[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-88]
THE CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE DIRECTION FOR U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY
AND POSTURE
__________
HEARING
BEFORE THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
OF THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
HEARING HELD
NOVEMBER 2, 2011
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio, Chairman
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama RICK LARSEN, Washington
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
Tim Morrison, Professional Staff Member
Drew Walter, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Professional Staff Member
Alejandra Villarreal, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011
Page
Hearing:
Wednesday, November 2, 2011, The Current Status and Future
Direction for U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy and Posture.......... 1
Appendix:
Wednesday, November 2, 2011...................................... 47
----------
WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 2, 2011
THE CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE DIRECTION FOR U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY
AND POSTURE
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces....................... 5
Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
WITNESSES
D'Agostino, Hon. Thomas P., Administrator, National Nuclear
Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy............. 12
Kehler, Gen C. Robert, USAF, Commander, United States Strategic
Command........................................................ 9
Miller, Hon. James N., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy, U.S. Department of Defense................. 7
Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O., Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security, U.S. Department of State............... 11
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
D'Agostino, Hon. Thomas P.................................... 84
Kehler, Gen C. Robert........................................ 70
Miller, Hon. James N......................................... 60
Sanchez, Hon. Loretta........................................ 57
Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O....................................... 80
Turner, Hon. Michael......................................... 51
Documents Submitted for the Record:
All DOE Current Directives--11/17/11......................... 98
Memorandum of Agreement Between the Department of Defense and
the Department of Energy Concerning Modernization of the
U.S. Nuclear Infrastructure................................ 93
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Langevin................................................. 127
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Brooks................................................... 169
Dr. Fleming.................................................. 171
Mr. Franks................................................... 166
Mr. Lamborn.................................................. 167
Ms. Sanchez.................................................. 159
Mr. Scott.................................................... 174
Mr. Turner................................................... 131
THE CURRENT STATUS AND FUTURE DIRECTION FOR U.S. NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY
AND POSTURE
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Wednesday, November 2, 2011.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:37 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael Turner
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Turner. I call to order the subcommittee. Good
afternoon and welcome everyone to today's hearing on ``The
Current Status and Future Direction for U.S. Nuclear Weapons
Policy and Posture.''
We have here today an all-star panel of government
witnesses. While they need no introduction, I will do an
introduction for those of you who are perhaps on C-SPAN. We
have the Honorable James N. Miller, Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy at the U.S. Department of
Defense; General C. Robert Kehler, U.S. Air Force, U.S.
Strategic Command; the Honorable Ellen Tauscher, the Under
Secretary of State for Arms Control and International Security
at the U.S. Department of State.
We are glad to see you here today, and I must acknowledge
Ellen, of course, as the past chair here and she--well, I
served as ranking member. I can tell you that not only did we
work in a great bipartisan basis, but I count Ellen Tauscher to
be one of my mentors, and I greatly appreciate the help that
you provided me when you served as chair of the committee.
And then we have the Honorable Thomas D'Agostino,
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration
at the U.S. Department of Energy.
The administration has undertaken a series of ambitious
``projects'' regarding U.S. nuclear policy and posture, and the
Congress has a significant role to play here as a co-equal
branch of government entrusted by Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution, with responsibility to ``raise and support armies
. . . provide and maintain a Navy . . .'' and, under Article I,
Section 9, to pay for those actions of the government Congress
deems prudent.
And these ``projects'' that are currently pending with the
administration are the U.S. nuclear force reductions under the
New START [Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty] Treaty and the
associated Section 1251 Plan, which provides for the
modernization of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, including the
triad of nuclear delivery systems, nuclear warheads, and the
infrastructure that supports them; the so-called Nuclear
Posture Review Implementation Study or ``mini-NPR,'' which we
understand is intended to provide the President with options,
possibly for future reductions in U.S. nuclear forces; and
NATO's [North Atlantic Treaty Organization] Deterrence and
Defense Posture Review, or DDPR, which will likely make
recommendations regarding U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe.
As the witnesses know, the House of Representatives in the
Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Act, NDAA,
exercised its constitutional responsibilities for supporting
the Armed Forces--and stewardship of taxpayers' resources--to
pass a variety of provisions regarding these administration
projects. In reviewing Dr. Miller's testimony, I see that he is
prepared to discuss these NDAA provisions in detail, and we
certainly look forward to that.
Regarding the modernization program, it is at the heart of
the agreement that led to ratification of the New START Treaty.
Let me quote from Secretary Gates in his testimony before the
Armed Services Committee last June.
He said, ``Frankly, and just basically realistically, I see
this treaty as a vehicle to finally be able to get what we need
in the way of modernization that we have been unable to get
otherwise.''
These are powerful words, and they effectively show what I
think all the witnesses understand: that New START and nuclear
modernization are a package deal.
Indeed, the New START Resolution of Ratification that was
passed by the Senate makes it clear that in the absence of full
funding for the modernization program, the President needs to
explain to the Congress whether it is still in the interests of
the United States to remain party to the agreement.
I quote from condition nine of the resolution: it says,
``If appropriations are enacted that fail to meet the resource
requirements set forth in the President's 10 year [Section
1251] plan . . . the President shall submit to Congress . . . a
report detailing . . . whether and why, in the changed
circumstances brought about by the resource shortfall, it
remains in the national interest of the United States to remain
a Party to the New START Treaty.'' I am pleased the President
followed through on his commitment to request the funds for
modernization of the nuclear deterrent pursuant to his revised
Section 1251 Plan.
I am, however, concerned that the administration did not
request an anomaly for the nuclear modernization program for
this first continued resolution that expires on the 18th of
this month. In other words, the administration asked for the
dollars in the budget, but when it comes to the issue of
actually funding that, the administration did not ask for, in
the continuing resolution, an anomaly that would have preserved
that funding, the short-term CR [continuing resolution].
As we are now heading toward a second CR, possibly until
the end of this year, it will be telling to me as to whether or
not the administration requests an anomaly for NNSA [National
Nuclear Security Administration] Weapons Activities this time
around.
Likewise, I am deeply troubled that your written testimony
for today, Mr. D'Agostino, appears to us to have been watered
down by the White House Office of Management and Budget from
its initially strong statement of complete support for the
President's full budget request for Weapons Activities, to what
can be considered a tepid statement of support for some level
of modernization funding.
One would think it would be relatively easy for
administration officials to state support for the President's
full budget request.
General Kehler, I understand that you have been working
with DOD [Department of Defense] and OMB [Office of Management
and Budget] to finalize a letter regarding the proposed cuts to
Weapons Activities. I wanted to express my interest in hearing
from you directly, and Admiral Winnefeld, the senior military
leadership for nuclear weapons on this issue.
I am not certain why the OMB cannot support the President's
budget request for fiscal year 2012, but I intend to ask each
of the witnesses whether or not they would recommend to the
President an anomaly for NNSA in the event of another CR, and
whether the continued funding of the nuclear modernization
program in fiscal year 2013, pursuant to the current Section
1251 Plan, should be supported.
The answer to the second question should be an easy ``yes''
because, as the witnesses know, in a letter to several Senators
in December of last year--while working to secure a
ratification of the New START Treaty--the President pledged to
support the nuclear modernization program for as long as he is
in office.
I am, however, pleased that the Department of Defense is
working hard to assist in securing this funding. Of course, a
lot of this funding is the Department of Defense's own money.
As the ``Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of
Defense and the Department of Energy Concerning Modernization
of the U.S. Nuclear Infrastructure'' makes clear, in May 2010,
DOD committed to invest $5.7 billion of its own budgetary
authority in NNSA's modernization program, with an additional
$2.6 billion promised since then.
Now, these funds now must go to that purpose and not to
other parochial purposes, like local water infrastructure
projects, which we see as a threat to some of this continued
funding.
Now, this document, the ``Memorandum of Agreement between
the Department of Defense and Department of Energy Concerning
Modernization of the U.S. Nuclear Infrastructure,'' kind of a
long title, is marked ``For Official Use Only'' and, therefore,
I hesitate to put it as part of the unclassified record of this
hearing.
I am going to ask Dr. Miller and Mr. D'Agostino if your
staff will work with our committee staff concerning what
portion of this document is sensitive and what needs to be
redacted so that we can put in an unclassified version as part
of the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 93.]
Mr. Turner. Regarding the NPR Implementation Study, I am
anxious to learn the process being followed for the study, and
the policy considerations and force structure options that are
under review.
While I am aware that many previous administrations have
put their imprint on these matters, I am not aware of any
previous administration that has stated the answer to its
review before conducting or completing it.
In this case, the predetermined answer appears to be that
further reductions are being considered and may be made. Let's
look at the record of statements from administration officials
about this study.
From the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review: ``The President has
directed a review of potential future reductions in U.S.
nuclear weapons below New START levels.''
President Obama's National Security Advisor, Tom Donilon,
at the Carnegie Endowment in March of this year stated, ``We're
making preparations for the next round of nuclear reductions.''
Gary Samore, the White House coordinator for Arms Control
and WMD [weapons of mass destruction] Terrorism in an interview
in May stated, ``We'll need to do a strategic review of what
our first requirements are and then, based on that, the
President will have options available for additional reductions
. . . there may be parallel steps that both sides could take or
even unilateral steps the U.S. could take.''
Now, let me say again, his quote includes, ``unilateral
steps the U.S. could take.'' Now, I am curious as to how this
could square--a senior White House official--with that of
Secretary Panetta, who said the following on the October 13th
committee hearing--Secretary Panetta just said before us--
``With regards to reducing our nuclear arena, I think that is
an area where I don't think we ought to do that unilaterally--
we ought to do that on the basis of negotiations with the
Russians and others to make sure we are all walking the same
path.''
I agree with Secretary Panetta, partially because I have
yet to see any dividend from the unilateral steps that we took
in abandoning, via the NPR, the submarine-launched nuclear
cruise missile capability or the multiple warhead ICBM
[intercontinental ballistic missile] capability.
And, of course, all of this is taking place when the ink on
the New START Treaty is barely dry, and when data exchanges
with the Russian Federation reveal that Russia has actually
increased its deployed nuclear forces since the treaty entered
into force. Increased.
What's more, the witness testimony before this subcommittee
on October 14th from Dr. Mark Schneider, a member of the New
START Treaty negotiation team, and Mr. Richard Fisher,
respectively, made clear that ``Russia is modernizing every leg
of its nuclear triad with new, more advanced systems'' and
``China is steadily increasing the numbers and capabilities of
the ballistic missiles it deploys'' and is ``actively working
to develop a submarine-based nuclear deterrent force, something
it has never had.'' Yet, the administration reviews are all
being done to support further U.S. reductions. This is
concerning.
Lastly, there is the NATO Deterrence and Defense Posture
Review that is being discussed with our allies in Europe.
Recently, as the Chairman of the United States Delegation to
the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, I was able to discuss this
issue with our allies at the meeting of the Parliamentary
Assembly in Bucharest.
It was clear that many of our allies were deeply concerned
with the direction that this review may take. For example, some
NATO members have suggested that geographical relocation would
be a serious step that the Russians could take to address the
thousands of tactical nuclear weapons they have deployed on our
allies' borders.
Of course, mere relocation of Russian nuclear weapons to
some point farther east is not a serious step, and is certainly
no reduction in their disproportionately large stockpile of
tactical nuclear weapons.
That is why the Defense and Security Committee of the
Parliamentary Assembly adopted, unanimously, my proposal to
make clear that the geographic relocation will not be
considered a reduction in Russian arms. I note that even the
Russian delegation did not object to the designation that
geographical relocation does not constitute a reduction in
Russian arms.
I look forward to learning more about the DDPR from our
witnesses, and finally, I am most concerned that the
administration may be seeking to amend the NATO-Russia Council
Charter to create guarantees regarding missile defense. That
has no support here and it should be a non-starter.
This is a very important hearing, and I want to reiterate
my thanks to each of our witnesses for appearing. I will now
turn to the ranking member of the subcommittee, Ms. Sanchez,
for her opening statement.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the
Appendix on page 51.]
STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I apologize to you
for my voice. I am a little under the weather today. I would
like to join Chairman Turner in welcoming Dr. Miller, General
Kehler, Under Secretary Tauscher, and Administrator D'Agostino
for being before us once again. I look forward to hearing about
the opportunities and the progress in moving beyond a Cold War
arsenal.
I would like to know, hopefully, through this hearing what
our requirements are and how we will implement the policies and
vision outlined in the Nuclear Posture Review, including how we
can maintain a strong and reliable deterrent at lower levels,
and what kind of arsenal we need to address current and
foreseeable threats and, of course, how do we do that in a
fiscally responsible manner?
And at the end of my comments, I will make a comment about
the controversial NDAA provisions contained in that bill. But
first, I am pleased that the President is leading the much-
needed efforts to reduce the dangers posed by nuclear weapons
in this post-war era because, of course, we need to move beyond
policies and force structure derived from Cold War-era
requirements and shift to deterrents that protect us today.
Looking in particular at the threats that are out there--
and there are many--President Obama noted in his Palm Sunday
speech in Prague in 2009 that ``The existence of thousands of
nuclear weapons is the most dangerous legacy of the Cold War.''
Even with the considerable reductions of the past decades, it
is still important to remember that the United States and
Russia still maintain thousands of nuclear weapons.
Over 95 percent of the nuclear weapons available are in
those two countries' hands. And so there is a lot of progress
that can be made in bringing down those levels and ensuring and
checking and working with each other to ensure that it is a
safer world.
In 2009, the National Defense Authorization Act-mandated
independent Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United
States--it was led by Secretaries Perry and Schlesinger--
concluded that ``This is a moment of opportunity to revise and
renew the U.S. nuclear strategy, but also a moment of
urgency.'' I think we all agree and we have talked off to the
side, many of us, including the chairman. There is a lot of
movement going on right now in these times, and it is a time of
opportunity.
The two Secretaries noted that ``the nuclear deterrent of
the United States need not play anything like the central role
that it did for decades in U.S. military policy and national
security strategy. But it remains crucial for some important
problems.''
And in their 2007 Wall Street Journal op-ed, ``A World Free
of Nuclear Weapons,'' Secretaries Henry Kissinger, George
Shultz, William Perry and Senator Sam Nunn recommended ``a
series of agreed and urgent steps that would lay the groundwork
for a world free of the nuclear threat.''
And among those have included, ``Changing the Cold War
posture of deployed nuclear weapons to . . . reduce the danger
of an accidental or unauthorized use of a nuclear weapon,'' and
``Continuing to reduce substantially the size of nuclear forces
in all states that possess them,'' and ``Eliminating short-
range nuclear weapons designed to be forward-deployed,'' and
``Initiating a bipartisan process . . . to achieve ratification
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.''
We must also take a hard look at what we need to meet our
national and our allies' deterrence requirements in light of
the current and new threats out there. And we also have the
responsibility to bear in mind the ramifications of the current
economic crisis, and we must carefully consider what is urgent,
what can be delayed, and what is no longer necessary.
Given what the requirements are, we must find ways to make
smarter investments, and nuclear weapons activities and
operations are no exception--are no exception. We are going
through that right now with the ``super committee'' and we have
to also take a look at this arena. These are important
oversight decisions and, quite honestly, pretty awesome
responsibilities for all of us up here and there to take a look
at.
So I look forward to discussing what the requirements are
for our nuclear deterrent, including: how do we size our
nuclear arsenal to best reflect and address the current
threats? What further nuclear weapons reductions may be needed
as a tool to strengthen U.S. and international security and
stability? Do we need, and can we afford, to sustain the triad
for the next 70 years; what are the decision points; and what
considerations impact that decision now? And what are the risks
and the costs of retaining forward-based nuclear weapons in
Europe merely as a political symbol if they are no longer a
unifying element of NATO and a useful military asset? And are
there other ways to maintain a strong nuclear NATO alliance?
Third, our committee has had an engaging and serious debate
on the nuclear policy provisions proposed by the chairman and
my Republican colleagues during markup of the House-passed
NDAA.
There was significant disagreement on these, and for the
need for legislative action. There are issues that we have to
revise, revisit, address with the Senate as we finalize our
bill, and I remain concerned about several of these provisions,
including their impact on national security and, quite frankly,
whether they are even constitutional.
So, public debate on these issues is important. I look
forward to advancing that debate today, and again, I thank all
four of you for being before our committee. And with that, Mr.
Chairman, I yield back.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Sanchez can be found in the
Appendix on page 57.]
Mr. Turner. Thank you. I will now turn to our witnesses.
Before they begin, of course, I would like, if you would, to
summarize your testimony in the 5-minute period so we can get
to the issue of questions from Members.
But also, reminding you of my opening statement, we would
appreciate if you, in your comments, might incorporate whether
you would recommend that, in this upcoming continuing
resolution, that NNSA Weapons Activities receive full funding
and receive, as you know, an anomaly, and also if you believe
that the President should, in 2013, continue his commitment of
full funding for modernization.
Dr. Miller.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES N. MILLER, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY UNDER
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Dr. Miller. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez and
members of the subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify today. I am very pleased to join STRATCOM [United
States Strategic Command] Commander Bob Kehler, Under Secretary
Ellen Tauscher, and Administrator D'Agostino.
The subcommittee asked us to address the ongoing
administration review of U.S. nuclear planning guidance and
several additional issues. I would like to summarize key points
from my written statement and ask that the full statement be
entered into record. First, I am going to start with some
numbers for context. The U.S. nuclear arsenal today consists of
about 5,000 warheads. In addition, we have several thousand
warheads awaiting dismantlement. Unclassified estimates suggest
that Russia has 4,000 to 6,500 total nuclear warheads, of which
2,000 to 4,000 are tactical nuclear warheads.
China is increasing the size of its nuclear arsenal, but is
estimated to have only a few hundred nuclear weapons. North
Korea has tested a plutonium-based weapon design and appears to
be trying to develop a highly enriched uranium design and Iran
continues to defy the will of the international community and
pursue its nuclear ambitions.
It is in this context that President Obama directed a
follow-on analysis to implement the 2010 Nuclear Posture
Review, or NPR. That work, as the chairman and ranking member
noted, is now under way and we are focused on achieving the
five objectives described in the Nuclear Posture Review.
First, preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear
terrorism; second, reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in
U.S. strategy; third, maintaining strategic deterrence and
stability at reduced nuclear force levels; fourth,
strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies
and partners; and fifth, and critically, sustaining a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. We expect this analysis
to be completed before the end of the calendar year.
This NPR Implementation Study will be followed by new
Presidential guidance, and then in succession, the Secretary of
Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs will then issue more
detailed planning guidance to the military, and then STRATCOM
will revise its military plans.
When complete, our analysis of deterrence requirements will
also help inform future arms control proposals, as the Under
Secretary will discuss in more detail, and I might note, as the
military did and the Department of Defense did as part of the
Nuclear Posture Review to inform New START treaty negotiations.
As the chairman noted, in parallel to this administration
work, NATO is undertaking a Deterrence and Defense Posture
Review to determine the appropriate mix of nuclear,
conventional, and missile defense forces that NATO will need to
deter and defend against threats to the alliance.
Work is ongoing. We expect it to be complete before spring
2012, prior to the NATO summit in Chicago. And it is proceeding
in accordance with the principles that have been central to
NATO's nuclear posture for decades, including retaining an
appropriate mix of conventional and nuclear capabilities,
sharing the risks and burdens of nuclear deterrence, and
encouraging Russia to better secure and reduce its arsenal of
non-strategic nuclear weapons.
The United States is fully engaged in this effort, and I
want to reiterate that any changes in NATO's nuclear posture
would only be undertaken as part of a decision by the alliance.
A critical issue that we face is ensuring funding for the
nuclear enterprise. When he took office, President Obama made
reversing the declining budgets for the nuclear complex a top
priority. And the administration's Section 1251 Report, in
fact, includes a plan for over $125 billion in spending on
strategic delivery systems, and about $88 billion for stockpile
and infrastructure costs over a 10-year period.
And I would like to thank this subcommittee for supporting
the administration's budget request for fiscal year 2012. Cuts
to NNSA funding in the House and Senate appropriations bills
are a big concern. The President has asked for the resources
that we need even in a tough fiscal environment. Now we need
Congress' help. We look forward to working with this committee
and other Members to that end.
I also want to touch very briefly on a number of provisions
of concern in the current version of the NDAA, the Defense
Authorization Act, as passed by the House, H.R. 1540. And I
would be pleased to discuss them further after this statement.
H.R. 1540 would dictate the pace of reductions under New START
in a way that would bar DOD and DOE [Department of Energy] from
following the most cost-effective means to implement
reductions.
It could preclude DOD from being logistically able to meet
New START Treaty timelines for reductions. It would divert
resources from stockpile sustainment in ways that tax the very
programs that we all want to support, and it would encroach on
the authorities to set nuclear employment policy that have been
exercised by every President in the nuclear age.
In conclusion, sustaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent will
be the work of many administrations and many Congresses, and we
believe strongly that it will require sustained bipartisan
support. And even as we face sustained downward pressure on DOD
and DOE budgets, we believe we need to sustain a strong
bipartisan consensus to address these nuclear issues as
apolitical national security priorities.
As our work on the NPR Implementation Study continues, we
welcome vigorous and important debate on these matters of
national importance, and I appreciate the opportunity to be
here today and look forward to follow-on conversations,
including in a classified environment, and look forward to
working with the committee on these issues.
Thank you, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Miller can be found in the
Appendix on page 60.]
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
General.
STATEMENT OF GEN C. ROBERT KEHLER, USAF, COMMANDER, UNITED
STATES STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Kehler. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member
Sanchez, members of the subcommittee. I really appreciate you
inviting me to share my views on strategic nuclear deterrence
issues, including the implementation of the Nuclear Posture
Review, New START, and nuclear deterrent force requirements. I,
too, appreciate the opportunity to join with my colleagues here
today as well, and would ask that my full statement be accepted
into the record as well.
Like Dr. Miller, I think it is useful to place my remarks
in the context of the April 2010 Nuclear Posture Review, which
placed the prevention of nuclear terrorism and proliferation at
the top of the U.S. policy agenda, and described how the United
States will reduce the role and the numbers of nuclear weapons.
At the same time, the NPR recognized as long as nuclear weapons
exist, the United States must maintain a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear arsenal to maintain strategic stability with
other nuclear powers, deter potential adversaries, and reassure
our allies and partners of our security commitments to them.
The United States Strategic Command is assigned several
important roles in executing the Nation's nuclear strategy, as
it was described in the NPR. First, we are responsible for
synchronizing planning for DOD combating weapons of mass
destruction efforts, in coordination with the other combatant
commands, the services, and appropriate U.S. Government
agencies.
Second, our men and women operate the Nation's strategic
nuclear deterrent forces 24 hours a day, 365 days a year, as
directed by the President. And third, we are responsible with
providing the President with credible response options to deter
attack and to achieve national security objectives should
deterrence fail.
We do so mindful that deterrence is no longer a one-size-
fits-all proposition, that the Nation's deterrence approaches
must be tailored to today's global environment, and that the
Nation's deterrence toolkit includes capabilities beyond
nuclear weapons. In short, these demands drive our strategy
and, in turn, our nuclear requirements and employment planning.
As directed in the Nuclear Posture Review, we are now
working with the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint
Staff, and the services to inform the review of the nuclear
weapons employment guidance that STRATCOM receives from the
President, the Secretary of Defense, and the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff.
STRATCOM plays a significant role in analyzing how the
deployment planning guidance drives nuclear force requirements
and force structures, and we are playing such a role in the
strategic requirements study. We are supporting the study by
providing military advice regarding potential changes in
employment guidance consistent with the NPR, and we are
providing analysis and advice on the force structuring and the
force posture required to meet our strategic needs.
As you know, STRATCOM played a similar role providing
analysis and advice to the team that developed the U.S. New
START negotiating position. We have a little more than 6 years
to comply with treaty limits, so we are also working closely
with OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense], the Joint Staff
and the services to determine how to implement the treaty
provisions safely, securely, and efficiently, what resources
are required, if any, to implement the eventual force structure
decisions, and how best to phase and synchronize the
implementation strategy.
The NPR validated the continuing need for the triad, and
the 1251 Report outlined the necessary sustainment and
modernization plans, including requirements and timelines.
These plans are essential to maintaining long-term confidence
in our nuclear deterrent capabilities. Unfortunately, the
nuclear enterprise simultaneously faces significant
recapitalization challenges and extraordinary fiscal pressures.
But in my view as the combatant commander responsible for
the nuclear deterrent force, for our Nation's security, we must
invest in these forces and the highly specialized enterprise
that supports them. This includes completing our nuclear weapon
life extensions, sustaining and beginning the phased
modernization of our delivery platforms, conducting scientific
surveillance of the stockpile, eliminating unneeded weapons,
and positioning for further reductions that may be directed.
Mr. Chairman, STRATCOM is moving forward to implement the
New START and NPR effectively, while maintaining our focus on
ensuring a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent force
today and for the long term.
Thank you again for this opportunity, and thanks to you and
the committee for your interest and support. I look forward to
answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Kehler can be found in
the Appendix on page 70.]
Mr. Turner. Thank you. Under Secretary Tauscher.
STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, UNDER SECRETARY FOR ARMS
CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Secretary Tauscher. Chairman Turner and Ranking Member
Sanchez, members of the subcommittee, I want to thank you for
this opportunity to testify on the future direction of U.S.
nuclear weapons policy and posture.
I am really happy to appear before your subcommittee, which
provided me the honor of working side by side with many of you
over seven terms in the House. I am equally proud to be sitting
next to my esteemed interagency colleagues and testifying on
the Obama administration's nuclear policies.
I will focus my initial marks on two areas where State is
playing a major role. The ongoing Deterrence and Defense
Posture Review, or DDPR, in NATO, and the preparations,
process, and expectations for future arms control efforts with
Russia and other countries. As outlined 2 years ago by
President Obama in Prague, the administration is committed to
continuing a step-by-step process to increase U.S. security by
reducing nuclear weapons worldwide. That effort includes the
pursuit of a future agreement with Russia for reductions in all
categories of nuclear weapons: strategic, non-strategic,
deployed, and non-deployed.
President Obama is committed to seeking to initiate
negotiations to address the disparity between the non-strategic
nuclear stockpiles of Russia and the United States, and to
secure and reduce non-strategic nuclear weapons in a verifiable
manner. The key principles that Secretary Clinton outlined at
the 2010 NATO Foreign Ministerial meeting in Tallinn will guide
our approach.
We aim to show strong Allied support for the President's
Prague vision and underscore our common view, as the Alliance
agreed at the November 2010 Lisbon summit, that NATO will
remain a nuclear alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist.
At Lisbon, the Alliance reaffirmed that the strategic
nuclear forces of NATO's nuclear armed member states are the
``supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies'' and agreed
that NATO should maintain the broadest possible level of
burden-sharing on nuclear matters.
NATO allies further agreed to seek to create the conditions
for future nuclear reductions, and noted that the Alliance
should seek Russia's agreement to increase the transparency of
its nuclear weapons in Europe and to relocate those weapons
away from the territories of NATO members. We are committed to
consulting closely with allies and making decisions by
consensus on NATO's nuclear deterrent.
The DDPR is examining NATO's overall posture in deterring
and defending against the full range of threats to the
Alliance. The review is to identify the appropriate mix of
conventional, nuclear, and missile defense capabilities that
NATO needs to respond effectively to 21st century security
challenges. The review also aims to strengthen deterrence as
part of our commitment to Allied security. The goal is to
complete the review for the May 2012 NATO summit that President
Obama will host in Chicago.
The DDPR also provides us an important opportunity to
consult with allies about nuclear deterrence in future Russian
nuclear talks. Those consultations will inform our
consideration in the next steps with Russia on nuclear
reductions. As a next step in our bilateral dialogue with
Russia, we seek to conduct a broad policy discussion on the
various considerations that affect strategic stability.
We also hope to deepen this engagement to discuss key
concepts in terminology which will become relevant as we
prepare to discuss future reductions in strategic and non-
strategic nuclear weapons, including both deployed and non-
deployed weapons. We also would like to increase transparency
on a reciprocal basis with Russia. We are thinking through how
such transparency measures might be implemented, and have
consulted with our allies through the DDPR.
I am happy to report that implementation on the New START
Treaty is proceeding smoothly since its entry into force on
February 5th. The New START Treaty places equal arms limits on
both sides, limits that are significantly lower than the levels
provided for in the earlier START treaty and the Moscow Treaty.
The New START Treaty provides us confidence that, as Russia
modernizes its strategic forces, Russian force levels will not
exceed the treaty limits 7 years after entering into force and
continuing for the remainder of the treaty's duration. The New
START Treaty contributes to our security not only through its
limits, but also through its strong verification regime.
The treaty provides us greater certainty about the
composition of Russia's forces. This verification regime
provides information and access that we would otherwise lack.
Without the New START Treaty, our inspectors would not be able
to visit Russian strategic weapons bases. To date, we have
conducted 13 onsite inspections inside Russia. New START's
verification regime enhances predictability and stability with
the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship, and reduces the risk of
miscalculation, misunderstanding, and mistrust.
Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member, I look forward to answering
any of your questions and, once again, it is an honor and a
privilege to be here.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Tauscher can be found
in the Appendix on page 80.]
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mr. D'Agostino.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D'AGOSTINO, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. D'Agostino. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez and
members of the subcommittee, it is a real honor to be here
today and be able to talk to you about the work we are doing in
the National Nuclear Security Administration as well as with
our interagency partners on taking care of this vital mission.
I also want to thank the committee for your continued
support of the Department of Energy and the National Nuclear
Security Administration. We have more than 35,000 men and women
across our enterprise working to keep the country safe, protect
our allies, and enhance global security. Your leadership and
support have made their jobs easier.
The President has made strengthening the nuclear security
and the nonproliferation regime one of his top priorities. Over
the last few years, we have worked tirelessly to establish a
consensus on U.S. nuclear policy. The commitment of the White
House has reinvigorated my entire organization. Furthermore,
President Obama's commitment to reverse a decline in investment
that took place before he entered office is essential for
accomplishing our nuclear security work.
This commitment was reflected in the President's 2012
budget request for the NNSA and, in fact, it was also reflected
in his 2011 budget request. This request reflects an integrated
10-year plan and identifies the funding necessary to ensure the
safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear stockpile,
modernizing infrastructure we need to execute our mission, and
revitalize the science, technology, and the engineering base
that supports the full range of our nuclear security
activities.
Investment in these capabilities over the next decade is
essential, and--I cannot over emphasize this point--it will
require sustained, multi-year support from future
administrations and Congress.
The stability we have gained from the NPR and New START has
allowed us to plan and use our resources much more effectively.
We have a comprehensive Stockpile Stewardship and Management
Plan that is updated annually and provides a long out-year
review on the stockpile as well as the science, infrastructure,
and human capital necessary to execute the nuclear
modernization work and perform the full range of nuclear
security work.
I would like to express my concern, however, that this
sense of stability could be eroded given the uncertainties
stemming from the reductions Congress is contemplating in the
fiscal year 2012 budget process. These uncertainties directly
impact our workforce, our ability to efficiently plan and
execute our programs and, ultimately, the ability to be
successful.
In order to plan and execute an integrated, complicated
program efficiently, we have developed and received support for
the 10-year plan outlined in the 1251 Report. However, this
consensus for nuclear modernization is facing great uncertainty
in the face of today's fiscal challenges and limitations
imposed by Congress in the Budget Control Act.
This consensus is also under attack by some who are
spreading incorrect cost estimates. By using numbers at
potentially three or four times higher than what it would
actually cost to modernize and maintain our stockpile, the
approach appears to use our current fiscal environment to
potentially tear up the path that the President and Congress
have laid out for us.
The 1251 Report makes clear that the total for the
Department of Defense and NNSA will cost approximately $200
billion over the next 10 years, not the $600-plus billion or so
that some are claiming.
It is critical to accept the linkage between modernizing
our current stockpile in order to achieve the policy objective
of decreasing the number of weapons we have in our stockpile,
while still ensuring that the deterrent is safe, secure, and
effective.
As you know, the United States will continue to have
nuclear weapons for the foreseeable future, and many of our
projects are vital to national security. The longer these
projects are delayed, the more expensive they become. Projects
like the Uranium Processing Facility and the Chemistry and
Metallurgy Replacement Facility will allow us to replace aging
Cold War infrastructure.
And at the other end of the life cycle of these materials,
the Mixed Oxide Fuel Fabrication Facility represents a critical
nonproliferation effort that will result in the elimination of
enough material for approximately 17,000 nuclear weapons. It is
the only permanent plutonium disposition method agreed to by
the United States and Russia, and has been supported by every
President and Congress since the idea was introduced.
Our Stockpile Stewardship Program, which allows us to
assess and certify the stockpile without returning to
underground testing, has grown increasingly important. Our
world-class scientific capabilities, for example in modeling
and simulation, continue to be developed to realize the
Stockpile Stewardship Program today. And today we actually have
a greater understanding of how a nuclear weapon behaves than we
did during the days of testing.
Investing in a modern 21st century enterprise is not just
about the stockpile. As the President said in Prague in April
of 2009, the threat of a terrorist acquiring and using a
nuclear weapon is the most immediate and extreme threat we
face.
The investments we make today help support the full range
of our nuclear security mission, which includes countering
nuclear terrorism.
As part of our nonproliferation work, we are working to
support the International Atomic Energy Agency and assisting
many member states around the world to implement their Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty obligations.
In our strategic arms control verification work, we are
leveraging the expertise of our physicists, our engineers, and
our scientists to advance radiation protection technology and
equipment, and we are leading the international effort to
implement more stringent standards for the physical protection
of nuclear material around the world.
Our engineers are also working to complete the design work
on the nuclear reactor plant for the Ohio-class replacement
submarine. This effort is a continuation of the longstanding
unique role the NNSA serves in partnership with the United
States Navy.
I would like to take a moment, a brief moment, to answer
your question about the anomaly, Mr. Chairman. The anomalies
depend of course if they are--we anticipate a continuing
resolution coming, we know the day is approaching us, 18
November. But the decision of whether to pursue an anomaly
involves a couple of factors. One is the length of the anomaly.
At this point right now, we don't know if there will be an
anomaly, first of all, and if there is a continuing resolution,
how long it will be. A short-term continuing resolution coupled
with the second factor, which is, what kind of resources do we
currently have available to continue our programs without
impact to the overall direction that we have--those two factors
are key elements in deciding whether the administration pursues
an anomaly. We are working very closely with the White House on
this question and as we get closer to the date, we will be in a
position to make a recommendation on this particular point. It
really depends on those two particular factors of which right
now, I don't have all the data, particularly on the first one,
the length of the continuing resolution.
That concludes my statement, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. D'Agostino can be found in
the Appendix on page 84.]
Mr. Turner. Thank you. I just, to follow on your comment on
the anomaly. I certainly understand your answer and it
certainly is a very practical and reasonable statement of,
basically, if you need the money you would ask for it, and if
you have other reasons, other ways to--you have the money or it
is not needed in the short term, that you might not ask.
But I would like you to consider, and all of our witnesses
to consider, the message that it sends. Because at the same
time the House is looking at cutting, if the anomaly is not
requested, it looks as if it is not necessary for the House to
fund, and so that might be your third environmental context
that you might want to put in, as far as your request for
anomaly, because it doesn't look like the administration is
doing an ``I want it'' in one hand, and a wink in the other, by
not asking for the anomaly. So if you would take that into
consideration, and all of you, as you look to recommendations
of the anomaly, I would appreciate that.
Because we have so many Members in attendance we want to
make certain that we have an ability for people to ask
questions. I am going to ask three questions for my start, two
of which, the first two, are relatively easy because they are
commercials. I am going to give an opportunity for each of you
to give a commercial for us.
Mr. D'Agostino, you begin, actually, in your statement,
addressing what my first concern is of the first of those two
where I am asking for a commercial. And that is, the issue of
the statements that have been circulating that the U.S. is
going to spend over $700 billion of nuclear weapons and related
programs over the next 10 years. Mr. Markey circulated a letter
signed by 62 Members that said that. It was followed on by The
New York Times in an editorial that said the number is $600
billion over the next 10 years.
You, in your statement before us just now, said it is
slightly over $200 billion that is going to be spent. So I
would like each of you to respond to that, the issue of the
actual cost.
The second part of that is, is the reason why that that is
coming about is because we are under these budgetary pressures?
I think that this false assumption that with budgetary
pressures that if there are reductions, there is this great
savings that is going to occur. And I try to tell people that,
you know for example, if this room was a nuclear storage
facility and you had a nuclear weapon in it, and you only had
1, versus if you had 20, you are not going to have less people
outside the door. And, similarly, I know, Mr. D'Agostino, you
tell us about the room down the hall where we have scientists
charged with knowledge with respect to nuclear weapons, and
knowledge is not something that has a reduced demand based upon
the numbers of weapons that we have deployed.
So my first question is, would you all speak--and Under
Secretary Tauscher, you are welcome to chime in on this one
also if you would like, but it is not directed at you--to the
issue of that we are not spending $700 or $600 billion, that it
is slightly over $200 billion over the next 10 years. And the
second aspect is that policy, not budgetary pressures, should
be the focus of reductions, and that the savings are somewhat
elusive, they are not as they are being expressed in these
calls for reductions. If you might give us some of your wisdom
on that, I would appreciate it.
We will start with Dr. Miller.
Dr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, as you know, the Section 1251
Report that was submitted by the administration included our
best estimate of the total costs of sustaining and modernizing
the nuclear enterprise and the delivery systems from fiscal
year 2012 through fiscal year 2021. That estimate was $125.8
billion for the delivery systems and about $88 billion for the
NNSA-related costs.
And my math suggests that that is, as the administrator
said, a little over $200 billion over that period--close to
$214 billion.
I have had an opportunity to look at some of the materials
that were referenced in the cost estimates just before coming
over here and I, without giving this more time than it
deserves, suffice it to say there was double counting and some
rather curious arithmetic involved.
Mr. Turner. Do you wish to comment with respect to the
issue of savings? Because I think that people really do look at
this as a ``take a number and divide by how ever many you
reduce them, and you have those savings,'' and that is not
exactly the case.
Dr. Miller. Yes, I would like to comment, thank you.
A strategic approach to the budget overall does not involve
taking an equal percentage from every element of the budget,
and the Department of Defense certainly is committed to taking
a strategic--in a different sense than strategic weapons, now,
but a thoughtful approach, a strategy-driven approach to the
reductions. We are looking to take north of $450 billion out of
the defense program over the next decade and as a result of
that, as Secretary Gates had said and Secretary Panetta has
said since, essentially everything is on the table; that
doesn't mean everything should get the same treatment.
We will look hard at our own spending within nuclear forces
to ask where savings could be gained while still producing the
same capabilities that we need, just as we are looking hard in
other areas. And I know that we will owe another Section 1251
Report with the new budget.
And the one constant I can promise in that is that we will
continue to propose what we believe is necessary for sustaining
a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent, including the
delivery systems and including the infrastructure, science, and
technology and work on weapons that is required.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
General Kehler.
General Kehler. Mr. Chairman, I would agree with both those
comments. I, too, agree with the 1251 Report and the $200-plus
billion that it documented for the need to both sustain and
begin the modernization of the nuclear enterprise over the next
10 years.
The second point--and I would agree here, totally, with Dr.
Miller as well--given the magnitude of the first round of
budget cuts that the Department is dealing with, and certainly
that the combatant commanders have been asked to help the
services deal with, we are looking for every possible place
that we can find that we can be more efficient while we
maintain our military capability. I would say that we have not
been immune from that look, nor should we have been immune from
that look. I think that Congressman Sanchez said this, though,
in her opening remarks, that there are decision points that are
along the way here that do give us some flexibility in terms of
how we ultimately decide to modernize and how we can go
forward.
So I do think that, in addition to looking for every place
we can save money, I also agree with you, in some places, this
is not a one-for-one, ``take something out and you
automatically save some X amount of money.'' It is a more
complicated answer than that. But there are also some key
decision points that are coming along, where I think that there
is still some flexibility to do some shaping.
Mr. Turner. Mr. D'Agostino, would you like to embellish
your comment you made in your statement?
Mr. D'Agostino. I would agree with Dr. Miller with respect
to the math and the numbers that the administration put out in
its 1251 Report. Regarding your second question, I would like
to add a little bit if I could.
I think it is important to recognize that what we have is a
capability-based enterprise. This is a nuclear security
enterprise. It is not a nuclear weapons enterprise; it is a
nuclear security enterprise. It is an enterprise that, of
course, takes care of the deterrent--because the President
said, as long as weapons exist, we are going to take care of
them to make sure they are safe, secure, and effective.
But it is an enterprise that does so much more. As an
enterprise, it does nuclear nonproliferation work in over 100
countries around the world with the State Department. It is an
enterprise that does nuclear counterterrorism work with our
partners in the Intelligence Community and the Defense
Department.
It is an enterprise that does nuclear forensics work, as we
work with our key allies to make sure that, if material is
found, we are in a best position to be able to attribute where
this material came from, and it is an enterprise that does
nuclear emergency response.
And nuclear emergency response is something that we
actually used earlier this year in assisting our Japanese
colleagues with the Fukushima event. Those assets, those key
assets, came from the account that Congress authorized and
appropriates. It is called the Weapons Activities Account. In
reality, not all of that account, that Weapons Activities
Account, is work exactly on the nuclear weapon. It provides
that base capability to address all of these other things.
One last point, and I will yield back. This enterprise,
because it is a capability-based enterprise, it can work up and
take care of a stockpile size. I mean, it is fairly independent
at low numbers. And this is where we are.
Jim Miller talked about the number of warheads that we have
and are active in the stockpile. It is able to take--that
capability, whether you do one or whether you do more than one,
you need the same amount of material. And that is the kind of
enterprise we have.
This is not a Cold War enterprise, where we can do
thousands and thousands and thousands of warheads, as we did
back in the 1960s, where we had over 31,000 warheads. It is
completely different.
But I wanted to make--the shift we are making in the NNSA
and in the administration is to shift the work from a nuclear
weapons complex to a nuclear security enterprise, to bring in
those other elements, because those are the elements that the
President had laid out in the NPR, that we feel would be a key
national security and global security challenge.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. And in the second aspect of the
commercial, we are all in agreement that the nuclear
modernization needs to go forward. I mean, this committee
passed in its bill full funding, the administration asked for
full funding.
We are all facing now the bills that came out of the Senate
and the House Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittees,
and then that had reductions in funding for nuclear
modernization. So a question, obviously, that people will have
is, you know, what is the difference? Is there? What is the
effect, if the cuts go into place, instead of what we all have
agreed would be the appropriate level of funding?
I will start with you, Dr. Miller.
Dr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, I will answer at a general level,
and leave the technical details to Administrator D'Agostino.
At a general level, the first order effects are going to be
that the NNSA, with the overall level of funding, will be
forced to make very difficult trades between investing in
science and technology that is necessary to support the overall
efforts that the administrator described, and the
infrastructure that is required to implement those, and to do
the life extension programs that the Department of Defense is
focused on. As you look at the level of reductions that have
been proposed by both the House and the Senate in the
appropriations, some essential activities will not be
undertaken.
If you look within those reductions, at the specifics, we
have particular concerns for the Department of Defense
reductions in funding for the B61 Life Extension Program.
That is a critical weapon system for both our bombers and
for our dual-capable aircraft, and reductions also in the W78
Life Extension Program, where there are cascading effects, if
one program is delayed, the next one is delayed. And again, Mr.
D'Agostino can give greater details, but one of those effects
is that, at the end of the day, the United States gets less
product for more cost because these changes in programs are
going to drive up costs overall.
Mr. Turner. General Kehler.
General Kehler. Mr. Chairman, I would just add that if we
are referring specifically to the markups dealing with
Department of Energy and NNSA part of the budget, then I would
just add that I am very concerned about the impact on life
extension programs.
I have a concern for the broader enterprise as well, as the
administrator suggested, but we have got some near-term issues
that will impact us in terms of life extension programs for
aging weapons.
In a broader context, though, I also have concerns as
budget reductions are related, either to our efforts to sustain
the existing force, or our efforts to modernize the existing
force. And we find ourselves at a point in time where several
modernization programs have begun.
It is important for us to continue to sustain this safe,
secure, and effective deterrent force as we transition this
time period to future modernization. And, of course, I have
concerns in both of those areas, in the macro sense, as we
struggle with budget reductions.
Mr. Turner. Mr. D'Agostino.
Mr. D'Agostino. Obviously, we have two bills--one from the
House, one from the Senate, in both subcommittees; the marks
are different. The House is down, overall, for the NNSA by
$1.16 billion. That is out of about the request of $11 billion
or so. So it is a pretty sizable percentage-wise reduction. The
Senate reduction is significantly less, $732 million as a
result of that.
Focus a little bit on the weapons account, I believe that
may be where some of your questions come from, but I do want to
mention nonproliferation, because that has an impact. The
President has laid out a fairly clear message with respect to
the desire to secure nuclear material around the world in 4
years, which, we believe, is absolutely critically important.
Both bills are marked on the plutonium and uranium
facilities, about $150 to $200 million. Those reductions are
going to cause us to look very closely--if they, if we end up,
in some way, in this region, are going to cause us to have to
look very closely at both of those facilities.
It doesn't, because we obviously are authorized and
appropriated on an annual basis, the 1251 Report makes very
clear about out-year commitments and requirements to do this.
It would be difficult to actually run--in fact, I would say
close to impossible--to run a large construction project
efficiently if every year we will anticipate having huge deltas
between House and Senate and the administration requests,
whether it is President Obama's budget request or whatever
happens out in the future.
It is just a horribly inefficient way to deliver a
construction project. And nobody, frankly, in their right mind
would run a program this way.
We will have to take a look at what makes sense, balancing
what Congress will support in the out-years but, more
importantly what the requirements are, because the requirements
are the things that ultimately will take us in the direction
that we believe the Nation needs to go into. And the President
has been very clear about his requirements and he has done it
with two budgets in a row.
On the life extension area, both the Senate and the House
took different approaches in the life extension area.
Essentially, the House largely did not reduce the resources in
the Directed Stockpile Work account, which is actually the
account that works on the stockpile itself directly.
But the Senate took a bit of an aggressive approach. That
is going to have to get worked out if there is a conference, if
things don't work out, we are going to wait and see how that
one looks. But I am with General Kehler on this.
We have very real needs with respect to the B61 warhead. We
are looking at it from a strategy standpoint, on it being able
to address the Nation's needs out in the future. We don't want
to necessarily disarm by, you know, just attrition, because we
can't agree.
We are seeking--we believe this is the right plan, and this
is why we have it put forward.
This group has spent a lot of time on Capitol Hill talking
to folks, both Members and staff, and obviously we are going to
continue to need to work with you and others to make sure that
there is clear understanding about what the President has put
forward in his plan and what the best way to move forward in
that area.
It is important also to say that reductions in what we call
the campaigns--the science campaigns, the computing work--these
types of reductions themselves, in one area it is cut by $140
million, in another area it is only cut by $60 million. But
this is work that directly supports enabling technologies.
This is the work to make sure these technologies are the
ones that allow us to certify the stockpile on an annual basis
without underground testing. Reductions in these areas have a
direct impact on the President today in the ability to certify
the stockpile without underground testing. We cannot
overemphasize that particular point.
I should probably just state one thing about
nonproliferation, and then the naval reactors area before I
stop. Unfortunately, I could probably talk for too long on this
area.
Nonproliferation work we have right now, we are deeply
concerned about our ability to convert research reactors
worldwide from highly enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium.
And two, having the resources to buy the long-lead material,
the casks and containers necessary to move highly enriched
uranium and plutonium materials from around the world back to
the United States or back to Russia where it is in a secure
area.
We are on the ragged edge, in my opinion, of dropping the--
making it very difficult for us to meet the President's vision
here. And I don't think that is good for anybody.
The Naval Reactors Program itself, in both cases, has
undergone either, depending on how you look at it, $60 million
or $100 million reduction or so. Those reductions, in many
cases, foreshadow decisions that the Defense Department has
already made--decisions on the path forward on the need to
replace the submarine.
So, we are responding with a program. This is what this
does. And what this does is put significant--makes it very
difficult, in my opinion, to be able to honor those commitments
that the Defense Department is asking us to do.
I will stop there. I think I can go longer, but----
Mr. Turner. I am going to hold the--you guys have given
such great and excellent answers on those topics, which are
very important. So, I am going to hold the rest of my questions
until the second round.
But before I turn it over to the ranking member, Dr.
Miller, I have one real quick one for you. In the same vein
that you were commenting, we all know that those cuts coming
out of the Energy and Water Appropriations bills affect the
fact that Secretary Gates transferred $8.3 billion in DOD top
line budget authority at the NNSA over a 5-year period to help
the modernization efforts.
Did you know the Energy and Water Appropriations bills cut
those modernization efforts while adding money to the
President's budget request for water projects? What is DOD's
view of that?
Dr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, let me say on the record that DOD
transferred those funds with the expectation and understanding
that the resources would go to weapons-related activities.
I think I do not want to get into the question of trying to
track dollars and proposals as it goes from the administration
over to the Hill. But clearly, as we look at the future of NNSA
funding and we look at any possibility of DOD transferring
additional resources, some of which of the amount you have
noted have been withheld in DOD. We would want to have an
understanding that the budget provided by Congress was going to
be at a level that was, of course, both sufficient but also
sustainable over time so they can get stability in the program.
Mr. Turner. Okay.
Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The current Nuclear Force Modernization Plans call for the
Navy to spend around $110 billion to build a new fleet of
nuclear-armed submarines. And the Pentagon estimates that the
total cost of building and operating the new submarine is going
to be about $350 billion over its 50-year lifespan.
And the Air Force also intends to spend about $55 billion
on procurement of 100 new bombers and an unknown sum on new
land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles. And
additionally, the NNSA plans to spend $88 billion over the next
decade to refurbish existing nuclear warheads and rebuild the
factories that make key nuclear warhead parts. However, U.S.
military leaders have stated that our nuclear weapons budget is
not grounded in a coherent overall strategy.
Former Vice Chair of the Joint Chief of Staff General
Cartwright noted in July 2011, ``We haven't really exercised
the mental gymnastics, the intellectual capital on that, what
is required for nuclear deterrence, yet . . . I'm pleased that
it's starting, but I wouldn't be in favor of building too much
until we had that discussion.'' Now, that was in July of 2011.
Do you agree with General Cartwright that the U.S.
shouldn't make procurement commitments until we establish how
many nuclear weapons we need for deterrence? Dr. Miller.
Dr. Miller. General Cartwright was involved in the, as we
began planning for the study that we were talking about
earlier. And so his comments about thinking hard about the
requirements for deterrence in the future I think are well
taken, and they are something that this administration is
working hard on. We intend to have a conclusion by the end of
the year.
At the same time, the requirement to reconsider what is
needed for deterrence and how to best provide stability, what
is the best approach for nonproliferation, is something that
has got to be done on an ongoing basis. And, in fact, Congress
should expect future administrations to conduct comprehensive
Nuclear Posture Reviews that address those questions.
And we can't say that, because the world is going to
change, therefore we are going to wait until the world
stabilizes and stops changing in order to make the necessary
investments in our nuclear weapons infrastructure and delivery
systems.
The figures that you cited for the future SSBN, the Ohio-
class replacement, would be consistent--although they are very
rough estimates at this point, would be consistent with
something that--not 10-year, not 20-year, not 30-year, but over
even a longer period of time. And the fact is that the cost of
these systems are significant.
The requirement to provide effective deterrence and to have
stability is critical to this country. And these investments,
while we are looking at every possible means to save costs,
these investments are essential enough that they deserve--in my
view, they deserve to get serious consideration. And if we can
have a stable approach with bipartisan political support over
time for a level of investment, we would do the right thing by
not just this administration, but by future administrations as
well.
Ms. Sanchez. General.
General Kehler. If I may add, I completely agree that our
force structure and our force posture need to be strategy-
based. And we would argue that every single time the question
is asked.
Here is what we know: what we know is that, at present, we
are still looking to sustain our current triad of strategic
forces. Even as we are looking at the appropriate mixture in
there, both to, within the limits of the New START, to sustain
our military effectiveness, but also to see if we can get some
fiscal efficiency out of doing that.
We know that the sustainment programs that are under way
for those three legs will take those forces to a certain point
in time. This gets back to your question about decision points.
What we do know is that, as far as we can see into the future,
the need for a sea-based leg and the attributes that it brings
is going to remain.
And so, the current Ohio submarine has a finite life. We
don't know exactly what year that is. The Navy probably can't
draw a specific bright line on the chart and say it is that
year. But what we know is that risk will go up as life
increases. And so there will have to be a replacement in place
at some time, we think in the late 2020s or so.
That brings it to today to begin research and development,
given acquisition lead times. So, in my view, it is not
premature to go forward with research and development for a
replacement to the Ohio-class submarine, a part of our
strategic deterrent that we believe is going to be with us for
a very, very long time.
That leads to the next one in serial order, which would be
the bomber, the B-52s, of course, that have been around since
the early 1960s. The Air Force intends to field a new long-
range strike platform that will be dual-capable, both
conventional- and nuclear-capable.
My view is we should leverage that. That is a wise leverage
point for us. That decision point is here now and, again,
research and development money is under way.
That leaves the ICBM, and there is not a decision yet about
how to go forward. Those analyses of alternatives are under
way.
And so I think there are a series of decision points here
as we go forward. Some we have reached. Some have crossed the
threshold, I think, of needing to have investment made starting
today.
And then there is the part about the warheads that we have
been discussing here, as well as some of the other pieces that
go with this; command and control, intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance, other things that make this a credible
deterrent.
Ms. Sanchez. General, my reason for asking the question was
just to put on the record that, in fact, it is fluid and we
continue to reassess, and that there are key milestones or
break points where we have to make a decision. And that it is a
long lead time to get some of this done.
But it is a lot of money that we are talking about also.
That is why we need to continually assess it.
And it really leads--I don't know if the other two had any
comment on that. But it really leads to my next question
about--not my next question, but one that I had in here.
The whole issue of, if we can decide unilaterally that we
can reduce the weapons and still be as strong as we need to be.
Or if we reach a particular point in time in the near future
where we can actually sit down with the Russians and decide to
reduce even further, despite or according to or whatever the
New START. Would that be a smart investment also to leave those
decision points open also?
Dr. Miller. Ma'am. Let me answer first, and then I know
that each of my colleagues is likely to want to add as well.
The Nuclear Posture Review stated that although precise
numerical equality or parity is not as important as it might
have been during the Cold War, that it was still important to
us that Russia join us as we work to further reductions. And
indeed, as Under Secretary Tauscher has suggested, our approach
is to work towards a proposal that would include strategic,
non-strategic, deployed, and non-deployed.
The Deterrence and Defense Posture Review is also seeking
to have Russian involvement with respect to transparency, a
movement of weapons and reductions as well.
There is one point that is worth parsing on this, and that
is, as we look at how to manage the stockpile to support those
weapons that are deployed as part of our strategic deterrent,
and that are forward-deployed and forward-deployable as well,
we do need to take cost into consideration. We need to take
reasonable planning for both what we call the technical hedge
and the geopolitical hedge into account.
The technical hedge is about being prepared to deal with
any problem or technological issue that arises with a warhead
or delivery system. And the geopolitical hedge being to be
prepared for changes in the environment in the future. And we
need to take those into account.
But then we need to, in my view, have a stockpile, a
combined stockpile and infrastructure that is able to support
those hedges at a reasonable cost. And just by way of example,
President George W. Bush reduced the stockpile from 10,000
weapons to 5,000 during his time. It wasn't a negotiated
change; it was a very sensible change that allowed the
different scaling for future size of the infrastructure and
allowed NNSA to plan along the lines that they are now.
So, those changes, with respect to the stockpile ought to
be considered in a different light than the changes with
respect to deployed strategic or with respect to our forward-
deployed or forward-deployable weapons.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Dr. Miller.
Anybody else want to chime in?
Secretary Tauscher. Well, I will very quickly add that, as
Dr. Miller said, when the Nuclear Posture Review was completed,
the President directed a review of the nuclear requirements in
the post-START environment and objectives to consider for
future reductions. And specifically, our goals with New START
bilateral negotiations with Russia include reducing non-
strategic tactical nuclear weapons and non-deployed nuclear
weapons as well as deployed strategic nuclear weapons on ICBMs,
SLBMs [submarine-launched ballistic missiles], and nuclear-
capable heavy bombers.
When the President wrote in February and certified to the
Senate that we would initiate negotiations with the Russian
Federation, we also said we would consult with our NATO allies.
And that is part of the consultation that you know is going on
now.
And Secretary Clinton also made very clear last year that
Allies agreed in the NATO new Strategic Concept, which is the
previous detailed thought pattern, that any further steps on
U.S. nuclear weapons in Europe must take into account the
disparity between our stockpiles and the much larger Russian
stockpiles of non-strategic nuclear weapons.
So, we have unilateral steps that the previous
administration took, bilateral steps that this administration
took. We are talking about strategic, non-strategic, deployed,
non-deployed. We are talking about consultations with our
allies. So, as you can see, this as a very turbulent--not
necessarily in a bad way--but lots of activities going on and
lots of decision points coming forward based on a lot of
consultation and a lot of results in the post-New START
implementation phase.
So, I think that this is a very energetic area. Obviously,
it is important that we keep in mind the long-term goal of a
world without nuclear weapons. But at the same time, what we
are specifically talking about today is the investment strategy
that gets us a safe and reliable and effective stockpile in the
meantime.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I will yield back
because I know there are a lot of people waiting.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank all of you for being here. I want to extend a special
thanks to Under Secretary Tauscher for being here. I had the
privilege of sitting with her on committees in the past. It is
really nice to see you here.
So, Ms. Tauscher, in the short time I have, you know how
these things are. I hope you will grant me diplomatic immunity
here. But everything I say is in the greatest deference.
Secretary Tauscher. Not until I hear the question.
Mr. Franks. Okay. All right. Well, here it goes. See, she
has gone and done it now.
Ma'am, in your the recent remarks at the Atlantic Council
you said the following: ``The Obama Administration's approach
provided more protection sooner against the existing threat,
using proven systems, and at a lower cost than the previous
proposal.''
Now, I understood that the MDA [Missile Defense Agency] is
developing a new interceptor, the SM-3 [Standard Missile-3] IIB
for that process, which at this point hasn't been developed
yet, and a brand-new satellite system, the Precision Tracking
Space System, about which this committee, of course, has
already expressed some considerable concerns because of the
unproven approach regarding technology.
So, I guess my first diplomatic question is, can you
explain the statement ``using proven systems'' in connection
with the EPAA [European Phased Adaptive Approach]? Help me
understand your understanding of these two European Phased
Adaptive Approach components?
Secretary Tauscher. Well, the EPAA is a huge success,
Congressman. It is not only on station and working, but it is
using a proven system, as you remember from many years of
committee testimony.
The EPAA is based on the SM-3 interceptor, which is an over
25-year-old Navy rocket that has been fully tested and tested
with great success. It is both a land-based and a sea-based
system, as you know--Aegis and Aegis Ashore--and the focus on
the ``now'' distinguishes our approach from the previously
proposed system, which focused on a longer-range missile threat
that has been slower to develop and a system that is still
under testing, which is the ground-based interceptor.
We already have the monitoring on station. So, the EPAA is
now actually working. It is now protecting not only our NATO
allies, populations, and territories against a proven short-,
medium-, and intermediate-range threat, but it also protects
American forward-deployed troops.
We also have finished all three negotiations with Poland,
Turkey, and Romania. Actually, the Poland and Turkey agreements
are in force, and the Romanian agreement is just about to be
ratified by their parliament.
So, we have the entire system; it is proposed, it is agreed
to by our NATO allies. It is the United States contribution as
a national asset to the NATO system. And we are working to
NATO-ize the planning and the command and control of that
system. So, that is pretty much the difference between what was
proposed and what is now actually on station and protecting our
NATO allies and forward-based American troops.
Mr. Franks. Let me shift gears a little bit. Your
legislative affairs staff was asked to provide the committee
the basis for the statement ``at a lower cost than the previous
proposal.'' When could this committee receive that information?
Secretary Tauscher. I didn't understand that you hadn't
received it, but I think that we certainly will endeavor to get
it to you very quickly. The proposal for the EPAA is one that
you have not only passed through this committee, but you have
also voted on. So, I am assuming it is something that meets
with your approval.
But it is at lower cost than the previous system, not only
because the previous system was out into the future, but
because we use systems, including Aegis system, that is a
multipurpose system. So, it has cost-benefits as opposed to
systems that just rely on ground-based interceptors.
Mr. Franks. Thank you.
Dr. Miller, I am going to try to get through this one here
quickly, I am about running out of time here. Regarding the
EPAA, the committee's majority has stated its concerns that,
with the current budget environment, it may not be possible to
provide to Europe's missile defense through the EPAA and
homeland defense in the United States.
Part of this is, of course, understanding the actual cost
of the EPAA, which the administration, it appears, has
generously offered to Europe free of charge, essentially to be
a U.S. contribution to the defense of Europe. At the same time,
the administration, the previous majority in the House, and the
Senate majority cut funding significantly for the GMD [ground-
based midcourse defense] system by $1.6 billion in President
Obama's 3 years in office.
When Chairman Langevin and Representative Turner wrote to
GAO [Government Accountability Office] and asked for a
comprehensive review of the EPAA, the GAO responded, ``We found
that the DOD has not fully implemented a management process
that synchronized EPAA acquisition activities and ensured
transparency and accountability. The limited visibility into
cost and schedule for the EPAA reflect the oversight challenges
with the acquisition of missile defense capabilities that we
have previously reported.''
Since then, the committee has told us that the EPAA
approach and content has matured significantly since this
document was developed. So, we have already talked about PTSS
[Precision Tracking Space System]. We already talked about the
SM-3 IIB missile which, it appears, the 2009 assumptions have
been essentially changed dramatically.
So, I guess my question to you, I will throw it out here
quickly. Dr. Miller, and to you, Ms. Tauscher, can you provide
to this committee by, say, the end of the month, a
comprehensive, soup to nuts, whole of Federal Government cost
for each phase of the EPAA?
Dr. Miller. Sir, we have included in the Missile Defense
Agency's budget submission the key elements of EPAA in terms of
our best estimate over this coming year and over the Future
Year Defense Program. One of the issues I think may have
possibly confused the GAO is that the EPAA, the European Phased
Adaptive Approach, while it includes two fixed sites, the Aegis
Ashore sites in Poland and Romania, and includes the fixed
radar in Turkey which, as Under Secretary Tauscher noted, are
all agreed, relies very heavily on mobile systems.
And these mobile systems will be available globally and on
Aegis ships. The SM-3 IA missile that we have in the force
today is a proven technology with a very strong record of
testing. The TPY-2 [Army Navy/Transportable Radar Surveillance]
radar is a proven technology with a very strong record.
The phases of the system were defined by the steps that we
intended to take to bring additional capability to bear and,
predominantly, defined by the next types of missiles from IA to
IB, to IIA to IIB. And so we knew that there was going to be
technological growth in the system that would improve those
capabilities.
It is also important to understand that the costs of the
system are shared. For NATO there is the ALTBMD [Active Layered
Theater Ballistic Missile Defense] system for command and
control, that is NATO shared costs. For the SM-3 IIA missile,
we are co-developing it with Japan. And so it is true that we
are devoting significant resources to Phased Adaptive Approach
in Europe. It is also true that the investment in the systems
that will help on EPAA will also be valuable for a scenario in
Northeast Asia or for a scenario in the Middle East or
Southwest Asia.
Finally, very briefly, with respect to your question of the
national missile defense, the administration remains fully
committed to defending the Nation against limited missile
attacks.
Mr. Franks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. There we go. Thank you. Again, it is a
pleasure to have the panel before us, and especially I want to
welcome back Secretary Tauscher.
It is wonderful to see you back here with us as always, and
we miss you in the House, of course. But we are certainly glad
to have your leadership at State and your guidance, first from
this subcommittee, and now in the administration, have been
valuable to our Nation. And I just want to thank you for all
your work.
And if I could, Madam Secretary, I will start with you.
Could you please comment on the status of the implementation of
the New START Treaty to date? Can you tell us how much data the
two sides have exchanged about each other's nuclear forces? How
many on-site inspections has the U.S. performed in Russia?
Can you share any information on what we have learned about
Russia's nuclear arsenal as a result of the treaty that we did
not know if the treaty were not in force?
Secretary Tauscher. Yes. Thank you, Congressman. And it is
always my pleasure to be back here.
As you know, we have implemented the treaty and the treaty
is, you know, we are doing our exchanges and our inspections.
We have had a number of them in a very short term. We have a
question right now of, me finding the page that tells me all
the numbers, which is right here someplace. But we have a
significant record right now in the New START Treaty.
Right now we have, as you know, the New START limit of 700
deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and nuclear-capable bombers will allow
the United States to retain their current 14 SSBNs. And we have
56 SLBM launchers. Not deploying SLBMs, but an additional 40
launchers.
So, we have, I think in the last number of months we have
had seven or eight exchanges that have brought to us a
significant amount of information. As we said repeatedly during
the ratification process of START, this is not only about
bringing us down to lower levels, but it is also about the fact
of access.
If we didn't have the New START Treaty, it was likely that
both countries would have reduced weapons, but very unlikely
that we would have been able to verify it. So the verification
regime that is part of New START and the compliance regime that
is part of New START, much of it that is adding technology and
new ways for us to improve the accounting rules so that we have
much greater assurance that this weapon that we see this time
is the weapon that we see the next time.
All of that information is vitally important to the kind of
assurance that we get here in the United States about what the
Russians are doing, what they get when they come to see us. But
I think what is most important, too, is that it is important
for the two great nuclear powers to be able to do this so that
the world sees what we are doing. So we are able to also
reassure everyone else that we have these inspections.
As I said, we have had eight or nine inspections, but back
and forth. And I think that we are expecting new inspections.
Do you know what the next date is, by any chance?
Dr. Miller. I don't have the next date, but I could suggest
that we provide the data for the record.
My recollection is that we have conducted 13 and the
Russians have conducted 12 inspections. We have done two data
exchanges and had two meetings at the Bilateral Consultative
Commission. And that because these are occurring almost real
time----
Secretary Tauscher. That is right.
Dr. Miller [continuing]. If we could provide something for
the record I think it would be----
Mr. Langevin. That would be helpful. Thank you.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 127.]
Secretary Tauscher. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin. And then let me now open the question up to
the panel. The House version of the Fiscal Year 2012 NDAA
includes a provision, Section 1055, that would delay force
reduction under New START until the Secretaries of Defense and
Energy certify that the plan to modernize the nuclear weapons
complex and delivery systems is being carried out.
The provision also limits reductions in the stockpile of
U.S. warheads held in reserve until several conditions are met.
In particular, two new facilities, the Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research Replacement [CMRR] nuclear facility and the Uranium
Processing Facility [UPF] must be operational, which will not
be until at least 2024.
Finally, Section 1055 prevents any unilateral reductions
below the limits contained in New START. A Statement of
Administration Policy threatened to veto the final bill if it
includes this provision. Could you elaborate on how these
conditions could prevent the Pentagon from implementing New
START?
Dr. Miller. Thank you, sir. I would be glad to offer some
examples. The requirement not to make any reductions until CMRR
and UPF are in place, as you noted, would push the timeline for
those reductions into the 2020s. The requirement under the New
START Treaty is to make all reductions within a 7-year period
after the entry into force of the treaty, so that that would
become infeasible.
If it is applied only to reductions in the stockpile, if
the requirement for CMRR and UPF is interpreted to apply only
to making reductions in the nuclear stockpile, what that would
then mean is that the administration would be required to
sustain a level of the stockpile through to the mid-2020s,
irrespective of the requirements for a geopolitical hedge or a
technical hedge. And that additional cost to the government, in
an era of limited budgets, what that means is that less is
going to something else. So maybe less science and technology--
--
Mr. Turner. Just a second, please, if I can interrupt for
just a moment. The second point that you are making is not a
New START Treaty issue, correct?
Dr. Miller. The second point is not----
Mr. Turner. I want to make that clear. The language that is
actually in that provision clearly limits it to non-deployed.
So, it would be the second--that you are talking about, which
is not a New START. I think his question was how does it affect
our New START compliance, and this really wouldn't.
Dr. Miller. So, then we focus on the second part. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman. The issue with respect to the stockpile is
as I said, that the provision would require this
administration, the next administration, the administration
after that, to sustain the stockpile at the present level at
additional cost, and irrespective of the geopolitical and
technical requirements.
If that provision had been in place under President George
W. Bush, we would have a stockpile of 10,000 instead of 5,000
today. It would be excess to need for national security and it
would be something that we, in an era of limited budgets, that
we would be wasting resources.
The question of no unilateral reductions under the levels
of the New START Treaty, I think is worth considering in two
parts.
The first is that if the interpretation is that the United
States must maintain precisely no fewer than 1,550 accountable
deployed nuclear weapons under the New START Treaty, one gets
into the question of, if it makes more sense because of the
specifics of how--to take one example, how SSBNs are loaded to
have slightly fewer to allow a balance loading of our SSBNs.
That is something that would be precluded. So, to be required
to hit 1,550 on the nose doesn't necessarily make operational
sense.
And the second element, and a critical element for the
administration, is that it is going well beyond what the Senate
had in the Resolution of Ratification. The Resolution of
Ratification said that any militarily significant reductions
below New START levels should be--I will paraphrase. I don't
have it in front of me. But should be negotiated and brought
back for the consent and advice of the Senate.
To understand that requirement, understand that militarily
significant changes should come back to the Senate, back to the
Congress. But to say that it has to be a specific number
exactly, under the treaty can be no more, under this law, can
be no less, would tie the hands of the commander and of the
President. And to say no reductions, no changes whatsoever will
be allowed, those are constitutional issues.
Mr. Langevin. Mr. Chairman, if the rest of the panel could
respond in kind for the record if we have time right now.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 127.]
Mr. Turner. That would be great. And we also have a second
round if you want to revisit the issue.
Mr. Langevin. Okay.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Lamborn.
Mr. Lamborn. All right. Thank you.
Continuing this discussion, you heard the chairman mention
Condition 9(B) of the Senate Resolution of Ratification. And do
you all agree that the U.S. should go to the point of
reconsidering remaining a party to the New START Treaty if
indeed we do not have the dollars the President--and this is to
the President's credit. He asked for the dollars for
modernization in fiscal year 2012 NNSA budget. And I would like
all of you to respond to that.
Dr. Miller. Two parts to the answer, sir.
The first is that we understand the requirement to report
if we have less funding than in the Section 1251 as requested
in Section 1251 Report. Our interpretation of that has been
substantially less. In fiscal year 2011 actually slightly less
was appropriated than requested. Our judgment was that a one
percent or less change didn't require us to submit the report.
The difference we are looking at now in both the House and the
Senate appropriations bill, I think, would trigger that, and we
would have to examine that question.
We entered into New START Treaty because it was in our
national security interest. We have the right to withdraw from
that treaty as a country. And, in principle, this is an issue
that should be considered whenever the security conditions
arise that would require it.
If there is substantially less funding than requested, we
will, of course, provide the report to Congress.
General Kehler. And, sir, I would just add that,
understanding what the language requires, I would form my
recommendation in this regard, based upon my assessment of
whether we could perform the military mission that is being
asked of us. And given the certain number of weapons and type
of weapons that we have, understanding, again, that there are
some trigger conditions here for reporting, I would form my
assessment based upon the force that we have and whether we can
execute the missions. And as long as we can execute the
missions, then my recommendation would be that we would
continue to go forward.
Mr. Lamborn. Are you saying, General, that you would not
take into account whether or not dollars were added to our
budget for modernization?
General Kehler. I would most certainly take that into
account. But I would be asked to provide a today
recommendation, and I would base that recommendation on whether
or not we could execute the mission that we were being asked to
perform. If a budget reduction was resulting in some decline in
that mission, as we could look to the future, then I would
offer my judgment accordingly.
Secretary Tauscher. You know, I think that there has been a
co-joining of these two issues for quite a long time. And in my
opinion, it has been almost a red herring. Who is not for
modernization of the forces? The President has made clear he
is. The President has put a tremendous amount of increase of
budget. He has talked about it for years. So the President has
said what he wants to do. He has put the money in the budget.
And now it is up to the Congress to provide the money. That is
where we seem to be having the problem.
Mr. Lamborn. That is right. And I said----
Secretary Tauscher. Not with the President.
Mr. Lamborn. No, exactly. And I said, to the President's
credit, the House and Senate have not, however, followed up in
the current status of both appropriation bills.
Secretary Tauscher. That is right. That is right. But the
New START negotiations were already something that was
considered previous to the end of the START Treaty, which
expired in December of 2009. And when we achieved those limits,
way before the end of the START Treaty, by the way,
subsequently, we had the Moscow Treaty that President Bush came
through. And that was a unilateral decision to decrease forces.
General Kehler is really the person with the Strategic
Command, and the National Command Authority, and the DOD and
the DOE, that are going to look to make sure that he has what
he needs. You also have the President and the lab directors
that have to sort of view the capability, effectiveness,
safety, and reliability of the stockpile every year.
So there are different components here that all add into
the question of, does the President, as Commander in Chief,
have what he needs in order to not only deter and defend the
United States, but to those countries to whom we extend our
deterrent, do we have the capability to do that?
And so the decision was made to modernize the NNSA and the
force and to make sure that we had at, lower levels, the kind
of numbers that were going to be able to be agreed to by
General Kehler and certified by the lab directors and to
satisfy the President's concern that we have what we need.
And there is a very, you know, significant process to that.
It includes the Nuclear Posture Review, as we have discussed.
It also includes dealing with our allies on the DDPR. So there
are many components to this. It is not just one or the other.
It is not just, ``if you don't have this, you don't get that.''
So I think that you have to look at this in a very holistic
way. You have to look at it more than just the simple boiling
down of, if you don't have modernization, can you actually keep
the New START Treaty? We have agreed to the New START levels.
We have done that assuming that we are going to get the
funding, assuming that we are going to have modernization,
assuming that we are going to have lower levels and that we are
going to be able to certify.
But I think that, you know, just saying ``if you don't have
one, you don't have the other,'' I think almost misses the
point of a very sophisticated strategy that numerous Presidents
have been working with that have put us in a position where we
do have a very safe and reliable stockpile, one that General
Kehler can tell you is going to meet the military requirements.
Mr. Lamborn. Well, Under Secretary Tauscher, am I wrong in
assuming that if we don't have the dollars for modernization,
then we can't rely on the lower numbers of weapons that New
START calls for?
Secretary Tauscher. I don't believe so. I believe that this
is not a zero-sum game.
Mr. Lamborn. We could disarm through attrition, like Tom
was saying?
Secretary Tauscher. I don't know how you get to that
assumption. What I am saying is, everybody is for doing what we
have agreed to do. The question is, where do we get the money?
The President has made very clear that he wants to have major
investments in the NNSA, the stockpile, human capital, and
refurbishing the enterprise to make it more responsive to the
reality of lower numbers.
And that is what we are going to have. We have not exactly
what the President has asked for in the budget, but we are not
at zero. This is not, you know, a supertanker where you hit the
brakes and you stop on a dime. This is going to take a while
for the fact that we don't have this money to affect the
system. Will it affect the system? Yes. Will we be able to get
what we need? No. Is it wrong to assume that these cuts are
fungible and that we can live with them? No.
But at the same time, it is not true that we endanger our
ability to go to lower levels tomorrow because we don't have
the budget numbers that the Congress is meant to give us and
agree with the President's numbers.
Mr. Lamborn. Okay, we are going to have to continue this
discussion, especially after we see what the appropriations
process yields. And my very last thing, Under Secretary
Tauscher, is, and I will just conclude with this, because we
are starting to run out of time. Is this administration
contemplating any unilateral cuts or any other further cuts at
all in U.S. nuclear warheads, platforms, delivery vehicles, or
capability?
Secretary Tauscher. Well, as I told you, the President
agreed in his letter to Senator Reid and Senator McConnell late
last year during the consideration of New START by the Senate
in the lame-duck session that, you know, this year we would
begin to work with the Russians on deployed, non-deployed,
strategic, non-strategic. I have my counterpart in what is
called the Ryabkov-Tauscher channel. We have already sat down
and started to have conversations with them about the kinds of
framework for future reductions, both, as I said, on strategic
and non-strategic, deployed and non-deployed. We have had
conversations with the P5 [permanent five members of the UN
Security Council] on different things, including verification
and the new kind of technology and the new science involved in
that.
So I don't make the policy. I just go off and do it. But
previous administrations have made the decision to do that. I
don't know of anything that the President has said where he has
said that he is considering unilateral cuts, so I will tell you
that my mission is to talk to the Russians and to continue what
we did in New START and also to talk in a multilateral range
with the P5.
Mr. Lamborn. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Garamendi.
Mr. Garamendi. I want to thank all of you for a fascinating
discussion about where we are with nuclear security.
Mr. Miller, you dismissed those who said that the numbers
are bigger as bad math and faulty assumptions. Could you please
be very specific, not now, but in writing, as to the math and
the assumptions, so that everybody can get it straight?
Dr. Miller. Yes, sir. And our first submission is the
Section 1251 Report that we provided to Congress with far
estimates.
Mr. Garamendi. Okay.
Dr. Miller. So if I can give one quick example, and----
Mr. Garamendi. Please. I only have a few moments.
Dr. Miller. Okay, quick example----
Mr. Garamendi. There are assumptions that were made,
numbers that were put. You say they are bad math. I assume they
are. Just tell me how, okay? Now----
Dr. Miller. Will do.
Mr. Garamendi. Thank you. This discussion is almost
occurring in a vacuum. Sequestration is out there. Whether
there is sequestration or not, there are very significant cuts
being discussed for the military. It is like a stovepipe here.
We are only discussing the nuclear security in this context,
and there are other things that are going on within the
military. And it is, frankly, driving me crazy that all of this
happens and we don't know how we are going to put this together
and we may have, like, a month and a half to put something
together.
The people around this town that think about these things,
think tanks from the left and the right, have thought about the
nuclear security issue over the years and have made
recommendations from the left of about, I don't know, $135
billion of cuts over the next 2 years and, from the right, a
little less than $100 billion, exactly $104 billion from the
Cato Institute and $139.5 billion from the Sustainable Defense
Task Force. That is the left and the right.
How does that figure into what we are doing here?
Basically, I heard you say we are tied up by treaties, but
apparently within that treaty there are some opportunities.
What I am looking at is, I would like to know what is really
viable. No cuts at all? Or, if there are going to be cuts in
the military, where does this particular portion of the
military fit? And what is viable? You know, it ranges from,
``okay, we don't need a triad'' or ``we don't need all of those
missiles'' or ``we don't need all of those new bombers right
now.'' We can wait; we can wait.
At some point, it is going to have to get beyond, ``gee, it
is going to be terrible if we have to make cuts.'' We are going
to have to say, ``here is what can actually happen.'' And I am
waiting for that information. And you have got 1 minute and 53
seconds to share it.
[Laughter.]
Dr. Miller. Mr. Garamendi, thank you. As I said earlier,
the Defense Department is looking at north of $450 billion in
cuts over the next decade, and a good fraction of those in the
next 5 years.
Nuclear delivery systems, which are funded out of DOD, are
not off the table for that discussion. And we are looking hard
at what the core requirements are and the timing of those
requirements, as well. That is true for each leg of the triad,
as it is true across the board. Secretary Panetta has talked
about these reductions being hard, but manageable. I can
confirm that they are hard, and as I said, no element of the
Department of Defense budget is off the table from examination.
Mr. Garamendi. And here is my point. And I said this
earlier to the chiefs. Terrific. And I know that eventually you
will tell us what it is. By my count, we have one month and a
few days before December 23rd, at which point we are, by law,
to make some decisions. May very well our decision is to not
make a decision and we will just change the law, which we could
do. But assuming we actually follow the law, we need to make a
decision.
So when will you share with us that information? Are we
talking about maybe the 22nd of December?
Dr. Miller. Sir, I think it is fair to say that is a
question that is above my pay grade. I will take it back to my
bosses.
Mr. Garamendi. I took it to your bosses about 3 hours ago.
I am taking it to you. I guess I am taking it to the chairman
of our committee here, is that at some point along the line, we
are going to have to make some tough decisions. And the sooner
we have that information, the more thorough the debate will be
and, quite possibly, the better the result.
But ignorance is not a good way to proceed. And we are
proceeding with a high level of ignorance, despite what you
have said. Now, you have all talked about it, but you have not
given us one piece of information about what a cut could be in
your area, other than it is going to be bad. I will let it go
at that.
Mr. Turner. Dr. Fleming.
Dr. Fleming. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I want to thank
the panel today. You all are definitely studied up on the
issue, and I appreciate that.
I am going to, we have been talking about math here, and I
am going to ask you about a little different math, General
Kehler and Mr. Miller. If the Navy and STRATCOM were
comfortable with 192 launchers on 12 SSBN(X) submarines based
on the assumption that New START levels will be those required
in 2027 and beyond, meaning 48 fewer launchers than suggested
for the submarine-based deterrent in the original 1251 Plan,
what other reductions are needed to the ICBM and bomber legs to
comply with the New START limits?
Dr. Miller. Sir, what we have previously said is that we
aimed toward a New START force structure of 240 SLBM launchers,
up to 420 ICBMs, and up to 60 bombers. In the context of the
budget situation in which we find ourselves, we are looking
hard at those numbers again and, in fact, want to be informed
by this NPR Implementation Study that is underway.
I think it is worth noting that the number of SLBM
launchers that you described would provide a very significant
number of warheads that could be deployed and that would allow
the SLBM leg to still account for two-thirds of the overall
strategic arsenal.
General Kehler. Sir, I would just add that I think this is
another one of those areas where it is helpful to me, anyway,
to separate this into two sets of questions. One is, how will
we structure today's force to get into the central limits of
the New START Treaty? And that is one set of issues that we are
working our way through, and that gets to the 240 up to 420 and
60, in terms of the three legs of the triad.
We have been looking very hard, because we are allowed to
mix, within the 1,550 deployed warheads that were allowed and
the up to 700 operational delivery vehicles that were allowed,
we are allowed to mix that force in many, many other ways. And
so we have been looking whether or not there are alternative
force mixtures that preserve a triad, that keep our military
effectiveness, and that maybe are more financially efficient.
So we are looking. That was certainly a baseline that we
departed from, but we are looking to see if there are other
ways to go at that mixture. The next question then becomes, for
questions of modernization, beyond this current force
structure, how should we go about looking at follow-ons, the
Ohio replacement, for example? And we have looked at various
numbers of tubes that might be on a replacement.
The requirement from STRATCOM has been, we have looked at
both 16 tube variants, we have looked at 20 tube variants. My
number-one issue is we must be able to get a replacement
platform. And therefore, affordability has to be an issue here.
What we don't have to make a decision on today is what the
ultimate number of submarines is that we might have to deploy,
depending on the world situation that we find as we go to the
out-years.
So my view is, I have been comfortable with talking about
submarines, like they were talked about in the 1251 Report and
elsewhere, that could have 16 tubes, provided we have enough to
put to sea to meet our needs, and given that we may make
different decisions as we go forward, our successors two or
three removed may decide that is not the right number of
submarines as we go forward. To me, it has to be survivable. It
has to be affordable, because we have to have it.
Dr. Fleming. All right, let me simplify this a little bit
for my understanding and for everyone here. So you are saying
that it may be a financially driven decision to go below the
understood limits and, in doing so, we can compensate in other
areas with other launch devices, other platforms. And are you
also saying that over time, in the out-years, we can actually
mix that up? That is fluid. We can move back and forth within
the total New START limits.
General Kehler. Yes, sir, that is exactly right. Plus, we
are making a big assumption here that the current limits in New
START will, in fact, carry beyond the 10-year term of the
treaty, plus another 5-year extension. We are beyond that,
even, when we are talking about a follow-on submarine platform,
for example.
So I think preserving flexibility, preserving our ability
to make judgments as we go forward, but committing now to the
fact that we must invest in the research and development, and
we must proceed with these modernization efforts at this point
in time, with the idea that we can make adjustments as we go to
the future, I think, is the most prudent thing for the security
of the country.
Dr. Fleming. Anyone else would like to add to that at all?
Just one other quick thing. Well, the full cost of eliminating
converting from deployed to non-deployed and converting to non-
nuclear status DOD systems is known by the Department at this
point?
General Kehler. The answer is they are not, sir, not to my
knowledge. That is something we are still working our way
through to include, as you know, in the number of launchers
that we count. We talked about, the Under Secretary talked
about the two data exchanges we have done with the Russians to
date. Our numbers look high, and they look high in some
respects because we are still counting what we would term as
``phantoms,'' ICBM silos that have already been deactivated,
but still remain technically on the books for us, airplanes
that are in the boneyard at Davis-Monthan down in Arizona, that
need to come off the books, as well.
Those costs are still being worked. We know we have those
costs to bear. The services know they have those costs to bear.
And we are working our way through how we will address those,
unless there is something more.
Dr. Miller. General Kehler is exactly right. I would just
add that the New START Treaty has more flexible provisions for
the elimination or conversion of systems than was the case
under the previous START Treaty. And we have asked for
estimates from the Air Force and Navy for the alternative
approaches, to include the lowest-cost approach, consistent
with the treaty, for the elimination of ICBMs, for the
elimination of bombers or conversion of bombers, and for the
conversion of SLBM tubes, which amounts to taking them off the
books.
And I have seen some initial estimates, but we have sent
them back for re-estimates, and we are looking to drive those
numbers down as low as possible.
Dr. Fleming. Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Dr. Miller, you had spoken about the provisions in the
National Defense Authorization Act, of which some the
administration had threatened to veto. And I want to walk
through some of those issues, because as you know in the
discussion, you know, we believed that we were just codifying
the administration's policy, that the administration's stated
policy, it would be X, and so we thought we had put it in the
legislation.
Now, I understand you not wanting it in legislation, but I
am concerned as to why the administration would go to the level
of arguing for a veto over what appears to be its own policy.
So I thought we could have a discussion on whether or not these
issues remain administration policy.
And before I do that, I want to disagree with you a little,
for a couple moments on the issue of your interpretation of
those provisions. With respect to the provision that we have in
the National Defense Authorization Act that ties modernization
to reduction, you had said of your concern that it might be an
impediment to our implementation of New START within the
requirements of New START.
Well, there is a provision that permits a waiver, and it is
a waiver that the Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of
Energy may sign. So the administration has the ability to waive
that if it saw it as an impediment. So I am not necessarily
persuaded by the argument that it would prevent us from
complying with New START.
The second thing that you had said is the issue of, you
know, what if we had some operational issues that kept us going
under the 1,550 and how that would be a concern? The numbers
requirement of the legislation that we have in the NDAA says
that the President may not retire, dismantle, or eliminate, or
prepare to retire, dismantle, or eliminate. Operational issues
are not retiring. Operational issues are not dismantling, and
they are not eliminating. So the only reductions that we have
in here that might be viewed as a restraint are not, certainly,
ones that you would run into. It is just operational.
And with respect to the new facilities and the, with
respect to the hedge, you know, those are the Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research Replacement Facility in New Mexico and the
Uranium Processing Facility in Tennessee, having those
operational before we do further reductions. And I believe that
that has been the administration's policy, that that was an
actual need that we had to have those facilities up before
further reductions were taken.
But my questions go not to the issues of whether or not we
should have this in legislation; I understand you say you would
prefer it not. My questions go to, are these things still
administration's policy? We have got four of them. The first
is, when the administration came forward and requested New
START to be ratified, the premise was that the reduction would
be taken in concert with modernization, meaning that they could
not be separated; that, in fact, modernization had to be done
in order to justify the lowered numbers.
Is that still the administration's view? Or does the
administration believe that we could just go to this number and
modernization is irrelevant to the reductions?
Dr. Miller. The administration views that both
modernization and the New START Treaty remain in the national
security interest of the United States.
Mr. Turner. Great. And that is what we put in the
legislation, so we wanted to confirm it was still a policy,
since we are facing a veto threat.
Dr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, let me add. Each of them remains
in the national security interest of the United States. Both of
them together are strongly preferred. And so you say, what
happens if we have somewhat less than the requested funding
under the 1251 Report? Does that mean we should withdraw from
the New START Treaty? I think the answer is----
Mr. Turner. And that wasn't my question, but go ahead and
answer that one.
Dr. Miller. Well, the answer is, we are going to be obliged
to provide a report on that question, but the New START Treaty
has benefits to the United States, including the 18 on-site
inspections per year, the exchange of data, and the ability to
have a much better understanding of Russian strategic forces
than otherwise would. So withdrawing from it would not be
without other costs.
Mr. Turner. The next issue goes to the issue of reducing
without the hedge. You know, our provision is that the
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility in New Mexico,
Uranium Processing Facility in Tennessee, that they need to be
operational. President Obama's National Security Advisor, Tom
Donilon, said at the Carnegie Endowment earlier this year, in
fact, ``If Congress approves the President's funding program
for the nuclear complex, it allows us to reduce the size of our
nuclear stockpile because we will be able to maintain a robust
hedge against technical problems with a much smaller reserve
force.''
We had put in the legislation that these two facilities had
to be operational. Obviously, if they are not operational, they
are not contributing to the hedge. Is it now the
administration's policy that they are not necessary for further
reductions in the hedge?
Dr. Miller. The administration continues to strongly
support the CMRR and UPF facilities. The issue on the
provision, and it is in, I believe it is 1055, says that the
Secretary of Defense, Secretary of Energy may not retire,
dismantle, or eliminate, or prepare to retire, dismantle, or
eliminate any deployed strategic or non-strategic nuclear
weapon until the date that is 90 days after certification that
these facilities are fully operational. And so----
Mr. Turner. I will just read it. I mean, do you have it
front of you? It says Department is to retire, dismantle, or
eliminate or prepare to retire, dismantle, or eliminate any
non-deployed strategic or non-strategic weapon until the date
that is 90 days after the date.
Dr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, is a B-52 bomber that is no
longer operational considered in this category?
Mr. Turner. The reason I am reading it is because your
answer used the word ``deployed,'' and this clearly does not
say ``deployed.'' I am not going to argue over what deployed
and non-deployed means, other than to reflect that the language
of the legislation is non-deployed.
Dr. Miller. So there is a semantic question that we would
need to clarify, and this is a relatively small issue, is
whether the intent of the House is to have this apply to
nuclear warheads only or to delivery systems. Frankly, I have
heard both of those explanations. That is the relatively
smaller issue.
Well, it is important, but I would hope that the intent was
nuclear warhead. If that is the case, then what it says is
that, given the timelines with--if we have received full
funding--the timelines for making CMRR and UPF operational, it
means that there may be no retirement, dismantlement, or
elimination of non-deployed weapons until the mid-2020s.
Is that something that makes sense for the country? My
guess is, my strong view, actually, is that the answer is
likely to be no.
Mr. Turner. Well, and I believe that that actually had
reflected the administration's policy, but with respect to the
issue of clarifications, considering that this is going into
conference, I would love to work with you on any language that
you think would be necessary to clarify that for you so we
don't have language that is confusing.
Dr. Miller. Sir, could I just be clear. The policy is to
look to shift from a reliance on non-deployed warheads to a
reliance on infrastructure over time. That is indeed the
objective and policy of the administration.
Mr. Turner. And that is those two facilities----
Dr. Miller. And, indeed, it involves more than that, but
the policy is not to avoid dismantling, eliminating, or
preparing to retire, dismantle, or eliminate any non-deployed
weapon until the time that all those investments are complete.
Indeed, the cost, that would be, I guess, and to use a term
usually used elsewhere, that would be a cost-imposing strategy
on the NNSA.
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, if I could just jump in on that just a
little bit. Clearly, you know, the idea of including the word
``non-deployed'' in a sentence, or even preparing to retire,
dismantle, or eliminate, the reality is, we move these systems
with the Defense Department from a non-deployed to deployed
status all the time. We are constantly doing surveillance,
which includes destructive surveillance, which actually means,
in effect, we would be coming back to the Secretaries--both
Secretaries with a bit of a bureaucratic, I would say ponderous
bureaucratic process that would slow down and render some
significant inefficiencies, in my line of work. I won't speak
for how it would impact the Defense Department on their
delivery systems.
So I don't particularly care for the language at all,
because it adds a level of bureaucracy that I believe is
unnecessary, because we have proven our ability to work with
the Defense Department on moving systems back and forth in
order to meet the national needs at the particular time. And I
just think it is extra work. It is unnecessary. As Jim was
talking about----
Mr. Turner. And you don't think the exception that says
activities determined by the Secretary of Defense ``be
necessary to ensure the continued safety, security, and
reliability'' is a big enough umbrella of your activities that
exempt, because, I mean, clearly, the intent is, you know, it
is not ``dismantle'' meaning we are cleaning. It is
``dismantle'' meaning it is not being put back together. Or
``eliminate,'' that is pretty clear. ``Retire,'' I think that
is pretty clear. I would be glad to work with you on language
for that exception, but I certainly understand----
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir.
Mr. Turner. Okay, thank you.
Dr. Miller, we had a conversation on the telephone today,
which I greatly appreciated, concerning the issue of nuclear
weapons targeting and doctrine and the ongoing review. We
referenced as a great starting point that fact that you were a
professional staffer on this committee and participated in the
1990s when those type of activities were ongoing. And the
expectation on behalf of the committee that your knowledge of
that exchange between staff and the administration is expected
would be the benchmark point for us looking to a satisfactory
exchange between the administration and this committee.
I know we have the letter from Secretary Panetta indicating
that there will be an exchange between the committee. I note
your taking back to the administration our benchmarking of your
participation when you were a staff member as being a level of
exchange that we are expecting, now that you are in the
administration. So we appreciate your level of experience and
expertise that you get to take to that discussion. And I
understand from your answer that you are going to be
endeavoring to get us clarification of that.
Dr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, I will ask for a clarification. I
will say that the language of the letter speaks for itself, in
a sense, in terms of what the Secretary has proposed we do. And
I will ask his guidance on the additional questions that you
have asked.
Mr. Turner. Great. I appreciate that. Because, again, back
to our conversation on the phone, reading this letter in light
of our discussion of what your experience was, we don't have
confidence that it is the same, and we would want the treatment
of the committee to be the same with you in the administration,
as it was when you were with the committee. Thank you.
Under Secretary Tauscher, you and I had conversations
before about the NATO Deterrence and Defense Posture Review.
And I have appreciated both the exchange that we have had and
your expertise. I am, as you know, very concerned on the issue
of what will count as a reduction. You have, in your answer
here today, I think very clearly stated that you look to
reductions, if there were to be reductions, with respect to
NATO's nuclear posture or European--U.S. nuclear weapons in
Europe, that you would see that as tied to a response from
Russia, and I would like some assurances from you that you
agree that mere geographic relocation of Russian tactical
nuclear weapons is neither a reduction, nor a significant
Russian action for addressing the threat to Europe posed by
Russia's thousands of tactical nuclear weapons.
As I indicated, the NATO Parliamentary Assembly said in its
resolution, which we will provide you a copy of, that they do
not view mere geographic relocation as a reduction. And I would
like to know if you agree.
Secretary Tauscher. I do.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
The only question I had is to allow the other members of
the panel to respond to my question, with respect to Section
1055, and how those conditions could prevent the Pentagon from
implementing New START. So, Secretary Tauscher, I know that you
have to leave. If you want to respond to me in writing, that is
fine. If the rest of the panel, if you could just take that
right now, that would be helpful.
General Kehler. Sir, again, I would just say, from my
perspective, the issue of whether or not the funding would be
sufficient to cause us to invoke a withdrawal from the treaty.
My view is that it is about risk.
And my perspective here is that, ultimately, I would be
asked, and I believe that I should provide, my military advice
on whether or not the force, as it is constituted, could
accomplish the job at hand. But there are some risk points
along the way.
And as we began to get to some of those risk points, for
example, we have issues today about, with the current level of
funding that has been allowed, through the congressional marks,
whether our air-delivered weapons can go through life
extension. I think that is a risk point that we would have to
assess, and I think it would go on from there. So that would be
my comment.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you.
Secretary.
Mr. D'Agostino. In our role in supporting the warfighter
and supporting General Kehler's organization, you know, that is
ultimately the job that I have in supporting the Defense
Department is to make sure they have the systems they need.
I would be concerned, though, clearly it is not my area of
work, but I would be concerned that as things change, as
concerns with our ability, essentially, maybe to extend the
life of a particular system, comes up and it becomes an issue.
The Defense Department would be in a position to say ``how do I
change the mix of warheads necessary in order to keep the
nation safe'' and made our commitments to our allies as well.
And, therefore, this provision, in my view, would say what, we
can't do that, until after these two facilities are completed.
I don't believe that is the intent. Ultimately it might not
be the intent of the committee, but it does place a restriction
on our ability, and the warfighter's ability, to say ``this is
the kind of mix that you should might recommend to the
President,'' and then ultimately my ability to support that.
General Kehler. Sir, if I could just add one more piece to
this, there are really two fundamental things that I am asked
to do on a recurring basis. One is I am asked to comment on my
view of the ability of the stockpile and the safety, security,
and effectiveness of the stockpile. And so every year I provide
my assessment of the stockpile.
That is one place where I can make my viewpoints known, as
the combatant commander, for the investment that we make in the
stockpile, not only in the life extension programs, but in
things like surveillance and basic science and the other things
that go with that.
So in one place, I would have an opportunity to comment on
what I thought funding was doing to the overall health of the
stockpile. In the other place, I have a commitment,
essentially, to be able to tell the President whether or not
the force as it is currently constituted is capable of
performing the fundamental mission here.
And the fundamental mission is to deter nuclear attack on
the U.S. and our allies, assure our allies, et cetera. And so I
am constantly looking at whether or not the force, as it is
constituted, is capable of performing the job that we are being
asked to do. As we would get to these decision points, where
funding would begin to impact that, I am obligated to stand up
at that point and say whether or not I think that either the
stockpile is impacted or, overall, whether we are able to
perform the mission that we can. And I would be prepared to do
that.
Mr. Langevin. Okay. Good.
Secretary Tauscher, did you have anything to add or----
Secretary Tauscher. Yes, I will just, you know, I will just
agree with my colleagues. You know, I think that there is the
issue of funding for the complex modernization and then the
limitations on nuclear forces contained in the House bill, I
think that there are some things that I just want to make very
clear.
The first is that this administration is following through
on all of its commitments on modernization. And modernization,
as I said earlier, is in the same room with the New START
Treaty and what the New START Treaty reductions will do. But
they are linked tangentially. They are not specifically linked.
It is not one for one.
We didn't go into the New START Treaty saying that, unless
we got this money, we would not go forward with these
reductions. The reductions are based on the Nuclear Posture
Review. But the President made clear that he believed that
these reductions are in the national security interest of the
country, and that these investments are in the national
security interest of the country.
So, you know, they are related, but they are not a quid pro
quo. One is not about the other. And I think my colleagues have
tried to make that as clear as possible. The reductions that we
went about in the New START Treaty were based on analysis
conducted under the Nuclear Posture Review.
And during that same review, it was very clear that we
needed to make investments in the modernization of the complex,
in the human capital, building facilities and making it a much
more capabilities-based environment than just dealing with this
number, that number. So I think it is a complicated situation.
But, you know, General Kehler's responsibilities, Dr.
Miller's, Administrator D'Agostino's are different than mine.
We all have specific responsibilities, but they are all
related. But, you know, it is really up to General Kehler on
the annual basis to make decisions about the safety, the
reliability, and the effectiveness of the stockpile for the
military requirements.
Mr. Langevin. Very good.
General Kehler. And if I could just pile on with one more
comment, there are two questions here. One question is do we
need to modernize? Do we need to invest? And the answer from my
perspective is, unequivocally, yes. Yes, we do.
The other question is, what happens if we don't? And at
that point in time, that is a different set of considerations
that we have to work our way through. And from my perspective,
that is when we get into the military judgment about our
ability to do the job.
Mr. Langevin. Good. I share many of your concerns, and you
know, I do have deep concern about Section 1055 and what do we
do in terms of preventing the Pentagon from implementing New
START.
So as you think about it, if there are other things that
you would like to add, and you can forward to me and to the
committee in writing, that would be helpful so that we have
full transparency into the implications of that section.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 127.]
Mr. Langevin. With that, my questions have ended.
And, Mr. Chairman, I yield back.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Mr. Langevin. This has been a very
long hearing, and I have two more questions, but my two
questions are for Dr. Miller and for General Kehler. So I am
going to offer to Mr. D'Agostino and to Under Secretary
Tauscher, if they would like to be excused, you are excused.
And if you want to stay to watch and observe, you certainly
can. But I wanted to let you know that the questions for you
are done.
Secretary Tauscher. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And please,
you know, if you are keeping them behind in class, let me tell
you how hard they work.
Mr. Turner. Very good. Well, I wanted to say that the
reason why this hearing has been so long is because you all are
working so hard. The amount of work that you have, the review
you are undertaking, everything that you are doing is really
the subject matter of this.
I have only two more questions, and they really are for the
record. But, I do certainly appreciate Under Secretary Tauscher
and Mr. D'Agostino's participation in the hearing.
Turning to Dr. Miller, nuclear force structure requirements
are developed based upon high-level guidance on nuclear
targeting strategy and nuclear weapons employment issued by the
White House.
DOD has informed this committee that a 90-day Nuclear
Posture Review Implementation Study is currently underway to
review this guidance and consider options for changes. We
understand the President has issued terms of reference for this
study in PPD [Presidential Policy Directive] 11.
Dr. Miller, what are the terms of reference for this study?
I have a four-part question. What are the terms of reference
for this study? Briefly, what targeting, employment, and force
structure options have been considered as a part of this
review?
And how might those different options affect the size and
structure of a nuclear force structure? Also, will you provide
us with a copy of the PPD-11, and any other terms of reference
or study charge? Also, please provide us with a list of the
agencies and officials who are directly involved in the study.
Please provide these to the committee within the next 7 days.
Based upon statements we see in the Nuclear Posture Review
and those made by senior administration officials, including
the National Security Advisor Tom Donilon, and White House
Coordinator for Arms Control and Weapons of Mass Destruction
Gary Samore in this study, is this study only considering what
further reductions can be made?
Or are the only possible outcomes those that enable and
justify further reductions? Is it possible that the study's
analysis will show that the current U.S. stockpile and force
structure is exactly right? Or even inadequate, especially in
view of the nuclear modernization programs in Russia and China?
And how is a potential failure to fund the modernization plan
in Section 1251 Report being factored into the options
considered as part of the NPR Implementation Study? If Congress
doesn't fully fund the modernization plan, does this limit what
options on the table are possible?
To give you a recap, the first one was, briefly, what
targeting, employment, and force structure options are being
considered as part of this review and the documents that we
requested, including the PPD 11.
[The committee notes that the administration did not
provide a copy of PPD-11 or a summary of that document, as had
been repeatedly requested.]
Dr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, I assume by the length of that
list that you have written it down. Many of the questions that
you ask go to the White House, and not to the Department of
Defense. I would propose to pass them along.
But I can say about the----
Mr. Turner. I am sorry. Before we go on, you are involved
in this, are you not?
Dr. Miller. I am.
Mr. Turner. So you would have to be qualified to answer the
questions. I mean, I didn't ask a policy question of what is
the conclusion. I asked the question of what is being
considered.
Dr. Miller. The question of what is being considered under
presidentially directed review, in my estimation, comes under
the purview of the White House to respond to, not under the
purview of the Department of Defense to respond to. So what I
will be happy to do is to take that question to the White
House.
Mr. Turner. But you are knowledgeable of these answers?
Dr. Miller. I am.
Mr. Turner. And you would be capable of answering them?
Okay.
Dr. Miller. I would be capable of answering them to the
best of my ability. What I would suggest is that you've asked
for a copy of the directive, you have asked for a number of
other things. That I would take that back to the National
Security Staff.
Mr. Turner. I understand your answer.
General Kehler, you have previously warned against cutting
the budget or size of our nuclear forces too deeply, resulting
in what you called a ``hollow force.''
Will you please explain what you mean by a ``hollow
force''? What are the risks of a hollow force to readiness,
morale, safety, security, and critical skill retention in the
nuclear components of the military for the three legs of the
triad? What are the break points or red lines in the size of
the force that would result in a ``hollow force''?
And what analysis has been done to examine these questions
and anything that you would be able to share with us? And, you
know, for example, how would cutting a whole wing of ICBMs, 150
missiles in total, affect nuclear weapons targeting?
And have you seen any calls for or desire for changing the
requirement of continuous at-sea deterrence, the number of
ships required to keep that continuous presence in both the
Atlantic and the Pacific?
General.
General Kehler. Sir, let me start with the question about
the ``hollow force.'' It is a term, as I think you know, that
is being used again extensively across the Department of
Defense from my colleagues, the other combatant commanders,
from the service chiefs, all with a cautionary note from things
that we have seen in our past.
Very simply, what I would say is that ``hollow force'' is
one, in my definition now, I don't know that there is a formal
definition for ``hollow force,'' but it is one that gives the
appearance of being able to do the job, but doesn't have the
capability to do it.
And I think you can have a ``hollow force'' in a lot of
ways. You can have a ``hollow force'' because you are not
properly organized, because you are not properly trained,
because you are not properly equipped, because you are not
properly sustained, because you don't have the number of
qualified people that it takes in order to provide an
enterprise that is a complex, experienced-based enterprise,
like the nuclear enterprise.
You can have a ``hollow force'' regardless of the size of
the force. You can have a large force that is a ``hollow
force''--my opinion, again, sir--you can have a small force
that is a ``hollow force.'' And so when I have referred to the
potential here for a ``hollow force'' in the nuclear force, I
am sounding the same cautionary note that my colleagues are
sounding about the conventional forces.
We can find ourselves in a position here, if we are not
careful, where either through our sustainment efforts or lack
thereof, or other elements here, that we can find ourselves in
a place where we have a hollow nuclear force.
I will tell you that my experience here is that, four or so
years ago, some parts of our nuclear force, I think we came to
the brink of, potentially, a ``hollow force.'' I think we
discovered that we had some issues in our nuclear enterprise
because of lack of sustainment funding.
I think we found that there were some issues in our nuclear
enterprise because lack of experience. I think we found that
there were some issues in our nuclear enterprise because we
were so committed to the wars that we had in the Middle East
and Southwest Asia that we found that, perhaps at some level,
we had taken our eye from some of the most critical pieces of
what it takes to have perfection as the standard.
So in my view, those are the cautions we need to make sure
that we are looking at as we go forward. Where the mixture of
forces that we are looking at, inside New START limits, at this
point in time, no decisions have been made about what that
ultimate force will look like. But we are looking at various
alternatives here.
Are there better ways than were described in the 1251
Report to get to the balancing that is going to be required,
and that still allows us to sustain properly while it allows
us, perhaps, to be more fiscally efficient? Those are the
issues that we are going to continue to look at.
And I must say that I would want to make it clear from my
perspective, anyway, that in these budget discussions we have
been having, the nuclear deterrent force has not been immune
from the conversations that we have been having, nor should
they have been immune.
And I think what we are looking at today and what we would
look at if sequestration occurs are two different things. I
think the current Secretary, the previous Secretary, both said
everything is on the table. If sequestration occurs, I think
everything, certainly in my world, is back on the table, while
we are trying to balance other things as well: space, cyber and
the other things that I am responsible for.
So, again, my caution has been that if we are looking at
alternative force mixtures, that we are mindful of all of the
pieces that I believe must be in place as we go forward so that
we do not result in a hollow force.
One of those pieces, I believe, is professional expertise
and professional experience and making sure that as we go
forward to come up with balanced triads--and, by the way, I
believe at this point in time, certainly, a triad is still the
right way to go--that we do that with the thought in mind that
we would be careful that we don't have that as a ``hollow
force'' as we go forward.
You asked about force posture as well, and so just let me
add one other thing about force posture. We both size and
posture our force today based upon the job that we have to
perform, recognizing that the force that we give to the
President has to be able to do a number of things.
One thing it has to be able to do is provide day-to-day
deterrence and assurance. Another thing it has to be able to do
is respond to surprise. Another thing it has to be able to do
is respond in a crisis so that we provide stability in a
crisis. And another thing it has to be able to do is get larger
within the treaty limit so that we can grow that force up to
the treaty limits, or close to those limits if, in fact, the
operational need dictates that in a deep crisis or, perhaps, if
we were engaged in some kind of a world situation that required
that.
That means that we maintain a portion of our force in a
ready-to-use posture on a day-to-day basis. I believe that is
an appropriate posture today, and that is certainly an element
of that as the at-sea survivable SSBNs, which I think is a
critical piece of our posture. If that helps.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, General.
In concluding, I wanted to say to Dr. Miller and to General
Kehler, we greatly appreciate not only your time in working
with this committee and your commitment to a strong deterrent,
which is, of course, evidenced in your questions, but also the
fact that you guys are the experts.
Thank you for being dedicated to this topic because we rely
on your expertise so greatly. And when you come before
Congress, you help us learn so that we can be a very good
partner with you. So thank you again.
And with that, we will be adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 6:07 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
November 2, 2011
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WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
November 2, 2011
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RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LANGEVIN
Dr. Miller. The next inspection in Russia after November 2, 2011,
was on November 16, 2011. The next inspection in the U.S. after
November 2, 2011, was on November 7, 2011. [See page 28.]
General Kehler. New START identifies ceilings for deployed and non-
deployed strategic delivery vehicles, launchers and accountable
warheads. The language proposed in H.R. 1540, Section 1055, defines New
START ceilings as the floor for delivery systems and warheads and
restricts non-deployed warhead reductions. As the combatant commander
responsible for the nuclear deterrence mission, my responsibility is to
advise the Secretary of Defense and the President whether the force, as
currently constituted, is mission capable. Section 1055 sets provisions
that limit flexibility to implement treaty provisions, as well as limit
our ability to efficiently and cost-effectively manage our strategic
force structure and stockpile. These provisions could result in the
diversion of strategic deterrence sustainment resources from critical
programs needed to maintain mission capabilities and support the long-
term safety, security and reliability of our nuclear deterrent. [See
page 30.]
General Kehler. As the combatant commander responsible for managing
forces and implementing the New START, I am concerned reporting
requirements and waiting periods have the potential to impact New START
implementation timeline. Additionally, the second provision restricts
the DOD/DOE annual weapons requirements process by tying the adjustment
of non-deployed quantities to infrastructure improvements that, given
the current fiscal environment, may not materialize. This provision has
the potential to divert resources from critical stockpile sustainment
efforts and delay prudent reductions to the non-deployed stockpile. In
my view, existing consultative processes (e.g., 1251, SSMP) ensure we
work jointly with Congress to implement New START and manage the
stockpile. [See page 42.]
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
November 2, 2011
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. At the House Armed Services Committee's October 13
hearing, Secretary of Defense Panetta said, ``With regards to reducing
our nuclear arena, I think that is an area where I don't think we ought
to do that unilaterally--we ought to do that on the basis of
negotiations with the Russians and others to make sure we are all
walking the same path.'' To ensure we are not reducing unilaterally,
will we retain nuclear forces that are at--or very near--the limits on
strategic forces imposed by the New START Treaty? Otherwise, wouldn't
it by definition be ``unilateral'' reductions?
a. Would you support reductions if they were a part of a non-
binding agreement with Russia?
b. At what force levels do we need to start bringing the ``others''
Secretary Panetta mentions, particularly China, into the picture?
Dr. Miller. The Administration has not made a final decision on the
specific mix of forces to be deployed under the New START Treaty. DOD
continues to plan on 240 SLBM launchers, up to 420 ICBM launchers, and
up to 60 nuclear-capable heavy bombers. It is important to note that
the U.S. retains the flexibility to modify the mix of delivery systems
under the Treaty.
a. As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), because of our
improved relations, the need for strict numerical parity between the
United States and Russia is no longer as compelling as it was during
the Cold War. But large disparities in nuclear capabilities could raise
concerns on both sides and among U.S. Allies and partners, and may not
be conducive to maintaining a stable, long-term, strategic
relationship, especially as nuclear forces are significantly reduced.
Therefore, we will place importance on Russia joining us as we move to
lower levels.
b. Maintaining strategic stability with both Russia and China will
remain a critical challenge in the years ahead. China is estimated to
have only a few hundred nuclear weapons and to be modernizing its
nuclear arsenal; a Chinese ``sprint to parity'' has not materialized.
That said, the overall lack of transparency surrounding China's nuclear
programs and capabilities raises questions about China's future
strategic intentions. We continue to pursue high-level, bilateral
dialogues with both Russia and China that seek to promote more stable,
resilient, and transparent strategic relationships. It is impossible at
this time to pinpoint an exact force level at which the United States
and Russia would want to bring other nations into a binding agreement.
However, given that the United States and Russia will still account for
90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons after New START is
implemented, there is a clear opportunity for future bilateral
reductions--including of tactical nuclear weapons, which the Russians
have in much larger numbers.
Mr. Turner. Dr. Miller, you noted that the NPR stated that ``strict
numerical parity between the United States and Russia is no longer as
compelling as it was during the Cold War,'' but that ``we will place
importance on Russia joining us as we move to lower levels.'' In my
mind, ``placing importance on'' is not the same as ``we won't do
this.'' Will the administration make reductions without reciprocal and
proportionate reductions from Russia?
Dr. Miller. The Administration is conducting a Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR) implementation study to determine the nuclear force size
and structure needed to support U.S. national security requirements and
meet international obligations in a dynamic security environment. The
ongoing study was directed by the President as part of the 2010 NPR.
The analysis from this study will provide options for the President's
guidance to the Departments of Defense and Energy on nuclear planning
with respect to the force structure, force posture, and stockpile
requirements needed to protect the United States and its Allies and
partners, and to inform plans for the employment of nuclear weapons in
the event that deterrence fails. As stated in the NPR, the United
States intends to pursue further reductions in nuclear weapons with
Russia. When complete, the analysis of deterrence requirements and
force postures will inform the development of any future arms control
objectives.
Mr. Turner. How many military and civilian personnel in the
executive branch have full or partial access to nuclear employment and
targeting guidance issued by the President, the Secretary of Defense,
the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Commander of U.S.
Strategic Command? Please break down this information by the numbers of
personnel with access to each level of guidance. How many personnel in
the legislative branch have full or partial access to each level of
guidance?
Dr. Miller. A very small group of personnel in the executive branch
have access to the nuclear employment guidance issued by the President,
the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff,
and the Commander, U.S. Strategic Command. Even within the Department
of Defense (DOD), access to this sensitive material is tightly
controlled. Within the Department of Defense, fewer than twenty copies
of the President's guidance are distributed in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and U.S. Strategic Command.
Fewer than 200 copies of the most recent amplifying guidance issued by
the Secretary of Defense were produced, and distribution was limited
primarily to Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, U.S.
Strategic Command, and other Combatant Commanders. The Chairman's
guidance is distributed more widely within DOD (fewer than 200 copies),
as the document assigns responsibilities to several defense agencies
and the intelligence community. Commander, U.S. Strategic Command must
issue guidance to his planners and forces in the field, so distribution
is somewhat wider because of that need.
There is a long history of debate about providing the legislative
branch access to this material. As a result, instances of providing
access to a member of Congress and senior staff personnel have been
quite limited and under restrictive terms.
This Administration is committed to working with Congress and
supporting effective congressional oversight on nuclear policy and
modernization issues. To this end, the Secretary of Defense has invited
the Chairmen and Ranking Members of the House and Senate Armed Services
Committees and the Strategic Forces Subcommittees, and the relevant
staff directors, to participate in a set of classified briefings that
the Office of the Secretary of Defense would provide, in conjunction
with the Joint Staff and U.S. Strategic Command. The provision of such
information would be subject to strict safeguards given its extremely
sensitive nature.
Mr. Turner. The House Appropriations Committee reported a Defense
Appropriations bill that contains a 1% reduction from the President's
budget request for DOD. The House Appropriations Committee reported an
Energy and Water appropriations bill that contains a 10% reduction for
NNSA and all of its defense activities. This came after strong and
vocal support from Secretary Gates and senior military leaders for
NNSA's full budget request. How do these discrepancies affect planning,
budgeting, and coordination between NNSA and DOD on the overall nuclear
security enterprise? Should all aspects of the nuclear security
enterprise be consolidated into a single budgetary and appropriations
authority?
Dr. Miller. The modernization program was closely coordinated
between the Department of Energy and the Department of Defense to
ensure that modernization efforts are funded, but also to manage costs
wisely. If Congress makes reductions without context and without
thoroughly examining the long-term effects on the national interest,
such actions could undermine our plans to ensure a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear deterrent.
It is essential to look across the complete nuclear security
enterprise to review budgetary impacts fully, particularly in light of
our current fiscal situation and the new constraints imposed by the
Budget Control Act of 2011; however, this does not necessarily require
a single budgetary and appropriations authority. As you know, the
Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC), established in Title 10, Section 179, of
the U. S. Code, has responsibility for coordinating programming and
budget matters pertaining to nuclear weapons programs between the
Department of Defense and the Department of Energy. The NWC has been
active in this role, and the Departments of Defense and Energy will
continue to consider any steps that could further improve effective
planning and oversight.
Fulfilling the President's commitment to modernize the nuclear
enterprise will require full and sustained congressional support. As we
review our defense budget for the most cost-effective means to secure
our Nation, I look forward to working with Congress to ensure funding
for the critical activities within the Department of Defense and
Department of Energy that are necessary to sustain the most effective
nuclear deterrent.
Mr. Turner. You said the 1251 Report shows that the total cost of
sustaining, operating, and modernizing our nuclear forces, nuclear
weapons, and their supporting infrastructure over the next ten years--
for both DOD and NNSA--is on the order of $214 billion. What percentage
of the defense budget is this? What percentage of the full federal
budget is this? How does this compare to historical trends, including
the Cold War? Please be as specific as possible.
Dr. Miller. The $214 billion is about 3 percent of the 10-year
defense base budget of $6.3 trillion (including the Department of
Defense (DOD) and the National Nuclear Security Administration) and is
about 2 percent of the Federal budget of $12.2 trillion (excluding
Overseas Contingency Operations).
The following are some historical trends based on the DOD budget:
Funding for Strategic Forces ($0.6 trillion) as a percent
of the DOD budget ($12.7 trillion) from FY 1962 to FY 2011 was about 4
percent.
Funding for Strategic Forces ($0.4 trillion) as a percent
of the DOD budget ($4.4 trillion) during the Cold War (based upon data
from FY 1962 to FY 1991) was about 8 percent.
Funding for Strategic Forces ($.2 trillion) as a percent
of the DOD budget ($8.3 trillion) after the Cold War (from FY 1992 to
FY 2011) was about 2 percent.
Note: The source for the historical data was from Table 6.4,
Department of Defense TOA by Program, in DOD's ``National Defense
Budget Estimates for FY 2012'' book (commonly referred to as the
``Green Book.'' This historical data includes all supplementals and
Overseas Contingency Operations/Global War on Terrorism funding.
Mr. Turner. We have heard that within the Deterrence and Defense
Posture Review (DDPR) process, some NATO allies might be encouraging
several changes to NATO's nuclear posture, possibly including: (1)
consolidation of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe to one or more
centralized bases, (2) decreasing the number of dual-capable aircraft
our allies are required to maintain, (3) relaxing or eliminating
requirements for pilots from allied nations to be trained and exercise
in the nuclear mission, and (4) potential removal of U.S. nuclear
weapons from Europe.
a. Are any of these actions being considered by the DDPR? Which
ones?
b. Would NATO and the U.S. consider taking any of these steps
unilaterally, without reciprocal and proportionate action on the part
of Russia?
i. What actions would we consider taking unilaterally, and what
actions would we only undertake bilaterally with Russia?
ii. What reciprocal actions would the U.S. look for from Russia in
exchange for any of these four actions?
Dr. Miller. The DDPR process is still in the deliberative stages.
However, in keeping with the Strategic Concept, any future reductions
will be made on the basis of reciprocity with Russia, not unilaterally.
We have not determined what reciprocal actions from Russia would be
sufficient for future changes.
Mr. Turner. Some subset of F-35 joint strike fighters are intended
to be nuclear-capable, replacing the nuclear-capable F-16s that will be
retired due to age. Can you affirm that there will be nuclear-capable
F-35s? This decision has been made and is being implemented?
a. How many F-35s will be nuclear-capable?
b. Based on the current F-35 program plan, when will the first
nuclear-capable F-35s be deployed?
c. When will the first nuclear-capable F-35s be deployed to Europe?
Dr. Miller. Yes, the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review confirmed the need
to retain a dual-capable fighter to ensure that the United States
retains the ability to forward deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons in
support of Alliance commitments. The Air Force plans to replace current
DCA-capable aircraft with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter and intends to
program, develop, and integrate nuclear capability as part the Joint
Strike Fighter's Block 4 upgrade planned to be released to the field in
the early 2020s.
a. The Air Force plans to purchase 1,763 F-35As. The Air Force
remains committed to deliver the DCA capability with the Block 4
upgraded F-35As in the early 2020s.
b. The Air Force will be prepared to deploy nuclear-capable F-35As
after the Block 4 upgrade in the early 2020s.
c. The first nuclear-capable U.S. Air Force F-35As will be
available for Europe in the early 2020s.
Mr. Turner. How does the deployment of the B61-12 warhead align
with deployment of nuclear-capable F-35s? Is deployment of the two
systems linked? Can one deploy without the other, while still retaining
our nuclear capability in Europe?
Dr. Miller. The B61-12 will sustain the U.S. extended deterrence
commitment to our Allies through life extension of the aging B61 family
of bombs. As part of this life-extension effort, compatibility with the
F-35 will be preserved; however, the B61 and F-35 programs are not
dependent on one another. Until the F-35 becomes nuclear-capable, non-
strategic deployment of the B61-12 will, if required, occur though the
use of existing Dual-Capable Aircraft.
Mr. Turner. Are our NATO allies still planning to purchase dual-
capable F-35s to replace their aging dual-capable aircraft? How many do
they plan to purchase and when? Please describe the plans for NATO
countries to replace or modernize their nuclear-capable aircraft,
including numbers of aircraft and timelines for purchase. How are these
plans being reflected in the DDPR?
Dr. Miller. Although the specific dates and quantities are
classified, some Allies are still planning to purchase F-35 aircraft.
The DDPR process is still in the deliberative stage.
Mr. Turner. When NNSA conducts a life extension program on a
particular weapon type, will NNSA extend the life of all warheads of
that type, including those in the non-deployed ``hedge'' part of the
stockpile? Or will it only extend those weapons in the active, deployed
part of the stockpile?
Dr. Miller. Each nuclear weapon life extension is unique to its
type and the hedge required to support operational requirements. Total
quantities for each life extension are determined by accounting for
operational needs, reliability and surveillance testing, spares, and
hedge needs. Hedge quantities are affected by geopolitical and
technical requirements to support each leg of the triad. The
Administration is reviewing hedging requirements and their implication
for stockpile size and status as part of the Nuclear Posture Review
implementation study.
Mr. Turner. Would you please elaborate on your statement that ``To
date no decisions have been made with respect to future force sizing or
the modernization plans for nuclear delivery systems; such decisions
will be informed by the Administration's ongoing review of deterrence
requirements''? Do the commitments made for modernization in the 1251
Report still hold? Does the President's commitment to the Senate during
New START consideration still hold? In a message to the Senate on New
START, the President said: ``I intend to (a) modernize or replace the
triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems: a heavy bomber and air-
launched cruise missile, an ICBM, and a nuclear-powered ballistic
missile submarine (SSBN) and SLBM.''
Dr. Miller. To date, no final decisions have been made with respect
to the specific future force sizing or the modernization plans for
nuclear delivery systems--i.e., the exact mix of delivery systems and
warheads under the New START Treaty. Such decisions will be informed by
the Administration's ongoing review of deterrence requirements. I can
assure you, however, that these decisions will be consistent with the
goals of the NPR, including to maintain strategic stability, provide
assurance to our Allies and partners regarding the credibility of the
U.S. nuclear umbrella and other security commitments, and to maintain a
safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
The Administration is committed to making the investments necessary
to recapitalize the nuclear enterprise and ensure we have the highly
skilled personnel needed to maintain our nuclear capabilities. These
are large investments that must be made over an extended period, but
are essential to U.S. national security.
Mr. Turner. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) says that ``the
presence of U.S. nuclear weapons--combined with NATO's unique nuclear
sharing arrangements under which non-nuclear members participate in
nuclear planning and possess specially configured aircraft capable of
delivering nuclear weapons--contribute to Alliance cohesion and provide
reassurance to allies and partners who feel exposed to regional
threats.''
a. Please explain how the presence of nuclear weapons in Europe
contributes to NATO cohesion, reassurance, and stability.
b. In particular, which NATO allies value these nuclear weapons and
``feel exposed to regional threats''?
c. Will unanimity among NATO members be required before any major
changes are made to our nuclear posture in Europe? What sorts of
changes to our nuclear posture in Europe might we undertake without
unanimity of NATO members?
Dr. Miller. The Strategic Concept reinforced that the Alliance will
maintain an ``appropriate mix'' of nuclear and conventional forces, and
that the Alliance would ``remain a nuclear Alliance as long as nuclear
weapons exist.'' As such, nuclear weapons contribute to overall
cohesion and stability of the Alliance. The Strategic Concept also lays
out the threats to which all members are exposed, including
conventional threats, proliferation threats, terrorism, and cyber
attacks. No major changes to nuclear posture would be expected without
consensus from Alliance members.
Mr. Turner. Dr. Miller, you recently told a reporter that DOD might
be willing to contribute more funding to NNSA's nuclear modernization
efforts, but would not be willing to transfer any more budget authority
if the Energy and Water appropriators do not use it for the intended
modernization purpose. Were you referring to some of the $8.3 billion
in budget authority DOD has already pledged for NNSA, or were you
referring to additional funds beyond this $8.3 billion?
Dr. Miller. The approximately $8.3B pledged for NNSA consisted of
two separate transfers--the first was $5.7B during Fiscal Year (FY)11-
FY15 and the second was $2.5B during the FY12-16 period. This second
transfer was intended to be distributed annually. It is the annual
distribution of this second transfer that I believe should be
reconsidered if funding is not appropriated as it was intended.
Mr. Turner. Dr. Miller, you recently said that you haven't seen
anything to suggest that $7.6 billion for NNSA Weapons Activities is
not the correct figure for FY12. Would you please elaborate?
Dr. Miller. The Fiscal Year (FY)12 Presidential Budget Request for
NNSA Weapon Activities was $7,629,716,000, which is the amount required
to meet DOD nuclear weapons requirements. This figure was arrived at
after careful consideration of the need to implement the policies of
the Nuclear Posture Review and the requirements of the New START
Treaty. This funding request is in alignment with the ten-year funding
profile in the report pursuant to Section 1251 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010; this profile was provided to
Congress in February 2011. It also includes a transfer of funds from
the DOD to the NNSA to ensure weapon life extension programs and
nuclear facility modernization efforts are funded appropriately.
Mr. Turner. The 2010 NPR states that nuclear force reductions are
possible because of overwhelming conventional military superiority.
Since the NPR was written, $330 billion in weapons systems have been
cancelled and $489 billion has been taken out of the defense budget.
And now we have the specter of sequester looming ahead with the promise
of an additional half trillion in cuts. Is this premise in the 2010 NPR
still valid? At what point is it not? Where is the break-point in terms
of our conventional military superiority as we see both China's large
buildup in conventional military capability and asymmetric capabilities
and China and Russia's major nuclear modernization programs?
Dr. Miller. Under the funding levels required by the Budget Control
Act, the United States will continue to possess overwhelming
conventional capability against any conceivable adversary for the
foreseeable future. If sequestration occurs, the scale and arbitrary
nature of the required cuts to defense spending would inflict severe
damage on the U.S. military. In this case, the United States would need
to reconsider all elements of its defense strategy.
Mr. Turner. After implementation of the New START Treaty and the
NPR, what percentage of our strategic forces will be deployed on
submarines?
a. Has the U.S. ever deployed so much of its deterrent on a single
platform before? In other words, on one leg of the triad and on one
type of submarine, ICBM, or bomber? What risks does the U.S. accept by
doing so?
Dr. Miller. Final decisions on specific force mix under New START
have not yet been made, but more than half of our operational strategic
warheads will be deployed on submarines.
The United States since the end of the Cold War, has deployed a
large portion of our forces on SSBNs. The percentage of warheads
deployed aboard SSBNs today is very similar to what we would expect
after full implementation of the New START Treaty.
There are both operational and technical risks associated with
strategic submarines. The operational risk is that these submarines
could become vulnerable--a scenario that appears highly unlikely for
the indefinite future. The technical risk is that a problem with the
type of warheads carried on the submarines, or with our submarine-
launched ballistic missiles, or the submarines themselves, could result
in that portion of the force becoming unavailable. A massive technical
failure is also highly unlikely. However, because of the importance of
the nuclear deterrence mission we mitigate these risks by maintaining
the capability to upload other legs of the Triad in response. To be
well-hedged against a technical surprise remains a key priority, and is
one of the metrics we use when evaluating force structures.
Mr. Turner. The NPR concluded that ``the current alert posture of
U.S. strategic forces . . . should be maintained for the present.''
Please explain why the NPR reached this decision. What are the benefits
of our current alert posture? Do you anticipate changes in this
decision?
Dr. Miller. The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) considered the
possibility of reducing alert response requirements for ICBMs and at-
sea response requirements of SSBNs, and concluded that such steps could
reduce crisis stability by giving an adversary the incentive to attack
before ``re-alerting'' was complete. At the same time, the NPR
concluded that returning heavy bombers to full-time nuclear alert was
not necessary, assuming the other two Triad legs retain an adequate
alert posture.
The current alert posture supports strategic stability through an
assured second-strike capability. It ensures that, in the calculations
of any potential opponent, the perceived gains of attacking the United
States or its Allies and partners would be far outweighed by the
unacceptable costs of the response.
At this time, I do not anticipate any major changes in the alert
posture for U.S. strategic forces.
Mr. Turner. Germany and Norway have put forward ideas in the DDPR
process to increase transparency in NATO's nuclear mission and NATO's
nuclear forces. What transparency measures are being considered?
a. What NATO transparency measures are the U.S. comfortable with
NATO doing unilaterally (i.e., without reciprocal and proportionate
action by Russia)?
b. What NATO transparency measures would we only consider doing
bilaterally based on agreements with Russia? Would you anticipate such
bilateral agreements being based on non-binding agreements or through
some sort of binding treaty or agreement?
c. How does the administration define ``transparency''? How does it
define ``verification''? How are the two concepts related?
Dr. Miller. The Deterrence and Defense Posture Review (DDPR)
process is still in the deliberative stages. We have not determined
what constitutes ``transparency measures'' and which ones will be
considered.
Transparency and verification are closely related concepts. The New
START Treaty, for instance, provides significant transparency regarding
the strategic nuclear relationship between the United States and Russia
through its extensive verification regime. The Treaty's verification
measures include extensive notifications, prohibitions on interference
with National Technical Means (NTM), unique identifiers, inspections,
and exhibitions. These measures allow each side to gain important
insights into the other side's strategic forces. They also reduce
uncertainty about the future direction of Russian strategic forces and
assist in improved planning for our future defense needs. On the whole,
this shared knowledge is valuable for maintaining strategic stability
between the two major nuclear powers.
Mr. Turner. How does the B61 Life Extension Program (LEP), which
would consolidate several different versions of the B61 into a single
B61-12 version, link to our extended deterrent in Europe?
a. What are the implications, both to our extended deterrent and
more broadly, of delay in the B61 LEP?
b. Why is it important to increase surety in B61 warheads during
the LEP?
Dr. Miller. The intent of the B61 LEP is to consolidate four
current versions of the B61 family of bombs into one single version
that will continue to sustain both our strategic and extended
deterrence missions. NNSA, in coordination with the Department of
Defense (DOD), identified the Initial Operating Capability (IOC) and
Full Operating Capability (FOC) to ensure that a seamless transition
between the B61-12 and the earlier versions that it is replacing is
achieved without any loss in operational capability. The NNSA and DOD
will continue to address any delay in meeting these dates that could
potentially jeopardize those missions and the extended deterrence
commitment to our Allies and friends.
As part of any life extension program, NNSA considers options for
enhancing the safety, security, and use control features of a weapon
system as part of the Phases 6.1/2/2A process. Policy directives
require an assessment of the warhead to meet safety and security
objectives for the future. This process ensures that viable weapon
surety features are identified and evaluated against all other design
requirements and balanced against cost and schedule risks to assure our
commitment to a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
Mr. Turner. When will a decision be made regarding how specifically
our nuclear forces will be structured to comply with the New START
Treaty? When will de-MIRVing of our ICBM forces begin to occur?
Dr. Miller. To date, no final decisions have been made with respect
to force structure under the new START Treaty; such decisions will be
informed by the Obama Administration's ongoing review of deterrence
requirements. I can assure you that these decisions will be consistent
with the goals of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), including to
maintain strategic stability, provide assurance to our Allies and
partners regarding the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and
other security commitments, and to maintain a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear deterrent.
Partial ``de-MIRVing'' (MIRV, Multiple Independent Reentry Vehicle)
of our ICBM forces began in the 1990s as part of our reductions under
the START Treaty. The Air Force has also begun the complete de-MIRVing
of the rest of the ICBM force, as directed in the NPR, in conjunction
with previous commitments and Air Force-established maintenance plans.
This minimizes disruption to our operational forces and is the most
cost-effective method for carrying out the NPR guidance to de-MIRV the
ICBM force.
Mr. Turner. Dr. Miller, in your remarks, you said ``The U.S.
nuclear arsenal included 5,113 weapons as of September 30, 2009, at the
time of our last unclassified release of stockpile totals.'' How many
of those weapons were in the various categories of active, inactive,
deployed, non-deployed, etc.? Is there any intention to make such
detailed numbers public?
Dr. Miller. The specific numbers associated with the deployed/non-
deployed, active/inactive stockpile remain classified and, as such, are
not to be made public. However, the United States declared an aggregate
1,790 warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and counted for
deployed heavy bombers to the Russian Federation as part of the New
START Treaty on September 1, 2011. There is no current plan to make
public the specific numbers of deployed/non-deployed, active/inactive
stockpile weapons.
Mr. Turner. How many nuclear warheads does Russia make each year?
What is our estimate for how many it can make? How does this compare to
actual U.S. production and our potential production capacity?
Dr. Miller. [The information referred to is classified and retained
in the committee files.]
Mr. Turner. Dr. Miller, when you said ``unclassified estimates
suggest that Russia has 4,000 to 6,500 total nuclear weapons, of which
2,000 to 4,000 are non-strategic tactical nuclear weapons,'' are those
numbers active warheads or all Russia warheads (including those in
storage or non-deployed status)?
Dr. Miller. [The information referred to is classified and retained
in the committee files.]
Mr. Turner. Are you concerned about reports about China potentially
increasing the MIRVing of its land- and sea-based ballistic missiles?
How might this trend affect the nuclear balance and our nuclear
policies 10 or 20 years from now? Are you concerned about reports of
Russia developing and deploying new heavy, highly-MIRV'd, silo-based
ICBMs? How would deployment of this system affect strategic stability
and U.S. nuclear policies and strategies? Did the U.S. seek to ban such
systems during New START negotiations?
Dr. Miller. We are concerned about the pace and scope of the
modernization of China's nuclear capabilities, both quantitatively and
qualitatively. We are also concerned about the lack of transparency
regarding the strategy and doctrine guiding this effort. Moreover, the
overall lack of transparency surrounding China's nuclear programs and
capabilities raises questions about China's future strategic intentions
and makes it difficult to assess the future nuclear balance.
A Russian deployment of a new heavy, highly MIRVed, silo-based ICBM
would reduce our strategic stability. The United States is taking steps
to enhance strategic stability, including de-MIRVing ICBMs and
sustaining a robust at sea presence of strategic submarines. These U.S.
steps reduce first-strike incentives for both sides, thereby enhancing
stability.
These questions and potential concerns illustrate why we continue
to pursue high-level, bilateral dialogues with China and Russia that
seek to promote a more stable, resilient, and transparent strategic
relationships.
Mr. Turner. The NPR mentions ``strategic stability'' more than a
dozen times, but never defined it. How does the administration define
``strategic stability''? How does it relate to force structure,
numbers, and modernization? How do nuclear modernization programs in
Russia and China affect strategic stability? How is strategic stability
affected in the long-term if other countries continue their nuclear
modernization efforts but our own modernization effort stalls or is
greatly reduced in scope?
Dr. Miller. Strategic stability exists when no side has incentives
or believes the other side has incentives to attempt to conduct a
disarming first-strike, whether in a day-to-day situation (``bolt-from-
the-blue'' scenario) or in a severe crisis (``pre-emption in crisis''
scenario). Survivable nuclear forces and command and control are
critical to strategic stability, and other factors including the de-
MIRVing of silo-based ICBMs contribute to stability. Modernization that
sustains or improves the survivability of nuclear forces and command
and control can be stabilizing. Increased transparency and discussions
on strategic doctrine, which the United States would like to expand
with Russia and initiate with China, can also improve stability by
reducing the prospects for miscommunication or misperception.
Mr. Turner. General Kehler, you cautioned against cutting the
budget or size of our nuclear forces too deeply, resulting in what you
called a ``hollow force.'' For each of the three legs of the triad,
what are the breakpoints or red-lines in the size of the force or
budget that would result in a ``hollow force'' for that leg?
a. What analysis has been done to examine these questions?
b. Would cutting one wing of ICBMs--leaving us with two wings--
potentially result in a hollow force in that leg of the triad?
General Kehler. A hollow force is a force giving the appearance of
readiness when, in fact, the capability is not there. The force may be
hollow if it is too small for the job, is inadequately supported, or
lacks an adequate industrial base. Therefore, any discussion and
assessment on ``hollow force'' or breakpoints must be preceded by a
thorough analysis of the strategy, its objectives, force composition,
and the level of budgetary support.
A. Resources and force structure identified in the President's
Budget and the updated 1251 Report are adequate to support today's
strategic deterrent strategy and policy goals as we move forward to
implement New START.
B. Eliminating a wing of ICBMs would not necessarily create a
hollow force, provided the remaining wings can meet national strategic
deterrent requirements, and are properly trained, equipped, maintained,
sustained, and led.
Mr. Turner. At the House Armed Services Committee's October 13
hearing, Secretary of Defense Panetta said, ``With regards to reducing
our nuclear arena, I think that is an area where I don't think we ought
to do that unilaterally--we ought to do that on the basis of
negotiations with the Russians and others to make sure we are all
walking the same path.'' To ensure we are not reducing unilaterally,
will we retain nuclear forces that are at--or very near--the limits on
strategic forces imposed by the New START Treaty? Otherwise, wouldn't
it by definition be ``unilateral'' reductions?
a. Would you support reductions if they were a part of a non-
binding agreement with Russia?
b. At what force levels do we need to start bringing the ``others''
Secretary Panetta mentions, particularly China, into the picture?
General Kehler. As specified in the 1251 report, we are presently
looking at New START implementation plans that are ``at or very near
the limits imposed by the New START Treaty.'' Any recommendations to
depart from that approach would have to be based on the international
situation and our deterrence, assurance and stability needs.
Regarding bringing states other than Russia into negotiated nuclear
arms reductions, the New START negotiating position took into account
our total force requirement involving all potential threats. As
discussed in the Nuclear Posture Review, we should bring others into
the ``picture'' now. But the ``picture'' is not necessarily limited to
negotiated arms reductions. Rather, the nature and objectives of our
interactions with others should be tailored to the countries involved.
Mr. Turner. Would you support unilateral reductions in our nuclear
forces, below the levels prescribed by New START? Would you support
reductions if they are part of a non-binding agreement with Russia?
General Kehler. I support the 13 October statement of Secretary of
Defense Panetta: ``With regards to reducing our nuclear arena, I think
that is an area where I don't think we ought to do that unilaterally--
we ought to do that on the basis of negotiations with the Russians and
others to make sure we are all walking the same path.'' We are
currently looking at New START force structures that are at or very
near the limits contained in New START.
Mr. Turner. General Kehler, your predecessor at U.S. Strategic
Command, General Kevin Chilton, said in June 2010 that, with regards to
the size of our nuclear arsenal, ``I do not agree that it is more than
is needed. I think the arsenal that we have is exactly what is needed
today to provide the deterrent. And I say this in light of--when we
talk about the non-deployed portion of the arsenal, it is sized to be
able to allow us to hedge against both technical failures in the
current deployed arsenal and any geopolitical concerns.'' Do you agree?
General Kehler. The nuclear arsenal is sized to meet current policy
and strategy objectives and manage technical and geopolitical risks.
The non-deployed stockpile provides considerable flexibility to respond
to operational issues, technical failures or breakthroughs, and
geopolitical uncertainty. We annually review stockpile requirements to
seek the most cost efficient force mix to provide deterrence
capabilities and manage risk.
Mr. Turner. How many military personnel have full or partial access
to STRATCOM's OPLAN 8010? How many must have knowledge of its contents
to fulfill their jobs and missions?
General Kehler. Full access to all portions of OPLAN 8010 is
limited to our most senior leadership. OPLAN 8010 is built on a full
spectrum of missions (nuclear, conventional, and non-kinetic) that
involve all levels of USSTRATCOM and its components. Because the
majority of the base plan and supporting annexes are classified SECRET,
military members with at least a SECRET clearance and need-to-know can
be granted access. However, those portions of the plan do not include
the details of our nuclear employment planning. Some portions of the
plan contain data which are classified at a higher level, including
those portions that include the details of our nuclear employment
planning, and access to those portions is limited accordingly.
Mr. Turner. When does our current force of Minuteman III ICBMs
start aging out? What life extension programs are currently underway
for the ICBMs?
a. What assessments or surveillance are we doing related to aging
in the ICBM force?
b. What are our plans or programs to extend the life of our
Minuteman III ICBMs? When must the decision be made to proceed with
life extension?
c. What are our plans or programs to replace the Minuteman III ICBM
force? When must the decision be made on a replacement program?
General Kehler. We are confident Minuteman is sustainable through
mid-2020s and are engaged with the Air Force to identify any additional
steps required to sustain Minuteman through 2030. The Air Force is
refurbishing the propulsion system rocket engines and warhead fuzes,
making improvements to depot and field support equipment, and security
and C2 sub-systems.
A. The Air Force conducts a comprehensive aging and surveillance
program and reports the results to USSTRATCOM. The surveillance and
testing program includes ground and flight testing. Results are used to
assess performance of the weapon system and provide insights on the
need for refurbishment and replacement programs.
B. The current Air Force plan is to extend Minuteman through
component replacement. This program is ongoing and reflected in the
PB12 budget. Major sub-systems being refurbished include the propulsion
system rocket engine and warhead fuzes. Guidance and propulsion sub-
systems require attention in the very near future to ensure performance
through 2030. Additionally, the Air Force is making investments in
advanced technology to support these future efforts.
C. Analysis is underway to support the Minuteman recapitalization.
The Air Force plans to conduct a Ground Based Strategic Deterrent
(GBSD) Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) to examine the full range of
alternatives including mobile options, as directed by the NPR. The
decision on investment for a Minuteman replacement depends on AoA
findings. Early investments may be required in the FY14 budget. The
goal is to ensure current and future investments on sub-systems are
leveraged in the recapitalization solution.
Mr. Turner. How do we support the industrial base for ICBMs and
submarine launched ballistic missiles? Please compare and contrast our
approach to maintaining the industrial base for these two programs.
a. The committee has been informed that there is a low-rate
production program in place for the D5 SLBM program. Is a similar
program in place for Minuteman III?
b. Do you have any concerns related to the rocket motor industrial
base, now that NASA has canceled so many of its human spaceflight
programs? Is DOD shouldering too much of the burden in this area now?
General Kehler. Various DOD solid rocket motor investments support
the industrial base. DOD Director of Defense Research and Engineering
(DDR&E) conducts science and technology (S&T) activities in propulsion
in the Technology for Sustainment of Strategic Systems Program. The Air
Force conducts propulsion Research Development Testing and Evaluation
(RDT&E) activities in the Demonstration and Validation Program. The
Navy D5 Life-Extension Program executes ongoing production of the D5
missile.
A. The Air Force conducts ongoing RDT&E efforts which could support
a future low-rate production activity, if funded by the Air Force.
B. In order to support strategic systems, the DOD will bear an
increased proportion of the industry's overhead costs. These increases
will be reflected in ongoing production and future development
programs. In addition, the U.S. needs to ensure the complete design-to-
production industrial capability and suppliers are sustained. Loss of
these capabilities would require numerous years and significant cost to
reconstitute.
Mr. Turner. General Kehler, your predecessor as commander of
Strategic Command, General Kevin Shelton, said the following in June
2010: ``The reason we have to maintain this large inventory is because
we no longer have the ability to produce nuclear weapons in this
country. The infrastructure has been allowed to decay and get to a
point where we cannot do that. The Russians, on the other hand, have an
ability to produce nuclear weapons. That is how they hedge. And so,
this is why it's--I think, the NPR findings and the investments in the
nuclear infrastructure and the personnel and expertise that is required
to sustain the stockpile are so important so that by the time we get to
next decade, we'll be in a position to look at our non-deployed arsenal
and consider future reductions to that. But today, I think we have what
we need to support the deterrent.'' Earlier this year, Administrator
D'Agostino testified before this subcommittee that NNSA's new plutonium
and uranium facilities--the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Replacement (CMRR) facility in New Mexico and the Uranium Processing
Facility (UPF) in Tennessee--need to be ``up and running'' before we
make substantial cuts to the non-deployed stockpile. General Kehler, do
you agree with these statements by General Chilton and Administrator
D'Agostino?
a. Should ``up and running'' mean the facilities are being built,
or should they have demonstrated actual production capability? What
metrics should we be using to judge that the infrastructure is robust
enough to support reductions in the non-deployed stockpile without
undue risk?
b. General Kehler, would you please provide the military's
perspective on the link between nuclear modernization and the ability
to reduce non-deployed weapons?
c. Do DOD and NNSA have a clear plan on what reductions in the non-
deployed stockpile are possible or planned for the future, and how
those reductions align with infrastructure and stockpile modernization
milestones?
d. Has STRATCOM provided NNSA input regarding how many non-deployed
weapons the military requires kept in the stockpile as a ``hedge''?
Please provide this information to the committee.
e. If nuclear modernization is delayed or postponed, can we reduce
the size of the non-deployed stockpile? How many non-deployed nuclear
weapons would STRATCOM want to see retained as a risk mitigation
measure or ``hedge''? If one or both of UPF and CMRR are delayed in
getting ``up and running,'' what levels and types of non-deployed
warheads would you recommend keeping in the stockpile as a risk
mitigation measure or ``hedge''? Please be specific.
General Kehler. NNSA's uranium and plutonium facilities are vitally
important, but are not the only considerations associated with
reductions in non-deployed weapons. There is a broader set of
considerations including the stockpile's condition, progress on life
extension programs, and demonstrated infrastructure capabilities
(existing or modernized). The current non-deployed stockpile's purpose
is to manage risk and we continuously assess and look for cost-
efficient opportunities to mitigate risk.
A. For the infrastructure to have a significant role in risk
mitigation there needs to be demonstrated production capabilities.
Again, there is a broader set of considerations beyond capacity that
influence non-deployed stockpile composition. For example, NNSA needs
to demonstrate the ability to conduct surveillance, perform maintenance
and execute weapon life extension programs on schedule.
B. As the U.S. currently has a limited production capacity, we rely
on the non-deployed stockpile for the following reasons: 1) mitigate
technical risk in our aging stockpile; 2) provide logistics spares to
ensure efficient operations; 3) provide risk management for
geopolitical uncertainty. The link is the ability of the infrastructure
to assume some of these functions.
C. The SSMP reflects our current estimate of planned reductions in
the non-deployed stockpile. Considerations that went into the
development of the SSMP included alignment with stockpile modernization
milestones and projected infrastructure capabilities. We conduct an
annual process to evaluate and adjust stockpile size and composition to
meet strategic deterrence requirements and manage risk.
D. We participate in an annual interagency process that proposes
stockpile composition and is reviewed by the Nuclear Weapons Council
and submitted to the President for approval. A document produced in
support of this process contains a detailed breakdown of non-deployed
weapons including those retained as a hedge. Release authority resides
with the Chairman, Nuclear Weapons Council.
E. I consider three important elements of nuclear modernization: 1)
sustainment activities needed to ensure a safe, secure, and effective
stockpile and annual stockpile certification; 2) progress on longer-
term life extension activities; and, 3) the infrastructure's capacity
to support the stockpile and assume some of the functions of the non-
deployed hedge. An assessment of these elements is necessary to make
informed recommendations on further reductions. It may be possible to
make prudent reductions of the non-deployed stockpile without incurring
operational risk. Again, from my perspective, the facilities are
important, but are not the only considerations associated with non-
deployed reductions.
Mr. Turner. What are STRATCOM's requirements for the Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) facility and Uranium Processing
Facility (UPF) in terms of capacity at each facility? When does
STRATCOM need the facilities to be fully operational?
a. General Kehler, are you familiar with NNSA's Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP), which projects a 20-year plan
for NNSA facilities and assumes further reductions in the number of
total warheads? Has STRATCOM fully endorsed that plan for the entire
20-year timeframe it covers? If not, up until when are NNSA and
STRATCOM in agreement? As NNSA's customer for the nuclear weapons it
produces and sustains, is STRATCOM in full agreement with NNSA's SSMP
plan?
General Kehler. NNSA's uranium and plutonium facility capacity is
important to sustain the stockpile, dismantle retired weapons, and
support non-proliferation efforts. These facilities represent a
national capability and they need to be updated. USSTRATCOM's
requirement is for a capability to conduct surveillance, maintenance
and life extensions in sufficient capacity to sustain our deployed and
non-deployed stockpile.
A. I am familiar with the SSMP and was consulted during development
through the Nuclear Weapons Council. The FY12 SSMP captures the planned
activities needed to sustain a safe, secure and effective stockpile.
There is DOD and NNSA consensus on the need to modernize the complex
and agreement on projected stockpile quantities through FY2030. The
stockpile requirements are reviewed annually by an inter-agency process
to maintain stockpile effectiveness and manage risks. The plan's
execution is dependent on a long-term commitment of funding.
Mr. Turner. If we continue reducing the total number of nuclear
weapons and delivery vehicles, there will naturally be a drive to
reduce the number of types of weapons and delivery vehicles. We are
already seeing this with consolidation of several B61 variants into a
single variant, and the drive to study a common ICBM and SLBM warhead.
Are we increasing technical risk by this consolidation--that is, are we
increasing the consequences and likelihood of a technical failure that
puts a large portion of the stockpile out of action? How are we dealing
with this problem as we move towards a smaller stockpile?
General Kehler. Reducing the total number of nuclear weapon types
can allow us to cost effectively sustain capabilities without
necessarily increasing technical risk. The principal technical risk is
age related degradation. Therefore, comprehensive life extension
programs that consolidate variants and improve reliability are more
important than multiple weapon types. For example, today there are five
aged B61 weapon types in stockpile. Upon completion of the planned B61
life extension there will be single B61 variant with improved long-term
reliability. This reduces stockpile resource requirements needed for
sustaining this air delivered capability. Likewise, introduction of
commonality for multiple ballistic missile warheads increases
operational flexibility and allows the reduction of non-deployed
warheads retained as a hedge. Consolidation and commonality risk are
further managed through acquisition strategies, comprehensive
surveillance, and increased component testing over the life cycle.
Mr. Turner. General Kehler, what are your views on warhead
diversity? In what cases would you be comfortable going down to a
single warhead or bomb for a leg of the triad or a particular delivery
system? For example, why is it helpful to have a B61 and a B83 in terms
of failure of one warhead type? Does your view change at smaller
stockpile sizes?
General Kehler. Warhead diversity and condition of the stockpile
are important factors in our ability to mitigate the risk of technical
failure. Given the ``aged'' condition of our nuclear weapons and
limited production capacity of our complex, diversity becomes
significant as we strive to maintain a credible deterrent over a range
of potential risk scenarios. However, there is inherent flexibility in
our Triad as we can mitigate risk of warhead failure in one leg with a
warhead from another. We assess diversity and condition of the
stockpile during our annual stockpile planning process.
Mr. Turner. How would cutting a wing on ICBMs--150 missiles in
total--affect STRATCOM's nuclear targeting? Could STRATCOM fulfill the
nuclear targeting and employment guidance that exists today, if a wing
of ICBMs were eliminated?
General Kehler. ICBMs remain a valuable component of our nuclear
deterrent force. They provide a prompt response option to the President
and complicate an adversary's decision calculus in many ways. We are
presently looking at a variety of force mixtures that would meet our
deterrence objective and fulfill current nuclear targeting and
employment guidance. Any decision by the President to reduce the ICBM
force, or any other leg of the Triad, could require adjustments to the
rest of the strategic force.
Mr. Turner. Is STRATCOM involved in setting requirements for
surveillance activities needed for sustainment and monitoring of the
stockpile? How? Is STRATCOM comfortable with NNSA's current
surveillance program--does it meet STRATCOM's needs and requirements?
General Kehler. NNSA establishes the detailed surveillance
requirements to ensure data is available to support annual stockpile
certification. USSTRATCOM annually assesses the safety, security and
military effectiveness of the stockpile based on surveillance findings.
Our annual assessment process highlighted the need for the increased
surveillance investment contained in the FY11 and FY12 budgets. These
funding levels need to be continued to address the backlog of
surveillance activities and improve understanding of our aging systems.
Mr. Turner. After implementation of the New START Treaty and the
NPR, what percentage of our strategic forces will be deployed on
submarines?
a. Has the U.S. ever deployed so much of its deterrent on a single
platform before? In other words, on one leg of the triad and on one
type of submarine, ICBM, or bomber? What risks does the U.S. accept by
doing so?
General Kehler. Current plans detailed in the 1251 Report reflect a
10% increase in accountable weapons on submarines over current levels.
A. In the early years of the Triad, bombers carried a significant
percentage of our nuclear deterrent. As Triad systems developed,
distribution of the deterrent became more balanced. The risk of
technical failure or technological breakthrough on one leg of the Triad
is mitigated by the unique and complimentary attributes of the Triad.
Retaining all three legs is the best method to mitigate risk and
maintain strategic stability.
Mr. Turner. The NPR concluded that ``the current alert posture of
U.S. strategic forces . . . should be maintained for the present.''
Please explain why the NPR reached this decision. What are the benefits
of our current alert posture? Do you anticipate changes in this
decision?
General Kehler. In the NPR's comprehensive review assurance,
deterrence, non-proliferation, ability to respond to technical and
geopolitical challenges and the unlikely event of deterrence failure
were considered when examining the nation's nuclear force posture. The
posture today provides a responsive and survivable capability day-to-
day to the President and it provides an ability to change the posture
as necessary in response to a changed environment or crisis. We
constantly review our force posture and will adjust it as needed to
meet our strategic needs and the operational circumstances.
Mr. Turner. How does the B61 Life Extension Program (LEP), which
would consolidate several different versions of the B61 into a single
B61-12 version, link to our extended deterrent in Europe?
a. What are the implications, both to our extended deterrent and
more broadly, of delay in the B61 LEP?
b. Why is it important to increase surety in B61 warheads during
the LEP?
General Kehler. The B61 is critical to extended deterrence because
it is the only weapon available for delivery by both heavy bombers and
tactical fighter aircraft meeting NATO commitments. The LEP addresses
critical components that are reaching end-of-life and require
replacement and/or refurbishment. Consolidation into a B61-12 conserves
resources and reduces life-cycle costs while enabling us to meet both
our strategic and extended deterrence requirements.
A. Delay to the LEP timeline will increase risk in meeting the
required number of weapons, with the required capabilities, for both
strategic and extended deterrence requirements. In addition, there will
likely be a substantial cost increase.
B. It is important to improve safety and security while maintaining
the effectiveness of nuclear weapons during life extension. The
upcoming planned life extension provides an opportunity to cost
effectively make these improvements during a time period the nuclear
complex has production capacity. It is a prudent course of action to
improve surety given the threat of nuclear terrorism.
Mr. Turner. When will a decision be made regarding how specifically
our nuclear forces will be structured to comply with the New START
Treaty? When will de-MIRVing of our ICBM forces begin to occur?
General Kehler. Discussions regarding final nuclear force structure
are ongoing. Force structure changes will be reflected in the annual
1251 Reports to Congress. Air Force plans to begin de-MIRVing in FY12.
Mr. Turner. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) considered
potential elimination of one or more legs of the triad, but ultimately
decided to keep the full triad. General Kehler, in an interview two
weeks ago, you said, ``I continue to stand by the need for a triad.''
Please explain the benefits of the triad, and why you believe we still
need it.
General Kehler. I agree with the results of the NPR study that
concluded that we should retain a nuclear triad under the New START
Treaty. The triad provides an effective, flexible and resilient
capability to deter potential adversaries, assure allies and partners,
maintain strategic stability, and defend U.S. and allied interests
should deterrence fail. Each leg of the triad provides unique
capabilities, and presents an adversary with unique problems.
Mr. Turner. General Kehler, B-52 and B-2 bombers are hardened to
protect them from electromagnetic radiation in the event of a nearby
nuclear detonation.
a. What will be the added cost to harden the next generation
bomber, vs. leave it unhardened?
b. The Air Force has said it can save money by delaying nuclear
certification and hardening of the next generation bomber until the
current bombers are readying for retirement. When would this nuclear
certification take place--what is the expected initial operational
capability date for its nuclear role? Would the next generation bomber
be hardened from the start, and just not certified initially? How much
money would this save, and when would this savings be realized?
General Kehler. A. The Air Force is not at the point in the
development process that would enable a detailed cost estimate of
platform hardening.
B. Testing and nuclear certification schedules have not been
determined. We are in consultation with the Air Force as requirements
are being developed. Certification needs to occur prior to a capability
gap in our air leg. Our understanding is the new bomber will be built
from the start to support the nuclear mission. Detailed cost
comparisons are not yet available; however, it is more cost effective
to nuclear harden early in development than trying to add these
capabilities later.
Mr. Turner. Before New START, the U.S. sea-based strategic
deterrent mission was carried out with a force of 14 ballistic missile
submarines (SSBN) with 24 missile tubes each. DOD has announced that to
comply with New START limits, by 2018 we will have at most 14 SSBNs
with 20 missile tubes each. The SSBN(X) ``Milestone A'' decision
earlier this year indicates that when the Ohio-class replacement is
fully deployed we will make do with 12 SSBNs with 16 missile tubes
each.
a. General Kehler, if the reductions in the number of missile tubes
and submarines proposed by the Navy's Ohio-class replacement
``Milestone A'' decision take place (from 24 to 16 missile tubes, and
from 14 boats to 12), could you still meet the existing targeting and
employment guidance that is in place today? Is the ``Milestone A''
decision anticipating changes in nuclear targeting and employment
guidance?
b. To save money, some are proposing that we should further reduce
the number of Ohio-class replacement submarines we buy, from 12 to 10,
or 8, or even lower. General Kehler, given the decreased flexibility we
will have by going to a lower number of tubes per boat, what is the
minimum number of 16-tube boats we can procure and still meet
deterrence and ``at-sea'' requirements?
c. Documents provided to the committee by the Navy show that the
total cost of designing, building, and operating a fleet of 12 Ohio-
class replacement boats with 20 missile tubes each would have been only
1.75% more (in current year dollars) than the total lifecycle cost of a
12-boat fleet with 16 missile tubes each. General Kehler, are you
comfortable with this trade-off in flexibility to save 1.75% of the
program's total lifecycle cost?
General Kehler. A. The Milestone A decision did not assume any
specific changes to targeting or employment guidance. Analyses
considered a range of potential security environments, strategy
requirements, and submarine force structures.
Contingent on funding, the first Ohio replacement submarine will be
available for strategic service in 2029. While there is uncertainty
about the future strategic environment and policy requirements, I am
confident that a plan to procure 12 Ohio Replacement SSBNs with 16
missile tubes will meet deterrence requirements. The ultimate number of
submarines and tubes will depend on a number of factors including our
deterrence needs and funding.
B. The number of available SSBNs for strategic service is as
important as the number of tubes. Today, 12 operational SSBNs are
required to meet deterrence and at-sea requirements. The minimum number
of Ohio Replacement SSBNs is based on an assessment of the security
environment and requirements of the strategy at a given time. There is
sufficient flexibility to adjust future force structure plans across
the Triad, or if required, procure additional submarines.
C. Yes, I am comfortable with the cost-capability trade that was
made to balance fiscal and operational considerations.
Mr. Turner. Are you concerned about reports about China potentially
increasing the MIRVing of its land- and sea-based ballistic missiles?
How might this trend affect the nuclear balance and our nuclear
policies 10 or 20 years from now? Are you concerned about reports of
Russia developing and deploying new heavy, highly-MIRV'd, silo-based
ICBMs? How would deployment of this system affect strategic stability
and U.S. nuclear policies and strategies? Did the U.S. seek to ban such
systems during New START negotiations?
General Kehler. We take seriously all reports of Russian and
Chinese strategic force modernization. Both countries have ambitious
programs. In China's case, their efforts involve both modernization and
expansion of their forces. However, while there is uncertainty
regarding the intended scale of their force expansion, our current
assessment is that it is unlikely to affect strategic stability. The
possible Russian development and deployment of a new ICBM, which would
be replacing an existing system, does not result in a significant
change in their capabilities. How this or any new Russian system
ultimately affects strategic stability depends on Moscow's success in
deploying the new system and whether the Russians continue to honor
their commitments under existing arms control regimes. In the New START
negotiations, we did not seek to ban such systems.
Mr. Turner. At the House Armed Services Committee's October 13
hearing, Secretary of Defense Panetta said, ``With regards to reducing
our nuclear arena, I think that is an area where I don't think we ought
to do that unilaterally--we ought to do that on the basis of
negotiations with the Russians and others to make sure we are all
walking the same path.'' To ensure we are not reducing unilaterally,
will we retain nuclear forces that are at--or very near--the limits on
strategic forces imposed by the New START Treaty? Otherwise, wouldn't
it by definition be ``unilateral'' reductions?
a. Would you support reductions if they were a part of a non-
binding agreement with Russia?
b. At what force levels do we need to start bringing the ``others''
Secretary Panetta mentions, particularly China, into the picture?
Secretary Tauscher. a. Both during and after the Cold War, the
United States and Russia have agreed to mutual, legally binding,
verifiable limits on their strategic nuclear arsenals in order to
prevent an arms race, increase transparency, and mitigate mistrust and
surprises. These agreements have contributed to building trust and
promoting stability in the relationship between the world's two largest
nuclear powers. Unilateral reductions would not provide the same level
of predictability and stability as agreed upon treaties because there
would be no obligation to make or maintain them. Furthermore, there
would be no verification regime associated with the reductions.
b. We are mindful of China's military modernization programs,
including its nuclear modernization, and the lack of transparency
surrounding them. We monitor carefully these developments and, in
concert with our allies and partners, will adjust our policies and
approaches, as necessary. However, China does not now appear to be
seeking parity with either the United States or Russia, and its nuclear
arsenal remains much smaller than the U.S. and Russian arsenals. As a
declared nuclear weapon state under the NPT, China's restraint in its
nuclear modernization is important to nuclear disarmament and global
non-proliferation efforts. As the United States and Russia conduct
bilateral negotiations to reduce nuclear arsenals further, the United
States will seek to expand dialogue with China on the doctrine, force
structure, and strategic modernization programs of our two countries to
improve mutual understanding, build trust, and reduce the risk of
misperception and miscalculation.
Mr. Turner. Data exchanges and on-site inspections between the U.S.
and Russia under the New START Treaty have begun. What are we learning
from these exchanges and inspections? Are we learning anything that
might facilitate making a future arms control treaty verifiable--
specifically a potential future treaty focused on non-deployed warheads
and/or non-strategic warheads?
Secretary Tauscher. One of the greatest contributions of the New
START Treaty is its strong verification regime. This regime was
developed to specifically verify the requirements of the New START
Treaty. Negotiators worked very hard to find innovative new mechanisms
to aid in the verification of this Treaty and the results from the
first year of implementing the Treaty have been positive. On-site
inspections are now being conducted routinely, as are the daily
notification requirements that help track movements and changes in the
status of systems. The New START Treaty data exchanges are providing us
with a detailed picture of Russian strategic forces and the inspections
give us crucial opportunities that we otherwise would not have to
confirm the validity of the data required to support verification of
the central limits of the New START Treaty.
As we implement New START, we're preparing for further nuclear
reduction negotiations with Russia. To date, no previous arms control
agreement has included provisions to limit and monitor nondeployed or
nonstrategic warheads. Future limits on such warheads would require
monitoring and verification different from those used in New START.
While the New START Treaty's verification provisions are not intended
to provide the United States or Russia any information on each side's
nondeployed warheads and/or nonstrategic warheads, the verification
regime will help by creating the foundation for future agreements.
Mr. Turner. What are some of the technical and procedural
challenges associated with verifying a potential future treaty with
Russia that limits non-deployed and non-strategic weapons? What must be
done to resolve these technical and procedural challenges? Do you
believe a treaty that limits non-deployed and non-strategic weapons can
be fully verifiable?
Secretary Tauscher. The monitoring and verification of any
potential future treaty limitations on nondeployed or nonstrategic
nuclear weapons will be more difficult due primarily to the relatively
small physical size of the items to be limited. Security concerns will
pose a significant technical challenge to our ability to confirm that
an object being counted during routine inspection is actually what it
is declared to be; similarly, we would have security concerns regarding
Russian access to U.S. nuclear warheads. The fact that air, sea- and
ground-launched nonstrategic nuclear weapons are primarily based on
delivery vehicles whose primary mission is non-nuclear adds complexity
to designing verifiable limits on these weapons.
Mr. Turner. We have heard that within the Deterrence and Defense
Posture Review (DDPR) process, some NATO allies might be encouraging
several changes to NATO's nuclear posture, possibly including: (1)
consolidation of U.S. nuclear forces in Europe to one or more
centralized bases, (2) decreasing the number of dual-capable aircraft
our allies are required to maintain, (3) relaxing or eliminating
requirements for pilots from allied nations to be trained and exercise
in the nuclear mission, and (4) potential removal of U.S. nuclear
weapons from Europe.
a. Are any of these actions being considered by the DDPR? Which
ones?
b. Would NATO and the U.S. consider taking any of these steps
unilaterally, without reciprocal and proportionate action on the part
of Russia?
i. What actions would we consider taking unilaterally, and what
actions would we only undertake bilaterally with Russia?
ii. What reciprocal actions would the U.S. look for from Russia in
exchange for any of these four actions?
Secretary Tauscher. The principle task of the Deterrence and
Defense Posture Review (DDPR) is to determine the appropriate mix of
political and military instruments including conventional, nuclear, and
missile defense forces that NATO will need to meet 21st-century
security challenges. Alliance nuclear policy will be a key element of
the review and there are no pre-ordained outcomes. NATO Allies agreed
in the new Strategic Concept that sharing of nuclear risks and
responsibilities is fundamental. We believe it is important to share
the burden of the nuclear mission as broadly as possible. How best to
accomplish this in the future is an issue we are committed to
addressing in the DDPR.
In its Strategic Concept, adopted in November 2010, NATO declared:
``In any future reductions, our aim should be to seek Russian agreement
to increase transparency of its nuclear weapons in Europe and relocate
these weapons away from the territory of NATO members. Any further
steps must take into account the disparity with the greater Russian
stockpiles of short-range nuclear weapons.''
The DDPR consultations will help to inform the appropriate posture
for forward-based U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe; however,
we do not expect that NATO would take steps to eliminate its nuclear
capabilities in the absence of reciprocal steps by Russia.
As National Security Advisor Donilon explained on March 29, 2011:
``We will work with our NATO allies to shape an approach to reduce the
role and number of U.S. tactical nuclear weapons, as Russia takes
reciprocal measures to reduce its nonstrategic force and relocates its
nonstrategic forces away from NATO's borders.''
Mr. Turner. Are our NATO allies still planning to purchase dual-
capable F-35s to replace their aging dual-capable aircraft? How many do
they plan to purchase and when? Please describe the plans for NATO
countries to replace or modernize their nuclear-capable aircraft,
including numbers of aircraft and timelines for purchase. How are these
plans being reflected in the DDPR?
Secretary Tauscher. All NATO Allies agreed in the new Strategic
Concept that the sharing of nuclear risks and responsibilities is
fundamental and we believe it is important to share the burden of the
nuclear mission as broadly as possible. Dual-capable aircraft and crews
are one of the key ways to share the burden of the nuclear mission and
as long as forward-based U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons remain in
Europe, the Alliance needs to commit the resources necessary to
maintain that capability. How best to accomplish this in the future is
an issue that will be determined following the completion of the DDPR.
Mr. Turner. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) says that ``the
presence of U.S. nuclear weapons--combined with NATO's unique nuclear
sharing arrangements under which non-nuclear members participate in
nuclear planning and possess specially configured aircraft capable of
delivering nuclear weapons--contribute to Alliance cohesion and provide
reassurance to allies and partners who feel exposed to regional
threats.''
a. Please explain how the presence of nuclear weapons in Europe
contributes to NATO cohesion, reassurance, and stability.
b. In particular, which NATO allies value these nuclear weapons and
``feel exposed to regional threats''?
c. Will unanimity among NATO members be required before any major
changes are made to our nuclear posture in Europe? What sorts of
changes to our nuclear posture in Europe might we undertake without
unanimity of NATO members?
Secretary Tauscher. All NATO Allies agreed in the 2010 Strategic
Concept that deterrence, based on an appropriate mix of nuclear and
conventional capabilities, remains a core element of NATO's overall
strategy. Allies also agreed collectively that the circumstances in
which any use of nuclear weapons might have been contemplated are
extremely remote, but as long as nuclear weapons exist, NATO will
remain a nuclear alliance. NATO's unique nuclear burden-sharing
arrangements assure each member state of the strength of the U.S.
commitment to collective defense, easing fears of exposure to regional
threats that may arise. The nuclear burden-sharing arrangements also
assure the United States that NATO Allies would be key partners in any
future and immensely difficult decisions regarding nuclear employment
on behalf of NATO. The role of nuclear weapons in defending Alliance
members and the threat environment confronting the Alliance are being
discussed as part of NATO's Deterrence and Defense Posture Review. Any
changes in NATO's nuclear posture, including forward-based U.S.
nonstrategic nuclear weapons in Europe, will be taken after a thorough
review within--and decisions by--the Alliance as a whole.
Mr. Turner. Germany and Norway have put forward ideas in the DDPR
process to increase transparency in NATO's nuclear mission and NATO's
nuclear forces. What transparency measures are being considered?
a. What NATO transparency measures are the U.S. comfortable with
NATO doing unilaterally (i.e., without reciprocal and proportionate
action by Russia)?
b. What NATO transparency measures would we only consider doing
bilaterally based on agreements with Russia? Would you anticipate such
bilateral agreements being based on non-binding agreements or through
some sort of binding treaty or agreement?
c. How does the administration define ``transparency''? How does it
define ``verification''? How are the two concepts related?
Secretary Tauscher. In advance of a new treaty limiting all types
of nuclear weapons, we plan to consult with our Allies on reciprocal
actions that could be taken on the basis of parallel steps with Russia.
At the NATO Foreign Ministerial in Berlin on April 14-15, Poland,
Norway, Germany and the Netherlands submitted a non-paper suggesting
ways to increase transparency and build confidence with Russia. After
the receipt of this non-paper, NATO's North Atlantic Council (NAC)
tasked the Weapons of Mass Destruction Control and Disarmament
Committee (WCDC) to provide input into the DDPR on possible options for
reciprocal measures to reinforce and increase transparency, mutual
trust and confidence with Russia. In the WCDC, NATO is now developing
transparency and confidence-building options that could be pursued on a
reciprocal basis with Russia. Initially, we would like to increase
transparency on a reciprocal basis on the numbers, locations, and types
of nonstrategic forces in Europe. Any transparency measures on U.S.
NSNW forward-based in Europe would require Alliance agreement.
Transparency builds stability and security by helping to ensure
against strategic surprise and by building the necessary confidence for
force planning based on a realistic view of the current and likely
force levels of others. Verification, the process by which we gather
and analyze information to make a judgment about parties' compliance or
non-compliance with an agreement, is an integral part of the arms
control regime. This Administration, as well as previous
Administrations before it, evaluates effective verification of nuclear
arms control agreements based on our ability to detect militarily
significant violations before they become a threat to our national
security. As stated in the 1992 report on START Treaty verifiability to
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
``A key criterion in evaluating whether a START agreement is
effectively verifiable is whether, if the other side attempts to move
beyond the limits of the Treaty in any militarily significant way, we
would be able to detect such a violation well before it becomes a
threat to national security so that we are able to respond.
Additionally, the verification regime should enable us to detect
patterns of other violations that, while they do not present immediate
risks to U.S. security, could, if left unchallenged, encourage actions
that would pose such risks.''
At least to the extent the parties trust in the information they
receive through transparency measures, such measures can help bolster
our confidence in the verifiability of a relevant arms control
agreement.
Mr. Turner. How does the B61 Life Extension Program (LEP), which
would consolidate several different versions of the B61 into a single
B61-12 version, link to our extended deterrent in Europe?
a. What are the implications, both to our extended deterrent and
more broadly, of delay in the B61 LEP?
b. Why is it important to increase surety in B61 warheads during
the LEP?
Secretary Tauscher. The B61 bombs assigned to support NATO are
intended to provide for the collective security of all Alliance
members. The B61 bombs couple U.S. and NATO security, and tangibly
assure the members of NATO that the United States is committed to their
national security. NATO is currently in the process of reviewing its
nuclear posture as part of the Deterrence and Defense Posture Review
and there are no pre-ordained outcomes. However, as long as forward-
based U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons remain in Europe the Alliance
needs to commit the resources necessary to maintain that capability and
the B61 LEP is an important element of that.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Franks asked for several pieces of information, but
I wanted to reiterate those requests and add one of my own. Please
provide the information requested within two weeks:
a. In your recent remarks at the Atlantic Council, you stated the
following, ``the Obama Administration's approach provided more
protection sooner against the existing threat, using proven systems,
and at a lower cost than the previous proposal.'' Your legislative
affairs staff was asked to provide this committee the basis for the
statement ``at a lower cost than the previous proposal.'' Please
provide the information requested to the committee within two weeks.
b. Please provide this committee, within two weeks, a
comprehensive, whole-of-the-federal-government cost for each phase of
the EPAA.
c. We understand the Department of State is advocating the return
of export control responsibility for commercial satellites and their
related components to the Department of Commerce. I also understand the
Department of State contracted with the Aerospace Corporation, through
Project West Wing, to develop a Counter Space Technology List. Our
committee staff has been asking for this list for over a month, with no
progress. Please provide a copy of this report to the committee within
two weeks.
Secretary Tauscher. a. One element of the basis for the statement
is that the Standard Missile (SM)-3, at around $10 million per
interceptor, is much cheaper than a GBI, which costs approximately $60
to $70 million per interceptor. This means that we can deploy many more
SM-3 interceptors than GBIs at the same cost. Since Iran already
possesses hundreds of short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, this
additional defensive capability is critical. In addition, the EPAA
(European Phased Adaptive Approach) relies on capabilities that are
mobile and relocatable, so additional capabilities can ``surge'' into
the region in a crisis. Furthermore, the deployment of the AN/TPY-2
radar to Turkey will also greatly improve U.S. and NATO's capability to
protect against the existing threat from short- and medium-range
ballistic missiles.
It is important to note that the EPAA is not an acquisition program
but a policy framework for delivering capabilities of which the
principal attribute is flexibility. By design, it can be enhanced,
expanded, and supplemented in each phase.
b. The Department of Defense would be the appropriate organization
to provide a cost estimate of the EPAA.
c. The Department of State, after consultation with the Department
of Defense, is advocating the return of export control responsibility
for commercial satellites and their related components to the
Department of Commerce, while retaining State Department jurisdiction
over sensitive military and intelligence related satellites,
components, and technology. The Counterspace Sensitive Technology List
(CSTL) is an ongoing research and analytical project which is projected
to be completed in late 2012. In short, there is no finished report or
list to provide at this time. We would be pleased to provide a
classified briefing to the committees of jurisdiction on the CSTL
effort.
Mr. Turner. What are some of the technical and procedural
challenges associated with verifying a potential future treaty with
Russia that limits non-deployed and non-strategic weapons? What must be
done to resolve these technical and procedural challenges? Do you
believe a treaty that limits non-deployed and non-strategic weapons can
be fully verifiable?
Mr. D'Agostino. A future treaty that includes limits on non-
deployed and non-strategic weapons could pose technical and procedural
challenges, depending on the specific terms of the treaty. From the
perspective of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), one
of the technical challenges that we are investigating to help inform
future decisions is warhead authentication, especially for non-deployed
warheads. In particular, we are investigating the technical means to
provide confidence that an object declared to be a nuclear warhead is a
warhead through radiation and other measurement techniques. This is
different from the New START Treaty, for example, where radiation
measurements may be used to confirm that an object placed on a deployed
delivery system and declared to be non-nuclear is in fact non-nuclear,
and therefore not counted as a warhead. We also are investigating
technical and procedural measures to provide warhead chain of custody
over time and between different locations. This kind of analysis and
capability development is necessary to understand the full scope of the
challenges associated with verifying a potential future treaty, and
NNSA is accomplishing important work in this regard.
An assessment of the verifiability of a future treaty would need to
be made by the U.S. national security community with supporting
analysis from the Intelligence Community. Such an assessment can only
be made once the specific terms of a treaty are known. From a technical
and procedural perspective, I am confident that we will be able to
provide the tools necessary for verification.
Mr. Turner. Administrator D'Agostino, earlier this year, you
testified before this subcommittee that NNSA's new plutonium and
uranium facilities--the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement
(CMRR) facility in New Mexico and the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF)
in Tennessee--need to be ``up and running'' before we make substantial
cuts to the non-deployed hedge force.
a. Please describe the relationship between modernizing our nuclear
infrastructure and the potential future ability to reduce non-deployed
weapons.
b. What metrics should we be using to judge that the infrastructure
is robust enough to support reductions in the non-deployed stockpile
without undue risk?
c. Do NNSA and DOD have a clear plan on what reductions in the non-
deployed stockpile are possible or planned for the future, and how
those reductions align with infrastructure and stockpile modernization
milestones? Please provide the committee a timeline showing, side-by-
side, the modernization plan with reductions in the non-deployed
stockpile deemed possible by the modernization effort.
d. If one or both of UPF and CMRR are delayed in getting ``up and
running,'' what levels and types of non-deployed warheads would you
recommend keeping in the stockpile as a risk mitigation measure or
``hedge''? Please be specific.
Mr. D'Agostino. a. Implementation of the Stockpile Stewardship
Program and appropriate nuclear infrastructure investments will allow
the United States to shift away from retaining the large numbers of
non-deployed warheads that are kept as a hedge against technical or
geopolitical surprise, allowing further reductions in the overall
nuclear stockpile. Investment is critical for maintaining a credible
deterrent and managing risk as stockpile reductions are made. NNSA
works closely with the Department of Defense in the Nuclear Weapons
Council to appropriately manage risk.
b. Page 34, Table 2 of the FY 2012 Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Plan summarizes the current and future infrastructure
capacities for each major NNSA mission function that directly supports
the stockpile. These represent the infrastructure improvements needed
as of April 2011 to support any future stockpile, which may include
reductions to non-deployed weapons. The infrastructure improvement
areas include:
Design Certification, Experiments, and Surveillance
Plutonium
Uranium
Tritium
High Explosives
Non-nuclear, and
Special Nuclear Materials Storage.
Analysis continues on continuing to meet these mission functions
under the caps established by the Budget Control Act.
c. Details of stockpile size and composition are classified and are
updated annually by the Nuclear Weapons Council and provided to the
President for approval. Classified Annex B of the FY 2012 Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Plan provides stockpile details as reflected
in the Fiscal Year 2011-2017 Nuclear Weapons Stockpile Memorandum and
the FY 2011-2024 Requirements and Planning Document. Also included in
Annex B is a discussion of potential future stockpiles based on events/
assumptions regarding infrastructure improvements and geopolitical
environment.
d. The specific effects on stockpile size and composition would
need to be addressed in a study in conjunction with the Department of
Defense.
Mr. Turner. The House Appropriations Committee reported a Defense
Appropriations bill that contains a 1% reduction from the President's
budget request for DOD. The House Appropriations Committee reported an
Energy and Water appropriations bill that contains a 10% reduction for
NNSA and all of its defense activities. This came after strong and
vocal support from Secretary Gates and senior military leaders for
NNSA's full budget request. How do these discrepancies affect planning,
budgeting, and coordination between NNSA and DOD on the overall nuclear
security enterprise? Should all aspects of the nuclear security
enterprise be consolidated into a single budgetary and appropriations
authority?
Mr. D'Agostino. NNSA is currently executing the FY 2012 enacted
appropriations in coordination with DOD and will continue to work with
DOD on the FY 2013 request. NNSA closely coordinates efforts with DOD
on identifying programmatic requirements in various reports, such as
Annual and Quarterly Reviews conducted by the Nuclear Weapons Council
(NWC).
Consolidation of the nuclear security enterprise (NSE) with DOD
appropriations would be at odds with the tenets of civilian agency
control over the NSE as identified in the Atomic Energy Act and the
NNSA Act. As such, NNSA does not believe all aspects of the nuclear
security enterprise can, or should be, consolidated into a single
budgetary and appropriations authority.
Mr. Turner. If we continue reducing the total number of nuclear
weapons and delivery vehicles, there will naturally be a drive to
reduce the number of types of weapons and delivery vehicles. We are
already seeing this with consolidation of several B61 variants into a
single variant, and the drive to study a common ICBM and SLBM warhead.
Are we increasing technical risk by this consolidation--that is, are we
increasing the consequences and likelihood of a technical failure that
puts a large portion of the stockpile out of action? How are we dealing
with this problem as we move towards a smaller stockpile?
Mr. D'Agostino. The Triad provides a sufficiently flexible force
structure that allows the U.S. to hedge effectively by shifting weight
from one Triad leg to another if necessary due to unexpected
technological problems or operational vulnerabilities. The pursuit of a
common warhead strategy is intended to provide the opportunity to
manage risk while reducing the total size of the stockpile. This
approach allows reductions to be made while maintaining the required
stockpile hedge, and it is our judgment that this approach may be
pursued in a manner that assures technical diversity. Therefore,
studies conducted for all future life extension programs will consider
the implications, including technical risk, of using the resulting
warhead on multiple platforms in order to reduce the number of warhead
types.
Mr. Turner. Do you anticipate having to shift NNSA's budget and
priorities to help pay for the B61 life extension? Do you anticipate
pushing the W78 LEP further into the future, or reprioritizing funds
allotted for the Science Campaign to B61 LEP work? How would such
shifts affect future LEPs like the W78? Is NNSA considering making the
B61-12 nuclear explosive package compatible with a future air-launched
cruise missile; is such a requirement part of the B61 LEP?
Mr. D'Agostino. NNSA is formulating our budget and priorities to
balance the Nation's need for modernized weapons against our ability to
manage, maintain, and certify the nuclear stockpile without the
requirement for underground testing. Activities such as the B61 life
extension are being scrutinized to ensure that their costs and benefits
are appropriate. Budget changes are being assessed as part of the FY
2013 budget development, to include appropriate alignment of Directed
Stockpile Work and campaign activities with the B61 LEP development and
certification work. Considering the Department of Defense's broader
needs and the throughput of our Nuclear Security Complex, NNSA is
finalizing schedules and budgets that realistically include the B61 and
W78 life extension programs into the overall NNSA priority matrix.
While there is no current requirement to make the B61 nuclear
explosive package (NEP) compatible with the future air launched cruise
mission, the Air Force and NNSA are evaluating the B61 NEP as a
candidate for the future cruise mission as well as other existing
warheads such as the W80 and W84.
Mr. Turner. Now that we are leaving a period of several decades
with minimal nuclear weapons design, engineering, and production work
and entering a long period of continual warhead life extension
programs, how is NNSA shifting its budget and priorities?
a. Is funding for scientific capabilities, which sustained the
human capital and led to dramatically better understanding of nuclear
weapon science when we were not actively working on the stockpile,
shifting toward design, engineering, and production activities to
sustain and modernize the warheads?
b. Given the fiscal environment, is it possible to sustain the
current levels of expenditures on science and also successfully execute
the LEPs and direct stockpile work, as well as infrastructure
modernization?
c. Has NNSA prioritized what science capabilities are critical for
stockpile assessment and certification, and which may be secondary for
that purpose? What are those priorities?
d. In real dollar terms, how much does NNSA plan to spend in FY12
on LEPs and other activities directly related to design, engineering,
and production of nuclear weapons (not surveillance or science-based
capabilities that enable assessments and certification), as compared to
history (e.g., 10, 20, and 30 years ago)?
e. Has NNSA considered a continual low-rate production model for
sustaining the stockpile, as opposed to its current approach of
discrete and infrequent LEPs? What are the costs, benefits, and risks
of such an approach as compared to the current approach? How might this
analysis change if the size and diversity of the stockpile decrease?
Mr. D'Agostino. a. No, funding for scientific capabilities is not
being shifted to engineering or production, since scientific
capabilities are essential to effect the modernization of the stockpile
along with stewarding the existing stockpile, as explained in Chapter 3
of the FY 2012 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan. Science,
engineering, and manufacturing are neither mutually exclusive nor
fungible. There was no time in the past when we were not working
actively on maintaining the stockpile. Notable stewardship milestones
over the past 15 years include certification of the B61-11 in 1997 (the
first new modification introduced into the stockpile since the end of
testing); the completion of the W87 LEP in 2004; delivery of new pits
manufactured in Los Alamos to the stockpile in 2007; and the design,
engineering, and ongoing production and delivery of the W76 LEP.
In parallel, we have developed new Stockpile Stewardship
facilities, including the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test
(DARHT) facility; the Microsystems and Engineering Sciences
Applications (MESA) complex; the National Ignition Facility (NIF);
Proton radiography; the Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental
(JASPER) facility and U1a facilities at the Nevada National Nuclear
Security (NNSS); as well as the extraordinarily successful series of
the Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC) platforms.
All of these science and technology tools are being applied today
to improve understanding and predictive capability for the stockpile,
without recourse to new underground tests. While priorities do change
and new problems arise each year, the necessary adjustments and
reprioritizations have taken place throughout the history of the
program and are reflected in the budget requests for each year in the
past and in the future years nuclear security plan (FYNSP).
b. Yes, the President's budget provides a balanced portfolio of
infrastructure modernization, stockpile sustainment, and pursuit of the
fundamental science, technology, and engineering necessary to maintain
a safe, secure, and reliable stockpile, as outlined in the FY12 SSMP.
Much of this effort is still in the design phase, and as the designs
are completed, NNSA will make adjustments to ensure the portfolio
remains balanced.
c. Yes, NNSA has prioritized the science capabilities for Stockpile
Stewardship, and this has resulted in the set of capabilities that have
been supported and constructed over the past 20 years. These priorities
are reflected in the annual budget requests and SSMPs. Any capabilities
that are less than essential to Stockpile Stewardship have already had
their supporting budgets reduced or eliminated, or are now principally
supported by work for other Government agencies.
Every year the science, technology, and engineering community has a
summit with the Directed Stockpile Work teams to ensure that the long
terms needs for stewardship without underground testing are being
optimized to support near-term Life Extension activities, as well.
There are a number of great, recent examples of this relating to
multipoint safety, high explosives performance, and surety.
d. For FY 2012, the President's Budget request for Directed
Stockpile Work is $1,963,583,000. That includes $239 million for
surveillance. Without surveillance, DSW together with supporting
Readiness and Engineering campaigns, are about 26% of the Weapons
Activity budget. For the period 2001-2011, a similar comparison is
presented in the table below. Due to drastic differences in how nuclear
weapons budgets were structured prior to 2001, we cannot provide a
meaningful comparison prior to that year. Additionally, a significant
portion of the Readiness in the Technical Base and Facilities budget
and the campaigns budgets directly support stockpile sustainment
outside of the support they provide to stockpile surveillance and that
spending is not included in these percentages.
Table 1: Yearly Percentage of Weapons Activities Funding Used for DSW (Without Surveillance) and Readiness and
Engineering Campaign
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Year 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Percent 25 23 24 28 25 26 26 25 27 25 27
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
e. NNSA is currently evaluating ways to optimize its life extension
program to achieve multiple objectives, including enhanced technology
maturation and integration, sustainment of the highly specialized
workforce, program affordability, increased interoperability (common
technologies), and increased technology insertion opportunities. Costs,
benefits and risks are being analyzed as part of this evaluation. Once
approved, the updated life extension program will be described in the
next Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan.
Mr. Turner. How does the deployment of the B61-12 warhead align
with deployment of nuclear-capable F-35s? Is deployment of the two
systems linked? Can one deploy without the other, while still retaining
our nuclear capability in Europe?
Mr. D'Agostino. The deployment of the B61-12 is well aligned with
the deployment of the nuclear-capable F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
program, but they are not linked. The JSF with nuclear capability is
planned to be deployed a few years after that the first production unit
for the B61.
A key element of the B61-12 Life Extension Program is
interoperability with current and planned future aircraft.
Mr. Turner. When NNSA conducts a life extension program on a
particular weapon type, will NNSA extend the life of all warheads of
that type, including those in the non-deployed ``hedge'' part of the
stockpile? Or will it only extend those weapons in the active, deployed
part of the stockpile?
Mr. D'Agostino. The scope of each life extension program (LEP) is
determined by the Nuclear Weapons Council and requirements for
quantities are documented in the NWC Requirements and Planning Document
(RPD). For each LEP, NNSA plans to replace the existing weapons (i.e.,
both active and inactive weapons) with life-extended weapons per
quantities provided in the RPD. The ``hedge'' is a portion of the
inactive stockpile.
Mr. Turner. What role did DOE and NNSA play in selection of the new
directors of Los Alamos National Lab and Lawrence Livermore National
Lab? Specifically, how were you and Secretary Chu involved? Given the
critical role the lab directors play in providing the President and
Congress independent assessments on the safety, security, and
reliability of the nuclear stockpile, do you believe it is important
for the lab directors to have extensive backgrounds in nuclear weapons
research, design, production, and assessment?
Mr. D'Agostino. Under DOE's contracts with Los Alamos National
Security, LLC, and Lawrence Livermore National Security, LLC, the
respective Boards of Governors are responsible for the selection of the
laboratory directors. As laboratory directors are considered ``key
personnel,'' the respective Contracting Officers of the LANS and LLNS
contracts must approve the selection of the laboratory directors. The
Secretary of Energy and I have no formal role in the selection process,
but as a courtesy, the Secretary was asked to concur in the selection
of Charles McMillan as the Los Alamos Laboratory Director, and Penrose
C. Albright, as the Lawrence Livermore Laboratory Director, which he
did.
I believe it is important for laboratory directors to be qualified
scientists that understand the complex phenomena that arise as issues
in research, design, production and assessment.
Mr. Turner. Please provide the committee, before December 15, a
list and description of the managerial and functional areas (e.g.,
legal, safety, security, health, human resources, etc.) in which the
Department of Energy is involved in NNSA activities, including detailed
descriptions of such involvement.
Mr. D'Agostino.
Legal Functions
Within the Department of Energy, NNSA is managed by the Under
Secretary for Nuclear Security, who reports to the Secretary. In
accordance with section 3213(a) and (b) of the National Nuclear
Security Administration Act (NNSA Act), NNSA employees ``shall not be
responsible to, or subject to the authority, direction, or control of,
any . . . officer, employee, or agent of the [DOE]'' other than the
Secretary of Energy, acting through the NNSA Administrator, the NNSA
Administrator, or the NNSA Administrator's designee within NNSA. 50
U.S.C. 2403(a) and (b). In implementing the mission of NNSA (NNSA Act
Sec. 3211(b), 50 U.S.C. 2401(b)), NNSA has 18 functional areas of
responsibility, as identified in section 3212 of the NNSA Act; these
include, for example: budget formulation, guidance, and execution, and
other financial matters; policy development and guidance; program
management and direction; safeguards and security, emergency
management; environment, safety, and health operations; administration
of contracts, including the management and operations of the operations
of the nuclear weapons production facilities and the national security
laboratories; legal matters; legislative affairs, and public affairs.
50 U.S.C. 2402(b).
As part of the Department of Energy, NNSA is subject to all
Departmental regulations, orders, and policies in all functional areas,
except that the NNSA Administrator may establish NNSA-specific
policies, unless disapproved by the Secretary of Energy. NNSA Act,
Sec. 3212(d), 50 U.S.C. 2402(d). See also the response to Q73b, below
[Appendix page 155].
DOE'S Involvement in NNSA Security Activities
1. Rule making and Directives. The Office of Health, Safety and
Security (HSS) has primary responsibility for rule-making, and for
developing and maintaining directives in the areas of nuclear safety,
worker safety and health, and security (the NNSA Act also gives the
Administrator authority to develop NNSA policies; this authority has
been used for some safety and security requirements).
2. Inspections. The HSS Office of Enforcement and Oversight
conducts independent external reviews to evaluate the implementation of
DOE requirements by DOE contractor and Federal operating organizations,
evaluate the oversight of operations by DOE Program offices; and
determine the adequacy of DOE requirements to DOE operations..
3. Enforcement. The HSS Office of Enforcement and Oversight also
administers the enforcement process for the nuclear safety, worker
health and safety, and classified information security rules (10 CFR
Part 820, 10 CFR Part 830, 10 CFR Part 835, 10 CFR Part 850, 10 CFR
Part 851, 10 CFR Part 708, and 10 CFR Part 824). Based on the NNSA Act,
the NNSA Administrator is assigned the authority upon which regulatory
direction and enforcement is provided to NNSA Contractors.
4. Technology and Data Sharing.
a. Electronic Data Bases and Transfer of Data between Department of
Energy (DOE) and other Federal Agencies
NNSA personnel security is required to use the DOE's Electronic
Integrated Security System (eDISS+) to collect, process, store, and
transfer personnel security data into the Central Verification System
(CVS) maintained by the U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM). CVS
is a national database used by all federal agencies for suitability/
clearance verifications.
The web-based Central Personnel Clearance Index (WebCPCI), which is
one of the many parts of the eDISS+ initiative, tracks security
clearance activity for DOE employees, contractors, and associated
personnel, and provides report and query capability to Personnel
Security, Headquarters, and Departmental offices. Within WebCPCI,
individuals are assigned a Case Folder containing information on
clearances, investigations, adjudicative codes, administrative reviews,
and case folder actions.
WebCPCI's ``e-delivery'' capability is exclusively used to
electronically receive and forward completed background investigations
from the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) to the respective
Personnel Security Office (PSO). WebCPCI is also the system of record
PSO's primarily use to verify that an active facility clearance (FCL)
code has been approved and registered into the Department's Safeguards
and Security Information Management System (SSIMS) before granting a
security clearance. DOE/HSS personnel are responsible for entering FCLs
into WebCPCI once notified that an FCL has been approved and registered
into SSIMS.
b. Data Sharing from external Federal Agency, specifically
Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Action data from OPM
regarding timeliness, volume, etc.
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) is provided the information
regarding case timeliness by OPM. HSS has a responsibility to track and
trend the case timeliness; however, they are a pass-through
organization, not calculating the actual case times. On a monthly and
quarterly basis, DOE provides to each Personnel Security Organization
an agency roll up for the Personnel Investigation Program in the form
of the OPM Federal Investigative Services' Agency Specific Performance
Metrics. The data identifies the End-to-End Overall Timeliness for the
fastest 90% of the access authorizations reported, initiated,
investigated, and adjudicated in response to the Intelligence Reform
Terrorism and Prevention Act of 2004 requirements.
5. Budget
a. Payments to Other Federal Agencies for Personnel Security
Background Investigations
Security Investigations are paid via an Intra-Governmental Payment
and Collection (IPAC) which is basically a transfer of funds from one
Government treasury account to another
HSS remains the OPM point of contact for all
investigation invoices
HSS receives one invoice from OPM for all of DOE
HSS breaks down the invoice by DOE organization and
forwards to the appropriate DOE Organization for payment instruction
DOE Organizations send payment information back to HSS
HSS sends entire invoice to DOE financial POC so that
payment can be aligned into the DOE financial system
b. Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD)-12 Budget
Process is very similar to approach listed above for
Investigations
HSS is the point of contact with GSA
In fiscal year (FY) 2011, HSS sent NNSA estimated costs
and PSD coordinated all NNSA funding back to HSS
Process for FY12 will be similar
6. Facility Clearance: There can be DOE involvement in the
registration of security activities which includes the Foreign
Ownership Control or Influence (FOCI) element. Within the FOCI program,
DOE counterintelligence and legal interactions may be required when
making a FOCI determination.
7. Counterintelligence and Intelligence Support: The Department's
Office of Intelligence and its Office of Counterintelligence, each
having been established by the NNSA Act of FY 2000, are now structured
as part of the combined DOE Office of Intelligence and
Counterintelligence (DOE/IN). NNSA relies upon DOE/IN for the effective
conduct of its mission. The support is critical to the success of our
core missions in Defense Programs and Nuclear Nonproliferation as well
as Security and Nuclear Counterterrorism. Foreign intelligence
collection and analyses inform our understanding of other countries'
capabilities and Counterintelligence (CI) protects our own assets and
capabilities from compromise or sabotage.
The CI directorate has aligned its functional capabilities to
address the key mission areas of Insider Threat, Foreign Risk
Management (regarding presence in and interaction with National
Laboratories), Threat Assessment (to support security and CI
objectives), Security (to manage clearances and SCIF's), and
Investigations (with oversight of CI investigations and operations
across the complex).
The Intelligence Analysis Directorate maintains its focus on
foreign energy and nuclear matters, as well as science and technology
capabilities more broadly.
The IN Cyber Directorate is composed of four divisions: Strategic
Initiatives, Network Architecture and Engineering Service, Information
Technology Support, and Cyber Operations. The NNSA Chief Information
Officer works in close collaboration with the IN Cyber Directorate to
ensure comprehensive protection of NNSA networks and associated
information.
The Field Intelligence Elements (FIE's) of DOE/IN located within
the NNSA laboratories and at the Nevada Nuclear Security Site (NNSS)
have a unique status. The lab FIE members are employees of the
laboratory Management and Operating contractors. But, under a narrow
exception to the general NNSA Act prohibition of DOE direction and
control of NNSA personnel (Sec 3117 of the FY 2007 National Defense
Authorization Act) as well as provisions in the updated Executive Order
12333, they are not only subject to direction and control of DOE/IN but
they (and the rest of IN) are also part of the U.S. Intelligence
Community, subject to the direction of the Director of National
Intelligence. NNSA relies upon DOE/IN to help manage the Intelligence
Work accomplished at the NNSA labs in support of the Intelligence
Community and other national security customers.
Listing of Security Rules and Directives provided as separate
attachment [see Appendix page 98]; however, the response to 73.b.
should include this information.
Listing of Security Rules and Directives
This listing may not contain all applicable National level policy
documents or Departmental Orders.
Directive Title/Comment
1. 5 CFR 732 National Security Positions
2. 5 CFR 736 Personnel Investigations
3. 10 CFR 30 through 40 Rules of general applicability to domestic licensing of byproduct
material
4. 10 CFR 72 Licensing Requirements for the Independent Storage of Spent Nuclear
Fuel and High-level Radioactive Waste, and Reactor-related great than
Class C Waste
5. 10 CFR 74 Material Control and Accounting of Special Nuclear Material
6. 10 CFR 707 Workplace Substance Abuse Programs at DOE Sites
7. 10 CFR Part 710, Subpart A General Criteria and Procedures for Determining Eligibility for Access
to Classified Matter or Special Nuclear Material
8. 10 CFR Part 712 Human Reliability Program
9. 10 CFR 725 Permits for Access to Restricted Data
10. 10 CFR 824 Procedural Rules for the Assessment of Civil Penalties for Classified
Information Security Violations
11. 10 CFR Part 860 Trespassing on Department of Energy Property
12. 10 CFR 862 Restrictions on Aircraft Landing and Air Delivery at DOE Nuclear Sites
13. 10 CFR 1016 Safeguarding of Restricted Data
14. 10 CFR 1017 Identification and Protection of Unclassified Controlled Nuclear
Information
15. 10 CFR 1044 Security Requirements for Protected Disclosures under section 3164 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year 2000
16. 10 CFR 1045 Nuclear Classification and Declassification
17. 10 CFR Part 1046 Physical Protection of Security Interests
18. 10 CFR 1046, Subpart B Protective Force Personnel
19. 10 CFR Part 1047 Limited Arrest Authority and Use of Force by Protective Force Officers
20. 32 CFR 2001 Classified National Security Information
21. DOE O 142.3A Unclassified Foreign Visits and Assignments Program
22. DOE P 205.1 Departmental Cyber Security Management Policy
23. DOE O 205.1B Department of Energy Cyber Security Program
24. DOE M 205.1-3 Telecommunications Security Manual
25. DOE N 206.4 Personal Identity Verification
26. DOE O 227.1 Independent Oversight Program
27. DOE P 310.1 Maximum Entry and Mandatory Separation Ages for Certain Security
Employees
28. DOE O 452.4B Security and Use Control of Nuclear Explosives and Nuclear Weapons
29. DOE O 452.6A Nuclear Weapon Surety Interface with the Department of Defense
30. DOE O 452.7 Protection of Use Control Vulnerabilities and Designs
31. DOE O 452.8 Control of Nuclear Weapon Data
32. DOE O 457.1 Nuclear Counterterrorism
33. DOE M 457.1-1 Control of Improvised Nuclear Device Information
34. DOE O 461.2 Onsite Packaging and Transfer of Materials of National Security
Interest
35. DOE P 470.1A Safeguards and Security Program
36. DOE O 470.3B Graded Security Protection (GSP) Policy
37. DOE O 470.4B Safeguards and Security Program
38. DOE O 471.1B Identification and Protection of Unclassified Controlled Nuclear
Information
39. DOE O 471.3 Identifying and Protecting Official Use Only Information
40. DOE M 471.3-1 Manual for Identifying and Protecting Official Use Only
41. DOE O 471.5 Special Access Programs
42. DOE O 471.6 Information Security
43. DOE O 472.2 Personnel Security
44. DOE O 473.3 Protection Program Operations
45. DOE O 474.2 Nuclear Material Control and Accountability
46. DOE O 475.1 Counterintelligence Program
47. DOE O 475.2A Identifying Classified Information
Within the Department of Energy, NNSA is managed by the Under
Secretary for Nuclear Security, who reports to the Secretary. In
accordance with section 3213(a) and (b) of the National Nuclear
Security Administration Act (NNSA Act), NNSA employees ``shall not be
responsible to, or subject to the authority, direction, or control of,
any . . . officer, employee, or agent of the [DOE]'' other than the
Secretary of Energy, acting through the NNSA Administrator, the NNSA
Administrator, or the NNSA Administrator's designee within NNSA. 50
U.S.C. 2403(a) and (b).
As part of the Department of Energy, NNSA is subject to all
Departmental regulations, orders, and policies in all functional areas,
except that the NNSA Administrator may establish NNSA-specific
policies, unless disapproved by the Secretary of Energy. NNSA Act,
Sec. 3212(d), 50 U.S.C. Sec. 2402(d). The U.S. Office of Personnel
Management (OPM) provides oversight with DOE's Office of Human Capital
of NNSA's human resources systems via a periodic review of efficiency,
effectiveness and compliance with regulations and law in the following
areas: strategic alignment, leadership and knowledge management,
performance culture, talent management, and accountability. Delegated
Examining authority (to hire using competitive procedures) flows
through the Secretary of Energy from the OPM to NNSA. Employee
appointments and removals for Senior Executive Service and other
Executive Review Board actions are subject to review or oversight by
DOE. Use of the DOE excepted service authorities (EJ and EK) is subject
to approval by DOE. Technical Qualifications Program (TQP) Policy is
owned by DOE, and DOE provides oversight of NNSA's management of the
TQP. NNSA Diversity and EEO Policy is subject to review and concurrence
by DOE. Personnel recordkeeping systems are owned by DOE and must
comply with OPM requirements.
Mr. Turner. Please provide the committee, before December 15, a
comprehensive list of all DOE Orders, Manuals, and any other DOE
regulations to which NNSA and/or its labs, plants, and facilities are
held or are subject to.
Mr. D'Agostino. A comprehensive list of all current DOE directives
(Policy, Orders, and Manuals) can be found at: www.directives.doe.gov.
An excerpt of the current DOE directives from the web site is
attached below. Please note the listing includes Guides which are non-
mandatory.
Listed below are the DOE Regulations to which the NNSA is subject.
[Response to Q73b, for cross-reference--ed.]
List of Applicable DOE Regulations
1. 10 CFR Part 202--Production or Disclosure of Material or
Information
2. 10 CFR Part 205--Administrative Procedures and Sanctions
3. 10 CFR Part 600--Financial Assistance Rules
4. 10 CFR Part 601--New Restrictions on Lobbying
5. 10 CFR Part 602--Epidemiology and Other Health Studies
Financial Assistance Program
6. 10 CFR Part 603--Technology Investment Agreements
7. 10 CFR Part 605--The Office of Energy Research Financial
Assistance Program
8. 10 CFR Part 609--Loan Guarantees for Projects That Employ
Innovative Technologies
9. 10 CFR Part 611--Advanced Technology Vehicles Manufacturer
Assistance Program
10. 10 CFR Part 622--Contractual Provisions
11. 10 CFR Part 624--Contract Clauses
12. 10 CFR Part 625--Price Competitive Sale of Strategic Petroleum
Reserve Petroleum
13. 10 CFR Part 626--Procedures for Acquisition of Petroleum for
the Strategic Petroleum Reserve
14. 10 CFR Part 706--Security Policies and Practices Relating to
Labor-Management Relations
15. 10 CFR Part 707--Workplace Substance Abuse Programs at DOE
Sites
16. 10 CFR Part 708--DOE Contractor Employee Protection Program
17. 10 CFR Part 709--Counterintelligence Evaluation Program
18. 10 CFR Part 710--Criteria and Procedures for Determining
Eligibility for Access to Classified Matter or Special Nuclear Material
19. 10 CFR Part 712--Human Reliability Program
20. 10 CFR Part 715--Definition of Non-Recourse Project-Financed
21. 10 CFR Part 719--Contractor Legal Management Requirements
22. 10 CFR Part 725--Permits for Access to Restricted Data
23. 10 CFR Part 727--Consent for Access to Information on
Department of Energy Computers
24. 10 CFR Part 733--Allegations of Research Misconduct
25. 10 CFR Part 745--Protection of Human Subjects
26. 10 CFR Part 760--Domestic Uranium Program
27. 10 CFR Part 765--Reimbursement for Costs of Remedial Action at
Active Uranium and Thorium Processing Sites
28. 10 CFR Part 766--Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and
Decommissioning Fund; Procedures for Special Assessment of Domestic
Utilities
29. 10 CFR Part 770--Transfer of Real Property at Defense Nuclear
Facilities for Economic Development
30. 10 CFR Part 780--Patent Compensation Board Regulations
31. 10 CFR Part 781--Doe Patent Licensing Regulations
32. 10 CFR Part 782--Claims for Patent and Copyright Infringement
33. 10 CFR Part 783--Waiver of Patent Rights
34. 10 CFR Part 784--Patent Waiver Regulation
35. 10 CFR Part 800--Loans for Bid or Proposal Preparation by
Minority Business Enterprises Seeking Doe Contracts and Assistance
36. 10 CFR Part 810--Assistance to foreign atomic Energy
Activities
37. 10 CFR Part 820--Procedural Rules for DOE Nuclear Activities
38. 10 CFR Part 824--Procedural Rules for the Assessment of Civil
Penalties for Classified Information Security Violations
39. 10 CFR Part 830--Nuclear Safety Management
40. 10 CFR Part 835--Occupational Radiation Protection
41. 10 CFR Part 840--Extraordinary Nuclear Occurrences
42. 10 CFR Part 850--Chronic Beryllium Disease Prevention Program
43. 10 CFR Part 851--Worker Safety and Health Program
44. 10 CFR Part 860--Trespassing On Department of Energy Property
45. 10 CFR Part 861--Control of Traffic at Nevada Test Site
46. 10 CFR Part 862--Restrictions on Aircraft Landing and Air
Delivery at Department of Energy Nuclear Sites
47. 10 CFR Part 871--Air Transportation of Plutonium
48. 10 CFR Part 950--Standby Support for Certain Nuclear Plant
Delays
49. 10 CFR Part 960--General Guidelines for the Preliminary
Screening of Potential Sites for A Nuclear Waste Repository
50. 10 CFR Part 961--Standard Contract for Disposal of Spent
Nuclear Fuel and/or High-Level Radioactive Waste
51. 10 CFR Part 962--Byproduct Material
52. 10 CFR Part 963--Yucca Mountain Site Suitability Guidelines
53. 10 CFR Part 1000--Transfer of Proceedings to the Secretary of
Energy and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
54. 10 CFR Part 1002--Official Seal and Distinguishing Flag
55. 10 CFR Part 1003--Office of Hearings and Appeals Procedural
Regulations
56. 10 CFR Part 1004--Freedom of Information
57. 10 CFR Part 1005--Intergovernmental Review of Department of
Energy Programs and Activities
58. 10 CFR Part 1008--Records Maintained on Individuals (Privacy
Act)
59. 10 CFR Part 1009--General Policy for Pricing and Charging for
Materials and Services Sold by DOE
60. 10 CFR Part 1010--Conduct of Employees and former Employees
61. 10 CFR Part 1013--Program Fraud Civil Remedies and Procedures
62. 10 CFR Part 1014--Administrative Claims Under Federal Tort
Claims Act
63. 10 CFR Part 1015--Collection of Claims Owed the United States
64. 10 CFR Part 1016--Safeguarding of Restricted Data
65. 10 CFR Part 1017--Identification and Protection of
Unclassified Controlled Nuclear Information
66. 10 CFR Part 1021--National Environmental Policy Act
Implementing Procedures
67. 10 CFR Part 1022--Compliance with Floodplain and Wetland
Environmental Review Requirements
68. 10 CFR Part 1023--Contract Appeals
69. 10 CFR Part 1039--Uniform Relocation Assistance and Real
Property Acquisition for Federal and Federally Assisted Programs
70. 10 CFR Part 1040--Nondiscrimination in Federally Assisted
Programs or Activities
71. 10 CFR Part 1041--Enforcement of Nondiscrimination on the
Basis of Handicap in Programs or Activities Conducted by the Department
of Energy
72. 10 CFR Part 1042--Nondiscrimination On the Basis of Sex in
Education Programs or Activities Receiving Federal Financial Assistance
73. 10 CFR Part 1044--Security Requirements for Protected
Disclosures Under Section 3164 of the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 2000
74. 10 CFR Part 1045--Nuclear Classification and Declassification
75. 10 CFR Part 1046--Physical Protection of Security Interests
76. 10 CFR Part 1047--Limited Arrest Authority and Use of force by
Protective Force Officers
77. 10 CFR Part 1048--Trespassing On Strategic Petroleum Reserve
Facilities and other Property
78. 10 CFR Part 1049--Limited Arrest Authority and Use of force by
Protective Force Officers of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve
79. 10 CFR Part 1050--Foreign Gifts and Decorations
80. 10 CFR Part 1060--Payment of Travel Expenses of Persons who
are not Government Employees
N.B.: The long DOE current directives list that followed in
manuscript has been scanned to EPS and put in Docs for Record
section deg.Mr. Turner. Please provide the committee, before
December 15, a comprehensive list of all audits conducted by any DOE
office, entity, or personnel on NNSA and/or any of its labs, plants, or
facilities in FY11.
Mr. D'Agostino. [The information referred to follows on the next
page.]
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1527.067
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1527.070
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1527.071
Mr. Turner. Please provide the committee, before December 15,
the number of NNSA personnel assigned to the site offices at each NNSA
site (e.g. Los Alamos, Pantex, etc.). Also, the number of NNSA
personnel at other NNSA facilities, such as headquarters, that are
conducting oversight of the labs and plants. In both cases, how do
these numbers compare to 5 years ago and 10 years ago?
Mr. D'Agostino.
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] T1527.072
Mr. Turner. Please provide the committee, before December 15,
the number of personnel working in the DOE Office of Health, Safety,
and Security.
Mr. D'Agostino. The mission of the Office of Health, Safety and
Security (HSS) is to maintain a safe and secure work environment for
all Federal and contractor employees, ensure that the Department's
operations preserve the health and safety of the surrounding
communities, and protect national security assets entrusted to the
Department. To accomplish these vital tasks, HSS requested and was
authorized a Federal staff of 398 FTEs for FY 2011 and has requested a
Federal staffing level of 376 for FY 2012.
Mr. Turner. Please provide the committee a detailed description of
NNSA's approach to managing, overseeing, and coordinating surveillance
of the stockpile by the labs and plants, including the name and
position of the individual within NNSA with responsibility for this
mission. Please also provide the committee with NNSA's requirements for
conducting surveillance and the program plan for fulfilling these
requirements.
Mr. D'Agostino. In 2011 a new surveillance governance model for
management of the surveillance program was instituted in which we
selected a Senior Technical Advisor for Surveillance (STAS) to oversee
all areas of the program and report directly to the Assistant Deputy
Administrator for Stockpile Management. The governance model
coordinates key surveillance activities to assure that each weapon
system maintains a current technical basis to determine its respective
requirements; all systems requirements are integrated into an
executable plan; appropriate diagnostics are developed and deployed;
and the surveillance plan is funded and supported by senior NNSA
management.
Surveillance requirements are identified by Sandia, Los Alamos, and
Lawrence Livermore National Laboratories and provided to the NNSA
production agencies to perform the necessary inspections, testing, and
capture of data. The primary goal of the Surveillance Program is to
identify any design or manufacturing defects either in newly produced
or in stockpiled weapons and weapon components, as well as, detect any
issues related to deployment or aging of the weapons. Each weapon
system has an integrated weapon evaluation plan that projects out 6
years.
Mr. Turner. How does the B61 Life Extension Program (LEP), which
would consolidate several different versions of the B61 into a single
B61-12 version, link to our extended deterrent in Europe?
a. What are the implications, both to our extended deterrent and
more broadly, of delay in the B61 LEP?
b. Why is it important to increase surety in B61 warheads during
the LEP?
Mr. D'Agostino. The B61-12 LEP plan submitted by NNSA has a central
theme of consolidating multiple legacy versions of the B61 that are
currently deployed in the U.S. and abroad. As a result, the B61-12 will
provide a modernized extended deterrent in Europe. Our planned
deployment schedule will ensure that no gap in extended deterrent
capability will occur, and will ensure seamless replacement of legacy
B61 systems with the modernized B61-12.
The implications of a delay in the B61-12 LEP have been studied by
NNSA and DOD as part of our LEP alternatives analysis. NNSA has
coordinated mitigation strategies with the Department of Defense for
the contingency of a delayed B61 LEP. If the proposed LEP is
significantly delayed, several critical and costly activities must be
pursued to temporarily stabilize the capabilities of legacy deployed
B61 systems. For the time period of the delay, more rigorous
surveillance activities must be performed to ensure an adequate state
of readiness is maintained for this aging legacy element of the
stockpile.
The B61 bomb variants have some of the most advanced safety and use
control features in the current stockpile. However, these features are
aging and designed for Cold War threats. The life extension program
provides the opportunity to improve weapon safety and security
especially against new, emerging threats of the 21st century. The B61
LEP will incorporate improvements to the existing surety features
without significant risk of schedule delays and will balance the B61
investments with those needed in other weapon LEPs. The design approach
will facilitate future surety upgrades as threats to our nuclear
deterrent evolve.
Mr. Turner. How many nuclear warheads does Russia make each year?
What is our estimate for how many it can make? How does this compare to
actual U.S. production and our potential production capacity?
Mr. D'Agostino. The NNSA is responsible for the warheads in the
U.S. nuclear weapons program. Questions about a foreign nuclear weapon
program should be answered by the Intelligence Community or the
Department of Defense.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ
Ms. Sanchez. General Kehler has stated recently that ``We're not
going to be able to go forward with weapon systems that cost what
weapon systems cost today . . . Case in point is [the] Long-Range
Strike [bomber]. Case in point is the Trident [submarine] replacement .
. . . The list goes on.'' In addition, Admiral Mullen before he retired
as Chairman of the JCS said: ``At some point in time, that triad
becomes very, very expensive, you know, obviously, the smaller your
nuclear arsenal is. And it's--so at some point in time, in the future,
certainly I think a decision will have to be made in terms of whether
we keep the triad or drop it down to a dyad.''
Can the U.S. guarantee its security and that of its allies in a
more fiscally sustainable manner by pursuing further bilateral
reductions in nuclear forces with Russia and scaling back plans for new
and excessively large strategic nuclear weapons systems and warhead
production facilities?
Dr. Miller. I believe that if properly structured, reductions below
New START levels with Russia could reduce costs to the United States,
while strengthening deterrence of potential regional adversaries,
strategic stability vis-a-vis Russia and China, and assurance of our
Allies and partners. At the same time, as noted in the Nuclear Posture
Review, Russia's nuclear force will remain a significant factor in
determining how much and how fast we are prepared to reduce U.S.
forces.
Ms. Sanchez. Do you have any concerns about the provisions related
to nuclear weapons employment and that could limit or delay nuclear
weapons reductions, which were included in the House National Defense
Authorization bill?
Dr. Miller. Sections 1055 and 1056 of H.R. 1540 would impinge on
the President's authority to implement the New START Treaty and
establish U.S. nuclear weapons policy. Moreover, it would set onerous
conditions on the Administration's ability to direct the retirement,
dismantlement, or elimination of non-deployed nuclear weapons.
This legislation would dictate the pace of reductions under New
START Treaty in a way that would bar DOD and DOE from exploring the
best means to implement reductions, could preclude DOD from being
logistically able to meet New START Treaty timelines, and would add
disruptions and costs at a time when our country and the nuclear
enterprise can ill afford them. Notably, it would set conditions on New
START Treaty implementation and divert resources from stockpile
sustainment in ways that tax the very programs that the House
Appropriations Committee has just cut drastically.
Further, Section 1056 raises constitutional concerns, as it appears
to encroach on the President's authority as Commander in Chief to set
nuclear employment policy.
Ms. Sanchez. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee in June 2010, former National Security Advisor Brent
Scowcroft stated: ``Some things [nuclear weapons] need to be modernized
in order to be safe, secure and reliable. Other things don't need to
be. And I would not put modernization itself as a key to what we need
to--we need to do.''
Do you agree with this statement?
Dr. Miller. I agree that nuclear weapons need to be modernized
(e.g., through warhead life extension programs) in order to be safe,
secure, and reliable. This modernization does not require the
development of new nuclear weapons.
Ms. Sanchez. What are the projected costs of, and associated
decision points, related to, development and production of a new
nuclear bomber, a new Air-Launched Cruise Missile, and a new ICBM?
Dr. Miller. The President's Budget for Fiscal Year (FY) 2012
contains $3.7 billion across FY 12-16 for a new, long-range penetrating
bomber. The program would use a streamlined management and acquisition
approach to balance capability with affordability by utilizing existing
and mature technologies to the maximum extent. Additionally, the Air
Force would limit requirements based on affordability using a realistic
cost target to inform capability and cost trade-offs. The program plans
to hold unit costs to the established targets to ensure sufficient
production and a sustainable inventory over the long term for
approximately 80 to 100 aircraft. The Air Force estimates an initial
capability in the mid-2020s.
The current funding for a new Air-Launched Cruise Missile, also
known as Long-Range Standoff, is $884.3 million across FY 2012-16. The
cost of this missile will be further refined when a materiel solution
is selected as a product of the ongoing Analysis of Alternatives that
is scheduled for completion in FY 2013.
The Air Force will begin a Ground-Based Strategic Deterrence
Capability-Based Analysis of Alternatives in FY 2013. This assessment
supports development of an Initial Capabilities Document, and will
establish a baseline of requirements for a future Inter Continental
Ballistic Missile (ICBM) replacement program.
Ms. Sanchez. Would the ALCM require a new warhead?
Dr. Miller. No. The Administration committed in the Nuclear Posture
Review to sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal
without developing new nuclear warheads. However, a new ALCM would
require a decision regarding how to conduct a life extension program
for the ALCM warhead.
Ms. Sanchez. Under the data provided by the New START verification
regime, Russia's nuclear forces were actually at one point under the
New START limits that must be met by 2018, but now have risen slightly.
Russia is deploying one new missile, the RS-24--a missile I would note
that U.S. inspectors got to examine up close solely because New START
came into force--and I believe Russia is also proposing a new 10-
warhead missile.
What can we do to discourage Russia from developing and fielding
new weapons?
Dr. Miller. Under the New START Treaty, each country is permitted
to shape and modernize its forces to meet their respective strategic
requirements. There is little we can do to discourage Russia from
developing and fielding new nuclear weapons as long as they remain
within the limits of the Treaty. Russia continues to modernize its
force to replace aging systems and to meet what it views as its
strategic needs. The United States is also modernizing nuclear systems
as allowed under the New START Treaty.
Ms. Sanchez. In the context of New START negotiations, how many
deployed strategic warheads did the U.S. military conclude that it
needed to fulfill the existing targeting requirements established by
the Bush administration in their nuclear policies.
And how many deployed strategic warheads are needed following the
analysis of the 90-day NPR implementation review based on the different
options that will be presented to the President?
Dr. Miller. I would be glad to brief the committee leadership with
a classified briefing to answer the first question. I cannot answer the
second question because at this time no options have been finalized for
presentation to the President.
[OSD provided briefing to Ranking Member Sanchez on the number of
deployed strategic warheads as part of a classified brief by Under
Secretary Miller and General Kehler on July 10, 2012.]
Ms. Sanchez. The Nuclear Posture Review emphasizes the importance
of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy, an
approach that makes sense in a world where such weapons are the only
existential threat to the United States.
Can you give us some examples of how the United States can further
reduce the role of nuclear weapons?
Can you tell us how and what further reductions in the size of the
U.S. stockpile would be possible based on current and foreseeable
requirements, and what assumptions about nuclear weapons technology and
geopolitics in the next decades factor into these requirements?
Dr. Miller. The United States continues to explore options to
reduce the role of nuclear weapons. In a regional context, continued
development of conventional capabilities and missile defenses can
strengthen non-nuclear deterrence and so help to reduce reliance on
nuclear weapons. In addition, implementation of the Stockpile
Stewardship Program and investments in our nuclear infrastructure will
allow the United States over time to shift away from retaining large
numbers of non-deployed warheads as a hedge against technical or
geopolitical surprise, allowing major reductions in the nuclear
stockpile. To date, no final decisions have been made with respect to
future force structure or the modernization plans for nuclear delivery
systems. The Department of Defense is close to concluding the NPR
Implementation Study, which will inform future decisions.
Ms. Sanchez. What assumptions underlie and inform the options
presented to the President?
Dr. Miller. The key assumption that informs the options being
developed is that the goals of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) remain
valid: to prevent nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; to
reduce the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security
strategy; to maintain strategic stability and deterrence at reduced
nuclear force levels; to strengthen regional deterrence and reassure
our Allies and partners of the credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella
and other security commitments; and to sustain a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear deterrent.
Ms. Sanchez. What is the cost of forward-deploying tactical nuclear
weapons in Europe? Please provide detailed cost break-down (in
classified form if necessary).
How are these costs shared between the U.S. and host countries?
Dr. Miller. DOD estimates the annual operating costs for the United
States to support forward deployed nuclear weapons in Europe is
approximately $100 million per year on average, as shown in the below
table.
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year (FY)($M) FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FYDP
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Officer 7.2 7.3 7.5 7.7 7.9 8 37.6
Enlisted 66.7 68.9 71.1 73.4 76.3 8 356.4
Operations & Maintenance 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 12.2
Security Investments 0.0 23.0 44.0 0.0 0.0 67.0
Weapon Storage Systems 2.8 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.4 12.3
Transportation Costs 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 14.5
Total 81.9 106.9 130.4 88.8 92.0 500.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Beyond the above costs, Host Nations fund all facility and
installation costs at the Munitions Support Squadrons locations. In
addition to facility and installation costs, NATO funded $14.7M in FY
2011 to develop and procure a replacement weapon maintenance vehicle
for all weapon sites and $63.4M in FY 2011-2012 in security upgrades
for munitions storage sites.
Ms. Sanchez. General Kehler, you've stated recently that ``We're
not going to be able to go forward with weapon systems that cost what
weapon systems cost today . . . Case in point is [the] Long-Range
Strike [bomber]. Case in point is the Trident [submarine] replacement .
. . . The list goes on.'' In addition, Admiral Mullen before he retired
as Chairman of the JCS said: ``At some point in time, that triad
becomes very, very expensive, you know, obviously, the smaller your
nuclear arsenal is. And it's--so at some point in time, in the future,
certainly I think a decision will have to be made in terms of whether
we keep the triad or drop it down to a dyad.''
Can the U.S. guarantee its security and that of its allies in a
more fiscally sustainable manner by pursuing further bilateral
reductions in nuclear forces with Russia and scaling back plans for new
and excessively large strategic nuclear weapons systems and warhead
production facilities?
General Kehler. U.S. policy is to maintain strategic deterrence,
strategic stability, and assure our allies with the lowest possible
number of nuclear weapons. The President has certified to Congress he
will seek negotiations with the Russian Federation for an agreement on
non-strategic nuclear weapons stockpiles of Russia and the U.S. and to
reduce tactical nuclear weapons in a verifiable manner. I believe our
triad of strategic nuclear weapons systems and our nuclear weapons
infrastructure need to be sustained and modernized and there are
opportunities to do so in a cost effective and affordable manner. New
START provides the necessary flexibility to examine alternatives while
meeting our national security policy objectives.
Ms. Sanchez. Do you have any concerns about the provisions related
to nuclear weapons employment and that could limit or delay nuclear
weapons reductions, which were included in the House National Defense
Authorization bill?
General Kehler. As the combatant commander responsible for managing
forces and implementing the New START, I am concerned reporting
requirements and waiting periods have the potential to impact New START
implementation. Additionally, I am concerned that some provisions could
divert resources from critical stockpile sustainment efforts and delay
prudent reductions to the non-deployed stockpile. In my view, existing
consultative processes (e.g., 1251, Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Plan) ensure we work jointly with Congress to implement New
START and manage the stockpile.
Ms. Sanchez. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee in June 2010, former National Security Advisor Brent
Scowcroft stated: ``Some things [nuclear weapons] need to be modernized
in order to be safe, secure and reliable. Other things don't need to
be. And I would not put modernization itself as a key to what we need
to--we need to do.''
Do you agree with this statement?
General Kehler. We need to sustain a safe, secure and effective
nuclear deterrent. We have reached a critical point where investment is
required to sustain the weapons, perform life extensions for
substantial pieces of our deterrent, and modernize the complex. The
current plans in the 1251 Report detail our best estimates for actions
needed to sustain the stockpile while meeting our deterrence
requirements.
Ms. Sanchez. What are the projected costs of, and associated
decision points, related to, development and production of a new
nuclear bomber, a new Air-Launched Cruise Missile, and a new ICBM?
General Kehler. The 1251 Report contains the most current projected
costs for the new bomber, ALCM follow-on, and Minuteman follow-on.
These estimates will be refined as the Air Force conducts the
requirements and acquisition processes for each platform and future
1251 Reports will be updated accordingly. The current Air Force plan
projects a technology development decision for the ALCM follow-on in
FY14. Specific plans for the new bomber are in development. The
Minuteman follow-on is dependent on the Ground Based Strategic
Deterrent Analysis of Alternatives which is scheduled to begin in FY13.
Ms. Sanchez. Would the ALCM require a new warhead?
General Kehler. The current ALCM warhead is sustainable with
investments by the Air Force and NNSA until 2030. The next-generation
cruise missile will require a life-extended warhead.
Ms. Sanchez. Under the data provided by the New START verification
regime, Russia's nuclear forces were actually at one point under the
New START limits that must be met by 2018, but now have risen slightly.
Russia is deploying one new missile, the RS-24--a missile I would note
that U.S. inspectors got to examine up close solely because New START
came into force--and I believe Russia is also proposing a new 10-
warhead missile.
What can we do to discourage Russia from developing and fielding
new weapons?
General Kehler. The New START Treaty was explicitly designed to
permit both countries to shape and modernize their forces to match
their requirements as they see fit within the treaty's limits. In
contrast to the United States, Russia is today conducting a
modernization of their force in part to serve as replacements for
existing systems that have exceeded or are ending their service lives
and more generally to meet their perceived geopolitical needs. To some
degree, the United States will be conducting similar modernization
efforts in the later half of this decade and the next. As discussed in
the NPR, I believe the way forward is to place ``importance on Russia
joining us as we move to lower levels.''
Ms. Sanchez. In the context of New START negotiations, how many
deployed strategic warheads did the U.S. military conclude that it
needed to fulfill the existing targeting requirements established by
the Bush administration in their nuclear policies.
And how many deployed strategic warheads are needed following the
analysis of the 90-day NPR implementation review based on the different
options that will be presented to the President?
General Kehler. As part of the Nuclear Posture Review the military
conducted extensive studies to inform the U.S. negotiation position for
the New Start Treaty. The resultant treaty level reflects the
military's identified requirements. The follow-on analysis directed in
the NPR (aka ``90 Day NPR implementation review'') is ongoing and thus
it would be premature to describe the content of these discussions.
Ms. Sanchez. The Nuclear Posture Review emphasizes the importance
of reducing the role of nuclear weapons in U.S. security policy, an
approach that makes sense in a world where such weapons are the only
existential threat to the United States.
Can you give us some examples of how the United States can further
reduce the role of nuclear weapons?
Can you tell us how and what further reductions in the size of the
U.S. stockpile would be possible based on current and foreseeable
requirements, and what assumptions about nuclear weapons technology and
geopolitics in the next decades factor into these requirements?
General Kehler. The ongoing follow-on analysis directed in the NPR
is examining these issues in detail and thus it would be premature to
describe the content of these discussions.
Ms. Sanchez. Do you have any concerns about the provisions related
to nuclear weapons employment and that could limit or delay nuclear
weapons reductions, which were included in the House National Defense
Authorization bill?
Secretary Tauscher. The May 24, 2011, Statement of Administration
Policy on H.R. 1540 made clear that the Administration had serious
constitutional concerns with sections 1055, 1056, and 1230. Sections
1055 and 1056 would impinge on the President's authority to implement
the New START Treaty and to set U.S. nuclear weapons policy. Similarly,
section 1230 would limit the president's ability to address tactical
nuclear weapons, a step called for in the Senate's Resolution of
Ratification of the New START Treaty.
Ms. Sanchez. Under the data provided by the New START verification
regime, Russia's nuclear forces were actually at one point under the
New START limits that must be met by 2018, but now have risen slightly.
Russia is deploying one new missile, the RS-24--a missile I would note
that U.S. inspectors got to examine up close solely because New START
came into force--and I believe Russia is also proposing a new 10-
warhead missile.
What can we do to discourage Russia from developing and fielding
new weapons?
Secretary Tauscher. Under New START, each Party retains the right
to determine for itself the structure and composition of its strategic
forces within the Treaty's overall limits. This provides both Parties
to the Treaty with the flexibility to deploy, maintain, and modernize
its strategic nuclear forces in the manner that best protects its
national security interests. However, modernization must occur within
the central limits of the Treaty. The Treaty limitations on U.S. and
Russian forces, combined with mechanisms to verify compliance, will
provide predictability, transparency, and stability in the U.S.-Russian
strategic relationship at lower nuclear force levels.
Ms. Sanchez. Are we taking the necessary steps to build
verification requirements into the CMRR and UPF facility designs to
preserve flexibility for future arms control agreements?
Secretary Tauscher. While designs for CMRR (Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research Replacement) and UPF (Uranium Processing Facility)
are flexible, specific verification requirements of future agreements
are unknown. The UPF facility design has been evaluated and determined
to have an appropriate level of transparency within the ongoing design
to accommodate potential activities that could be related to future
treaty obligations. UPF can accommodate access, and appropriate areas
for monitoring and measuring of fissile material for inspection teams.
The CMRR Nuclear Facility is not considered a production facility and
is not anticipated to be subject to routine inspections.
Ms. Sanchez. Could you further detail the relationship between
modernization and reductions?
Does delay in modernization necessarily prevent any reductions?
Could the U.S. pursue negotiations for further reductions before CMRR
and UPF are operational? Could the U.S. make unilateral reductions, as
was done under Presidents George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush, if they
can be done without jeopardizing deterrence requirements? Why or why
not?
Secretary Tauscher. Appropriate investments to improve the
capability and responsiveness in our nuclear infrastructure ensure the
United States will retain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal
so long as nuclear weapons exist and will help to enable further
reductions.
As stated in the Nuclear Posture Review, the President has directed
a review of post-New START arms control objectives to consider further
reductions in nuclear weapons.
Ms. Sanchez. What is the cost of forward-deploying tactical nuclear
weapons in Europe? Please provide detailed cost break-down (in
classified form if necessary).
How are these costs shared between the U.S. and host countries?
Secretary Tauscher. We refer you to the answer below provided by
the Department of Defense which outlines the U.S. support for forward
based nuclear weapons in Europe as well as the contribution by host
countries and the NATO Alliance. The current amount funded by the
United States to support forward based nuclear weapons in Europe is:
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fiscal Year (FY)($M) FY12 FY13 FY14 FY15 FY16 FYDP
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Officer 7.2 7.3 7.5 7.7 7.9 37.6
Enlisted 66.7 68.9 71.1 73.4 76.3 356.4
Operations & Maintenance 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.5 2.5 12.2
Security Investments 0.0 23.0 44.0 0.0 0.0 67.0
Weapon Storage Systems 2.8 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.4 12.3
Transportation Costs 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 2.9 14.5
Total 81.9 106.9 130.4 88.8 92.0 500.0
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Host Nations currently fund all facility and installation costs
at the Munitions Support Squadrons (MUNSS) locations. In addition to
facility and installation costs, NATO funded $14.7M (FY11) to develop
and procure a replacement weapon maintenance vehicle for all weapon
sites and $63.4M (FY11/12) in security upgrades for the MUNSS storage
sites.
Ms. Sanchez. Do you have any concerns about the provisions related
to nuclear weapons employment and that could limit or delay nuclear
weapons reductions, which were included in the House National Defense
Authorization bill?
Mr. D'Agostino. Section 1055 of H.R. 1540, the House National
Defense Authorization Bill for FY 2012, would impose onerous conditions
on NNSA's ability to retire, dismantle, or eliminate non-deployed
nuclear weapons. The effect of this section would be to preclude
dismantlement of weapons in excess of military needs. Additionally, it
would increase stewardship and management costs and divert key
resources from our critical stockpile sustainment efforts and delay
completion of programs necessary to support the long-term safety,
security, and reliability of our nuclear deterrent.
Ms. Sanchez. In testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee in June 2010, former National Security Advisor Brent
Scowcroft stated: ``Some things [nuclear weapons] need to be modernized
in order to be safe, secure and reliable. Other things don't need to
be. And I would not put modernization itself as a key to what we need
to--we need to do.''
Do you agree with this statement?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, I agree with Mr. Scowcroft's statement. As Mr.
Scowcroft stated, NNSA is not pursuing modernization of nuclear weapons
or the nuclear security enterprise for the sake of modernization;
rather, NNSA is extending the life of systems where necessary, on a
case-by-case basis, to ensure the continued safety, security and
reliability of the U.S. nuclear deterrent, including assuring the
continued capability of the entire nuclear security enterprise.
[Text from the June hearing for context: Mr. SCOWCROFT. Yes, I am.
I am comfortable. I did not use the term ``modernization'' in my
comments. I said safe, reliable, assurance. Modernization for the sake
of modernization, in light of the comments that Senator Lugar has made
about the overall defense budget, is a separate question. Some things
need to be modernized in order to be safe, secure, and reliable. Other
things do not need to be. And I would not put modernization itself as a
key to what we need to do. We need to be assured that the system will
work the way we want it to work.]
Ms. Sanchez. Would the ALCM require a new warhead?
Mr. D'Agostino. The Air Force is assessing options to replace the
Air Launched Cruise Missile (ALCM) with another long-range standoff
(LRSO) capability in the next decade. NNSA is prepared to install new
neutron generators to extend the life of the W80 deployed on the ALCM.
NNSA will continue to support the Air Force's ongoing Analysis of
Alternatives (AoA) to establish requirements for the LSRO. Until the
AoA is complete, the warhead options will not be determined.
Ms. Sanchez. Under the data provided by the New START verification
regime, Russia's nuclear forces were actually at one point under the
New START limits that must be met by 2018, but now have risen slightly.
Russia is deploying one new missile, the RS-24--a missile I would note
that U.S. inspectors got to examine up close solely because New START
came into force--and I believe Russia is also proposing a new 10-
warhead missile.
What can we do to discourage Russia from developing and fielding
new weapons?
Mr. D'Agostino. Russian determinations regarding the development
and fielding of weapons will be based on Russian national security
considerations, just as the United States will make determinations
based on U.S. national security considerations. Looking to the future,
the President has made clear his commitment to a step-by-step process
for further reducing and eliminating nuclear weapons, while recognizing
that this process will take time and must be based on international
security conditions that will enable such reductions to occur in a
secure, predictable, and stable manner. In this regard, the United
States must continue to work with the international community,
including Russia, to improve the regional and international security
considerations affecting national security decisionmaking.
Ms. Sanchez. What assumptions underlie, and what requirements
drive, the 50-80 pits and secondaries production capacity for CMRR and
UPF? What is the cost comparison for facilities that could produce a
lower maximum number of pits/secondaries?
Mr. D'Agostino. NNSA infrastructure is capability-based and will be
responsive to changing world demands and have the inherent capacity for
uranium processing, plutonium analytical chemistry and material
characterization support, and storage to support production of the
required pits and canned subassemblies (CSA) per year while sustaining
the remaining stockpile. Stockpile life extension plans developed
jointly between the Department of Defense and NNSA provide the drivers
for the requirements for pits and secondaries production capacity.
During the NNSA Critical Decision process that resulted in approval of
capability-based designs for both facilities, multiple alternatives
were considered for meeting mission needs. Both project teams are
currently working to achieve 90 percent design maturity in FY 2012.
NNSA will conduct independent cost reviews before setting the
performance baselines for cost and schedule in 2013.
Ms. Sanchez. What are the projected operation and management costs
of CMRR and UPF?
Mr. D'Agostino. For UPF: The projected total 50 year operational
period cost of operations and maintenance and the average annual costs
for the Uranium Processing Facility expressed in 2011 dollars are:
Total Cost Over 50 Years Average Annual Cost Over 50 Years
Operations $4,693,000K $93,800K
Maintenance $1,761,000K $34,900K
For CMRR: The projected total 50 year operational period cost of
operations and maintenance and the average annual costs for the
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility Replacement including the
radiological laboratory/utility/office building expressed in 2011
dollars are:
Total Cost Over 50 Years Average Annual Cost Over 50 Years
Operations $4,500,000K $90,000K
Maintenance $1,800,000K $35,000K
Ms. Sanchez. What are the costs of decontamination and
decommissioning of the CMRR and UPF, and are these costs included in
the cost estimates for these facilities? Why/why not?
Mr. D'Agostino. Since CMRR and UPF are planned to operate for 50
years, the future costs of decontamination and decommissioning (D&D) of
CMRR and UPF have not been determined.
As reflected in the Construction Project Data Sheet for CMRR in the
President's FY 2012 Congressional Budget request, the initial pre-
conceptual cost estimate range for D&D of the existing CMR facility is
approximately $200M-$350M in non-escalated FY 2004 dollars.
As reflected in the Construction Project Data Sheet for UPF in the
President's FY 2012 Congressional Budget request, the D&D of Building
9212 is included as part of the Integrated Facility Disposition Project
proposed by the Office of Environmental Management to dispose of legacy
facilities at Y-12 and Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Buildings 9215,
9998, and 9204-2E are being evaluated for further consolidation of non-
Special Nuclear Material manufacturing functions. Since these buildings
will not be immediately excess to program needs when UPF becomes
operational, NNSA has no near term D&D plans for these facilities.
Ms. Sanchez. Are we taking the necessary steps to build
verification requirements into the CMRR and UPF facility designs to
preserve flexibility for future arms control agreements?
Mr. D'Agostino. While designs for CMRR and UPF are flexible,
specific verification requirements of future agreements are unknown.
The UPF facility design has been evaluated and determined to have an
appropriate level of transparency within the ongoing design to
accommodate expected activities related to our treaty obligations. UPF
can accommodate access, and appropriate areas for monitoring and
measuring of fissile material for inspection teams. The CMRR Nuclear
Facility is not considered a production facility and is not anticipated
to be subject to routine inspections.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS
Mr. Franks. Under Secretary Tauscher, during the November 2nd
hearing you mentioned the EPAA is based on the SM-3 interceptor,
implying the EPAA is comprised of proven systems; as you and I know,
Phases II through IV of the EPAA will use new missiles and are
experiencing technical difficulties. Indeed, the SM-3 Block IIB
missile, slotted for phase IV of the EPAA, was entirely zeroed out by
the SAC-D due its technical challenges and to devote more money to the
SM-3 IB and IIA since they are also having challenges. It is also
perplexing to assert the EPAA will be less expensive than the previous
missile defense plan in Europe. The Missile Defense Agency currently
does not have an estimate as to how much the EPAA will ultimately cost
the U.S.; moreover, if the EPAA fails to deploy an effective SM-3 Block
IIB, or GBIs as a hedge in the event Iran succeeds in developing an
effective ICBM, the entire plan will fall woefully short of what the
original plan was primarily supposed to do--provide added protection of
the U.S. homeland. If the EPAA isn't even going to provide the same
coverage of the U.S. as the original plan, than it makes no sense to
compare their costs. In light of the these facts, please provide
specific evidence supporting your statement that President Obama's
approach to missile defense uses ``proven systems at a lower cost than
the previous proposal.'' I have seen no evidence to support your
statement, which causes concern for the viability of the entire EPAA.
Secretary Tauscher. The EPAA includes a number of elements such as
the SM-3 interceptor, the Aegis SPY-1 radar, and the AN/TPY-2 radar.
The current version of the SM-3, the SM-3 Block IA, is deployed with
the fleet today. The Aegis SPY-1 radar has been deployed on U.S.
warships for over 30 years, and AN/TPY-2 radars have been deployed and
operated in Japan and Israel for a number of years.
One element of the basis for the statement is that the Standard
Missile (SM)-3, at around $10 million per interceptor, is much cheaper
than a GBI, which costs approximately $60 to $70 million per
interceptor. This means that we can deploy many more SM-3 interceptors
than GBIs at the same cost. Since Iran already possesses hundreds of
short- and medium-range ballistic missiles, this additional defensive
capability is critical. In addition, the EPAA relies on capabilities
that are mobile and relocatable, so additional capabilities can
``surge'' into the region in a crisis.
It is important to note that the EPAA is not an acquisition program
but a policy framework for delivering capabilities of which the
principal attribute is flexibility. By design, it can adapt to changes
in threats and available technologies.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LAMBORN
Mr. Lamborn. Dr. Miller, in response to a question during this
subcommittee's March 31, 2011 hearing on the budget for missile defense
programs, your deputy, Dr. Brad Roberts stated, ``The Administration is
considering additional steps to strengthen the U.S. hedge posture . . .
we are evaluating the deployment timelines associated with fielding
additional capabilities . . . we have committed to brief the Committee
on the results of this work . . . once it is complete.'' And, you Dr.
Miller, during this subcommittee's March 2 hearing, stated ``the
Department is in the process of finalizing and refining its hedge
strategy, and we will be pleased to brief this subcommittee on the
results in a classified setting when it is complete.'' Dr. Miller, here
we are eight months later and the Department has not released its
hedging strategy. When can we expect to see it?
Dr. Miller. The analysis conducted for the hedge strategy is
informing the budget decisions under consideration as part of the
development of the Department's fiscal year 2013 budget request. The
Department will ensure that Congress is briefed on the results of the
hedge strategy in early 2013.
Mr. Lamborn. Do you agree with Secretary Gates who said at the
Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore in June, ``With the continued
development of long-range missiles and potentially a road-mobile
intercontinental ballistic missile and their continued development of
nuclear weapons, North Korea is in the process of becoming a direct
threat to the United States.'' And two weeks later he said, ``North
Korea now constitutes a direct threat to the United States. The
president told [China's] President Hu that last year. They are
developing a road-mobile ICBM. I never would have dreamed they would go
to a road-mobile before testing a static ICBM. It's a huge problem. As
we've found out in a lot of places, finding mobile missiles is very
tough.'' Do you concur with Secretary Gates' statements? Was the
question of a North Korean road-mobile missile factored in to the
decision in 2009 to abandon the Third Site and the deployment of 44
ground based interceptors at the missile fields at Fort Greely and
Vandenberg Air Force Base? If North Korea begins fielding an array of
road mobile ICBMs, and if they proliferate this technology to Iran and
other countries as in the past, what does such activity do to current
judgments about the adequacy of the current inventory of GBIs?
Dr. Miller. I agree with Secretary Gates' assessment that North
Korea constitutes a direct threat to the United States, as it does to
our South Korean and Japanese allies. North Korea's nuclear ambitions
and continued development of long-range missiles remain a primary focus
of the development and deployment of the Ballistic Missile Defense
System (BMDS). The capabilities developed and deployed as part of the
integrated BMDS protect the United States from the potential emergence
of an ICBM threat from Iran or North Korea. To maintain this
advantageous position, the Administration is taking steps to improve
the protection of the homeland from the potential ICBM threat posed by
Iran and North Korea. These steps include the continued procurement of
ground-based interceptors (GBIs), the deployment of additional sensors,
and upgrades to the Command, Control, Battle Management, and
Communications system. Improvements to the Ground-based Midcourse
Defense (GMD) system, in particular, will better protect the United
States against future ICBM threats, whether from Iran, North Korea, or
other regional actors.
In the future, if projections regarding Iran or North Korea change
significantly, then the United States should reassess its baseline
program and consider implementing some elements of our hedge posture.
Mr. Lamborn. This summer, when asked about the consequence of cuts
to NNSA's modernization program, Secretary Gates said: ``This
modernization program was very carefully worked out between ourselves
and the . . . Department of Energy. And, frankly, where we came out on
that also, I think, played a fairly significant role in the willingness
of the Senate to ratify the New START agreement. So the risks are to
our own program in terms of being able to extend the life of our weapon
systems . . . this modernization project is, in my view, both from a
security and a political standpoint, really important.'' Do you agree
with Secretary Gates that the modernization project is very important
both from a national security standpoint and from a perspective of
sustaining support for the New START Treaty? What are the consequences
of not funding the ``very carefully worked out'' plan for NNSA
modernization?
Dr. Miller. I agree with Secretary Gates that NNSA's modernization
is very important to U.S. national security. The nuclear security
enterprise remains, today and for the foreseeable future, the
foundation of the U.S. deterrence strategy and defense posture. The
Administration is committed to making the investments necessary to
recapitalize the U.S. nuclear complex and to ensure we have the highly
skilled personnel needed to maintain our nuclear capabilities.
With the passing of the Budget Control Act (BCA), we now face new
fiscal realities. These fiscal realities do not weaken our commitment
to the safety, security, and effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent,
but they must inform our path forward. The Administration is working to
develop an FY13 budget request for NNSA that reflects these fiscal
realities, but funds the core elements of the nuclear complex and meets
military requirements.
Without adequate funding for NNSA, the nuclear weapons life
extension programs, nuclear infrastructure, and the retention of the
people on which we depend to maintain a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear arsenal would be at risk. Congressional participation in this
process and commitment to continuing investments in these programs and
capabilities is critical to the future health of our nuclear deterrent.
Mr. Lamborn. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review says that, ``by
modernizing our aging nuclear facilities and investing in human
capital, we can substantially reduce the number of nuclear weapons we
retain as a hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise.'' It goes
on to say that these modernization ``investments are essential to
facilitating reductions while sustaining deterrence under New START and
beyond.'' If we do not carry out the modernization program, what is
your military opinion of the risks associated with nuclear stockpile
reductions?
General Kehler. Modernization and investment in our aging nuclear
facilities and human capital are important to the sustainment of our
nuclear weapons, the dismantlement of retired weapons and other non-
proliferation activities. There are increased risks if the
modernization program is not executed and it is an important
consideration in reducing the stockpile. I believe successful life
extension programs are critical to strategic deterrence.
Mr. Lamborn. This summer, when asked about the consequence of cuts
to NNSA's modernization program, Secretary Gates said: ``This
modernization program was very carefully worked out between ourselves
and the . . . Department of Energy. And, frankly, where we came out on
that also, I think, played a fairly significant role in the willingness
of the Senate to ratify the New START agreement. So the risks are to
our own program in terms of being able to extend the life of our weapon
systems . . . this modernization project is, in my view, both from a
security and a political standpoint, really important.'' Do you agree
with Secretary Gates that the modernization project is very important
both from a national security standpoint and from a perspective of
sustaining support for the New START Treaty? What are the consequences
of not funding the ``very carefully worked out'' plan for NNSA
modernization?
General Kehler. I agree the nation must recapitalize its nuclear
capabilities as all of our nuclear weapon systems and facilities are
``aged'' and require investment in the upcoming decades. The fiscal
environment demands that we prioritize and synchronize the various
platform, weapon and infrastructure modernization activities.
Inadequate funding undermines our ability to provide a credible
deterrent force to assure allies and respond appropriately, as directed
by the President, if deterrence fails.
Mr. Lamborn. This summer, when asked about the consequence of cuts
to NNSA's modernization program, Secretary Gates said: ``This
modernization program was very carefully worked out between ourselves
and the . . . Department of Energy. And, frankly, where we came out on
that also, I think, played a fairly significant role in the willingness
of the Senate to ratify the New START agreement. So the risks are to
our own program in terms of being able to extend the life of our weapon
systems . . . this modernization project is, in my view, both from a
security and a political standpoint, really important.'' Do you agree
with Secretary Gates that the modernization project is very important
both from a national security standpoint and from a perspective of
sustaining support for the New START Treaty? What are the consequences
of not funding the ``very carefully worked out'' plan for NNSA
modernization?
Secretary Tauscher. Yes. A credible and affordable modernization
plan is necessary to sustain the nuclear infrastructure and support our
nation's deterrent. NNSA will continue to update and improve the exact
details of these modernization plans as it completes the designs and
analyzes the infrastructure needed to support the stockpile. The
programs and capabilities of our long-term modernization plans for the
nuclear infrastructure remain important both from a national security
standpoint and from a perspective of sustaining support for the New
START Treaty.
Mr. Lamborn. This summer, when asked about the consequence of cuts
to NNSA's modernization program, Secretary Gates said: ``This
modernization program was very carefully worked out between ourselves
and the . . . Department of Energy. And, frankly, where we came out on
that also, I think, played a fairly significant role in the willingness
of the Senate to ratify the New START agreement. So the risks are to
our own program in terms of being able to extend the life of our weapon
systems . . . this modernization project is, in my view, both from a
security and a political standpoint, really important.'' Do you agree
with Secretary Gates that the modernization project is very important
both from a national security standpoint and from a perspective of
sustaining support for the New START Treaty? What are the consequences
of not funding the ``very carefully worked out'' plan for NNSA
modernization?
Mr. D'Agostino. We agree that modernization is important and we
urge the Congress to provide funding. The consequence for not funding
the NNSA modernization plan is increased risk to the long-term
maintenance of the U.S. stockpile and deterrence in general. The plan
for modernization of the complex was carefully crafted through
concerted interaction between the Departments of Energy and Defense. It
was based on national strategic planning outlined in the April 2010
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). This stockpile planning has been
carefully formulated in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
(SSMP) as a flow of complex activities over the next two decades. In
some cases, decreases in funding would risk cessation or reduction of
key activities (such as certain complex experiments and nuclear
component manufacturing). Additional analysis will be undertaken, often
in consultation with the Department of Defense, to minimize or
eliminate such risks.
The New START Treaty is an important part of our security strategy
and provides transparency and stability between the world's two major
nuclear powers and will remain in our interest as long as we face
nuclear challenges.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BROOKS
Mr. Brooks. Dr. Miller, as you know, this committee has been
concerned about what a U.S.-Russia missile defense agreement negotiated
by the Obama Administration might look like. Specifically, the
provision I authored in this year's national defense authorization act
would prohibit the exchange of sensitive missile defense sensor data
and technology, such as our hit-to-kill technology. I note that the
Administration expressed concern about this provision but it did not
rise to the level of a veto threat. Several weeks ago, the Russian
newspaper Kommersant published a report that a heretofore secret
agreement tabled by Ms. Tauscher--I say secret because nothing about
this ``agreement'' was briefed to Congress--with her Russian
counterpart that President Obama actually had to reject. Surely, as a
former congressional staffer, Dr. Miller, you understand that the
Congress has a vital oversight function. In the absence of transparency
by the Administration, the Congress has no choice but to resort to
legislative provisions such as the amendment I offered. Would you
please provide us get a copy of that draft agreement? It appears that
now it is even circulating in the Russian press.
Dr. Miller. The Administration is committed to keeping Congress
informed of its missile defense efforts. The Administration is
currently pursuing a political framework with the Russian Federation
that could open the way for practical cooperation with Russia on
missile defense. There are a variety of ways to establish such a
political framework; no agreement has been reached on the content or
format of any such framework to date. Any finalized statement will be
shared with Congress. The Administration has been clear that it will
not agree to any constraints or limitations on U.S. and NATO missile
defense systems. As such, any political framework we reach with the
Russian Federation would not be a legally binding agreement. I have
passed your specific request to the Department of State.
Mr. Brooks. Ms. Tauscher, as you know, this committee has been
concerned about what a U.S.-Russia missile defense agreement negotiated
by the Obama Administration might look like. Specifically, the
provision I authored in this year's national defense authorization act
would prohibit the exchange of sensitive missile defense sensor data
and technology, such as our hit-to-kill technology. I note that the
Administration expressed concern about this provision but it did not
rise to the level of a veto threat. Several weeks ago, the Russian
newspaper Kommersant published a report that a heretofore secret
agreement tabled by you--I say secret because nothing about this
``agreement'' was briefed to Congress--with your Russian counterpart
that President Obama actually had to reject. Surely, as a former Member
of Congress, you understand that the Congress has a vital oversight
function. In the absence of transparency by the Administration, the
Congress has no choice but to resort to legislative provisions such as
the amendment I offered. Would you please provide us get a copy of that
draft agreement? It appears that now it is even circulating in the
Russian press.
Secretary Tauscher. The Administration is committed to keeping
Congress informed of its missile defense efforts. We have provided
numerous senior level briefings to the Congress on our efforts to
cooperate with Russia on missile defense. The most recent briefing for
this Committee was held on December 21, 2011. The Administration is
currently pursuing a political framework that would open the way for
practical cooperation with Russia on missile defense. There are a
variety of ways to establish such a political framework. No agreement
has been reached on the content, and no decision has been made on a
format. The political framework would not be a legally binding
agreement. Any finalized statement will be shared with Congress. The
Administration has been clear that it will not agree to any constraints
limiting the development or deployment of U.S. and NATO missile defense
systems.
Mr. Brooks. The State Department has been negotiating a Defense
Technology Cooperation Agreement (DTCA) with Russia since the beginning
of the Obama Administration, but a copy of a draft of that agreement
has never been shared with this committee or anywhere in the Congress
as far as I am aware. Ms. Tauscher, by refusing to share this draft
document with the Congress, it appears that the Administration seems to
trust the Russians more than Congress.
a. Can you help us resolve this situation? Can you make clear for
the members of this subcommittee whether the United States will share
with the Russian Federation telemetric information on U.S. missile
defense interceptor or target vehicles? Do you understand why the House
passed my amendment prohibiting the sharing of ``sensitive'' missile
defense information with the Russians when we can't even see what
you're offering them? This is not the only concern, with such
information sharing, but it is a weighty one. Are you willing to share
any classified U.S. missile defense technology with Russia? What
classified information is Russia willing to share with us?
b. Perhaps most distressing is talk of guarantees for Russia
concerning our missile defenses. Ms. Tauscher, can you please tell us
the Administration position concerning missile defense agreements and
guarantees for Russia? What of NATO guarantees? We are told that the
United States may outsource to NATO, perhaps at the May 2012 Chicago
NATO Summit, political guarantees to Russia about our missile defenses.
Is that something you and the State Department would support? Regarding
the guarantees the Obama Administration is willing to provide, would
you see any reason a future Administration wouldn't be able to just
walk away from the guarantees the Obama Administration is willing to
provide, would you see any reason a future Administration wouldn't be
able to just walk away from the guarantee you're offering? Would there
be geopolitical costs to doing so? Two weeks ago, in the news clips
distributed to members of this committee, where was a press report
concerning Russia's S-500 ICBM-killer missile defense system. Why is so
much time spent addressing Russian concerns about our missile defense
system with regards to their deterrent when never a peep is heard about
the extensive Russian missile defense system and is implications for
the U.S. deterrent?
Secretary Tauscher. a. The Department of Defense is negotiating a
DTCA with Russia. Such negotiations have been ongoing since initiated
during the Bush Administration in 2004. We will not provide Russia with
sensitive information about our missile defense systems that would in
any way compromise our national security. For example, hit-to-kill
technology and interceptor telemetry will not, under any circumstances,
be provided to Russia.
However, in the event that the exchange of classified information
with Russia on missile defense will increase the President's ability to
defend the American people, U.S. deployed forces, allies, and partners,
the President will retain the right to do so. These factors are the
same ones that motivated the last Administration to have determined
that some classified information exchange with Russia on missile
defense would benefit the United States.
In those circumstances where an exchange of sensitive data with
Russia would benefit the national security of the United States, the
Administration will only do so contingent on an agreement regarding
information handling and protection, including the prohibition of
access to such information by third parties. Additionally, any Russian
access to classified information would be strictly governed by U.S.
National Disclosure Policy and other applicable laws, including a
determination that such exchange benefits the United States. The
President has also ordered us to closely consult with the appropriate
Members of Congress before the exchange of classified information with
Russia.
b. The Administration has consistently stated that it will not
agree to legally binding restrictions or limitations on U.S. or NATO
missile defenses. The Administration has stated, publicly and
privately, that the missile defense system being established in Europe
is not directed against Russia. The Administration is prepared to put
the same statement in writing as part of a political framework that
would open the way for practical cooperation with Russia on missile
defense. There are a variety of ways to establish such a political
framework. No agreement has been reached on the content, and no
decision has been made on a format. The political framework would not
be a legally binding agreement. The Administration would also support,
in coordination with and subject to agreement by all Allies, such a
statement by NATO.
With Russia, the Administration is pursuing an agenda aimed at
bringing the strategic military postures of our two countries into
alignment with our post-Cold War relationship--no longer enemies, no
significant prospect of war between us, and cooperating when mutually
advantageous. Therefore, Russia is not the focus of U.S. BMD.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY DR. FLEMING
Dr. Fleming. When will the New START force structure be determined?
When does it need to be determined in order to achieve implementation
not later than February 2017? Specifically, with respect to potential
strategic force reductions under New START:
a. Are the full costs of eliminating, converting from deployed to
non-deployed, and converting to non-nuclear status DOD systems known by
the Department?
b. If the Navy and STRATCOM are comfortable with 192 launchers on
12 SSBN-X submarines based on the assumption that New START levels will
be those required in 2027 and beyond, meaning 48 fewer launchers than
suggested for the submarine-based deterrent in the original 1251 plan,
what other reductions are needed to the ICBM and bomber legs to comply
with the New START limits?
Dr. Miller. To date, no final decisions have been made with respect
to future force structure or the modernization plans for nuclear
delivery systems; such decisions will be informed by the
Administration's ongoing Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Implementation
Study. These decisions will be consistent with the goals of the NPR,
including maintaining strategic stability, providing assurance to our
Allies and partners regarding the credibility of the U.S. nuclear
umbrella and other security commitments, and maintaining a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
The final costs of implementing New START Treaty will be dependent
on decisions concerning the future force structure, conversion and
elimination procedures, facility requirements for supporting
inspections or conversion and elimination procedures, and possibly the
development of additional inspection equipment. Although the NPR
provided certain recommendations concerning force structure, it did not
specify a New START Treaty-compliant structure nor set the schedule for
its implementation, aside from a seven-year implementation period of
the Treaty. Costs will also be dependent on the procedures that are
selected for the conversion or elimination of U.S. strategic offensive
arms. The Treaty provides the flexibility for the United States to
decide what conversion or elimination procedures are most suitable
given its strategic requirements.
Dr. Fleming. One of the binding conditions (condition 9(B)) of the
Senate's Resolution of Ratification for the New START Treaty says: ``If
appropriations are enacted that fail to meet the resource requirements
set forth in the President's 10-year [Section 1251] plan . . . the
President shall submit to Congress, within 60 days of such enactment .
. . a report detailing--(1) how the President proposes to remedy the
resource shortfall; (2) if additional resources are required, the
proposed level of funding required and an identification of the
stockpile work, campaign, facility, site, asset, program, operation,
activity, construction, or project for which additional funds are
required; (3) the impact of the resource shortfall on the safety,
reliability, and performance of United States nuclear forces; and (4)
whether and why, in the changed circumstances brought about by the
resource shortfall, it remains in the national interest of the United
States to remain a Party to the New START Treaty.''
a. Administrator D'Agostino, General Kehler, and Dr. Miller: Which
of you is responsible for this report? Has the President delegated his
responsibility on this requirement from the Resolution of Ratification?
b. The current continuing resolution funds NNSA's modernization
plans well-below the FY12 levels laid out in the 1251 plan--essentially
at a level 1.5% below FY11. Is the administration preparing a report
for submission to Congress per this requirement? Please submit such a
report, in writing, prior to the expiration of the current CR.
c. If the funding levels for Weapons Activities in the Energy and
Water appropriations bills in the House and Senate are enacted, or if
sequestration or a budget deal results in funding for Weapons
Activities less than that laid out in the Section 1251 plan, will the
administration submit a report per this binding condition?
Dr. Miller. The President has not delegated his responsibility on
this requirement from the Resolution of Ratification. Should there be a
resource shortfall, DOD would expect to work closely with the National
Security Staff (NSS) and National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) in drafting the President's report specified in Condition 9(B)
of the Senate's Resolution of Ratification for the New START Treaty. At
this time, it would be inappropriate to assume that a resource
shortfall exists; the Administration continues to support full funding
in an Appropriations bill.
Dr. Fleming. When will the New START force structure be determined?
When does it need to be determined in order to achieve implementation
not later than February 2017? Specifically, with respect to potential
strategic force reductions under New START:
a. Are the full costs of eliminating, converting from deployed to
non-deployed, and converting to non-nuclear status DOD systems known by
the Department?
b. If the Navy and STRATCOM are comfortable with 192 launchers on
12 SSBN-X submarines based on the assumption that New START levels will
be those required in 2027 and beyond, meaning 48 fewer launchers than
suggested for the submarine-based deterrent in the original 1251 plan,
what other reductions are needed to the ICBM and bomber legs to comply
with the New START limits?
General Kehler. Discussions regarding final nuclear force structure
for New START are ongoing. Once a final force structure decision is
reached Services will be able to finalize costs to conduct any
necessary conversions, eliminations, and non-deployment of systems.
A. The Air Force and the Navy estimates of expected costs are based
on the force structure detailed in the current 1251 Report. Once a
decision has been made on a final force structure the Services will
refine estimates.
B. The Ohio Replacement SSBN will not enter strategic service until
after New START has expired. The future strategic environment and other
factors will ultimately determine future force structure requirements.
Dr. Fleming. General Kehler, as you know B-52 and B-2 bombers are
hardened to protect them from electromagnetic radiation in the event of
a nearby nuclear detonation.
a. Why is this hardening important in terms of STRATCOM's
operational construct?
b. Will the next generation bomber be nuclear-hardened as well?
c. Can STRATCOM estimate the additional developmental and life
cycle costs associated with hardening the next generation bomber?
d. General Kehler, you stated at a recent breakfast with the
Defense Writers Group (10-18-11) that the follow-on bomber ``has to be
long range.'' Can you please elaborate on the importance of this
concept? Also, can you describe what its combat payload will be
relative to our current heavy bombers, the B-52 and B-2?
e. Will it be nuclear certified from Initial Operational
Capability? If not, why?
f. Please describe in detail STRATCOM's requirements for warhead
modernization on the next ALCM, a.k.a., the long-range standoff
missile. Has STRATCOM performed an analysis of alternatives on warhead
options, and what the projected costs for each alternative are? Is the
W84 one of the alternatives being studied? If yes, do a sufficient
number of W84s exist in the enduring stockpile to fulfill the
requirement?
General Kehler. A. Bombers must be capable of operating in a
variety of environments, to include nuclear effects environments--
hardening directly supports bomber survivability and effectiveness,
underwriting deterrence and assurance.
B. Yes, USSTRATCOM has conveyed a requirement for a nuclear
hardened bomber to the Air Force.
C. The Air Force is not at a point in the development process that
would enable a detailed cost estimate for the new bomber. We anticipate
hardening to be a relatively small percentage of the overall cost, if
incorporated in initial designs.
D. Denying geographic sanctuary to potential adversaries is an
important aspect of deterrence. The new bomber must have sufficient
range to hold targets that adversaries value at risk. Trades concerning
specific capabilities e.g. payload and range, are being evaluated.
E. The new bomber will be nuclear capable, but nuclear
certification timeline decisions have yet to be made.
F. The next ALCM requires a safe, secure and effective warhead. The
Air Force is conducting an analysis of alternatives including a
specific working group with USSTRATCOM representatives to examine
warhead alternatives, including the W84. The alternatives will require
varying investments; however, a detailed concept and cost study has not
been started. There are not enough W84 assets to field a cruise missile
replacement at current ALCM levels.
Dr. Fleming. General Kehler, please explain in detail why the B61
LEP is important to the bomber leg of our strategic deterrent.
General Kehler. The B61 is an important part of DOD's long range
planning to ensure the bomber leg of the strategic deterrent remains
credible. The B61 LEP will provide a refurbished weapon capable of
being employed on the B-2 and integrated with a future bomber.
Additionally, the B61 nuclear package will be evaluated for
incorporation into a future stand-off missile.
Dr. Fleming. One of the binding conditions (condition 9(B)) of the
Senate's Resolution of Ratification for the New START Treaty says: ``If
appropriations are enacted that fail to meet the resource requirements
set forth in the President's 10-year [Section 1251] plan . . . the
President shall submit to Congress, within 60 days of such enactment .
. . a report detailing--(1) how the President proposes to remedy the
resource shortfall; (2) if additional resources are required, the
proposed level of funding required and an identification of the
stockpile work, campaign, facility, site, asset, program, operation,
activity, construction, or project for which additional funds are
required; (3) the impact of the resource shortfall on the safety,
reliability, and performance of United States nuclear forces; and (4)
whether and why, in the changed circumstances brought about by the
resource shortfall, it remains in the national interest of the United
States to remain a Party to the New START Treaty.''
a. Administrator D'Agostino, General Kehler, and Dr. Miller: Which
of you is responsible for this report? Has the President delegated his
responsibility on this requirement from the Resolution of Ratification?
b. The current continuing resolution funds NNSA's modernization
plans well-below the FY12 levels laid out in the 1251 plan--essentially
at a level 1.5% below FY11. Is the administration preparing a report
for submission to Congress per this requirement? Please submit such a
report, in writing, prior to the expiration of the current CR.
c. If the funding levels for Weapons Activities in the Energy and
Water appropriations bills in the House and Senate are enacted, or if
sequestration or a budget deal results in funding for Weapons
Activities less than that laid out in the Section 1251 plan, will the
administration submit a report per this binding condition?
General Kehler. A number of agencies are responsible for inputs to,
and review of the report, including USSTRATCOM. The President has not
yet delegated his responsibility on this requirement from the
Resolution of Ratification, but USSTRATCOM stands ready to assist as
needed.
Dr. Fleming. Ms. Tauscher, please explain in detail why the B61 LEP
is important to our allies.
Secretary Tauscher. The B61 life extension program (LEP) will
ensure its functionality with the dual capable aircraft as well as
ensure continued confidence in the warhead's safety, security, and
effectiveness. The B61 LEP will ensure that the United States maintains
the capability to forward deploy U.S. nonstrategic nuclear weapons to
Europe in support of its Alliance commitments and that our arsenal is
safe, secure, and effective. The decision to conduct a B61 LEP does not
presume the results of future decisions within NATO about the
requirements of nuclear deterrence and nuclear sharing, but keeps all
options open.
Likewise, the B61 plays a significant role in assuring our allies
in Asia. As you know, as a result of our Nuclear Posture Review, the
United States will retire the TLAM-N. That decision was made after
close consultation with our allies, during which we assured them that
there would be no diminution of our extended deterrence commitment and
capabilities. The B61 is an important component of those capabilities.
Dr. Fleming. Mr. D'Agostino, please explain in detail why the B61
LEP is needed, both for the extended deterrent in Europe and to the
bomber leg of the U.S. TRIAD.
Mr. D'Agostino. The B61 Life Extension Program (LEP) supports the
sustainment of the U.S. strategic and non-strategic nuclear capability.
Consistent with U.S. commitments to the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and the findings of the 2010 Nuclear Posture
Review, the B61 LEP will ensure the U.S. retains its capability to
forward-deploy non-strategic nuclear weapons in support of its Alliance
commitments. Furthermore, it is a key component of the air-delivered
strategic deterrent and ensures continued contribution of the bomber
leg of the Triad to nuclear deterrence.
The B61 bomb is one of the oldest warheads in the stockpile and has
components dating from the 1960's, such as vacuum tube radars. The B61
LEP provides the opportunity to include modern safety and security
technologies, sustain system effectiveness, optimize NNSA production
capacity, and reduce costs over the long-term.
Dr. Fleming. One of the binding conditions (condition 9(B)) of the
Senate's Resolution of Ratification for the New START Treaty says: ``If
appropriations are enacted that fail to meet the resource requirements
set forth in the President's 10-year [Section 1251] plan . . . the
President shall submit to Congress, within 60 days of such enactment .
. . a report detailing--(1) how the President proposes to remedy the
resource shortfall; (2) if additional resources are required, the
proposed level of funding required and an identification of the
stockpile work, campaign, facility, site, asset, program, operation,
activity, construction, or project for which additional funds are
required; (3) the impact of the resource shortfall on the safety,
reliability, and performance of United States nuclear forces; and (4)
whether and why, in the changed circumstances brought about by the
resource shortfall, it remains in the national interest of the United
States to remain a Party to the New START Treaty.''
a. Administrator D'Agostino, General Kehler, and Dr. Miller: Which
of you is responsible for this report? Has the President delegated his
responsibility on this requirement from the Resolution of Ratification?
b. The current continuing resolution funds NNSA's modernization
plans well-below the FY12 levels laid out in the 1251 plan--essentially
at a level 1.5% below FY11. Is the administration preparing a report
for submission to Congress per this requirement? Please submit such a
report, in writing, prior to the expiration of the current CR.
c. If the funding levels for Weapons Activities in the Energy and
Water appropriations bills in the House and Senate are enacted, or if
sequestration or a budget deal results in funding for Weapons
Activities less than that laid out in the Section 1251 plan, will the
administration submit a report per this binding condition?
Mr. D'Agostino. The main responsibility for this report lies with
the Department of Defense. Should there be a resource shortfall, NNSA
would work closely with the DOD in drafting the President's report
specified in Condition 9(B) of the Senate's Resolution of Advice and
Consent to Ratification for the New START Treaty.
While we recognize that fiscal austerity will constrain spending on
national security programs in the years ahead, our strategic and
extended deterrence will continue to be the top priority. The President
committed to modernizing our nuclear weapons and infrastructure after
completion of the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review--including a commitment
to pursue these programs and capabilities for as long as he is
President. Even in this difficult budget climate, the President's
budget for NNSA continues to consistently reflect those commitments.
The Department of Defense contributed significantly to the
preparation of NNSA's budget requests for FY2011 and FY2012, and is
prepared to continue support at least through FY2016. These
contributions are reflective of the close linkage between NNSA's
nuclear weapons programs and the specific needs of its partner, the
Department of Defense. Without adequate funding for NNSA, however, the
nuclear weapons life extension programs, nuclear infrastructure
modernization, and the retention of the people on which we depend to
maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal, may be at risk
and will continue to be analyzed in consultation with the Department of
Defense.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. SCOTT
Mr. Scott. How is deterring China different from deterring Russia?
a. How is providing extended deterrence in Europe different than
doing so in East Asia?
b. During a recent Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing on the
nuclear weapons programs of Russia and the People's Republic of China,
Dr. Mark Schneider stated:
``We know a lot less about China overall than we know about the
Russians in nuclear capability, if for no other reason that the
Russians talk about it all the time, where the Chinese are fairly
secretive. I think you can find deliberate leaks by the PLA in Hong
Kong Press. I think they are using that as a mechanism of debating some
issues that they can't openly debate in China. But I suspect we are
going to see a very large increase in Chinese capability, including
extensive MIRVing.''
How do we hedge the uncertainty in our understanding of China's
nuclear weapons program? How will this be reflected in the
Administration's mini-NPR on nuclear weapons targeting? Why do you
think China has a large underground tunnel complex for its second
artillery?
Dr. Miller. Fundamentally, deterrence requires that, in the
calculations of any potential adversary, the perceived gains of
attacking the United States or its allies and partners would be far
outweighed by the unacceptable costs of the response. But in seeking to
deter potential adversaries, there is no ``one size fits all''
approach. The requirements of deterrence vary by circumstance,
including the capabilities of the adversary, the nature of the issue in
dispute, and the ability and willingness of the adversary to escalate--
and to exercise restraint. Uncertainty is an enduring feature of the
deterrence equation, though the United States makes a priority of
trying to reduce such uncertainty with detailed assessments of the
intentions and capabilities of potential adversaries. Uncertainty about
the potential future nuclear weapons capabilities of other states is
also an enduring theme of U.S. deterrence policy. Every President in
the nuclear era has sought to have some capacity to respond to a
significant erosion of the nuclear security environment. The United
States hedges against such uncertainty by ensuring that it has the
technical means to cope with geopolitical surprise, with a mix of
short-term responses (such as the potential to up-load existing weapons
onto existing delivery systems) and long-term responses (the production
and deployment of new capabilities). The requirements of this hedge are
one of the many elements in review in the NPR Implementation Study.
China's large underground tunnel complex fits well with China's
overall military strategy. It enables China to conceal capabilities, in
a manner consistent with its general lack of transparency. And it helps
to ensure that its leadership and any hidden capabilities survive
attack.
Providing extended deterrence to Allies in NATO and in East Asia is
similar in some ways and different in others. It is similar in a) an
appropriate mix of nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities; b) a
combination of capability and credibility to effectively deter
potential adversaries and assure Allies; c) appropriate consultations
between the United States and Allies; and d) adjustments over time to
account for changes in the security environment.
Providing extended deterrence to Allies in NATO and in East Asia is
different in several respects, including: a) different mutual
expectations about the specific modalities of nuclear deployments, as
reflected in differing historical practices; and b) different
assessments of the specific requirements for deterring potential
adversaries.
Mr. Scott. Some budget cutting proposals that are circulating have
suggested significantly reducing the size of our intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) force to save money. For instance, eliminating
one-third of the ICBM force by cutting one of the three wings.
a. Does the New START Treaty require us to close down an entire
ICBM wing to meet its deployed strategic launcher limit? What about
eliminating a squadron?
i. Would such a cut amount to a unilateral reduction in delivery
vehicles?
ii. Is such a reduction being considered in the 90-day NPR
Implementation Study?
b. Based on the most recent public data released as part of a New
START Treaty data exchange, if we were to eliminate 150 ICBMs this
would be more than enough to put us below the 700 deployed strategic
launchers limit. Would we then retain all of our forces in the other
legs of the triad, to remain at or near the New START limit?
c. Please describe when de-MIRVing of our ICBMs will begin to occur
under the 2010 NPR. Please describe when DOD intends to have that
process and completed, how much it will cost, and how the skill set
required to upload in the event that is necessary will be maintained.
Dr. Miller. The New START Treaty does not require the United States
to reduce any specific element of its strategic forces. To date, no
final decisions have been made with respect to future strategic nuclear
force structure; such decisions will be informed by the
Administration's ongoing NPR implementation study.
The elimination of 150 deployed ICBMs, if that were to be decided
(and to respond to your specific conjecture) would allow the United
States to retain all or virtually all of its current deployed strategic
forces in the other legs of the Triad under the limits of the New START
Treaty. Force structure decisions will be consistent with the goals of
the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), including maintaining strategic
stability, providing assurance to our Allies and partners of the
credibility of the U.S. nuclear umbrella and other security
commitments, and maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
deterrent. I expect a final decision regarding the specific force mix
for New START Treaty implementation to be made following the conclusion
of the NPR implementation study in the near term.
The ``de-MIRVing'' (reduction of Multiple Independent Reentry
Vehicle capability) of our ICBM forces has already begun. In order to
maximize safety and security, we have allowed the Air Force to begin
de-MIRVing ICBMs in conjunction with its previously established
maintenance plans. This minimizes disruption to our operational forces
and is the most cost-effective method for carrying out the NPR guidance
to de-MIRV the ICBM force.
Mr. Scott. How is deterring China different from deterring Russia?
a. How is providing extended deterrence in Europe different than
doing so in East Asia?
b. During a recent Strategic Forces Subcommittee hearing on the
nuclear weapons programs of Russia and the People's Republic of China,
Dr. Mark Schneider stated:
``We know a lot less about China overall than we know about the
Russians in nuclear capability, if for no other reason that the
Russians talk about it all the time, where the Chinese are fairly
secretive. I think you can find deliberate leaks by the PLA in Hong
Kong Press. I think they are using that as a mechanism of debating some
issues that they can't openly debate in China. But I suspect we are
going to see a very large increase in Chinese capability, including
extensive MIRVing.''
How do we hedge the uncertainty in our understanding of China's
nuclear weapons program? How will this be reflected in the
Administration's mini-NPR on nuclear weapons targeting? Why do you
think China has a large underground tunnel complex for its second
artillery?
General Kehler. The primary difference in how extended deterrence
is provided today is that in Europe we have forward deployed non-
strategic nuclear capabilities and robust nuclear burden sharing
commitments with our NATO allies. We do not have forward deployed non-
strategic nuclear capabilities in East Asia.
In general we hedge against uncertainty, both geopolitical and
technical, by retention of non-deployed warheads in the stockpile in
order to provide the ability to increase warhead loading on our
existing nuclear systems, and through our infrastructure's ability to
diagnose and repair weapons that develop technical problems. Today,
this hedge relies more heavily on the stockpile, but as our
infrastructure is modernized it will assume a larger share of the
required capability. The ongoing follow-on analysis to the NPR is
examining our hedge requirements.
Since the early 1950s, the PLA has employed underground tunnels to
protect and conceal its vital assets. These likely include both nuclear
and conventional missile forces.
Mr. Scott. Some budget cutting proposals that are circulating have
suggested significantly reducing the size of our intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) force to save money. For instance, eliminating
one-third of the ICBM force by cutting one of the three wings.
a. Does the New START Treaty require us to close down an entire
ICBM wing to meet its deployed strategic launcher limit? What about
eliminating a squadron?
i. Would such a cut amount to a unilateral reduction in delivery
vehicles?
ii. If we were to eliminate a third of our ICBM force, how would
you like to see our future SSBN force structured (number of boats,
number of tubes, etc.)? Are the size and makeup of the ICBM and SSBN
forces linked? How?
iii. Would you support such a cut? Have you done any analysis that
would support a cut of 150 ICBMs?
b. Based on the most recent public data released as part of a New
START Treaty data exchange, if we were to eliminate 150 ICBMs this
would be more than enough to put us below the 700 deployed strategic
launchers limit. Would we then retain all of our forces in the other
legs of the triad, to remain at or near the New START limit?
c. Please describe when de-MIRVing of our ICBMs will begin to occur
under the 2010 NPR. Please describe when DOD intends to have that
process and completed, how much it will cost, and how the skill set
required to upload in the event that is necessary will be maintained.
General Kehler. A. No, New START provides considerable flexibility
to manage the deployed force and meet strategic deterrent requirements
in a cost effective and safe manner over the duration of the treaty.
i. The treaty provides the flexibility to manage the deployed force
within central limits, not to exceed 700 deployed strategic delivery
vehicles (SDVs). My principle concern is ensuring the strategy
objectives are met and deterrence and stability are maintained while
ensuring we are as cost efficient as possible.
ii. Any decision to reduce Minuteman and subsequently change SSBN
and bomber force structures must be based on strategy. The size and
makeup of the SSBN and ICBM forces are complementary. Sufficient
ballistic missile capabilities must be retained to address strategy
requirements. Therefore, potential adjustments in Minuteman would
result in a reassessment of the entire force structure.
iii. Any adjustment to Minuteman must be strategy based. USSTRATCOM
is participating in the ongoing National Security Staff (NSS)-led
interagency activity and is providing analysis and military advice to
OSD and the Joint Staff. Any detailed discussion of that analysis and
potential implications to our current force structure is premature.
B. Not necessarily. I am concerned about meeting policy and
strategy objectives and maintaining deterrence and stability. New START
provides the U.S. considerable flexibility in determining the
composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms. New START
provides the option of retaining force structure, if required, and
deployed strategic launchers should be viewed as a ``ceiling'' not a
``floor,'' so we can meet our operational needs with flexibility.
C. We are working with the Air Force to develop plans to begin de-
MIRVing Minuteman in FY12. There are many factors that impact
completion date including integration with other maintenance activities
and weather. In the near-term, skills to accomplish re-MIRVing is not
an issue. I have asked the Air Force to develop long-term re-MIRVing
plans to include cost and skill set retention.
Mr. Scott. Under Secretary Tauscher, we hear the Russians are
placing certain conditions on starting any new arms control talks--in
other words, Russia is saying these conditions must be met before any
negotiations can begin on another arms control agreement. For instance,
we have heard that Russia is demanding that U.S. nuclear weapons be
removed from Europe, that we destroy the infrastructure in Europe that
supports those weapons so that they cannot be easily redeployed, and
that NATO allies cease training for the nuclear mission. Is this
correct? What other conditions is Russia saying must be met by the U.S.
before negotiations can begin? What conditions is the United States
saying must be met by Russia before negotiations can begin?
Secretary Tauscher. Some Russian officials have suggested that
several issues should be considered in future discussions, but whether
those suggestions amount to preconditions remains unclear. In regards
to tactical nuclear weapons, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov on March
1, 2011, stated at the UN Conference on Disarmament that the ``first
step'' towards reductions in these weapons should be the ``withdrawal
of tactical nuclear weapons to the territory of the State to which they
belong as well as removal of the infrastructure for their deployment
abroad.''
The United States rejects preconditions for discussions with Russia
to reduce nuclear weapons. The President has certified to the Senate
and the United States has made clear to the Russians that we seek to
initiate negotiations with the Russian Federation on an agreement to
address the disparity between the nonstrategic nuclear weapons
stockpiles of the Russian Federation and the United States and to
secure and reduce these weapons in a verifiable manner and that such
negotiations shall not include defensive missile systems. Indeed, the
United States is committed to continuing a step-by-step process, as
outlined by President Obama in Prague in 2009, to reduce the overall
number of nuclear weapons, including the pursuit of a future agreement
with Russia for broad reductions in all categories of nuclear weapons:
strategic, nonstrategic, deployed and nondeployed.
As a first step, we want to have a broad policy discussion with
Russia on stability, security, and confidence-building, which will help
lay the groundwork for eventual further nuclear arms reductions.
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