[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-136]
CREATION AND IMPLEMENTATION
OF THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR
SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
JUNE 27, 2012
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio, Chairman
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama RICK LARSEN, Washington
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia RON BARBER, Arizona
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
Drew Walter, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Professional Staff Member
Eric Smith, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2012
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, June 27, 2012, Creation and Implementation of the
National Nuclear Security Administration....................... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, June 27, 2012......................................... 13
----------
WEDNESDAY, JUNE 27, 2012
CREATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
WITNESSES
Aloise, Eugene, Director, Natural Resources and Environment, U.S.
Government Accountability Office............................... 4
Brooks, Amb. Linton F., Senior Advisor, Center for Strategic and
International Studies, Former Administrator, National Nuclear
Security Administration........................................ 1
Kuckuck, Dr. Robert W., Former Principal Deputy Administrator,
National Nuclear Security Administration, Former Director, Los
Alamos National Laboratory..................................... 3
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Aloise, Eugene............................................... 41
Brooks, Amb. Linton F........................................ 22
Kuckuck, Dr. Robert W........................................ 34
Sanchez, Hon. Loretta........................................ 20
Turner, Hon. Michael......................................... 17
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Thornberry............................................... 59
Mr. Turner................................................... 59
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Heinrich................................................. 88
Mr. Langevin................................................. 87
Ms. Sanchez.................................................. 75
Mr. Turner................................................... 63
CREATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY
ADMINISTRATION
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, June 27, 2012.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:35 p.m., in
room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael R.
Turner (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Turner. Call to order the Strategic Forces
Subcommittee. We are going to be under a severe time constraint
because votes are occurring at approximately around 4:00, and
when they do, they are going to be a very long series, and then
all the Members have an obligation after that. So we're going
to do a real short compression; both the ranking member and
myself are going to waive our opening statements and merely put
them into the record.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the
Appendix on page 17.]
[The prepared statement of Ms. Sanchez can be found in the
Appendix on page 20.]
Mr. Turner. I want to recognize Ron Barber of Arizona, who
is our new member. We welcome you.
And we would like to immediately then turn for opening
statements to our panel members with the prospects of maybe
doing some 2-minute rounds of questions, so as people have
things, they might be able to get to theirs. So, Ambassador
Brooks, we will begin with you.
STATEMENT OF AMB. LINTON F. BROOKS, SENIOR ADVISOR, CENTER FOR
STRATEGIC AND INTERNATIONAL STUDIES, FORMER ADMINISTRATOR,
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Sanchez, members of this committee. I have submitted a detailed
statement, and what I am going to do is make a series of
assertions which I hope that statement either amplifies or
backs up. I am going to describe the situation through January
2007 when I left the NNSA [National Nuclear Security
Administration]. I am not qualified to speak in detail about
today.
NNSA was formed in the belief that reforms, especially in
security, would be impossible within the Department of Energy
bureaucracy as it existed at the time. In standing up NNSA we,
or at least I, had three broad objectives: first, to streamline
the organization, avoid duplication, and clarify roles and
responsibilities of Federal officials; second, to restore the
appropriate division of labor between the national labs and
their Federal overseers. We believed, and I believe today, that
the right relationship is for the Government to decide what to
do and the laboratories to decide how to do it. And, third, to
establish the appropriate degree of autonomy within the
Department of Energy. And we adopted the term ``semi-
autonomous,'' which is not what the legislation actually says,
to describe what we were seeking.
We started by trying to correct the organizational
inefficiencies and clarify responsibilities, and while that is
a never-ending process, I think we made significant process--
progress, which I have detailed in my statement.
We were much less successful in establishing the proper
balance in oversight, especially at the national laboratories.
In part this was because we failed utterly at developing an
acceptable common understanding with DOE [Department of Energy]
on what semi-autonomy meant. And I have provided a fair amount
of additional detail on that point in my detailed prepared
statement.
Now, what lessons should the committee draw from our
experience? First, I think our broad approach was right then
and I think it's right now, but the effectiveness of a semi-
autonomous NNSA is too dependent on the personalities and
preferences of officials outside of the organization.
Competent, dedicated people can make any organization work, and
virtually all NNSA senior officials and all DOE senior
officials are both dedicated and competent. But the present
arrangement required, at least in my day, constant effort from
senior officials, and thus diverted them from focusing on the
mission. Ultimately, as I said in a statement I submitted for
an earlier hearing, I believe NNSA will need to be made a
stand-alone organization.
Secondly, clear lines of authority and accountability are
made more difficult by the number of external bodies to whom
the administrator is in some sense accountable. Separating NNSA
from the rest of DOE will solve part of that problem, but it
won't solve all of it. There will still be the Defense Board,
the Congress, the GAO [Government Accountability Office], the
White House, somebody's Inspector General.
And finally, if the Congress wants, as I believe it should,
the relationship between NNSA and the laboratories that I
described as part of our vision, it has to guard against the
tendency when problems arise to ask why Federal overseers
didn't find the problem in advance and prevent it through more
detailed audits and more detailed inspections.
The pressure, which in fairness has not primarily come from
this committee, at least when I was doing this, makes it more
difficult for us to preserve the important distinction between
the Government responsibility to say what is to be done and the
laboratory leadership responsibility to determine how to do it.
Thank you, and after you have heard from my colleagues, I
look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Brooks can be found in the
Appendix on page 22.]
Mr. Turner. Thank you. Doctor.
STATEMENT OF DR. ROBERT W. KUCKUCK, FORMER PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, FORMER
DIRECTOR, LOS ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY
Dr. Kuckuck. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez,
members of the committee, thank you for inviting me this
afternoon. I also have submitted a written statement, and I
have a few comments to make here, and I will abbreviate them,
given the time constraint we are under. My comments come from
40 years at the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory under DOE, 2
years helping the Ambassador and General Gordon as we laid out
NNSA, and then returning 5 years later to be the director of
Los Alamos to work under NNSA. So I have a very dimensioned
view of what we have been through.
I was going to talk a little bit about our vision in
setting the organization up. I think I will skip over that
since it is in written material, and you have reports to the
Congress prior to this. I would only say that I think we did
make progress early on, but it was very clear even then that
this was going to be a project that required years of effort,
continual leadership, and that was even assuming that we were
going to be in a semi-autonomous organization, which didn't
happen.
Let me jump forward to the 2 years I spent at the Lawrence
Livermore Laboratory--excuse me, at the Los Alamos Laboratory
in 2005 and 2006. When I arrived, it wasn't long to see that
the vision that we had in mind had not been achieved. To my
disappointment, I found the working environment there to be at
least as burdensome as it was in my experience at Livermore a
decade before that and, unfortunately, even more adversarial.
Tasking was coming from various parts of the Federal
Government and from various levels of the Government. Some of
it was explicit, which of course required unnecessary work and
expense from my judgment, but much was implicit; and implicit
to me were taskings that we got because of the site office
withholding approval documents in a frustrating bring-me-
another-rock kind of exercise. It was exhausting and costly.
There was implicit tasking coming from site office members
making--Federal employees making comments to the staff at the
laboratory, and from the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board who had permanent representatives on site at Los Alamos
also making comments to the staff, so that the staff was sort
of being told don't go there, we are not going to approve it
when the time comes.
The implicit tasking embedded inefficiencies and lost
opportunities as laboratory employees invented workarounds,
compromises to avoid conflicts with these overseers. I saw many
examples that cost millions of dollars and many months and
months of delay. I am still serving on advisory boards to all
three nuclear weapons laboratories, and so I have a strong
perception that things have not improved since I left Los
Alamos.
I have looked at your legislation, H.R. 4310. To me it
feels a little bit like an attempt to legislate the vision that
we indeed had back in 2001. Frankly, I think that vision was
really management 101, with responsibilities clear and so
forth.
Will your bill be enough? I am skeptical. It may be
probably necessary, but may be insufficient. I think it is very
difficult to legislate the trust, the teamwork, the judgment,
the leadership, the balance of risk and mission that is so
sorely needed in the endeavor we have today. However, I think
it is possible to legislate conditions that will facilitate
achieving those ideals.
It has been clear to me in my almost 50 years in this
enterprise that the DOE laboratory management relationship has
been deteriorating for several years now, maybe back to the
days of the tiger teams; year by year, step by step, rule by
rule, contract by contract.
The creation of NNSA was an attempt to reverse this trend.
I personally believe it has failed to do so. I also am
concerned that perhaps we have reached or are nearly reaching
the tipping point where the solution by partial organization
change won't be possible.
I thank you. I will be happy to answer questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Kuckuck can be found in the
Appendix on page 34.]
Mr. Turner. Mr. Aloise.
STATEMENT OF EUGENE ALOISE, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENT, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Aloise. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Sanchez, and
members of the subcommittee, I am pleased to be here today to
discuss the creation and implementation of NNSA. Today my
remarks will focus on NNSA's early experiences, organizing and
operating as a separately organized agency within DOE, and
NNSA's progress in correcting longstanding problems.
For years before NNSA was established, external studies
found problems with the organization and operation of what is
now NNSA's principal organization, DOE's Office of Defense
Programs. These studies cited continuing problems in the areas
of overall management, organization, priority setting, and
maintenance of a viable infrastructure and workforce.
In short, Mr. Chairman, prior to the enactment of Title 32,
DOE's organization was a mess, with no clear lines of
authority. The budget for weapons activities was in two big
buckets of money that were sent to the labs and plants with
little or no transparency and accountability for what it was
being spent on. Title 32 allowed NNSA to step back and come up
with something better.
While we continue to identify problems with NNSA's budget
processes, the current budget structure is a vast improvement
over what existed prior to the enactment of Title 32. Still, in
our view, NNSA has never been given a chance to work as the
Congress intended. After the enactment of Title 32, DOE and
NNSA struggled to determine how NNSA should operate as a
separately organized agency within the Department, largely
because there were no useful models in Government to follow.
Another complication was DOE's January 2000 implementation
plan which did not define how NNSA would operate within DOE;
instead, reflecting the opposition of the then-DOE leadership
to the creation of NNSA, the implementation plan dual-hatted
virtually every single statutory position in NNSA with DOE
officials. This practice caused concern about NNSA's ability to
function independently.
Also the lack of formal agreements between DOE and NNSA in
a number of key areas, such as budgeting and procurement and
interpersonal disagreements led to conflicts that prevented
effective organizations--operations.
Specifically, in January 2007 we reported on the conflict
between NNSA and DOE's counterintelligence offices. In the case
of both dual-hatting and the counterintelligence dispute,
Congress had to step in and correct the situation. Since then
NNSA has made considerable progress in resolving longstanding
management deficiencies and security weaknesses.
However, major improvements are still needed in NNSA's
management of major projects and contracts, and vigilance is
needed in the area of security to ensure that improvements are
sustained. In some areas NNSA is viewed as a success.
Importantly, it has continued to ensure that the nuclear
weapons stockpile is safe and reliable without underground
testing. Nevertheless, NNSA still struggles to define itself as
a separately organized agency within DOE, and the management
problems that exist have led to calls to increase NNSA's
independence from DOE.
We continue to believe, as we concluded in our January 2007
report, that while reforms are needed, drastic organizational
changes are necessary and questioned whether such changes would
solve the agency's remaining management problems. Having said
that, GAO stands ready to assist the Congress and this
subcommittee in looking for ways to ensure more effective
management of NNSA's programs and contractors.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks. I would be happy
to address any questions you or the ranking member or any other
member of the subcommittee may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Aloise can be found in the
Appendix on page 41.]
Mr. Turner. Thank you. I think what we will do is we will
do one round of 2-minute questions if that is okay with
everyone, and that way everybody hopefully will get an
opportunity to speak. And I'll start.
In the initial statements, there has been a lot of
referencing of what the semi-autonomous nature of NNSA was
supposed to accomplish. Right-sizing, reinvigorating the staff,
reducing burden, employee numbers. Employee numbers have gone
back to the same level that they were prior to NNSA. On the
administration side, we have not one life extension program
that's on track.
Mr. Aloise, you said, you know, they have got progress and
success. Not one life extension program is on track. The fact
that they have been able to certify that it is safe and
reliable is not because of refurbishment and life extension. It
has been because, you know, obviously some of the legacy work
has been done, but not one of the life extension programs is on
track.
I was wondering if everyone could speak for a moment about
semi-autonomy. Ambassador Brooks, you said it should be
absolutely independent, but it appears that semi-autonomous
failed. What was--what--in saying that it failed and we need to
go autonomous, why hasn't semi-autonomous worked? And, Mr.
Aloise, when you get to your portion, I'd like you to give me
that context of how we can consider this success when not one
life extension program is on track. So there are calls for a
number of groups, besides just the two gentlemen sitting here,
who are independent groups who have indicated that perhaps they
should be fully autonomous. Speak for a moment about the semi-
autonomy and what it was to achieve and why it can't. And then,
Mr. Aloise, if you would give us the contrast, because you
don't believe that how semi-autonomous could be working when
not one life extension program is on track. Ambassador Brooks,
2 minutes.
Mr. Brooks. There are two sets of problems, structural and
cultural. Structurally, example: the Clinger-Cohen Act and the
relationship between having an integrated information system
and a semi-autonomous NNSA worked out by good people working
together, but you can't have one department directed from two
people.
Example: environmental cleanup at NNSA sites. The
responsibility of the Assistant Secretary for Environmental
Management, who lacks the legal authority to direct NNSA sites.
I tried to move that responsibility to NNSA and was not able to
convince the Congress in the first term, and my own Secretary
in the second term, to support that. So we had a workaround
which was Byzantine, probably wouldn't have stood up to a
legal----. Example: number of duplicating functions----
Mr. Turner. Ambassador, I am going to ask you to finish
your statement for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 59.]
Mr. Turner. Doctor and Mr. Aloise, 30 seconds apiece.
Dr. Kuckuck. Thirty seconds. I won't be as erudite as my
learned colleague here, but I believe that it never was given a
chance to happen. I believe that we never left DOE in the whole
process. The oversight of rules were all the same, felt the
same, and I don't think anybody believed we were going to see
something different.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Aloise, how can we call it a success when
not one life extension program is on track?
Mr. Aloise. Well, my point was that we have a safe,
reliable stockpile, and that is a success. But you are
absolutely right about the life extension programs; and there
is more than that. There are the major projects that are
problematic.
Mr. Turner. Very good, thank you. Ranking Member.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Chairman. Mr. Aloise, when the NNSA
was formed, the defense nuclear facilities remained under
independent health and safety oversight of the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board. So based on your experience, was that
a good decision at the time? Why or why not? And do you think
that the NNSA defense nuclear facilities should still remain
under independent oversight by the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board, or do you think it would be a better decision to
place those facilities under the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
regulation?
Mr. Aloise. Well, GAO is on record promoting external
regulation of DOE facilities. DOE self-regulates itself now. So
we believe in a strong, independent regulatory function.
Ms. Sanchez. And I would ask--thank you, Mr. Aloise. And I
would ask all the witnesses: Has the oversight of the nuclear
complex improved as a result of the NNSA, the oversight of the
overall? Ambassador?
Mr. Brooks. In some areas yes, in some areas no.
Ms. Sanchez. Could you denote very quickly what some might
be for ``yes'' and what some might be for ``no''?
Mr. Brooks. Security is clearly better, safety is no worse,
but we haven't removed the burden on the labs. Nuclear safety
and the Defense Board, the relationship is not, was not when I
was there, working well. That is separate from saying what a
better relationship would be on which--but there was too much
mission creep from the board.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you. Doctor.
Dr. Kuckuck. I would say that the board did both. I think
in the early stages it certainly brought a stronger safety
culture to the laboratories' nuclear facilities. Operations
are--conduct of operations are much more formal, employees are
much safer, ISSM [Integrated Safeguards and Security
Management] is embedded, but I think it is now past its day and
it has become a point of when is enough enough. The balance is
gone, and I think that the NRC [Nuclear Regulatory Commission]
would look to me as a more balanced model to then put our
nuclear weapons labs under.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Doctor. And Mr. Aloise.
Mr. Aloise. As I mentioned, we are in favor of external
regulatory oversight. That would be a model that we have
considered.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Ms. Sanchez. Again, too, because of
the constraint of time, what we are going to do is we will get
to everyone, you will get to ask your question, we will start
the clock at 2 minutes, and then we can submit all the other
questions for the record.
Mr. Thornberry, you are next.
Mr. Thornberry. Just to follow that for a second.
Ambassador, and then Doctor, would you describe what you
believe the proper relationship should be between Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, if any, or if it should be
replaced by the NRC as far as this independent outside
oversight of these NNSA facilities? How should that be
structured? Because that has been one of the biggest issues.
Mr. Brooks. My goal when I was administrator was to make us
completely indifferent to that. I told the Secretary I was
working so that his successor--because I thought it would take
me at least 4 more years--was able to say the board is no
longer necessary, we are doing the job well. We didn't succeed
in that. Not clear whether we can succeed.
I think the safety board or some external agency needs to
provide a check on the operation of the Department. I think it
needs to do so considering, first, getting the mission done--I
mean, you can be perfectly safe if you stop working--and
avoiding mission creep through asking for information.
Mr. Thornberry. And let me just interject. That's the
issue. Defense, the board, doesn't have any responsibility to
get anything done. And so part of the problem that people
complain about is you have somebody who can put up a red card
and stop everything, but they have no accountability for making
anything happen.
Mr. Brooks. I agree with that, sir, and that was
frustrating to me. On the other hand, the board was created
because the Department was all screwed up, and I am not sure I
want to look you in the eye and say I had made everything all
better.
Dr. Kuckuck. I would think that relationship should be,
should start from a clear and reasonable set of requirements
that are designed in some collaborative form so that everybody
understands where they are coming from, but the oversight
organization should have the authority for the final design of
those requirements. I think then that the oversight should be
done by monitoring performance against those clear standards,
and I think that areas of nonperformance should be a more
collaborative approach to be resolved, but again the oversight
has to be authoritative and in place.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Aloise, if you have comments on this, you
could submit them to the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 59.]
Mr. Turner. Turning to Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Gentlemen, I
appreciate your testimony today.
Ambassador Brooks, the PFIAB report found that DOE and
the--quoting--``the DOE and the weapons laboratories have a
deeply rooted culture of low regard for and at times hostility
to security issues, which has continually frustrated the
efforts of its internal and external critics, notably the GAO
and the House Energy and Commerce Committee. Therefore, a
reshuffling of the offices and lines of accountability may be a
necessary step toward meaningful reform, but it most almost
certainly will not be sufficient. Even if every aspect of the
ongoing cultural structural reforms is fully implemented, the
most powerful guarantor of security at the Nation's weapons
laboratories won't be laws and regulations or management
charts; it is going to be the attitudes and the behavior of the
men and women who are responsible for the operation of the labs
each day. So these will not change overnight, and they are
likely to change only in a different cultural environment, one
that values security, adds a vital and integral part of the
day-to-day activities and believes it can coexist with
science.''
So with that, can you talk about the, you know, whether or
not there is sufficient progress on increasing accountability,
at least, and what challenges remain to improve accountability
and cost-effectiveness?
Mr. Brooks. At least on the Federal side, I think we have
made lines of responsibility, and therefore accountability,
clear.
I guess I would push back, sir, on the idea that the
laboratories, as I knew them, didn't care about security. The
problem--there is a cultural problem, but the cultural problem
is not about security but about security through detailed
procedures. The same type of problem exists in the safety area.
And that would be fine, except we know that if you don't have
detailed procedures, things screw up.
So the culture that we are building in slowly, I think
there is actually a demonstrable improvement in that, as Dr.
Kuckuck mentioned, but I think that I erred in believing that
we could change that culture more rapidly than we have been
able to.
Dr. Kuckuck. I would agree with the Ambassador. I think the
attitudes of the laboratory scientists are very much in line
with improved safety and procedures to the degree the
procedures are appropriate. I think, unfortunately, the
attitude now, we are at risk of straining this success that we
have already achieved because the oversight is now so
oppressive and past the limit of a good balance that I think
the attitudes are now turning toward the overseers rather than
against safety itself.
Mr. Langevin. So let me ask the panel this question: Was
NNSA a good idea?
Mr. Brooks. Somebody has got to answer. Yes. It was worth
trying. It may still be worth trying. It hasn't worked as well
as we hoped.
Dr. Kuckuck. Quite agree.
Mr. Aloise. Absolutely, yes.
Mr. Turner. Your time has expired. Turning to Mr. Rogers.
Mr. Rogers. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Doctor, in your opening statement you made reference to
deterioration of the lab under DOE, and you thought that it may
be beyond the point of redemption. Can you expand on what you
meant by that?
Dr. Kuckuck. Yes, sir. I didn't mean to make the point that
you heard in that. What I was referring to was the management
relationship between the DOE and the laboratory was
deteriorating. The laboratories were not deteriorating at all.
Mr. Rogers. Okay. Thank you. That is all I have, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Dr. Fleming.
Dr. Fleming. Yes, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Kuckuck, your prepared statement references problems
caused by, quote, implicit tasking resulting from such
behaviors as withholding the necessary approval documents and
frustrating, bring-me-another-rock exercises. It kind of sounds
to me like there are a lot of authorities but none with enough
authority to control the process. Can you elaborate on your
metaphor, give me a better idea of what you are trying to
explain?
Dr. Kuckuck. I would almost react to your statement by
saying I think there is too much authority implicit at all
turns of the laboratories' surrounding oversight space. An
extreme example of that that I saw while I was at the
laboratory, that I will make very short, given the time, is the
laboratory had a significant amount of nuclear material located
at a certain place that we were using to conduct a program. And
as we continued every year to raise the bar on security
demands, the Department decided--the NNSA decided that they
wanted those put in a more secure place. There was an amount of
material that would take a couple of years to package and
process and remove, and the new site was going to be the Nevada
Test Site. We felt that the 2 years of sitting where it was
wasn't appropriate, so we came up with an idea of putting a
small parking lot inside the PIDAS [Perimeter Intrusion
Detection and Assessment System] in the nuclear plutonium
facility, TA-55, move these four SST [Safe Secure Trailers]--
certified vehicles for carrying the stuff around the Nation
every day--move four of those in place, put the material in
there, and work from them safely stored in there for this 18
months or so. That is what we started out with for a million
dollars.
The safety board didn't like that, continued to push back,
and a year later we ended up with a category 2 nuclear
facility, which was a pad of cement three foot deep,
seismically qualified, with a roof over it in case lightning
didn't hit these trucks that had been moving around the
country, on and on and on, at a result of a $7 million cost
instead of a $1 million cost. And ironically, the entire year
we sat there doing that, the material sat in the area that was
considered inappropriate in the first place.
Dr. Fleming. So, really, trying to satisfy too many bosses,
too many authorities.
Dr. Kuckuck. Exactly.
Dr. Fleming. Requiring overlapping authorities that are
contradictory in some cases.
Dr. Kuckuck. The final decision has to be an approval from
the site office, but it is clear that direction is coming from
all sectors and interfering with that process.
Dr. Fleming. Thank you.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Brooks.
Mr. Brooks of Alabama. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Recurring
security problems within the Department of Energy were a major
factor in the creation of the NNSA.
This is a question for any or all of you to answer. Why was
the Department of Energy unable to get a handle on these
security problems without congressional intervention, part one;
part two, how effective and what has NNSA done to correct these
security issues?
Mr. Brooks. Why the Department couldn't get a handle on it
before I think is demonstrated in the President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board report, and there is an
organization chart in there which will convince you that nobody
using that organization chart could get a handle on anything.
We, after some false starts for a variety of reasons, came
up with the appropriate organizational level and the right
people, so that at least we had coherent security oversight.
On physical security I think--of course, the bar got raised
considerably after 9/11--that we have made substantial
progress. Information security has been harder. We've made some
progress. We have simplified some requirements. I think this
security, sir, is frankly something you just keep working on.
If you believe there is a time when you have fixed it, you will
find you are wrong. You have to just keep working on it.
I think we have substantially improved security. That is
not saying that there are not still problems.
Mr. Brooks of Alabama. Do either of the other two witnesses
have any insight they are able to share?
Dr. Kuckuck. I could add nothing to that.
Mr. Aloise. I would say ineffective Federal oversight and a
culture that initially didn't value security, those two
combinations led to a lot of the security breaches. Many of
them severely impacted our national security. We seem to be at
a level now where security is at a right place as far as we can
tell. But Linton is correct, we need to be vigilant to make
sure those safeguards stay in place.
Mr. Brooks of Alabama. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. We appreciate that throughout all
the testimony, and even in your discussion, Mr. Aloise, there
is a recognition that the status quo is unacceptable, that
there are failures in the performance of NNSA. We are grappling
with the issue of what then is the answer. As we look to
questions that we are going to be submitting to the record, we
look forward to your additional information that you might
provide us as we try to, you know, offer some solutions as to
how that may be addressed.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 59.]
Mr. Turner. Thank you. We will be adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 4:09 p.m. the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
June 27, 2012
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PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
June 27, 2012
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Statement of Hon. Michael Turner
Chairman, House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
Hearing on
Creation and Implementation of the National Nuclear Security
Administration
June 27, 2012
Good afternoon and welcome to today's hearing on the
``Creation and Implementation of the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA).''
This hearing is part of the subcommittee's continuing
oversight of governance and management issues related to NNSA
and our nuclear security enterprise. As many of you here today
undoubtedly know, this subcommittee has spent considerable
effort over the past year to better understand these problems
and determine appropriate remedies. We are gravely concerned
about the overwhelming number of studies and reports that have
identified the same serious problems at NNSA and the Department
of Energy--including reports that NNSA is ``broken,'' that
``science and engineering quality is at risk'' at the nuclear
weapons labs, and that ``it is time to consider fundamental
changes'' to the entire organization and construct.
As part of the subcommittee's broader efforts, this hearing
will take a detailed look at the past. With the help of our
witnesses, we will explore the history that led up to the
creation of the NNSA in 1999 and 2000, the congressional intent
behind creating NNSA, and the early years of implementation of
the NNSA. Ultimately, we hope that the witnesses can help us
answer several questions that are important for the future:
LDid implementation of NNSA achieve the vision of
a ``separately organized'' and ``semi-autonomous'' organization
with significant freedom of action from the Department of
Energy (DOE)?
LCan a ``semi-autonomous'' structure work?
LWhat lessons should we learn from the
implementation of NNSA, and how should we apply those lessons
as we look to address the continuing problems that sound eerily
similar to those that NNSA was intended to fix?
Given their deep experience from many different angles of
this issue, our witnesses are well-equipped to help us with all
of this. They are:
LAmbassador Linton F. Brooks, Senior Advisor,
Center for Strategic and International Studies, Former
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration;
LDr. Robert W. Kuckuck, Former Principal Deputy
Administrator, National Nuclear Security Administration, Former
Director, Los Alamos National Laboratory; and
LMr. Eugene Aloise, Director, Natural Resources
and Environment, Government Accountability Office.
Gentlemen, thank you for joining us today.
Reviewing your prepared statements, as well as some
information provided by the staff, I was struck by how, at one
point in its early years, NNSA seemed to be headed in the right
direction. At the senior levels within NNSA, the intentions and
the actions seemed to be to implement the intent of the NNSA
Act and create agile, efficient, and effective operation.
A case in point is the February 2002 Report to Congress on
the Organization and Operations of the NNSA. This report
contains action plans to streamline and clarify roles and
reporting relationships; right-size Federal staff; clarify the
nature and operations of NNSA's semi-autonomous nature; and
lift administrative burdens through streamlining policies,
procedures, and staffing. In short, this appears to have been a
real plan for creating the NNSA that was actually intended by
the NNSA Act.
So the question is: Where did it get off track and why?
Because we have many, many reports by independent groups that
it has gotten very off track. For instance, the bipartisan 2009
Strategic Posture Commission said:
L``Despite some success, the NNSA has failed to meet
the hopes of its founders. Indeed, it may have become
part of the problem, adopting the same micromanagement
and unnecessary and obtrusive oversight that it was
created to eliminate.''
That same year, a bipartisan report by the Stimson Center
said:
L``The implementation of the NNSA Act failed to
achieve the intended autonomy for NNSA within the
Department of Energy. The Labs now must operate within
a complicated set of bureaucratic relationships with
both DOE and NNSA.''
Looking at the history, it is apparent that the non-NNSA
portions of DOE (in his statement, Ambassador Brooks calls it
``Big DOE'') have fought to restrict NNSA's autonomy from the
very beginning. First we saw President Clinton's signing
statement and the ``dual-hatting'' of DOE officers into senior
NNSA positions. But that particular problem was eventually
overcome, thanks to vigorous oversight by the HASC Special
Oversight Panel led by Rep. Thornberry and Rep. Tauscher. But
DOE meddling remained, and appears to remain to this day.
Ambassador Brook's prepared statement indicates that even
if senior DOE leaders were on board with the concept of NNSA,
many DOE staff were decidedly not. The ambassador's statement
gives one example:
L`` . . . the then-[DOE] General Counsel objected
strongly to my approach. As I understood her
objections, she believed that the NNSA Act provision
was inappropriate and that NNSA should have no
flexibility that was not available to any other element
of the Department.''
A General Counsel has no authority to decide what law is
inappropriate--this is merely defending bureaucratic turf. This
is indicative of the larger problem: The DOE bureaucracy fought
against even limited autonomy for NNSA, despite clear
congressional intent with the NNSA Act. More recent evidence
indicates this trend continues.
Dr. Kuckuck's prepared statement highlights what I think is
the key issue for any solution we pursue: How do we change an
entrenched and deeply bureaucratic culture? Dr. Kuckuck says:
L`` . . . change of the magnitude envisioned with the
creation of the NNSA was obviously a daunting challenge
that would involve more than just principled redesign
of organizational structure and procedures. It would
require a fundamental change in the underlying culture
of the entire enterprise.''
I agree. Changing the culture will require bold action,
followed by strong and committed leadership for years
afterward. Both Dr. Kuckuck and Ambassador Brooks suggest that
full autonomy is needed for NNSA. They seem to suggest--based
on their experience as senior leaders at NNSA and in the
nuclear security enterprise--that the semi-autonomy construct
will not work. I hope both witnesses will comment on what
particular experiences and evidence from the early years of
NNSA and more recent years makes them recommend this course of
action.
Mr. Aloise and GAO have conducted oversight on NNSA since
its beginning, and noted in a 2007 report that DOE and NNSA
have struggled to determine how NNSA should operate as a
separately organized agency. Mr. Aloise's prepared statement
notes that NNSA has made considerable progress in some areas,
but remains sorely deficient in others. But Mr. Aloise also
disagrees with the testimony of our other two witnesses--as
well as the reams of reports from independent groups--on
whether NNSA should be made fully autonomous from DOE. I hope
to explore that judgment during the discussion period.
We must find a way out of this mess. Our nuclear deterrent
requires an effective and efficient steward. In the FY13
National Defense Authorization Act, the House has put forward
reasonable and prudent solutions that are well founded in the
findings of myriad experts and commissions. Now we look to
others, including the Administration, for their own proposals.
A letter that Chairman McKeon and I sent to President Obama 6
weeks ago seeking his solutions remains unanswered. While we
wait, my hope for this hearing is that by looking to the past,
we can help find a clear way forward to the future.
Thank you again to our witnesses for joining us today--we
look forward to the discussion.
Statement of Hon. Loretta Sanchez
Ranking Member, House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
Hearing on
Creation and Implementation of the National Nuclear Security
Administration
June 27, 2012
Before we turn to the topic of today's hearing, I would
like to extend a warm welcome to Congressman Ron Barber of the
eighth district of Arizona who has joined the House Armed
Services Committee and the Strategic Forces Subcommittee.
I would like to join Chairman Turner in thanking our
witnesses, Ambassador Linton Brooks, Dr. Robert Kuckuck, and
Mr. Aloise, for being here today.
Chairman Turner, our Committee members, and I are committed
to the success of NNSA, the nuclear complex, and its National
Security mission.
As we discuss the reasons for creating the National Nuclear
Security Administration, its implementation and the way ahead,
I would like to emphasize three key points.
LFirst, this remains a critical time for NNSA
and the nuclear weapon laboratories and the production
complex. As we examine oversight and management, our
priority and focus must remain a safe, secure, and
reliable nuclear arsenal and urgent nonproliferation
efforts. Having in place a cost-effective and robust
structure to support the cutting-edge science and
engineering that underpin these efforts, is paramount.
Improvements for more effective oversight, stronger
accountability measures, clearer lines of authority,
and setting clear requirements and guidance, remain
necessary. These changes require strong leadership and
an improved culture of excellence at NNSA. However, I
am concerned that efforts to push for a fully
independent NNSA at this time may pose an unacceptable
risk of detracting from the focus and important
missions at hand. We cannot risk NNSA losing focus from
life extension programs, and the construction of
billion-dollar facilities. We must proceed carefully
and deliberately in adding value to the process of
improving NNSA.
LSecond, I would also like to raise the issue
of cost. The Administration is investing--and the
Congress has supported--unprecedented levels of funding
for the nuclear weapons complex. The FY 2013 budget
request of $7.6 billion represents about a 20% increase
over 2010 levels, when many other programs are being
cut. At a time of fiscal crisis and scarce resources,
we must put in place robust governance and management
structures to avoid budget and schedule overruns. This
is all the more important for billion-dollar projects.
And we must seek opportunities for improving efficiency
within NNSA, DOE, and across the nuclear complex to
drive down costs. A November 2011 Department of Energy
Inspector General report on Management Challenges at
the Department of Energy made some initial
recommendations on this issue.
LThird, strong independent oversight, for
example by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
(DNFSB) and the Department of Energy's Office of Health
Safety and Security, to preserve a safe environment for
our scientists and workers at the facilities, remains
crucial. We must have appropriate independent oversight
in place to avoid the kind of accidents that plagued
the nuclear complex in the past and for correcting
current safety deficiencies. I am concerned about the
growing tendency to cast unwarranted blame on the DNFSB
and other independent reviews (including those mandated
by Congress) that maintain high standards for safety.
Accidents can and do happen, as illustrated by the
tragic events at Fukushima and Deepwater Horizon. A
nuclear accident, even a minor one, would have
significant repercussions on the future of the nuclear
weapons complex. That is a consequence that we would
all like to avoid. Creating and maintaining a strong
safety culture is key to ensuring a safe, secure, and
reliable arsenal.
Thank you for sharing your insights on the creation of the
NNSA to inform our oversight. In conclusion, as we look ahead I
look forward to hearing your thoughts on:
1) Leffective oversight, contract structure, governance
and management--including transparency, accountability,
and clear lines of authority;
2) Lthe need for a process that ensures safety for
workers and the public; and
3) Lwhether the structure is set up to incentivize
savings, maximize investment in programmatic work,
avoid uncontrolled cost escalation and schedule delays,
set priorities, and enable competition.
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?
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
June 27, 2012
=======================================================================
RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Brooks. I believe I was able to present the structural problems
during my testimony and have no examples to add. The cultural problems
are more difficult. Most Federal civil servants, like most human
beings, want to believe that they are making a difference. The
Department of Energy is fortunate to have an experienced and dedicated
workforce. It has proven difficult for some of them to accept that
things that they have done for a lifetime they should now no longer do
in the name of something called ``semi-autonomy.'' Many working level
officials of the non-NNSA parts of the Department tend to believe that
it is an error for them to no longer be involved with NNSA. This is
true even in areas (such as five year budgeting) where NNSA was clearly
the leader within the department. Perhaps the most striking example of
this tendency is in the legal area. Federal lawyers quite properly
regard their job as protecting senior officials, especially the
Secretary. It is very difficult for them culturally to accept that
legal organization (such as the office of NNSA's General Counsel) over
which they have no control can be consistently relied on to provide
appropriate legal services in areas for which they feel responsible.
The structural problems I observed are almost certainly amenable to
solution, although the integrated nature of the Department of Energy
information technology is particularly challenging. The cultural
problems, however, may not be solvable and are the strongest argument
for greater autonomy for NNSA. [See page 6.]
Mr. Aloise. We have not performed an organizational culture
assessment of NNSA. However, organizational culture experts generally
agree that an organization's beliefs and values affect the behavior of
its members. In previous work [GAO: Organizational Culture: Techniques
Companies Use to Perpetuate or Change Beliefs and Values, GAO/NSIAD-92-
105, (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 27, 1992).], we have found that (1)
experts agree that an organization's decision to change its culture is
generally triggered by a specific event or situation and is a long-term
effort that takes at least 5 to 10 years to complete and (2) company
officials believe that the two key techniques for a successful culture
change are the top management's total commitment to the change and
training that promotes and develops skills related to the company's
desired values or beliefs. In addition, the organizations we reviewed
indicated that effecting successful cultural change requires a
combination of many techniques, including (1) distributing a written
statement of values and beliefs; (2) creating a management style that
reinforces the desired values and beliefs; (3) offering rewards,
incentives, and promotions to encourage behavior that reinforces those
beliefs; (4) holding company gatherings to discuss those beliefs; (5)
developing an organizational structure that is compatible with those
beliefs; (6) using systems, procedures, and processes to support
organizational values; and (7) using stories, legends, myths, and
slogans to communicate those values and beliefs. In our view, a
dramatic organizational change will be disruptive in the short run. In
addition, dramatic organization change that is not supported by the
other activities listed above may not be effective in changing
organizational culture. [See page 11.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY
Mr. Aloise. We recommended in October 2008 that if DOE's Office of
Health, Safety, and Security (HSS) does not take appropriate action to
meet the criteria for independent oversight as defined in our report
[GAO, Nuclear Safety: Department of Energy Needs to Strengthen Its
Independent Oversight of Nuclear Facilities and Operations, GAO-09-61
(Washington, D.C. Oct. 28, 2008).], the Congress should consider the
following:
permanently establishing in law the responsibilities of
HSS, or
shifting DOE to external regulation by:
providing the resources and authority to the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board to oversee all DOE nuclear
facilities and to enforce DOE nuclear safety rules and
directives, or
providing the resources and authority to NRC to
externally regulate all or just newly constructed DOE nuclear
facilities.
Appendix V of this report assessed the options for external
regulation of DOE's nuclear facilities, either by the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. As
discussed in this appendix, shifting responsibility for external
regulation to either of these organizations appears practical, if they
are given the necessary authority and resources. We reported that the
Nuclear Regulatory Commission had not expressed a view on expanding its
oversight role beyond the DOE facilities already subject to its
regulation. DOE and the Safety Board have taken issue with this option
because of concerns about the transition costs versus the likely safety
benefits of doing so. [See page 8.]
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
June 27, 2012
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. 1) Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, does having
detailed procedures and very prescriptive processes help or hinder
safety? What about security? Does having detailed procedures and very
prescriptive processes lead to improvements in safety culture or
security culture? How does detailed, transaction-level oversight impact
efforts to improve safety, security, and associated cultures?
Mr. Brooks. I believe there is considerable evidence that detailed
procedures for complex operations help improve safety. There is,
however, no evidence that attempting to prescribe such procedures from
headquarters is useful. Transaction level oversight risks descending
into micromanagement and shifts the perceived responsibility from those
conducting the procedures to those overseeing them. Thus I believe that
for both safety and security, the appropriate function of oversight is
to ensure that the local plant or laboratory has provided appropriate
procedures and has a system to ensure their consistent and effective
use.
Mr. Turner. 2) Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, as mentioned in
my prepared opening statement, NNSA's February 2002 report to Congress
on how it would operate and be organized contains many indications that
NNSA was headed in the right direction--that it was preparing to
implement the intent of the NNSA Act. The report lists a series of
actions it would take to ``lift administrative burdens through
streamlining policies, procedures, and staffing.'' This included an
``objective of reducing by half the administrative workload imposed by
policies, procedures, and guidance,'' and plans to ``reengineer core
business practices and right-size and reinvigorate federal staff.''
Do you believe implementation of this February 2002 plan was
successful? Why or why not?
Was the objective of ``reducing by half the administrative
workload imposed by policies, procedures, and guidance'' achieved? Why
or why not?
Was the Federal staff ``right-sized and reinvigorated'' as
the report indicated?
-- Budget documents indicate that NNSA's Office of the
Administrator started at around 1,940 employees in FY2002, was reduced
to less than 1,700 by FY2005 through streamlining initiatives, but is
now back at above 1,900. Why did the Federal workforce numbers bounce
back to pre-NNSA levels, despite all of the effort at streamlining?
All of the reports we read and experts we talk to seem to say
that the administrative bureaucracy has only gotten worse. How and
where did we get off track?
Mr. Brooks. I lack the detailed knowledge to comment on
developments within NNSA since I left in 2007. I believe that during my
tenure we made substantial progress on ``right-sizing and
reinvigoration.'' As detailed in my prepared testimony, however, we
were never fully successful in establishing NNSA's autonomy from the
broader Department of Energy.
Mr. Turner. 3) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise,
NNSA's February 2002 report to Congress states the NNSA and the
Secretary of Energy agreed to a streamlined independent oversight
process for NNSA. Basically, DOE's Office of Independent Oversight and
Performance Assurance would consolidate DOE's oversight of NNSA into a
single office.
Did this independent DOE oversight model work? Why or why
not?
Was this independent DOE oversight model really tried in
earnest? Is it still in place? If it is not in place, what is DOE's
current structural approach to oversight of NNSA?
Mr. Brooks. The intent of the February 2002 report was to save
staff resources by not requiring NNSA to establish its own independent
oversight organization. In principle, this was a good idea, but in
hindsight it has had unforeseen and unfortunate consequences. As I
indicated in my prepared testimony, NNSA's practice of using Department
of Energy-wide organizations (independent oversight, legal, etc.) made
it more difficult to establish semi-autonomy and thus to reduce
excessively prescriptive procedures. In theory, the DOE oversight
organization could simply have used to evaluate how well NNSA policies
and procedures were being implemented. In practice, however, the Office
of Independent Oversight and Performance Assurance became an obstacle
to our reducing and streamlining requirements.
I am not able to comment on current procedures within the
Department of Energy and recommend the committee seeks that information
from DOE and NNSA.
Mr. Turner. 4) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise,
NNSA's February 2002 report to Congress indicates that NNSA was
striving to become a true ``separately organized'' agency, and that
``where appropriate, NNSA is seeking autonomy, but it has negotiated .
. . the use of the DOE's staff to address NNSA needs, with the proviso
that DOE support staff function in accordance with an agreement that
ensures that NNSA priorities and standards are the basis of the
service.''
Ambassador, your prepared statement says that you now
``regret'' relying on DOE staff offices for support because it weakened
your ability to establish autonomy--and ``establishing such autonomy
became a major problem.''
-- Please explain why this form of ``semi-autonomy'' didn't work.
-- Do you believe this type of ``semi-autonomy'' can work at all,
or is full or much stronger autonomy necessary?
Dr. Kuckuck and Mr. Aloise, do you believe this concept of
semi-autonomy can work, or is full or significantly stronger autonomy
needed?
Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, NNSA has told us that it
is currently subject to 270 separate DOE orders, directives, and rules.
Does this fit the definition of ``separately organized'' and ``semi-
autonomous'' as you understood it during your time in the early years
of NNSA?
Mr. Brooks. Semi-autonomy did not work because organizations that
had department-wide responsibilities were unwilling (without
substantial and continuing effort by senior NNSA officials) to accept
the view that they need not exercise supervision over NNSA. This was a
perfectly understandable reaction from dedicated civil servants who
were convinced that they were adding value. Such an attitude, however,
made it difficult to implement our vision of semi-autonomy. Although we
did not fully realize it early in my tenure, there actually are no good
examples of semi-autonomy within the Federal Government on which we can
model an appropriate DOE-NNSA relationship. This leads me to conclude
that, while good people can make any system work to some degree, the
structural benefits of an independent NNSA are inconsistent with semi-
autonomy as it was actually implemented.
I do not believe that simply counting the number of Department of
Energy orders and other directives is a particularly useful measure of
how well a ``separately organized'' or ``semi-autonomous'' organization
is functioning. What is important is not the number of orders, but
their content. For example, when we did the pilot program at the Kansas
City Plant, we exempted the plant from a number of departmental
regulations. The Inspector General objected to our including a
departmental order that required cooperation with the Inspector General
functions. Whether that order did or did not apply to NNSA had very
little bearing on our functioning. The problem with the large number of
DOE orders is not the number per se but the prescriptive detail of many
of them.
Mr. Turner. 5) Ambassador Brooks, your prepared statement mentions
that ``clear lines of authority and accountability are made more
difficult by the number of external bodies to whom the Administrator is
in some sense accountable.'' As you know, one of the key reasons for
the NNSA Act was to clear up confused lines of authority and
accountability.
Did implementation of NNSA help clear this up? How?
Would you please describe all of the oversight that is
applied to the nuclear security enterprise, for instance on safety?
Do you think all of these layers contribute to inefficiency?
Do you think they add value, or are they duplicative and add minimal
benefit?
Mr. Brooks. I believe implementation of NNSA clarified lines of
authority and accountability. While there is considerable evidence
(including the significant Y-12 security incident that occurred after
the date of this hearing) that there are still areas in which clear
lines of accountability do not exist, I believe that NNSA had made
substantial progress compared to the almost incomprehensible situation
documented in the 1990s. That said, much of the perceived
micromanagement and duplicative oversight was not within the control of
the NNSA Administrator and some of it was not within the control of the
Secretary of Energy. NNSA facilities were routinely audited by the
Department of Energy Office of Independent Assessment, by the
Department of Energy Inspector General, by the Government
Accountability Office and by the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board. These audits were in general not coordinated with one another
and often were duplicative. Many required detailed, formal corrective
action plans which tended to foster detailed transactional oversight.
Routine audits by the Government Accountability Office and the
Inspector General are simply a fact of life. I do not believe it is
useful for the Congress to consider changing NNSA's vulnerability to
such procedures given that both GAO and the Inspector General serve
broader purposes. Therefore my efforts--which were not successful--were
to reduce oversight and audits from within the Department of Energy and
to work toward a time when I could recommend to the Congress that the
jurisdiction of the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board was no
longer required. I still believe that to be the correct approach.
Mr. Turner. 6) Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, in a recent press
article, in the Nuclear Weapons Exchange Monitor, Ambassador Brooks is
quoted saying ``I just think it's a misunderstanding that the line
doesn't care about safety because you can't do your mission if you have
safety problems . . . I think that the idea that if the NNSA
organization doesn't have DOE's Office of Health, Safety, and Security
looking over its shoulder [NNSA] will not pay enough attention to
safety is wrong.'' Do you think NNSA's safety program is sufficiently
mature without DOE staff--but still with independent oversight from the
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and the Inspector General?
Mr. Brooks. Yes.
Mr. Turner. 7) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise,
we've heard from many experts that the status quo at NNSA and DOE is
unsustainable. We've heard ominous warnings from the National Academies
of Science that these governance and management problems are
threatening the quality of science and engineering at the nuclear
weapons labs. We've heard from DOD that the costs of key nuclear
infrastructure modernization projects are being driven up dramatically
by excessive oversight and regulation that provide minimal safety
benefit. And now, with this latest budget request, we're seeing key
programs tossed overboard because we don't have enough money to pay for
both the bureaucracy and the mission--and apparently the bureaucracy is
a higher priority.
We saw how dysfunctional DOE was in the 1990s--that's why we
created NNSA. What do you think the future will hold if we just
continue under the current status quo?
Mr. Brooks. At the time I left NNSA I believed that these problems
would be mitigated by greater autonomy. At the same time, it is
important to recognize that structures and procedures can facilitate
leadership but not substitute for it. Good people can make any system
work. The challenge for the Congress and the executive branch is to
devise an NNSA governance structure that will make it easier to
exercise sound leadership. The present path does not appear likely to
eliminate the problems that you cite. But I am not as certain as I was
when I left NNSA that greater autonomy alone is an acceptable answer.
There are disconcerting examples, including the recent Y-12 security
incident, that suggest internal NNSA procedures may also require
review. It is my understanding that such detailed review is in
progress.
Mr. Turner. 8) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise, as
we look to address the continuing challenges at NNSA and DOE through
legislation and actions in the executive branch, what lessons should we
learn from the NNSA Act and its implementation? What should be the key
messages from the past and how might they apply to the problems at NNSA
and DOE that all of these reports talk about today?
Mr. Brooks. First, if there is to be change driven by legislation,
I believe it will be important to focus on people. In particular, I
believe significant continuity is required in the office of the
Administrator. Further, it will be important that the Secretary and
Deputy Secretary of Energy understand and support the intent of
Congress.
Second, the intent of the legislation must be clear and strong
barriers must be established to eliminate the need for constant low-
level bureaucratic warfare to implement Congress's intent.
While it is possible that a semi-autonomous approach can be made to
work, it remains my view--as my testimony indicated--that full
separation between NNSA and the Department of Energy may be required.
Mr. Turner. 9) Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, based on your
experiences in the early NNSA and since then, would you please comment
on the reforms to NNSA contained in the House-passed FY13 defense
authorization bill (H.R.4310)? Will it address the well-known and long-
standing problems?
Your testimony indicates you think they may not be aggressive
enough--that full autonomy is needed for NNSA. Do the reforms in the
bill not go far enough? Can they be effective without strong leadership
from the executive branch? Are there gaps we are not addressing?
Mr. Brooks. Some of the reforms in the bill attempt to constrain
the authority of Department of Energy staff elements to interfere with
NNSA. Unfortunately, they do so by constraining the authority of the
Secretary of Energy. This is probably unworkable. The Secretary must
have the authority to oversee NNSA if the intent of Congress is to keep
NNSA within the Department, while remaining a separately organized
entity.
Whatever the ultimate solution is, it cannot be effective without
strong leadership from within the executive branch. Organizational
changes can facilitate leadership, but they cannot substitute for it.
Mr. Turner. 10) Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, this
subcommittee has reviewed the dozens of reports in the 1980s and 1990s
that led to creation of NNSA. They all offer clear descriptions of the
problems at DOE, including recurring security problems and gross
mismanagement. Senior DOE leadership even embarked on several reform
initiatives--but none were effective at fixing the organization. Why
was senior DOE leadership unable to reform the organization? Why did it
require Congress to step in and try to fix a problem that was so widely
recognized?
Mr. Brooks. I do not know why pre-NNSA reforms were not effective.
I had no experience within the Department of Energy prior to NNSA, and
thus have no personal basis for making judgments. I do, however, know
some of the individuals who were involved in early reform efforts. They
are dedicated and competent public servants. I conclude, therefore,
that the problem probably lies in the organizational culture of the
Department of Energy.
Mr. Turner. 11) Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, in the early
days of NNSA you were both in senior positions responsible for
implementing the NNSA Act. With hindsight, what are the strengths and
weaknesses of the NNSA Act?
Was the intent of the ``separately organized'' and ``semi-
autonomous'' nature of NNSA clear in the statute?
Do you believe it was clearly understood within DOE and the
new NNSA?
Do you believe there was agreement from all stakeholders--
particularly within DOE and NNSA--regarding what these terms meant and
intended?
What problems did you encounter in trying to stand up NNSA?
Did you see resistance from leaders and staff at DOE? Ambassador, your
prepared statement mentions problems with the DOE General Counsel. Can
you elaborate? Are there other examples?
The Rudman Report, which was used as a guide for the NNSA
Act, explained that this term, ``semi-autonomous,'' would mean that the
agency would be ``strictly segregated from the rest of the
department''--which would be ``accomplished by having the agency
director report only to the Secretary.'' Has this definition of the
term been put into practice?
Mr. Brooks. I believe now and believed then that the intent of
``separately organized'' and ``semi-autonomous'' was clear. I
discovered, however, that it was not clear to all officials in the
Department. For example, as I mentioned in my prepared testimony,
during the first term of the Bush administration the DOE General
Counsel took the view that in order to intelligently exercise his
oversight, the Secretary needed essentially the same information from
the rest of the Department to evaluate NNSA that he needed for any
other bureau or office. Other officials also had difficulty in
accepting that their responsibilities did not include supervising NNSA.
I do not believe the intent of the Rudman Report that NNSA be
strictly segregated from the rest of the Department has been
implemented. As my testimony suggests, I have considerable doubt that
it can be implemented under the present governance structure.
Mr. Turner. 12) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise, the
NNSA Act establishes a mission set for NNSA that includes broadly
supporting nuclear security activities across the U.S. Government
(i.e., not just for DOE). How did this ``Work For Others'' (WFO)
function prior to NNSA? Does it work more effectively or more
efficiently now? How do NNSA and DOE interface on WFO, or is it
entirely in NNSA's hands?
Mr. Brooks. I do not have a clear understanding of the functioning
of Work for Others (WFO) prior to the establishment of NNSA. There have
been periodic problems with managing WFO which reportedly make it
difficult for other agencies to employ the NNSA laboratories. I do not
believe that this is primarily a problem of the existing governance
structure. Rather it is caused by an inappropriate level of review from
within the existing organization.
At the time I left NNSA Work for Others was primarily within NNSA's
ability to control with the single exception of the area of
intelligence where the DOE Office of Intelligence controlled the
process.
Mr. Turner. 13) Dr. Kuckuck, would you please provide some examples
of how the semi-autonomous model for NNSA has not worked? What factors
most directly lead you to recommend full autonomy for NNSA?
Dr. Kuckuck. I believe the most substantive examples are those
presented by Amb. Brooks as to DOE's contraints upon the
Administrator's ability to establish a less burdensome and costly
oversight model for the NNSA. Specific examples have also been clearly
presented in the numerous reviews and critiques by prestigious outside
review groups.
Mr. Turner. 14) Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, does having
detailed procedures and very prescriptive processes help or hinder
safety? What about security? Does having detailed procedures and very
prescriptive processes lead to improvements in safety culture or
security culture? How does detailed, transaction-level oversight impact
efforts to improve safety, security, and associated cultures?
Dr. Kuckuck. The level of detailed procedures and prescriptive
processes should vary with the specific task being performed. While
detailed procedures such as checklists may be essential for some
highly-complex but repetitive tasks, they can also be counterproductive
to good safety in others. There is often a tendency for workers to
begin to believe the paperwork ``makes them safe'' and to stop thinking
on their own. In addition, an excess of procedures reduces efficiency
and moral. Transaction-level oversight as opposed to oversight of
performance against broader principles and objectives, frequently
becomes disconnected from the mission as a whole, often tends toward
measuring minutia, is an insult to the professional doing the job, is
extremely costly and inefficient, and destroys morale.
Mr. Turner. 15) Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, as mentioned in
my prepared opening statement, NNSA's February 2002 report to Congress
on how it would operate and be organized contains many indications that
NNSA was headed in the right direction--that it was preparing to
implement the intent of the NNSA Act. The report lists a series of
actions it would take to ``lift administrative burdens through
streamlining policies, procedures, and staffing.'' This included an
``objective of reducing by half the administrative workload imposed by
policies, procedures, and guidance,'' and plans to ``reengineer core
business practices and right-size and reinvigorate federal staff.''
Do you believe implementation of this February 2002 plan was
successful? Why or why not?
Was the objective of ``reducing by half the administrative
workload imposed by policies, procedures, and guidance'' achieved? Why
or why not?
Was the Federal staff ``right-sized and reinvigorated'' as
the report indicated?
-- Budget documents indicate that NNSA's Office of the
Administrator started at around 1,940 employees in FY2002, was reduced
to less than 1,700 by FY2005 through streamlining initiatives, but is
now back at above 1,900. Why did the Federal workforce numbers bounce
back to pre-NNSA levels, despite all of the effort at streamlining?
All of the reports we read and experts we talk to seem to say
that the administrative bureaucracy has only gotten worse. How and
where did we get off track?
Dr. Kuckuck. I do not believe the February 2002 plan was
implemented as designed, neither the reduced administrative workload
nor Federal staff levels were realized. I believe the NNSA was
constrained by bureaucratic barriers within the DOE as well as within
NNSA itself. I was not at NNSA after 2002, so cannot comment on
variations in the Federal workforce after then. As for ``where did we
get off track,'' I believe the transformation of NNSA never really got
``on track.''
Mr. Turner. 16) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise,
NNSA's February 2002 report to Congress states the NNSA and the
Secretary of Energy agreed to a streamlined independent oversight
process for NNSA. Basically, DOE's Office of Independent Oversight and
Performance Assurance would consolidate DOE's oversight of NNSA into a
single office.
Did this independent DOE oversight model work? Why or why
not?
Was this independent DOE oversight model really tried in
earnest? Is it still in place? If it is not in place, what is DOE's
current structural approach to oversight of NNSA?
Dr. Kuckuck. I believe the ``Independent DOE oversight'' model did
not work. I believe that DOE blocked the NNSA from issuing it's own
directives. I believe that senior NNSA officials certainly tried ``in
earnest'' to succeed, but met insurmountable barriers. I am not current
on exactly what oversight is in place now, but am of the impression is
it essentially still DOE's oversight model.
Mr. Turner. 17) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise,
NNSA's February 2002 report to Congress indicates that NNSA was
striving to become a true ``separately organized'' agency, and that
``where appropriate, NNSA is seeking autonomy, but it has negotiated .
. . the use of the DOE's staff to address NNSA needs, with the proviso
that DOE support staff function in accordance with an agreement that
ensures that NNSA priorities and standards are the basis of the
service.''
Ambassador, your prepared statement says that you now
``regret'' relying on DOE staff offices for support because it weakened
your ability to establish autonomy--and ``establishing such autonomy
became a major problem.''
-- Please explain why this form of ``semi-autonomy'' didn't work.
-- Do you believe this type of ``semi-autonomy'' can work at all,
or is full or much stronger autonomy necessary?
Dr. Kuckuck and Mr. Aloise, do you believe this concept of
semi-autonomy can work, or is full or significantly stronger autonomy
needed?
Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, NNSA has told us that it
is currently subject to 270 separate DOE orders, directives, and rules.
Does this fit the definition of ``separately organized'' and ``semi-
autonomous'' as you understood it during your time in the early years
of NNSA?
Dr. Kuckuck. I cannot answer the question of whether or not ``this
concept of semi-autonomy can work.'' I believe it is abundantly clear
that in the NNSA-DOE context it has not worked. There are pros and cons
to all models that have been proposed, but I personally believe that
experience thus far would suggest it is time to try other than the
current model. I believe that unless the NNSA Administrator has chosen
to be subject to those 270 DOE orders, this does not constitute
``separately organized,'' or ``semi-autonomous'' as I envisioned it in
2000-2002.
Mr. Turner. 18) Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, in a recent
press article, in the Nuclear Weapons Exchange Monitor, Ambassador
Brooks is quoted saying ``I just think it's a misunderstanding that the
line doesn't care about safety because you can't do your mission if you
have safety problems . . . I think that the idea that if the NNSA
organization doesn't have DOE's Office of Health, Safety, and Security
looking over its shoulder [NNSA] will not pay enough attention to
safety is wrong.'' Do you think NNSA's safety program is sufficiently
mature without DOE staff--but still with independent oversight from the
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and the Inspector General?
Dr. Kuckuck. I believe NNSA's safety program (AND SAFETY CULTURE)
are quite mature without DOE staff. But, obviously, there still must be
independent oversight. I do not believe that the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board has been able to provide a properly balanced
oversight function in this role. I am unaware of the level of safety
expertise that resides in the office of the Inspector General. I would
believe that the NRC or an NRC-like model might be most appropriate for
NNSA.
Mr. Turner. 19) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise,
we've heard from many experts that the status quo at NNSA and DOE is
unsustainable. We've heard ominous warnings from the National Academies
of Science that these governance and management problems are
threatening the quality of science and engineering at the nuclear
weapons labs. We've heard from DOD that the costs of key nuclear
infrastructure modernization projects are being driven up dramatically
by excessive oversight and regulation that provide minimal safety
benefit. And now, with this latest budget request, we're seeing key
programs tossed overboard because we don't have enough money to pay for
both the bureaucracy and the mission--and apparently the bureaucracy is
a higher priority.
We saw how dysfunctional DOE was in the 1990s--that's why we
created NNSA. What do you think the future will hold if we just
continue under the current status quo?
Dr. Kuckuck. I tend to agree with the warnings you are receiving
from these prestigious outside reviewers.
Mr. Turner. 20) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise, as
we look to address the continuing challenges at NNSA and DOE through
legislation and actions in the executive branch, what lessons should we
learn from the NNSA Act and its implementation? What should be the key
messages from the past and how might they apply to the problems at NNSA
and DOE that all of these reports talk about today?
Dr. Kuckuck. I suspect there are many elements that have
contributed to the less-than-intended outcome of the NNSA Act,
including: competing oversight jurisdictions within the Congress; lack
of independence from the DOE; bureaucracy within the NNSA itself; too
many Federal staff to ``make work;'' entitlement of outside oversight
functions to become de-facto regulators without a balanced
consideration of mission or resources.
Mr. Turner. 21) Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, based on your
experiences in the early NNSA and since then, would you please comment
on the reforms to NNSA contained in the House-passed FY13 defense
authorization bill (H.R.4310)? Will it address the well-known and long-
standing problems?
Your testimony indicates you think they may not be aggressive
enough--that full autonomy is needed for NNSA. Do the reforms in the
bill not go far enough? Can they be effective without strong leadership
from the executive branch? Are there gaps we are not addressing?
I believe that H.R.4310 clearly indicates Congressional intent to
improve upon the current and failing NNSA semi-autonomous model created
by the NNSA Act. It is a step in the right direction, but may not be
enough--necessary, but not sufficient. For example, the bill attempts
to limit NNSA regulations in non-nuclear health and safety to OSHA
standards. This allows for NNSA to interpret the OSHA standard and
issue a separate NNSA regulation. Why have NNSA regulations at all? Why
not subject NNSA facilities to OSHA oversight and eliminate the NNSA
``middle man''? Much of the burdensome oversight being objected to
comes from such middlemen and their interpretations. The bill attempts
to force the DNFSB into a more collaborative, balanced oversight model.
Rather than try to reform the DNFSB, why not take positive steps to
move nuclear oversight to the NRC? The bill attempts to force
partnership and communication between the Secretary of Energy and the
Laboratory Directors and Plant Managers. Why have this forced
relationship, versus allowing relationships to build naturally in a
fully independent NNSA? Why encumber the chances of success with the
burdens of overcoming the legacy of past failures?
Dr. Kuckuck. It is true that the bill cannot legislate leadership,
trust, partnership and good judgment, but the bill can definitely
legislate an environment that will attract, encourage and foster these
qualities. It seems to me that there is a greater chance of success in
this endeavor by starting from a clean sheet of paper than by trying to
reform embedded bureaucracies.
Mr. Turner. 22) Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, this
subcommittee has reviewed the dozens of reports in the 1980s and 1990s
that led to creation of NNSA. They all offer clear descriptions of the
problems at DOE, including recurring security problems and gross
mismanagement. Senior DOE leadership even embarked on several reform
initiatives--but none were effective at fixing the organization. Why
was senior DOE leadership unable to reform the organization? Why did it
require Congress to step in and try to fix a problem that was so widely
recognized?
Dr. Kuckuck. I am not in a position to answer questions pertaining
to DOE leadership in the 1980s and 1990s, but observing the barriers to
reform that have existed in the last decade I could imagine that many
existed then as well.
Mr. Turner. 23) Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, in the early
days of NNSA you were both in senior positions responsible for
implementing the NNSA Act. With hindsight, what are the strengths and
weaknesses of the NNSA Act?
Was the intent of the ``separately organized'' and ``semi-
autonomous'' nature of NNSA clear in the statute?
Do you believe it was clearly understood within DOE and the
new NNSA?
Do you believe there was agreement from all stakeholders--
particularly within DOE and NNSA--regarding what these terms meant and
intended?
What problems did you encounter in trying to stand up NNSA?
Did you see resistance from leaders and staff at DOE? Ambassador, your
prepared statement mentions problems with the DOE General Counsel. Can
you elaborate? Are there other examples?
The Rudman Report, which was used as a guide for the NNSA
Act, explained that this term, ``semi-autonomous,'' would mean that the
agency would be ``strictly segregated from the rest of the
department''--which would be ``accomplished by having the agency
director report only to the Secretary.'' Has this definition of the
term been put into practice?
Dr. Kuckuck. I believe the greatest strength of the NNSA Act, at
least in its intent, was some sort of autonomy for NNSA. Clearly, this
``semi autonomous'' model did not work within DOE. There was not
agreement by all parties as to what ``semi autonomous'' meant. Amb.
Brooks has testified more about this than I am able to offer.
Mr. Turner. 24) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise, the
NNSA Act establishes a mission set for NNSA that includes broadly
supporting nuclear security activities across the U.S. Government
(i.e., not just for DOE). How did this ``Work For Others'' (WFO)
function prior to NNSA? Does it work more effectively or more
efficiently now? How do NNSA and DOE interface on WFO, or is it
entirely in NNSA's hands?
Dr. Kuckuck. I have had little direct experience with WFO and can
not comment on this.
Mr. Turner. 25) Mr. Aloise, do you agree with Ambassador Brooks
when he says, with respect to today's situation at NNSA compared to
before NNSA was created, ``Security is clearly better, safety is no
worse, but we haven't removed the burden on the labs. Nuclear safety
and the Defense [Nuclear Facilities Safety] Board, the relationship is
not--was not when I was there--working well''? Has security improved?
Has safety? Has the burden on the labs and plants been lessened? What
is your assessment of the relationship between NNSA and the DNFSB and
the effectiveness of the DNFSB?
Mr. Aloise. As we stated in our June 2012 testimony, NNSA has
established an effective headquarters security organization, and this
organization has made significant progress in resolving many of the
security weaknesses we had identified. [GAO, Modernizing the Nuclear
Security Enterprise: Observations on the Organization and Management of
the National Nuclear Security Administration, GAO-12-867T, (Washington,
D.C.: June 27, 2012).] However, in our view, the recent serious
security incident at the Y-12 site demonstrates that NNSA faces
challenges in sustaining security improvements.
Our work has also raised questions about the independence of DOE's
oversight of safety. Furthermore, the results of DOE's recent safety
reform are unclear because DOE did not determine if the original
directives were burdensome, and the reform did not fully address safety
concerns we and others have identified. [GAO, Nuclear Safety:
Department of Energy Needs to Strengthen Its Independent Oversight of
Nuclear Facilities and Operations, GAO-09-61 (Washington, D.C.: Oct.
23, 2008) and Nuclear Safety: DOE Needs to Determine the Costs and
Benefits of Its Safety Reform Effort, GAO-12-347 (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 20, 2012).] We have not assessed the regulatory burden on the labs
and plants.
We also have not formally assessed the relationship between NNSA
and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, nor the board's
effectiveness. We stated that DOE must decide how to respond to the
board recommendations and, to date, the agency has generally accepted
these recommendations.
Mr. Turner. 26) Mr. Aloise, in their prepared statements,
Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck recommend full autonomy for NNSA. We
also have many, many reports by independent, bipartisan commissions and
nonpartisan study groups that recommend the same. But you advocate
against ``dramatic changes.'' Why do you disagree with all of these
other experts?
Mr. Aloise. As we said in our June 2012 testimony, we do not
believe that dramatic changes are warranted because we are uncertain
whether such significant organizational changes to increase NNSA's
independence would produce the desired effect. [GAO-12-867T] In our
view, few, if any, of NNSA's problems in the areas of safety, security,
and project management stem from the organizational relationship
between NNSA and DOE. A dramatic organizational change, such as making
NNSA an independent agency, may be disruptive. Currently, DOE provides
NNSA with a large number of services, such as personnel and
headquarters building security, office space, payroll, and information
technology. NNSA would have to devote substantially more effort to
create and then maintain these overhead functions.
Mr. Turner. 27) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise,
NNSA's February 2002 report to Congress states the NNSA and the
Secretary of Energy agreed to a streamlined independent oversight
process for NNSA. Basically, DOE's Office of Independent Oversight and
Performance Assurance would consolidate DOE's oversight of NNSA into a
single office.
Did this independent DOE oversight model work? Why or why
not?
Was this independent DOE oversight model really tried in
earnest? Is it still in place? If it is not in place, what is DOE's
current structural approach to oversight of NNSA?
Mr. Aloise. Without performing additional audit work, we cannot
determine if the oversight model discussed in the 2002 report was fully
implemented. The Secretary of Energy created the Office of Health,
Safety, and Security (HSS) in October 2006, incorporating most of the
responsibilities from the former Office of Environment, Safety, and
Health and the Office of Safety and Security Performance Assurance. HSS
is the only office within DOE that oversees these programs without
influence from the program offices, thus avoiding the potential
conflict of interest inherent with program office oversight and helping
to ensure public confidence in the Department's ability to self-
regulate nuclear safety and security. As we reported in October 2008,
HSS has fallen short in providing effective independent oversight of
nuclear safety. [GAO-09-61.] For example, the office's ability to
function independently was limited because it has no role in reviewing
the technical analysis that helps ensure safe design and operation of
nuclear facilities. We recommended that if DOE does not take
appropriate action to meet these criteria for independent oversight,
then the Congress should consider the following:
permanently establishing in law the responsibilities of
HSS, or
shifting DOE to external regulation by:
providing the resources and authority to the Defense
Nuclear Facilities Safety Board to oversee all DOE nuclear
facilities and to enforce DOE nuclear safety rules and
directives, or
providing the resources and authority to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to externally regulate all or just newly
constructed DOE nuclear facilities.
DOE and HSS took actions in response to our report's
recommendations, including placing an emphasis on assessing the design
of new nuclear facilities before they are constructed and establishing
site leads within HSS responsible for each of DOE's sites. Despite
these actions to strengthen independent oversight of nuclear safety, we
reported in April 2012 that some of these actions may undermine the
safety culture at DOE nuclear facilities and may weaken HSS oversight
responsibilities. [GAO-12-347.] For example, DOE's reform effort did
not fully address safety concerns we and others have identified in
three key areas: (1) quality assurance, (2) safety culture, and (3)
Federal oversight. Regarding quality assurance, DOE strengthened its
quality assurance directive by clarifying that contractors must follow
specific industry quality assurance standards, but quality assurance
problems persist. For example, DOE proposed a nearly $250,000 fine
against a contractor in July 2011 after identifying quality assurance
problems in an incident where a worker punctured his hand with a sharp
object contaminated with plutonium. With regard to safety culture, DOE
revised its Integrated Safety Management directives to attempt to
strengthen the safety culture at its sites, but DOE removed
requirements for contractors to follow the directives because
contractors already had to comply with safety management requirements
in Federal regulation. Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
officials raised concerns that the requirements in Federal regulation
are less detailed and, as a result, contractors may not implement
safety practices as rigorously as if they were subject to the more
specific requirements in DOE's directives. Finally, regarding Federal
oversight, DOE revised its approach to place greater emphasis on having
its independent oversight staff review safety design documents before
facilities are constructed, rather than after they are built. Other
changes, however, such as requiring oversight staff to coordinate their
assessment activities with DOE site office and contractor staff, raise
concerns about the oversight staff's ability to provide a critical
review of safety at DOE's sites that is independent from DOE site
office and contractor staff.
Mr. Turner. 28) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise,
NNSA's February 2002 report to Congress indicates that NNSA was
striving to become a true ``separately organized'' agency, and that
``where appropriate, NNSA is seeking autonomy, but it has negotiated .
. . the use of the DOE's staff to address NNSA needs, with the proviso
that DOE support staff function in accordance with an agreement that
ensures that NNSA priorities and standards are the basis of the
service.''
Ambassador, your prepared statement says that you now
``regret'' relying on DOE staff offices for support because it weakened
your ability to establish autonomy--and ``establishing such autonomy
became a major problem.''
-- Please explain why this form of ``semi-autonomy'' didn't work.
-- Do you believe this type of ``semi-autonomy'' can work at all,
or is full or much stronger autonomy necessary?
Dr. Kuckuck and Mr. Aloise, do you believe this concept of
semi-autonomy can work, or is full or significantly stronger autonomy
needed?
Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, NNSA has told us that it
is currently subject to 270 separate DOE orders, directives, and rules.
Does this fit the definition of ``separately organized'' and ``semi-
autonomous'' as you understood it during your time in the early years
of NNSA?
Mr. Aloise. In 2007, we examined the issues that hindered NNSA from
functioning as a separately organized agency within DOE. [GAO, National
Nuclear Security Administration: Additional Actions Needed to Improve
Management of the Nation's Nuclear Programs, GAO-07-36, (Washington,
D.C.: Jan. 19, 2007).] At the time of our 2007 review, we identified
several factors contributing to NNSA's lack of autonomy. First, DOE and
NNSA did not have a useful model to follow for establishing a
separately organized agency in DOE. Second, the January 2000 NNSA
implementation plan, required by the NNSA Act, did not define how NNSA
would operate as a separately organized agency within DOE. As a result,
although some NNSA programs had set up procedures for interacting with
DOE, other programs had not, resulting in organizational conflict. Even
where formal procedures were developed, interpersonal disagreements had
hindered effective cooperation.
We recommended that, to ensure that NNSA functions as a separately
organized agency, the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator, NNSA,
should clearly define NNSA's status as a separately organized agency
within the Department. In his 31 USC Section 720 response to our
report, the Deputy Secretary of Energy stated that he did not concur
with this recommendation. He stated that elements of the Department and
the NNSA had executed memorandums of understanding specifying how
certain departmentwide functions would be performed while respecting
the statutory insulation of NNSA personnel. He also stated that the
Department would consider issuing circumstance-specific guidance where
required to correct misperceptions about the effect of the NNSA's act
limitations. Since then, we have identified instances that indicate the
DOE-NNSA relationship has become less clear. For example, DOE recently
announced that DOE's Environmental Management program will begin to
report to the NNSA Administrator, who simultaneously is an Under
Secretary for Energy. As a result, we have left this recommendation
open and still believe that further clarification of the NNSA-DOE
relationship is needed.
Mr. Turner. 29) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise,
we've heard from many experts that the status quo at NNSA and DOE is
unsustainable. We've heard ominous warnings from the National Academies
of Science that these governance and management problems are
threatening the quality of science and engineering at the nuclear
weapons labs. We've heard from DOD that the costs of key nuclear
infrastructure modernization projects are being driven up dramatically
by excessive oversight and regulation that provide minimal safety
benefit. And now, with this latest budget request, we're seeing key
programs tossed overboard because we don't have enough money to pay for
both the bureaucracy and the mission--and apparently the bureaucracy is
a higher priority.
We saw how dysfunctional DOE was in the 1990s--that's why we
created NNSA. What do you think the future will hold if we just
continue under the current status quo?
Mr. Aloise. GAO agrees that the status quo is unacceptable. At the
same time, we believe that the current situation can be improved
without separating NNSA completely from DOE. In our view, the problems
we continue to identify in the nuclear security enterprise are not
caused by excessive oversight but instead result from ineffective
oversight and poor contractor management. We believe that NNSA has made
progress in improving its management practices, and we will continue to
monitor NNSA's efforts to improve performance.
Mr. Turner. 30) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise, as
we look to address the continuing challenges at NNSA and DOE through
legislation and actions in the executive branch, what lessons should we
learn from the NNSA Act and its implementation? What should be the key
messages from the past and how might they apply to the problems at NNSA
and DOE that all of these reports talk about today?
Mr. Aloise. In our view, a retrospective ``lessons-learned''
evaluation of the creation of and implementation of NNSA would be
valuable, but we have not conducted audit work that is sufficient to
answer this question.
Mr. Turner. 31) Mr. Aloise, a series of GAO reports in the 1990s
were highly critical of DOE's management of the nuclear weapons
complex--particularly in the areas of security, contract management,
and clarity in roles, responsibilities, and authorities. For instance,
in 1993 GAO said ``DOE has significant management problems, as reported
by many oversight groups and acknowledged by agency leadership,'' and
``management of the nuclear weapons complex and the national laboratory
system . . . [is] in disarray.'' The reports contributed to the
momentum that ultimately resulted in creation of the NNSA in 2000.
Was it within DOE's authority to fix these problems? If so,
why didn't it?
Why did it require Congress to step in and fix a problem that
was so widely recognized?
Mr. Aloise. DOE and NNSA and their predecessor organizations
generally have the authority to address the issues that our reports
identified over the years. We have not comprehensively assessed why
these agencies have not always done so. It is within Congress created
NNSA to address management problems, which included serious security
incidents involving espionage and the potential compromise of highly
classified nuclear data. Similarly, in the late 1980s, Congress
established the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board in response to
long-standing safety concerns at DOE's sites.
Mr. Turner. 32) Mr. Aloise, in 1998, one year before the NNSA Act
was signed into law, GAO analyzed DOE's progress in addressing the
dozens of recommendations made by various advisory groups to improve
and streamline management of DOE's national laboratories. After
analyzing the actions DOE told GAO it was pursuing to implement these
recommendations, GAO said that, ``Most of the actions DOE reported to
us are process oriented, incomplete, or only marginally related to past
recommendations for change. For example, creating new task forces and
strengthening old ones may be good for defining problems, but these
measures cannot force decisions or affect change.'' Generally, how do
we get an organization to move from these sorts of fuzzy measures and
start taking real, active steps to force change?
Mr. Aloise. Generally speaking, cultural change is needed. We have
not performed an organizational culture assessment of NNSA. However,
organizational culture experts generally agree that an organization's
beliefs and values affect the behavior of its members. In previous
work, we found that (1) experts agree that an organization's decision
to change its culture is generally triggered by a specific event or
situation and is a long-term effort that takes at least 5 to 10 years
to complete and (2) some corporate officials believe that the two key
techniques for a successful culture change are the top management's
total commitment to the change and training that promotes and develops
skills related to the company's desired values or beliefs. [GAO:
Organizational Culture: Techniques Companies Use to Perpetuate or
Change Beliefs and Values, GAO/NSIAD-92-105, (Washington, D.C.: Feb.
27, 1992).]
Mr. Turner. 33) Mr. Aloise, in its 2007 report, GAO said
``management problems continue, in part, because NNSA and DOE have not
fully agreed on how NNSA should function within the department as a
separately organized agency. This lack of agreement has resulted in
organizational conflicts that have inhibited effective operations.''
What were some of the organizational conflicts? How did they
inhibit effective operations?
What evidence led GAO to make this finding? What did GAO
suggest be done to resolve it?
Has this problem been resolved? Do you believe NNSA and DOE
have agreed upon--and implemented--a coherent and rational management
structure for how NNSA should function within DOE as a ``separately
organized'' agency, as required by the NNSA Act?
The Rudman Report, which was used as a guide for the NNSA
Act, explained that this term, ``semi-autonomous,'' would mean that the
agency would be ``strictly segregated from the rest of the
department''--which would be ``accomplished by having the agency
director report only to the Secretary.'' Has this definition of the
term been put into practice?
Mr. Aloise. Regarding organizational conflict, our January 2007
report provides detail on the conflict between DOE and NNSA over the
organization and conduct of counterintelligence. [GAO-07-36, pp. 39-
44.] More specifically, we found a lack of formal agreement between DOE
and NNSA in a number of key areas--budgeting, procurement, information
technology, management and administration, and safeguards and
security--which resulted in organizational conflicts that inhibited
effective operations. Even where formal procedures were developed,
interpersonal disagreements hindered effective cooperation. For
example, our report described the conflict between NNSA and DOE
counterintelligence officials who disagreed over (1) the scope and
direction of the counterintelligence program, (2) their ability to
jointly direct staff in the headquarters counterintelligence program
offices, (3) the allocation of counterintelligence resources, (4)
counterintelligence policy making, and (5) their roles and
responsibilities in handling specific counterintelligence matters.
Subsequently, Congress amended the NNSA Act to consolidate DOE's and
NNSA's counterintelligence programs under DOE.
In terms of evidence, we reviewed the NNSA Act as well as two House
of Representatives reports in 2000 on the act's implementation. Because
the establishment of NNSA as a separately organized agency in DOE was a
key provision of the NNSA Act, we met with officials from NNSA
headquarters; the NNSA Service Center; the NNSA site offices; and DOE
offices where NNSA and DOE need to interact, including DOE's Office of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence (formerly the Office of
Counterintelligence); Chief Financial Officer; Chief Information
Officer; General Counsel; and Human Capital Management. To understand
how NNSA and DOE were intended to interact, we interviewed officials
and reviewed documents, such as DOE's January 2000 implementation plan
for NNSA. We also interviewed officials with the Department of
Commerce's National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, the Defense
Advanced Research Projects Agency, the Defense Threat Reduction Agency,
and the Department of Transportation's Federal Aviation Administration
to obtain their views on the reporting relationships that need to be in
place for an entity designated as a ``separately organized agency'' to
succeed. We contacted the first two agencies cited because they were
identified in the Defense Science Board's June 1999 report as good
models of a separately organized agency. We contacted the latter two
agencies cited after consultation with staff in your offices. We also
interviewed former NNSA and DOE officials, including the first and
second Administrators and the Deputy Secretary of Energy, who helped
establish NNSA, to get their perspective on the difficulties involved
in creating a separately organized agency within a department.
In regard to semi-autonomy, the Secretary of Energy disagreed with
our recommendation that, to ensure that NNSA functions as a separately
organized agency, the Secretary of Energy and the Administrator, NNSA,
should clearly define NNSA's status as a separately organized agency
within the Department. In his 31 USC Section 720 response to our
report, the Deputy Secretary of Energy stated that he did not concur
with this recommendation. He stated that elements of the Department and
NNSA had executed memorandums of understanding specifying how certain
departmentwide functions would be performed while respecting the
statutory insulation of NNSA personnel. He also stated that the
Department will consider issuing circumstance-specific guidance where
required to correct misperceptions about the effect of the NNSA Act's
limitations. Since we received the response, there have been instances
where the DOE/NNSA relationship has become less clear. For example, DOE
recently announced that DOE's Environmental Management program will
begin to report to the NNSA Administrator, who simultaneously is an
Under Secretary for Energy. As a result, we have left this
recommendation open and still believe that further clarification of the
NNSA-DOE relationship is needed.
Mr. Turner. 34) Mr. Aloise, GAO had noted long before NNSA was
established that DOE program managers and Federal employees did not
have the technical knowledge to effectively oversee the complex
programs of the nuclear security labs. Did the NNSA Act address this
concern effectively?
Ambassador Brooks and Dr. Kuckuck, do you agree this is or
was a problem? Did the NNSA Act help attract top-quality leaders and
managers to the Federal side?
Mr. Aloise. Yes, we believe the NNSA Act addressed this concern. As
we reported in April 2012, through the NNSA Act and other actions, DOE
and NNSA sought, and were granted, authorities by Congress to offer
higher pay to staff primarily in certain engineering and science
fields. [GAO, Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise: Strategies
and Challenges in Sustaining Critical Skills in Federal and Contractor
Workforces, GAO-12-468 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2012).]
Specifically, to help NNSA retain more experienced competitive service
employees with critical skills--that is, employees in regular civil
service positions--Congress granted exceptions to normal hiring
regulations, including salary caps, under three excepted service
authorities. First, under the Department of Energy Organization Act the
Secretary of Energy is granted special excepted service hiring
authorities to hire up to 200 highly skilled scientific, engineering,
professional, and administrative individuals to upgrade the
Department's technical and professional capabilities. NNSA can use this
authority in some cases to hire senior-level employees from outside the
Government or difficult-to-hire administrative staff. According to NNSA
officials, the agency currently employs about 50 such individuals.
Second, under the National Defense Authorization Act, the Secretary of
Energy is also granted special excepted service hiring authorities to
hire up to 200 highly skilled individuals--typically scientists,
technicians and engineers with skills related to and necessary for the
operation of nuclear facilities. According to NNSA officials, the
agency currently employs about 100 such individuals. Third, under the
National Nuclear Security Administration Act, NNSA may hire up to 300
highly qualified scientists, engineers, and other technically skilled
workers needed to support the missions of NNSA under similar excepted
service hiring authorities. According to NNSA officials, NNSA has used
this authority to employ about 280 highly skilled individuals. NNSA
officials told us that all of these flexibilities are useful and help
NNSA compete with the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and national
laboratories.
While DOE and NNSA have used these authorities and we have found
performance improvements, significant deficiencies remain. We have
attributed these ongoing deficiencies to, among other things,
inadequate oversight and poor contractor management. Some of these
deficiencies may also be attributed to not having enough technically
skilled Federal officials, but we have not conducted a formal
evaluation of the extent to which DOE and NNSA employees possess
adequate technical knowledge.
Mr. Turner. 35) Ambassador Brooks, Dr. Kuckuck, and Mr. Aloise, the
NNSA Act establishes a mission set for NNSA that includes broadly
supporting nuclear security activities across the U.S. Government
(i.e., not just for DOE). How did this ``Work For Others'' (WFO)
function prior to NNSA? Does it work more effectively or more
efficiently now? How do NNSA and DOE interface on WFO, or is it
entirely in NNSA's hands?
Mr. Aloise. We are currently starting a review of the work for
others (WFO) program in response to a request from the House Energy and
Commerce Committee and plan to complete this work in 2013.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ
Ms. Sanchez. 36) Do you think that it would have been a better
decision to place NNSA nuclear facilities under Nuclear Regulatory
Commission regulation? Why or why not?
Mr. Brooks. I believe that such a step should be considered but
that the ramifications need careful study. That is why the paper I
prepared for the Strategic Posture Commission advocated a three year
transition. Experience in the United Kingdom (which I acknowledge has a
different regulatory culture) has shown a civil regulator can be
effective in regulating military facilities. I believe the existing
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board is inherently subject to
mission and requirements creep. I note that the MOX Fuel Fabrication
Facility now under construction is regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC). While this facility has had significant problems
during construction, I am unaware of any evidence that NRC regulation
has been the cause.
Ms. Sanchez. 37) Some have asserted that NNSA and its contractors
have reached a mature and high level of safety performance. However,
just in the past year, NNSA site managers have needed to issue a number
of letters to their contractors to correct significant safety
deficiencies.
Examples include:
a. Letter from the LANL Manager to LANS dated September 16,
2011, regarding the safety of operations at LANL
b. Letter from the Pantex Manager to B&W Pantex dated
December 2, 2011, regarding the quality and safety of work at
Pantex
c. Letter from the Pantex Manager to B&W Pantex dated May 29,
2012, regarding deficiencies in safety-related fire suppression
systems
d. Letter from the Y-12 Manager to B&W Y-12 dated January 26,
2012, regarding safety risks from hazardous energy sources
e. Letter from the Y-12 Manager to B&W Y-12 dated May 21,
2012, regarding deficiencies in isolating hazardous energy
sources (the lockout/tagout process)
So, given the number and significance of ongoing safety
deficiencies noted in these letters, do you believe that NNSA and its
contractors have reached a mature, conservative level of safety
performance with regard to complex, nuclear operations, maintenance and
design/construction of new facilities such that they no longer need the
oversight/regulation functions currently performed by DOE? If so, what
data or metrics are you aware of that support your position?
Mr. Brooks. I am not able to comment on the details of current
actions within NNSA. In my experience there will always be safety
problems and thus there will always be in need for oversight. The
examples you cite appear to me to be cases where NNSA was exercising
that oversight. It is not clear why duplication of oversight by
Departmental elements other than NNSA would make the situation better.
Ms. Sanchez. 38) Mr. Aloise noted in his testimony that
``Significant improvement is still needed especially in NNSA's
management of its major projects and contracts.''
Should contractors subcontract major construction projects or
should NNSA contract and manage these directly? As an example, NNSA in
recent years had a pilot program consisting of NNSA contracting
directly for the repair of roves across the nuclear complex which was a
successful effort but was discontinued.
Mr. Brooks. The example you cite for repair of roofs was conducted
under a ``get well'' program to compensate for neglected maintenance
during the 1990s. NNSA achieved substantial savings and efficiencies by
centrally managing this essentially similar work that was conducted at
multiple sites. While I am proud of this effort, I do not believe it
has a direct bearing on the question of major construction projects at
a single site.
I do not regard myself as an expert in construction management.
Nonetheless, the number of problems that have occurred with allowing
major construction projects to be managed by the operating contractors
at plants and laboratories is disturbing. I believe that the skills to
operate a national laboratory or production plant and the skills to
oversee a construction project are not the same. Thus I believe it may
be useful for NNSA to consider contracting separately for construction
of major facilities. I do not, however, believe that this is an
appropriate subject for legislation since NNSA facilities tend to be
unique and therefore the circumstances of their construction are unique
as well.
Ms. Sanchez. 39) What is the role for independent safety oversight?
What is the appropriate risk level for hazardous and nuclear
operations?
Mr. Brooks. The role of independent safety oversight of hazardous
and nuclear operations is to protect the public and the workers
involved from harm. Independent safety oversight can do this only when
it is verifying that operations are being conducted safely but is not
seeking to remove the basic responsibility for their actions from those
performing the operations.
The changes in oversight that I recommended in my testimony and
that I sought to implement when I was NNSA Administrator were not
intended to eliminate oversight but to make it more efficient. In
particular, I believe that multiple levels of oversight, not all of
which are responsive to line management are less likely to achieve the
safe operations that must be our constant goal.
Ms. Sanchez. 40) Who should balance risk and mission? Should it be
NNSA or the labs?
Mr. Brooks. Both have an important role. The facilities within
NNSA's National Security Enterprise are owned by the Government and
thus the ultimate responsibility for balancing risk and mission must
reside with Federal officials. At the same time, the technical
knowledge necessary to make sound decisions is usually found in the
organizations actually running these facilities. This leads to the
notion that Federal officials should oversee the balancing of risk and
mission with heavy input from the laboratories and plants.
Ms. Sanchez. 41) Do you believe it's prudent to remove independent
oversight from either NNSA or its contractors?
Mr. Brooks. No. That is why my efforts as Administrator were
directed not at limiting independent oversight but at making it more
effective and less burdensome.
Ms. Sanchez. 42) Should the NNSA Administrator, as is the case in
Naval Reactors and as is the case for the Ministry of Defence in the
UK, have the authority to lose confidence in any contractor employee
from the director to lower levels, to increase accountability from the
laboratories?
Mr. Brooks. Yes and I believe existing contracts provide that
authority although its very existence usually makes it unnecessary to
employ.
Ms. Sanchez. 43) Can you comment on the increase in fees post-
privatization of the labs? With such a disparity in fees paid to the
labs, with Sandia National Laboratory receiving a third of the fee that
LANL and LLNL receive, do you think the mission or performance change
depending on the fee level?
Mr. Brooks. First, I should note that Sandia National Laboratory
has always been operated by a for-profit entity. The increased fees we
offered in connection with the competition to manage the Los Alamos
National Laboratory were intended to attract operating partners with
experience in industrial management of complex high hazard facilities.
We hoped that the increased fee would be balanced by greater efficiency
and the elimination of costly problems, thus resulting in a net long
term savings to the Government. From recent discussions, I believe we
are beginning to see such a result, although it has taken us
substantially longer than we hoped or expected. When the Congress
directed that NNSA compete the operating contract for the Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory, we chose a similar approach for
consistency.
All three NNSA national laboratories have always been headed by
experienced scientists, usually with long careers at those
laboratories. I do not believe that the attitude of such leaders toward
mission and performance is dependent on the size and structure of the
annual fee. My observations during my tenure have convinced me that
what motivates laboratory directors is a sense of mission and the
professional reputation of their laboratories. Thus, the increased fees
should properly be seen as a tool induce the industrial partners to
provide skill sets to assist the laboratory director that would not
otherwise be available. This was our philosophy during both the Los
Alamos and Livermore competitions. As noted above, we are only now
beginning to see indications that it was correct.
Ms. Sanchez. 44) How do we instill a culture of trust and expertise
going forward?
Mr. Brooks. The most important factor in instilling such a culture
is leadership by laboratory directors, plant managers, and Federal
officials. Congress can facilitate such a leadership by mandating an
organizational structure that has clear lines of responsibility,
authority, and accountability. It can also help by avoiding the
tendency to call for more detailed transactional level supervision when
problems do occur.
Ms. Sanchez. 45) How do you improve lines of authority to avoid
conflicting directives?
Mr. Brooks. I know of no way to do this except by mandating a
single chain of command and reducing the ability of organizations not
responsible to the Administrator to issue directives. I recognize this
places a huge responsibility on the Administrator.
Ms. Sanchez. 46) There have been a number of changes in the past
year, including DOE streamlining duplicative regulations and NNSA
moving the site manager reporting authority to the office of the
Administrator. Can you share your insights and comment on these
management and governance changes?
Mr. Brooks. I need to stress that I have only limited knowledge of
today's detailed procedures within the Department of Energy. Based on
my understanding, both of these changes are for the better. They are
almost certainly not, however, sufficient. Eliminating duplicative
regulations (and even more important, conflicting regulations) is
important but ultimately it is the content of the remaining regulations
and the manner of their implementation that matters.
I established what I called the ``strong site manager'' model where
the site managers reported directly to the office of the Administrator.
I was disappointed when the Department directed me to alter these
reporting relationships. I am therefore obviously pleased to see that
they are being reestablished. At the same time, they will only improve
management if the Site Manager is once again the route into the plants
and laboratories for all operational direction. The key is that NNSA
must speak to its contractor partners with one voice.
Ms. Sanchez. 47) What mechanisms would you recommend to drive down
costs and ensure efficiencies?
Mr. Brooks. I do not believe there is a single simple solution to
this problem. Further, it is important to recognize that NNSA
facilities and programs are often complex and one-of-a-kind. In such
programs, it is inherently difficult to manage costs. The two most
important variables appear to me to be strong, well-trained and well-
qualified managers and predictable funding. The first is fundamentally
a responsibility of the Executive branch, while the second is a shared
responsibility between the Executive and Congress.
Ms. Sanchez. 48) There are efforts, including in the House NDAA to
reduce the number of NNSA FTEs as progress is made to streamline
management. Could you comment on the risk and benefits of reducing the
number of FTEs at NNSA. If such reductions occur, should we see a
proportional number of efficiencies at labs and cost savings at the
labs?
Mr. Brooks. In general I find reducing FTEs in anticipation of
streamlined management to be a blunt instrument of questionable
utility. There is no assurance that the right billets will be
eliminated. I do not believe it is possible to predict in advance
whether or not the mere fact of an FTE reduction will lead to
laboratory efficiencies.
Ms. Sanchez. 49) Do you believe that NNSA and their contractors can
accomplish required levels of oversight/self-regulation for complex
high-hazard nuclear operations through a system of performance-based
self-assessments by the contractor and NNSA with no transactional
oversight? If you believe performance-based oversight should be
employed, what level of accidents, if any, do you believe would require
a reinstitution of transactional oversight for complex high-hazard
nuclear operations?
Mr. Brooks. I do not believe that the Federal Government can simply
take a hands-off approach and depend entirely on contractor self-
assessment. At the same time, I believe that transactional oversight is
exceptionally likely to lead to micromanagement and to shift the
presumed responsibility from the contractors. Thus I believe in a
performance-based approach such as that I was trying to implement
during my tenure.
I do not believe that one can answer in the abstract questions
about response to accidents. The goal is not to have such accidents in
the first place. The issue for the Congress and NNSA is what procedures
are most likely to lead to this result.
Ms. Sanchez. 50) What challenges remain to improve accountability
and cost effectiveness?
Mr. Brooks. As I have noted elsewhere, I lack detailed knowledge of
the current status of NNSA and thus I believe it is inappropriate for
me to attempt to judge how far they have come or what the most
important remaining challenges are.
Ms. Sanchez. 51) In 2011, the Department of Energy Inspector
General issued a report entitled ``Management Challenges at the
Department of Energy'' which recommended eliminated duplicative
functions at the NNSA, including General Counsel, Chief Information
Officer, Human Resources, Public Affairs. What are the benefits and
risks of this approach? What is the cost of having separate functions?
Mr. Brooks. I believe it is more correct to say that the Inspector
General recommended studying such a consolidation in order to meet the
anticipated funding challenges of the coming years. The Inspector
General's report noted the view (which it neither endorsed nor refuted)
that the separate functions made NNSA more efficient.
The principal benefit of the existing functions is to enhance the
ability of NNSA to function as a separately organized entity, as the
Congress directed. As I indicated in my testimony, the more NNSA is
required to draw on support from the larger Department, the less clear
its organizational independence becomes. Thus the specific changes are
surrogates for the broad question of whether a separately organized
NNSA (either inside or outside of the Department of Energy) remains in
the national interest. I believe it does.
The principal costs are only financial in cases where the broader
Department decides that it is unwilling to accept NNSA's independent
action and seeks to duplicate it. That this sometimes happens. On the
other hand, the amount of effort required to process personnel actions
does not change significantly whether those performing such actions are
in one organization or two.
The most significant cost of the present arrangement, however, is
the need to coordinate in order that the Department may speak with a
consistent voice. One of the Secretaries of Energy for whom I worked,
was particularly concerned with this aspect. I acknowledge that this is
in fact a real cost but I believe that the benefits of maintaining a
separately organized NNSA are worth paying that cost.
Ms. Sanchez. 52) Do you think that it would have been a better
decision to place NNSA nuclear facilities under Nuclear Regulatory
Commission regulation? Why or why not?
Dr. Kuckuck. It appears to me that the oversight model of our
civilian nuclear industry functions in a considerably more balanced
manner than does the DOE oversight of our nuclear weapons complex. I do
not see any added value in the latter, but do see considerable added
cost. I believe the NRC or an NRC-like model could be preferable for
the weapons complex.
Ms. Sanchez. 53) Some have asserted that NNSA and its contractors
have reached a mature and high level of safety performance. However,
just in the past year, NNSA site managers have needed to issue a number
of letters to their contractors to correct significant safety
deficiencies.
Examples include:
a. Letter from the LANL Manager to LANS dated September 16,
2011, regarding the safety of operations at LANL
b. Letter from the Pantex Manager to B&W Pantex dated
December 2, 2011, regarding the quality and safety of work at
Pantex
c. Letter from the Pantex Manager to B&W Pantex dated May 29,
2012, regarding deficiencies in safety-related fire suppression
systems
d. Letter from the Y-12 Manager to B&W Y-12 dated January 26,
2012, regarding safety risks from hazardous energy sources
e. Letter from the Y-12 Manager to B&W Y-12 dated May 21,
2012, regarding deficiencies in isolating hazardous energy
sources (the lockout/tagout process)
So, given the number and significance of ongoing safety
deficiencies noted in these letters, do you believe that NNSA and its
contractors have reached a mature, conservative level of safety
performance with regard to complex, nuclear operations, maintenance and
design/construction of new facilities such that they no longer need the
oversight/regulation functions currently performed by DOE? If so, what
data or metrics are you aware of that support your position?
Dr. Kuckuck. I no longer have sufficient knowledge of the specifics
of day-to-day oversight by the Site Managers of the NNSA laboratories
and plants to answer this question adequately. However, I think a key
word in your question would be the ``significance'' of the
deficiencies. In my experience both in my laboratory career as well as
my NNSA career, many of those deficiencies cited by the DOE overseers
were minor and of an administrative nature--in a system of excessive
and overwhelming paperwork.
Ms. Sanchez. 54) When you were at NNSA, you came to agreement with
the Office of Health Safety and Security on implementing safety
regulations. Can you provide us more details on this process and its
impact?
Dr. Kuckuck. I was not part of this process or agreement while at
NNSA.
Ms. Sanchez. 55) Mr. Aloise noted in his testimony that
``Significant improvement is still needed especially in NNSA's
management of its major projects and contracts.''
Should contractors subcontract major construction projects or
should NNSA contract and manage these directly? As an example, NNSA in
recent years had a pilot program consisting of NNSA contracting
directly for the repair of roves across the nuclear complex which was a
successful effort but was discontinued.
Dr. Kuckuck. I believe there are many underlying factors that
complicate construction projects in the NNSA. As in other areas,
excessive regulation, either explicit from NNSA (DOE), or implicit from
the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board, play a major role in the
cost and schedule of NNSA facilities. Improving the overall NNSA model
will aid considerably in improving performance on major construction
projects.
Ms. Sanchez. 56) What is the role for independent safety oversight?
What is the appropriate risk level for hazardous and nuclear
operations?
Dr. Kuckuck. Obviously, the NNSA laboratories and plants should
have independent safety oversight. Particular risk levels or standards
should be developed in a balanced way. I would believe the NRC model
and standards might be relevant.
Ms. Sanchez. 57) Who should balance risk and mission? Should it be
NNSA or the labs?
Dr. Kuckuck. Both should have a role, and one would hope a
relationship would exist that would provide the nation a reasonable
balance.
Ms. Sanchez. 58) Do you believe it's prudent to remove independent
oversight from either NNSA or its contractors?
Dr. Kuckuck. No.
Ms. Sanchez. 59) Should the NNSA Administrator, as is the case in
Naval Reactors and as is the case for the Ministry of Defence in the
UK, have the authority to lose confidence in any contractor employee
from the director to lower levels, to increase accountability from the
laboratories?
Dr. Kuckuck. Of course, they have the authority to ``lose
confidence'' in an employee. However, I believe the subsequent
consequences of that loss of confidence must be addressed in advance by
both sides in their contractual agreements.
Ms. Sanchez. 60) Can you comment on the increase in fees post-
privatization of the labs? With such a disparity in fees paid to the
labs, with Sandia National Laboratory receiving a third of the fee that
LANL and LLNL receive, do you think the mission or performance change
depending on the fee level?
Dr. Kuckuck. My career at the laboratories was totally during the
time they were managed by the University of California. There were no
fees until my later years when fees were forced upon the UC by DOE, and
even then the UC turned them all back to the laboratories to invest in
R&D for the nation. There was no impact on performance one way or the
other. I am not in a position to comment on what role fees play under
the new LLC management contracts, but knowing the dedication,
commitment and patriotism of the people at our national laboratories, I
cannot imagine that the award of fees would affect mission performance
per se. However, I am not cognizant of the extent, if any, to which
these fees may be decreasing the resources available for mission.
Ms. Sanchez. 61) You say in your testimony that ``As Director of
the Los Alamos National Laboratory in 2005-2006, I was disappointed
that the laboratory working environment at least as burdensome as I had
experienced at Livermore prior to the creation of NNSA, and
unfortunately, somewhat more adversarial.'' Why do you think the
environment became more adversarial after the creation of NNSA?
Dr. Kuckuck. I cannot be sure if my perceived increase in adversity
was due to a change in time, place or people, or even me. However, I
would suspect that most people were optimistic about the improvements
that were expected with the creation of the NNSA in 2000 and as these
improvements did not materialize as the years went by, perhaps even
worsened, tensions and frustrations, and hence, conflicts invariably
grew.
Ms. Sanchez. 62) How do we instill a culture of trust and expertise
going forward?
Dr. Kuckuck. This is a difficult question and if there was a simple
answer, I think we would have achieved it by now. I think such an end
state will be based on new faces and a fresh start. Hence, beginning
with a severance from the past is probably a reasonable first step.
Ms. Sanchez. 63) How do you improve lines of authority to avoid
conflicting directives?
Dr. Kuckuck. I think the NNSA report of February, 2002 stated an
appropriate management and oversight model.
Ms. Sanchez. 64) There have been a number of changes in the past
year, including DOE streamlining duplicative regulations and NNSA
moving the site manager reporting authority to the office of the
Administrator. Can you share your insights and comment on these
management and governance changes?
Dr. Kuckuck. I have no data upon which to judge the change in
reporting of site managers. However, I have seen no evidence of
streamlined or simplified governance.
Ms. Sanchez. 65) What mechanisms would you recommend to drive down
costs and ensure efficiencies?
Dr. Kuckuck. Eliminate excessive oversight and trust the expertise
embedded in our laboratories. Replace current safety oversight with a
more balanced, but still independent model.
Ms. Sanchez. 66) There are efforts, including in the House NDAA to
reduce the number of NNSA FTEs as progress is made to streamline
management. Could you comment on the risk and benefits of reducing the
number of FTEs at NNSA. If such reductions occur, should we see a
proportional number of efficiencies at labs and cost savings at the
labs?
Dr. Kuckuck. I believe the NNSA would be considerably more
efficient with fewer Federal employees. I think efficiencies would also
result at the laboratories.
Ms. Sanchez. 67) Do you believe that NNSA and their contractors can
accomplish required levels of oversight/self-regulation for complex
high-hazard nuclear operations through a system of performance-based
self-assessments by the contractor and NNSA with no transactional
oversight? If you believe performance-based oversight should be
employed, what level of accidents, if any, do you believe would require
a reinstitution of transactional oversight for complex high-hazard
nuclear operations?
Dr. Kuckuck. I believe that NNSA and their contractors can indeed
manage and operate high-hazard nuclear operations at a safe level. I
believe there should also be balanced, independent performance-based
(vice transactional) oversight.
Ms. Sanchez. 68) What challenges remain to improve accountability
and cost effectiveness?
Dr. Kuckuck. There will always be challenges to improve
accountability and cost effectiveness. The specifics will vary in both
place and time, but continuous improvement should be a fundamental
principle of any endeavor.
Ms. Sanchez. 69) In 2011, the Department of Energy Inspector
General issued a report entitled ``Management Challenges at the
Department of Energy'' which recommended eliminated duplicative
functions at the NNSA, including General Counsel, Chief Information
Officer, Human Resources, Public Affairs. What are the benefits and
risks of this approach? What is the cost of having separate functions?
Dr. Kuckuck. I believe there are no risks with this approach. The
benefits would be the NNSA having the ability to streamline and reduce
the burdens of excessive oversight that the DOE currently brings to the
table. The costs of separate functions would be negligible compared to
the savings that would accrue.
Ms. Sanchez. 70) Do you think that it would have been a better
decision to place NNSA nuclear facilities under Nuclear Regulatory
Commission regulation? Why or why not?
Mr. Aloise. Our October 2008 report addressed the issue of
potentially transferring the regulation of DOE nuclear facilities to
the Nuclear Regulatory Commission or to the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board. [GAO-09-61.] Specifically, we assessed the extent to
which the DOE office responsible for independent assessments of nuclear
safety--the Office of Health, Safety, and Security (HSS)--met GAO's
elements of effective independent nuclear safety oversight. We found
that HSS fell short of fully meeting these criteria. For example, the
office's ability to function independently is limited because it has no
role in reviewing the technical analysis that helps ensure safe design
and operation of nuclear facilities. Nearly all of the shortcomings
that we identified were caused, in part, by DOE's desire to strengthen
oversight by the program offices that are responsible for carrying out
DOE's various missions, with HSS providing assistance. We recommended
that if DOE did not take the necessary actions to meet the criteria for
effective independent oversight, then the Congress should consider,
among other things, shifting the responsibility for regulating nuclear
safety to Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board or to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission. DOE has taken some actions in response to the
recommendations made in this report, but we reported in April 2012 that
recent revisions to safety requirements may undermine efforts to
establish an effective safety culture at DOE's nuclear facilities and
weaken independent oversight of nuclear safety. [GAO-12-347] We
recommended in October 2008 that if DOE does not take appropriate
action to meet the criteria for independent oversight as defined in our
report, then the Congress should consider the following:
permanently establishing in law the responsibilities of
HSS,
shifting DOE to external regulation by providing the
resources and authority to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
to oversee all DOE nuclear facilities and to enforce DOE nuclear safety
rules and directives, or
providing the resources and authority to NRC to
externally regulate all or just newly constructed DOE nuclear
facilities.
Appendix V of our 2007 report assessed the options for the external
regulation of DOE nuclear facilities, either by the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. As
discussed in this appendix, shifting responsibility for external
regulation to either of these organizations appears practical, if they
are given the necessary authority and resources. We reported that that
Nuclear Regulatory Commission had not expressed a view on expanding its
oversight role beyond the DOE facilities already subject to the
commission's regulation. DOE and the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board have taken issue with this option because of concerns about the
transition costs compared with the likely safety benefits of doing so.
[GAO-09-61.]
Ms. Sanchez. 71) Some have asserted that NNSA and its contractors
have reached a mature and high level of safety performance. However,
just in the past year, NNSA site managers have needed to issue a number
of letters to their contractors to correct significant safety
deficiencies.
Examples include:
a. Letter from the LANL Manager to LANS dated September 16,
2011, regarding the safety of operations at LANL
b. Letter from the Pantex Manager to B&W Pantex dated
December 2, 2011, regarding the quality and safety of work at
Pantex
c. Letter from the Pantex Manager to B&W Pantex dated May 29,
2012, regarding deficiencies in safety-related fire suppression
systems
d. Letter from the Y-12 Manager to B&W Y-12 dated January 26,
2012, regarding safety risks from hazardous energy sources
e. Letter from the Y-12 Manager to B&W Y-12 dated May 21,
2012, regarding deficiencies in isolating hazardous energy
sources (the lockout/tagout process)
So, given the number and significance of ongoing safety
deficiencies noted in these letters, do you believe that NNSA and its
contractors have reached a mature, conservative level of safety
performance with regard to complex, nuclear operations, maintenance and
design/construction of new facilities such that they no longer need the
oversight/regulation functions currently performed by DOE? If so, what
data or metrics are you aware of that support your position?
Mr. Aloise. DOE's nuclear facilities will always require a degree
of oversight and regulation. As we reported October 2008 and April
2012, [GAO-09-61, GAO-12-347], we have concerns about the extent to
which the efforts of DOE's Office of Health, Safety, and Security (HSS)
meet the elements of effective oversight. As we reported in 2012, DOE
has acted to reform its safety practices, including greater emphasis on
having HSS review safety design documents for facilities at DOE sites
before their construction, but revisions to nuclear safety requirements
may weaken HSS's ability to conduct independent oversight. For example,
DOE's reform effort did not fully address safety concerns we and others
have identified in three key areas: (1) quality assurance, (2) safety
culture, and (3) Federal oversight. Regarding quality assurance, DOE
strengthened its quality assurance directive by clarifying that
contractors must follow specific industry quality assurance standards,
but quality assurance problems persist. For example, DOE proposed a
nearly $250,000 fine against a contractor in July 2011 after
identifying quality assurance problems in an incident where a worker
punctured his hand with a sharp object contaminated with plutonium.
With regard to safety culture, DOE revised its Integrated Safety
Management directives to attempt to strengthen the safety culture at
its sites, but DOE removed requirements for contractors to follow the
directives because contractors already had to comply with safety
management requirements in Federal regulation. Defense Nuclear Safety
Board officials raised concerns that the requirements in Federal
regulation are less detailed and, as a result, contractors may not
implement safety practices as rigorously as if they were subject to the
more specific requirements in DOE's directives. Finally, regarding
Federal oversight, DOE revised its approach to place greater emphasis
on having its independent oversight staff review safety design
documents before facilities are constructed, rather than after they are
built. Other changes, however, such as requiring oversight staff to
coordinate their assessment activities with DOE site office and
contractor staff, raise concerns about the oversight staff's ability to
provide a critical review of safety at DOE's sites that is independent
from DOE site office and contractor staff.
Ms. Sanchez. 72) You issued a GAO report in February 2012,
Observations on NNSA's Management and Oversight of the Nuclear Security
Enterprise (GAO-12-473T). The purpose of that report was to explore
NNSA's oversight of safety and security in the nuclear security
enterprise. Your conclusion in this report was, and I quote, ``GAO
agrees that excessive oversight and micromanagement of contractors'
activities are not an efficient use of scarce federal resources, but
that NNSA's problems are not caused by excessive oversight but instead
result from ineffective departmental oversight.''
Could you please further explain this conclusion?
Mr. Aloise. Our previous testimonies have focused on problems NNSA
and DOE have experienced in terms of safety, security, and project and
contract management. In our view, we cannot trace these problems to
micromanagement nor could DOE's Inspector General establish a causal
link too overly burdensome regulation. Addressing NNSA's ineffective
management requires the following:
well-trained Federal personnel, both in headquarters and
in the field, with a thorough understanding of NNSA sites and programs;
contracts with measurable performance targets and
financial incentives to meet these targets;
contractor assurance systems that provide detailed
information on, among other things, achieving performance targets;
strong Federal leadership to hold NNSA contractors
accountable for their performance; and
vigorous independent oversight in the crucial areas of
safety and security.
Ms. Sanchez. 73) In October 2008, GAO issued the report, Department
of Energy Needs to Strengthen Its Independent Oversight of Nuclear
Facilities and Operations (GAO-09-61). One conclusion included in that
report was, ``HSS [Office of Health Safety and Security] falls short of
fully meeting GAO's elements of effective independent oversight of
nuclear safety . . . '' Another conclusion was, ``In the absence of
external regulation, DOE needs HSS to be more involved in nuclear
safety oversight because a key objective of independent oversight is to
avoid the potential conflicts of interest that are inherent in program
office oversight.''
Do you believe that the Department has made any significant
improvements in oversight since you issued this report in October 2008?
Do you believe that the oversight model outlined in H.R. 4310 can
satisfy the elements of effective independent oversight that GAO used
as its standard of comparison in 2008?
Mr. Aloise. DOE's Office of Health, Safety, and Security (HSS) took
a number of important steps to implement the recommendations we made in
our October 2008 report. For example, as we reported in April 2012
[GAO-12-347.], HSS is reviewing safety design documents for facilities
at DOE sites before their construction and establishing site leads
within HSS to maintain and assess all aspects of a site's operations.
However, we also reported that recent revisions to safety requirements
may weaken HSS's ability to conduct independent oversight. For example,
we found that HHS must now coordinate its assessment activities with
site office management, which could compromise the ability of HHS to
perform its mission independently.
Concerning H.R. 4310, we have not formally evaluated the proposed
legislation, but we observe that any revisions to independent oversight
of NNSA should adhere to the criteria we used in evaluating the
effectiveness of HSS in October 2008. These criteria include (1)
independence, (2) technical expertise, (3) capability to perform
reviews and have findings effectively addressed, (4) enforcement, and
(5) public access to facility information.
Ms. Sanchez. 74) Mr. Aloise noted in his testimony that
``Significant improvement is still needed especially in NNSA's
management of its major projects and contracts.''
Should contractors subcontract major construction projects or
should NNSA contract and manage these directly? As an example, NNSA in
recent years had a pilot program consisting of NNSA contracting
directly for the repair of roves across the nuclear complex which was a
successful effort but was discontinued.
Mr. Aloise. We have not specifically examined whether contractors
should subcontract major construction projects or whether NNSA should
contract and manage these projects directly. However, in our 2011
report on two planned NNSA procurements, [GAO, Modernizing the Nuclear
Security Enterprise: The National Nuclear Security Administration's
Proposed Acquisition Strategy Needs Further Clarification and
Assessment, GAO-11-848 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 20, 11).], we noted
that the agency's own analysis showed that simply changing contract
types and structures will produce little effect unless NNSA better
manages its contracts. Furthermore, we reported that NNSA's analysis
underpinning its procurement decisions also identified 18 better
management practices--some of which could be accomplished now through
existing contracts--such as improving enterprisewide collection and
analysis of costs that could lead to greater efficiencies regardless of
the contracting strategy employed.
We are also on record as opposing DOE's use of ``fast-track''
design-build--where design, construction, and technology development
occur simultaneously--for designing and constructing one-of-a-kind,
complex nuclear facilities. We have found that this approach, among
other things, increases the risk of encountering problems that can
increase a project's cost and delay completion on schedule. [GAO,
Hanford Waste Treatment Plant: Contractor and DOE Management Problems
Have Led to Higher Costs, Construction Delays, and Safety Concerns,
GAO-06-602T (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 6, 2006).]
Ms. Sanchez. 75) What is the role for independent safety oversight?
What is the appropriate risk level for hazardous and nuclear
operations?
Mr. Aloise. As we reported in October 2008, any independent
regulatory authority would need to meet the criteria for effective
independent oversight: independence, technical expertise, ability to
perform reviews and have findings effectively addressed, enforcement,
and public access to facility information. [GAO-09-61.] As we reported,
DOE and/or Congress have the following options they could take to
improve independent oversight:
permanently establishing in law the responsibilities of
DOE's Office of Health, Safety and Security;
shifting DOE to external regulation by providing the
resources and authority to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
to oversee all DOE nuclear facilities and to enforce DOE nuclear safety
rules and directives; or
providing the resources and authority to the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission to externally regulate all or just newly
constructed DOE nuclear facilities.
Appendix V of our 2008 report assessed the options for external
regulation of DOE nuclear facilities, either by the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board or the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. As
discussed in this appendix, shifting responsibility for external
regulation to either of these organizations appears practical, given
the necessary authority and resources. We reported that NRC had not
expressed a view on expanding its oversight role beyond the DOE
facilities already subject to NRC regulation. DOE and the Safety Board
have taken issue with this option because of concerns about the
transition costs compared with the likely safety benefits of doing so.
Ms. Sanchez. 76) Who should balance risk and mission? Should it be
NNSA or the labs?
Mr. Aloise. Both NNSA and its contractors share responsibilities in
managing the risks of day-to-day activities. However, the nuclear
enterprise's sites, including facilities and equipment, are Government
owned and contractor operated, formal acceptance of risk--balancing
mission needs compared with potential risks--is ultimately a Federal
responsibility. Some high-security risks require the notification of
the Secretary of Energy.
Ms. Sanchez. 77) Do you believe it's prudent to remove independent
oversight from either NNSA or its contractors?
Mr. Aloise. No. In our view there will always be a need for
independent oversight for health, safety and security issues.
Ms. Sanchez. 78) Do you believe that the DNFSB performs a needed,
independent oversight function?
Mr. Aloise. Yes. In our view, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board performs a needed, independent oversight function. In our October
2008 review of DOE's Office of Health, Safety, and Security, [GAO-09-
61.] we noted that the Safety Board was given responsibilities to (1)
review and evaluate the content and implementation of the standards for
the design, construction, operation, and decommissioning of defense
nuclear facilities; (2) investigate any event or practice at these
facilities that it determines has adversely affected or may adversely
affect public health and safety; (3) analyze design and operational
data, including safety analysis reports; (4) review new facility design
and monitor construction, recommending any changes within a reasonable
time period; and (5) make such recommendations to the Secretary of
Energy, considering the technical and economic feasibility of
implementing them. By statute, the Secretary must respond in writing to
the Safety Board to accept or reject the recommendation and make this
public. If the Safety Board transmits a recommendation relating to an
imminent or severe threat, it is to also transmit the recommendation to
the President and provide as information to the Secretary of Defense.
The President is to review DOE's response and accept or reject the
Safety Board's recommendation. The Safety Board does not have the
authority of a regulator but rather uses both informal interactions and
formal communications with DOE to implement its statutory ``action
forcing authorities.'' We believe that this range of responsibilities
is an important aspect of ensuring the safety of DOE's defense nuclear
facilities.
We did note in our report, however, the following limitations with
the Safety Board's responsibilities:
As of December 2007, the Safety Board did not have
responsibility for DOE's 51 nondefense high-hazard nuclear facilities.
While DOE had been responsive to the Safety Board's
recommendations, a number of past deficiencies remained unresolved, and
the pace of closure for many other recommendations has been slow.
Specifically, it had taken DOE up to 11 years to obtain closure from
the Safety Board for some recommendations, and some systemwide
recommendations had remained open for a decade or more.
A 1995 DOE Advisory Committee report found that the
Safety Board was not subject to the same checks and balances as Nuclear
Regulatory Commission is with respect to regulating NRC's licensees.
Ms. Sanchez. 79) Do you think that oversight by the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board has helped or hindered the ability of NNSA to
carry out its missions?
Mr. Aloise. We believe that the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety
Board has helped NNSA to carry out its missions. As described in our
response to question 78, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's
primary responsibility is safety. However, we also believe safety and
security are fundamental components of DOE and NNSA's missions.
Furthermore, we do not believe that the Defense Nuclear Facilities
Safety Board has hindered NNSA's mission because, according to statute,
it is a DOE responsibility to accept or reject the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board's recommendations and the Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board has no enforcement authority. In our view, it
is the responsibility of DOE and NNSA to balance mission needs with the
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's recommendations.
Ms. Sanchez. 80) Should the NNSA Administrator, as is the case in
Naval Reactors and as is the case for the Ministry of Defence in the
UK, have the authority to lose confidence in any contractor employee
from the director to lower levels, to increase accountability from the
laboratories?
Mr. Aloise. We are not in a position to address this question
because we have not examined how NNSA's Office of Naval Reactors or the
Ministry of Defence in the United Kingdom manage their contractors.
Ms. Sanchez. 81) Can you comment on the increase in fees post-
privatization of the labs? With such a disparity in fees paid to the
labs, with Sandia National Laboratory receiving a third of the fee that
LANL and LLNL receive, do you think the mission or performance change
depending on the fee level?
Mr. Aloise. We are not in a position to address this question
because we have not systematically examined whether the additional
costs of the Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory contracts have been worth the additional fees. A
recent National Academy of Sciences study reported that additional
costs for the two laboratories total about $210 million annually. These
costs include fees, taxes, and personnel issues, such as pension
changes. We note that this study found little relationship between the
nature of the laboratories' contracts and their scientific and
engineering accomplishments and outputs, which continue at a high
level. NNSA plans to recomplete the Sandia National Laboratory contract
in the near future, but we do not know the details of NNSA's planned
acquisition strategy.
Ms. Sanchez. 82) How do we instill a culture of trust and expertise
going forward?
Mr. Aloise. Given NNSA's record of weak management of its major
projects, safety and security issues, and lack of basic enterprisewide
data, we believe that careful and capable Federal oversight is critical
to an efficient and effective nuclear weapons program. We support
NNSA's efforts to move to more effective, performance-based oversight.
As we testified in February 2012, NNSA's progress has been mixed. [GAO,
National Nuclear Security Administration: Observations on NNSA's
Management and Oversight of the Nuclear Security Enterprise, GAO-12-
473T (Washington, D.C.: Feb. 16, 2012).] Based on our past and ongoing
work, we believe important elements of performance-based oversight
include the following:
well-trained Federal personnel, both in headquarters and
in the field; with a thorough understanding of NNSA sites and programs;
contracts with measurable performance targets and
financial incentives to meet these targets;
contractor assurance systems that provide detailed
information on, among other things, achieving performance targets;
strong Federal leadership to hold NNSA contractors
accountable for their performance; and
vigorous independent oversight in the crucial areas of
safety and security.
Ms. Sanchez. 83) How do you improve lines of authority to avoid
conflicting directives?
Mr. Aloise. The creation of NNSA and its implementation have
already largely addressed the issue of improving the lines of
authority. As we reported in June 2004, by better delineating lines of
authority between NNSA headquarters and its field offices, NNSA's
reorganization has addressed past problems, such as communication
problems resulting from the overlapping roles and responsibilities of
the Federal workforce that oversees the nuclear weapons program. [GAO,
National Nuclear Security Administration: Key Management Structure and
Workforce Planning Issues Remain as NNSA Conducts Downsizing, GAO-04-
545, (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2004).] For example, according to NNSA
site office managers, the streamlined structure has improved vertical
communication because communication channels between headquarters and
the field do not involve an extra layer of management in the operations
offices. In addition, the realignment provides NNSA site office
managers with additional authority to manage contractors and assigns
them responsibility for the day-to-day security and safety of
contractor operations. As a result, the realignment has strengthened
the hand of local NNSA site office managers, who now have the authority
to shut down operations for safety and security reasons.
We have not systematically examined the issue of conflicting
directives, but we reported on DOE's and NNSA's efforts to streamline
directives. [GAO, Nuclear Safety: DOE Needs to Determine the Costs and
Benefits of Its Safety Reform Effort, GAO-12-347 (Washington, D.C.:
Apr. 20, 2012).] In addition, NNSA has the authority to develop its own
tailored directives through its Policy Letter procedure. [NNSA, Policy
Letters: NNSA Policies, Supplemental Directives, and Business Operating
Procedures, NASD 251.1 (Washington, D.C.: July 5, 2011).]
Ms. Sanchez. 84) There have been a number of changes in the past
year, including DOE streamlining duplicative regulations and NNSA
moving the site manager reporting authority to the office of the
Administrator. Can you share your insights and comment on these
management and governance changes?
Mr. Aloise. As we reported in July 2012, the benefits of DOE's
reform effort announced in a March 2010 memorandum--reducing the number
of safety-related directives from 80 to 42 by eliminating or combining
requirements the Department determined were unclear, duplicative, or
too prescriptive and by encouraging the use of industry standards--are
not clear for several reasons. [GAO-12-347] Specifically, DOE did not
(1) determine how the original requirements impaired productivity or
added costs, (2) assess whether the cost to implement the revised
directives would exceed the benefits, or (3) develop performance
measures in order to assess how the reform effort will lead to improved
productivity or lower costs. Furthermore, DOE's safety reform effort
did not fully address safety concerns we and others identified in the
areas of quality assurance, safety culture, and Federal oversight. In
fact, some of the revisions DOE made to its safety-related directives
may actually result in weakened independent oversight. For example,
while DOE policy notes that independent oversight is integral to help
ensure the effectiveness of safety performance, DOE's Office of
Independent Oversight staff must now coordinate its assessment
activities with NNSA site office management to maximize the use of
resources. This arrangement potentially raises concerns about whether
Office of Independent Oversight staff will be sufficiently independent
from site office management. In addition, the reform effort gives the
NNSA site office, rather than Office of Independent Oversight staff,
increased responsibility for managing actions to correct problems
identified in independent assessments. Site office determinations of
what issues require more formal contractor responses may be influenced
by the fact that the site offices also have responsibility for keeping
costs under control and work on schedule.
We have not examined NNSA's governance changes, which involved
revising the agency's business model to, among other things, place more
reliance on contractors' self-oversight through contractor assurance
systems to ensure such things as effective safety and security
performance. However, in response to the new business model, the
Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board and the DOE Office of Inspector
General raised concerns about contractor assurance systems. For
example, in an April 2011 congressional testimony, the chairman of
Safety Board stated that contractor assurance systems at defense
nuclear facilities have not achieved a degree of effectiveness that
would warrant a reduction in Federal safety oversight and that they are
not expected to achieve this effectiveness in the foreseeable future.
Ms. Sanchez. 85) What mechanisms would you recommend to drive down
costs and ensure efficiencies?
Mr. Aloise. In terms of project and contract and project
management, NNSA remains on our high-risk list and remains vulnerable
to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. DOE has recently taken a
number of actions to improve management of major projects, including
those overseen by NNSA. For example, DOE has updated program and
project management policies and guidance in an effort to improve the
reliability of project cost estimates, better assess project risks, and
better ensure project reviews that are timely and useful and identify
problems early. Although DOE's responses to our recommendations and its
own findings have been largely positive, and a number of corrective
actions have been taken, problems persist, as demonstrated by a number
of our recent reports, which we summarized in our February and June
2012 testimonies. However, DOE needs to ensure that NNSA has the
capacity--that is, the people and other resources--to resolve its
project management difficulties and that it has a program to monitor
and independently validate the effectiveness and sustainability of its
corrective measures. This is particularly important as NNSA embarks on
its long-term, multibillion-dollar effort to modernize the nuclear
security enterprise.
Ms. Sanchez. 86) There are efforts, including in the House NDAA to
reduce the number of NNSA FTEs as progress is made to streamline
management. Could you comment on the risk and benefits of reducing the
number of FTEs at NNSA. If such reductions occur, should we see a
proportional number of efficiencies at labs and cost savings at the
labs?
Mr. Aloise. Based on previous work, reducing the number of NNSA
employees without completing workforce plans now being developed could
have risks. For strategic planning purposes, NNSA is undertaking a
comprehensive reassessment and analysis of staffing requirements to
ascertain future Federal workforce requirements. NNSA-wide workforce
plans are not expected to be completed until 2013, according to NNSA
officials. [GAO, Modernizing the Nuclear Security Enterprise,
Strategies and Challenges in Sustaining Critical Skills in Federal and
Contractor Workforces, GAO-12-468 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 26, 2012).]
These plans are critical to effective streamlining of management. As we
have reported, when downsizing takes place in an unstructured
environment, agencies experience significant challenges to deploying
people with the right skills, in the right places, at the right time,
and to performing its missions economically, efficiently, and
effectively. For example, in June 2004 we reported that an earlier NNSA
reorganization was unlikely to ensure that the agency had sufficient
staff with the right skills in the right places because NNSA chose to
downsize its Federal workforce without determining what critical skills
and capabilities it needed to meet its mission and program goals. [GAO,
National Nuclear Security Administration: Key Management Structure and
Workforce Planning Issues Remain as NNSA Conducts Downsizing, GAO-04-
545, (Washington, D.C.: June 25, 2004).] In December 2001, we reported
that NNSA did not have the coherent human capital and workforce
planning strategies it needed to develop and maintain a well managed
workforce over the long run. [GAO, NNSA Management: Progress in the
Implementation of Title 32, GAO-02-93R (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 12,
2001).] Consequently, we recommended that NNSA develop a thorough human
capital and workforce planning strategy. Instead of developing a
workforce plan, according to a senior NNSA official, NNSA managers
relied on their judgment about how much to reduce the Federal staff and
where those reductions should occur in carrying out its December 2002
reorganization. NNSA did develop a workforce plan in December 2003 that
attempted to establish a framework for long-term workforce planning,
but this plan is of limited use without current statistics on
workforce, positions, and organizational structures.
We are uncertain what, if any, NNSA Federal workforce reductions
would have on the contractor workforce.
Ms. Sanchez. 87) Do you believe that NNSA and their contractors can
accomplish required levels of oversight/self-regulation for complex
high-hazard nuclear operations through a system of performance-based
self-assessments by the contractor and NNSA with no transactional
oversight? If you believe performance-based oversight should be
employed, what level of accidents, if any, do you believe would require
a reinstitution of transactional oversight for complex high-hazard
nuclear operations?
Mr. Aloise. We are supportive of NNSA's moves toward a more
performance-based approach to oversight. For example, in our review of
security at Los Alamos National Laboratory, we recommended that the
Administrator of NNSA provide meaningful financial incentives in future
performance evaluation plans for implementation of for laboratory
security. [GAO, Los Alamos National Laboratory: Long-Term Strategies
Needed to Improve Security and Management Oversight, GAO-08-694
(Washington, D.C.: June 13, 2008).] We similarly recommended providing
financial incentives to LLNL's contractor to sustain security
performance improvements. [GAO, Nuclear Security: Better Oversight
Needed to Ensure That Security Improvements at Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory Are Fully Implemented and Sustained, GAO-09-321
(Washington, D.C.: Mar. 16, 2009).] However, in our view, effectively
evaluating performance, as opposed to ensuring compliance, is likely to
be more demanding, will require skilled personnel, and needs to be done
more than once a year. More specifically, our past work has found
issues with NNSA's oversight of security, including staffing shortages
at NNSA site offices, inadequate security staff training, and lack of
comprehensive security data. These issues have hampered the agency's
understanding of the overall effectiveness of its security program.
[GAO-07-36.]
We have made similar findings regarding NNSA's project management.
While noting recent actions, we believe that DOE needs to ensure that
NNSA has the capacity--that is, the people and other resources--to
resolve its project management difficulties and that it has a program
to monitor and independently validate the effectiveness and
sustainability of its corrective measures. This is particularly
important as NNSA embarks on its long-term, multibillion-dollar effort
to modernize the nuclear security enterprise. [GAO-12-473]
Contractor self-assessments are important but are just one element
of a contract administration and oversight program. Other elements of
equal importance are the following:
well-trained Federal personnel, both in headquarters and
in the field, with a thorough understanding of NNSA sites and programs;
contracts with measurable performance targets and
financial incentives to meet these targets;
contractor assurance systems that provide detailed
information on, among other things, achieving performance targets;
strong Federal leadership to hold NNSA contractors
accountable for their performance; and
vigorous independent oversight in the crucial areas of
safety and security.
Ms. Sanchez. 88) What challenges remain to improve accountability
and cost effectiveness?
Mr. Aloise. In terms of accountability and cost effects in managing
projects and contracts, NNSA remains on our high-risk list and remains
vulnerable to fraud, waste, abuse, and mismanagement. DOE has recently
taken a number of actions to improve management of major projects,
including those overseen by NNSA. For example, DOE has updated program
and project management policies and guidance in an effort to improve
the reliability of project cost estimates, better assess project risks,
and better ensure project reviews that are timely and useful and
identify problems early. Although DOE's responses to our
recommendations and its own findings have been largely positive, and a
number of corrective actions have been taken, problems persist, as
demonstrated by a number of our recent reports, which are summarized in
our February and June 2012 testimonies. However, DOE needs to ensure
that NNSA has the capacity--that is, the people and other resources--to
resolve its project management difficulties and that it has a program
to monitor and independently validate the effectiveness and
sustainability of its corrective measures. This capacity issue is
particularly important as NNSA embarks on its long-term, multibillion-
dollar effort to modernize the nuclear security enterprise.
Given NNSA's record of weak management of its major projects,
safety and security issues, and lack of basic enterprisewide data, we
believe that careful and capable Federal oversight is critical to an
efficient and effective nuclear weapons program. We support NNSA's
efforts to move to more effective, performance-based oversight. As our
testimony shows, NNSA's progress has been mixed. [GAO-12-473T.] Based
on our past and ongoing work, we believe important elements of
performance based oversight include the following:
well-trained Federal personnel, both in headquarters and
in the field, with a thorough understanding of NNSA sites and programs;
contracts with measurable performance targets and
financial incentives to meet these targets;
contractor assurance systems that provide detailed
information on, among other things, achieving performance targets;
strong Federal leadership to hold NNSA contractors
accountable for their performance; and
vigorous independent oversight in the crucial areas of
safety and security.
Ms. Sanchez. 89) In 2011, the Department of Energy Inspector
General issued a report entitled ``Management Challenges at the
Department of Energy'' which recommended eliminated duplicative
functions at the NNSA, including General Counsel, Chief Information
Officer, Human Resources, Public Affairs. What are the benefits and
risks of this approach? What is the cost of having separate functions?
Mr. Aloise. We share the Inspector General's views that merging
these functions back into DOE would require amending the NNSA Act,
which prohibits the use of dual-hatting (i.e., having DOE officials
contemporaneously serve in NNSA and DOE positions) and specifies NNSA's
separately organized status. Some personnel cost savings might result
if duplicative positions were eliminated but these savings are likely
to be small.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Mr. Langevin. 90) In 2011, the Department of Energy Inspector
General issued a report entitled ``Management Challenges at the
Department of Energy'' which recommended eliminating duplicative
functions at the NNSA, including General Counsel, Chief Information
Officer, Human Resources, and Public Affairs. 1. What are the benefits
of this approach?
Dr. Kuckuck. This is the same question as #69, hence, same answer.
Mr. Langevin. 91) In 2011, the Department of Energy Inspector
General issued a report entitled ``Management Challenges at the
Department of Energy'' which recommended eliminating duplicative
functions at the NNSA, including General Counsel, Chief Information
Officer, Human Resources, and Public Affairs. 2. What is the cost of
having separate functions?
Dr. Kuckuck. This is the same question as #69, hence, same answer.
Mr. Langevin. 92) Have the recommendations made by GAO in its 2007
report been implemented satisfactorily?
Mr. Aloise. DOE and NNSA have responded positively to 20 of the 21
the recommendations we made in our 2007 report. [GAO-07-36.] We
continue to monitor the agencies' progress in implementing these
recommendations and note general progress in improving their security
program, but more persistent problems in project management.
DOE, however, disagreed with one of the 2007 report's
recommendation. More specifically, we recommended that, to ensure that
NNSA functions as a separately organized agency, the Secretary of
Energy and the Administrator, NNSA, should clearly define NNSA's status
as a separately organized agency within the Department. In his 31 USC
Section 720 response to our report, the Deputy Secretary of Energy
stated that he did not concur with this recommendation. He stated that
elements of the Department and NNSA had executed memorandums of
understanding specifying how certain departmentwide functions would be
performed while respecting the statutory insulation of NNSA personnel.
He also stated that the Department will consider issuing circumstance-
specific guidance where required to correct misperceptions about the
effect of the NNSA's act limitations. Since we received the letter,
there have been instances where the DOE-NNSA relationship has become
less clear. For example, DOE recently announced that DOE's
Environmental Management program will begin to report to NNSA
Administrator, who simultaneously is an Under Secretary for Energy. As
a result, we have left this recommendation open and still believe
further clarification of the NNSA-DOE relationship is needed.
Mr. Langevin. 93) What efficiencies do you recommend going forward?
Mr. Aloise. Generally, our recommendations have focused on
improving the effectiveness of NNSA. In our view, focusing unduly on
efficiencies may disrupt some of the progress NNSA has made over the
past 12 years. Our ideas on improving effectiveness follow. DOE has
recently taken a number of actions to improve management of major
projects, including those overseen by NNSA. For example, DOE has
updated program and project management policies and guidance in an
effort to improve the reliability of project cost estimates, better
assess project risks, and better ensure project reviews that are timely
and useful and identify problems early. Nevertheless, problems persist,
as we noted in our February and June 2012 testimonies that summarized
recent reports. [GAO-12-473T.] In particular, we noted that DOE needs
to ensure that NNSA has the capacity--that is, the people and other
resources--to resolve its project management difficulties and that it
has a program to monitor and independently validate the effectiveness
and sustainability of its corrective measures. This capacity and
monitoring program are particularly important as NNSA embarks on its
long-term, multibillion-dollar effort to modernize the nuclear security
enterprise.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HEINRICH
Mr. Heinrich. 94) Based on the testimony, it appears that the keys
to success are (1) finding the proper balance between oversight and
operations, (2) strong leadership at NNSA, and (3) deep partnership
between senior NNSA officials and the national security lab directors.
But it's hard to legislate balance, leadership and good behavior. If
you were to have the opportunity to be the NNSA Administrator again,
what would you want in your tool chest to address each of these three
issues?
Mr. Brooks. I agree with your conclusion that the three factors you
cite are the keys to NNSA's success (or that of almost any other
organization). In order to find the proper balance between oversight
and operations, I would want it to be clear that my chain of command
and ultimately me personally were the ones responsible and that we were
not to be second guessed by other entities. I believe this is the only
one of the three factors you cite that is amenable to legislation.
With regard to strong leadership at NNSA, I believe existing law
gives the Administrator all the authority he or she requires to select
the right officials and to establish internal procedures to allow them
to do their job. I was extremely fortunate during my tenure to have an
outstanding group of career civil servants in leadership positions. My
attempts to establish a ``strong site manager'' model (described in a
previous response) were, I believe, correct. Thus, existing Federal law
is adequate in this area. I believe, however, that it is necessary to
find a way of giving new managers more effective training. From my 30
years in the military and the Department of Defense, I am struck by how
much more time is spent on training the career leadership in those
organizations. I do not have specific recommendations in this area
which is, of course, not an exclusive concern of NNSA.
Finally, with regard to partnership between senior NNSA officials
and the national security laboratory directors, I do not believe there
were any tools I needed that I did not have. My experience was that,
despite the fact that the laboratory directors and I all found frequent
personal private meetings to be exceptionally useful, such meetings
were difficult to arrange given the exceptional workload of both
laboratory directors and senior Federal officials. Obviously there is
no solution to this except setting priorities on the part of the
Administrator.
Mr. Heinrich. 95) Ambassador Brooks, at the end of your written
testimony you mention that: ``Finally, if the Congress wants--as I
believe it should--the type of relationship between NNSA and the
laboratories that I described as part of our vision, it must be
constantly on guard against the tendency, when problems arise, to ask
why federal overseers did not prevent the problem though more detailed
audits and inspections.'' What suggestions would you have for Congress
to help improve the performance of the NNSA?
Mr. Brooks. I believe that Congress needs to spend considerable
time ensuring that it understands the cause of the current problems at
NNSA. The panel established by the National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2013 may help. As I have testified, I believe that the
failure of the current semi-autonomous approach to NNSA will require
legislation to correct. Given that all change is disruptive, it is
important to be as certain as possible that those of us seeking to
improve the situation are dealing with the real problem and not taking
action to solve problems that may have existed in the past but are not
current issues. Thus I believe the Congress must take all testimony of
those of us whose experience is several years in the past with some
degree of skepticism.
The other thing that this committee can do is to serve as a
champion for NNSA on the Hill. I was extremely fortunate during my
tenure to have strong and bipartisan support from this committee. I
understand that that situation continues.
Mr. Heinrich. 96) Based on the testimony, it appears that the keys
to success are (1) finding the proper balance between oversight and
operations, (2) strong leadership at NNSA, and (3) deep partnership
between senior NNSA officials and the national security lab directors.
But it's hard to legislate balance, leadership and good behavior. If
you were to have the opportunity to be the NNSA Administrator, what
would you want in your tool chest to address each of these three
issues?
Dr. Kuckuck. The Administrator would need a true commitment, and
visible support from the Congress and the Administration for a new,
balanced NNSA. A convincing commitment from those entities would then
allow the enticement of top scientific and management talent to serve
as NNSA leadership--a condition that does not exist today. The
Administrator and his/her strong leadership team could then establish
the proper balanced oversight model and develop the partnerships that
are necessary not only with the laboratories, but also across the
entire NNSA complex and with external partners and customers. This
would not be achievable overnight even with the best of leadership.
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