo, the Russians are not in compliance
with treaties, when that is not the case at all. Is that
correct, Mr. Payne?
Dr. Payne. Sir, the PNIs are outside of the formal ratified
treaty process. That is correct, sir.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. Now, I would like to take this a
little different direction. What kind of weapons do we need
going forward? Do we need three different weapons? Do we need
one different weapon? This is in part targeting but it is also
targeting with what? Any one of you gentlemen want to talk
about this?
Dr. Blair. Well, the Global Zero report developed an option
that was based on a dyad of nuclear submarines and of B-2
[Spirit] bombers and made the case that there are serious
liabilities with the current Minuteman nuclear force and that
that was a force that could and should be closely examined for
potential elimination. Reasons for that had to do with the lack
of flexibility of the Minuteman forces, the fact that they have
to fly over Russia and China to attack the current contemporary
real adversaries of the United States, such as North Korea;
whereas, the flexibility of the submarines and the bombers were
much greater in their ability to carry out a range of missions,
nuclear missions.
So, we based the 900-warhead arsenal that I presented in my
testimony on a dyad of submarines and B-2 bombers.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay. Comments.
Dr. Payne. Sure. My thoughts on that are the priority of
maintaining a U.S. triad of nuclear forces.
Mr. Garamendi. Why?
Dr. Payne. Because the triad provides the United States
enormous level of flexibility and resilience to deter threats
in the future that we may not be able to identify now. It
allows us to adapt to threats as they come along. That is the
great brilliance of the triad, and if we are going to maintain
a triad, then we need to look at what are the steps that need
to be taken now.
Just for example, life extension program for the Minuteman
missile, I think, is very important. Going ahead with a new
bomber would strike me as very important to help maintain the
triad so we don't move down to a dyad or a monad and then
getting on----
Mr. Garamendi. Excuse me. I am almost out of time. In fact,
I am out of time, but before you get to all of that, you have
got to come back to the initial question of why a triad is
necessary. You quickly blew through. You didn't have enough
time to really get into it, but we really need in this
committee, it seems to me, to really get down into the details
of why or why not a triad. It is an enormous amount of money.
The reconditioning of those, all three elements is
extraordinarily expensive. Is it essential, and that is the
subject matter.
I am out of time, and I thank you very much for your
testimony.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Garamendi.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Franks for 5 minutes for any
questions he may have.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank all of you
for being here today. Dr. Blair, I will start with you. I was
over in North Korea and South Korea here some time ago and I
agreed with your premise that we have gained, at least South
Korea has gained a qualitative advantage in conventional
weapons. Did I understand your testimony that you had said
something along the lines that now that that is gained, the
nuclear deterrence or the nuclear capability on the part of
South Korea or the United States supporting forces was no
longer as necessary?
Dr. Blair. For tactical warfighting purposes we no longer
have to rely on short tactical nuclear weapons to suppress the
North Korea's artillery threat to the South. We do, obviously,
want to continue to project a strategic threat at North Korea.
Mr. Franks. I wanted to make sure about that.
Dr. Krepinevich--I am sorry. Krepinevich. I got it right,
didn't I, Krepinevich?
Dr. Krepinevich. Close. It is Krepinevich.
Mr. Franks. Krepinevich. Boy, I tell you, I know that never
happens to you. I was impressed with your comments related to
deterrent itself. It is in the minds of the beholder, and you
know, it occurs to me that this discussion should always be
predicated on how people perceive our deterrent.
I remember years ago that the discussion about a nuclear
freeze or something along those lines, and William F. Buckley
put it so well. He said, you know, the idea is not to freeze
it, being able to only destroy each other a few times. The idea
is to prevent someone from proceeding. And so I wanted to ask
you, Dr. Blair, based on that, because I assume that you
believe in deterrence in some of the comments you made, it
sounds. Who would be more deterred? Who, as far as a potential
enemy of the United States, Iran or China or anyone, who would
be more deterred by our reduction in our strategic capability?
Who would that deter more?
Dr. Blair. I don't think the reductions matters. It is what
is left over at the end. Remember----
Mr. Franks. No. My question is, would there be anybody that
would be deterred more by a reduction in our strategic
capabilities?
Dr. Blair. If we have a 900----
Mr. Franks. Is that a ``yes'' or a ``no.''
Dr. Blair [continuing]. We have the ability----
Mr. Franks. I am going to move on then. Who would reduce
their nuclear weapons based on us--I say put Russia aside for a
moment. Who else would reduce their nuclear weapons arsenal or
existing arsenals following our potential reduction?
Dr. Blair. Well, I don't think anyone would. I think we
need to----
Mr. Franks. I think that is the right answer.
Dr. Blair. I think we need to assert leadership to bring
other countries into the----
Mr. Franks. Is there a number too low, from your
perspective, that we should go? In other words, what would be
too low from your perspective?
Dr. Blair. We need to bring all the nuclear weapons
countries into a negotiation.
Mr. Franks. All right. And if we did that, would there be a
number too low?
Dr. Blair. The goal of Global Zero is through phased
verifiable proportional reductions that in due course----
Mr. Franks. Hence Global Zero, I got you. All right. I just
wanted to know where you were coming from.
Dr. Blair. And most people, I think, these days in the
mainstream believe that the United States would be more secure
living in a world without nuclear weapons than it is living in
the world today.
Mr. Franks. Well, we might all feel more secure if we just
lived on some distant fairyland planet, too. I mean, you know,
the notion is unfortunately other people don't always do what
we would like for them to do. It is a dangerous world.
Dr. Blair. In the 1980s, no one would have guessed that we
would be----
Mr. Franks. Let me ask you another question. I am asking
the questions here today, Dr. Blair.
Dr. Blair. Sorry?
Mr. Franks. I am asking you questions here today. I guess
my question to you then----
Dr. Blair. I am trying to answer your question, sir. You
are not giving me an opportunity.
Mr. Franks. All right. You have answered them so far. Given
your conviction for steep nuclear reductions, would you then
advocate significant increases in expenditures for conventional
warfare, conventional weapons capability and missile defense?
Dr. Blair. Yes.
Mr. Franks. That's an answer.
Dr. Krepinevich, if you could suggest to us, as a
committee, what is the one thing that we could do in our
nuclear doctrine that would increase ultimately the safety and
protection of American men, women, and children and posit the
course, the pursuit of freedom in a safer capacity? What is the
one thing you think that we should do that would make this
country safer and give us less chance of having a nuclear
exchange of some kind?
Dr. Krepinevich. I think the most important thing that we
can do right now is to understand our nuclear rivals,
understand how they calculate cost, benefit, and risk. If we
are going to--if the ultimate goal is to prevent the use of
these weapons and ultimately we are trying to deter them from
using these weapons, then I think we have to understand how
they go about calculating cost, benefit, and risk. And there
has been a lot of advances over the last 10 years in the
cognitive sciences, in the psychological sciences that really
have highlighted some of the fundamental differences between
cultures, Western cultures and other cultures as to how these
factors are calculated.
Dr. Krepinevich. Dr. Payne has done a great job of
highlighting some of the history of just how leaders, other
leaders have undertaken what we would consider highly
irrational acts that are within their framework rational. So
again I think if that is the ultimate goal, understanding, sort
of thinking this through before we start committing huge sums
of money one way or the other would be greatly to our benefit.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentlemen.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Carson for 5 minutes for any
questions he may have.
Mr. Carson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Krepinevich, in the event that our nuclear stockpile
was significantly reduced, to what degree do you believe our
nonnuclear conventional capabilities would ever provide a
deterrent? Do you believe that any level of investment in these
capabilities could ever create a deterrent to rival our current
nuclear deterrent? If not, how close could we get?
Dr. Krepinevich. I think, and this goes back to
conversations I had with leaders of our Strategic Command after
the first Gulf War, even then people like General Horner,
General Habiger thought there was a small but significant
substitution effect. In other words there were some targets
that we could use precision guided weapons for in lieu of
nuclear weapons. So again I think there is some
substitutability effect there.
On the other hand, the competition isn't static, it's
dynamic, and so have you rivals dispersing their assets, they
go deep underground, they put them in mountains, and it is this
back-and-forth game. So while I think there is some possible
substitution there, I don't think it is widespread.
Second, I think that when you are looking at this question,
nuclear weapons offer prompt catastrophic destruction, cyber
weapons don't, biological weapons don't. Nuclear weapons are in
a class all on their own, and for that purpose they are unique.
Now to what extent do you need that capability? I think you
need it in a lot of ways for deterrence, it is the ultimate
threat.
One of the things I think that is becoming worrisome from
my point of view is the blurring of this distinction between
nuclear weapons and nonnuclear weapons. We now have things like
the mother of all bombs, highly destructive conventional
weapons, still nothing like a large-yield nuclear weapon. The
Russians on the other hand are producing nuclear weapons of
extremely small yield again to offset their conventional
inferiority. To the extent that you got conventional weapons
that in some cases can substitute for nuclear weapons and
nuclear weapons that rivals consider to be usable because they
are low yield, I think there is a real risk area there. I am
not sure I am answering your question, but I do think this is
one area that concerns me greatly.
Mr. Carson. Dr. Krepinevich, thank you, sir.
Dr. Payne.
Dr. Payne. Same question?
Mr. Carson. Yes, sir.
Dr. Payne. Great. I believe that there is role for advanced
conventional forces to complement deterrence. I have thought
that for a good long time. But that is a different point than
saying they can substitute for nuclear weapons for deterrence.
We know that conventional deterrence fails catastrophically on
occasion. We have been to the nuclear-free mountaintop, and
what we saw last time is we had 110 million casualties in just
over 10 years of warfare. That was the nuclear-zero mountaintop
we were at last time. And so I am real careful about saying
conventional forces can substitute for nuclear forces for
deterrence because we have been there and we have seen what
happens and it was pretty ugly. But I think they can complement
nuclear weapons for deterrence by making our arsenal more
flexible and giving us more options which with to deter.
Dr. Blair. I would answer the question by saying there has
been a massive substitution over the last 30 years of
conventional for nuclear forces. We have relieved ourselves of
the need to rely on nuclear weapons for almost all of the
missions that we have today. That is one of the reasons why our
numbers have gone so dramatically down over the last 25 years.
When I worked at Strategic Command in Omaha for a man who
became the vice commander, he put together in 1984 a plan that
would have substituted conventional air launch cruise missiles,
launched by B-52 [Stratofortress] bombers, to cover all of the
soft targets in the Soviet Union to the east of the Ural
Mountains. That was shot down by--at the Pentagon because it
infringed on the roles and missions of the tactical U.S. Air
Force with its conventional missions. But since 1980 and the
beginning of cruise missiles and precision guided munitions and
now with the advent of amazing information processing and
collection, we have basically been in the process of shutting
down the nuclear enterprise and replacing it with missile
defenses and now with cyber, but also special ops, drones, all
of the things that we at one time in our history would have had
to rely on a nuclear weapon to carry out a mission now we have
conventional options in our kit bag.
Mr. Carson. Thank you, gentlemen. Mr. Chairman, I yield
back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentlemen.
The Chair now recognizes Mr. Wilson from South Carolina for
5 minutes.
Mr. Wilson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and thank you all for
being here today. And I certainly agree with Sheriff Nugent
that I appreciate the very candid comments from each of you on
very important issues to our country.
Dr. Payne, the National Nuclear Security Administration is
currently constructing the mixed oxide fuel fabrication
facility at the Savannah River site. This facility once
complete will dispose of excess plutonium from dismantled
nuclear weapons as provided by the 2000 Plutonium Management
and Disposition Agreement by the United States and the Russian
Federation. There is speculation about reducing or even halting
the funding for the project. What is your opinion as to the
Russian reaction?
Dr. Payne. Sir, I know I know enough to say when I don't
know enough to give you an informed answer. On this particular
subject I will tell you I don't know enough to give you a very
informed answer on the subject.
Mr. Wilson. Again, I said this is candid, you are. So thank
you. And Dr. Blair, given the Administration's goal of reducing
our Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile it is clear that the
National Nuclear Security Administration will need a pathway
for plutonium disposition. In fact you referenced this. Do you
believe it would be better to dispose of weapons-grade
plutonium by turning it into mixed oxide fuel for commercial
power generation or do you support indefinite storage of the
pits at Pantex and the Savannah River site?
Dr. Blair. I don't believe those are the only options.
Unfortunately, I think the MOX [mixed oxide nuclear fuel]
option is really interesting, but unfortunately that MOX
facility is 10 years behind schedule, and over $10 billion over
budget, and it is looking less and less like a viable idea. I
think that facility could be and should be used probably to
dispose of the plutonium pits through mixing it with waste, all
kinds of different plutonium disposition techniques that you
know wouldn't involve your facilities that would glassify,
vitrify, mix with waste, et cetera, and then move it out and
store it in the New Mexico repository probably is the most
sensible way to go at this point I am afraid.
Mr. Wilson. And I do need to let you know there is dispute
over the numbers you used and also the timeline.
Dr. Krepinevich, you have written a book that sounds
intriguing and that is 7 Deadly Scenarios: A Military Futurist
Explores War in the 21st Century. As the author could you just
briefly tell us what the top three scenarios you believe are
most likely as what you call real-world likely?
Dr. Krepinevich. Well, after writing the book the ones that
certainly bothered me the most, one had to do with Pakistan
coming apart at the seams and breaking into factions, competing
factions, and you had the issue of loose nuclear weapons to
consider. So that was one.
Second had to do with nuclear weapons that were sold on the
Russian black market that were smuggled into the United States,
and it wasn't one weapon, it was a number of weapons. You had a
weapon go off and there was--it presented rather unique
problems for the political leadership of the country as well as
technical problems, and that was the second scenario.
The third had to do with a nuclear-armed Israel and Iran,
and the inherent instability of exceedingly short warning times
and the willingness of Iran now that it had nuclear weapons to
be very aggressive in its pursuit of proxy warfare against
Israel.
Mr. Wilson. And with these scenarios has there been any
indication of former Soviet nuclear materials coming into the
United States?
Dr. Krepinevich. No, no, no, there is no bombs, not to my
knowledge, being smuggled into the United States. But again
looking at the issue of Soviet nuclear security, Soviet
organized crime, terrorist operatives in that part of the world
and so on, and the funding of certain terrorist groups, that
formed the basis for the event that triggered the scenario.
Mr. Wilson. Well, again I appreciate you raising these
issues and I in particular in regard to Pakistan I had the
privilege and opportunity of actually having breakfast 4 weeks
and a day with Benazir Bhutto before she was assassinated, so
the possible dissolution of Pakistan certainly is of great
concern.
Thank you very much.
Dr. Krepinevich. Just very quickly to mention, it turned
out Secretary Gates read the book at the time and asked me to
come in and write a number of scenarios that they actually
wargamed out. So there was some I guess public policy payoff of
the book.
Mr. Wilson. Well, congratulations on your recognition.
Thank you.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentlemen for yielding back.
I want to go back and revisit a dialogue that Mr. Nugent
and Mr. Garamendi were having a little earlier about the
difference between the New START Treaty and the PNIs. I think
there was some clouding there. Dr. Payne emphasized that the
Russians had in his opinion not been complying with the PNIs
that preceded the New START Treaty. And my question, Dr. Blair,
is do you dispute that the Russians have not been in compliance
with the PNIs that preceded New START Treaty.
Dr. Blair. No, I wouldn't dispute that. I don't think they
have fully strictly complied with the understandings of what we
thought they were supposed to do.
Mr. Rogers. That was my understanding.
Dr. Blair. That is one of the reasons why the Global Zero
Commission really wants to go the bilateral negotiated
verifiable route to reductions in nuclear weapons and not have
this fuzzy process out there of unilateral reductions or
unilateral understandings of the other person's obligations, et
cetera.
Mr. Rogers. I am in complete agreement with that. I think
that we need to have verifiable treaties that go through the
Senate, the regular order process. I do note on page 1 of your
report it says that in talking about getting to 900 it says,
``These steps could be taken with Russia in unison through
reciprocal Presidential directives negotiated in another round
of bilateral arms reduction talks or implemented
unilaterally.'' So----
Dr. Blair. We looked at all the options. You could do X, Y,
or Z but we came down in the end the consensus, unanimous
consensus was that the bilateral negotiated treaty approach was
the way to go.
Mr. Rogers. And, that's in the report too?
Dr. Blair. Yes.
Mr. Rogers. Excellent. Thank you. I also want to mention I
have had distributed to all of you a chart that was drafted,
put together by Admiral Richard Mies and it looks at the global
fatalities from major wars around the world over the last 400
years. And you see that approximately 2 percent of the world's
population was dying in these wars from 1600 to 1800, then it
fell down to about 1 percent. And then we saw in the 1900s,
World War I and World War II saw a spike. But right after that
with the advent of nuclear weapons we see that for the last 50
years or so the percentage of global fatalities from war has
dropped to less than one-tenth of 1 percent. My question is,
wouldn't this be hard objective quantifiable data that in fact
nuclear weapons do have a chilling effect on warfare as opposed
to escalating the probability of major wars? And I would open
that up to anybody who wants to respond.
Dr. Blair. I think you should survey the landscape of
conflict around the world today from Mali to anywhere you want
to look, Russia, Georgia, et cetera, Chechnya. And ask yourself
the question do nuclear weapons play a role in the 21st century
in resolving those conflicts? And I think whatever role they
played after the end of World War II and during the Cold War in
preserving the peace and preventing great war that's changed,
it is a different world.
Mr. Rogers. I completely agree. Those minor conflicts and
relatively to the global population, those are minor, have
always existed along with these major wars. And my question is
since, this chart lends credibility to the argument that
nuclear weapons in fact----
Dr. Blair. On the face of it but it is just a correlation
that you have to dig deeper into. I mean, I don't think any of
us here would want the whole world to go nuclear on the
strength of that premise, that nuclear weapons keep the peace.
By that logic we would have 198 countries with nuclear weapons
and it would be a much more dangerous world obviously. India
and Pakistan today, would we prefer that they eliminate their
nuclear weapons or keep them on the hope that they preserve the
peace between the two countries? You know, as far as I am
concerned, I think we are all better off with fewer nuclear
weapons in any part of the world.
Mr. Rogers. And I appreciate and respect that is your view.
I have a polar opposite and it is because of this chart that I
believe the opposite's true.
Dr. Payne, would like to comment on Admiral Mies' chart?
Dr. Payne. Sure. There is enough historical evidence to
demonstrate beyond any reasonable doubt that nuclear weapons
add usefully to deterrence. This chart aggregates that over 4
centuries, there are also individual case studies in more
recent history where you can go and we understand what was
going on with the two parties to know that nuclear deterrence
helped prevent war or helped prevent the escalation to war. We
know that beyond any reasonable doubt, which is why I am so
interested in not focusing on the notion that fewer is better,
fewer might be better, fewer might also be worse. The question
is do we have the kind of nuclear arsenal that maximizes our
ability to deter war and to deter escalation? That is the key
question, not whether the number is fewer or more. The question
is it the kind of arsenal that contributes most effectively to
deterrence because as this chart recognizes nuclear deterrence
is a very, very important product. And for us to back away from
it, and for example, going towards nuclear zero, what we are
risking is getting back to the world we saw there at World War
II in a nonnuclear world where nuclear deterrence wasn't
operating and we had enormous number of casualties because
deterrence failed catastrophically.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you. The last question I will ask,
because I will submit the rest of mine for the record,the last
question I ask goes back to a topic raised by Mr. Garamendi
which is a very important topic which is the triad. He is
right, it is a very costly approach. However, having said that
General Kehler, who is the commander, U.S. security forces,
recently said, ``The Triad of SSBNs, ICBMs, and nuclear
capability heavy bombers all with their associated support
elements offer a mutually reinforcing strategic package that
provides a credible deterrent to our adversaries, assurance to
our allies and partners, and flexibility for the President.''
What do you all think, I mean that`s General Kehler saying
that we really need it for all of those reasons for our allies
and our President's flexibility. Is it worth the investment
that we are making? And I will start with Dr. Krepinevich and
then go to Dr. Blair and then Dr. Payne and that will be my
time.
Dr. Krepinevich. Well, one of the virtues of the triad is
that each element has advantages that the other doesn't so they
help cover for one another's weaknesses. I would say in the
case of bombers, as we have seen in multiple conflicts, bombers
have proven useful for conventional deterrence and in
conventional warfighting.
Mr. Rogers. Go back to my point, I don't want to wear out
my welcome here with time. Is it worth the investment or not?
It is kind of a ``yes'' or ``no'' thing.
Dr. Krepinevich. I can't give it to you ``yes'' or ``no,''
Mr. Chairman. You really need to sit down and look at real
world problems I think and how you are going to address them.
Mr. Rogers. Dr. Blair.
Dr. Blair. No, it is not worth the investment.
Mr. Rogers. Dr. Payne.
Dr. Payne. It certainly is in the bipartisan congressional
strategic posture commission.
Mr. Rogers. We get one ``yes,'' one ``no,'' and one ``I
can't say.''
With that I yield back. The Chair now recognizes the
ranking member for any questions he may have.
Mr. Cooper. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the
patience and courtesy of the witnesses here as we explore these
important issues. It almost seems to me that we need to have a
couple of closed-session hearings so that we can talk about
some things that cannot be aired in public. I thought the
chairman's chart was very interesting here. I look forward to
reading Admiral Mies' book. I do worry though, I think Dr.
Blair put it very well, there is a difference between
correlation and causation, a big drop in casualties here but
after 1800 you wonder like if the repeating rifle can be
credited with that advance or perhaps rifle to barrels or
something. I think what this chart fails to show is that if we
were to make mistakes now with nuclear weapons the casualty
rates would not only go off the chart, it would probably bust
through the ceiling of this building and I mean the top floor,
because that is the risk with nuclear weapons. Certainly a
massive exchange could be extinction of the planet. So I also
thought Dr. Blair phrased it very well except for a few powers
nuclear weapons really don't play any role at all with a lot of
the asymmetric warfare we are seeing around the world in
smaller conflicts.
I hope that as these hearings progress we can have fewer
arguments about straw men because I think there are so many
false impressions that people have. I am very much glad the New
START/PNI confusion was cleared up, but I think if we are
careful about this we can figure out what an appropriate number
is and not really make this political at all. I think it is the
first Bush administration that is credited with the greatest
percentage reduction in nuclear weapons that we had from 1989
to 1994, but there have been substantial cuts under both
administrations. And I think most people agree now that it was
probably for the good. So let's see what is feasible based on
current information and proceed on that basis.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank the witnesses for their
patience and expertise.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentlemen. Mr. Garamendi, do you
have any questions? You are the swan song.
Mr. Garamendi. Yes, about a thousand questions. Just a
couple of things very quickly. I really agree with the
necessity for confidential hearings on this and to really get
into the details for all kinds of reasons.
One of the straw men that has been going on here is the
issue between zero and some other number. I don't think in my
career here which I hope is a good long time I will see zero,
but I would hope to see a reduction to a point where there is
deterrence, but there is no more than that. So we ought to in
my view try to identify what that is.
With regard to the triad, very complex, but very, very
important for all the reasons some of which have been discussed
here and many, many more.
I just want to cover something that Mr. Wilson brought up
and that is the issue of the plutonium pits that are in the
United States and in Russia. These are ready-made weapons. This
is not something to be--it is something to be really serious
about. And the security of those is questionable. The committee
has had hearings about that. And if it is questionable it
certainly ought to be dealt with. There happens to be a
solution, Mr. Blair, and that is to take the pits and to turn
them into a metal fuel, which could be done easily and quickly
and that fuel could be set aside for some later use in an
integral fast reactor. It is very viable and it does not create
the same problems that the MOX facility has. That is an issue
for another day and another hearing.
Mr. Chairman, I am just going to let it go at this. These
gentlemen have an extraordinary amount of knowledge, they
obviously--and I thank you for bringing both sides to the
table. We really need to get into this in much, much more
detail. It is extremely important for the security of this
Nation and beyond. Mr. Cooper made the point that I wanted to
make and he made it very well, is that all well and good with
this chart, but if--and this is Mr. Krepinevich's book--the
first issue he raised the most likely scenario was India-
Pakistan, and the potential instability in Pakistan. And should
that happen then the nuclear weapon may very well become a
conventional use of it or a terrorist use, in which case the
numbers here would go way off the chart. And so anything we can
do to remove such potential, that is to remove the number of
weapons here, there, anywhere, is to our benefit. We understand
deterrence and the necessity for that, but that doesn't mean we
can't move forward with a reduction in numbers and the delivery
mechanisms both by terrorists and by traditional military
means. I yield back.
Mr. Rogers. I thank the gentlemen and I also want to take
time to thank all the witnesses for taking their time not only
to be here but for the time it takes to prepare for this. I
know it takes a lot of effort, and energy, and time and you
ought to be commended. Mr. Garamendi is right, you are all very
knowledgeable experts and we appreciate your opinions, whatever
the opinions are. It is important for us to hear all sides.
To that end, as you know this hearing came at the end of
the last series of votes for the day and members went different
directions and they weren't all here. So you may have some
additional members who have questions for the record. We will
ask that the record remain open for 10 days, any members who
come in and want to submit questions to you all. I ask that you
reply to those in writing.
And with that, thank you for attendance and this meeting is
adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 5:33 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 19, 2013
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 19, 2013
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Statement of Hon. Mike Rogers
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
Hearing on
The U.S. Nuclear Deterrent: What Are the Requirements
for a Strong Deterrent in an Era of Defense Sequester?
March 19, 2013
Our hearing today is on an important topic: ``The U.S.
Nuclear Deterrent: What Are the Requirements for a Strong
Deterrent in an Era of Defense Sequester?'' And, we have a
distinguished group of experts to help us consider this
subject. They are:
LDr. Keith B. Payne, Professor and Head,
Graduate Department of Defense and Strategic Studies,
Missouri State University;
LDr. Andrew F. Krepinevich, Jr., President,
Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments; and
LDr. Bruce Blair, Co-founder, Global Zero.
This Nation has some key decisions ahead of it. We find
ourselves in the position of having to recapitalize our entire
deterrent at exactly the time that every other nation is
growing or modernizing its nuclear forces, but, we have
absorbed reductions in our defense budget of $487 billion and
we're now 18 days into President Obama's defense sequester that
will take another half a trillion dollars out of our defense
budget over the next decade. If we can't fix this problem, we
will do what Secretary Panetta described as cuts that would
``decimate our defense. It would cripple us in terms of our
ability to protect this country.''
I am encouraged that, at least in the short term, DOD
understands the importance of the nuclear deterrent and will
act to protect it and the central role it plays in the Nation's
security. For example, Deputy Secretary Carter, when testifying
before the full committee 2 weeks ago, said that:
`` Lnuclear deterrence is pretty important. So it's the
last thing that you want to do serious damage to. So I
would imagine that the Department of Energy, and the
leadership there, and certainly we in the Department of
Defense, will try to protect our nuclear capabilities
to the maximum extent possible.''
But, I worry that in the long term, this situation will
allow the President to further walk back on his commitments to
modernize and maintain the deterrent. And these are his
commitments he made during the New START treaty. They are his
Section 1251 plan he promised to the Senate; this is his
Nuclear Posture Review.
As I mentioned at the outset of my remarks, the United
States is in the position of having to modernize and replace
its entire nuclear triad in the very near future. For example,
our sea-based deterrent leg was first commissioned in 1981; our
land-based deterrent has been deployed and on-alert since 1970;
and, the mainstay of our airborne deterrent has been performing
the strategic deterrent mission since 1955. Our nuclear
deterrent is the most cost-effective and proven means of
promoting peace for the American people and their allies, but
we have not been investing in it in a responsible way. Our real
and potential adversaries and competitors understand this.
Russia, for instance, has tested three new ICBMs since the New
START treaty entered into force 2 years ago. The People's
Republic of China is preparing to put to sea a ballistic
missile submarine and sea-launched ballistic missile and it
appears to be readying three new long-range ballistic missiles
capable of attacking the United States.
If President Obama is right, and there is peace and
security in a world without nuclear weapons, it seems every
other country with nuclear weapons--or, like Iran, the
aspiration to develop them--has missed the memo. I will add to
the record a document derived from open sources that lists
summaries of just a few open source articles of what other
nuclear weapons states are undertaking today. I note that
Russia's Vladimir Putin tells his people that, ``[n]uclear
weapons remain the main guarantee of Russia's sovereignty and
its territorial integrity, it plays a key role in maintaining
global and regional stability and balance.''
President Obama, however, said at the State of the Union
address last week that, ``we will engage Russia to seek further
reductions in our nuclear arsenals . . . because our ability to
influence others depends on our willingness to lead.''
Are they both right? I think General Welch, former
Strategic Air Command Commander and former Chief of Staff of
the U.S. Air Force, had it right when he said that,
`` LThe only basis for the idea that drastically
reducing the number of nukes we have would magically
make us safer and help eliminate other nuclear dangers
is hope. But hope is not a plan, and hope is not a
basis for security. Hope does not defend us. I would
ask who would be willing to rely on hope for the safety
and security of their family? . . . Leading the world
to zero nuclear weapons is, at best, a fairy tale.''
(emphasis added)
There is a rising consensus from General Scowcroft,
Secretaries Perry, Kissinger, Shultz, and Senator Nunn that the
one-time frenzy of a world without nuclear weapons is little
more than a fantasy, and a dangerous one. For example, the so-
called Gang of 4's recent Wall Street Journal op-ed piece is a
dramatic shift from the original 2007 piece. I think you'll
find that the requirements in the March 2013 piece are
precisely those Republican Senators and House Members would
insist upon:
`` LWashington should carefully examine going below New
Start levels of warheads and launchers, including the
possibility of coordinated mutual actions. Such a
course has the following prerequisites: a) strict
reciprocity; b) demonstrable verification; and c)
providing adequate and stable funding for the long-term
investments required to maintain high confidence in our
nuclear arsenal.''
Indeed, Secretary Kissinger and General Scowcroft warned in
April 2012 that: ``[s]trategic stability is not inherent with
low numbers of weapons; indeed, excessively low numbers could
lead to a situation in which surprise attacks are
conceivable.''
This shift by the distinguished elder statesmen is welcome.
It may not make the Washington, DC, arms control community
happy, because these requirements shut the door on the idea of
evading the treaty clause or endorsing the ``Global Zero''
vision, but they are smart policy. We are at a crisis point
where we must focus on the imminent threats of North Korea and
Iran.
So, I look forward to examining these matters today. They
are important to the Nation's security and they are matters we
will tackle in our markup of the FY14 National Defense
Authorization Act.
Statement of Hon. Jim Cooper
Ranking Member, House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
Hearing on
The U.S. Nuclear Deterrent: What Are the Requirements
for a Strong Deterrent in an Era of Defense Sequester?
March 19, 2013
I would like to join Chairman Rogers in welcoming Dr.
Payne, Dr. Krepinevich, and Dr. Blair to this hearing on the
U.S. nuclear deterrent.
A recent edition of the Wall Street Journal contained the
latest opinion piece by four of America's most distinguished
defense and foreign policy experts: George Shultz, Bill Perry,
Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn. Their article is entitled:
``Next Steps in Reducing Nuclear Risks: The Pace of
Nonproliferation Work Today Doesn't Match the Urgency of the
Threat.'' Their article is perfectly timed for today's hearing,
and contains several valuable lessons for this subcommittee.
First, the article is bipartisan. Two top Republicans and
two Democrats have joined together to advocate for a better,
safer world. They have set aside their differences for the
common good. The House of Representatives should learn from
their example.
Second, the article is balanced. The authors think that
``Washington should carefully examine going below New Start
levels of warheads and launchers,'' but are quick to cite the
need for reciprocity, verification, and stable funding. Instead
of sloganeering, they seem to be offering a responsible path to
reducing America's warheads from 1,550 to a lower number.
Third, they are bullish on the prospect that today's
leaders can act promptly and responsibly in order to reduce
nuclear risk in the world. They believe that today's leaders
can and will do a better job of securing nuclear materials,
changing deployments and hair-trigger launch protocols, and
engaging in global and regional dialogues. This optimism is not
from starry-eyed idealists but from hard-nosed realists.
What worthier challenge could this subcommittee, or this
Congress, have than to do what we can in the legislative branch
to promote a safer, saner world? Perhaps our goal should be,
mindful of our limitations, to do no harm. We should not treat
any of these issues as political footballs, or stand in the way
of responsible efforts to reduce nuclear risk.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
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DOCUMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
March 19, 2013
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 19, 2013
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. ROGERS
Mr. Rogers. 1) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: Do you wish to comment
on the material in the questions submitted to Dr. Blair noted below?
Dr. Blair: the Global Zero report you led stated that:
``(page 16) The reductions and de-alerting proposed under this
illustrative plan could be carried out in unison by the United States
and Russia through reciprocal presidential directives, negotiated in
another round of bilateral arms reduction talks, or implemented
unilaterally.''
In his confirmation hearing to be Secretary of Defense, then-
Senator Hagel stated: ``I don't--I do not agree with any recommendation
that would unilaterally take any action to further reduce our nuclear
warheads and our capability . . . Every--every option that we must look
at, every action we must take to reduce warheads or anything should be
bilateral. It should be verifiable. It should be negotiated.''
a. Dr. Blair, Do you agree with the Global Zero report or Secretary
Hagel?
b. Why is verification important? Are you aware of any precedent
for verification that isn't treaty based?
c. Is verification important because we have to know if there's
cheating?
d. Dr. Blair, you cite the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs)
several times as an example of how further reductions, and actions like
de-alerting, could be effectuated. Are you aware that Russia is not in
compliance with those Initiatives, in other words, it is cheating? Does
that change your endorsement of that approach?
Dr. Payne. The authors of the Global Zero report, including Dr.
Blair, state specifically (on pages 1, 16 and 18) that unilateral U.S.
reductions should be considered an acceptable course of action.
As noted in the question, the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives
(PNIs) often are cited as examples of unilateral reductions. The PNIs
were commitments by U.S. and Russian leaderships to extensive limits on
their tactical nuclear weapons. According to considerable official
Russian information, Russia is in violation of these commitments and
has been so for years. A robust verification regime and vigorous U.S.
response to Russian cheating that is discovered are essential to the
integrity of any arms control process involving Russian strategic and
tactical forces. In the absence of verification and compliance
enforcement, Russia will violate such arms control agreements at its
convenience. This has been the historical experience.
Mr. Rogers. 2) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: What comments would you
have regarding the question to Dr. Blair noted below?
Dr. Blair, you assert in the Global Zero report that ``mutual
assured destruction (MAD) no longer occupies a central psychological or
political space in the U.S.-Russian relationship.'' On the other hand,
Vladimir Putin tells his people that ``[n]uclear weapons remain the
main guarantee of Russia's sovereignty and its territorial integrity,
it plays a key role in maintaining global and regional stability and
balance''. Sir, which of you is right?
Dr. Payne. Russia places more emphasis on nuclear deterrence now
than it did during the Cold War. The Russian political and military
leadership is absolutely clear in its public statements that nuclear
deterrence remains its highest priority and that the United States and
allies are Russia's number one enemy. Russia's vigorous nuclear
modernization programs reflect these views.
Mr. Rogers. 3) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: What comments do you
have regarding the question to Dr. Blair noted below?
Dr. Blair, you state in the Global Zero report that ``the
obligation to assure U.S. allies in Europe and Asia of American
commitment to their defense and to extend deterrence to them would fall
to U.S. strategic nuclear and conventional forces, which are amply
capable of fulfilling it.'' Sir, why, in your estimate has NATO asked,
three times in 4 years, for the U.S. to keep forward deployed nuclear
weapons--a.k.a. tactical nuclear weapons--in Europe?
Dr. Payne. NATO members have emphasized in the most recent open
NATO consensus documents that nuclear deterrence is essential to NATO
security and that the existing arrangement of U.S. nuclear weapons and
Dual Capable Aircraft located in Europe are an essential element of
NATO's deterrence posture. Several key NATO allies have openly
expressed considerable concern over suggestions that the U.S. would
withdraw nuclear weapons from Europe.
Mr. Rogers. 4) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: Do you wish to comment
on the questions to Dr. Blair noted below?
Dr. Blair: the Global Zero report states that we could partly
offset our nuclear force with ``a stood-up alert missile defense and
conventional force capability that is prompt and global, and that can
function sufficiently well for 24-72 hours.''
Excepting for the fact that the Russians hate both of these
capabilities, and the Senate has traditionally been hostile to
conventional prompt global strike, can you state how much it would cost
to deploy these capabilities? How many missile defense interceptors do
we need, for example, to counter Iran's thousands of short- and medium-
range ballistic missiles?
a. How many would we need to defend Israel? How many would we need
to defend Saudi Arabia? How many to defend the Emirate? How about all
three combined?
b. How about the conventional prompt global strike capability you
describe?
c. Is it possible that to develop and deploy these capabilities we
wouldn't in fact save any money over the relatively cheap nuclear
capability?
Dr. Payne. Missile defense and conventional prompt global strike
can add to U.S. deterrence capabilities. However, no one, including the
authors of the Global Zero report, know if or to what degree nonnuclear
forces can offset U.S. nuclear forces for deterrence. No one, including
the authors of the Global Zero report, can predict the future
functioning of deterrence in such detail. Available evidence suggests
strongly that in some cases, U.S. nuclear weapons have been essential
both for the deterrence of opponents and the assurance of allies. There
is no evidence to suggest that the value of nuclear weapons for these
purposes has declined. Indeed, contemporary statements of key allies
demonstrate the continuing assurance requirement for U.S. nuclear
forces. In addition, serious programs attempting to substitute
conventional forces for nuclear deterrence purposes would likely entail
greater costs than would be saved via the nuclear force reductions
recommended in the Global Zero report.
Mr. Rogers. 5) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: Do you wish to comment
on the questions to Dr. Blair noted below?
Dr. Blair, I note that this Global Zero report goes into a great
deal of detail on U.S. and Russia nuclear force levels. Can you please
describe how it helps to deal with the threat of instability in
Pakistan's nuclear program? Why have you invested so much time in
dealing with relatively stable matters like U.S. and Russian nuclear
forces, but, apparently none at all on matters like Pakistan's nuclear
program?
Dr. Payne. Placing strategic arms control negotiations with Russia
as the central focus of U.S. nuclear policy and attention is an
inheritance of the Cold War and an obsolete practice in the
contemporary threat environment. More important are efforts to address
Russian tactical nuclear weapons, Chinese and North Korean nuclear
capabilities, and the Iranian nuclear program. To date, there is no
apparent success in any of these, and the 2010 New START Treaty with
Russia did not require any Russian deployed warhead or launcher
reductions and has provided no apparent improvement in efforts to
secure nonproliferation goals vis-a-vis North Korea, Iran or elsewhere.
Mr. Rogers. 6) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: do you wish to comment
on the questions to Dr. Blair noted below?
Dr. Blair, your Global Zero report calls for increased reliance on
missile defenses and ``passive hardening'' to deter or defeat a
regional adversary for 24 to 72 hours. Yet, you try to have it both
ways by capping missile defenses to not agitate Russia and China.
a. Please explain what you mean by ``hardening'' and
``sheltering''? How expensive would bomb shelters to ride out North
Korean or Iranian missile defenses be?
b. How many missile defense interceptors would we need to ride out
24 to 72 hours of attacks by Iran or North Korea?
c. How do we balance this with reducing the theater missile defense
program by 10 to 50 percent?
d. How do we tell NATO that we are creating ``100 exclusion
zones,'' as you propose, concerning the deployments of our missile
defenses? How do you expect our Eastern European NATO allies would feel
about that?
Dr. Payne. The programs identified in the Global Zero report,
including hardening and sheltering, missile defense, and advanced
conventional weapons, if undertaken to provide an alternative to
nuclear forces for deterrence, would likely cost far more than the
savings that could be realized by the deep reduction in U.S. nuclear
forces. The Nuclear Zero report gives only one side of the cost
implications of its proposal by identifying only the potential saving
from nuclear reductions. It does not provide any net assessment that
includes the additional unavoidable costs of its missile defense and
conventional force recommendations--thus it misleadingly points only to
great cost savings. The notion of pushing ``100 exclusion zones''
within NATO is fanciful and would likely further degrade the U.S.
ability to assure several key allies who already are wary of recent
U.S. policy initiatives that appear to them to disadvantage their
security.
Mr. Rogers. 7) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich, why is a ``no first
use'' policy a bad idea? Why have we never had one?
Dr. Payne. A ``no first use'' policy would tell opponents that they
need not fear the U.S. nuclear deterrent if they use chemical or
biological weapons of mass destruction against the United States or
allies. It also would tell U.S. allies that the U.S. nuclear umbrella
is not available to protect them from chemical or biological weapons,
or from attacks by an opponent with overwhelming conventional
capabilities. As such, a U.S. ``no first use'' policy should degrade
the U.S. capability to deter chemical and biological weapons threats,
and it would cause enormous concern among at least some key allies
about the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella. In addition, it is
far from clear what practical benefit this declaratory policy would
provide. There is, for example, no evidence to suggest that it would
contribute to U.S. nonproliferation goals or inspire others to ``follow
the U.S. lead.''
Mr. Rogers. 8) Would you please describe China's so-called ``no
first use'' policy? Is it as solid as some would have us believe? Why
does that matter?
Dr. Payne. China's ``no first use'' policy is highly ambiguous with
regard to its actual meaning. This is not by accident. Chinese
officials state that maintaining strategic ambiguity regarding China's
nuclear policies and forces is done intentionally. Even as stated
openly by the Chinese, there are numerous conditions and caveats
pertaining to the ``no first use'' policy. No one should expect this
declaratory policy to affect China's actual planning for the use of
nuclear weapons. This is important because U.S. planning should take
into account the potential for China's first use of nuclear weapons in
the event of a severe military crisis in Asia, particularly if the
crisis involves Taiwan.
Mr. Rogers. 9) Please describe China's nuclear program, China's
aspirations as a nuclear power, and what that means for the Global Zero
recommendations in terms of extended deterrence in that region?
Dr. Payne. According to open reports, China has vigorous nuclear
force modernization programs. China's aspiration is for a nuclear
capability that is at least adequate to deter the United States from
responding forcefully to Chinese political and military initiatives in
Asia. For example, China has most recently disputed Japan's sovereignty
over Okinawa. These initiatives could easily lead to crisis
confrontations with the United States and U.S. allies. The Global Zero
report's stated presumption that nuclear deterrence is not, and will
not be pertinent to U.S. relations with China is a hope expressed as a
truth. The report's recommendations threaten to undermine the U.S.
capability to deter China and the U.S. capability to assure allies who
feel threatened by China. Against these potential risks, there are no
plausible benefits for U.S. extended deterrence likely to be realized
from its recommended policies.
Mr. Rogers. 10) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: Would you care to
respond to any of the questions noted below?
Dr. Blair: Your report, Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force
Structure and Posture, states that ``Precision-guided conventional
munitions hold at risk nearly the entire spectrum of potential targets,
and they are useable.'' (p.2)
Given your assertion that conventional weapons can address ``nearly
the entire spectrum of potential targets'' addressed by nuclear
weapons, it seems reasonable to assume that such weapons should become
part of nuclear arms control negotiations.
a. Do you agree? If not, why not?
b. How many of these systems do we need to hold ``nearly the entire
spectrum of potential targets'' at risk? How much would that cost and
when could we deploy them?
c. As you know, Congress, the Senate in particular, has never been
particularly willing to fund conventional prompt global strike
capabilities. How does our inability to develop and deploy them affect
your illustrated reduction scenario?
Dr. Payne. According to the Global Zero report, U.S. advanced
conventional weapons can hold at risk only a fraction of the targets
traditionally assigned to U.S. nuclear forces (page 11). And, given the
prospective cost of these systems and the cost of the support
infrastructure necessary for these systems, any plan to substitute them
for nuclear deterrence forces is almost certain to cost more than the
savings possible via their substitution.
Advanced conventional forces can, nevertheless, contribute to
deterrence by expanding the threat options available to a president;
they should not be captured by arms control agreements. Unfortunately,
the administration's New START Treaty already places limits on these
systems. Moreover, Russia insists on further restrictions on advanced
conventional strike capabilities as a condition for follow-on
negotiations on reducing nuclear arms.
Mr. Rogers. 11) Dr. Payne: Why do you say that the flexibility and
resilience of the U.S. arsenal may be key for deterrence?
Dr. Payne. The flexibility and resilience of the U.S. nuclear
arsenal may be key to U.S. deterrence effectiveness because the
contemporary threat environment is diverse and shifting in terms of
threats, opposing leaderships, contexts, and stakes. Requirements for
deterrence effectiveness, correspondingly, are likely to vary greatly;
one size and type of nuclear deterrent is unlikely to provide the type
of credible deterrent effect needed to address a wide spectrum of
plausible severe threats. Consequently, the U.S. arsenal must be
sufficiently flexible and resilient to adopt U.S. deterrence
capabilities to an extremely diverse threat environment. In short, the
flexibility and resilience of the U.S. arsenal is likely to be a key to
U.S. deterrence effectiveness. Those qualities of the U.S. nuclear
arsenal are related directly to its size and diversity and would be
threatened by the recommendations of the Global Zero report.
Mr. Rogers. 12) Dr. Payne: How is it that these deterrence
qualities (flexibility and resilience) are linked to the size and
diversity of U.S. forces?
Dr. Payne. The flexibility and resilience of U.S. deterrence forces
are linked directly to the size and diversity of the U.S. nuclear
arsenal. The spectrum of possible U.S. nuclear threat options will
depend on the variety of weapons and weapon platforms available. And, a
large, diverse arsenal simply permits a wider array of deterrence
threat options. Similarly, a large, diverse arsenal provides a greater
variety of weapons and platforms with which to adopt to the shifting
deterrence requirements of an ever-changing threat environment. If the
future were fixed and benign, perhaps a small, fixed nuclear arsenal
could be known to be adequate. But the future is not fixed and the
emerging threat environment hardly appears to be benign. Consequently,
flexibility and resilience are likely key ingredients to effective
deterrence, and directly related to the size and diversity of the U.S.
arsenal.
Mr. Rogers. 13) Dr. Payne: Do you have any recommendations
regarding the number of U.S. forces needed for the requisite level of
force flexibility and resilience?
Dr. Payne. Yes. There are three benchmarks. First, the U.S. nuclear
triad of launchers--bombers, ICBMs, and submarine-launched missiles--is
a source of great flexibility and resilience for the U.S. nuclear
arsenal. This is why the bipartisan Congressional Strategic Posture
Commission emphasized the need to sustain the triad in its 2009
consensus report.
Second, following considerable analysis of the question, the 2001
NPR identified a range of 1700-2200 operationally deployed weapons and
preservation of the triad as adequate for the needed flexibility and
resilience.
Similarly, in 2010, Gen. Kevin Chilton said in open testimony that
given this need for flexibility, he could accept no lower ceiling on
U.S. deployed strategic nuclear forces than that of the 2010 New START
Treaty, i.e., 1550. In doing so, he added elsewhere that the Treaty's
bomber counting rules actually allowed a greater number of weapons than
1550, and that this factor was important in his acceptance of the
ceiling.
The threat environment has only become more complex and dangerous
since those numbers were identified. There has been no apparent basis
for concluding that flexibility and resilience are now somehow less
important or available with fewer weapons and launchers. In fact, the
threat environment appears to be heading in darker directions.
Mr. Rogers. 14) Dr. Payne: Why do you conclude that deep nuclear
reductions could degrade the deterrence of opponents?
Dr. Payne. First, deep U.S. nuclear reductions will pressure the
U.S. to move its deterrence threats to targets that are vulnerable and
relatively few in number. Consequently, most proponents of deep nuclear
reductions identify an opponent's soft civilian targets as the basis
for the U.S. minimal deterrent threat. However, given the well-known
U.S. desire to minimize civilian casualties, some opponents are likely
to see such a U.S. deterrent threat as incredible for most all
plausible contingencies. Some opponents have expressed this view
openly. In addition, if the opponent is armed with a nuclear or
biological arsenal, it may be particularly incredible for the U.S. to
threaten to respond against that opponent's soft civilian targets given
the opponent's likely capability to counter reply against U.S.
vulnerable civilian targets. The deterrent threat that the U.S. would
engage in a mutual process of destroying civilian targets may simply be
an incredible U.S. deterrent as perceived by at least some opponents,
and thus an ineffective deterrent. It is not a prospect that should be
encouraged by U.S. policy.
Second, deep nuclear reductions would likely reduce the flexibility
and resilience of the U.S. arsenal, particularly if it led to
elimination of the triad, as is likely. This would increase the
prospects for deterrence failure because the U.S. might not have the
number and/or diversity of nuclear forces necessary for deterrence
purposes on those occasions when nuclear deterrence would be necessary
to preserve peace or limit escalation.
Third, a very small U.S. nuclear arsenal almost certainly would be
more vulnerable to attack by an opponent's covertly or overtly deployed
forces. An effective U.S. deterrent force is one that does not invite
attack upon itself by appearing vulnerable to enemy attack. Such a
condition could encourage an opponent to strike first in a crisis when
it otherwise would not consider such a strategy, and thereby degrade
deterrence. Small U.S. numbers would, in this sense, be
``destabilizing.''
Fourth, a very small and thus more vulnerable U.S. nuclear arsenal
could inspire nuclear arms competition by lowering the bar for
opponents to acquire a capability to threaten the survivability of the
U.S. deterrent. The U.S. forces recommended in the Global Zero report,
for example, would leave the bulk of U.S. deployed strategic nuclear
forces vulnerable to a very small number of enemy nuclear weapons. Such
a U.S. arsenal could encourage opponents to move toward covert
deployments and/or noncompliance with arms control measures for the
same reason.
Mr. Rogers. 15) Dr. Payne: Why do you conclude that deep nuclear
reductions could degrade the assurance of allies?
Dr. Payne. Several U.S. allies, notably South Korea and Japan,
already are deeply concerned that the U.S. drive to denuclearize is not
reciprocated by the neighboring countries that pose nuclear-armed
threats to them. They fear that further U.S. nuclear reductions simply
will further degrade the credibility of the U.S. extended deterrent
that is key to their security. As a consequence, some senior leaders in
these allied countries now question the continued reliability of the
U.S. ``nuclear umbrella'' as never before. They see the robustness of
the U.S. nuclear arsenal and declared U.S. deterrence policy as
critical to their own security, and thus are particularly disturbed by
U.S. moves to denuclearize without corresponding movement that reduces
the threats they face. The blatant fact that U.S. denuclearization
appears to have no moderating effect on North Korean, Chinese, Iranian
or Russian nuclear programs has led to the degradation of the important
U.S. strategic goal of providing security assurance to some allies.
Mr. Rogers. 16) Dr. Payne: Why do you conclude that deep reductions
could actually promote nuclear proliferation?
Dr. Payne. Further deep U.S. nuclear reductions will deepen the
concern already apparent among some key allies that the U.S. nuclear
umbrella is losing credibility. Further U.S. deep nuclear reductions
will compel some of these key allies to reconsider their commitment to
their current nonnuclear status. This is not speculation; some allied
political leaders already are expressing precisely these views.
Consequently, further U.S. deep nuclear reductions could easily
provoke, not prevent, further nuclear proliferation.
Mr. Rogers. 17) Dr. Payne: Why do you conclude that deep nuclear
reductions could actually lead to a need to increase U.S. defense
spending?
Dr. Payne. The savings that would be available via even deep
reductions in the number of U.S. nuclear weapons would not be
substantial, as was most recently observed in open testimony by Dr. Don
Cook, a senior official at NNSA. This is so because the costs of
nuclear weapons generally are not driven directly by the number of
nuclear weapons: a substantial reduction in warhead numbers would not
yield similarly substantial savings. The potential for savings would
come largely from abandonment of one or more legs of the triad.
However, deep nuclear reductions in forces and launchers would
necessitate a substantial expansion of U.S. advanced conventional
weapons and improvement or replacement of some key enabling systems.
The cost of doing so would almost certainly be more than the savings
that could be realized by moving to a nuclear dyad, as recommended in
the Global Zero report.
Mr. Rogers. 18) Dr. Payne: Why do you conclude that nuclear
deterrence could contribute to countering terrorism?
Dr. Payne. Historical evidence shows with no doubt that some
terrorists organizations can be deterred indirectly on at least some
occasions by deterring state sponsors of terror from providing support
to their terrorist clients. There is no reason whatsoever to conclude
that these state sponsors of terrorism, such as North Korea and Iran,
are immune to U.S. nuclear deterrence threats. Consequently, the
assertion that U.S. nuclear capabilities are irrelevant to terrorism is
common but contrary to evidence and logic.
Mr. Rogers. 19) Dr. Payne: Why do you doubt that U.S. advanced
conventional forces can substitute for nuclear forces for deterrence
and assurance purposes?
Dr. Payne. Advanced U.S. conventional forces and missile defense
can contribute to deterrence. However, historical and anthropological
studies indicate that nuclear weapons can provide unique deterrence
effect because opponents perceive them as promising incalculable and
unpredictable punishment for aggression against the U.S. and allies.
Also, the percentage of casualties (of the global population) due to
warfare calculated over centuries shows a dramatic and unprecedented
drop following the introduction of nuclear weapons and nuclear
deterrence. This reflects the historical fact that conventional
deterrence fails catastrophically with some regularity. This has not
been the case for nuclear deterrence, perhaps because nuclear weapons
uniquely present would-be aggressors with incalculable, unpredictable
punishment. The assertion that conventional weapons will substitute
reliably for nuclear forces for deterrence purposes is a hope/wish that
does not reflect available evidence.
Mr. Rogers. 20) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich, would you care to
comment on the questions to Dr. Blair noted below?
The President said at the State of the Union address last month
that, ``we will engage Russia to seek further reductions in our nuclear
arsenals . . . because our ability to influence others depends on our
willingness to lead.''
a. Dr. Blair, would you please explain just who has been following
the President's leadership? Put another way, with our unilateral
reductions under the New START treaty, who has followed us in reducing?
As you know, Russia was already below two of the three ``central
limits'' of the New START treaty upon entry into force of the treaty.
Dr. Payne. There is little or no evidence that U.S.
denuclearization has any positive impact on nuclear nonproliferation
efforts or more formal arms control negotiations. No country appears to
be following the U.S. lead in this regard--quite the contrary. In
addition, there is available evidence that suggests that further deep
U.S. nuclear reductions will motivate some allies and friends in the
direction of nuclear proliferation. The linkage suggested by President
Obama is common expression of hope unsupported by available evidence.
Mr. Rogers. 21) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich, would you care to
comment on the questions to Dr. Blair noted below?
Dr. Blair, in the recent Global Zero report, it was stated that
``this illustrative agenda with its deep cuts and de-alerting would
strongly validate the Non-Proliferation Treaty and help preserve it in
the face of challenges by North Korea, Iran and other prospective
proliferators.''
a. Can you describe in detail, and with specificity, how further
nuclear reductions by the United States and Russia (if Russia is
interested) will strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty and deal with
the nuclear threats of Iran and North Korea? Specifically, what will
other states (be specific as to which states) do to stop the spread of
nuclear weapons if we only reduce our nuclear weapons further.
Dr. Payne. There is little or no evidence suggesting the validity
of this linkage claimed in the Global Zero report. Instead,
considerable evidence suggests that further deep U.S. nuclear
reductions could hasten the collapse of the NPT by motivating U.S.
friends and allies to move toward their own independent nuclear
capabilities. In addition, the frequent assertion that the NPT mandates
U.S. deep nuclear reductions independent of global movement toward
general and complete disarmament is false.
Mr. Rogers. 22) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: would you care to
comment on the questions to Dr. Blair noted below?
Dr. Blair: Do you agree with the finding of the 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review that ``fundamental changes in the international security
environment in recent years--including the growth of unrivaled U.S.
conventional military capabilities, major improvements in missile
defenses, and the easing of Cold War rivalries--enable us to fulfill
those objectives at significantly lower nuclear force levels and with
reduced reliance on nuclear weapons''?
a. So how do the Budget Control Act and Sequestration change this
calculus? Combined, we are spending $1 trillion less over a decade on
procurement, acquisition, operations and maintenance. For example, we
can't sortie or refuel aircraft carriers under the President's
sequester. Doesn't this mean, if the logic of the NPR holds true, that,
the assumption we can rely on our conventional capabilities and
conventional deterrent, should be reconsidered?
Dr. Payne. First, available historical evidence suggests strongly
that conventional weapons can contribute to deterrence, but not that
they can replace nuclear weapons for the needed deterrent effect on at
least some occasions. In some cases, it is implausible to expect
conventional forces to provide the necessary lethality or psychological
effect needed for deterrence purposes.
Second, if U.S. policy, nevertheless, is to rely on conventional
forces for deterrence, the number and types of conventional forces
necessary, and the necessary supporting infrastructure, would likely be
far more expensive than modernization of the triad and the nuclear
weapons infrastructure. In any event, there is little evidence to
suggest that the U.S. will invest in these conventional force programs.
Mr. Rogers. 23) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: Do you wish to comment
on the material in the questions submitted to Dr. Blair noted below?
Dr. Blair: the Global Zero report you led stated that:
``(page 16) The reductions and de-alerting proposed under this
illustrative plan could be carried out in unison by the United States
and Russia through reciprocal presidential directives, negotiated in
another round of bilateral arms reduction talks, or implemented
unilaterally.''
In his confirmation hearing to be Secretary of Defense, then-
Senator Hagel stated: ``I don't--I do not agree with any recommendation
that would unilaterally take any action to further reduce our nuclear
warheads and our capability . . . Every--every option that we must look
at, every action we must take to reduce warheads or anything should be
bilateral. It should be verifiable. It should be negotiated.''
a. Dr. Blair, Do you agree with the Global Zero report or Secretary
Hagel?
b. Why is verification important? Are you aware of any precedent
for verification that isn't treaty based?
c. Is verification important because we have to know if there's
cheating?
d. Dr. Blair, you cite the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs)
several times as an example of how further reductions, and actions like
de-alerting, could be effectuated. Are you aware that Russia is not in
compliance with those Initiatives, in other words, it is cheating? Does
that change your endorsement of that approach?
Dr. Krepinevich. I have no additional comments.
Mr. Rogers. 24) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: What comments would you
have regarding the question to Dr. Blair noted below?
Dr. Blair, you assert in the Global Zero report that ``mutual
assured destruction (MAD) no longer occupies a central psychological or
political space in the U.S.-Russian relationship.'' On the other hand,
Vladimir Putin tells his people that ``[n]uclear weapons remain the
main guarantee of Russia's sovereignty and its territorial integrity,
it plays a key role in maintaining global and regional stability and
balance''. Sir, which of you is right?
Dr. Krepinevich. I have no additional comments.
Mr. Rogers. 25) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: What comments do you
have regarding the question to Dr. Blair noted below?
Dr. Blair, you state in the Global Zero report that ``the
obligation to assure U.S. allies in Europe and Asia of American
commitment to their defense and to extend deterrence to them would fall
to U.S. strategic nuclear and conventional forces, which are amply
capable of fulfilling it.'' Sir, why, in your estimate has NATO asked,
three times in 4 years, for the U.S. to keep forward deployed nuclear
weapons--a.k.a. tactical nuclear weapons--in Europe?
Dr. Krepinevich. It is not possible to know for certain why
European leaders have repeatedly requested that the United States
maintain tactical nuclear weapons on their territory. Nevertheless, it
is likely that three factors in explain this point of view. First,
forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons have traditionally
underpinned extended deterrence by providing limited nuclear options
that could be exercised in response to conventional or nuclear
aggression. During the Cold War, for example, Western conventional
military forces were considered insufficient on their own to deter or
counter an assault by the Warsaw Pact, because the Soviets and their
satellites enjoyed a sizeable quantitative advantage. At the same time,
U.S. strategic nuclear forces were not considered a credible deterrent
to an invasion, because their use would trigger a reprisal against
American targets by Soviet strategic forces. Second, although the Cold
War is long-since over, these weapons continue to provide an important
hedge against the prospect that relations between NATO and the Russian
Federation could deteriorate in the future. Moreover, once withdrawn,
it could be extremely difficult to redeploy tactical nuclear weapons in
Europe given a confluence of fiscal, political, and operational-
military considerations. Third, if the United States further reduces
its conventional military presence in Europe, and if European nations
fail to increase their own defense spending, then forward-deployed
tactical nuclear weapons would arguably become the most important
element of the alliance, and the key factor that ensures the security
of America's NATO partners--even in the absence of a near-term threat
from Russia.
Mr. Rogers. 26) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: Do you wish to comment
on the questions to Dr. Blair noted below?
Dr. Blair: the Global Zero report states that we could partly
offset our nuclear force with ``a stood-up alert missile defense and
conventional force capability that is prompt and global, and that can
function sufficiently well for 24-72 hours.''
Excepting for the fact that the Russians hate both of these
capabilities, and the Senate has traditionally been hostile to
conventional prompt global strike, can you state how much it would cost
to deploy these capabilities? How many missile defense interceptors do
we need, for example, to counter Iran's thousands of short- and medium-
range ballistic missiles?
a. How many would we need to defend Israel? How many would we need
to defend Saudi Arabia? How many to defend the Emirate? How about all
three combined?
b. How about the conventional prompt global strike capability you
describe?
c. Is it possible that to develop and deploy these capabilities we
wouldn't in fact save any money over the relatively cheap nuclear
capability?
Dr. Krepinevich. I have no additional comments.
Mr. Rogers. 27) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: Do you wish to comment
on the questions to Dr. Blair noted below?
Dr. Blair, I note that this Global Zero report goes into a great
deal of detail on U.S. and Russia nuclear force levels. Can you please
describe how it helps to deal with the threat of instability in
Pakistan's nuclear program? Why have you invested so much time in
dealing with relatively stable matters like U.S. and Russian nuclear
forces, but, apparently none at all on matters like Pakistan's nuclear
program?
Dr. Krepinevich. I have no additional comments.
Mr. Rogers. 28) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: do you wish to comment
on the questions to Dr. Blair noted below?
Dr. Blair, your Global Zero report calls for increased reliance on
missile defenses and ``passive hardening'' to deter or defeat a
regional adversary for 24 to 72 hours. Yet, you try to have it both
ways by capping missile defenses to not agitate Russia and China.
a. Please explain what you mean by ``hardening'' and
``sheltering''? How expensive would bomb shelters to ride out North
Korean or Iranian missile defenses be?
b. How many missile defense interceptors would we need to ride out
24 to 72 hours of attacks by Iran or North Korea?
c. How do we balance this with reducing the theater missile defense
program by 10 to 50 percent?
d. How do we tell NATO that we are creating ``100 exclusion
zones,'' as you propose, concerning the deployments of our missile
defenses? How do you expect our Eastern European NATO allies would feel
about that?
Dr. Krepinevich. I have no additional comments.
Mr. Rogers. 29) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich, why is a ``no first
use'' policy a bad idea? Why have we never had one?
Dr. Krepinevich. The United States has traditionally preserved the
option of being the first side to use nuclear weapons during a crisis
or conflict for several reasons: to deter or defeat a conventional
military attack that overwhelmed U.S. and allied forces, namely a
Warsaw Pact invasion of Western Europe; to launch a damage-limiting
first strike in response to unambiguous warning of an impending nuclear
attack; and to deter or retaliate for an attack with chemical or
biological weapons. Although Washington's decision to forgo a ``no
first use'' pledge was a product of the Cold War, and although the
threat of a massive conventional assault that could only be stopped by
using nuclear weapons has receded over the past two decades, there are
still reasons to preserve existing policy. For example, the possibility
of a biological or chemical attack, particularly by a rogue nation,
still remains--and could increase in the years ahead. The United States
also requires the ability to hold at risk hardened or deeply buried
targets that cannot be reliably destroyed by conventional munitions. As
a result, publicly adopting a no first use policy could weaken
deterrence, undermine extended deterrence commitments to frontline U.S.
allies, and remove options for countering hostile regional powers.
Mr. Rogers. 30) Would you please describe China's so-called ``no
first use'' policy? Is it as solid as some would have us believe? Why
does that matter?
Dr. Krepinevich. China has long pledged that it would not be the
first nation to use nuclear weapons in a crisis or conflict.
Nevertheless, there has been speculation that its definition of ``no
first use'' might be different and considerably narrower than an
American one. According to most recent report on China's military power
released by the Department of Defense, ``there is some ambiguity over
the conditions under which China's NFU [No First Use] policy would
apply, including whether strikes on what China considers its own
territory, demonstration strikes, or high-altitude bursts would
constitute first use.'' Likewise, there has been recurring speculation
over the past several years that China might adapt or abandon this
pledge in the future. More generally, there are reasons to doubt that
commitments made during peacetime would be upheld in the event of war.
Gaining greater insight into this issue is critical, therefore, because
American actions in a future crisis with China would undoubtedly be
shaped by Washington's assessment of the likelihood of escalation.
Mr. Rogers. 31) Please describe China's nuclear program, China's
aspirations as a nuclear power, and what that means for the Global Zero
recommendations in terms of extended deterrence in that region?
Dr. Krepinevich. According to publicly available sources, China's
nuclear arsenal consists of approximately 240 warheads and 140 silo-
based and road-mobile ballistic missiles--including intercontinental
and medium-range ballistic missiles. There has been speculation,
however, that the size of its arsenal might be larger, perhaps over a
thousand weapons. What is certain is that Beijing is modernizing its
nuclear capabilities, to include fielding new road mobile ICBMs,
several ballistic missile submarines, and a new submarine-launched
ballistic missile. Collectively, these steps will enable Beijing to
field a much more survivable nuclear arsenal. Because China appears
more intent on making qualitative improvements to its arsenal than
engaging in a major quantitative buildup, any effort to eliminate
nuclear weapons would almost certainly require large unilateral or
bilateral reductions by the United States and Russia before China would
be willing to cap or reduce its own nuclear capabilities. In short,
approximate parity between these three powers would be a prerequisite
for any agreement among them--a position that the Global Zero
organization explicitly acknowledges and accepts. An issue that merits
further analysis, therefore, is whether and to what extent American
extended deterrence commitments to its allies in East Asia will remain
viable if the relative gap between U.S. and Chinese nuclear forces were
to shrink considerably. Furthermore, in a world in which China, Russia
and the United States each had the same number of nuclear weapons, it
would not be possible for the United States to maintain parity against
the other two powers. It would therefore be important to understand the
dynamics of a nuclear competition in which the United States could find
itself confronting an alliance of China and Russia.
Mr. Rogers. 32) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: Would you care to
respond to any of the questions noted below?
Dr. Blair: Your report, Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force
Structure and Posture, states that ``Precision-guided conventional
munitions hold at risk nearly the entire spectrum of potential targets,
and they are useable.'' (p.2)
Given your assertion that conventional weapons can address ``nearly
the entire spectrum of potential targets'' addressed by nuclear
weapons, it seems reasonable to assume that such weapons should become
part of nuclear arms control negotiations.
a. Do you agree? If not, why not?
b. How many of these systems do we need to hold ``nearly the entire
spectrum of potential targets'' at risk? How much would that cost and
when could we deploy them?
c. As you know, Congress, the Senate in particular, has never been
particularly willing to fund conventional prompt global strike
capabilities. How does our inability to develop and deploy them affect
your illustrated reduction scenario?
Dr. Krepinevich. If conventional precision-strike weapons were
indeed a functional substitute for nuclear weapons, than this would
suggest that the former should be included in future arms control
negotiations over the latter--an outcome that could disproportionately
favor other nations given the United States' advantage in conventional
precision-strike munitions. It is far from clear, however, that
conventional weapons can actually perform the identical functions as
nuclear weapons. Despite their virtues, conventional weapons do not
possess the same ability to hold at risk wide area, hardened, or deeply
buried targets. This suggests that the United States cannot rely upon
conventional weapons alone for deterrence and extended deterrence, and
should avoid efforts to conflate conventional and nuclear forces in any
future arms control negotiations.
Mr. Rogers. 33) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich, would you care to
comment on the questions to Dr. Blair noted below?
The President said at the State of the Union address last month
that, ``we will engage Russia to seek further reductions in our nuclear
arsenals . . . because our ability to influence others depends on our
willingness to lead.''
a. Dr. Blair, would you please explain just who has been following
the President's leadership? Put another way, with our unilateral
reductions under the New START treaty, who has followed us in reducing?
As you know, Russia was already below two of the three ``central
limits'' of the New START treaty upon entry into force of the treaty.
Dr. Krepinevich. The evidence to date provides grounds for
skepticism that other nations will follow the U.S. lead if Washington
engages in further nuclear reductions. Both the United States and
Russia have made deep cuts in the size of their nuclear arsenals over
the past two decades. Nevertheless, nuclear proliferation has
continued: India, Pakistan, and North Korea have joined the nuclear
``club;'' Syria and Iran have pursued the technical capabilities
necessary to build nuclear weapons; all existing nuclear powers are
modernizing their capabilities; and Pakistan and Russia appear to be
lowering the barriers to nuclear use. In all likelihood, this can be
explained by a simple observation: other nations' nuclear programs are
not primarily a response to the size and shape of the U.S. nuclear
arsenal, but rather to local rivalries, domestic political
considerations, and U.S. conventional military superiority.
Mr. Rogers. 34) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich, would you care to
comment on the questions to Dr. Blair noted below?
Dr. Blair, in the recent Global Zero report, it was stated that
``this illustrative agenda with its deep cuts and de-alerting would
strongly validate the Non-Proliferation Treaty and help preserve it in
the face of challenges by North Korea, Iran and other prospective
proliferators.''
a. Can you describe in detail, and with specificity, how further
nuclear reductions by the United States and Russia (if Russia is
interested) will strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty and deal with
the nuclear threats of Iran and North Korea? Specifically, what will
other states (be specific as to which states) do to stop the spread of
nuclear weapons if we only reduce our nuclear weapons further.
Dr. Krepinevich. I respectfully refer back to my answer to question
no. 33.
Mr. Rogers. 35) Drs. Payne and Krepinevich: would you care to
comment on the questions to Dr. Blair noted below?
Dr. Blair: Do you agree with the finding of the 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review that ``fundamental changes in the international security
environment in recent years--including the growth of unrivaled U.S.
conventional military capabilities, major improvements in missile
defenses, and the easing of Cold War rivalries--enable us to fulfill
those objectives at significantly lower nuclear force levels and with
reduced reliance on nuclear weapons''?
a. So how do the Budget Control Act and Sequestration change this
calculus? Combined, we are spending $1 trillion less over a decade on
procurement, acquisition, operations and maintenance. For example, we
can't sortie or refuel aircraft carriers under the President's
sequester. Doesn't this mean, if the logic of the NPR holds true, that,
the assumption we can rely on our conventional capabilities and
conventional deterrent, should be reconsidered?
Dr. Krepinevich. The (questionable) assumption that conventional
capabilities can substitute for nuclear weapons will be challenged by
two trends that are already taking place. The first trend is the
proliferation of conventional precision-strike systems, and in
particular anti-access/area denial systems, which could make it
increasingly difficult for the United States to project and sustain
military power abroad. Put simply, arguments that the United States can
decrease its reliance on nuclear weapons thanks to the growing
sophistication of its conventional capabilities implicitly assume that
the U.S. will maintain the near monopoly in conventional precision
strike that it has enjoyed over the past two decades. But this
advantage is waning, and conventional deterrence will likely erode as a
result. The second trend now taking place is the changing fiscal
environment, especially growing constraints on the U.S. defense budget
highlighted by the Budget Control Act. Importantly, this development
could limit Washington's ability to develop and field the types of
capabilities that might be necessary to maintain (or regain) its
conventional military advantage, from new long-range strike platforms,
to additional nuclear-powered submarines, to more advanced missile
defenses. In sum, the view that the United States can continue to
reduce its reliance on nuclear weapons thanks to its conventional
military superiority appears likely to be seriously tested in the years
ahead.
Mr. Rogers. 36) Dr. Blair: the Global Zero report you led stated
that:
``(page 16) The reductions and de-alerting proposed under this
illustrative plan could be carried out in unison by the United States
and Russia through reciprocal presidential directives, negotiated in
another round of bilateral arms reduction talks, or implemented
unilaterally.''
In his confirmation hearing to be Secretary of Defense, then-
Senator Hagel stated: ``I don't--I do not agree with any recommendation
that would unilaterally take any action to further reduce our nuclear
warheads and our capability . . . Every--every option that we must look
at, every action we must take to reduce warheads or anything should be
bilateral. It should be verifiable. It should be negotiated.''
a. Dr. Blair, Do you agree with the Global Zero report or Secretary
Hagel?
b. Why is verification important? Are you aware of any precedent
for verification that isn't treaty based?
c. Is verification important because we have to know if there's
cheating?
d. Dr. Blair, you cite the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs)
several times as an example of how further reductions, and actions like
de-alerting, could be effectuated. Are you aware that Russia is not in
compliance with those Initiatives, in other words, it is cheating? Does
that change your endorsement of that approach?
Dr. Blair. 36a) The Global Zero report (May 2012) chaired by Gen.
(ret.) James Cartwright and co-authored by him, then-Sen. Chuck Hagel,
Amb. Thomas Pickering, Amb. Richard Burt and Gen. (ret.) Jack Sheehan
considered a wide range of approaches to implementing the report's
recommendations. The unanimous consensus of these commissioners was
that the reductions and de-alerting should be negotiated with the
Russians and should be verifiable. I quote Gen. (ret.) Cartwright and
Amb. Pickerings' on-the-record words in clarifying this endorsement by
the Global Zero commission:
`` The commissioners agreed that cuts to 900 total nuclear weapons
in the U.S. and Russian arsenals should be the aim of the next round of
bilateral New START follow-on negotiations. We call upon them to reach
a comprehensive, verifiable agreement that provides for equal
reductions by both sides down to a total force of 900 weapons that
counts all types of strategic and nonstrategic weapons--with ``freedom
to mix'' on both sides--and that counts every individual warhead or
bomb whether deployed or held in reserve. We wish to emphasize that the
commission does not call for unilateral cuts by the United States. Our
view is that the only valid and useful approach should be to negotiate
an agreement with the Russians.''
Thus, the Global Zero report and the testimony of then-Sen. Hagel
in his confirmation hearing to become Secretary of Defense are in
complete agreement.
36b) Verification is important to ensure compliance with nuclear
arms reductions agreements, and thereby to help preserve strategic
stability and build confidence in the dependability of the parties in
future arms agreements. As the U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons
stockpiles decrease, the importance of verification grows. As the
answer to 36a) question above indicates, the Global Zero report calls
for counting and verifying every individual warhead and bomb of all
types, whether deployed or held in reserve. This represents a higher
standard of verification than has been adopted in the past. Previously,
no agreement has regulated the total size of our stockpiles, and the
deep reductions in nuclear stockpiles made during the past two decades
have thus been essentially unilateral in nature.
Regarding the question whether there is any precedent for
verification that is not treaty based, I would note two of them: First,
no provisions for verification of the Moscow Treaty under President
George W. Bush were explicitly provided for, though they were
implicitly provided for by the previous START I Treaty that remained in
force along with its extensive verification arrangements.
Second, verification of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs)
of 1991 is not treaty based, but rather relies on U.S. `national
technical means of verification.' The 36d) question below asserts that
Russia is not in compliance with these PNIs. Apparently, verification
is possible in this case without treaty-based verification provisions
in place.
36c) Verification is important to determine whether a party is
cheating intentionally; clarify whether there are other explanations
for noncompliance such as different interpretations of treaty
obligations; and rectify the situation.
Also, verification is important to enable a party in full
compliance with its treaty obligations to demonstrate its fidelity to
the treaty and thereby boost the confidence of its treaty partners in
its reliability. This confidence-building aspect, rather than the
detection of cheating aspect, is the hallmark of the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty. It is similarly an important aspect of all
nuclear arms reduction agreements.
36d) While I believe that PNIs could offer an alternative approach
to carrying out nuclear arms reductions or steps such as de-alerting, I
generally do not endorse this approach over a treaty-based approach
with adequate verification provided for by the treaty. However, in the
specific case of the 1991 PNIs the purpose was not so much to
facilitate an reduction in nuclear arms as it was to enable President
Gorbachev to return to Russia and secure the thousands of Russian
weapons dispersed in other countries that could have fallen into the
hands of those countries or of unauthorized actors including terrorists
or organized crime groups. Time was of the essence, and the PNIs were
adopted and carried out in months instead of the many years that a
formal arms negotiation would have taken to complete and implement. As
I recall, no American leader was worried about exact compliance with
these voluntary actions, while many Americans were concerned with the
security of the weapons.
As far as my awareness of Russian compliance with the PNIs of 1991,
my own research based upon public sources suggests that Russia's
pledges were largely kept but that the exceptions in which they were
not kept are significant. I have not thoroughly assessed based on
classified information the extent of compliance and noncompliance with
these PNIs. I understand that the lack of verification provisions
associated with the PNIs hampers our ability to determine exactly how
compliant Russia is, but at the same time there is apparently
sufficient independent verification on which to ground accusations of
cheating.
Mr. Rogers. 37) Dr. Blair, you assert in the Global Zero report
that ``mutual assured destruction (MAD) no longer occupies a central
psychological or political space in the U.S.-Russian relationship.'' On
the other hand, Vladimir Putin tells his people that ``[n]uclear
weapons remain the main guarantee of Russia's sovereignty and its
territorial integrity, it plays a key role in maintaining global and
regional stability and balance''. Sir, which of you is right?
Dr. Blair. MAD remains a major technical factor in the security
strategies of Russia as well as the United States, and nuclear
deterrence is an especially important element in Russian security
strategy vis-a-vis NATO, the United States, and China. However, the
U.S., Russian, and Chinese nuclear arsenals have little or no utility
in addressing the main threats facing these countries--nuclear
terrorism, nuclear proliferation, and cyber warfare. The relevance of
MAD after the end of the Cold War has declined precipitously as a
technical matter, and moreover the perceived threat of nuclear
aggression by any of these parties against any of the others is very
much lower today compared to the Cold War period. Politically and
psychologically, MAD no longer animates our relationships.
Mr. Rogers. 38) Dr. Blair, you state in the Global Zero report that
``the obligation to assure U.S. allies in Europe and Asia of American
commitment to their defense and to extend deterrence to them would fall
to U.S. strategic nuclear and conventional forces, which are amply
capable of fulfilling it.'' Sir, why, in your estimate has NATO asked,
three times in 4 years, for the U.S. to keep forward deployed nuclear
weapons--a.k.a. tactical nuclear weapons--in Europe?
Dr. Blair. NATO countries' positions on whether to keep U.S.
tactical nuclear bombs forward deployed in Europe vary widely. Most of
the leading countries of the alliance, e.g., Germany, support
withdrawing (unilaterally if necessary) these weapons back to U.S.
territory. Others, particularly the Baltic members of NATO, favor
keeping them or, alternatively, getting U.S. military troops to be
stationed on their territories as a tripwire for U.S. engagement in
their defense in the event of a Russian incursion. In short, NATO is
divided on the issue, and since NATO operates by consensus requiring
unanimous support for any major policy change, the default position of
NATO is that the tactical weapons remain in Europe. Since the U.S.
tactical nukes (B-61 air-dropped bombs) have scant military utility,
their main purpose is `alliance cohesion.' They primarily serve
political purposes. Also, officially, NATO takes the position that as
long as nuclear weapons remain in the world, NATO will remain a
nuclear-armed alliance. (Of course the U.K. and France as well as the
United States have strategic nuclear forces that ensure NATO will
remain a nuclear alliance even if tactical weapons are removed from
Europe.)
Mr. Rogers. 39) Dr. Blair: the Global Zero report states that we
could partly offset our nuclear force with ``a stood-up alert missile
defense and conventional force capability that is prompt and global,
and that can function sufficiently well for 24-72 hours.''
Excepting for the fact that the Russians hate both of these
capabilities, and the Senate has traditionally been hostile to
conventional prompt global strike, can you state how much it would cost
to deploy these capabilities? How many missile defense interceptors do
we need, for example, to counter Iran's thousands of short- and medium-
range ballistic missiles?
a. How many would we need to defend Israel? How many would we need
to defend Saudi Arabia? How many to defend the Emirate? How about all
three combined?
b. How about the conventional prompt global strike capability you
describe?
c. Is it possible that to develop and deploy these capabilities we
wouldn't in fact save any money over the relatively cheap nuclear
capability?
Dr. Blair. The report only goes so far as to say that these
nonnuclear defenses and global strike systems could partly offset U.S.
nuclear forces. Calculating the exact number and costs of these systems
needed to perform various missions such as defending allies in the
Middle East was beyond the scope of the Global Zero study.
It is certainly possible that the costs of developing and deploying
these capabilities could exceed the costs of maintaining nuclear forces
for these missions. However, the primary goal of this substitution is
to extend the amount of time available to terminate a conflict before
having to resort to nuclear weapons.
Mr. Rogers. 40) Dr. Blair, I note that this Global Zero report goes
into a great deal of detail on U.S. and Russia nuclear force levels.
Can you please describe how it helps to deal with the threat of
instability in Pakistan's nuclear program? Why have you invested so
much time in dealing with relatively stable matters like U.S. and
Russian nuclear forces, but, apparently none at all on matters like
Pakistan's nuclear program?
Dr. Blair. The subject of the Global Zero report is U.S. nuclear
force structure, posture and modernization. These matters are largely
driven by Russia's forces, posture and modernization. Therefore the
report focused on the U.S.-Russia nuclear policies and force levels.
Also, the report's purpose was to illustrate an alternative U.S. force
structure and posture on the assumption that further deep cuts in U.S.
and Russian forces would be taken in the next round of nuclear arms
reductions.
As for Pakistan and other countries, the report emphasizes their
importance and the urgent need to broaden nuclear arms control beyond
the U.S.-Russian bilateral process. The report underlines the fact that
indeed the more serious risks of instability and nuclear weapons use,
intentionally or accidentally, lie in South Asia and other regions. It
is critical to bring these countries into a multilateral process to
regulate their arsenals and prevent the outbreak of nuclear conflict
and the acquisition of nuclear materials by terrorists. The deep
bilateral cuts proposed by the report were designed to encourage China
to join a multilateral process, which in turn would increase pressures
and incentives for India and Pakistan to join. I certainly agree with
the view expressed in this question to me that Pakistan poses
unprecedented nuclear danger that demands our full attention.
Mr. Rogers. 41) Dr. Blair, your Global Zero report calls for
increased reliance on missile defenses and ``passive hardening'' to
deter or defeat a regional adversary for 24 to 72 hours. Yet, you try
to have it both ways by capping missile defenses to not agitate Russia
and China.
a. Please explain what you mean by ``hardening'' and
``sheltering''? How expensive would bomb shelters to ride out North
Korean or Iranian missile defenses be?
b. How many missile defense interceptors would we need to ride out
24 to 72 hours of attacks by Iran or North Korea?
c. How do we balance this with reducing the theater missile defense
program by 10 to 50 percent?
d. How do we tell NATO that we are creating ``100 exclusion
zones,'' as you propose, concerning the deployments of our missile
defenses? How do you expect our Eastern European NATO allies would feel
about that?
Dr. Blair. These important questions lie within the expertise of
the Global Zero commission, particularly Gen. (ret.) Cartwright, but it
is not an area that I can knowledgeably address without consulting with
the commissioners and conducting further research.
Mr. Rogers. 42) Dr. Blair, you state in the Global Zero report that
we can ``remove the technical threat of a surprise U.S. nuclear first
strike,'' correct?
a. Is this another way of calling for a ``no first use'' policy?
Dr. Blair. The Global Zero report does not reject the first use of
nuclear weapons. Rather, it calls for reducing the number of strategic
weapons that could be fired in a sudden, surprise first strike. It
merely thwarts the potential for a surprise first use of nuclear
weapons.
Mr. Rogers. 43) Would you please describe China's so-called ``no
first use'' policy? Is it as solid as some would have us believe? Why
does that matter?
Dr. Blair. China's long-standing policy is that its nuclear forces
would only be employed in retaliation to a nuclear attack against
China. It would not resort to their use in a conventional conflict as
long as its adversary refrains from using nuclear weapons.
China's force levels and posture reflect a commitment to `minimum
deterrence' requiring a small number of nuclear forces capable of
riding out a nuclear attack and striking back in retaliation against
the aggressor. It's rejection of first use is evident in the historical
record in which China does not marry up its nuclear weapons to its
delivery vehicles during confrontations. It does not plan to prepare to
employ nuclear forces in a conventional conflict even if it is losing
on the battlefield.
The importance of this policy is that it bolsters nuclear stability
during a crisis or conventional war. If China is observed keeping its
nuclear weapons out of the fray, and not increasing launch readiness,
any adversary will be less tempted to preemptively or preventively
attack China's nuclear forces.
This policy historically has been very solid. The last time any
senior official or general raised the possibility of Chinese nuclear
first use was in 2005. This view was immediately quashed by the Chinese
leadership and no-first-use was reiterated as China's firm position.
There is scant evident of any cracks developing in this position
but as China's nuclear forces are modernized and as their capabilities
to rapidly increase launch readiness of these forces improves, the
Chinese may be tempted to expand their options beyond the current
minimal deterrence policy. This is one of the reasons why the Global
Zero report seeks the inclusion of China in a multilateral process of
arms reduction negotiations.
Mr. Rogers. 44) Please describe China's nuclear program, China's
aspirations as a nuclear power, and what that means for the Global Zero
recommendations in terms of extended deterrence in that region?
Dr. Blair. My answer above alludes to an across-the-board Chinese
nuclear modernization program designed primarily to ensure a survivable
deterrent force. China has a fleet of five new strategic submarines in
various stages of construction and deployment, and a serious effort to
deploy modern and capable mobile (truck-based) intercontinental
rockets. Both programs serve to improve China's second-strike
retaliatory capabilities.
China is also strengthening its safeguards against the unauthorized
use of nuclear weapons, a newfound confidence that may lead to
increasing launch readiness in peacetime.
On balance, however, China's military priorities lie in the
conventional and space arenas with a view to `area denial' of U.S.
conventional forces, e.g. aircraft carriers, which play a critical role
in the defense of Taiwan. Global Zero's focus is less on the question
of countering China's nuclear programs with countervailing U.S. nuclear
forces than on maintaining U.S. conventional superiority in region. The
Global Zero report emphasizes the enormous capability of the United
States to provide extended deterrence using conventional forces alone,
but also notes the need to invest in new conventional capabilities such
as a conventional ICBM in order to offset Chinese conventional and
space modernization.
Mr. Rogers. 45) Dr. Blair: Your report, Modernizing U.S. Nuclear
Strategy, Force Structure and Posture, states that ``Precision-guided
conventional munitions hold at risk nearly the entire spectrum of
potential targets, and they are useable.'' (p.2)
Given your assertion that conventional weapons can address ``nearly
the entire spectrum of potential targets'' addressed by nuclear
weapons, it seems reasonable to assume that such weapons should become
part of nuclear arms control negotiations.
a. Do you agree? If not, why not?
b. How many of these systems do we need to hold ``nearly the entire
spectrum of potential targets'' at risk? How much would that cost and
when could we deploy them?
c. As you know, Congress, the Senate in particular, has never been
particularly willing to fund conventional prompt global strike
capabilities. How does our inability to develop and deploy them affect
your illustrated reduction scenario?
Dr. Blair. 45a) In principle, if precision-guided munitions or
other conventional forces (or missile defenses) impact the nuclear
balance and strategic stability, then one could argue that they should
be included in some form of arms negotiations, either separately from,
parallel to, or integral to nuclear arms control negotiations. In
practice, PGMs in particular do not lend themselves to such constraints
inasmuch as their capabilities stem primarily from information and
intelligence processing, which cannot be meaningfully limited.
Quantitative limits on the number of specific weapons can be
envisioned, as can geographic deployment constraints. The achievement
of U.S. conventional superiority is not something to be bargained away,
however, if it lowers the nuclear threshold at which the U.S. would
resort to nuclear weapons to compensate for losing conventional
options.
45b) The United States has already massively substituted
conventional for nuclear weapons such that we can presently hold
practically the entire spectrum of key military targets at risk in
potentially hostile nations. Conventional forces now carry out missions
that only nuclear forces previously could perform. For example, as my
formal testimony asserted, U.S. tactical nuclear forces are no longer
needed to suppress North Korea's artillery threat to Seoul. The cost of
additional key capabilities such as conventional ICBMs requires further
analysis.
45c) The inability to deploy a conventional ICBM for the purpose of
prompt global strike would mean that certain targets, e.g. Chinese ASAT
facilities, will grow increasingly invulnerable to available U.S.
conventional-armed forces, e.g. B-2 bombers. This means that disabling
such facilities will require increasing numbers of U.S. bomber sorties
at growing risk to their crews. This would also mean that the nuclear
threshold would be lowered; in principle, the U.S. would need to resort
to a strategic nuclear missile to disable critical targets if
conventional forces cannot perform the mission.
Mr. Rogers. 46) Dr. Blair: Your Global Zero report, Modernizing
U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure and Posture, states that with
respect to making nuclear arms reductions a ``multilateral enterprise''
involving states other than the United States and Russia, ``the effort
will probably only succeed by starting with a dialogue with China and
others on matters of transparency and verification in particular.
Sharing information on numbers, types and locations of nuclear stocks
is a critical first step in laying the groundwork for formal arms
control talks.'' (pp. 3-4)
a. Since you assert that this is a ``critical first step,'' what
assurances can you offer that: 1) China and Russia will provide
accurate information? And, 2) that we have, in President Reagan's
famous phrase, the means not only to ``trust, but verify'' this
information?
Dr. Blair. 46a1) I cannot personally guarantee that China and
Russia would provide accurate information, but presumably they would
opt to refuse to provide information in the first instance if the
alternative is to provide false information and risk getting caught.
46a2) If the falsification of information is extensive, then U.S.
national technical means of verification offer a reliable means of
detecting that fact. Moreover, although our ability to detect a
particular falsehood cannot be assured, a party contemplating
submitting false declarations and disclosures could not be certain of
its ability to elude detection by the other parties at the table. In
general, the goal in the initial phase of discussions is to begin to
define a baseline of nuclear stocks that can then be gradually
investigated through intensified monitoring including onsite inspection
with a view to shrinking the band of uncertainty surrounding the
voluntarily submitted information.
Mr. Rogers. 47) Dr. Blair: Your report, Modernizing U.S. Nuclear
Strategy, Force Structure and Posture, states that ``Stockpiles of 500-
1,000 total weapons on each [U.S. and Russia] side are roughly the
level at which China could be drawn into the process. As more countries
join, it will become harder for the rest to remain on the sidelines.''
(p. 4)
a. Has the Chinese Government committed to being ``drawn into the
process'' if we reduce our nuclear forces to these levels? If they have
not why should we assume that they will? Indeed, if this were the case
it would seem their government would very much want to make such a
statement as a way of incentivizing the Russians and ourselves to
undertake further reductions--don't you agree?
b. And, if what you assert regarding the ability of precision-
guided weaponry to substitute for nuclear weapons, wouldn't the United
States also need to unilaterally drawn down its advantage in this area
as well in order to have China join in the process?
Dr. Blair. 47a) The Chinese recognize that the Global Zero movement
coupled to further sharp reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear
arsenals will increase pressure on China to join a multilateral arms
reduction negotiation. Their historical position on participation in
such a forum goes back to the early 1980s when the Chinese foreign
minister addressed the United Nations General Assembly and laid out the
conditions for joining such a negotiation--including preconditions such
as 50 percent reductions by the United States and Russia. Those
conditions have in fact already been essentially met. However, the
Global Zero commissioners have proposed that the next round of deep
bilateral reductions by the U.S. and Russia be linked to China's
acceptance of certain constraints on its nuclear arsenal--e.g.
accepting a cap of 300 total weapons in 2022--which by the way is the
maximum size of the Chinese arsenal projected out by a decade. (It
currently stands at fewer than 200.)
47b) The conventional balance between China and the U.S. and U.S.
allies in the region is relevant to the nuclear balance and to the
prospects of bringing China into multilateral nuclear arms
negotiations. Negotiations may well have to be extended into the
nonnuclear arena. The exact forum and approach to this set of issues
needs to be carefully considered. It's uncharted territory that calls
for creative thinking.
Mr. Rogers. 48) Dr. Blair: Is there any evidence either now or in
our historical experience to assume that when a country or group of
countries engages in unilateral disarming that other countries find it
``harder to remain on the sidelines?''
Dr. Blair. Global Zero commissioners are not so naive as to believe
that either unilateral or negotiated reductions will lead other
countries to follow suit. Each nation's assessment of its strategic
interest in acquiring, or divesting, nuclear weapons is complex and
unique. The example set by others may have little or no influence on a
particular nation's calculation of the purposes served by possessing
nuclear weapons, or its determination of the desired size of its
arsenal.
However, the massive unilateral stockpile reductions made by the
United States and Russia over the past two decades and negotiated deep
reductions proposed by Global Zero for the next decade strengthen their
hands in trying to persuade China and others--including key nonnuclear
states--to become stakeholders in nuclear arms control. It assists
diplomats in making the case for, and exerting pressure on, the hold-
outs to join the process. The historical disarmers--South Africa and
the four former Soviet republics that surrendered them--along with
major nations that abandoned their nuclear weapons programs such as
Brazil and Argentina--reinforce this pressure.
Mr. Rogers. 49) Dr. Blair, have you had any conversations with the
White House about the so-called Nuclear Posture Review Implementation
Study? a. When? b. What have you been told? c. Are you aware of what
options they have been considering? Can you enlighten this
subcommittee? We have been completely shut out of this process.
Dr. Blair. 49a,b,c) I have not had any direct conversations with
the White House about any details of the NPR Implementation Study. My
understanding is that several reduction options under consideration
ranged from a high of 1,000-1,100 deployed strategic weapons to be
implemented over a period of 5 years, to a mid-range of 700-800 such
weapons over a 10-year drawdown, to a low of 300-400 such weapons
within 15 years. These cuts and other reductions of nondeployed nuclear
warheads would constitute an overall cut of 50 percent of the overall
stockpile. The de-alerting options included one that would reduce the
launch-readiness of U.S. strategic forces and require 48 hours to bring
them to immediate launch-ready status.
One idea put forward in the internal process would have all of
these options linked together in a time-phased reduction over a 15-year
period, and to incorporate the phased reductions into the forthcoming
Presidential Decision Directive (i.e., Presidential Nuclear Guidance)
so that future cuts would be pursued by succeeding presidents unless a
new Nuclear Posture Review were conducted and new presidential nuclear
guidance issued to halt the drawdown. I expect that otherwise the
forthcoming PDD on nuclear forces will not depart significantly from
past guidance in terms of targeting and related force posture matters.
I expect it to endorse the Triad, the launch on warning option, the
first-use option, the requirement to be able to conduct full-scale
nuclear operations against Russia and China simultaneously, and holding
at risk WMD forces, leadership, and war-supporting industries in
Russia, China, North Korea, Iran and Syria. I expect it will end the
targeting of chemical facilities in Russia and China, though perhaps
not such facilities in Syria. I also expect that it may assign missile
defenses the task of defeating limited nuclear missile strikes by
Russia or China.
Mr. Rogers. 50) The President said at the State of the Union
address last month that, ``we will engage Russia to seek further
reductions in our nuclear arsenals . . . because our ability to
influence others depends on our willingness to lead.''
a. Dr. Blair, would you please explain just who has been following
the President's leadership? Put another way, with our unilateral
reductions under the New START treaty, who has followed us in reducing?
As you know, Russia was already below two of the three ``central
limits'' of the New START treaty upon entry into force of the treaty.
Dr. Blair. This statement from the State of the Union address
reflects the historical reality that the United States has been the
strong leader in the instigating nuclear arms reduction negotiations
and other nuclear security efforts such as the Nunn-Lugar program.
Regarding the New START Treaty, President Obama took the lead in
starting those negotiations with former President Medvedev and he now
is enlisting President Putin's support for starting the next round.
Within the context of the New START reductions schedule, Russia has
taken the lead in the sense that it is ahead of the required drawdown
schedule, and the United States is following this lead.
Mr. Rogers. 51) Dr. Blair, in the recent Global Zero report, it was
stated that ``this illustrative agenda with its deep cuts and de-
alerting would strongly validate the Non-Proliferation Treaty and help
preserve it in the face of challenges by North Korea, Iran and other
prospective proliferators.''
a. Can you describe in detail, and with specificity, how further
nuclear reductions by the United States and Russia (if Russia is
interested) will strengthen the Non-Proliferation Treaty and deal with
the nuclear threats of Iran and North Korea? Specifically, what will
other states (be specific as to which states) do to stop the spread of
nuclear weapons if we only reduce our nuclear weapons further.
Dr. Blair. By ratifying the NPT, the United States and Russia
assumed a legal obligation to reduce and eventually eliminate their
nuclear arms--the disarmament pillar of the Treaty. It is an obligation
under international law that cannot be ignored. The nonnuclear weapons
signatories of the NPT also expect the nuclear weapons states to
undertake other steps related to nuclear disarmament such as ratifying
the CTBT and lowering the launch readiness of nuclear forces.
To the extent that the United States, Russia and other nuclear
weapons states demonstrate their commitment to the NPT disarmament
agenda through deep cuts and de-alerting and other steps, the greater
the onus on the nonnuclear weapons states to remain nonnuclear and the
greater their commitment to the enforcement of the NPT--e.g.,
preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons and rolling back North
Korea's weapons capabilities. Without this backing from the nonnuclear
weapons countries, the risks of proliferation will grow.
Mr. Rogers. 52) Dr. Blair: Do you agree with the finding of the
2010 Nuclear Posture Review that ``fundamental changes in the
international security environment in recent years--including the
growth of unrivaled U.S. conventional military capabilities, major
improvements in missile defenses, and the easing of Cold War
rivalries--enable us to fulfill those objectives at significantly lower
nuclear force levels and with reduced reliance on nuclear weapons''?
a. So how do the Budget Control Act and Sequestration change this
calculus? Combined, we are spending $1 trillion less over a decade on
procurement, acquisition, operations and maintenance. For example, we
can't sortie or refuel aircraft carriers under the President's
sequester. Doesn't this mean, if the logic of the NPR holds true, that,
the assumption we can rely on our conventional capabilities and
conventional deterrent, should be reconsidered?
Dr. Blair. The defense budget cuts under the sequester affect both
nuclear and conventional forces to a degree that is difficult to gauge
at this time. If U.S. conventional capabilities erode significantly as
a result, then U.S. reliance on nuclear options could well grow
somewhat. The major determinant of this reliance, however, will likely
be the international security environment and U.S. security relations
with Russia and China. If these relations continue to improve, leading
for instance to stronger regional security and peace in Asia, then the
United States will require less conventional and nuclear capabilities.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. COOPER
Mr. Cooper. 53) Have improvements to yield or accuracy in reaching
targets changed the targeting requirements and/or reduced the number of
nuclear weapons required?
Dr. Payne. I cannot comment on U.S. plans for nuclear targeting. It
is however, a mistake to believe that weapon requirements to meet
targeting plans are the same as the requirements necessary for
deterrence. U.S. targeting plans and the weapons required to support
those plans can be revised by the appropriate U.S. process. But,
deterrence requirements are determined by the opponent's calculations
and the composition of the opponent's most highly valued assets. The
number, lethality and diversity of U.S. weapons necessary to threaten
those assets set the requirements for deterrence. These requirements
may or may not be reflected in U.S. targeting plans. For deterrence
purposes, U.S. targeting plans must be determined by the composition of
opponents' most highly valued assets and the forces necessary to hold
them at risk, not the number of weapons preferred by the political
leadership for other purposes.
Mr. Cooper. 54) How can we reduce the risk of miscalculation in a
crisis?
Dr. Payne. We can reduce the risk of miscalculation in a crisis by
having, prior to a crisis, the most realistic, clear-eyed understanding
possible of the opponent and context and multiple channels of
communication with the opponent. In the midst of a crisis, reliable
communication and mutual understanding between contending parties is
unlikely, but may be aided by a solid foundation of long-standing
mutual understanding and communication prior to the crisis. Achieving
such a level of understanding and communication demands a long-term,
multidisciplinary intelligence and diplomatic undertaking vis-a-vis
each prospective antagonist. In addition, strategic defenses may help
to protect against miscalculation and the possible failure of
deterrence by providing a defensive response to apparent threats rather
than offensive actions. The role of U.S. missile defense in the context
of recent North Korean nuclear missile launches and threats is an
example of this benefit.
Mr. Cooper. 55) What are the risks and benefits of having ICBMs on
high-alert?
Dr. Payne. The benefits of having ICBMs on high-alert include
giving the President as much time as possible to assess an evolving
crisis and to use that time prudently before making a decision in a
high stress situation. In addition, no potentially provocative and
time-consuming realerting steps are required that an adversary might
observe and take as a sign of an imminent attack by the United States.
Keeping the ICBM force on high alert, which is relatively inexpensive,
avoids the need to increase force readiness during a crisis and the
danger that a de-alerted force could tempt an enemy's first strike
strategy by presenting a target set that is easier to strike than would
otherwise be the case. Also, the current number of ICBM silos and alert
rate may help afford the option of launch under attack rather than a
launch on warning strategy, which I consider to be dangerous. In
general, alert ICBMs are ``stabilizing.''
In addition, an alert ICBM force contributes to the assurance of
allies, while a de-alerted force would be a source of allied concern.
This concern is understandable: allies, who rely on the U.S. extended
nuclear deterrence for their protection against nuclear or biological
attack are unlikely to find great assurance in a U.S. deterrent threat
that is unable to respond to a horrific attack for 72 or more hours.
Telling U.S. allies under nuclear or other WMD attack that they would
need to wait three days for the U.S. deterrent is unlikely to inspire
allied confidence in the U.S. nuclear umbrella. This situation would
likely encourage some allies to seek their own independent deterrent
capabilities.
As to the risk, reported safeguards in the command and control for
ICBMs--the use of authorization codes, the two-person rule, and dual
phenomenology for tactical attack warning, for example--reduce the risk
of unauthorized or accidental missile launches. I agree with former
USSTRATCOM Commander, Adm. Richard Mies on this issue. In the spring of
2012, he wrote `` . . . the oft-cited characterization that our
strategic forces are on 'hair trigger' alert is a scare tactic
routinely used to justify proposals to lessen the potential
responsiveness of our strategic forces. In fact, multiple stringent
procedural and technical safeguards are in place to guard against
accidental or unauthorized launch and to ensure the highest levels of
nuclear weapon safety, security, reliability, and command and
control.'' (ref: Undersea Warfare, Spring 2012, p. 17)
Mr. Cooper. 56) What kind of nuclear force structure do you believe
we should have today, if we could choose the ideal force structure
today, rather than relying on legacy force structure?
Dr. Payne. To support U.S. deterrence and extended deterrence
purposes, the U.S. nuclear force structure should be survivable,
flexible, diverse and resilient, and thus adaptable to a wide spectrum
of prospective deterrence contexts and requirements. As such, it should
enable the President to adjust U.S. declared deterrence threats to the
specific types and numbers of targets demanded by a diverse and
shifting line up of opponents and contexts. It also should provide the
President with numerous types of limited threat options to help
minimize any prospective use of force should deterrence fail initially.
A great advantage of the traditional U.S. nuclear triad is that it
helps to provide this type of survivable, flexible and diverse force
structure, as can multiple warhead types capable of holding at risk a
wide spectrum of prospective targets. The force structure also should
be highly survivable to help preclude any opponent from seeing possible
advantage in striking at U.S. deterrent forces.
The U.S. strategic force structure also should include active and
passive defensive capabilities to help reduce U.S. casualties and limit
damage in the event deterrence fails.
To support U.S. assurance goals, the force structure should possess
the lethality, quantity, and qualities that provide assurance to key
allies. Some allies have identified these characteristics from their
unique perspective, including:
An arsenal that is at least capable in size and scope
to Russia's strategic and tactical nuclear arsenal;
Nuclear forces that are deployed permanently to their
region or on their territory;
Nuclear forces that are rapidly deployable to their
region;
Forces that can be deployed discreetly or with great
visibility, as best fits the deterrence occasion; and,
Warhead designs that include very low-yield and
earth-penetrating options.
Finally, U.S. forces should be well-protected and under positive
and enduring political control to help ensure no theft or unauthorized
use. Similarly, it should help provide the President with the maximum
amount of decision time possible to help preclude any pressure toward a
rush to employment.
Mr. Cooper. 57) Has Russia reciprocated in the past when the United
States has pursued ``unilateral'' reductions? What are the risks and
benefits of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) as a way to
pursue reciprocal reductions?
Dr. Payne. The Obama administration recently unilaterally
eliminated U.S. TLAM-N (nuclear-armed cruise missiles) systems, despite
concerns expressed by a key ally, without any apparent reciprocation by
Russia. Russia committed to the 1990-1991 PNIs. These include specific
restrictions on tactical nuclear weapons. However, Russia, according to
its own official statements, is in violation of its PNI commitments.
The primary risk of such attempted reciprocal reductions is that
the U.S. will consider such reductions to be prudent on the mistaken
presumption that Russia would agree to them and abide by its
commitment. Russia may agree to reciprocal reductions, but not abide by
that commitment. This is the result already seen with the earlier PNIs.
Mr. Cooper. 58) What are your thoughts on more cost-effective
alternatives for U.S. nuclear deterrence that could assure our allies
of the U.S. strong commitment to nuclear umbrella, given the $8-10
billion cost for the life extension program of the B-61 nuclear bomb?
Is there value in opening a dialogue with NATO countries on potential
cost-effective measures for ensuring strong and reliable extended
deterrence?
Dr. Payne. There certainly is value in continuing dialogue within
the NATO alliance regarding the requirements for deterrence and
assurance. The recent consensus NATO document on the subject publicly
endorsed continuation of the dual capable aircraft (DCA)/B-61 posture
and committed the alliance to consensus decisions on this matter. It
certainly is reasonable to demand that the B-61 LEP cost be reduced to
the extent feasible. However, given the established alliance
infrastructure for this system, and its general acceptance with the
alliance, I do not know of any plausible alternative posture that would
obviously be less costly and also meet alliance-wide deterrence and
assurance requirements. Identifying alternatives to the DCA/B-61
posture is not a challenge. But identifying alternative postures that
could satisfy NATO deterrence and assurance requirements, and do so
more cost-effectively, is the material question.
Mr. Cooper. 59) Dr. Payne: You noted in your disclosure form that
you were appearing in an individual capacity and thus did not provide
any information on Federal grant contracts (the other witnesses
provided this information with Dr. Krepinevich listing his
organization's grant contracts, and Dr. Blair noting he did not receive
any). Please list the Federal grant contract information sought on the
disclosure form (Federal grants for FY2011-2013 and Federal contract
information, including number of contracts with the Federal Government,
Federal agencies with which the contracts are held, list of subjects of
the contracts, and aggregate dollar value of these contracts), relating
to the National Institute for Policy and Public Policy (of which you
serve as President and co-founder).
Dr. Payne. As noted in the question, I appeared in an individual
capacity. Indeed, in my opening remarks I stated specifically that the
views I presented were my own and not those of any institution with
which I am affiliated. As such, I will reply as did Dr. Blair and
report that I have no Federal grants or contracts and had none in FY
2011 or FY 2012.
Mr. Cooper. 60) Have improvements to yield or accuracy in reaching
targets changed the targeting requirements and/or reduced the number of
nuclear weapons required?
Dr. Krepinevich. The answer to this question depends on classified
information--in particular information on our existing nuclear
capabilities and targeting strategies, as well as the capabilities and
strategies of potential adversaries. What can be said, however, is that
advances in accuracy generally contribute to increased counterforce
capabilities, or the ability to target enemy military forces and
infrastructure. Nevertheless, improved accuracy can be offset in
several ways by a determined adversary; for instance by increasing the
mobility of potential targets, hardening potential targets, or fielding
``active'' defenses such as counter-air and antiballistic missile
systems. In short, improved accuracy can have an important but not
necessarily an enduring effect on force structure requirements and
strategy. There will always be a dynamic competition under way between
the U.S.'s ability to hold at risk targets that an opponent values and
efforts by opponents to better defend those targets from attack.
Mr. Cooper. 61) How can we reduce the risk of miscalculation in a
crisis?
Dr. Krepinevich. In general, the likelihood of miscalculation
during a crisis is influenced by several factors: first, how accurately
a nation understands its rival's decision calculus, namely how that
rival calculates cost, benefit, and risk; second, the ability to
communicate threats, demands, and promises clearly; and third, the
nation's ``track record,'' or its reputation for upholding its past
commitments. To the extent that the United States can reduce the risks
of miscalculation, therefore, it should make a dedicated effort to
better understand potential opponents, take steps to ensure that clear
lines of communication are available even during periods of heightened
tension; and make good on its threats to take action when an adversary
crosses its ``red lines.''
Mr. Cooper. 62) What are the risks and benefits of having ICBMs on
high-alert?
Dr. Krepinevich. According to open-sources, the United States
maintains the overwhelming majority of its ICBMs on high-alert status,
meaning they can be launched almost immediately after (or upon
unambiguous warning of) an attack. Traditionally, the prompt response
capability of the ICBM force has contributed to deterrence by providing
added certainty that an aggressor would suffer an immediate and
devastating retaliation. Today, however, the prospect of a massive
``bolt from the blue'' attack appears remote, which has led some to
argue that ICBMs should be ``de-alerted.'' Proponents of changing the
alert status of the ICBM force also maintain that the dangers of
unauthorized use and miscalculation are far too high; namely, missiles
might be launched absent orders from the national command authority
(NCA), or the NCA might be compelled to launch an immediate reprisal in
response to ambiguous indicators and warnings, respectively. There are,
however, several reasons to be skeptical about the virtues of de-
alerting. First, multiple procedures are in place to guard against
unauthorized use. Most importantly, launching ICBMs requires
authenticating launch codes that can only be authorized by the NCA.
Second, the miscalculation argument essentially suggests that because
the United States can launch its ICBMs in a matter of minutes, it might
do so. It is far more likely, however, that the United States would
adopt a retaliatory (rather than launch on warning) posture, except in
response to a massive and unambiguous nuclear attack. In sum, de-
alerting ICBMs would likely have a minimal impact on strategic
stability, and could have a negative impact on deterrence.
Mr. Cooper. 63) What kind of nuclear force structure do you believe
we should have today, if we could choose the ideal force structure
today, rather than relying on legacy force structure?
Dr. Krepinevich. Despite the fact that today's nuclear force
structure is a legacy of the Cold War, in many ways it remains well
suited to meeting current and prospective security challenges. In
particular, even if it were possible to design a new force structure
from scratch, the triad of strategic delivery systems that has
underpinned nuclear deterrence for half a century is still highly
relevant given the unique attributes of each leg. The ballistic missile
submarine (SSBN) fleet, for example, provides an extremely survivable
and responsive retaliatory capability; the bomber force offers a high
degree of visibility and flexibility; and the ICBM force creates a
targeting problem for any potential opponents contemplating a first
strike, because they would have to expend a large number of nuclear
weapons to neutralize a relatively small portion of the U.S. nuclear
arsenal. To the extent that planned modernization initiatives proceed,
therefore (most importantly fielding a new long-range bomber,
developing a successor to the Ohio class SSBN, and continuing life-
extension programs to maintain the viability of the Minuteman III
ICBM), the United States can retain a highly capable nuclear arsenal
well into the future.
Mr. Cooper. 64) Has Russia reciprocated in the past when the United
States has pursued ``unilateral'' reductions? What are the risks and
benefits of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) as a way to
pursue reciprocal reductions?
Dr. Krepinevich. The unilateral nuclear reductions announced by
President George H.W. Bush in 1991, aimed at reducing the U.S. arsenal
of forward-deployed tactical nuclear weapons, symbolized the dramatic
change that had taken place in U.S.-Soviet relations at the end of the
Cold War. Although Mikhail Gorbachev (and subsequently Boris Yeltsin)
pledged to respond in kind, there are reports that Moscow has not
upheld its commitment to destroy certain classes of tactical nuclear
warheads. To what extent, then, might these unilateral initiatives
provide a basis for reciprocal U.S. and Russian nuclear reductions in
the future? In general, two observations are worth making. First, there
is an inherent dilemma in unilateral reductions of any kind. On the one
hand, small, symbolic reductions intended to demonstrate good faith and
encourage reciprocity are rarely meaningful in a military sense, and
therefore may not lead others to follow suit. On the other hand, the
large, meaningful reductions that might be necessary to encourage
reciprocity can be quite dangerous if others choose not to respond in
kind. This dilemma makes the notion of unilateral, reciprocal
reductions a difficult model for informal arms control. Second,
unilateral reductions--particularly unilateral reductions in tactical
nuclear weapons that do not have large signatures--can be difficult to
monitor and verify, because they lack the enforcement provisions
contained in formal arms control agreements.
Mr. Cooper. 65) How can further nuclear weapons reductions beyond
New START strengthen national and security?
Dr. Krepinevich. Perhaps the only way that further nuclear
reductions beyond the levels outlined in New START would unambiguously
strengthen U.S. national security is if they were multilateral in scope
(i.e., if all existing and prospective nuclear powers participated),
made in such as way as to preserve the United States' existing
quantitative and qualitative advantages relative to other nuclear
powers (e.g., through proportional reductions), and rigorously
verifiable. Beyond this extremely unlikely set of conditions, any
future reductions are likely to be so small that their impact on U.S
national security (for better or worse) would be marginal, or so large
that they would raise legitimate concerns that U.S. national security
would be harmed more than helped.
Mr. Cooper. 66) What are your thoughts on more cost-effective
alternatives for U.S. nuclear deterrence that could assure our allies
of the U.S. strong commitment to nuclear umbrella, given the $8-10
billion cost for the life extension program of the B-61 nuclear bomb?
Is there value in opening a dialogue with NATO countries on potential
cost-effective measures for ensuring strong and reliable extended
deterrence?
Dr. Krepinevich. Although the cost of the B-61 life extension
program is substantial, it is important to note that the purpose of
this effort is not solely to preserve our nuclear guarantees to NATO
partners. Specifically, this program seeks to modernize tactical
nuclear weapons delivered by dual-capable combat aircraft (which
underpin extended nuclear deterrence in Europe) and strategic nuclear
weapons delivered by dual-capable bombers.
Mr. Cooper. 67) Have improvements to yield or accuracy in reaching
targets changed the targeting requirements and/or reduced the number of
nuclear weapons required?
Dr. Blair. Improvements in the accuracy of U.S. nuclear weapons
have increased their lethality and enabled U.S. planners to decrease
the yield of the weapons and the number of weapons aimed at the same
target. However, the dominant factor today in reducing the number of
U.S. warheads required to cover the target set--apart from the steady
reduction in the size of the Russian nuclear arsenal, which shrinks the
target set--is the revolutionary improvement in surveillance and
intelligence collection. For instance, better intelligence on the
target set such as on the entryways to hardened command bunkers has
reduced the number of aimpoints and reduced the number of U.S. weapons
assigned to strike such targets. Similarly, to the extent that the
location of mobile missiles in the field (out of garrison) in Russia
and China can be pinpointed through real-time surveillance, then the
fewer weapons required to barrage the area to offset the `position
location uncertainty' of the mobile targets.
One of the other main factors today in setting requirements and
allocating warheads is the reliability of the U.S. strategic missile
force. For instance, U.S. planners are generally forced to assign two
warheads to attack each opposing nuclear missile silo in order to
ensure that one of them arrives on target if the other one proves
unreliable.
Mr. Cooper. 68) How can we reduce the risk of miscalculation in a
crisis?
Dr. Blair. The best way to reduce the risk of miscalculation in a
crisis is to improve warning and intelligence, and above all to
increase the amount of warning and decision time. Under the current
U.S. nuclear posture, which depends on launch on warning in the event
of a large-scale Russian attack, the time allowed for information
processing and decisionmaking from the top to the bottom of the chain
of nuclear command would be measured in minutes and seconds. Emergency
war order (EWO) decisionmaking and execution are driven by checklists
and such short deadlines that the process is aptly characterized as the
enactment of a prepared script. The risks of premature intentional
launch, launch on false warning, mistaken launch based on erroneous
intelligence and warning, and unauthorized launch remain very real
today.
The Global Zero report chaired by Gen. (ret.) Cartwright and co-
authored by then-Senator Hagel addressed this issue by recommending
that U.S. and Russian missiles be taken off of launch-ready alert. De-
alerting steps would be adopted that require 24-72 hours to reverse.
The amount of warning and decision time would thus be increased from
minutes to days.
Mr. Cooper. 69) What are the risks and benefits of having ICBMs on
high-alert?
Dr. Blair. The risks of having ICBMs on high-alert are numerous.
First, they create `use or lose' pressures on the national command
authorities on both sides because neither U.S. nor Russian missiles (in
silos, in garrison garages, or hiding in the field in the case of
dispersed mobile ICBMs) could survive an attack by the opposing side
unless they are launched on warning of incoming warheads minutes before
the warheads arrive. The pressures exerted on the President and the
rest of the chain of command would be severe and would increase the
risks of an inadvertent nuclear exchange. In projecting a crippling
first strike threat at each other, these forces inject instability into
a crisis.
ICBM launch circuits may also be vulnerable to cyber warfare. ICBMs
on high alert are ready to fire in seconds and only need to receive a
short stream of computer signals to cock their warheads, ignite their
rocket motors, and blast out of their silos. Keeping them on hair-
trigger alert in an era of sophisticated cyber warfare invites
catastrophe. The Russian rockets are also kept at instant launch
readiness. At a recent Senate hearing, the current head of Strategic
Command was asked whether cyber hackers could trigger a Russian rocket
launch, whose aimpoint might be New York City. His answer: I don't
know. With the help of insiders in possession of passwords and other
codes, it is likely that the firewalls sealing off the launch circuits
of both countries' nuclear missiles could be breached.
ICBMs and their launch centers and crews are themselves sitting
targets for terrorists or others to attack or infiltrate. Launch crews
routinely ignore a cardinal nuclear safety and security rule: the
multiton blast door protecting the underground center may not be opened
by a crew member when the other is sleeping. That rule is fudged when,
for instance, a crew member calls topside for a thermos of coffee to
stay awake while his or her crewmate snoozes during the 24-hour alert
stint.
This transgression might help enable outsiders to gain access to
the launch center, and to its super-secret codes, the result of which
would be an increase in the risk of unauthorized launch or of
compromising critical codes whose wholesale invalidation might become
necessary to prevent unauthorized launches. Such invalidation might
effectively neutralize for an extended period of time the entire U.S.
strategic nuclear arsenal and the President's ability to launch
strategic forces while the Pentagon scrambles to reissue new codes.
As for the benefits of keeping ICBMs on high-alert, one may be
their responsiveness and potential ability to be fired so quickly than
an adversary could not be confident in delivering a knock-out punch to
the opponent's ICBM force. However, as noted above, the flip side of
the `benefit' are the liabilities associated with having to fire these
forces quickly by necessity lest incoming warheads destroy them on the
ground. All these scenarios apply to a U.S.-Russian exchange only,
which is the least plausible scenario today. U.S. ICBMs would have to
fly over Russia to reach targets in other countries--China, Iran, North
Korea. These polar routes are to be avoided. Thus the ICBMs high launch
readiness offers scant benefit in confrontations with any other country
besides Russia.
Mr. Cooper. 70) Dr. Blair: You noted in your testimony the
discovery in the 1990s of an electronic back door to the Naval
Broadcast network that could have been exploited by outside hackers to
inject a launch order into the VLF (Very Low Frequency) radio network
used to transmit launch directives from the Pentagon to Trident
ballistic missile submarines on launch patrol. How was this discovered
and what is the risk and consequence of adversaries finding and using a
vulnerability of the command and control system?
Dr. Blair. The discovery of an electronic back door to the Trident
force was discovered during an intensive investigation in the mid-1990s
by a nuclear fail-safe commission headed by the late Amb. Jeanne
Kirkpatrick. Dozens of deficiencies that increased the risk of
unauthorized use of nuclear weapons were discovered by this commission,
leading to significant strengthening of safeguards--e.g. new locks
installed on Trident launching components, and new protocols for
Trident crews to authenticate launch orders.
The risks and consequences of adversaries exploiting deficiencies
in nuclear command and control systems essentially boil down to two
general dangers. First, an unauthorized actor--a state or even a group
or individual--could inject false missile attack warning information or
a launch order itself into the communications network and trick
commanders into ordering or carrying out a launch. Second, the
penetration of the nuclear command control system could compromise the
codes used to arm and fire nuclear weapons, and the resulting
invalidation of the codes could thwart the ability of the President to
command the U.S. nuclear arsenal. Both of these general dangers would
be significantly aggravated if a corrupt `insider' assisted outsiders
in breaching the command, control, communications, and early warning
networks.
Mr. Cooper. 71) What kind of nuclear force structure do you believe
we should have today, if we could choose the ideal force structure
today, rather than relying on legacy force structure?
Dr. Blair. The Global Zero Nuclear Policy Commission report
``Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure, and Posture''
(May 2012) outlines a nearly optimal nuclear force structure and
posture for the next decade. The force structure would consist of 900
total weapons. It utilizes legacy forces such as Trident SSBNs and B-2
strategic bombers that would contribute to U.S. national security and
to strategic stability, and it eliminates legacy forces such as
Minuteman ICBMs, B-52 strategic nuclear bombers and tactical nuclear
weapons that contribute less. The commission also recommends
diversifying the U.S. deterrent forces to include missile defenses and
a conventional ICBM. The ideal force structure would improve upon some
of the features of retained legacy forces, but mainly it would provide
for much longer warning and decision time, and would greatly reduce the
risks of inadvertent launch stemming from today's extremely short
warning and decision times. Security and stability in the nuclear arena
stem more from strong command and control systems than from the size
and technical characteristics of the forces.
Mr. Cooper. 72) Has Russia reciprocated in the past when the United
States has pursued ``unilateral'' reductions? What are the risks and
benefits of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives (PNIs) as a way to
pursue reciprocal reductions?
Dr. Blair. It is important to remember that the vast majority of
nuclear cuts during the nuclear era--75 percent reductions in U.S. and
Russian stockpiles since their peak of 70,000 weapons in the mid-
1980s--were made unilaterally by both sides. No arms agreements ever
regulated the size of their total stockpiles. START agreements have
only covered one category of weapon--deployed strategic--which
represented a fraction of the total stockpiles. So both countries
pursued unilateral stockpile reductions in parallel, without
verification provisions for the most part, and this informal reversal
of the nuclear arms race should be recognized as having contributed
hugely to the vast reductions on both sides.
PNIs were a part of this informal process though they were more
specific in the sense that the parties pledged to eliminate and reduce
some specific categories of weapons. They contributed to a dramatic
reduction in overall stockpile sizes even though some weapons that the
Russians pledged to eliminate did apparently remain in their arsenal.
This discrepancy has generated accusations of Russian cheating that has
spoiled the otherwise positive effects of these parallel reciprocal
measures. Without a `contract' agreement between the parties and
verification provisions, PNIs are susceptible to misinterpretation,
ambiguous compliance, and political strains.
One of the great benefits of the 1991 PNIs was the speed with which
they were informally adopted and carried out. It took months rather
than many years to downsize the arsenals under the PNIs. It is
important to keep in mind that the main purpose of the 1991 PNIs was to
improve the security of Russian nuclear weapons by giving President
Gorbachev an excuse to return Russia's far-flung tactical weapons to
Russia, and to consolidate them at storage locations that strengthened
security over them. The goal was not to slash the size of the arsenals
so much as to prevent them from falling into the hands of neighboring
states or terrorists.
Mr. Cooper. 73) How can further nuclear weapons reductions beyond
New START strengthen national and security?
Dr. Blair. Further nuclear arms reductions beyond New START can
serve U.S. national security interests in innumerable ways, beginning
with the fact that fewer weapons in Russia mean fewer possibilities for
inadvertent or unauthorized nuclear strikes against the United States
and potentially less damage if such strikes occurred. More importantly,
further reductions that draw China and other nuclear weapons states
such as Pakistan and India into negotiations to cap, reduce, or
otherwise constrain their arsenals would bring stability and regulation
to dangerous regions of the world, and help thwart further
proliferation and nuclear terrorism. It is critical to bring these
other states to the negotiating table. The alternative is further
proliferation, growing arsenals, new nuclear arms races, and growing
risks of an intentional or unintentional outbreak of nuclear violence.
It is manifestly in the U.S. national interest to prevent such
outcomes, and multilateral cooperation involving all the nuclear
weapons states including those outside of the NPT (Pakistan, India, and
Israel) in constraining nuclear arms is critical to preventing a
nuclear catastrophe that deeply undermines U.S. and international
security.
Mr. Cooper. 74) What are your thoughts on more cost-effective
alternatives for U.S. nuclear deterrence that could assure our allies
of the U.S. strong commitment to nuclear umbrella, given the $8-10
billion cost for the life extension program of the B-61 nuclear bomb?
Is there value in opening a dialogue with NATO countries on potential
cost-effective measures for ensuring strong and reliable extended
deterrence?
Dr. Blair. I doubt whether America's allies' perception of the U.S.
commitment to their defense depends at all on the status of the B-61
life extension program. Our NATO allies have the guarantee of NATO-wide
protection led by the United States and her overwhelming conventional
superiority backed up by a strategic nuclear capability capable of
deterring any rational leader. Reallocating the $10 billion earmarked
for B-61 LEP to shoring up U.S-NATO conventional capabilities during a
time of defense budget austerity might do more to reassure the allies.
This is an important topic for dialogue with America's allies.
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