[Senate Hearing 112-228]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 112-228
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (START) AND
PLANS FOR FUTURE REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS
POST-NEW START TREATY
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
of the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MAY 4, 2011
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
__________
72-462 PDF WASHINGTON : 2011
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COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina KELLY AYOTTE, New Hampshire
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JOE MANCHIN III, West Virginia LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
RICHARD BLUMENTHAL, Connecticut
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
David M. Morriss, Minority Staff Director
______
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska, Chairman
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
MARK UDALL, Colorado ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
MARK BEGICH, Alaska ROB PORTMAN, Ohio
JEANNE SHAHEEN, New Hampshire JOHN CORNYN, Texas
KIRSTEN E. GILLIBRAND, New York DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Implementation of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) and
Plans for Future Reductions in Nuclear Warheads and Delivery Systems
Post-New START Treaty
may 4, 2011
Page
Perry, Hon. William J., Michael and Barbara Berberian Professor,
Center for International Security and Cooperation, Stanford
University, Former Secretary of Defense........................ 4
Miller, Hon. James N., Jr., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy............................................. 24
Kehler, Gen. C. Robert, USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.. 28
Payne, Dr. Keith B., Professor and Head, Graduate Department of
Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University
(Washington Campus)............................................ 30
(iii)
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY (START) AND
PLANS FOR FUTURE REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR WARHEADS AND DELIVERY SYSTEMS
POST-NEW START TREATY
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WEDNESDAY, MAY 4, 2011
U.S. Senate,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to notice, at 2:31 p.m. in
room SR-232A, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator E.
Benjamin Nelson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Nelson, Udall, Shaheen,
and Sessions.
Committee staff members present: Leah C. Brewer,
nominations and hearings clerk; and Jennifer L. Stoker,
security clerk.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; and Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member.
Minority staff member present: Daniel A. Lerner,
professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Hannah I. Lloyd and Breon N.
Wells.
Committee members' assistants present: Ann Premer,
assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Casey Howard, assistant to
Senator Udall; Chad Kreikemeier, assistant to Senator Shaheen;
and Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator
Sessions.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR E. BENJAMIN NELSON, CHAIRMAN
Senator Nelson. Good afternoon. The subcommittee meets this
afternoon to discuss implementation of the New Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START) and the next steps for possible future
reductions in strategic systems beyond those in the New START
treaty. With us today we have: Principal Deputy Under Secretary
of Defense for Policy, Dr. Jim Miller; Commander of U.S.
Strategic Command (STRATCOM), General C. Robert Kehler; former
Secretary of Defense, Dr. William Perry; and Dr. Keith Payne,
Professor and Head, Graduate Department of Defense and
Strategic Studies, Missouri State University at the Washington
Campus.
Dr. Perry was the Chairman of the Perry-Schlesinger
Strategic Posture Commission. Dr. Payne was a member of that
Posture Commission. Other than General Kehler, all of our
witnesses this afternoon have testified on previous occasions
on the topic of strategic arms reduction during the Senate
consideration of the New START treaty. The only reason General
Kehler didn't is because he was appointed subsequent to that.
The organization of the hearing today is not the norm as
we're having just one panel of witnesses, both government and
private sector. Normally this hearing would have been conducted
in two panels, but to allow us to take full advantage of Dr.
Perry's limited availability today we're having one panel.
In that regard, I would note that Dr. Perry has to leave at
3:15 p.m. so he can catch his flight back to California for a
speech. As a result, I'll forego additional opening remarks
until later in the hearing, and I'd ask as well our witnesses
to forego some opening remarks, but ask each witness to make
closing remarks at the end of the hearing.
Dr. Perry, we would like to have any closing remarks from
you as well prior to departure at 3:15 p.m. Several people are
watching the clock so that time doesn't get away from us and we
keep you on schedule.
All written statements that have been received will, of
course, be included in the record.
Now I turn to my ranking member, my good friend, Senator
Sessions.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JEFF SESSIONS
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It's a pleasure
to work with you. I know your expertise and interest in these
important matters.
Today's hearing is a continuation of our dialogue on U.S.
strategic posture in a post-New START treaty environment in
what appears to be the administration's intention to change
U.S. nuclear doctrine and targeting guidance in an attempt to
pursue further reductions in the nuclear stockpile on the path
to what many of us feel is a misguided and dangerous idea of a
world without nuclear weapons.
I wish it were so, but I believe that it's beyond
unrealistic. It really could be dangerous if it clouds our
thinking.
When we commissioned the bipartisan Perry-Schlesinger
Strategic Posture Commission in 2008, we looked to a
distinguished panel of 12 independent experts to address the
current state and future role of nuclear weapons and strategic
deterrence, among other crucial national security issues. Dr.
Perry, thank you for your leadership. Dr. Payne, thank you for
serving as a valuable member of that commission.
Among their many findings and recommendations, the Posture
Commission emphasized the importance of achieving balance by
sustaining a nuclear deterrence for the indefinite future while
reducing reliance on nuclear weapons for deterrence. It is a
balanced approach, and I'm concerned that the administration
may be on the verge of abandoning that approach, opting instead
for a nuclear weapons policy focused on unilateral reductions,
an approach the Posture Commission warned would ``weaken the
deterrence of foes and the assurance of allies.''
While the Posture Commission expressed differing visions of
what might be possible in the long term, they urged extreme
caution towards pursuing any approach characterized as being
lopsided and concluded that: ``So long as nuclear dangers
remain, the United States must have a strong deterrence that is
effective in meeting its security needs and those of its
allies.''
So I look forward to hearing from Dr. Perry and Dr. Payne
as we go forward to discuss the balance that we need to
achieve.
Recent statements by the President's National Security
Advisor have prompted new questions in my mind about the
administration's intent to pursue additional reductions. In his
speech before the Carnegie Endowment, National Security
Advisor, Tom Donilon, the President's right-hand man, stated
that the administration is currently ``making preparations for
the next round of nuclear reductions'' already, and that the
Department of Defense (DOD) will be directed to ``review our
strategic requirements and develop options for further
reductions in our current nuclear stockpile.''
Mr. Donilon continued, stating that in meeting these
objectives the White House will direct DOD to consider
potential changes in targeting requirements and alert
procedures. Furthermore, by inferring that the New START treaty
signified a ``shared goal of disarmament,'' his words, between
the United States and Russia--so I question the reality and the
seriousness of that goal, frankly.
The U.S. Senate did not consent to a goal of disarmament.
That was not part of the New START treaty.
The U.S. Senate has also not agreed to or been consulted on
unilateral nuclear reductions, which according to recent press
reports the administration is also considering.
So I look forward to hearing our witnesses' assessments of
Mr. Donilon's comments, to better understand from our DOD
witnesses what actions they've been instructed to take, how
such guidance could influence the ongoing modernization of the
triad of nuclear delivery vehicles, and the potential
operational impacts of such guidance on force posture,
targeting, and alert procedures.
The outdated state of nuclear weapons complex and the
overdue need for robust investment is an area of significant
concern, and I think we share that. I commend the President for
working with Congress to address it. In response to the Posture
Commission's assessment and the urging of Congress, the
administration has identified a need for more than $200 billion
over the next 10 years to modernize and sustain our nuclear
deterrence. This is a level of investment that appears to be
absolutely necessary to create the kind of weapons systems we
need. Maybe some efficiencies can occur, but fundamentally we
need to meet the goal we set of modernizing our facilities and
our weapons systems.
We should remember that during the Cold War we devoted
about one-quarter of our defense budget to the nuclear
deterrence mission. Today our current spending will account for
only some 3 percent of the defense spending. With a sustained,
whole-of-government commitment to modernizing our forces, we
will be postured to better face the challenges of the future.
The conditions for further reductions, in my opinion, however,
do not exist today, and while a modernized and robust
manufacturing and delivery capability will gradually instill
greater confidence and increased deterrence, even then I remain
unconvinced that the conditions will ever exist to facilitate
reductions below the New START levels. I just think there's a
danger in going below this level and I think we need to be
careful and thoughtful about it. The future threat remains
dynamic. We look forward to hearing your testimony.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I welcome the witnesses.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Dr. Perry, I'll go with the first question here. You were
the Chairman of the Strategic Posture Commission, as indicated,
and one of the Posture Commission's findings was that reaching
the ultimate goal of global nuclear elimination would require a
fundamental change in the world geopolitical order.
Did the Posture Commission have a view on the conditions
for future incremental reductions beyond those in the New START
treaty, number one? Number two, in your view, what sort of
changes, if any, in geopolitical order would merit additional
reductions?
Dr. Perry. The answer to the first question, Senator
Nelson, is that the Commission did not look directly at the
question of what should follow. It advocated support of the New
START treaty, but did not seriously discuss the steps that
would follow after that.
In my own view, what would be required there is very
difficult, but worth doing, is coming to an agreement with the
Russians on the tactical nuclear weapons, of which they have
several thousand and of which we only have a few hundred.
There's a real asymmetry in forces between the United States
and Russia in that regard, and there's a real asymmetry in
threat perception, which leads the Russians to believe they
need those tactical nuclear weapons. They live in a different
neighborhood than we live in.
I'm very much in favor of moving forward with a follow-on
treaty. I think it's going to need to include tactical nuclear
weapons. I think that will be a very difficult task, but not
impossible to arrive at a way of dealing with that problem.
Senator Nelson. From your perspective, you don't see the
administration moving unilaterally to reduce the arms?
Dr. Perry. No, I do not. I think all of the actions that
I've seen from the administration and all the statements that
have been made suggest they're going to move hand-in-hand with
the Russians, and I think it's possible that they will be able
to find some mode of agreement with the Russians on a follow-on
treaty. But it's a treaty which will be bilateral and I think
will look forward. If there's any movement beyond that, it has
to be beyond bilateral; it has to include other nations that
have nuclear weapons.
Senator Nelson. On April 18 in the op-ed in the Financial
Times that my colleague has mentioned, Tom Donilon, the
President's National Security Advisor, discussed the need to
begin the next round of nuclear weapons reductions as the New
START treaty is implemented. He said that a review at President
Obama's direction ``will develop options for new reductions in
the U.S. stockpile. Once complete, this will shape our approach
to a new agreement with Russia.''
Dr. Miller, has the review that Mr. Donilon mentioned
started? Who is participating in that review and would there be
a timeline for completion if there is such a review ongoing?
Dr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, that review has not yet
officially kicked off, but we've had some initial discussions
about both its content and the timeline. We expect that when we
do get presidential guidance to initiate the study it will take
several months, and following that we would then expect to see
changes to presidential guidance for nuclear weapons targeting,
and all of this we expect to be consistent with the Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR).
Following any changes in presidential guidance, we would
expect to see changes to the Secretary's guidance, changes in
the guidance from the Chairman, each of which, each layer from
the President to the Secretary to the Chairman, is more
detailed, and then the development of any revisions to
operational plans by the Commander of STRATCOM.
Mr. Chairman, I want to emphasize that all of this activity
is entirely consistent with what has happened in the past after
the completion of NPRs and similar work, and that we are
intending to undertake this consistent with the principles
outlined in the NPR and intending to ensure that we continue to
have effective deterrence and stability, that we have effective
extended deterrence and assurance of our allies as well; and
that, as Senator Sessions noted, the investments in our
infrastructure and our delivery systems are critical as we move
forward.
Senator Nelson. While the administration may be moving
forward in anticipation of a new reduction, anything that it's
doing is not intended to be unilateral; I heard Dr. Perry say
something of that sort. Is that the way you see it?
Dr. Miller. Senator Nelson, that's exactly correct. We said
in the NPR that, while exact parity may not be as important as
it was in the Cold War, there are still a number of good
reasons why it's important that, if we go and as we go forward
to any further reductions, that Russia join with us. That
principle, articulated in the NPR, still remains valid and is a
guiding principle for the analysis that we expect to undertake
and implement in the NPR.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Sessions, would you like to ask questions?
Senator Sessions. Yes. I'm looking at the Associated Press
article of April 5 by Desmond Butler: ``In the mean time,'' it
says, ``the administration is looking for other ways to cut its
arsenal. A senior administration official, speaking on
condition of anonymity because of the sensitivity of the issue,
confirmed that the United States is considering these cuts
independent of negotiations with Russia.''
So do you know who made those comments and do they reflect
the opinion of the administration, Dr. Miller?
Mr. Miller. Senator, I don't know who made the comments and
the policy of the administration has been and remains to move
forward after--with any reductions beyond New START, in
partnership with Russia, and to give priority to that. We have
said in the past that we--and I believe that National Security
Advisor Donilon made reference to this in his remark--that our
intention is to propose reductions in strategic and non-
strategic weapons, in both deployed and nondeployed weapons, in
order to go after the asymmetry that Dr. Perry referred to,
where Russia has much larger numbers of tactical nuclear
weapons.
We could foresee some steps to improve transparency--we
think that would be very helpful--to continue to work on
strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, and ultimately to
reduce their numbers.
Senator Sessions. I'll be frank with you. I appreciated the
agreement that Congress asked for and insisted on as part of
the START treaty negotiations to spend the $200 billion to
modernize our arsenal and our facilities. But in the defense
NPR the document had 31 references to the President's goal of
zero nuclear weapons and a world without nuclear weapons. The
President has repeatedly stated that he wants to lead by
example.
In this article I just quoted from from AP, it quotes the
President as promising: ``To put an end to Cold War thinking,
we will reduce the role of nuclear weapons in our national
security strategy, and urge others to do the same.'' In other
words, we will reduce and urge others to do the same.
Forgive me if it's making me feel like that this very
strong commitment to zero nuclear weapons has put us in a
position where we're going to lead without being assured that
our nuclear competitors are participating equally.
Could you comment on that?
Dr. Miller. Senator, thank you. Every President since the
nuclear age began has advocated the eventual elimination of
nuclear weapons with one exception. That was George W. Bush.
Every President since Truman has advocated that as a goal.
President Obama, I think, is therefore not unique in that goal,
and he has noted explicitly that he does not expect it
necessarily to occur in his lifetime.
Senator Sessions. Necessarily to occur, but it might. Do
you think it's likely? Do you think it's likely we'll have zero
nuclear weapons in President Obama's lifetime, recognizing he's
even as a young man he is?
Dr. Miller. Senator Sessions, I think it would take, as Dr.
Perry referred to, fundamental changes in the security
environment that are very difficult to foresee today.
Senator Sessions. You would agree that somebody that wrote
the defense NPR took very seriously this goal, to a degree I've
never seen before, to reduce nuclear weapons to zero.
I know Secretary Gates did the introductory letter and he
made reference to zero nuclear weapons in his introduction. To
what extent were you involved in that?
Dr. Miller. I was very much involved in it, Senator.
Senator Sessions. Was it under your supervision?
Dr. Miller. Sir, the NPR was under the supervision of the
President. It was a report provided by Secretary Gates and I
was honored to play a role in that.
Senator Sessions. What I would tell you is that according
to Mr. Donilon, the National Security Advisor, the White House
will direct DOD to consider ``potential changes in targeting
requirements and alert procedures.''
If you want--the policy we have today, the numbers we've
agreed on today match, do they not--General Cartwright I
believe testified they did--the targeting and alert
requirements this country has? Is that yes or no?
Dr. Miller. The answer is yes, that the numbers agreed to
under the New START are more than sufficient to meet the
guidance that currently exists, which is the guidance that was
inherited from the Bush administration.
Senator Sessions. I believe it was General Cartwright that
said they meet the requirements. That's what's required to meet
the targeting and alert requirements. If you want to reduce
that number, then you need to get DOD to change the targeting
requirements, do you not? Otherwise, your weapons system
wouldn't meet your targeting requirements.
Dr. Miller. Senator, we see it in the other direction, and
that is that we're being asked to look at potential changes in
nuclear targeting guidance and associated requirements and to
then do so in a way that strengthens deterrence and extended
deterrence and assurance of our allies, and also to do so in a
way that over time will reduce the role of nuclear weapons.
Senator Sessions. The goal should be, am I not correct, to
ensure the defense and security of the United States of
America? That's your goal.
Dr. Miller. Of course that's the goal, Senator.
Senator Sessions. If you're going to reduce the targeting
requirement, I come back to the thing, it seems to me that the
President's goal is permeating DOD. He's not asking DOD, what
do you need to meet your targeting requirements? He's asking
DOD, apparently through Mr. Donilon, to change the targeting
requirements, therefore to meet his goal of reducing weapons.
Dr. Miller. Senator, case number one in the analysis will
be what we have today and the planned forces under New START,
it will look at that with respect to current guidance. We
already know that those two match up because that was the
analysis done during the NPR relating to the New START treaty.
The analysis will then look at alternative approaches to
targeting and to hedging and to other steps that are also
intended--all of them are intended to meet our deterrence and
assurance requirements. Then we'll look at the associated
numbers there. That is intended to inform future presidential
guidance.
The alternative would be to say the President should
provide guidance which all previous Presidents have done
without the benefit of that analysis. So my perspective is it's
a good useful thing to have the President informed as to the
possible consequences of different types of guidance. It
doesn't mean that any one will necessarily be selected. That's
the purpose of the analysis, to inform that and to do it in a
way that will help understand the implications of each for
deterrence, extended deterrence, and assurance in particular.
Senator Sessions. Will you assure us that the military
professionals, I hope, that are engaged in this will be
protected and allowed to produce their independent, best
independent judgment of what kind of targeting procedures we
need?
Dr. Miller. Yes, sir. Explicitly, STRATCOM played a central
role in the NPR, including our analysis of what was appropriate
under New START, and that will be the case in this analysis as
well. The same will be true of the Joint Staff--you mentioned
General Cartwright--and the Services also and the Chiefs played
a critical role in our analysis in NPR. That will be the case
for this analysis as well.
Senator Sessions. I believe the state of the record today
is that it was General Cartwright, if I'm not mistaken--General
Chilton, excuse me. I was confused about that. General Chilton
has testified this is the force structure we need. His quote
is: ``I think the arsenal we have is exactly what is needed
today to provide the deterrent.''
So all of a sudden, as soon as we sign the New START
treaty, the President, who has repeatedly said his goal is to
go to zero nuclear weapons, his goal is to set an example for
the world, his staff person I'll acknowledge anonymously says
that they might do it independent of Russian participation. It
just causes me concern that there will be pressure on DOD to
produce targeting policies to meet and justify the reduction.
I've been around here long enough to know that can happen, and
I'm uneasy about it.
My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, gentlemen. I have some specific questions, but I
did want to comment on the line of thinking that my friend from
Alabama just explored. Dr. Miller, you said every President
with the exception of George W. Bush starting with General
Eisenhower has called for an ongoing reduction in nuclear arms
consistent with the national security needs of the United
States?
Dr. Miller. Senator, every President starting with
President Truman has called for the elimination of nuclear
weapons, except for President George W. Bush.
Senator Udall. Is it fair to say that you look at the arc
of history over those 60-some years now, that the civilized
world, the developed world, with two exceptions I can think of,
Iran and North Korea--and some would argue particularly the
latter country is far from being developed--have come to
understand that the reduction in nuclear arms can actually
result in a safer, more stable world, as opposed to an arms
race without limits?
Dr. Miller. Senator, I think that's generally correct.
We've also seen over this same period of time a number of
countries pursuing nuclear weapons principally because of their
regional security conditions. You can think of, for example,
Pakistan in that category.
Senator Udall. That's fair enough.
Dr. Miller. India as well.
Senator Udall. Secretary Perry and Dr. Miller, I note that
National Security, Advisor Donilon, wrote an op-ed in the
Financial Times focused, I think, in particular on the
reduction of tactical nukes in the European theater, as did
Minister Ivanov and former Secretary of State Albright as well.
It seems to me that was a part of the debate we had on the
floor of the Senate last year, that being can we do more to
reduce tactical nukes, are we not putting ourselves at a
disadvantage because of the Russian arsenal? So my
interpretation of what they're doing is following through on
the promises and the commitments that were made in the Senate
and by our nuclear arms experts to continue to pursue ways to
meet that concern.
Would you each care to comment?
Dr. Perry. I think in my judgment an important goal of any
follow-on treaty to New START would be to address the tactical
nuclear weapons issues. This will be a very difficult issue to
address because of the tremendous asymmetry between the United
States and Russia in that case, the asymmetry being not only in
the number of tactical nuclear weapons possessed--we have a few
hundred, they have a few thousand--but in the asymmetry in the
threat perception. The United States does not perceive any
threat from our immediate neighbors, Canada and Mexico, whereas
Russia perceives significant threats from several countries to
the south of them, and their tactical nuclear weapons are
directed to those threats.
Therefore, because of this asymmetry it's going to be very
difficult to address that issue, but I think important to
address it.
The other problem that we would have with such a treaty is
that in strategic nuclear weapons we have verified agreements
we have made by verifying the missiles themselves, which are
quite easy to verify, relatively speaking, but in tactical
nuclear weapons we don't have that database to begin with. We
don't even know, to begin with, how many tactical nuclear
weapons they have. So the verification issue is going to be
very difficult. It's going to involve a much higher degree of
intrusive inspections than we've ever had in the past.
Senator Udall. Dr. Miller?
Dr. Miller. If I could just confirm that you are accurate
in your recollection. Declaration No. 11 of the Senate
resolution of ratification calls upon the President to pursue,
following consultation with allies, an agreement with the
Russian Federation that would address the disparity in tactical
nuclear weapons; and later on, just as Dr. Perry suggested,
suggests taking steps to look to improve transparency and
improve confidence in numbers as well.
So that is an important objective, just as the Senate, as
Dr. Perry, as the National Security Advisor, has said. At this
point we believe that the most effective way to pursue that is
likely to be seeking a combined agreement that looks at overall
numbers, including deployed and nondeployed, strategic and non-
strategic or tactical. That is not a final decision, but that's
certainly the approach that we have looked at to date.
Senator Udall. I may be misinterpreting what I've heard,
but it strikes me as a little strange that those who had
concerns about the treaty, those who may have even, in fact,
voted against the treaty, would be critical of attempts to
begin to undertake this important mission to reduce the number
of tactical weapons. I wouldn't ask you all to comment on that.
That's an opinion I'm expressing. But it seems to me that the
administration is keeping faith with those promises that were
made to begin to do this important work.
I think my time is about to expire, but I want to ask
General Kehler just a quick question about the heavy bombers.
Under the previous START treaty, literally we take them apart,
as I understand, even cutting the fuselages in half. I don't
know if that's on the long axis or the short axis. It probably
doesn't matter. Either way, they don't fly very effectively
after that.
The New START treaty recognizes legitimate non-nuclear
missions and allows for the bombers to be made non-nuclear
capable. I think maybe that's the term that's used. Can you
describe the methods by which the aircraft are modified so they
are not able to carry nuclear weapons, and does that restrict,
those modifications, the uses for the airplane in other
missions and in other capacities?
General Kehler. Senator, you have to think about the heavy
bombers, I think, in three contexts. There are those that are
in the boneyard, essentially, that we don't want to have
counted against any limits in the treaty, and that we will just
take destructive measures to deal with.
Then there is a category of heavy bombers that will be
dual-capable, nuclear-capable bombers that will also be
available for conventional missions. Then there is a category
that we will not have nuclear-capable at all, but will be
available for conventional purposes. That's the category I
think you're talking about, and in that case we will propose
for our own compliance review group a series of steps that we
would take that would make it clear that the bomber was not
capable of carrying or delivering nuclear weapons, but still
retained its full capability as a platform to deliver
conventional weapons, to include precision guided weapons that
are conventional.
So we haven't gotten to the complete end of that string yet
about approvals to represent it that way with the Russians.
That's pending and we believe we have a good way to do that
that still allows them to be capable for conventional missions.
Senator Udall. Thank you for that explanation.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Miller. Senator, if I could just add very briefly, just
to divide that last part into two different parts. As General
Kehler said, we're not at the end of the process yet. In
particular for the B-52Hs that would be converted to
conventional only, which we plan to do, we are still working
through exactly how that will be done and have not yet done an
exhibition of that to the Russians.
We did do an exhibition of the B-1B bomber because we have
been, as General Kehler knows well, undertaking conversions of
those to conventional for some time. That first exhibition of
the B-1 bomber, that will allow them to be non-accountable,
occurred just a few weeks ago.
Senator Nelson. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all very much for being here. I'm sorry I missed
your statements, but I do want to begin by--I'm sure you
probably referred to this--but by congratulating all of you on
your role in passage of the New START treaty. It was an
extensive debate in the Senate. I think finally we were able to
get the bipartisan support that was required.
It was interesting to me that after support from virtually
every living Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense from
both sides of the aisle, that it took us so long to get
agreement on the treaty. But it's there and I'm delighted and
appreciate that now we have new challenges as we begin to
implement it.
There was a lot of discussion during that debate about the
importance of getting the treaty passed so that we could again
resume on-the-ground inspections. Again, I apologize if you've
already talked about this in your opening testimony, but can
you talk about--I understand the first of these inspections was
done in April, and I wonder if you could speak to what we've
learned from that inspection. Were there any surprises or did
it go about the way we expected?
Dr. Miller. Senator Shaheen, first thank you for your words
about the New START treaty.
The first U.S. inspection was undertaken in April. It was
of an SS-19 base, which is a MIRVed ICBM that's kept in silos.
I think that I can say that the inspection went about as
expected, and I think in an open session, given our
expectations about what's discussed in inspections, that that's
about all I should say.
I will also note that we've exchanged databases, we've had
the first meeting of the Bilateral Consultative Commission to
work through the process through which any future debates would
be resolved with respect to inspections.
But I think with respect to this one inspection that's
probably all I should say.
Senator Shaheen. General?
Senator Nelson. Senator Shaheen, by prior agreement, Dr.
Perry has to leave at 3:15 p.m. and we're going to give him 5
minutes to summarize anything that he'd like to say. He has to
catch a plane. So if you suspend just for a minute, we'll
finish that.
Senator Shaheen. I'm happy to do that. I'm pleased that Dr.
Perry's here.
Dr. Perry. First of all, I must apologize. I must apologize
for this restriction. When I was Secretary of Defense, the
answer to the question, when does the plane leave, is when I
get there. That's not the answer any more, so I need to be
there, and I have to give a talk tomorrow morning in
California.
I want to make a few comments, though, in wrapping up, and
pointing out that the threats of nuclear weapons to the United
States today are in two very different categories. One is the
threat that the nuclear weapons could be used by a terror group
against us. So the proliferation and nuclear terrorism is one
set of threats, and dealing with that set of threats takes a
certain set of actions.
In addition to that, we are not yet able to dispense with
deterrence. So we have two different requirements we have to
meet: maintaining deterrence while at the same time working to
decrease this threat of proliferation and nuclear terrorism. So
we have to have a balance in dealing with those two.
That has been recognized, I think, since the end of the
Cold War. The policy that we had in the Clinton administration,
which was really followed before that and since then, but not
by the same name, was called ``Lead But Hedge.'' We lead in the
reduction of nuclear arms, we lead in programs to prevent the
proliferation, but we hedge against adverse political
developments by maintaining our deterrence.
That policy was strongly reaffirmed in the NPR. The
Strategic Commission which Keith Payne and I were both on, also
reaffirmed that, but that was prior to the NPR. I must say I
think the NPR got it just right. It said the U.S. goal was to
reduce nuclear weapons, but we will not do it unilaterally, we
will maintain deterrence.
Secretary Miller can tell you, but I can also affirm, that
the President was intimately involved in this NPR and these are
his goals, not just the goals of the people who wrote the
report.
The hedging has been achieved, I think, very effectively.
We have stated that we're going to maintain a safe, secure
deterrence and we're going to do that without building new
weapons. We're going to strengthen the scientific program at
the three laboratories and that is being done. We're going to
rebuild the nuclear infrastructure. That is being done. Very
substantial requests for appropriations are in for doing that
right now.
We have said we were going to increase the stockpile
stewardship program, which has been a great success to this
date, but is in danger of deteriorating. So the increased
funding of that was very important. We said we're going to
increase the emphasis on the life extension program.
Those are all commitments that were made in the NPR. Those
are substantial commitments, and in my judgment they are being
carried out, with the support and enthusiastic support, I might
say, of the U.S. Congress. So I think we are striking that
balance. But I would say again that part of the balance is
leading on this reduction of nuclear weapons and the move to
deal with proliferation and nuclear terrorism. I think that is
very important also.
So we cannot debate this issue by looking at just one of
these goals. We have to look at both of them at the same time
and understand that sometimes they're in conflict and we have
to strike a balance between them. In my judgment, we have done
a very effective job, the administration has done a very
effective job, of striking that balance, and I think in as much
as the NPR states clearly and explicitly the goals of the
administration I think that is the proper test of how they're
doing.
You then have to see, are they following up on the
commitments in terms of their requests for support? I believe
that the requests for support in this field that went in with
this last budget does just that, and now it's up to Congress, I
think, to pass those requests. From what I hear, I think
Congress is likely to do that.
So I'm feeling very good at this stage about meeting these
two goals, the lead on the one hand, which I think the
President is doing very effectively, but still maintaining that
hedge, still understanding this is a dangerous world and we
have to maintain the deterrence of a nuclear force.
Other people can testify better than I how well we're doing
that. We have General Kehler here today and he can tell you
whether or not he feels confident that we're maintaining our
deterrence in the face of these changes.
I very much appreciate the opportunity to speak with this
committee. I apologize again for my needing to leave a little
early.
Senator Nelson. No need to apologize. We're mindful of your
time constraints and thank you so very much; not that you need
to be, but you are excused.
Dr. Perry. Thank you very much.
Senator Sessions. Dr. Perry, thank you for your work and
leadership on the Posture Commission and for your commitment to
the United States.
Dr. Perry. Thank you, Senator Sessions. Questions on the
Posture Commission as they come up in the latter part can be
answered very ably by Keith Payne, who is a very close
colleague of mine and we worked closely together on the Posture
Commission. Thank you.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
I think, General Kehler, you were about to also respond to
my question about the inspections.
General Kehler. I was, Senator. Let me just make two
points, if I could. First is, the debate that you described,
the conversations on the nuclear issues, were also noted in
Omaha. I can tell you that across STRATCOM the feedback that I
get is that they very much appreciate the fact that these
issues are getting national attention. So I think that was a
point that was not lost on them and they're very appreciative
of that fact.
Second, I would just expand on what Dr. Miller said. We are
committed to implementing the New START treaty. There are many
steps that are already under way. We have less than 7 years
already, not a lot less but under 7 years, to bring all of the
pieces together. Since the treaty entered into force on the 5th
of February, we have done the following things.
Dr. Miller mentioned we've done the first New START
database exchange. He also mentioned we've done a required
exhibition of B-1 bombers. There has been a required exhibition
of the Russian road-mobile SS-27 ICBM and launcher. There has
been a required exhibition of our B-2A bomber and, as he
described, the first of the U.S. New START onsite inspections.
In this case, the Russian SS-19 at Kazelsk has also been
accomplished.
There's a lot more to do, but I did want to let you know
that there is a full range of activities that are already under
way in implementing New START.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you. I know that we have until 2018
to bring our nuclear force structure into compliance with the
treaty limits. Is there the possibility of moving up that
timetable in any way?
General Kehler. Senator, from my perspective we are right
now working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the
Joint Staff to point together and finalize our plans for what
our force mixture will look like as we implement the New START
treaty. The 1251 report that was submitted to Congress back in
the fall and updated again in the fall describes a baseline
force structure that has a certain number of submarine-launched
ballistic missile launchers associated with it, up to a certain
number of ICBMs, up to a certain number of bombers.
We are now working our way through how do we make those
balances and tradeoffs in that mixture. We expect that
something will go to the Chairman here in the not too distant
future. Some of the precursor steps in order to do those force
structure--to execute those force structure decisions, like
going to single-warhead ICBMs, we will have to, in a budgetary
sense anyway, get going sooner rather than later so that we can
have all the pieces in place.
So I think what you will see as we sequence these steps,
that some things will actually have to begin sooner simply
because it will take us a certain number of years to cycle
ballistic missile submarines through the wharves, to handle the
weapons, do the things that we're going to need to do.
Dr. Miller. Senator, if I could just briefly add to General
Kehler's excellent, accurate response, two thoughts. One is
that once that timeline is defined the United States under the
terms of the treaty, as will Russia, will have flexibility to
mix forces should that be required because of a problem in one
leg or another of the triad--one of the advantages of
sustaining the triad, as we intend to do under the treaty.
The second is I wanted to explicitly acknowledge that the
administration remains cognizant of the Senate resolution of
ratification, its Declaration No. 5, and it talks about
asymmetry in reductions and directs that the President should
regulate reductions such that no strategic imbalance endangers
the national security interests of the United States. So as we
look at this we'll also assess the likely timeline and path for
Russian reductions as well.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
My time has expired, but I actually have to say I was
pleased, but a little surprised, to hear how optimistic Dr.
Perry was about the commitment to continue to fund all of the
requirements for our nuclear arsenal. I'm not quite as sanguine
as he is about the continued commitment of Congress to do that,
given the current budget debate that we're having. So I may get
some time later to ask you to comment on that, but thank you.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator.
Some critics of the administration have suggested that the
administration's primary goal is getting to zero nuclear
weapons and that this is a shift away from the lead-hedge
tradition which we just heard Dr. Perry reference and the need
to maintain deterrence. Dr. Payne, do you see the
administration continuing with the lead-hedge tradition or not?
Dr. Payne. I do. For example, my friend Dr. Miller has
provided the NPR of 2010 which I think in general is a very
commendable document. It certainly reflects a continuing
commitment to the goals of deterrence, assurance, limited
defense, and extended deterrence.
On the other hand, it's true that concern has been raised
with regard to other voices in the administration which seem to
subordinate those traditional goals to the goal of nuclear
reductions. Senator Sessions quoted National Security Advisor
Donilon's announcement of the forthcoming reviews. We should
note that National Security Advisor Donilon stated specifically
that the forthcoming nuclear reviews are for the purpose of
finding further U.S. nuclear reductions. Other senior
administration officials have similarly described the purpose
of these reviews as being to facilitate nuclear reductions on
the journey toward nuclear zero.
In addition, the administration itself has said that, ``for
the first time''--and that's a quote--``for the first time,''
it places atop the U.S. nuclear agenda nonproliferation as an
element moving toward nuclear zero. So this isn't a concern
that comes out of imagination. It's a concern that comes
directly out of the way these goals have been described by some
administration officials on some occasions.
So I conclude that what we see is in a sense two competing
dynamics within the administration regarding the prioritization
of U.S. goals and the calculation of force requirements. One,
as is well and ably presented by Dr. Miller, is committed to
sustaining effective strategic capabilities for deterrence,
assurance, extended deterrence, and limited defense. The other,
however, appears to place top priority on arms control and
movement towards nuclear zero in the calculation of force
adequacy.
I should note, as Secretary Perry noted earlier,
reconciling these two dynamics will be very difficult and
ultimately impossible. So the fundamental question, I think,
that we're presented with--and Senator Sessions identified this
early in this discussion--is with regard to the
administration's nuclear reviews, which of these two different
views or dynamics with regard to U.S. priorities and
requirements will dominate?
My concern and the concerns that have been raised by others
who see these competing priorities is that the goal that places
priority--or I should say, the approach that places top
priority on movement towards nuclear zero and other arms
reductions will dominate those considerations and by definition
subordinate these other goals that have been consistently
supported by U.S. Democratic and Republican administrations for
5 decades.
Senator Nelson. General Kehler, from your perspective are
you satisfied that the movement is in the right direction in
terms of reduction, and are you concerned that the
administration will then begin on its own to reduce the number
of warheads unilaterally?
General Kehler. Sir, I would make two points. The first is,
on the force levels that are described in the New START treaty,
I don't have any concerns with those force levels at all. I
think that Dr. Miller earlier described STRATCOM's role in this
entire process and our role really is at the right-hand side of
the process. If it starts on the left with presidential
guidance, that's refined by both the Secretary of Defense and
the Chairman. STRATCOM takes that guidance and does mission
analysis, and at the end of that mission analysis process we
are able to articulate what from our military perspective we
believe are the requirements for both force capability and
force capacity.
Based upon the guidance that was used to arrive at the New
START treaty, I have no concerns whatsoever. I believe that,
given that guidance, that we are capable of achieving our
deterrence objectives. I think that remains our role as we go
forward. Our role will be to examine alternative guidance
packages, if you will, and perform the same kind of mission
analysis on those, to describe from our military perspective
what the implications of various guidance alternatives might
be.
I do see that as our rightful role in the process. I am
fully expecting that we will be involved as deeply in this
process as the command was in the New START discussions and as
it was in the NPR itself. The preliminary, although we haven't
seen any official taskings, discussions that we've had with Dr.
Miller's office and others lead me to believe that our advice
is going to be sought.
Senator Nelson. Dr. Miller?
Dr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, I will just state for the record
General Kehler and STRATCOM's advice is being sought and that
will continue to be the case.
Senator Nelson. Thank you.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Dr. Payne, National Security Advisor Donilon in this speech
said that ``The New START treaty represents a commitment by the
world's two largest powers to the goal of disarmament.'' Do you
think the Russians, by signing this treaty, in any way
evidenced an inclination to go to disarmament? How would you
assess the state of the Russian mind?
Dr. Payne. I would suggest that, based on the various
statements from senior Russian officials and senior military
officials, both in the lead-up to New START and following the
ratification of New START, that the chances of the Russians
agreeing to nuclear disarmament are so close to zero that we
might as well call them essentially zero.
They identify, that is Russian senior officials, both in
the military and on the civilian side, the great value they
continue to place in nuclear weapons, including for what we
would call here warfighting purposes. They have said
specifically that because their conventional forces are in poor
shape and not likely to get into better shape for many years to
come, that they are deeply reliant on nuclear weapons for their
security, and in fact virtually all of the senior Russian
officials who have commented--I may have missed some--virtually
all of the senior Russian official comments that I've seen with
regard to the future of tactical nuclear weapons and reductions
of tactical nuclear weapons have in a sense said they're not
interested in moving in that direction and certainly not in any
time soon.
Senator Sessions. I'm sure the administration raised it in
the New START negotiations and they faced a stone wall because
the Russians refused, and so we acquiesced and focused on the
strategic.
Dr. Miller, on what basis does the President's National
Security Advisor conclude that the New START treaty represents
a commitment to disarmament?
Dr. Miller. Senator Sessions, if you look at the preamble
to the treaty, it notes both parties' commitment to nuclear
disarmament over the long term. I think it's fair to say that
the reductions in nuclear warheads, in deployed nuclear
warheads and strategic delivery vehicles, represent a step in
that direction.
Senator Sessions. I will just say if the President had said
to the U.S. Senate, the New START treaty is a start toward
disarmament, I guess it would have caused more concern than we
had. This does not strike me as a wise approach and it is part
of the concern that I have as we wrestle with these very
important issues.
I do feel like that President Bush, George W. Bush, our
recent President Bush, unilaterally drew down nuclear weapons
substantially. He did not do that pursuant to a treaty, but he
made clear he was going to a level, as I understood it, he
thought was sufficient for our national security and that we
were free to take other action, if necessary, to strengthen
that capability to protect our national security. So I'm just
worried about this trend.
Dr. Payne, there are other players in the world other than
Russia. One of the problems we have is that as we draw down our
weapons, it seems to me that China may have an incentive to
seek equivalence with the United States, nuclear parity with
the United States, as might other countries, frankly. According
to the report of the Strategic Posture Commission, the Chinese
have some 400 nuclear warheads in their arsenal, and according
to DOD China deploys 60 long-range ballistic missiles capable
of targeting our Homeland.
How can we know with any certainty how many nuclear weapons
the United States needs to maintain in order to disincentivize
China to seek nuclear parity with the United States? Is that a
concern?
Dr. Payne. Senator Sessions, that's one of the very
difficult questions that confronts us in all of these areas of
deterrence and assurance of allies: how do we know what's going
to be necessary 5 years from now or 10 years from now; what
will it take, for example, if the occasion arises to deter
China or to assure an ally?
That's why in my view--and I know General Kehler concurs
with this and I suspect that Dr. Miller does as well--that
retaining the flexibility of our force to adapt to changes and
the resilience of our forces and force structure to adapt to
changes is so important.
I guess the conclusion that I draw on that is no one can
give you a number right now and give you any kind of confident
prediction that this number will be enough to deter 10 years
from now or to assure allies 10 years from now, for the simple
reason that threats change and opponents change and conditions
change. So the requirements for deterrence and assurance
similarly shift and change, and so our force structure needs to
be agile and resilient and flexible enough to change with the
changing threats.
Senator Sessions. Isn't it true that other nations depend
on the U.S. nuclear umbrella, that there is a political,
psychological dimension to clear and strong nuclear capability,
and that as a member of the Posture Commission you were able to
ascertain that nations around the world who don't now have
nuclear weapons, good civilized nations, become concerned as
the United States draws its weapons arsenal down too low?
Dr. Payne. Yes, sir. What the Posture Commission learned
through a whole series of briefings by senior officials from
abroad is that they place enormous value on the U.S. extended
nuclear umbrella, and that umbrella is provided for some 30
countries, allies in NATO, Japan, South Korea, Australia, and
so on.
So what we learned through that exercise was the high
priority that these countries place on the U.S. extended
nuclear deterrent for their security, and a number of them
suggested to us that they are beginning, were at that time
beginning, to be concerned about the credibility of the U.S.
extended nuclear umbrella and were potentially concerned that
if we drew our forces down too far that the credibility of that
extended nuclear umbrella would no longer be sufficient in
their eyes. Some of them even suggested if that were the case
they were going to have to reconsider their commitment to being
non-nuclear states.
I should add that we've heard subsequently senior voices,
for example, in Japan have said that the threshold at which
point they start becoming very worried about the credibility of
the U.S. extended nuclear deterrent is if the United States
starts moving down to around 1,000 nuclear warheads. So it
strikes me that the number that the New START treaty provides
of 1,550 is well above that. But when we start looking at
numbers that go potentially well below that, we will be
potentially jeopardizing the credibility of our extended
nuclear deterrent, as judged by our allies, and they are the
ones who judge that.
Senator Sessions. The perverse consequence of too much
reduction could actually be a proliferation of nuclear weapons
in other countries that previously did not feel the need to
have them.
Dr. Payne. Yes, sir. I think it's widely recognized that
the U.S. extended nuclear umbrella, extended deterrence, is one
of the most important tools for nonproliferation, and to the
extent that it is degraded or rendered less credible we would
actually be promoting nuclear proliferation, which obviously
runs against one of the highest goals of the Obama
administration.
Senator Sessions. Dr. Miller, briefly, you wrote in your
March 2, 2011, House testimony that: ``The lack of transparency
surrounding China's nuclear program, their pace and scope, as
well as the strategy and doctrine that guide them, raise
questions about China's future strategic intentions.'' As we
deal with the proper level of nuclear weapons, don't we need to
consider also what may be in China's plans for the future?
Dr. Miller. Senator Sessions, let me divide the answer into
two parts. One is about numbers, which you mentioned earlier,
and one is about their doctrine and so forth.
With respect to numbers, the United States and Russia still
have 90 to 95 percent of nuclear weapons in the world and that
will still be the case after the New START treaty is
implemented. We unclassified about a little over a year ago the
number of nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile, as of now
almost a year and a half ago. It was 5,113 in the stockpile
plus several thousand awaiting dismantlement. Russia is broadly
in the same ballpark.
If the numbers cited about China are correct--and I won't
say in this forum what the best estimate is from the
Intelligence Community--if those are correct, we're 10 times
plus above, and we have not seen anything approaching a rush to
parity. Instead, we've seen action by China that's consistent
with their stated doctrine of wanting to have the ability to
deliver in a second strike a relatively limited number of
nuclear weapons.
The second part, with respect to transparency----
Senator Sessions. You say there's a lack of transparency as
to their pace and scope. I don't know how you can be so
confident, with that testimony.
Dr. Miller. I think if we look out--sir, that's the second
part, exactly. If we look out from today into the future, today
we would like to understand more about their doctrine. It's
true for nuclear, it's true for space and cyber space as well,
and we've asked for a strategic dialogue with them on these
issues.
As we look to the future and try to understand where they
might be going, I think that uncertainty grows and our ability
to go forward certainly beyond any next round will depend in
significant measure on what China does.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
Senator Nelson. Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Dr. Miller, the administration, though, has always said
that we'll maintain a strong deterrent as long as nuclear
weapons exist, right? That's been one of the pillars of this
administration's nuclear policy. While I appreciate the
dichotomy that's been talked about, in fairness that has been
one of the things that the President has said from the very
beginning; is that right?
Dr. Miller. Senator, that's correct, a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear arsenal as long as nuclear weapons exist. I
also should add that that applies not just to deterrence of
attack on the United States, but to deterrence of attack on our
allies as well. We have consulted very closely with our allies
during the NPR and during the New START treaty and have, in
fact, established some new bilateral dialogues with allies to
have discussions about both nuclear deterrence and broader
elements of deterrence, to ensure that we sustain the effective
extended deterrence and assurance of our allies.
Senator Shaheen. I know that you mentioned that NATO is
soon going to undertake its deterrence and defense posture
review. Can you give us some insight into what we would like to
see NATO come out with as part of that posture review process?
Dr. Miller. Senator, let me first note that the deterrence
and defense posture review is starting from the premises
outlined at the NATO summit, and that includes that NATO will
remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist. So
that therefore the purpose of the deterrence and defense
posture review, is to examine the appropriate mix of nuclear,
conventional, and missile defense capabilities.
So what we would like to do is to ensure that as that takes
place that we have the continued principles that have been at
the foundation of the alliance, including risk-sharing and
burden-sharing, as foundational elements of where we go, and
that, just as is the case for the targeting assessment that
we've talked about, that we look--while we could look at
changes in posture, that we fundamentally look at what's
required for effective deterrence and assurance as well.
Senator Shaheen. As NATO engages Russia in some of these
discussions, what's been the reaction from our allies in the
Eastern European countries?
Dr. Miller. NATO in general and including the Baltic States
and Eastern European countries have been particularly concerned
about gaining more transparency on the status of Russian
tactical nuclear weapons and to ensure that those weapons are
under the safest possible security arrangements. So what we've
seen in discussions with our allies is encouragement to look to
initial steps following New START, even prior to considering
reductions that aim at increased transparency, and that
continue some of the efforts at improved security that, in
fact, the Senate and Congress have supported over the years,
including through the Nunn-Lugar program.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
General, do you want to add anything to that?
General Kehler. Senator, I would just offer that we
understand the relationship between our strategic weapons and
the requirements of extended deterrence. We understand that not
only the NATO alliance, but other friends around the world, do
rely on that, and we are mindful of that as we go about our
force planning.
Senator Shaheen. As we're looking at the future of arms
control and thinking about China, for example, as Senator
Sessions mentioned, and what's happening there, have we begun
to engage them at all in the debate about arms control and how
they might fit into that, whether they might be willing to
consider engaging in arms control talks at any point in the
future?
Dr. Miller. Senator Shaheen, we see that, for nuclear arms
control, we see an appropriate next round to be bilateral
between the United States and Russia, given that we, as I said,
account for 90 to 95 percent of nuclear weapons in the world,
even after New START. We have often expressed an interest to
have discussions with China sooner rather than later, as
Senator Sessions referred to, to particularly look at
transparency and to understand how they think about planning,
how they think about doctrine, and to have a better sense of
where they intend to go also with respect to numbers in the
future.
We've seen some signs that the Chinese may be open to
strategic dialogue in general and I hope that the nuclear issue
will be one of those that they pick up on.
General Kehler. If I could add to that, my predecessor last
fall had a counterpart visit in Omaha with one of the senior
Chinese defense officials. We would like to see greater
military-to-military contact. Of course, Secretary Gates was in
China in January and approached that same issue. We have
invited Chinese representatives at lower levels in their
military structure to come and participate in our public
deterrence seminars, for example, and we will do so again this
year.
But we would like to see greater contact, certainly at the
military level, with the Chinese. There are some questions
about their intent. We are supposed to look at capabilities and
it's very hard to understand their capabilities on the surface
if you don't understand the intent that goes behind it.
Senator Shaheen. This is a topic that I haven't heard
raised since I've been here this afternoon. Has there been any
reaction from Iran upon the passage of the New START treaty?
Have they responded to that? From anybody on the panel?
Dr. Miller. Senator Shaheen, I have not seen any such
reaction. I recall an Iranian reaction to the NPR, which, as
you recall, for nuclear doctrine it essentially eliminated what
we described as the Iran loophole. So that if a country's not
meeting its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty, then our so-called negative security assurance doesn't
apply. They noted that that appeared to affect their posture.
From our perspective of encouraging them to meet their
obligations, I think that was a positive thing, that they
noticed.
Dr. Payne. I can add to that, Senator Shaheen, that one of
the most recent statements that I've seen coming out of Teheran
was to suggest that the current events in Libya show what a
mistake it was for Libya to give up its weapons of mass
destruction, and the leadership in Teheran says: We take note
of that.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Shaheen mentioned, and so did my colleague, Senator
Sessions, about engaging in conversations with China about
nuclear reduction. Given the situation with Pakistan quite
apart from the events of this week, but the fact that they're a
nuclear power and things are less stable in Pakistan, would it
be appropriate for us to begin to engage in discussions there
with Pakistan about nuclear reduction? Or would we have to do
it in conjunction with Pakistan, India, and the United States?
Dr. Miller, do you have any thoughts about that?
Dr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, we have offered any assistance
that Pakistan might desire with respect to our approach in
thinking about the most effective means for strategic of
nuclear weapons. I don't believe that we've ever suggested that
we should at this point include them in any arms control
negotiations.
Senator Nelson. Is there a particular reason not to or is
it just it doesn't seem to be the time?
Dr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, I think that in order to look to
take additional steps in the coming years, we've made the
judgment that it makes sense to look to, for any formal arms
control, a bilateral step that would follow a New START.
I might note that, if I recall correctly, that the Posture
Commission also recommended an initial first step, given that
the START treaty was expiring, and then to look for further
steps after that. We think that more--once you go beyond that
point, we need to deal with the questions of the security of
nuclear weapons globally, the global lockdown that President
Obama has talked about, has more than talked about, has
advocated and acted on with the nuclear security summit and our
follow-on activities. Our real focus in the near-term in that
regard is to ensure the security of nuclear materials worldwide
and to have as much possible, and indeed all, fissile materials
under the safest possible arrangements.
Senator Nelson. You raise a good question about the
security discussions and offers of assistance on the security
in Pakistan. On a congressional delegation I think in late
2001, I asked President Musharraf how confident he was that
they had the security of all their nuclear weapons under
control. After a little bit of thought, he said: ``95
percent.''
So he remembered that, that discussion. So after when we
had the unfortunate occasion of flying nuclear weapons all over
the United States unknowingly, the next time I saw him he asked
me how confident I was that we had our nuclear armaments,
nuclear force, under control. I said: ``96 percent.''
[Laughter.]
But in working on this issue, I think the question that is
out there that's bothering my colleague, Senator Sessions, and
some others is, is there a plan to just unilaterally bring our
numbers down without regard to a bilateral agreement with our
Russian counterpart? I think that is the question.
Apparently, Mr. Donilon's comments may have obviously
helped trigger this question, but would it be possible to get a
statement somewhere along the way that would clarify what his
speech was about, because that seems to be what the issue, what
has triggered the issue at the level that we're dealing with it
right now?
I think we're seeing assurances, we're hearing assurances,
and I understand that, but there is written documentation out
there that seems to be leading in another direction and causing
maybe undue concern, but we don't know that it's undue, and
that's, I think, what's truly my colleague's concern.
Dr. Miller?
Dr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, I will want to state that I read
and heard the National Security Advisor's speech differently
and I found it entirely consistent with what we had said in the
NPR and the idea that we would conduct analysis first of how to
sustain effective deterrence and assurance and then look to
associated numbers. I will take back the question that you've
asked, however.
[The information referred to follows:]
The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) stated that we would pursue
additional reductions in strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons
with Russia and that U.S. objectives in future negotiations with Russia
will be based on several factors that together will strengthen:
deterrence of potential regional adversaries, strategic stability with
Russia and China, and assurance of our allies and partners. This will
require an updated assessment of deterrence requirements.
Thus, Mr. Donilon's statement that the Department of Defense's
review of U.S. strategic requirements will help shape our negotiating
approach to the next agreement with Russia is consistent with the
administration's previously stated approach in the NPR.
Senator Nelson. Let's see. I think next would be Senator
Sessions.
Senator Sessions. I think the National Security Advisor's
comments were troubling. I don't think they can be blithely set
aside. Having just returned from the Baltics and the Ukraine
and Georgia, Dr. Payne, what we heard was a very unease about a
concern over tactical nuclear weapons. Apparently, the German
foreign minister seems to believe that--we should--I don't know
if it's the position of the government, but the foreign
minister's view is that tactical nuclear weapons should be
drawn down in Europe. I got the great concern that ours should
be drawn down; and that these nations are really worried that
we might reach an agreement that would make the situation even
more precarious for them.
Do you have any thoughts about that, any observations about
the dynamics of the 10 to 1 or so advantage that the Russians
have on tactical nuclear weapons?
Dr. Payne. Yes. The Russian numeric advantage in tactical
nuclear weapons that you mentioned is of great concern to some
allies. Other allies are less concerned, but some allies are
particularly concerned, including allies in the Baltic States.
This concern, I think, is increased by the Russian position
that Russia will not agree to, in a sense, negotiations or to
begin the discussions on tactical nuclear weapons until the
United States withdraws its nuclear weapons from Europe. So in
a sense they say, we don't want to start talking about this
until you've withdrawn yours from Europe.
Of course, the problem with that is that I believe we have
very little leverage with regard to the Russians on tactical
nuclear weapons now. If we withdraw all of our tactical nuclear
weapons from Europe as the starting-out point of discussions, I
think that leverage is reduced further. Many of our allies
understand this, which is why they're concerned both about the
asymmetry in capabilities and also the Russian demands with
regard to what would happen before discussions could take
place.
Senator Sessions. Do you think it would assuage their
concerns if the Russians were to drop theirs 20 percent and we
dropped ours 20 percent, or the Russians said, well, we'll pull
back our tactical nuclear weapons 300 miles from Eastern Europe
and not have any there? Would that make them feel any better?
Dr. Payne. I would refrain from speaking for our allies,
but I suspect it would not make some of them feel any better at
all.
Senator Sessions. In fact, that's what they expressed to
us, is a concern that there might be some sort of agreement
reached with the United States and that they would make a token
reduction or a token pullback, but it would enhance or
certainly not diminish the advantage they have.
Now, Dr. Miller wrote about the lack of transparency
surrounding China's nuclear programs, their pace and scope, as
well as their strategy and doctrine that guide them. It's a
plain fact, is it not, Dr. Miller, that the Chinese are playing
hardball on this? They're not wanting to talk with us. General
Kehler, they've been willing to come over to the United States
to some degree and snoop around and see what they can see, but
they're not inviting us to China to tell us what they're doing,
and they're being pretty hard-nosed about this, are they not?
Dr. Miller. Senator Sessions, the Chinese have taken a
different approach to thinking about deterrence and have
emphasized historically not transparency, but almost the
opposite, that for effective deterrence it's useful to have
uncertainty on the part of the other party. We have attempted
to make the case that, in fact, stable deterrence and stable
relations between the United States and China would be
strengthened by this type of dialogue.
As I said, while we don't know the answer yet, we've seen
some positive signs that they will be willing to engage in a
strategic dialogue that may include this, among other issues.
Sir, if I could just add very briefly with respect to NATO,
what we said in the NPR was that any decisions about nuclear
weapons and NATO would not be undertaken unilaterally by the
United States, but any decisions would be taken at NATO by
NATO. That is precisely what is going on as we begin this
deterrence and defense posture review. It's an opportunity for
NATO to come together and to have a conversation about the role
of nuclear weapons--I should put that differently--about how--
what is the appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional
capabilities to continue to sustain effective deterrence over
time. The guidance that's come from ministers has explicitly
stated, just as mentioned in the New START resolution of
ratification, that any further steps, any steps by NATO, have
to take account of the disparity with respect to Russia.
Senator Sessions. Mr. Chairman, thank you for a good
hearing. Thank you for calling this. You've allowed us to air
these issues at my request. I feel like you were very
forthcoming about that.
These are important issues. I don't pretend to know the
answers. I know the President, from all his great skill and
talent, has not had the kind of experience in these matters
over a period of years. I've been on this committee 14 years
and I still feel like I'm pretty much a novice, I suppose, to
it. So his repeated statements about what I consider to be an
unrealistic goal of going to zero nuclear weapons and his very
strong desire to have treaties and agreements with Russia, even
causing, I think, the negotiations to not be as rigorous as I
would like to have seen with regard to the New START treaty,
hopefully it doesn't place us in danger. Hopefully the numbers
are something we can be comfortable with. But I've been uneasy
about that, and I intend to fulfill what I think my duty is to
ensure we're thinking clearly, realistically, about the threats
we face, the nature of the world in which we live. It's not
where we would like it to be. It is the world that is and we
have to live in that real world. So I am uneasy about it.
I will probably submit some written questions, but I to
date am hopeful that the new funding that the President has
supported and Congress seems willing to support will put us on
the road for first time in a number of years to see us
reconstitute or refurbish our commitments and nuclear
capabilities. So that's good news.
I thank each of you for your service to your country very
much.
Senator Nelson. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Shaheen.
Senator Shaheen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I don't have any
further questions, but on the NATO discussion I would like to
just point out that all of our NATO allies came out very
strongly in support of passing New START, and one of the
strongest statements came from Poland. So I think, while I
appreciate some of the issues that have been raised about next
steps, I think it's important to point out that they were very
supportive of the passage of the treaty.
Thank you all very much.
Senator Nelson. I want to thank you as well. Thank you,
Senator Shaheen, for your service and for being here today; and
just to suggest maybe a clarification that might eliminate any
confusion that's been raised and discussed during the hearing
today.
Thank you all. We're adjourned.
[The prepared statements of Dr. Miller, General Kehler, and
Dr. Payne follow:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. James N. Miller
Chairman Nelson, Ranking Member Sessions, and members of the
subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today regarding
key nuclear issues. I am pleased to meet with you and to testify with
the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, General Robert Kehler; former
Secretary of Defense, William Perry; and Dr. Keith Payne.
Just over a year ago, Secretary Gates delivered the 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR) Report to Congress. The NPR provides a roadmap for
advancing the administration's comprehensive approach to reducing the
role and number of nuclear weapons toward the ultimate goal of a world
free of nuclear weapons, while sustaining, as long as nuclear weapons
exist, a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.
We have made substantial progress over the past year in
implementing the NPR; our efforts continue, and the Department of
Defense (DOD) looks forward to working with Congress to achieve the
aims set forth in the NPR. I would like to focus today on five areas in
particular: implementation of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) treaty; the revision of presidential guidance; the development
of plans for next steps in arms control; the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization's (NATO) Deterrence and Defense Posture Review; and the
administration's commitment to maintaining a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear arsenal.
implementing the new start treaty
The New START treaty, which entered into force on February 5, 2011,
allows the United States to continue to field a credible and flexible
nuclear deterrent force. The Treaty's limit of 1,550 warheads on
deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), deployed
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and accountable nuclear
warheads for deployed heavy bombers allows the United States to sustain
effective nuclear deterrence, including sufficient survivable nuclear
forces for an assured devastating second-strike capability. The
Treaty's limit of 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed
heavy bombers supports strategic stability by allowing the United
States to retain a robust triad of strategic delivery systems--while
downloading all remaining Minuteman III ICBMs to a single warhead each.
Maintaining each leg of the nuclear triad--ICBMs, SLBMs, and dual-
capable heavy bombers--under New START allows us to preserve strategic
stability and hedge against any unexpected technical problems or
operational vulnerabilities that may arise in any one leg. The
administration plans a robust nuclear triad of 700 deployed ICBMs,
SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers under New START:
We plan to retain all 14 Ohio-class SSBNs and deploy
no more than 240 Trident II D5 SLBMs at any time.
We also plan to retain up to 420 of the current 450
deployed Minuteman III ICBMs, each with a single warhead.
We plan to retain up to 60 nuclear-capable B-2A and B-
52H heavy bombers, while completing the conversion of all
nuclear-capable B-1B and some B-52H heavy bombers to
conventional-only capability.
DOD is currently defining detailed plans for meeting New START
limits. We will give priority to doing so in a cost-effective way over
the 7 year implementation period for the Treaty, for example by making
any necessary changes to Ohio-class SSBNs during their regularly-
scheduled maintenance. The Department is committed to providing timely
information to Congress as our plans develop further.
A key contribution of New START is its verification regime, which
provides a firm basis for monitoring Russia's compliance with its
treaty obligations while also providing important insights into the
size and composition of Russian strategic forces. The United States and
Russia exchanged initial New START databases in March 2011. Required
notifications for changes in that data, along with routine updates
every 6 months for the entire database, will allow us to track changes
in the status of Russian strategic offensive arms covered by the
Treaty.
One of the tasks under New START is to remove from accountability
hundreds of U.S. strategic delivery vehicles that counted under the old
START treaty. This will be done by a combination of offering
exhibitions of conventional-only systems including our converted cruise
missile-carrying SSGNs and the B-1B bomber, and eliminating a number of
ICBM silos and heavy bombers that are no longer in use. The exhibition
of the converted B-1B occurred on March 18.
Both Parties have already completed some Treaty-required
exhibitions of other strategic systems. The Russian Federation
conducted an exhibition of the RS-24 road-mobile ICBM and its
associated launcher in March, and the United States exhibited the B-2A
bomber in early April.
The Treaty allows each party to conduct up to 18 on-site
inspections each year. The United States successfully completed the
first of these inspections in Russia on April 16. We expect the Russian
Federation to conduct their first inspection soon.
revising guidance
A key part of implementing the 2010 NPR, as with previous such
reviews, is the revision of presidential and Departmental guidance for
nuclear operations and deterrence, and subsequent modification of
operational plans. That effort is now beginning. In follow-on analysis
called for in the NPR, DOD will update our assessment of deterrence
requirements, including analyzing potential changes in targeting
requirements and force postures. Potential changes will be assessed
according to how they meet key objectives outlined in the NPR,
including reducing the role of nuclear weapons, sustaining strategic
deterrence and stability, strengthening regional deterrence, and
assuring U.S. allies and partners.
The analysis of potential revisions to guidance and planning will
take account of commitments made in the NPR, including:
Fully implementing New START while retaining and
modernizing the triad;
``De-MIRVing'' to single warheads on each ICBM;
Retiring Tomahawk Land Attack Missile-Nuclear while
modernizing Dual-Capable Aircraft and their associated nuclear
bomb;
Fully funding warhead Life Extension Programs and the
associated Stockpile Management Program; and
Making long-deferred investments in the Department of
Energy nuclear complex so that it can assure an arsenal of
safe, secure, and effective weapons as long as nuclear weapons
exist.
The NPR Report reflects clearly the commitment of the Obama
administration to ensure that nuclear deterrence remains effective for
the problems for which it is relevant in the 21st century. We will
continue to ensure that, in the calculations of any potential opponent,
the perceived gains of attacking the United States or its allies and
partners would be far outweighed by the unacceptable costs of the
response. Effective deterrence requires a credible threat to respond.
It also requires forces that can put at risk that which a potential
adversary's decision makers hold dear.
The analysis will also look at possible changes to force posture
that would be associated with different types of reductions. It will
consider possible changes to nuclear deterrence strategies associated
with changes in the global security environment, as well as the
potential contributions of non-nuclear strike capabilities to strategic
deterrence. To be well-hedged against geopolitical or technological
surprise remains a key priority.
Every President since the beginning of the nuclear age has asked
DOD to conduct such analyses and has used that information to inform
updated planning guidance to DOD. As Commander in Chief, the President
is responsible for determining what is required to protect the United
States and our allies and partners, as well as how he wishes the
military to support deterrence, to prepare for the possibility that
nuclear deterrence might fail, and for taking steps to restore
deterrence. Ensuring that our forces are properly sized and configured
for the real threats of today and tomorrow is a key responsibility of
any administration.
planning for next steps in arms control
As stated in the NPR, the United States intends to pursue further
reductions in strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons with Russia,
including both deployed and nondeployed nuclear weapons. When complete,
the analysis of targeting requirements and force postures will help
inform the formulation of any future arms control objectives.
We intend to consider future reductions in the numbers of deployed
and nondeployed nuclear weapons, both strategic and nonstrategic, and
the associated changes in Russian forces and other variables that would
be required to do so in a manner that supports the commitments to
stability, deterrence, and assurance.
The NPR noted that because of our improved relations, strict
numerical parity between the United States and Russia is no longer as
compelling as it was during the Cold War. However, it also noted that
large disparities in nuclear capabilities could raise concerns on both
sides and among U.S. allies and partners, and may not be conducive to
maintaining a stable, long-term strategic relationship, especially as
nuclear forces are significantly reduced. It is therefore important to
us that Russia joins us in moving towards lower levels.
Maintaining strategic stability with both Russia and China will
remain a key priority in the years ahead. We continue to pursue high-
level, bilateral dialogues with Russia and China aimed at promoting
more stable, resilient, and transparent strategic relationships. Such
discussions are moving forward with Russia, and we are seeking similar
discussions with China.
It is our intention to keep the Senate fully informed about new
developments in U.S. arms control policy and strategy.
conducting nato's deterrence and defense posture review
The 2010 NPR stated that any changes in NATO's nuclear posture
should only be taken after a thorough review within--and decision by--
the Alliance. We and our NATO allies agreed to conduct a review of
NATO's deterrence and defense posture at the Lisbon summit last
December. At that summit, leaders approved a new Strategic Concept for
the alliance, agreed to update allied capabilities to ensure that
allies can make good on Article 5 commitments in the face of new
threats, and rejuvenated the alliance's relationship with Russia.
The new Strategic Concept repeats the alliance's traditional
formulation that it will maintain an ``appropriate mix'' of
capabilities, both nuclear and conventional, for deterrence and
defense. Allies also endorsed territorial missile defense as an
alliance mission, thereby reinforcing the interest in determining the
appropriate mix in current circumstances.
Accordingly, the primary aim of the Deterrence and Defense Posture
Review (DDPR) is to determine the appropriate mix of nuclear,
conventional, and missile defense forces that NATO will need to deter
and defend against threats to the Alliance and ensure its members'
security. The review will also consider how political instruments like
arms control can affect the level of capabilities that will be needed
in the future and what additional capabilities may need to be created.
The DDPR will be guided by the new NATO Strategic Concept, which
states that ``[d]eterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and
conventional capabilities, remains a core element of our overall
strategy,'' and that ``[a]s long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will
remain a nuclear alliance.'' The Strategic Concept also notes that the
Alliance ``will seek to create the conditions for further [nuclear]
reductions in the future,'' and consistent with Senate language in the
New START resolution of ratification, that any further steps must take
into account the disparity between the nonstrategic (tactical) nuclear
weapons stockpiles of the Russian Federation and of the United States.
The DDPR report will be prepared by the North Atlantic Council,
where permanent representatives to NATO will work in close consultation
with allied capitals to ensure a result that is focused on the
requirements of maintaining an effective deterrence and defense
posture. We expect that this review will be conducted over the coming
year and concluded in spring 2012.
investing in a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal
The 2010 NPR highlighted the importance of sustaining a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. The administration's fiscal
year 2012 budget reflects our commitment to the modernization of our
nuclear arsenal for the long term, including some $125 billion over the
next 10 years to sustain our strategic delivery systems, and about $88
billion over the same period to sustain our nuclear arsenal and
modernize infrastructure. These are large investments, but essential to
U.S. national security.
As articulated in the NPR and consistent with the New START treaty,
the administration is committed to modernizing the nuclear triad:
Funding began for the Ohio-class replacement SSBN in
fiscal year 2010 to support the fiscal year 2019 lead ship
procurement. Continued research, development, technology, and
engineering investments are included in the fiscal year 2012
President's budget request.
The Navy plans to sustain the Trident II D5 missile,
carried on the Ohio-class SSBN, through at least 2042 with a
robust life extension program.
The preparatory analysis for a follow-on ICBM
capability to be fielded in the 2030 timeframe has begun.
DOD will continue to maintain heavy bombers to provide
a long-range air-delivered conventional and nuclear attack
capability for the indefinite future, including upgrades to the
B-2 and the development and fielding of a new long-range,
nuclear-capable penetrating bomber starting in fiscal year
2012.
In addition, DOD is developing a new dual-capable
Long-Range Standoff missile to replace the current air-launched
cruise missile in the latter half of the 2020s.
The NPR identified a number of NNSA nuclear weapons facilities that
are decades old and must be replaced or modernized to ensure the
reliability of a smaller nuclear arsenal. Two particularly critical
facilities are the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR)
Facility and the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF), which will take
more than a decade to complete. The CMRR and UPF are in their early
design phases today; as their designs proceed, we will have more
accurate estimates of their costs.
conclusion
A key premise of the 2010 NPR--following the advice of the
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United
States--is that a successful long-term national approach for reducing
nuclear dangers must be balanced, with movement in one area enabling
and reinforcing progress in other areas. The approach must also be
integrated, both nationally--across Federal agencies and between the
executive and legislative branches--and internationally among a wide
range of partner governments. An effective approach must be sustained
over time, with support from a long succession of U.S. administrations
and Congresses. A balanced, integrated, and sustained approach to
nuclear policy will require a strong bipartisan consensus. This
administration has devoted significant time and energy to this effort
and we are gratified at the many signs of progress in this regard.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on these critical issues
today, and I look forward to your questions.
______
Prepared Statement by Gen. C. Robert Kehler, USAF
Thank you Senator Nelson, Senator Sessions, and members of the
Subcommittee for inviting me to join you today to share my views, as
the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), on several issues
that I believe are important to the security of our Nation, our allies
and partners, and the world. I appreciate this opportunity to join Dr.
James N. Miller, Principle Deputy Under Secretary of Defense (Policy),
in discussing the implementation of the New Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (New START) and the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). I look forward
to describing STRATCOM's role in the implementation of these efforts,
to include the follow-on analysis called for in the 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review and mentioned by National Security Advisor to the
President, Thomas E. Donilon, in formal remarks delivered to the
Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference on March 29, 2011.
u.s. strategic command's nuclear responsibilities
Before addressing STRATCOM's role in NPR and New START
implementation, I would like to describe the roles and responsibilities
that STRATCOM is assigned in the execution of the Nation's nuclear
strategy.
STRATCOM is assigned combatant command responsibility for the
Nation's triad of strategic nuclear deterrent forces: our ballistic
missile submarines, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and
nuclear-capable heavy bombers, along with the supporting strategic
warning, command, control, communications, and planning capabilities.
STRATCOM operates these responsive, flexible, and capable strategic
forces 24 hours per day, 365 days per year as directed by the
President's strategic guidance. While the international security
environment has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War, the
purpose of the nuclear deterrent force remains clear: to deter nuclear
attack, to assure our allies and friends, and to respond appropriately
if deterrence fails. The men and women assigned to STRATCOM perform an
essential, and mostly uncelebrated, service to the Nation. It is a
service that few Americans think about but all benefit from. As
Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates has said, these men and women and
their partners throughout the Departments of Defense and Energy,
including the national labs, underwrite the security of the United
States as well as our partners and allies.
STRATCOM is also responsible for building the Nation's nuclear
employment plans. These plans bolster deterrence by providing the
President with credible nuclear response options to achieve his
objectives should deterrence fail. All nuclear employment planning is
performed in strict accordance with planning guidance transmitted to
STRATCOM in three forms: Presidential guidance, Secretary of Defense
guidance, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff guidance. Each
level articulates the President's intent in more detail. Once STRATCOM
receives the totality of guidance, we conduct extensive mission
analysis to determine the means to achieve the assigned objectives. The
resulting plans provide the President with an array of executable
nuclear force options. We also maintain a robust adaptive planning
capability should circumstances develop in which the President requires
options not provided in already built plans.
As the STRATCOM Commander, I am assigned important roles in the
broader nuclear enterprise as well. I am a member of the Nuclear
Weapons Council. I am responsible for annually certifying to the
President the surety of the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. I am
also responsible for advocating for nuclear force capabilities within
the Defense Department. Lastly, I provide professional military advice
to the President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff on nuclear strategy, operations, and weapons
issues.
Given the magnitude of these nuclear responsibilities and the
continuing importance of nuclear weapons in our national security
posture, STRATCOM's number one priority remains to ensure a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear deterrent force.
Of course, the Nation's deterrence toolkit is not limited to our
nuclear forces. A potential adversary contemplating a military attack
on the United States or our allies and partners needs to take into
account the full array of military capabilities at the President's
disposal. Particularly important are our ongoing efforts to enhance our
regional deterrence architectures through deployment of ballistic
missile defenses, advanced conventional precision strike capabilities,
and improved abilities to counter weapons of mass destruction. STRATCOM
plays important roles in all three of these areas, and we are fully
engaged in assisting with the integration of these capabilities in our
deterrence strategy and posture.
u.s. strategic command's role in new start implementation
Let me turn now to the STRATCOM role in implementing New START.
STRATCOM played an important and integral role in providing analysis
and advice to the team that developed the U.S. negotiating positions.
STRATCOM also supported the U.S. delegation when requested throughout
the talks and provided advice to both the Secretary of Defense and
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. STRATCOM's expertise in nuclear
strategy, planning, and operations is a unique and invaluable resource.
New START has now entered into force, and the United States has
until February 2018--a little less than 7 years--to bring our nuclear
force structure into compliance with treaty limits. That may seem like
a long time, but much work must be done, and STRATCOM has a leadership
role for implementation planning. We are working with the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Services to determine
how we will implement specific provisions of the treaty efficiently and
without undue impact on ongoing operations, what resources are required
to execute that implementation, and how we will phase and synchronize
the implementation steps. The planning is in its initial stages,
pending important force structure decisions, consistent with the NPR
and 1251 Report, that have strategic, operational, and funding
implications. I expect those decisions to be made soon.
Let me make two final points about New START implementation. First,
the treaty allows us the operational flexibility to adjust our force
structure under its limits to address planned and unexpected events.
For example, when combined with a smaller, sustainable weapon
stockpile, we can adjust triad warhead loading to meet both near-term
needs and potential unforeseen circumstances. This operational
flexibility is important for our technical and geopolitical hedging
strategy. Second, it is critically important to proceed with the
planned investments in force sustainment, force modernization, warhead
life extension, Stockpile Management Program, and the Department of
Energy's nuclear weapons complex.
u.s. strategic command's role in npr implementation: follow-on analysis
As called for in the Nuclear Posture Review, the Department of
Defense will conduct follow-on analysis to update our assessment of
deterrence requirements and inform administration thinking about
potential future nuclear reductions below the levels in New START. The
President will soon direct a strategic force analysis that will develop
options for further reductions in our current nuclear stockpile. While
STRATCOM has not yet received any formal tasking, I would like to make
several points on how I believe our nuclear force requirements should
be determined.
I believe a fundamental principle of national security planning is
that strategy should drive force requirements, and not vice versa.
Stated slightly differently, the ``ends'' and ``ways'' of our strategy
should determine the required ``means'' that our forces must provide.
The New START negotiating position was based on this fundamental
principle. I expect that the follow-on analysis will be based on the
same concept: first define the strategy, and then we can determine the
force requirements to implement it.
Based on this principle, STRATCOM will have, in my view, two proper
roles in the strategic requirements analysis. First, I will provide my
best military advice for shaping potential changes in targeting
requirements consistent with the principles stated in the Nuclear
Posture Review. Second, as the command responsible for conducting
strategic nuclear planning and operations, STRATCOM will provide advice
on the force structure and force posture required to meet our
deterrence requirements.
It is important to note that the Nation's nuclear strategy is
broader than just our employment strategy and the force-employment
requirements derived from that strategy. Our nuclear forces have always
played important strategic functions beyond the classic military role
of holding potential adversary target sets at risk. For example, as we
consider further negotiated reductions with Russia in our strategic and
nonstrategic nuclear weapons, including nondeployed nuclear weapons,
our strategy for hedging against technical and geopolitical surprise
must inform our negotiating position. My point is that this is a
complex endeavor that will require a multidisciplinary approach.
u.s. strategic command's role in advocating for nuclear enterprise
sustainment and modernization
The NPR validated the role of the nuclear weapon complex and the
triad and supported investments to modernize these capabilities. The
nation faces a substantive recapitalization challenge that will be a
multi-decade effort. While the platforms and systems in service today
will remain throughout the life of New START, we must not delay our
modernization efforts. Delivery system, warhead, and command and
control actions must be completed on schedule to address age-related
and performance concerns before operational forces are impacted. The
length of our acquisition processes means we must now consider the
requirements and develop the options for maintaining confidence in our
nuclear deterrent capabilities. As we move to lower numbers, we must
continue to make adequate investments in flexible force structure,
weapons maintenance, and infrastructure sustainment programs.
The substantial support Congress provided for the President's
fiscal year 2011 funding request and continued support of the
Presidents fiscal year 2012 funding request are key for the long-term
safety, security, and effectiveness of our Nation's nuclear deterrent.
These programs are essential for the sustainment and modernization of
delivery systems (development of Ohio-class SSBN replacement,
requirements scoping for follow-on bomber and ICBM), stockpile
maintenance life extensions (W76-1, B61, W78), infrastructure
recapitalization (Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement-Nuclear
Facility, Uranium Processing Facility), crucial naval reactor design
activities for the Ohio-class SSBN replacement, and command and control
architectures including the STRATCOM Headquarters command and control
complex.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, Senator Sessions, and members of the subcommittee,
STRATCOM is moving forward to implement New START and the NPR
efficiently and effectively, and we stand ready to appropriately and
fully participate in the strategic force analysis. Thank you for this
opportunity to appear before you, and I look forward to your questions.
______
Prepared Statement by Dr. Keith B. Payne
The administration recently announced that it will undertake a
review of U.S. nuclear requirements. Ultimately, the answer to the
question of ``how much is enough?'' will be determined by the goals
U.S. nuclear forces are expected to serve, the priorities attached to
those goals and the standards used to judge their adequacy. For over
five decades, those goals have been: (1) the stable deterrence of
attacks; (2) assurance of allies via extended deterrence and the
``nuclear umbrella''; (3) dissuasion of competitive challenges; (4)
defense in the event deterrence fails; and (5) arms control. Democratic
and Republican administrations alike have consistently given priority
to these national goals, particularly stable deterrence, extended
deterrence, and the assurance of allies.
The forces pertinent to these five different goals overlap to some
extent, but each also has its own unique requirements. For example, the
forces that may be adequate to deter attacks on the United States may
not be adequate to assure allies.\1\ There also can be competing
pressures among these goals. For example, arms control initiatives may
be incompatible with force standards for deterrence and assurance.
Nevertheless, it is the combination of the requirements needed to
support these diverse goals that should set the standards for measuring
``how much is enough?''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ The different requirements for deterrence and assurance were
best illustrated by Denis Healey, Britain's Defence Minister in the
late 1960s, when he said that, ``it takes only 5 percent credibility of
American retaliation to deter the Russians, but 95 percent credibility
to reassure the Europeans.'' Denis Healey, The Time of My Life (London:
Michael Joseph, 1989), p. 243.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Measuring the adequacy of U.S. forces in this fashion follows the
adage that strategy should drive numbers; numbers should not drive
strategy. Of course, other factors such as budget and technical
realities will intrude, but we should at least start by linking our
definition of overall force adequacy to the standards linked to these
goals.
An alternative approach is to start with a level of forces
preferred for a specific goal such as arms control, and then mandate
that the force requirements for deterrence, assurance, defense and
dissuasion conform to those preferred arms control levels. The downside
of this approach is that the number and types of forces preferred for
arms control purposes may ultimately be out of step with those needed
to deter, assure, defend and dissuade--in which case, trade-offs must
be made at the expense of these goals.
The most fundamental question with regard to the forthcoming review
of U.S. nuclear force requirements is what goal or set of goals will
take precedence when the administration sets the standards to measure
the value and adequacy of U.S. forces.
The Obama administration has committed to sustaining effective
capabilities for deterrence, assurance and limited defense, and has
stated that force reductions must serve the goals of deterrence and
assurance.\2\ It also has stated that, ``for the first time'' it places
``atop the U.S. nuclear agenda'' international nonproliferation efforts
``as a critical element of our effort to move toward a world free of
nuclear weapons.'' \3\ This prioritization has led to the concern that
the goal of nuclear reductions will take precedence in the calculation
of ``how much is enough?''--particularly when trade-offs must be made.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April,
2010, p. xi.
\3\ Nuclear Posture Review Report, p. vi (italics added); see also
p. v.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This concern was stoked when National Security Advisor Thomas
Donilon announced the forthcoming nuclear reviews in the context of a
conference and speech devoted to the administration's arms control
agenda and stated specifically that the nuclear reviews are for the
purpose of further U.S. nuclear reductions.\4\ Under Secretary of State
Ellen Tauscher similarly described the purpose of these reviews--to
facilitate nuclear reductions on the ``journey'' toward nuclear
zero.\5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\4\ National Security Advisor Thomas E. Donilon's Remarks at the
Carnegie International Nuclear Policy Conference, as Prepared for
Delivery and Released by the White House, March 29, 2011.
\5\ See the remarks by Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary for Arms
Control and International Security, The Global Zero ``GZ/DC
Convention,'' The George Washington University, Washington, DC, April
8, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
As described, this approach to reviewing U.S. nuclear requirements
poses two serious problems: (1) it starts with the answer that further
nuclear reductions are warranted; and (2) it says little or nothing
about linking the standards of adequacy for U.S. forces to deterrence,
assurance, defense and dissuasion as priority goals.
If the priority goal behind the measure of U.S. nuclear forces is
their reduction and ultimate elimination, then other goals such as
deterrence, assurance and defense will be subordinated and further
nuclear reductions inevitably will be acceptable--if the priority goal
is so limited, no other answer could be expected. The conclusions
reached on this basis, however, would force our strategies for
deterrence, assurance, defense and dissuasion to conform to the lowered
force levels deemed desirable for the different goal of further
reducing nuclear weapons. That forced fit could undercut our
traditional goals of deterrence, assurance and defense.
The administration's apparent willingness to force that fit may be
seen in its 2010 rejection of any new U.S. nuclear warheads to support
new military missions or to provide any new military capabilities.\6\
This policy direction is intended to promote an arms control agenda,
but comes at the potential expense of U.S. capabilities important for
deterrence, assurance and defense. While Russia lists the United States
as its greatest threat and places highest investment priority on the
modernization of its nuclear forces, an administration official
reportedly has stated recently that further cuts in U.S. nuclear forces
could be made ``independent of negotiations with Russia.'' \7\ These
policies, actions and statements suggest that some in the
administration are willing to give precedence to the goal of arms
reductions in the critical definition of U.S. force adequacy.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Nuclear Posture Review Report, p. xiv.
\7\ Desmond Butler, ``Promises: Obama's mixed results on nukes,''
Associated Press, April 5, 2011.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
There appear to be two competing dynamics within the Obama
administration regarding the prioritization of U.S. strategic goals and
the related calculation of force requirements. One generally reflected
in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review is committed to sustaining effective
strategic capabilities for deterrence, assurance and limited defense;
the other places top priority on arms control and movement towards
nuclear zero in the calculation of force adequacy. Reconciling these
two dynamics will be increasingly difficult and ultimately impossible
absent the transformation of international relations.\8\ The
fundamental question with regard to the administration's forthcoming
nuclear reviews is how these two different views of U.S. priorities and
requirements will play out in its calculation of ``how much is
enough?''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ This point is emphasized in William J. Perry and James R.
Schlesinger, America's Strategic Posture: The Final Report of the
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States
(Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2009), p. xvi.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Based on the historical record, we know that U.S. nuclear weapons
help to deter war and prevent conflict escalation. We also know that
U.S. nuclear weapons help to assure allies and thereby contribute to
nuclear nonproliferation. Finally, we know that deterrence can fail and
leave us no alternative but to defend. Consequently, we should be wary
of any review that does not place priority on the goals of deterrence,
assurance and defense.
Various commentators who instead place top priority on movement
toward nuclear zero advocate continuing deep reductions--down to levels
of 300, 500, or 1,000 warheads--all well below the New START treaty's
ceiling of 1,550 warheads. At these much-reduced levels of warheads,
they claim the United States could still meet some targeting
requirements and thereby retain effective deterrence.
Perhaps, but so subordinating the requirements for deterrence and
assurance to the priority goal of further nuclear reductions entails
serious potential risks. Most important, the reduced U.S. force posture
flexibility and resilience at such low numbers would likely undermine
the U.S. capability to adjust to surprising and dangerous political
and/or technical developments as may be necessary to deter future wars,
assure allies or defend if deterrence fails.
A minimum standard of force adequacy also could make U.S. forces
more vulnerable to opponents' covert or deceptive deployments and ease
the technical/strategic difficulties for opponents who seek overtly to
counter or get around our deterrence strategies-- possibly encouraging
some to move in these directions. As such, very low numbers could work
against U.S. efforts to dissuade nuclear arms competition with
countries such as China.
In addition, at minimal force levels the reduced credibility of our
extended deterrent would motivate some allies to seek their own
independent nuclear capabilities; i.e., it would contribute to
incentives for nuclear proliferation among allies and friends and thus
be at odds with the administration's stated top priority.
Finally, minimal nuclear force standards and related policies of
Minimum Deterrence almost inevitably lead to targeting concepts that
seek deterrent effect from threats to kill large numbers of civilians
and/or civilian targets.\9\ This is because unprotected civilians and
civilian targets are highly vulnerable to limited nuclear threats.
Successive U.S. administrations have rightly rejected this approach to
deterrence as being incredible, immoral and illegal.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ ``Likewise, the United States needs relatively few warheads to
deter China. A limited and highly accurate U.S. nuclear attack on
China's 20 long-range ballistic missile silos would result in as many
as 11 million casualties and scatter radioactive fallout across 3
Chinese provinces . . . '' Pentagon is Exaggerating China's Nuclear
Capability to Justify Buying New Generation of U.S. Weapons, Report
Finds, Natural Resources Defense Council, Press Release, November 30,
2006. See also, Hans M. Kristensen, et al., From Counterforce to
Minimal Deterrence: A Nuclear Policy Toward Eliminating Nuclear
Weapons, Federation of American Scientists and The Natural Resources
Defense Council, Occasion Paper, No. 7 (April 2009), pp. 2, 31.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
These are the primary reasons why, for five decades, Democratic and
Republican administrations have rejected a minimum standard for U.S.
force requirements and Minimum Deterrence policies--despite their
obvious attraction to many in the arms control community. These reasons
remain sound.
Is there room for further reductions in U.S. deployed nuclear
forces below New START levels because some now suggest that deterrence
could be maintained at 300, 500, or 1,000 warheads? The answer must be
no, because no estimate of ``how much is enough?'' for deterrence alone
is adequate to understand U.S. strategic force requirements. Recall
that U.S. forces also serve the purposes of assurance, dissuasion and
if necessary defense. Consequently, no calculation of deterrence
requirements--no matter how sophisticated--can define the adequacy of
U.S. strategic forces.
Is there room for further nuclear reductions simply because a lower
number of nuclear warheads could provide an assured retaliatory
capability? The answer again must be no. First, not all U.S.
retaliatory threats are likely to be credible. In addition, future
threats to us and our allies remain inherently unpredictable in
important ways; \10\ we will be confronted with unexpected threats
because as former CIA Director, George Tenet said, ``What we believe to
be implausible often has nothing to do with how a foreign culture might
act.'' \11\ As a result our deterrence requirements can shift rapidly
across time, place and opponent. Consequently, there is much more to
the requirements for deterrence and assurance than simply having the
number of warheads necessary to satisfy a targeting policy and maintain
a retaliatory threat. The requirements for deterrence and assurance
include qualitative factors that may be more important than quantity.
Particularly critical are the flexibility and resilience of U.S. forces
needed to adapt our deterrence strategies to shifting and unforeseen
threats and circumstances.\12\ This requirement moves the calculation
of ``how much is enough?'' for deterrence alone well beyond a matter of
numbers and targeting policies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ As noted recently by both James Clapper and Leon Panetta. See,
Leon Panetta, testimony before the House Permanent Select Committee on
Intelligence, World Wide Threats Hearing, February 10, 2011; and, James
Clapper, testimony before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
Hearing, The Worldwide Threat, February 16, 2011.
\11\ George Tenet (with Bill Harlow), At the Center of the Storm:
My Years at the CIA (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), p. 46.
\12\ Flexibility meaning U.S. possession of a spectrum of possible
threat options suitable for a wide range of opponents and
contingencies, and resilience meaning the capability to adapt
deterrence to changes in threats and contexts, including rapid and
unanticipated changes. See, Keith B. Payne, ``Maintaining Flexible and
Resilient Capabilities for Nuclear Deterrence,'' Strategic Studies
Quarterly (forthcoming, Summer 2011), p. 13.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Neither I nor anyone else can legitimately claim to know that a
much smaller nuclear force would be adequate to deter future attacks
and assure allies in the years ahead. Precisely because future threats
and the related requirements for deterrence and assurance are so
uncertain, it is critical to sustain the flexibility and resilience of
our strategic forces necessary to adapt to future, surprising
circumstances. Correspondingly, we must sustain the number and
diversity of our force posture necessary for its flexibility and
resilience--moving to lower force levels than necessary for this
purpose would carry real risk.
If we posit that existing U.S. force levels are adequate for
deterrence, assurance and defense, the burden of proof must be on those
who claim that moving to a dramatically different, lower level of U.S.
nuclear forces would continue to provide adequate support for
deterrence, assurance and defense. This proof, however, is nowhere to
be found because such claims are inherently speculative and typically
based on optimistic assumptions about future threats. The inconvenient
truth is that no one knows with any level of confidence how many of
what types of nuclear forces will be adequate to deter or assure in
coming years because threat conditions and opponents can change
rapidly. This again is why sustaining the level of U.S. forces
compatible with their flexibility and resilience is so critical.
How much risk is reasonable in this regard? Following comprehensive
analyses, the former Commander of STRATCOM, General Kevin Chilton,
recently concluded that New START force levels would provide adequate
force flexibility for deterrence under specific assumed conditions.\13\
But, even with optimistic assumptions about the future, Gen. Chilton
explicitly cautioned against further reductions below New START force
levels.\14\ Nothing has changed over the past few months to suggest
that Gen. Chilton's caution no longer is valid. To the contrary, recent
developments suggest some troubling threat conditions. For example,
Russia has demonstrated the great war-fighting value it places on its
large arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons, and its 2010 Military
Blueprint identifies NATO and the United States as the primary threats
to Russia.\15\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ Gen. Kevin Chilton, Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing
to Receive Testimony on the Nuclear Posture Review, April 22, 2010, pp.
8, 13, 14; and General Kevin Chilton, House Armed Services Committee,
Hearing, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy and Force Structure, April 15,
2010, p. 11.
\14\ Gen. Kevin Chilton, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Hearing, The New START treaty: Views from the Pentagon, June 16, 2010,
Federal News Service.
\15\ Aleksey Arbatov, ``Arbatov on Need to Balance Army: With
Available Resources, Clearer Foreign Policy,'' Voyenno-Promyshlennyy-
Kuryer Online, March 30, 2011, CEP20110330358006.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In sum, the administration has voiced commitments to U.S. strategic
forces and to the goals of deterrence, assurance, and limited defense.
But recent statements with regard to the intent behind the forthcoming
nuclear reviews cast some doubt on those commitments. If the reduction
of nuclear forces en route to zero is the operative top goal of ``the
U.S. nuclear agenda,'' then the forthcoming reviews undoubtedly will
find a basis for further reductions. Deep reductions, however, would
entail significant potential risks, which is why Democratic and
Republican administrations for 5 decades have rightly rejected
minimalist standards of force adequacy and related minimalist notions
of deterrence. These may seem attractive if the ``journey'' to nuclear
zero is the priority that dominates calculations of ``how much is
enough?''--but not otherwise.
______
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator E. Benjamin Nelson
implementation of the nuclear posture review
1. Senator Nelson. Dr. Miller, the administration's Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR) formed the basis for the New Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START) negotiations, but it is also the basis for the
development of the policy documents that will actually implement the
NPR. There are three basic documents that need to be developed: the
presidential guidance; the Secretary of Defense guidance; and the
guidance from the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. What is the
status of each of these documents; what is the process for developing
these documents; and why are they important?
Dr. Miller. Generally, three high-level documents provide overall
policy guidance regarding U.S. nuclear weapons.
Presidential guidance provides high-level direction on our nuclear
deterrence strategy, employment/targeting policy, and force posture. I
anticipate that President Obama will issue new presidential guidance
later this year that incorporates many of the policy decisions reached
during the NPR.
The Secretary of Defense provides additional guidance in a document
known as the Policy Guidance for the Employment of Nuclear Weapons
(NUWEP) that implements and amplifies presidential guidance. The NUWEP
is an annex to DOD's Guidance for Employment of the Force. The current
NUWEP was issued in 2008. It will be revised by the Office of the Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy in close coordination with the Joint
Staff, U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), the military departments, and
other combatant commands following the issuance of the new Presidential
guidance, and provided for approval by the Secretary of Defense.
The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff also issues a document
known as the Nuclear Supplement to the Joint Strategic Capabilities
Plan (JSCP-N), which provides additional direction to military planners
regarding the preparation of contingency plans for potential employment
of U.S. nuclear weapons. The current JSCP-N was issued in 2004 and will
be revised after the issuance of new presidential guidance and the
NUWEP.
2. Senator Nelson. General Kehler, STRATCOM is responsible for
building its targeting plans in response to the guidance documents we
just discussed. Can you please explain the process by which these
targeting plans are developed?
General Kehler. National-level target planning guidance flows from
the President to the Secretary of Defense, then to the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, and on to STRATCOM. STRATCOM planning begins with an
analysis of the national level target planning guidance. The STRATCOM
commander translates this guidance into direction for his staff and
components through planning directives, guidance statements, and verbal
instructions.
To develop detailed targeting plans, STRATCOM develops a target
list and then allocates specific weapon types to the targets, based on
target characteristics and weapon performance factors. Next, STRATCOM
plans specific weapons, down to the specific unit and platform for the
targets previously constructed. Finally, the completed plans are
approved by the Secretary of Defense, prior to distribution to national
decision makers and dissemination to U.S. nuclear forces.
targeting and alert posture
3. Senator Nelson. General Kehler, in a speech at the Carnegie
Nonproliferation Conference last month, National Security Advisor, Tom
Donilon, said that in developing options for future reductions: ``we
need to consider several factors, such as potential changes in
targeting requirements and alert postures.'' What changes in targeting
postures are you considering?
General Kehler. It is premature to discuss changes in targeting
requirements prior to this review.
4. Senator Nelson. General Kehler, what changes in alert postures
are you considering?
General Kehler. The current nuclear alert posture was reaffirmed in
the 2010 NPR. Potential changes to that alert posture to be considered
in the NPR follow-on requirements review have not yet been identified.
5. Senator Nelson. Dr. Miller, is the Department of Defense (DOD)
considering any changes in the alert posture of nuclear forces?
Dr. Miller. The 2010 NPR examined possible adjustments to the alert
posture of U.S. strategic forces and concluded that the current
posture--with heavy bombers off full-time alert, nearly all
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) on alert, and a significant
number of SSBNs at sea at any given time--should be maintained for the
present. Potential changes to alert posture may be considered in the
NPR follow-on analysis, and if so, I expect such changes would be
assessed by whether they support the NPR goals of maintaining strategic
deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels, strengthening
regional deterrence, and reassuring U.S. allies and partners.
unilateral disarmament
6. Senator Nelson. Dr. Miller, I think there is concern that the
administration is headed down a path to make unilateral reductions in
U.S. nuclear weapons. Is the administration planning to make unilateral
reductions or will all future reductions be in the context of bi- or
multi-lateral legally binding treaties?
Dr. Miller. As stated in the 2010 NPR report, the administration
will pursue a follow-on agreement to New START with Russia that binds
both countries to further reductions in all nuclear weapons. The NPR
report noted that while the need for strict numerical parity between
the two countries is no longer as compelling as it was during the Cold
War, large disparities in nuclear capabilities could raise concerns on
both sides and among U.S. allies and partners. Therefore significant
disparities may not be conducive to maintaining a stable, long-term
strategic relationship, especially as nuclear forces are significantly
reduced. Therefore, we will place importance on Russia joining in
moving towards lower levels.
It is our intention to keep the Senate fully informed about new
developments in U.S. arms control policy and strategy.
7. Senator Nelson. Dr. Miller, when is the right time to bring
China, India, Pakistan, or others into discussions with respect to
nuclear weapons?
Dr. Miller. China, India, Pakistan, and others are already part of
multilateral discussions on nuclear nonproliferation. This is a key
element of the President's ``nuclear security agenda.'' As stated in
the NPR report, the administration will pursue a follow-on agreement
with Russia that binds both countries to further reductions in all
nuclear weapons. This approach makes sense because even after New
START, the United States and Russia will still have 95 percent of the
world's nuclear weapons. Depending on the degree of any post-New START
reductions made by the United States and Russia, it could well make
sense to expand the negotiating process to a multilateral approach for
subsequent steps.
It is our intention to keep the Senate fully informed about new
developments in U.S. arms control policy and strategy.
maintaining the triad
8. Senator Nelson. Dr. Miller, in the NPR, DOD said that it would
maintain the triad of nuclear forces. Is there any discussion or plan
to go to a dyad of nuclear forces, and eliminate one of the three legs
of the triad?
Dr. Miller. The triad has significant advantages, and at this time
the administration has not changed its stated plan to sustain a triad
under the New START treaty. However, given the requirement to identify
significant cost savings for DOD over the next decade or more, no set
of capabilities can be considered to be completely ``off the table.''
The administration intends to provide a baseline force structure for
the New START treaty as part of the fiscal year 2013 budget submission.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
further reductions
9. Senator Sessions. Dr. Miller and General Kehler, in a recent
speech at the Carnegie Endowment, the President's National Security
Advisor, Tom Donilon, stated that the administration is currently
``making preparations for the next round of nuclear reductions'' and
that DOD will ``review our strategic requirements and develop options
for further reductions in our current nuclear stockpile.'' He continued
by stating that in meeting these objectives, ``the White House will
direct DOD to consider potential changes in targeting requirements and
alert postures.'' With respect to Mr. Donilon's comments, what guidance
and assumptions have you been given or told to follow in the design,
development, and posture for modernizing the nuclear triad?
Dr. Miller. At this time, DOD has not received additional White
House guidance beyond the President's approval of the 2010 NPR, which
included commitments to:
Implement the New START treaty fully while maintaining
the triad;
``De-MIRV'' to a single warhead on each ICBM;
Retire Tomahawk Land Attack Missile-Nuclear while
modernizing Dual-Capable Aircraft and the associated nuclear
bomb;
Fund warhead Life Extension Programs and the
associated Stockpile Management Program fully; and
Make long-deferred investments in the Department of
Energy nuclear complex so that it can ensure an arsenal of
safe, secure, and effective weapons as long as nuclear weapons
exist.
I expect that DOD will receive White House guidance within the next
several months for conducting an analysis of options for future
targeting requirements and alert postures.
General Kehler. The administration outlined a long-term approach to
nuclear triad modernization and sustainment in both the NPR and 1251
report, and I fully support these plans. Until the NPR follow-on
requirements review is conducted, it is not possible to say what--if
any--changes will result, but I do expect any changes to be consistent
with the findings of the NPR.
10. Senator Sessions. General Kehler, have you been asked to
conduct any technical analysis on modifications to force structure?
General Kehler. We have not yet been tasked to conduct any
specific, technical analyses for the NPR follow-on requirements review.
However, we are participating in studies on the sustainment and
modernization of the force, and I expect STRATCOM to be a full
participant in the NPR follow-on requirements review.
11. Senator Sessions. General Kehler, we were told the balance of
forces represented by the New START treaty would be stable and that
those force levels were what was necessary to support U.S. deterrence
requirements. Why is it necessary to pursue further reductions?
General Kehler. The NPR recommended the conduct of a follow-on
analysis to set goals for future reductions below the levels expected
in new START, while strengthening deterrence of potential regional
adversaries, strategic stability vis-a-vis Russia and China, and
assurance of our allies and partners. The pace and magnitude of
potential future reductions should be influenced by the outcome of this
analysis, as well as the following:
Full implementation of the Stockpile Stewardship
Program and the nuclear infrastructure investments recommended
in the NPR and codified in the 3113 (Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Plan) and 1251 reports; and
Russia joining us as we move to lower levels of
nuclear weapons.
12. Senator Sessions. General Kehler, in your best military
judgment, how prudent is it to begin consideration of reductions past
the New START levels?
General Kehler. It is prudent to consider any actions that have the
potential to improve the security of the United States and its allies
by enhancing deterrence and maintaining strategic stability. I will
always evaluate any such actions carefully and provide my best military
judgment accordingly. In the meantime, STRATCOM is fully engaged in
implementing the New START treaty.
nuclear doctrine and targeting guidance
13. Senator Sessions. Dr. Miller and General Kehler, why is the
administration contemplating changes to well-established nuclear
doctrine and targeting requirements?
Dr. Miller. Over the last 50 years, U.S. nuclear doctrine and
targeting strategy have continually evolved with the global strategic
environment. Given continued changes globally, the United States would
be remiss if we did not reexamine our nuclear strategy and targeting
requirements in today's dynamic security environment. As General Kehler
stated, DOD routinely conducts analysis to inform nuclear planning. As
Commander in Chief, the President is responsible for determining what
is required to protect the United States and our allies and partners,
as well as how he wishes the military to support deterrence, to prepare
for the possibility that nuclear deterrence may fail, and, should that
occur, to take steps to end conflict on the best possible terms.
General Kehler. As discussed in the NPR, the security environment
has changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. A review is a
prudent step towards addressing the top priorities discussed in the
NPR:
Discourage additional countries from acquiring nuclear
weapons;
Prevent terrorists from acquiring nuclear weapons or
materials to produce them;
Maintain stable strategic relationships with Russia
and China; and
Counter threats posed by emerging nuclear-armed
states.
14. Senator Sessions. Dr. Miller and General Kehler, to the extent
you can in an unclassified response, please describe current nuclear
doctrine and targeting guidance.
Dr. Miller. Current doctrine and targeting guidance provide the
President with a wide range of pre-planned, flexible response options
should deterrence fail. Planners are directed to develop response
options designed to hold at risk targets that a potential adversary
values, while minimizing civilian and other collateral damage, and
where possible to limit damage to the United States and our allies and
partners. Planners are also directed to provide the ability for
``adaptive planning'' to provide additional options if directed to
respond to unanticipated circumstances. The United States continues the
practice of open-ocean targeting of all ICBMs and SLBMs. This is so
that in the highly unlikely event of an unauthorized or accidental
launch, the missile would land in the open ocean. The maintenance of
such flexibility in our forces and planning capability has been a
cornerstone of U.S. nuclear policy for decades and will remain a key
component of our upcoming analysis.
General Kehler. U.S. nuclear doctrine can be broadly defined as
follows:
The fundamental role of nuclear weapons, which will
continue as long as nuclear weapons exist, is to deter nuclear
attack on the United States, our allies, and partners;
The United States will not use or threaten to use
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are
party to the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear
nonproliferation obligations. In the case of countries not
covered by this assurance, a narrow range of contingencies
remain in which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in
deterring a conventional or CBW attack against the United
States or its allies and partners; and
The United States would only consider the use of
nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend the vital
interests of the United States or its allies and partners.
15. Senator Sessions. Dr. Miller and General Kehler, what is wrong
with the current guidance?
Dr. Miller. Current guidance is not ``wrong.'' Over the last 50
years, U.S. nuclear doctrine and targeting strategy have continually
evolved with the global strategic environment. The United States would
be remiss if we did not reexamine our nuclear strategy in today's
dynamic security environment. Revisions to current guidance may be
required to ensure that our forces remain properly sized and configured
for the real threats of today and tomorrow. Updating guidance to
support deterrence is a key responsibility of any administration and
both previous NPRs preceded presidential updates in nuclear guidance.
General Kehler. Reviewing nuclear employment guidance following a
NPR is a logical follow-on step, given past precedent and today's
dynamic security environment.
16. Senator Sessions. Dr. Miller and General Kehler, has there been
a change in global security conditions that warrants a guidance change?
Dr. Miller. Since the last NPR was completed in 2001, global
security conditions have changed significantly. We would be remiss if
we did not review nuclear guidance rigorously and review it as needed.
General Kehler. As noted in the NPR, there have been significant
and ongoing changes in global security conditions. The purpose of the
NPR follow-on requirements review is to determine whether, and in what
ways, those changes might require changes in guidance.
17. Senator Sessions. Dr. Miller and General Kehler, what will be
the impact of these changes on our ability to assure our allies?
Dr. Miller. As noted in the 2010 NPR Report, reassuring U.S. allies
and partners is one of the key objectives of U.S. nuclear deterrence
policies. Any changes in our nuclear posture which supports these
policies will be considered in the context of our continuing need to
assure our allies and partners of our commitment to their security. It
is the administration's goal to demonstrate this commitment not only
through words, but also by tangible deeds and capabilities.
General Kehler. Until we receive and begin to review any updated
guidance, it is premature to speculate on the impact of potential
changes. However, consistent with the NPR, any potential changes to our
employment guidance will be evaluated regarding their impacts on our
ability to assure our allies in the context of global security
conditions.
18. Senator Sessions. Dr. Miller and General Kehler, what will be
the impact of these changes on our ability to discourage other
countries from seeking strategic equivalence with the United States in
nuclear weapons?
Dr. Miller. Russia is the only country that maintains nuclear
forces in numbers that are on par with the United States. While noted
in the 2010 NPR Report, the need for strict numerical parity between
the two countries is no longer as compelling as it was during the Cold
War, large disparities between the nuclear capabilities of the United
States and Russia could raise concerns on both sides, and among U.S.
allies and partners, and jeopardize the prospect for further
reductions. Therefore, we will place importance on Russia joining us as
we move to lower levels. Remaining well-hedged against both
technological and geopolitical surprise (e.g., an attempted ``sprint to
parity'' by a third country) remains a key priority and is one of the
metrics we intend to use to assess any potential changes in our nuclear
doctrine and force structure.
General Kehler. Until we receive and begin to review any updated
guidance, it is premature to speculate on the impact of potential
changes. However, consistent with the NPR, any potential changes to our
employment guidance will be evaluated regarding their impacts on our
ability to discourage other countries from seeking strategic
equivalence with the United States in nuclear weapons.
19. Senator Sessions. Dr. Miller and General Kehler, what will be
the impact of these changes on our ability to hedge against future
threats and uncertainties?
Dr. Miller. Remaining well-hedged against geopolitical or
technological surprise will be a key metric by which we intend to
assess any potential changes in U.S. nuclear doctrine or force
structure.
General Kehler. Until we receive and begin to review any updated
guidance, it is premature to speculate on the impact of potential
changes. However, consistent with the NPR, any potential changes to our
employment guidance will be evaluated regarding their impacts on our
ability to hedge against future threats and uncertainties.
alert posture
20. Senator Sessions. Dr. Miller and General Kehler, why did Mr.
Donilon suggest a need to re-review our alert posture?
Dr. Miller. The 2010 NPR examined possible adjustments to the
current alert posture of U.S. strategic forces and concluded that the
current posture should be maintained for the present. However, the NPR
also directed the initiation of studies that could lead to future
reductions in alert posture, including potential new modes of basing
for ICBMs that may ensure the survivability of this leg of the triad
while eliminating or reducing incentives for prompt launch.
DOD continually assesses our deterrence requirements, including
potential changes in targeting requirements and alert postures that are
required for effective deterrence. We expect that the NPR follow-on
analysis will consider postures that offer varying degrees of
flexibility and redundancy with respect to our deterrence and related
targeting objectives, and identify the force levels needed to support
those objectives and any potential risks associated with each.
This approach is entirely consistent with Mr. Donilon's statement
that the DOD's review of U.S. strategic requirements will help shape
our negotiating approach to the next agreement with Russia.
General Kehler. Mr. Donilon stated his rationale for re-review in
his 2011 Carnegie International Policy Conference speech. The NPR
concluded ``that the current alert posture of U.S. strategic forces--
with heavy bombers off full-time alert, nearly all ICBMs on alert, and
a significant number of SSBNs at sea at any given time--should be
maintained for the present.'' The NPR went on to state: ``Looking into
the longer term, NPR initiated studies may lead to future reductions in
alert posture. For example, in an initial study of follow-on systems to
the Minuteman III ICBM force, the DOD will explore whether new modes of
basing may ensure the survivability of this leg of the triad while
eliminating or reducing incentives for prompt launch.''
21. Senator Sessions. Dr. Miller and General Kehler, didn't the NPR
from just a year ago conclude that the current alert posture should be
maintained?
Dr. Miller. You are correct. The 2010 NPR examined possible
adjustments to the current alert posture of U.S. strategic forces and
concluded that the current posture should be maintained for the
present. However, the NPR also directed the initiation of studies that
over the longer term may lead to future reductions in alert posture.
For example, an initial study to explore whether new modes of basing
for ICBMs may ensure the survivability of this leg of the triad while
eliminating or reducing incentives for prompt launch. We live in a
highly dynamic security environment. The purpose of the NPR follow-on
analysis is to ensure that our forces remain properly configured for
the real threats of today and tomorrow.
General Kehler. Yes.
22. Senator Sessions. Dr. Miller and General Kehler, what is
destabilizing about the current alert posture?
Dr. Miller. The 2010 NPR report recommended that the current alert
posture of U.S. strategic forces--with heavy bombers off full-time
alert, nearly all ICBMs on alert, and a significant number of SSBNs at
sea at any given time--should be maintained for the present. However,
the NPR report also stated that the United States should continue to
posture U.S. forces and enhance command and control arrangements for
strategic nuclear forces to reduce further the possibility of nuclear
launches resulting from accidents, unauthorized actions, or
misperceptions, while maximizing the time available to the President to
consider whether to authorize the use of nuclear weapons. We live in a
highly dynamic security environment. The purpose of the NPR follow-on
analysis is to ensure that our forces remain properly sized and
configured for the real and evolving threats of today and tomorrow.
General Kehler. The NPR reaffirmed the current alert posture. In my
view, our current alert posture is not destabilizing. We are constantly
reviewing our alert posture to see if it may be possible to make
changes that further enhance our security without increased risk.
23. Senator Sessions. Dr. Miller and General Kehler, are U.S.
forces on hair trigger alert?
Dr. Miller. Although it is true that portions of the U.S. nuclear
triad are capable of rapid execution upon authorization from the
President, a robust system of safeguards and procedures is in place to
prevent the accidental or unauthorized launch of a U.S. nuclear weapon.
These safeguards and procedures have been successful for many decades
and we continually refine them to ensure their continued effectiveness.
The 2010 NPR examined possible adjustments to the current alert
posture of U.S. strategic forces and concluded that the current
posture--with heavy bombers off full-time alert, nearly all ICBMs on
alert, and a significant number of SSBNs at sea on alert at any given
time--should be maintained for the present. It also stated that the
United States should continue to posture U.S. forces and enhance the
command and control architecture for strategic nuclear forces to
minimize the possibility of nuclear launches resulting from accidents,
unauthorized actions, or misperceptions, while maximizing the time
available for the President to consider whether to authorize the use of
nuclear weapons. The net result of the U.S. alert posture should remain
that any potential adversary must conclude that the gains for
initiating nuclear hostilities against the United States would be far
outweighed by the costs, which is the essence of deterrence.
General Kehler. Although it is true that portions of the U.S.
nuclear triad are capable of rapid execution upon authorization from
the President, a robust system of safeguards and procedures is in place
to prevent the accidental or unauthorized launch of a U.S. nuclear
weapon. These safeguards and procedures have been successful for many
decades and we continually refine them to ensure their continued
effectiveness.
The 2010 NPR examined possible adjustments to the current alert
posture of U.S. strategic forces and concluded that the current
posture--with heavy bombers off full-time alert, nearly all ICBMs on
alert, and a significant number of SSBNs at sea on alert at any given
time--should be maintained for the present. It also stated that the
United States should continue to posture U.S. forces and enhance the
command and control architecture for strategic nuclear forces to
minimize the possibility of nuclear launches resulting from accidents,
unauthorized actions, or misperceptions, while maximizing the time
available for the President to consider whether to authorize the use of
nuclear weapons. The net result of the U.S. alert posture is that any
potential adversary must conclude that the gains for initiating nuclear
hostilities against the United States would be far outweighed by the
costs, which is the essence of deterrence.
24. Senator Sessions. Dr. Miller and General Kehler, what are the
risks of further de-alerting U.S. nuclear forces?
Dr. Miller. The 2010 NPR examined possible adjustments to the
current alert posture of U.S. strategic forces and concluded that the
current posture--with heavy bombers off full-time alert, nearly all
ICBMs on alert, and a significant number of SSBNs at sea on alert at
any given time--should be maintained for the present. The 2010 NPR
report also concluded that reducing the alert rates for ICBMs and at-
sea rates of SSBNs could reduce crisis stability by giving an adversary
the incentive to attack before re-alerting was complete.
However, the NPR report also stated that the United States would
study potential changes that could lead to future reductions in alert
posture, such as alternate basing modes for ICBMs. In addition, the NPR
report affirmed that the United States should continue to posture U.S.
forces and enhance command and control arrangements for strategic
nuclear forces to reduce further the possibility of nuclear launches
resulting from accidents, unauthorized actions, or misperceptions,
while maximizing the time available to the President to consider
whether to authorize the use of nuclear weapons. We live in a highly
dynamic security environment. The purpose of the NPR follow-on analysis
is to ensure that our forces remain properly sized and configured for
the real threats of today and tomorrow.
General Kehler. Any relaxation of alert posture must consider the
effect of these actions on the geopolitical environment, our ability to
achieve national objectives, and the corresponding actions taken by
other nuclear powers. Potential risks and benefits are scenario-
specific but could include crisis stability concerns as forces are re-
alerted.
25. Senator Sessions. Dr. Miller and General Kehler, wouldn't these
risks be destabilizing during a crisis as each side starts to re-alert
its forces?
Dr. Miller. The 2010 NPR concluded that reducing the alert rates
for ICBMs and at-sea rates of SSBNs could reduce crisis stability by
giving an adversary the incentive to attack before re-alerting was
complete. The 2010 NPR concluded that the current posture--with heavy
bombers off full-time alert, nearly all ICBMs on alert, and a
significant number of SSBNs at sea on alert at any given time--should
be maintained for the present.
However, the NPR report also stated that the United States would
study potential future changes that could lead to reductions in alert
posture, such as alternate basing for ICBMs. In addition, the NPR
report stated that the United States should continue to posture U.S.
forces and enhance command and control arrangements for strategic
nuclear forces to reduce further the possibility of nuclear launches
resulting from accidents, unauthorized actions, or misperceptions,
while maximizing the time available to the President to consider
whether to authorize the use of nuclear weapons. We live in a highly
dynamic security environment. The purpose of the NPR follow-on analysis
is to ensure that our forces remain properly sized and configured for
the real threats of today and tomorrow.
General Kehler. Any relaxation of alert posture must consider the
effect of these actions on the geopolitical environment, our ability to
achieve national objectives, and the corresponding actions taken by
other nuclear powers. Potential risks and benefits are scenario-
specific but could include crisis stability concerns as forces are re-
alerted.
strategic balance
26. Senator Sessions. Dr. Payne, as I mentioned in my opening
comments, I am concerned this administration intends to ignore the
importance of achieving strategic balance and establishing a defensive
posture that is neither overly reliant nor overly abolitionist towards
nuclear deterrence, opting instead for a political agenda focused on
unilateral reductions. Do you agree that pursuing unilateral reductions
is a risky proposition?
Dr. Payne. On June 1, 2011, the Department of State released the
first data exchange on U.S. and Russian strategic forces under the New
START. That data exchange demonstrates conclusively that Russia's
deployed forces were below the treaty's ceiling on the first day the
treaty came into force. In contrast, the United States will have to
make reductions in its deployed warheads and launchers. Consequently,
New START does indeed require unilateral U.S. reductions, a fact long-
denied by senior Obama administration officials. These unilateral
reductions that follow from U.S.-Russian negotiations and treaty-
imposed limits on U.S. forces are different from unilateral U.S.
decisions to reduce its forces as appropriate to ensure that U.S.
forces are compatible with U.S. requirements and potential
requirements.
If the United States unilaterally adjusts its forces and in doing
so maintains all of the forces necessary to meet the spectrum of goals
those forces are intended to support, then unilateral reductions will
not necessarily pose a risk. However, if those reductions are mandated
by negotiated treaty ceilings and other legal constraints that impose
enduring boundaries on current and future U.S. force options, then the
great risk is that those reductions and limits will prevent the United
States from fielding the number and types of forces that may be
necessary now and in the future to help deter war, assure worried
allies, and defend against attacks, if necessary. In addition, such
unilateral reductions preclude one of the preeminent values attributed
to arms control negotiations, i.e., securing some degree of our desired
reductions in an opponent's forces in return for accepting to some
degree its desired reductions in our forces. (Indeed, the Obama
administration presented the major value of New START in terms of the
reductions it supposedly imposed on deployed Russian forces.) The great
risk of our engaging in unilateral reductions as part of a negotiated
agreement is that the United States effectively gives up the
negotiating leverage that otherwise resides in those forces and
realizes no reductions in the other party's forces in exchange.
Unilateral reductions squander potential negotiating leverage. This is
a great risk if, in fact, the United States would like to realize some
level of reductions in the other party's forces. In the contemporary
example of New START, the United States has engaged in unilateral
reductions while it continues to have serious unmet goals with regard
to the reduction of Russian nuclear forces, particularly including in
Russian tactical nuclear forces and prospectively in future Russian
heavy ICBMs.
27. Senator Sessions. Dr. Payne, the Strategic Posture Commission
report states: ``the United States needs a spectrum of nuclear and non-
nuclear force employment options and flexibility in planning along with
the traditional requirements for forces that are sufficiently lethal
and certain of their result to threaten an appropriate array of targets
credibly.'' In your opinion, does our nuclear doctrine and nuclear
targeting strategy adequately address this approach today?
Dr. Payne. Contemporary U.S. doctrine as described publicly calls
for considerable U.S. flexibility and options to support the
fundamental national goals of deterrence, extended deterrence,
assurance, and defense. Some elements of U.S. doctrine, such as the
policy that precludes any new U.S. nuclear capabilities, limit the
flexibility and options that may be important to support U.S. goals in
the future. It is very difficult to discuss U.S. targeting issues
openly. It is possible to observe that the current triad of bombers and
missiles and the associated warheads provide flexibility and lethality
that help support these fundamental national goals. However, some
recent public discussion by senior officials cast troubling doubt on
the future of the U.S. triad and the flexibility and options made
possible by the triad. In addition, there are some U.S. targeting
capabilities that may be extremely important in support of U.S. goals
that either are in short supply or are unavailable. For example, as
several senior military officers have emphasized publicly, available
U.S. long-range prompt global strike (PGS) options are nuclear; the
availability of non-nuclear PGS options could be important for U.S.
national goals in numerous plausible scenarios. Similarly, some allies
have openly described the U.S. nuclear force characteristics they deem
important for extended nuclear deterrence and their assurance. U.S.
forces with these characteristics in some cases either are aged or non-
existent. In addition, the level of U.S. societal vulnerability to
various types of weapons of mass destruction attack appears to be
extremely high, reflecting a potential inadequacy in U.S. societal
defensive assets available and as planned. Finally, the strategic
offense and defense capabilities needed to support national goals in
the future are bound to change over time and cannot be predicted with
great precision. Therefore, ensuring that the U.S. force posture
provides flexibility and has the necessary resilience to adapt to
future threats must be our primary consideration. Further reductions
and limitations on the U.S. force structure beyond New START could
undermine that needed flexibility and resilience.
28. Senator Sessions. Dr. Payne, how could a policy of unilateral
reductions impact our nuclear strategy and targeting doctrine?
Dr. Payne. Unilateral reductions could create a gap or further
exacerbate the gaps in U.S. force flexibility and options that could
prove necessary now or in the future to support the fundamental
national goals of deterrence, assurance, extended deterrence, and
defense. Unilateral reductions could also further reduce the
negotiating leverage available to the United States without securing
further negotiated reductions in Russian nuclear forces, including in
Russian tactical nuclear weapons.
29. Senator Sessions. Dr. Payne, the Strategic Posture Commission
report states that: ``reductions in deployed forces should be made on
the basis of bilateral agreement with Russia.'' Why is this important?
Dr. Payne. Bilateral agreement as the basis for reductions is
important now because the United States has outstanding unmet
objectives with regard to the negotiated reduction of Russian nuclear
forces. Further U.S. unilateral reductions would potentially further
degrade the negotiating leverage that could otherwise be available to
the United States to realize these objectives.
30. Senator Sessions. Dr. Payne, if significant reductions are
sought, do you agree all nuclear powers should be required to reach
agreement and address threats like North Korea and Iran?
Dr. Payne. Any further reductions should be subject to extensive
and serious consultation with our allies given the importance of U.S.
nuclear forces to their security and their evaluations of their
potential need for nuclear weapons. In addition, if negotiations for
the purpose of further and very significant reductions take place, such
negotiations certainly should become multilateral and effectively
involve not only other nuclear powers but also key non-nuclear allies
dependent on U.S. nuclear forces.
31. Senator Sessions. Dr. Payne, are you concerned that it has been
reported that administration officials are considering further
reductions independent of negotiations with Russia?
Dr. Payne. Yes. The United States has significant, unmet goals with
regard to further reductions in Russian nuclear forces. Further U.S.
unilateral reductions beyond New START would likely undermine the U.S.
ability to realize those goals.
weapons complex modernization
32. Senator Sessions. General Kehler, in what ways will the
construction of the Chemical and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR)
facility at Los Alamos and the Uranium Production Facility (UPF) at Y-
12 impact current requirements for the size of our strategic hedge?
General Kehler. As described in the 2010 NPR, the restoration and
modernization of our current weapons complex infrastructure will
provide an opportunity for the United States to shift away from
retaining large numbers of nondeployed nuclear warheads as a strategic
hedge. The CMRR Nuclear Facility and the UPF will provide national
capabilities to support production of nuclear components critical for
maintaining and managing the stockpile. With adequate funding, these
facilities are projected to be fully operational in the mid-2020s
timeframe.
33. Senator Sessions. General Kehler, without these facilities and
the other elements associated with the robust plan for modernizing the
nuclear weapons complex, do you believe reductions to the strategic
hedge would be prudent?
General Kehler. In the near-term, I support the retention of
nondeployed warheads as a cost effective risk management approach to
ensure our nuclear deterrent remains credible. Key considerations for
determining the size of nondeployed hedge are confidence in the
capability of our nuclear forces, stockpile, and infrastructure to
address technical and geopolitical uncertainty. Hedge requirements are
evaluated annually to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent and manage
risk.
new start implementation costs
34. Senator Sessions. Dr. Miller and General Kehler, the fiscal
year 2012 budget provides little details on the costs associated with
implementing the New START treaty. Has DOD estimated the anticipated
cost? If so, what is the anticipated cost?
Dr. Miller. DOD continues to evaluate projected costs for
implementation of the New START treaty. The fiscal year 2012
President's budget request includes approximately $22.4 million for New
START treaty implementation: U.S. Air Force $8.2 million, U.S. Army
$0.47 million, U.S. Navy $6.3 million, the Missile Defense Agency $0.02
million, and the Defense Threat Reduction Agency $7.4 million.
Over the 10-year life of the New START treaty, our best estimate of
the total cost for DOD activities associated with implementation of the
treaty is currently between $880.5 million--$1,169 million. This
estimate is tentative and does not include potential offsetting cost
savings such as reducing operations and maintenance costs of eliminated
forces. However, until final decisions are made on U.S. Air Force
strategic delivery vehicles, as well as elimination methods for ICBM
silos and conversion methods for the B-52 and SLBM launchers, it is not
feasible to provide an accurate total cost estimate.
General Kehler. DOD continues to identify and analyze New START
implementation costs. We anticipate that future budgets will include
costs for implementation.
35. Senator Sessions. Dr. Miller and General Kehler, does DOD
intend to provide Congress the estimated cost associated with
implementing the New START treaty?
Dr. Miller. Over the life of the New START treaty (10 years), our
best estimate of the total estimated cost for DOD activities associated
with implementation of the New START treaty would be between $880.5
million and $1,169 million. This estimate is tentative and does not
include potential offsetting cost savings such as reducing operations
and maintenance costs of eliminated forces. However, until final
decisions are made on U.S. Air Force strategic delivery vehicles, as
well as elimination methods for ICBM silos and conversion methods for
the B-52 and SLBM launchers, it is not feasible to provide an accurate
total cost estimate.
General Kehler. Yes. New START implementation costs will be
reflected in future budget submissions. We anticipate the President's
budgets will identify what must be started in the near-term in order to
ensure successful completion by February 2018.
36. Senator Sessions. Dr. Miller and General Kehler, what is the
current timeframe for implementing the force posture as outlined in the
1251 report that accompanied the New START treaty?
Dr. Miller. The New START treaty provides flexibility for each
party to implement its nuclear force structure changes and does not
mandate a schedule for the implementation of reductions beyond the
requirement that the three central limits are met within 7 years of the
entry-into-force date.
The New START treaty entered into force on February 5, 2011, and
the United States has until February 2018 to bring its nuclear force
structure into compliance with New START treaty limits. The Office of
the Secretary of Defense is working with STRATCOM, the Joint Staff, and
the military departments to determine how we will implement specific
provisions of the New START treaty efficiently and without undue impact
on ongoing operations, what resources are required to implement these
New START treaty provisions, and how we will phase and synchronize the
implementation steps.
DOD is currently reviewing New START treaty implementation options
in order to sequence activities in an efficient and fiscally
responsible manner.
General Kehler. As you are aware, the United States has until
February 2018 to meet treaty central limits. DOD is currently reviewing
New START treaty implementation options in order to sequence activities
in an efficient and fiscally responsible manner.
37. Senator Sessions. Dr. Miller and General Kehler, when does DOD
intend to identify a final force posture given the plans to date only
specify a range for deployed ICBMs, i.e. up to 420 and up to 60
nuclear-capable bombers?
Dr. Miller. DOD intends to provide a baseline force structure that
meets New START treaty limits within the treaty's 7-year implementation
period, as part of the fiscal year 2013 budget submission to Congress.
It is important to note, however, that this baseline force structure
could be adjusted in the future, for example, if the United States
faced technical challenges with one triad leg and wished to shift
weight toward another. The New START treaty provides flexibility for
each party to implement its nuclear force structure changes and does
not mandate a schedule for the implementation of reductions beyond the
requirement that the three central limits are met within 7 years of the
entry-into-force date.
General Kehler. New START provides a flexible framework to meet
central limits over a 7-year period. Because it is important not to
make decisions today that preclude future options, DOD is reviewing New
START implementation plans in order to identify critical milestones and
key decision points. Examinations of alternate force structures are
part of this comprehensive review.
[Whereupon, at 3:58 p.m., the subcommittee adjourned.]
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