[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
IRAN AND SYRIA: NEXT STEPS
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
JUNE 23, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-45
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.foreignaffairs.house.gov/
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
TED POE, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DAVID RIVERA, Florida FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
VACANT
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
The Honorable John Bolton, senior fellow, American Enterprise
Institute for Public Policy Research (former U.S. permanent
representative to the United Nations and former Under Secretary
of State for Arms Control and International Security).......... 11
Mr. Olli Heinonen, senior fellow, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs, Harvard University (former deputy
director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency and
head of its Department of Safeguards).......................... 30
Mr. Robert Satloff, executive director, Washington Institute for
Near East Policy............................................... 38
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Florida, and chairman, Committee on Foreign
Affairs: Prepared statement.................................... 4
The Honorable John Bolton: Prepared statement.................... 13
Mr. Olli Heinonen: Prepared statement............................ 32
Mr. Robert Satloff: Prepared statement........................... 40
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 78
Hearing minutes.................................................. 79
The Honorable Gerald E. Connolly, a Representative in Congress
from the Commonwealth of Virginia: Prepared statement.......... 81
Written response from Mr. Olli Heinonen to question submitted for
the record by the Honorable Russ Carnahan, a Representative in
Congress from the State of Missouri............................ 82
Questions submitted for the record to Mr. Robert Satloff by the
Honorable Russ Carnahan........................................ 83
IRAN AND SYRIA: NEXT STEPS
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THURSDAY, JUNE 23, 2011
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 10 o'clock a.m.,
in room 2172 Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-
Lehtinen (chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. I am pleased to convene today's
hearing. So the committee will come to order. After recognizing
myself and the ranking member, Mr. Berman, for 7 minutes each
for our opening statements, I will recognize the chairman and
the ranking member of our Middle East and South Asia
Subcommittee for 3 minutes each. And I will then recognize
members for 1-minute statements if they have one. We will then
hear from our witnesses.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being with us. I would ask that
you summarize your prepared statements in 5 minutes each before
we move to the questions and answers with members under the 5-
minute rule.
Without objection, the witnesses' prepared statements will
be made a part of the record. And members may have 5 days to
insert statements and questions for the record subject to the
length limitations in the rules.
The Chair now recognizes herself for 7 minutes. Today's
hearing is part of a broader oversight effort by the committee
to examine U.S. policy options to address the twin threats
presented by both Iran and Syria. We will continue to be
engaged in a number of other activities--from roundtable
conversations with EU, Middle East, and other visiting
dignitaries and ambassadors to meetings with panels of experts
on Iran and Syria--to ensure that we do not take our eye off
some of the most pressing threats to U.S. and global security.
The date of May 24, 2011, a watershed in our efforts to
confront the Iranian-Syria axis over their nuclear programs,
passed with little fanfare. On May 24th, the International
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued two damning reports with
respect to the nuclear programs of Iran and Syria. The first,
with respect to Iran, cited significant increases in the
production rate of low enriched uranium. Most concerning, it
also cited ``current undisclosed nuclear related activities
involving military related organizations, including activities
related to the development of nuclear payload for a missile.''
Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms control estimates that as of
last April 2011, Iran's stockpile of low enriched uranium
provides enough material to fuel four nuclear bombs.
Additionally, the report detailed a list of seven nuclear
activities exclusive to a nuclear weapons program that Iran has
refused to explain.
The report with respect to Syria outlines in detail the
evidence it has collected of a suspected covert nuclear reactor
building under construction in Syria which, as we know, was
destroyed, thankfully, by Israel in September 2007. Syria has
long denied that it was building a covert nuclear reactor and
systematically denied the IAEA access to the site.
The level of specificity in the descriptions of the
activities and the publicizing of information in each report
suggests that the IAEA believes its evidence is credible. Thus,
the nuclear ambitions of both Teheran and Damascus have been
laid bare.
And while President Obama has said that Iran's acquisition
of nuclear weapons is ``unacceptable,'' some in the
administration appear resigned to the eventuality that the
regime will build a bomb and the goal is to delay, rather than
force permanent verifiable dismantlement. Iran with a nuclear
weapon or a nuclear breakout capacity would embolden Iran's
pursuit of regional domination and could embolden the regime's
proxies to develop comparable capabilities. It could also set
the Middle East down a cascade of proliferation that is
unacceptable to U.S. security, to our interests and vital
allies, such as Israel.
President Obama stated that if the IAEA determines that
Iran is noncompliant, ``we will have no choice but to consider
additional steps, including potentially additional sanctions,
to intensify the pressure on the Iranian regime.'' Such steps
would have to be immediate, comprehensive, and dramatic. They
must not continue to give a pass to Russia, to China, or to the
likes of Total, and must not be based on persuading the so-
called ``international community'' to act collectively--meaning
agreeing to the lowest common denominator while continuing to
cultivate ties with the regime in Teheran.
Despite statements by outgoing Deputy Secretary of State
James Steinberg, who told the online publication The Cable that
new congressional legislation expanding sanctions on Iran is
unnecessary, it is vital that Congress act to close loopholes
identified in the current sanctions structure and compel the
executive branch to fully and unequivocally augment the
pressure on Iran, Syria, and their enablers.
Last year, after a long, hard-fought struggle, the
Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment
Act was enacted. Although weaker than some of us had hoped,
this law represents a strong step forward, especially through
its energy, refined petroleum, and financial sanctions. This
congressionally-driven effort has led some countries, including
the EU, Japan, Australia, and South Korea, to finally impose
their own, albeit more limited, sanctions on Teheran.
Since the implementation of the 2003 Syria Accountability
and Lebanese Sovereignty Restoration Act, my colleagues from
both sides of the aisle and I have been calling for the full
implementation of the menu of sanctions contained under that
act.
To address the growing threats and compel the Iranian and
Syrian regimes into abandoning their destructive policies, I
have worked with my good friend, the distinguished ranking
member, Mr. Berman, and Congressman Sherman and Congressman
Engel along with the other bipartisan colleagues in introducing
legislation aimed at expanding and strengthening existing
sanctions on Iran and Syria, and ensuring their full
implementation and enforcement by the executive branch.
The tools we have must be used to their maximum
effectiveness. We must look for new means of compelling both
Iran and Syria to stop activities that threaten our security,
our interests, and our allies. Our policies toward both Iran
and Syria can no longer be bifurcated but must include an
integrated, cohesive strategy with the singular goal of
preventing Iran's and Syria's pursuit of nuclear and other non-
conventional weapons, the missiles to deliver them, their
sponsorship of terrorism, and other activities that threaten
Americans, our interests, and our allies.
Addressing these threats require tough choices. I look
forward to receiving the testimony of our witnesses today and
listening to their recommendations of what the United States
can do to definitively deny the Iran-Syria axis the wherewithal
to continue their dangerous policies.
I am now pleased to yield to my friend Mr. Berman for his
statement.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Ros-Lehtinen follows:]
[GRAPHICS NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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Mr. Berman. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairman. And
you have truly convened an excellent panel on this subject. I
look forward to hearing their testimony.
Iran and Syria are the world's two leading state sponsors
of terrorism and present a broad range of threats to U.S.
policy. None of these is of greater concern, however, than
their programs for developing weapons of mass destruction.
We have devoted considerable time to the Iranian nuclear
threat over the past two Congresses. It is critical we continue
to do that. We face no greater long-term challenge to our
national security than preventing the emergence of a nuclear-
armed Iran. And that is why I am co-sponsoring your bill, Madam
Chairman, the Iran Threat Reduction Act, which strengthens
sanctions on those who assist Iran's nuclear program directly
or indirectly.
We must be firm in our insistence that Iran meet its U.N.
Security Council obligation to suspend uranium enrichment. We
should seek to achieve that goal by peaceful means but with
full awareness that in order to make our diplomacy as effective
as possible, all options must remain on the table.
The United States and like-minded countries must do more to
pressure other countries to implement U.N. sanctions on Iran,
including a state-by-state effort to upgrade legal and
practical export controls, greater effort to identify and take
down Iran's front companies, an institution of catch-all
controls to prevent the export of prohibited items for Iran's
uranium enrichment program, including those that fall just
below control thresholds but that could be upgraded and other
similar measures.
On the home front, I am encouraged by recent sanctions
imposed by the administration using the authorities established
by Congress last year. The administration's actions have an
important symbolic and deterrent effect, but I am still looking
forward to the first energy-related sanctions on foreign
companies that actually do business with the United States.
And, as I have said before, there is significant evidence
that Chinese companies are engaged in sanctionable investment
activities in Iran. I would like to see those companies
sanctioned. Many other companies and nations have ceased doing
business with Iran at our behest. We don't want them to get the
idea that we are not really serious about sanctions.
As for Syrian efforts to construct an illicit and
clandestine nuclear reactor, the decision by the IAEA earlier
this month to refer Syria's noncompliance with its safeguards
obligations to the U.N. Security Council was an important
diplomatic achievement. The Security Council must take action
to force Syria to come clean. I would like to see the
administration pull out the stops to impose Security Council
sanctions, though it will not be easy to overcome Russian and
Chinese objections.
Russia should drop its objection to the public release of
the recently completed panel of experts who are put on the Iran
Commission by the U.N. Security Council. The world must know
about Iran's nefarious efforts to elude sanctions, develop even
longer-range missiles, and provide weapons to Syria.
I would like to say a further word about Syria in the
context of the so-called Arab Spring. If we are honest about
the wave of uprisings over the past few months, we have to
acknowledge they have evoked many conflicting emotions. On the
one hand, they certainly do appeal to our and my democratic
convictions and our bedrock values. On the other hand, we worry
that they may produce regimes that are not supportive of our
interests. And at the end of the day perhaps these regimes
won't even be democratic.
In Egypt, for example, we are concerned that the new regime
will be less committed to peace treaty with Israel. In majority
Shiite Bahrain, we are concerned that a more democratic regime
might be one that is closer to Iran, less hospitable to the
U.S. Fifth Fleet.
In Yemen, there is the question of whether a new and
hopefully more humane regime would protect our counterterrorism
interests as well as President Saleh, not protect him, protect
our counterterrorism interests as well as he has done. He
hasn't done much else well. Never mind.
These are concerns, not conclusions, but they constitute
some of the more prominent examples of Arab uprisings where
values and interests compete for the upper hand in U.S. foreign
policy to date. There is one Arab country, however, where I see
in the protests the potential for remarkable merging of our
most critical interests, our most fundamental values. That is
Syria.
It is clear that the Assad regime through its murderous
crackdown on armed civilians as they relinquish most or all of
whatever legitimacy it may once have enjoyed among the Syrian
people. Its demise would likely lead to the achievement of one
of our most cherished strategic goals, breaking the bond
between Damascus, on the one hand, and Teheran and Hezbollah,
on the other.
That would deprive Iran of its primary base of operations
in the Middle East and mark perhaps its first major strategic
setback in the region. It would also mark a setback for
Hezbollah. I don't think it would prevent Iran from arming
Hezbollah altogether, but it would certainly make the job more
difficult.
To the extent the new Syrian regime wants to be part of the
international community, it also may very well break its link
to Sunni terrorist groups like Hamas.
How do I know these desirable goals would be achieved with
the fall of the Assad regime? I don't know for certain, but to
the extent that the U.S. can influence the process, it is
certainly worth the risk.
I reject arguments that we are better off with Assad in
power. As for the claim that he is the devil we know, let's
keep the following in mind. During his tenure, there has been
no progress toward peace with Israel. Hezbollah has emerged as
a major regional power. Iraqi extremists have used Syria as a
safe haven. And Iran has established a beachhead in the Middle
East while advising and assisting Assad in his murderous
repression of civilians.
How much worse could the next devil be? The United States'
ability to influence the course of events in Syria may be
limited. We should use what tools we have and produce sanctions
targeted at regime leaders and human rights abusers to make
clear that our sympathies, our shared visions are with the
victims, not the victimizers.
The administration has taken some important steps in that
direction in recent weeks. One of these steps--I am getting
near the end here. I am almost done. One of these steps was the
sanctioning last month of Cham Holding, the flagship enterprise
of Assad's corrupt cousin Rami Makhlouf.
We should encourage the European Union, Syria's leading
trading partner, to follow our lead in that regard. Makhlouf
recently claimed he is giving up his various businesses. We and
our friends should help them do that.
For years now, many strategists in this country have
encouraged Syria-Israeli peacemaking for the primary purpose of
breaking Syrian-Iranian tie and beginning the process of
pushing Iran out of the Arab Middle East. We now have a
historic opportunity to accomplish these goals. Even before the
peacemaking begins, this is an opportunity we should not pass
up.
I yield back. Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Berman, for
that statement.
Mr. McCaul is recognized for 1 minute, the vice chair of
the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you Madam Chair. I will be very brief.
Thanks to the witnesses for attending the hearing today. It is
an important issue. I have always viewed Iran as one of the
greatest threats that we have had, even prior to 9/11. And I
look forward to the testimony. And, Madam Chair, thank you for
holding this hearing.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Connolly of Virginia?
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And I want to
welcome our witnesses today, particularly my old friend John
Bolton. I was reminding him that I actually staffed his very
first nomination hearing when he was in the Reagan
administration a number of years ago. We are both a little
grayer today. I want to thank you for holding this hearing.
As we look at sort of the unfolding Arab Spring, it is
important not to be distracted by the fact that there are other
very serious security issues and certainly in Syria and Iran.
I hope we will also explore the nuclear issue, not only in
Iran, which is front and center, but also the disturbing report
that was just issued about the now defunct Al-Kibar facility
destroyed by Israel in Syria that seemed to have some North
Korean links to it. The instability of both of these regimes is
increasingly manifest, certainly in Syria but even in Iran in
terms of the ongoing feud within that government. So I look
forward to the testimony and our discussion.
Thank you, Madam Chairman.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Johnson of Ohio is recognized for 1 minute.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Madam Chairman. And I want to thank
our panel for being here today.
You know, we face major diplomatic challenges with both
Syria and Iran. In recent years, it has become very clear that
the engagement process started by the administration is not
working. Since we started that policy, Syria has maintained its
support for terrorism, facilitated the trafficking of weapons
to Hezbollah in Lebanon, continued to commit human rights
violations, and repeatedly lied about its proliferation
efforts. Similarly, Iran's support of far-flung terrorist
activities and development of nuclear weapons have not been
deterred by diplomatic efforts.
The second policy of economic pressure has had some effect
on Iran's economy working to stall economic progress in the
hopes of curbing their nuclear efforts. We should continue
that. And I believe we need to reevaluate our current
nonproliferation policy in the Middle East before escalating
pressure on Israel triggers more drastic preventive measures in
itself.
So I thank the panel for being here. Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Sires of New Jersey is recognized.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you very much
for being here.
I am also very concerned. Obviously both Iran and Syria,
they just have no regards for international law. And they
support terrorists at every turn. This is a concern for the
security of this country. I am also very concerned.
And I would like to hear about Iran. How soon do you really
think that they can build an atomic weapon? This is a big
concern to many people in my community. So I will look forward
to your testimony, and I thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Sires.
Mr. Chabot is recognized for 3 minutes as the Subcommittee
on Middle East and South Asia chairman.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you very much, Madam Chair. And thank you
for calling this timely and very important hearing here this
morning.
I continue to be extremely frustrated with the
administration's Syria policy. In particular, I am frustrated
with a lot of their other policies as well, but Syria I think
maybe most of all.
President Obama's recent suggestion that Bashar al-Assad
could remain in power if he makes the appropriate reforms is,
at best, disappointing. I will leave it there.
By ruthlessly cracking down and indiscriminately killing
peaceful protesters, Assad has betrayed his people and has lost
all legitimacy. No piecemeal reforms can wash away the blood on
his hands. And, yet, the administration still refuses to say
aloud what the entire world sees so clearly. Assad is not a
legitimate leader.
I have to confess that I find this lack of strength,
clearness on the administration's part baffling. For years,
Bashar al-Assad has allowed Syria to function as a freeway for
terrorists.
Countless jihadists traveling to kill American soldiers in
Iraq entered that country via Syria. Similarly, Iranian weapons
have flowed freely across Syria's borders and into the hands of
Hezbollah. It is horrifying to stop and consider how much blood
American, Syrian, Iraqi, Lebanese, and Israeli the Assad regime
has on its hands. And, yet, we continue to confer legitimacy.
Engagement has failed. And leading from behind is not
leading at all. It is high time that the administration stands
up and say what we all know to be true. Bashar must go.
Madam Chair, I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Chabot.
Mr. Higgins of New York is recognized.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Madam Chair. And thank you for
holding this hearing.
The world is watching these countries in the Middle East
and North Africa struggle to transition into states more
representative of the aspirations of the people. There are no
two more powerful forces in the world today than youth and
technology, which is driving in large part this change. And, as
we are seeing the calls for democratic reform in both Iran and
Syria and Iran, despite internet censorship, Iranians are some
of the most prolific bloggers in the world, 80 percent of the
country is literate.
With more than two-thirds of the population under the age
of 30, the ability of Iran's dynamic population to plug in and
play to the world's marketplace of ideas will continue to grow
as a challenge to the country's autocratic regime.
And in Syria, decades of oppressive rule have begun to fray
as a population. As New York Times columnist Tom Friedman
writes, armed only with cell phone cameras and access to
Facebook and YouTube, it will grow more and more difficult for
the willing regimes to thwart the demands of their people, the
demands for citizenship, for civil rights, and for opportunity.
Our foreign policy must be sensitive to these dynamic
changes, encouraging freedom of thought and expression,
particularly as more stable and self-determined states in the
Middle East are likely to create a more stable world.
I look forward to discussing these issues with the
witnesses before us today. And I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, sir.
Ms. Schmidt of Ohio?
Ms. Schmidt. Thank you, Madam Chairman. I will be very
brief.
I am here today to listen to the experts regarding Iran and
Syria and what our next steps should be. We cannot ignore
either one of these countries. They are the bad actors in the
Middle East, and they are rogue states that make it very, very
dangerous, not just for the folks in the Middle East, but for
those in the world, so I'm eager to listen to the panelists.
Thank you. And I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Now the Chair is pleased to welcome our witnesses. I would
like to welcome back to our committee Ambassador John Bolton. I
love John Bolton. Ambassador Bolton currently serves as a
senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. His area of
research is U.S. foreign and national security policy.
Prior to arriving at AEI, Ambassador Bolton served as the
United States permanent representative to the United Nations
from August 1, 2005, to December 9, 2006. From June 2001 to May
2005, Ambassador Bolton served as Under Secretary of State for
Arms Control and International Security, also in the Bush
administration. Prior to this, Ambassador Bolton was senior
vice president of the American Enterprise Institute. Welcome
back.
And we also would like to welcome back Dr. Olli Heinonen.
Dr. Heinonen is currently a senior fellow, Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs.
Before joining the Belfer Center as a senior fellow in
August 2010, he spent 27 years at the International Atomic
Energy Agency in Vienna, with the last 5 years as deputy
director general of the IAEA and head of its Department of
Safeguards. He led the agency's efforts to identify and
dismantle nuclear proliferation networks, including the one led
by Pakistani scientist Dr. A.Q. Khan. And he oversaw its
efforts to monitor and contain Iran's nuclear program. Welcome
back, Doctor. Thank you.
And, finally, the committee would also like to welcome back
Dr. Robert Satloff. Thank you, sir. The executive director of
the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, an expert on
Arab and Islamic politics as well as U.S. Middle East policy,
Dr. Satloff has written and spoken widely on the Arab-Israeli
peace process, the Islamist challenge to the growth of
democracy in the region, and the need for bold and innovative
public diplomacy to Arabs and Muslims.
We thank you, gentlemen. And, please, we will enter your
statements into the record. And be brief or I will gavel you
down, even the ones I love. And I like you guys, too.
Mr. Bolton?
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE JOHN BOLTON, SENIOR FELLOW, AMERICAN
ENTERPRISE INSTITUTE FOR PUBLIC POLICY RESEARCH (FORMER U.S.
PERMANENT REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS AND FORMER UNDER
SECRETARY OF STATE FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY)
Ambassador Bolton. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
Thank you for the invitation to appear before the committee,
Congressman Berman, many old friends. I think this is a very
important subject. I think Iran's nuclear weapons program
remains one of the most important national security challenges
we face. It has been trying to get nuclear weapons for close to
20 years. And, despite in the past 10 years some very vigorous
efforts on the part of the United States to stop it, it is now
closer than ever.
I just want to start by saying, you know, we all talk
confidently about what Iran's capabilities are, what its
centrifuges are doing, what its plans are. We are only talking,
really, about what is publicly known. Our intelligence knows
more, but our intelligence in Iran is far from perfect. And it
is what we don't know about Iran's nuclear weapons program that
particularly worries me.
I think the evidence is clear from years of efforts at
diplomatic resolution to the Iranian nuclear program, that that
is not going to work. We can see that years of efforts on
economic sanctions have failed to have a material effect on the
nuclear weapons program.
I am all in favor of the sanctions. I think anything that
destabilizes the Iranian regime is a good thing because I think
regime change in Teheran should be our national policy, but I
don't think we can operate under the view that sanctions can
stop the Iranian effort to achieve nuclear weapons in a timely
way.
Look at North Korea. It is the most heavily sanctioned
regime on the planet. It has exploded two nuclear devices. We
know that its nuclear weapons program continues. It has now
admitted again, as it did 8 years ago, it has a functioning
uranium enrichment program. It is working ahead on its
ballistic missile programs, all the most friendless regime on
Earth. Iran has many more resources that economic sanctions are
not going to stop.
So I think what this means, unfortunately, is that the most
likely outcome as of now for Iran is that in a very short
period of time, it is going to get nuclear weapons absent some
dramatic step by an outsider. And I think the change that this
will have in the world is almost impossible to calculate. I
think it is very important to understand just what a dramatic
step it will be if Iran crosses the nuclear weapons threshold.
First, it doesn't have to be the case that Iran actually
uses nuclear weapons. Simply having that capability in the
region will have a profound effect. Imagine, for example, how
we would have treated the breakup of Yugoslavia if Milosevic
had had nuclear weapons. And then think of the possibility of
weapons in the hands of the regime in Teheran.
Second, it is a mistake to believe that American security
guarantees to our friends and allies in the region against the
possible Iranian program are going to provide much assurance at
all. I think the outlook as of today is declining American
influence in the region. I think our security guarantees are
declining in value as well.
Third, I think it is a big mistake to conclude, as I
believe the administration has, that a nuclear Iran can be
contained and deterred. The psychology of the regime in Teheran
is very different from the psychology of the Soviet Union
during the Cold War. It is an asymmetric threat as well. And it
would be foolish to look forward to a world in which we are at
the discretion of the rulers in Teheran.
But, even if I am wrong on that and Iran can be contained
and deterred, it doesn't stop with Iran. If Iran gets nuclear
weapons, Saudi Arabia will get nuclear weapons. Egypt will.
Turkey will and perhaps others. And you are going to have a
very, very widespread proliferation of nuclear weapons in the
Middle East.
That is why I think we have honestly to confront the very
unattractive alternative that absent military action against
Iran's nuclear weapons program, Iran will have nuclear weapons
much sooner, rather than later.
No one likes to contemplate this possibility, but there are
only two options that currently exist in my view. One is that
Iran gets nuclear weapons. The other is the preemptive use of
force against them.
Let me just touch briefly on Syria. I recount in my
testimony, Madam Chairman, your hearing back in September of
'03, when I tried to warn about the interest of Syria in
nuclear weapons. It was very controversial testimony. It was a
very controversial issue in my confirmation hearing to be
ambassador to the U.N. because Senator Biden and others thought
that I had over-stressed the danger of the Syrian nuclear
weapons program.
I think the point was very well-handled when the Israeli
defense forces destroyed a North Korean reactor--I underline a
North Korean reactor--being built in Syria. We still don't know
what else is going on there, but I think there is every reason
to believe that Syria, Iran, and North Korea have cooperated on
other aspects of nuclear weapons programs there as well.
So this threat is not simply an Iranian threat. It is a
global threat. Syria is a piece of it. And I think the United
States underestimates this threat at its peril.
Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Bolton follows:]
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Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Ambassador.
Dr. Heinonen, thank you.
STATEMENT OF MR. OLLI HEINONEN, SENIOR FELLOW, BELFER CENTER
FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS, HARVARD UNIVERSITY
(FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY AND HEAD OF ITS DEPARTMENT OF SAFEGUARDS)
Mr. Heinonen. Chairwoman Ros-Lehtinen and Congressman
Berman, distinguished members of the committee, thank you for
inviting me to address this hearing today.
In my testimony, I intend to provide a snapshot of where
the nuclear programs of Iran and Syria currently stand and
highlight some of the key implications. Let me start with Iran.
Iran's nuclear program is disturbingly much further down
the road today than when its nuclear this year was first
brought to the IAEA Board of Governors' attention in 2003.
Before that, Iran was engaged in clandestine nuclear activities
almost for two decades. The world discovered that Iran was
secretly building an enrichment plant in Natanz.
Iran's history of clandestine nuclear pursuit, continuing
enrichment and unresolved military related questions really
reveal a comprehensive and committed approach that puts it on
the path to achieving nuclear weapons' capability.
Today, the Natanz plant is an industrial sized enrichment
facility with 8,000 installed IR-1 centrifuges. Since 2007, the
plant has produced a total of 9,050 pounds, of 3.5 percent,
enriched uranium. Since February 2010, Iran began enriching
uranium to 20 percent. Two weeks ago, Iran announced that it
will transfer production of 20 percent enriched uranium from
Natanz to Fordow, where it plans to triple the production.
The Fordow facility was another nuclear installation that
Iran built in secrecy until evidence of its construction
surfaced in September 2009. In addition, Iran has announced
that it would be constructing up to 10 new enrichment sites,
but has not provided details about its plans nor locations.
The significance of these developments is several-fold.
Although there have been also ups and downs in this nuclear
program and delays, there will be such delays also in the
future. But, first, given the current and planned production
rates on its declared available uranium stock, Iran can be
expected to possess 550 pounds of 20 percent enriched uranium
by the end of 2012. This means that Iran would have subsequent
uranium stocks, if further enriched and converted, to produce
275 to 330 pounds of high enriched uranium metal.
Iran is also moving ahead, albeit with delay, on its heavy
water reactor program. This means being able to produce
weapons-grade plutonium, sufficient for one nuclear device per
year from 2014 onwards.
Second, Iran's suspected military-related studies on:
Special neutron sources without civilian applications, high
explosives with precise timing, and missile re-entry vehicle
design, alongside with the procurement, design, and
manufacturing of nuclear-related equipment by military
entities, add a dangerous dimension.
Third, the possibility of secret nuclear facilities
existing in parallel present a deeply troubling scenario.
Now I want to turn to Syria.
Syria's nuclear dossier was brought to public attention in
2007, when a facility in Dair Alzour, suspected to house a
clandestine nuclear reactor, was destroyed by aerial bombing.
Information gathered indicates that the destroyed facility had
a reactor design similar to that of a five-megawatt nuclear
reactor built by the DPRK in Yongbyon.
Apart from one restricted visit, Syria has refused to allow
inspectors back to the Dair Alzour site. Questions remain
concerning Syria's nuclear program. Was the destroyed reactor
built on the Dair Alzour site the only clandestine facility?
Are the uranium particles found in Damascus and at Dair Alzour
a sign of more substance activities yet to be uncovered? Et
cetera.
The Dair Alzour reactor no longer exists, but the IAEA
needs to know the full picture to ensure that all nuclear
material and facilities in Syria are declared and its nuclear
activities are peaceful. It is, therefore, not a closed book.
Both Iranian and Syrian nuclear dossiers have been referred
to U.N. Security Council. Subsequent Security Council
resolutions would benefit from provisions that would oblige
member states to provide information relating to proliferation
activities and nuclear programs of the two countries.
It is important that the Security Council reinforces the
IAEA's request for full and unimpeded access to all relevant
information, including claimed military sites or personnel.
When it comes to the technical assessments made on nuclear
programs, that standard cannot be compromised. In the case of
Syria, the IAEA should have used all inspection rights it has,
including conducting special inspection. The U.N. Security
Council could also choose to provide wider authorities to the
IAEA.
Iran and Syria must be encouraged to turn to a different
path on their nuclear programs. Iran and Syria must understand
they bear responsibility for the choices they make and the
consequences generated.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Heinonen follows:]
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Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, sir.
Dr. Satloff?
STATEMENT OF MR. ROBERT SATLOFF, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, WASHINGTON
INSTITUTE FOR NEAR EAST POLICY
Mr. Satloff. Madam Chairman, Mr. Ranking Member, thank you
very much for the opportunity to appear before you today. I
salute you for your leadership in addressing issues of vital
concern to American national interests in the Middle East, two
of which are no greater than the ones on our agenda today.
It is appropriate that the committee addresses Iran and
Syria together because these states together as the principal
poles of the region's anti-West, anti-American, anti-peace axis
have an organic linkage between them.
Madam Chairman, on the technical and scientific matters on
today's agenda, I will defer to my colleagues, who are far
better qualified than I. I will focus for a few moments on the
broader strategic and policy matters at hand.
Madam Chairman, there were two great competitions that
define the Middle East today: One, the challenge from Shiite
Islamist supremacist ideology, led by the Islamic Republic of
Iran; and, second, the challenge of Sunni Islamist supremacist
ideology, led by al-Qaeda.
Thankfully, al-Qaeda is on the decline for many reasons.
Iran, however, still retains enormous hegemonic designs; still
sees American policy in the region at risk; still sees American
power waning; still has its sights on expanding its influence
throughout the region; and, perhaps most dangerously, is still
investing in the pursuit of nuclear weapons.
I believe we must first recognize that the tumultuous
events of the last several months have had the effect of
limiting our collective attention spans to address the problem
of Iran. There simply has been so much to attract our attention
in Arab countries that there have not been enough hours in the
day for our senior officials to focus on the continuing urgent
challenge of Iran.
Secondly, the Iranians, however, have viewed regional
change as moving very much in their direction. Even before the
Arab Spring, Iran counted as successes the emergence of a
Hezbollah-dominated government in Lebanon, the ongoing control
of Gaza by Hamas, the crushing of their own internal dissent in
June 2009, and our expected withdrawals from Iraq and
Afghanistan. And the last 6 months, they have seen American
allies disappear in Egypt and Yemen and in Tunisia. They have
seen violent tensions emerge between America and its two
preeminent regional allies: Saudi Arabia and Israel. Only with
the emergence of a challenge in Syria has the democratic wave
begun to pose a threat to Iranian interests.
Third, I believe that the direct threat posed by Iran,
especially the nuclear aspect of this threat, is more acute
today than before the Arab Spring. It only stands to reason,
for example, that Iran looks at the situation in Libya and,
through its eyes, sees what happens to a country that reaches a
nuclear bargain with the West. It eventually gets bombed by the
same countries with whom it reached the bargain. I am not
criticizing our efforts in Libya. I am looking at this through
Iranian eyes.
The logical conclusion from the rulers in Teheran is to
speed up their acquisition of a nuclear bomb. That is certainly
what I would do. That is certainly what I think most
strategists would do looking at their regional situation.
Against this backdrop, I believe it is essential for
America to counter Iranian ambitions with some strategic
setbacks. There are three places where we can focus on doing
this: One, Syria; two, Iraq; and, three, Iran itself.
On Syria, I concur totally with the observations of the
ranking member. This is one area, the first time in the Arab
Spring, where our values and our interests are complementary.
We should not withhold any effort in my view to hasten the
demise of the Assad regime. And in my testimony, Madam
Chairman, I list, I believe, more than a dozen very specific
policy actions the administration could take short of using
military force to do precisely that. This is not a moment for
hesitance, reluctance, or caution. This is a moment to
recognize the strategic opportunity to sever the alliance and
to weaken Iran precisely at a moment when Iranian ambitions are
at a height.
On Iraq, just one sentence. The opportunity here is to
create a new security relationship, which denies Iran the
ability to fish in troubled waters in its neighboring country.
On Iran itself, we should focus in two areas, Madam
Chairman: First, making more real and believable the U.S.
commitment to use all means necessary to prevent Iran from
achieving a military nuclear capability.
I believe there is considerable doubt in the minds of
Iranians, which is what matters most, whether, in fact, we are
committed to that objective; and, secondly, expanding our
support for Iranian Democrats and readying the day when the
green movement resurrects itself so that we should be ready to
do next time what we did not do in June 2009, to be ready
verbally and with effective action to support the potential for
real change in that country.
I will leave the rest of my comments for my formal remarks
and look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Satloff follows:]
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Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much. Excellent
testimony, gentlemen.
Ambassador Bolton, under what conditions would you support
nuclear cooperation agreements or 123 agreements with countries
in the broader Middle East? And what criteria do you believe
the U.S. must require to ensure that these agreements do not
undermine our national security interests and specifically our
efforts to counter Iran's and Syria's nuclear weapons
ambitions?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I would favor 123 agreements under
very limited circumstances, where the countries involved
foreswear any uranium enrichment or reprocessing activities.
If you look back, President Bush gave a speech in 2003 or
2004 at the National Defense University where he outlined some
of these circumstances where we could engage in that kind of
activity. I think they need full export control regimes,
protections against transshipments. They need to be completely
free of any support for regimes that are engaged in state-
sponsored terrorism.
All of these criteria, I think, and others contained in the
legislation you and Congressman Berman have introduced to
reform the Atomic Energy Act, which I think is an excellent way
of declaring our intention that if we are going to see the
spread of peaceful nuclear power, we want it done under
circumstances that are not going to be conducive to
proliferation. It is a very, very important point.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
And given the realignment of rogues, Iran, Syria, North
Korea, what actions do you believe are necessary to cut the
links between and end the collusion among Iran, Syria, and
North Korea?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, you know, this is a point that the
State Department has struggled with in formulating our response
to these nuclear programs because they have done it in silos,
North Korea is an Asian problem, Iran is a Middle Eastern
Bureau program when, in fact, we know that cooperation among
the rogue states has been very extensive. That is one of the
reasons President Bush used the phrase ``axis of evil.''
On ballistic missiles, we know that since 1998, at least,
North Korea and Iran have conducted joint research and joint
testing. They both have the same Soviet-era Scud missile
technology. And they are not doing it because of their interest
in weather satellites. They are creating launch vehicles to
deliver nuclear payloads.
I think it will become clear ultimately that this North
Korean nuclear reactor, a clone of the Yongbyon reactor being
built at al-Kabir in Syria, was a joint venture with Iranian
involvement. Iran and North Korea share the common interest of
hiding their illicit nuclear activities from prying eyes
internationally. What better place to hide it than in a country
that nobody is looking, as the United States was not looking?
We were informed of that by Israeli intelligence in the spring
of 2007.
So I think acknowledging these linkages and the risk of
other linkages developing. Looking at Venezuela's extensive
supplies of uranium in the ground, the risk is that this
cooperation could grow.
I think we need to use the proliferation security
initiative even more than we do now to stop trade among the
rogue states and nuclear, chemical, biological weapons
technologies. I think we have simply got to apply more pressure
on China, in particular not to facilitate trade between North
Korea and the others. And I think we have got to make it clear
that we are determined, in particular, to stop Iran from
getting nuclear weapons because the record will be that North
Korea continued and expanded its program, despite U.S.
opposition, that Iran, over heavy U.S. opposition, succeeded in
getting nuclear weapons. And that will be a signal to every
other country around the world that aspires to nuclear weapons,
that if you have the patience and the will, you can get them.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. And, lastly, in the 1 minute I have
left, as we know, there are flights from Teheran to Caracas. Do
you believe that it would be possible for the United States to
sanction that airline company, that carrier that is involved in
those flights? And do you think that there are other
opportunities for us to sanction targeted sanctions against
Venezuela for their collusion with Iran?
Ambassador Bolton. Absolutely. I think, as my colleague
Roger Noriega at AEI has pointed out, this level of collusion
between Venezuela, Hugo Chavez, and the Iranian regime is
enormous.
You know, Iran has probably its largest Embassy in the
world in Caracas for purposes of evading international
financial and other sanctions. And I worry very much about the
developments of Venezuela and policy purchasing nuclear
reactors from Russia and the possible introduction of a nuclear
weapons concern in this hemisphere for the first time in many
years.
So I think there is a lot of work we should all be doing on
that Venezuela-Iran connection.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Amen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Berman is recognized.
Mr. Berman. Well, thank you much, Madam Chair. And I thank
the witnesses for their excellent testimony. Just to initiate,
I would like to praise and agree with Ambassador Bolton's
shout-out for the current head of the IAEA.
There are some very good people at that agency who have
been there for a long time who care about proliferation. Now
they have a leader who lets them do their work and make
subjective and public announcements about what is happening.
And I think it was very useful for you to say that, and I
appreciate it.
I think, Dr. Satloff, in your testimony, you said it is
time for President Obama to say that Assad lost legitimacy in
Syria and must go.
But let me see if the witnesses, quickly because I have
another question, can take the opposite argument. Someone is
saying to the President, ``Be careful. There is credibility
here. You said that about Ghadafi.''
The fact is the President could say that and Assad could
remain in power. What is the implication of that? How do you
answer the strategist who says, ``Here is the problem with
doing that?''
Mr. Satloff. Thank you, Mr. Berman.
You are absolutely right. There are those people who will
say at the first press conference after the President's
statement, ``So what are you doing to make sure he is gone
tomorrow? When is the Sixth Fleet going off the coast of Syria?
When are we dropping bombs on Damascus?'' since we cannot use
military force to achieve our objectives in every scenario.
The administration needs to face these questions sooner,
rather than later, and not let all our policy around the world
be hamstrung by the inability to answer the question. We have
to be able to say that ``Yes, we have objectives. We have
strategies to achieve them.'' And not every objective requires
military force to achieve its ultimate goal. We should bite the
bullet on this now and be on the right side of what is
something which is clearly in our national interest.
For the first time ever, we have a convergence between
Turks, Arabs, Israelis, Europeans, and our own national
interest on the future of Syria. They have all come to the
conclusion that Assad is no longer a legitimate leader. We
should build on this convergence and face down that obvious
question and not let the bogeyman of that question, ``When are
you going to be forced to achieve it?,'' stand in the way of
doing everything else, the 20-30 other items on the menu, in
order to achieve that goal.
Ambassador Bolton. Could I just say, Mr. Berman, we should
have been doing this a long time ago, but there is one key
difference in the case of Syria compared to the other Arab
regimes, like Libya. And that is the presence of Iran's not
only interest in preventing Assad from falling but its active
cooperation in stopping that from happening.
People in the Iranian Embassy are working there. We have
reports of Iranian----
Mr. Berman. Absolutely.
Ambassador Bolton [continuing]. Revolutionary guards and so
on. So this is one reason I think you have to look at the
regime in Teheran and overthrowing that as well as Assad.
Mr. Berman. Well, interesting answer. And I could take the
whole 5 minutes for doing that. So let me try and get one out,
one other question.
Mr. Heinonen, Ambassador Bolton states that it would take--
essentially Iran would be able, citing the very respectable
institution--I forget the full name of it, Mr. Milhollin, the
Wisconsin Project. It would take 1\1/2\ months to enrich
uranium to weapons-grade uranium. I had the impression it would
take somewhat longer, 6 months to 1 year, after kicking out
IAEA inspectors, reworking pipes, other tasks. In other words,
we have more notice than he thinks.
What is your reaction to what Ambassador Bolton said?
Mr. Heinonen. Well, it depends, first of all, about how you
define this capability and what Iran might have on top of that.
Mr. Berman. Let's assume for a second--and I sure hope we
don't operate on that rosy a scenario--that this is what they
got.
Mr. Heinonen. Well, it will take quite some time because
they have to feed this uranium through a reconfiguration of the
cascades, either in Natanz or in Qom now that they are building
more. That is a limited number, IR-1 centrifuge the best in the
world. So, therefore, I would say, as you said, something
between 6 months to 1 year. And they had to turn it also to
uranium metal machine, et cetera.
So there is time, but the time is running out, as I said in
my testimony, by the end of next year.
Ambassador Bolton. The estimate of 1\1/2\ months obviously
was calculated on the basis of what is publicly available
information to the Wisconsin Center. The Nonproliferation
Education Center estimated 2 months, so slightly longer than
that. But I think it is important to understand that the
technology is perfectly within the control of the Iranians,
that it is simply a matter of the most efficient way of
redesigning the pipes and feeding the Iranian end.
When you get to reactor-grade levels of concentration of
the U-235 isotope, you have done two-thirds of the work you
need to do to get the weapons-grade. Even though the
differences look large in terms of percentage of U-235
isotopes, the actual amount of work is really quite small.
Now, there are other steps, as my testimony says, including
the fabricating of the metal and whatnot, but the Iranians, as
we know, have continued work on a wide range of other aspects
of this. And this, again, I want to say is only what we know.
And you know the old adage. The absence of evidence is not
evidence of absence.
Mr. Berman. I am done.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. That is an old adage?
Michael McCaul, vice chair, Western Hemisphere?
Mr. McCaul. Thank you, Madam Chair.
I agree with you that time is running out. It has been
running out for a while. Madam Chair, you mentioned A. Q. Khan
and his network proliferating to Iran, Syria, and North Korea.
Secretary Clinton testified on Iran recently. I gave her
that, in my judgment, diplomacy with Iran as a solution to this
problem is a naive foreign policy. I believe that they are very
close absent a cyber attack on their centrifuges, very close to
getting nuclear weapons.
We can't afford a nuclear race in the Middle East. And that
is precisely what I believe a nuclear Iran would present. And
at the same time, we have the Arab Spring phenomenon, which, on
one hand, brings a great promise of democracy and, yet, on the
other hand, great threats. Middle East abhors a vacuum. And I
believe that Iran wants to fill it.
Ambassador Bolton, can you comment on what we can do at
this late juncture to stop a nuclear Iran? And, secondly,
assuming they get it, what impact would that have on this Arab
Spring phenomenon in the region?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I think we are very late in the
game. I think, in fact, it is too late to do much of anything,
even from cyber attacks. If you look at the production figures
for low enriched uranium from the latest IAEA report last
month, it is up dramatically from 2009. It is up substantially
from the report earlier this year. They are going to introduce
more sophisticated centrifuges. They are now obviously aware of
the possibility of cyber attack. And I don't doubt they have
instituted countermeasures.
I think that this proceeding toward nuclear capability is
something that is going to proceed, even with the Arab Spring
or maybe even accelerated by it. And it is one of the reasons
that even the prospect of democratic change in Iran concerns
me.
If you imagine Iran, let's say, in the next year achieving
nuclear weapon status but then imagining the regime falling and
seeing the creation of a representative government there, I am
not sure that representative government in Iran would convince
Saudi Arabia not to get nuclear weapons if the new government
in Iran kept theirs.
So that this risk of proliferation triggered by an Iranian
success in achieving nuclear weapons is an enormous, enormous
redline to cross. And we should not underestimate it. It is not
simply a question of one country getting nuclear weapons. It is
a risk of half a dozen nuclear weapon states in the Middle East
in very short order thereafter.
Mr. McCaul. And I agree. And I also want to echo and
associate myself with the remarks of Madam Chair on the
Caracas-Teheran connection. That greatly concerns me. I have
had lawmakers from Latin America tell me uranium is being
shipped from Latin America to Iran. And that is of great
concern.
Let me switch to another topic that a lot of people haven't
focused on. That is Azerbaijan. I met with Dr. George Friedman
from Stratford yesterday. Obviously they are an ally. They are
pro-Israel. They have been an ally in our wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan. They are next to, close to Iran. And, yet,
according to Dr. Friedman, they are sort of being shunned by
the State Department in their ability to purchase military
weapons.
It seems to me that they are very strategically placed in
the Middle East. And he believes this is one of the key sort of
cornerstones in the Middle East that we are not paying enough
attention to and needs to be stressed I think more.
Ambassador Bolton, do you have any thoughts on that?
Ambassador Bolton. I think our policy with respect to
Azerbaijan does need to be modified. Obviously this is
complicated by the conflict with Armenia and the range of
disagreements with their internal policy there. But precisely
for the reason that you mentioned, given Azerbaijan's access to
Black Sea oil and natural gas assets, the importance of the
Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline route, and just its geographical
location, I think this is a place where one of these frozen
conflicts, as they say, between Azerbaijan and Armenia needs
more U.S. attention. I mean, I know there are a lot of things
going on in the world, but this is in the space of the former
Soviet Union, one of enormous strategic significance?
I don't think we can forget what Prime Minister Putin said
a few years ago when he was still President of Russia, that the
collapse of the Soviet Union was the greatest geopolitical
catastrophe of the twentieth century. I think most of us think
it was a great way to end the twentieth century. That is
obviously not Putin's view. And his effort, as we have seen by
the Russian attack on Georgia, is, at a minimum, to reestablish
Russian hegemony in the space of the former Soviet Union. It is
very much in our interest to prevent that.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. McCaul.
Mr. McCaul. Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Sires of New Jersey is
recognized.
Mr. Sires. Thank you, Madam Chair.
You know, China has long been a roadblock to tougher
international sanctions on Iran. Iran continues to use China's
companies to procure hardware for its nuclear and missile
programs. In the past, it seems that both administrations have
been willing to confront China on trade issues, but they seem
to be reluctant to confront China on this issue. How do we
balance our interests with China and then we confront China on
this issue where they keep assisting Iran and keep blocking any
strong sanctions against Iran?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I can tell you my personal view
that I don't think we have been strong enough with China in
insisting that they conform to international norms and
agreements and indeed sanctions against nuclear and other forms
of proliferation.
Many of the companies that we are concerned about in China
are owned by the People's Liberation Army. And it is very
difficult for the civilians to influence them.
I think China's record has gotten better, but I think there
is little question that China has been lax on dealing with the
sanctions against North Korea, that its interest in securing
natural resources, like oil and natural gas from countries like
Iran, has led it to fly political cover for Iran, in the
Security Council. And I think it is something--and I would say
this was a mistake in the Bush administration and a mistake in
the current administration. We have to make nonproliferation
compliance and determination to stop it a higher priority and
not sweep it behind other priorities, which is what tends to
happen to them.
Mr. Sires. Thank you.
Dr. Heinonen, would you like to add to that? No. I am
concerned about Venezuela. And I am concerned because many
people come to my office, including a recent Panamanian friend
of mine tells me how Chavez is stirring up the peasants in that
country, in the countryside. But I am also concerned about the
airline, Conviasa.
People tell me that crates and crates of things from these
airplanes come through into Venezuela and out of Venezuela. And
I was also told that the largest Embassy in terms of personnel
is in Caracas now from Iran. Can you comment on that?
Ambassador Bolton. Yes. You are correct. I have heard
exactly the same thing about the size of the Iranian Embassy in
Caracas. And it is not because of their longstanding cultural
ties. It is because the Iranians are using the Venezuelan
banking system and ports and other facilities in Venezuela to
evade sanctions.
I think it has been a measure of substantial concern
whether cutout companies, front companies, are being used to
evade other sanctions, including the military sanctions, that
have been imposed on Iran over the years and that Chavez is
actively cooperating and assisting Iran in evading these
sanctions.
Mr. Sires. There are two or three flights weekly.
Ambassador Bolton. Yes. I think those are the ones that we
know about as scheduled, but I would worry that there are many
more into airports and Venezuela that we are not monitoring or
observing.
Mr. Sires. Dr. Satloff?
Mr. Satloff. Just one further word on this. In addition to
the direct Iranian-Venezuelan problem, I would call your
attention to Hezbollah activity in Venezuela. And using
Venezuela as a base throughout Latin America, there is
considerable clandestine activity by Hezbollah, both fund-
raising and operations. And I know that law enforcement in the
United States is quite concerned about their ability to use
this as a base for potential operations throughout the
hemisphere, including here in the homeland.
Mr. Sires. Well, this is where my conversations with one of
the Panamanians, the concerns that they have that Chavez
through surrogates is stirring up the interior of----
Ambassador Bolton. Yes. There are many concerns that we
have had about what Chavez is doing with the revenues from his
oil production in terms of destabilizing democratic governments
in Latin America, providing assistance to the FARC guerrillas
in Colombia, and other things like that as well. So when you
look at the range of destabilizing activities he is
undertaking, even before you get to the nuclear question, it is
something that I think we just need to take a lot more
seriously than we do.
Mr. Sires. I didn't mean to take away from Syria and Iran,
but I just think it is important to have the ties that are
being established here, Madam Chair. Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, very important. Thank
you, Mr. Sires.
And now I am pleased to recognize for 5 minutes Ms. Jean
Schmidt of Ohio. And I would ask her to chair the committee for
a few minutes. I have to return a few phone calls.
And Ms. Schmidt and I are colleagues on a bipartisan
congressional softball game, on a lighter note, than this heavy
and important topic. It is a free game. You are all invited,
Watkins Field, at 7 o'clock p.m. today. Debbie Wasserman-
Schultz and Jo Ann Emerson are our colleagues who are captains
of the team. So come support us. And it is for breast cancer
research.
Ms. Schmidt of Ohio is recognized and am pleased to have
her take over.
Ms. Schmidt [presiding]. What the Chairlady didn't tell you
is we are playing the press corps. So pray for us.
On a more serious note, Ambassador Bolton, given what you
know about Syrian nuclear programs, do you agree that we cannot
bifurcate our policies toward Syria, Iran, North Korea, and
their enablers?
Ambassador Bolton. I think this is a very important point.
I think looking at the threat of nuclear proliferation from a
global perspective is important because we know what the
historical linkages have been.
We know the prospect of cooperation. And that should tell
us that there is a lot going on that we don't fully understand.
So that in the case of Iran, where there have been IAEA
inspectors on the ground and some public disclosure, there is
next to nothing out of North Korea. And in both cases, our
intelligence is weak.
So the prospect of cooperation on uranium enrichment, on
ballistic missile testing and technology, on a whole range of
activities designed to evade international sanctions, this kind
of cooperation requires a comprehensive effort and not saying,
``Well, North Korea is a case we deal with over here. And Iran
we deal with over there. And Venezuela we deal with somewhere
else.''
Ms. Schmidt. Mr. Heinonen, do you want to add to that?
Mr. Heinonen. I think Ambassador Bolton has raised an
important issue here when he earlier made a reference to the
silos. I will repeat it. I have a very simple question. Who has
the global overview on nonproliferation? Who has a global
overview on these activities?
For example, IAEA is very limited because IAEA verification
is basically based on comprehensive safeguards agreements. And
this kind of thing doesn't exist between IAEA and North Korea.
IAEA has instruments come from there, from Security Council.
So we need to have somewhere a system which looks the whole
thing in its totality and what is the connection with Venezuela
and someone? North Korea delivered nuclear material to Libya at
the same time Pakistan was providing technology to Libya.
Pakistan was providing all. Technology went from Pakistan to
North Korea and to Iran.
So we have a very complex situation. I think that we need
to get some kind of, I would say, global order to this. And
then what is entirely almost out of this global picture are the
missile programs, because there is no organization currently
which is looking at it. However, these are interconnected. So
we need to create perhaps a new system to tackle with this.
Thank you.
Ms. Schmidt. Thank you.
Ambassador Bolton, along the same thing, would you agree
that a holistic approach is necessary to ensure that these
proliferators, to quote your 2003 testimony, understand that
they will pay a steep price for their effort?
Ambassador Bolton. Yes. I think the other would-be
proliferators around the world are watching how we deal, in
particular, with Iran but also North Korea. And to the extent
that they perceive that launching into a nuclear weapons
program brings the United States or others to the table with
inducements, economic or otherwise, to get them to stop the
program is itself an incentive to get into the nuclear weapons
business.
And the ability of regimes like North Korea and Iran to
evade sanctions, certainly not to feel the full pain of
sanctions shows that the cooperation among these rogue states
is something that we have not dealt with effectively.
So while you can't find anybody in Washington who doesn't
agree that proliferation is a problem, the blunt reality is for
10 years, 20 years we have talked about it a lot, but we have
not been effective. North Korea has tested nuclear weapons.
Iran is getting very close. Others could be on the way.
And what that means is the number of nuclear weapon states,
admittedly with relatively small nuclear arsenals, is
increasing. Dr. Heinonen mentioned Pakistan, a very grave
concern should that government fall into the hands of radicals
or terrorists, that its substantial arsenal of nuclear weapons
would be available for terrorism on a worldwide basis.
So, even though we don't face the kind of civilizational
threat that we faced during the Cold War from a potential
exchange of nuclear salvos with the Soviet Union, the use of
nuclear weapons as terrorist devices has to worry us. They are
targeted against innocent civilians. That is the purpose that
these states want the weapons. And we shouldn't underestimate
the danger that we face.
Ms. Schmidt. I am going to let you finish it, Mr. Satloff.
You wanted to say something.
Mr. Satloff. Madam Chairman, I would like to focus the
attention for a moment on the potential for loose WMD in Syria.
Syria has, as we know, not just a nuclear issue but chemical
weapons program, biological weapons program. The country is in
disarray. Leadership may crack. We don't really know what is
going on inside the leadership of Syria.
I would urge the United States to take a leadership
position in organizing a contact group of interested countries
to focus on what do we do with the potential for loose WMD in
Syria to ensure that loose WMD does not get into the hands of
terrorists. And this country borders the Mediterranean. This
country borders our allies, our NATO ally, including Turkey;
our friend Israel.
I think this is a matter of huge importance. And I am not
sure that adequate attention is being paid to this issue.
Ms. Schmidt. Thank you.
And now I am going to turn the questions over to
Congressman Higgins from New York.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Dr. Satloff, you had indicated in your opening statement
that the United States response to the 2009 Green Revolution
perhaps should have been more direct and decisive. Would you
elaborate a little bit further?
Mr. Satloff. Thank you, Congressman.
Yes. I would say, in retrospect, almost everyone in the
administration would say that we missed an opportunity. We
missed an opportunity to use our bully pulpit to more
effectively support the aspirations of the Iranian people. We
missed an opportunity to ensure that Iranians had the technical
means to circumvent the Iranian Government's use of
communications technology to break down social networks and to
stop the flow of information among the opposition.
We didn't use our technical means to prevent Iranian
interference with satellite activity. There are all sorts of
things that we chose not to do.
I would hope that we are better prepared when I believe the
Iranian people are going to rise up again.
Mr. Higgins. We read recently that there are deep fissures
within the Iranian leadership between Ayatollah Khamenei, the
supreme leader, and that of President Ahmadinejad.
Some have argued that a stronger response--and this has
been going on for some time, including the revolutionary guard.
It is a generational divide in many respects. But some have
argued that a stronger American response in 2009 would have
helped to coalesce those forces back together because we are
viewed as a larger enemy than the enemy than the enemy within.
You reject that I presume?
Mr. Satloff. I think it is apples and oranges, Congressman.
I think that the division between the supreme leader and the
President is a structural phenomenon of how the Islamic
republic is created.
It has one leader, the supreme leader, who is appointed by
God, as it were, and the other who gets elected by mere people.
And the one who gets elected by mere people has two terms. They
expire at the end of 8 years, as he is now approaching the end
of his second term, as is the case with the previous two
Presidents, Khatami and Rasanjani.
The differences emerge between the God-appointed and the
human-appointed leader. This is just part of the system. It has
nothing to do with the United States, I am afraid to say.
Mr. Higgins. Ambassador Bolton, you had talked about Iran's
nuclear weapons program. And you expressed concerns not only
about what is publicly known, but what is not publicly known
should really concern us.
Iran and North Korea, economic sanctions don't appear to be
working. A nuclear Iran cannot be contained or deterred. Are
you advocating for a U.S. military action to destroy Iran's
nuclear capabilities?
Ambassador Bolton. Yes. I have argued for that for about
3\1/2\ years. I think that the only real alternative now is
that Iran gets nuclear weapons. And I advocate that course, not
happily, not because I am enthusiastic about it but because I
think the alternative of a nuclear Iran is so much more
dangerous for us and for our friends and allies in the region,
that having seen all of the other options for dealing with the
Iranian nuclear weapons program failed, that is what we are
left with.
Mr. Higgins. If such action was taken, what would be the
regional consequences relative to the Middle East?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I think there are two basic
questions. First, how would Iran itself respond? And, then,
second, what would some of the other countries do? I think the
fact is the Arab regimes in the region would welcome the
destruction of Iran's nuclear weapons program.
They fear it as much as we do or Israel does, but they
appreciate that they don't have the capability to do anything
about it. They would certainly criticize us or criticize Israel
if Israel were to undertake such a strike. They would criticize
us publicly, but they would welcome it privately.
The issue of how Iran would respond is obviously a crucial
element of the calculus. And it is one we can't know with
certainty. But I have looked at this very carefully. And I
think that Iran is unlikely to do anything that would bring it
into direct confrontation with the United States beyond the
destruction of the nuclear program itself.
I think Iran's most likely response would be to unleash
Hezbollah, in particular, and possibly Hamas as well for rocket
attacks against Israel. I think that would certainly be their
response if it were Israel that did the attack. And that
obviously puts at risk civilian populations.
This is not a pleasant alternative, but it is a lot less
pleasant to look at a future where Iran has nuclear weapons.
Mr. Higgins. Thank you. And I will yield back.
Ms. Schmidt. Thank you. And now we will recognize Mr.
Duncan from South Carolina for 5 minutes for questions.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you. And, Ambassador Bolton, thank you
for being here today. I followed your career with a lot of
interest and admiration over the years, and I want to say thank
you for your service to our country.
First and foremost, I would like to delve into the
connection between Iran and al-Qaeda a little bit more because,
really, the links go back to the early 1990s with the Quds
force and al-Qaeda, go back to the Khobar Towers bombing in
Saudi Arabia and a lot of links there. The 9/11 Commission
report detailed a lot of those connections.
And concurrently with support from a state sponsor like
Iran, al-Qaeda would be in a better position than ever to
strike both the West and our allies and from that chaos in both
the Arab world and south Asia.
What should the United States be aware of with that
relationship? And what threat do you see from al-Qaeda with
regards to Iran?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, certainly Iran has for many years
been the world's central banker for international terrorism.
And it is a funder and an armor of terrorists pretty much on an
equal opportunity basis: Hezbollah; Shia; Hamas, which Iran has
funded and armed; Sunni. The Iranian regime has funded
extremists in Iraq who have attacked American forces, but they
have also funded their once-sworn enemy, the Taliban, in
attacking NATO forces in Afghanistan.
So I don't think we really know what the connection is, but
I think just as a target of opportunity, it is obviously
something to worry about because the common enemy is the United
States.
Even if there is no connection at all, obviously the risk
of al-Qaeda itself getting nuclear weapons I think is something
we have to consider. It has been an objective of al-Qaeda
almost since its inception. And to me it is the continuing
perfect storm that terrorists of whatever stripe do get weapons
of mass destruction and use them against the United States or
our friends and you have 9/11 on a dramatically more damaging
scale.
Mr. Duncan. On a different line of questioning because I am
very interested in the Muslim Brotherhood and the Arab Spring
and what is going on with the rising democracy or move for a
democratic self-governance within the Arabian Peninsula,
northern Africa, it is my opinion and I am asking if you agree
with me that the Muslim Brotherhood is pushing for a more
democratic style government so they will have a seat at the
table. And they can continue to grow their influence toward
other things.
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I think that is certainly their
objective. I think it is very hard to project what comes out of
the changes that we have seen in different parts of the Arab
world. You know, in Egypt today, we still have a military
government. And that military government has brought Hamas and
the Palestinian Authority together.
It has opened the border between Egypt and Gaza Strip and
allowed Hamas to have full communications with the Muslim
Brotherhood, which is, in effect, its corporate sponsor. This
government in Egypt has recognized the regime in Iran for the
first time since 1979. Leading figures in the regime as well as
candidates for President have called into question the Camp
David Accords.
So I think we are in a very dangerous period ahead. And I
don't think that we can project on a straight line what
organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood or others did from
the past into the future because with the repression of the
Mubarak era released, that they could move in any of several
different directions.
They could become legitimately democratic or they could
become far more radical from a religious point of view. And
that is why I think with conditions so uncertain we have to
really be very worried about the future of the Camp David
Accords under any new Egyptian Government and what effect that
would have in Jordan and to the security of Israel and our
other friends in the region more broadly.
And when you lay over all of that uncertainty, the
continuing, indeed growing risk of Iran's nuclear weapons
program, I think that conditions are right for more turmoil,
more risk, more potential trouble in the region than at any
time in decades.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, sir. And I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Payne, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on
Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights, is recognized.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. I wonder what our
assessment of the IAEA is currently, whether it is really
strong enough. I do remember that during the Bush
administration, we did watch inspections, which Saddam Hussein
prevented IAEA to have the opportunity to inspect properly.
However, I do recall that when Hans Blix was finally given
the opportunity by Saddam Hussein, although albeit late knowing
that they had no weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, although
all of our experts, Cheney and Rumsfeld and Bush and yourself,
were convinced that there were weapons of mass destruction.
And, of course, we ordered the IAEA to leave Iraq at the
time that the Saddam Hussein regime said they could go anywhere
they wanted to know because they, of course, knew they had no
weapons of mass destruction nor did they have biological or
chemical weapons. However, we ordered the IAEA out and then, of
course, went on to have the attack on Iraq. And then we did
finally conclude that there were no weapons of mass
destruction. And, of course, we got rid of a bad guy. It cost
us an awful lot.
I wonder if anybody could tell me about your opinion of
IAEA at this time and its effectiveness. Evidently it's not
what we would like it to be because this Ambassador Bolton said
that the way to deal with Iran, of course, is to blow up their
facilities. I wonder if that is a permanent solution or whether
they may have an alternate site where they are developing the
weapon at some other site that we may not have determined and
that to destroy one may not end the problem.
So I just wondered if anybody had any comments. Of course,
Ambassador Bolton certainly could comment on anything that I
have mentioned and that I have said since I referred to him and
his administration. We have had these discussions before.
Ambassador Bolton. Right. Well, Congressman, I would love
to get back into a discussion of Iraq. I will just say one
thing on that score. One reason we believe Saddam Hussein had
weapons of mass destruction because after the first Persian
Gulf War, he declared to the United Nations that he had massive
supplies of chemical weapons, which he never proved to the
U.N.'s satisfaction that he had destroyed. And, actually, I am
not aware of anybody before the second Persian Gulf war who
didn't believe that Saddam had massive amounts of chemical
weapons. That turns out not to be true, for whatever reason,
but I don't remember before the war anybody doubting that his
claims of those stocks were accurate.
On the IAEA itself, I think, as Congressman Berman noted,--
and I appreciate his mentioning it--I think under the
leadership of the new director general, Yukiya Amano, that
there is a real chance that the IAEA can have the more
prominent role in anti-proliferation activities that we hope
that it should.
The IAEA has always been a different kind of U.N.
specialized agency. It has a unique relationship with the
Security Council. And it is one we should foster.
I think it has been historically the case that the IAEA's
inspectors, like Dr. Heinonen and others, have been straight
shooters. They have tried to report the facts as they have been
able to find them out. Our trouble has been more at the top
level. I think that problem is now corrected. I certainly hope
so. And I certainly look forward to supporting the IAEA in its
efforts, particularly on Iran.
Mr. Payne. Thank you very much. My time has just about
expired, but we do recall that we did know that Iran, Iraq had
biological and chemical weapons because we supplied them. They
never had the capacity to make them themselves according to the
report that I have seen. And I just wonder whether that is true
or not that they had----
Ambassador Bolton. It's not true. Now, we did not supply
Iraq with biological or chemical weapons. Their programs were
known before. The question was before the attack what level of
stockpiles that the Iraqis had.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Ambassador Bolton. And their declarations on the chemical
weapons side, in particular, were very extensive. U.N. weapons
inspectors asked repeatedly to see the stockpiles and to see
them destroyed. And the Iraqi regime repeatedly said, ``We have
destroyed the''----
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much.
Ambassador Bolton. [continuing]. ``But we are not going to
let you see where.''
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Chabot, the Middle East Subcommittee chair, is
recognized.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you, Madam Chair.
Mr. Satloff, if I could begin with you first? I was in the
region recently. One of the countries we were in, among others,
was Saudi Arabia. I am interested in relative to Saudi Arabia
and Iran. The Saudis believe quite strongly in fear that Iran
is slowly but certainly encircling them and that there are
Iranian influenced entities, terrorist organizations, and
otherwise; in Egypt, for example, the warming relations between
Egypt and Iran, Yemen, Bahrain, others, and that that is one of
their real threats. Are they correct in that belief that they
have?
Mr. Satloff. I think that the Saudis are absolutely correct
to take with the utmost seriousness the Iranian effort to
encircle them and to erode first American strength in the Gulf
and eventually to compel Saudi Arabia to recognize Iranian
hegemony in the Gulf.
The Saudis view what is going on in Yemen as an opportunity
for Iran to be trouble-making via the Houthis. The Saudis view
what happened in Bahrain as an Iranian exercise. I think to a
certain extent the Saudis exaggerate the Bahrain situation. The
Bahrain situation was legitimately overwhelmingly a domestic
opposition movement for more pluralistic society, but the
Iranian effort to take advantage of this is real. And, most
importantly, I think the Saudis doubt America's staying power,
but America is not evincing toward the Iranians the view that
we are truly committed to stop your nuclear program, that we
are truly committed to roll back your intentions to expand your
influence, that we are truly committed in Lebanon, truly
committed in Syria, truly committed in Iraq. I think the
Saudis' view is that we are without a clear strategy to counter
Iran's hegemonic designs.
And, therefore, you see this fundamental tension between
Washington and Riyadh today. It is not over some symbolic
issue. It is over a very real difference.
Mr. Chabot. I tend to agree with you. And, despite some of
the administration have kind of poo-pooed Saudi's belief in
that, I think there is a lot of legitimacy in that belief and
the threat that Iran plays toward Iran and the rest of the
region.
We have such limited time. Mr. Ambassador, if I could turn
to you next? You said a couple of things that really struck me,
and maybe you could expound upon them a little bit. One, you
said that our security guarantees our declining. And I assume
what you mean is that other countries, perhaps some that are
relying upon the United States or what ultimately if they ally
themselves with us or they cooperate with us, in some
countries' mind, that may be not necessarily the smartest thing
to do in their view. Could you talk about that a little bit?
Ambassador Bolton. Right. The idea that some have advocated
is that for the Gulf Cooperation Council nations; for example,
the six Arab members of that organization, that if we gave them
guarantees that we would protect them against Iran's use of
nuclear weapons, that that would help create a system of
deterrence in the region that would mitigate against the risk
of Iran once it gets nuclear weapons.
I think that is, number one, a pretty minimal kind of
guarantee. I mean, are we saying we are prepared ourselves to
engage in hostilities with Iran if they use nuclear weapons or
threaten them against the Gulf countries, number one? And,
number two, I think for the Gulf countries themselves, they are
not inclined at this point to believe the security guarantee
when they see essentially a withdrawal of America from Iraq;
substantial drawdown in Afghanistan; and, as Dr. Satloff
mentioned, an inability over a sustained period of time to deal
with the Iranian terrorist of nuclear weapons threats to begin
with?
Mr. Chabot. Let me shift to one other gear, if I could. I
have only got real limited time. You had also said that absent
some I think you said significant step or some action or
something from an outsider, Iran will get nuclear weapons. I
tend to agree with that. I think that the sanctions and all of
this stuff is just a way to kick it down the road and that they
are bound and determined and they are going to do it unless
there is some action.
And I don't have much time for you to respond, but any
quick response you want to give?
Ambassador Bolton. I agree.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Sorry.
Mr. Chabot. Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. That's good. Thank you so much.
Mr. Engel, my good friend, the Subcommittee on the Middle
East and South--no--the ranking member on the Subcommittee on
the Western Hemisphere? You switched regions on me. And I am
still thinking of you in that area. Thank you.
Mr. Engel. Well, thank you. Thank you, Madam Chair. And, of
course, you and I did good work together passing the Syria
Accountability Act many years ago. And we now have joint
legislation against Syria again.
Ambassador Bolton, it is good to see you again. I remember
the time we visited the United Nations and appreciate your work
and Mr. Heinonen and Mr. Satloff as well. Thank you. Thank you
very much.
When we sat down and did the Syria Accountability Act back
in 2003, I noted that the State Department's list of terrorist
countries that support terrorism included Syria. And it was a
charter member of that list since 1979, when that list came
through. And, yet, it was renewed every year as a charter
member. And we continued to have normal diplomatic relations
with Syria.
Frankly--and I question some of the administration
officials here--I couldn't understand why we sent our
Ambassador back to Syria. I didn't think that their behavior
was warranted for us to send an ambassador back.
It seems to me, you know, we made a decision to go into
Libya. And I supported that decision. But I think Syria is
worse than Libya, quite frankly.
Libya is a large country. Ghadafi is out of his mind. And,
granted, he is a bad player and the Arab League did say that
they wanted to get rid of him. But when you look at what Assad
has done, you look at the fact that Lebanon, which had a war
with Israel not long ago, and part of the agreement to end that
war was that the weapons that Hezbollah had would not be
replenished and, yet, Hezbollah has many, many more weapons
today than it did before. And obviously those weapons came from
Iran through Syria. And Syria is the closest ally with Iran.
So I just don't understand why we are turning our heads the
other way when it comes to Syria. And I wonder, Ambassador
Bolton, if you could comment on that.
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I largely agree with that
analysis. I was at the U.N. when we negotiated the cease-fire
resolution to bring to a conclusion the Summer 2006 war between
Israel and Hezbollah. And central parts of that resolution
involved pushing Syria further out of Lebanon and demarcating
the border, making sure Syria wasn't supplying weapons to
Hezbollah and Iran as well.
And the fact was that we were trying to use the
opportunity. At least that is where we started out, not only to
buttress the Cedar Revolution in Lebanon but to apply pressure
to the Assad regime in Syria as well. And we just simply did
not follow through on that. And that has been a mistake. And we
can see it in spades now given the violence against innocent
civilians that is an Assad family tradition in Syria.
Mr. Engel. Let me ask you something else. Back in 2007,
during the Bush administration, it was generally felt that Iran
was obviously producing weapons, nuclear weapons. And there was
talk about the administration taking out Iran's facilities.
And then there became a national intelligence estimate,
which said essentially, falsely obviously, that Iran had
stopped its nuclear weapons programs in 2003 and, therefore,
all the steam seemed to go out of the Bush administration. At
least that is the way it appeared to me in terms of confronting
Iran.
You know, we would have been better off confronting them
earlier. It is harder now. Can you tell me about that and what
your feeling is about that because I think that was a disaster?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I think that NIE was the most
politicized intelligence estimate probably in the history of
our intelligence services. It did real damage to the focus on
Iran. And it was inaccurate when it was written.
I give an example in my testimony of reports about the
Parchin facility in Iran, an artillery and armor base where
they were doing testing on simultaneous detonation
capabilities. In the Fall of 2004, reported by ABC News, it was
live testing going on then, the only purpose of which was to
create the capability to explode a nuclear device.
So I think that there were factual mistakes in that
estimate. I think it was politicized. I think it has done
enormous damage. And I don't think we have operated for quite
some time on the basis that it is accurate. And it certainly
was not.
Mr. Engel. Thank you.
Mr. Satloff, let me ask you this. I have been frustrated
with Saudi Arabia because obviously they could be more helpful
in terms of the Middle East peace process and help bring the
Arab countries over. Iran is obviously a major threat to Saudi
Arabia. One of the Saudi royals was saying the other day that
they thought that Saudi Arabia would try to bring down the
price of oil in order to hit Iran in the pocketbook.
Why isn't Saudi Arabia doing more to help us bring the
Iranian regime down or at least stop the nuclear weapons
program vis-a-vis reaching out to Israel?
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. And that is an excellent question
that will be answered at a later time. Thank you.
Mr. Engel. Madam Chair.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Mr. Rohrabacher, the Subcommittee on
Oversight and Investigations chair.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
On April 8th of this year, Iraqi troops stormed into Camp
Ashraf, which is on the Iraq-Iran border, and massacred unarmed
Iranian expatriates who were residents of that camp. This, in
and of itself, was criminal activity. I mean, as a crime
against humanity or at least a murder of those 35 unarmed
people. And I would say the wounding of at least 100 others is
a crime.
But does this also, Mr. Bolton, indicate that Iran is
having undue influence on Iraq? Here we did all of this we
could do to create a democratic Iraq. And then they are under
the tutelage of Iran? Because obviously the slaughter of these
people, these unarmed people, in Camp Ashraf was done to the
benefit of Iran.
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I think it is very troubling what
happened, as you mentioned, what the Government of Iraq did
there. I am aware also that they refused to allow U.N. and
other members of a congressional delegation to visit Camp
Ashraf in the past couple of months.
Mr. Rohrabacher. That was my delegation. Yes.
Ambassador Bolton. I just couldn't believe that they did
that. And I do think that there are many signs of Iran's
efforts to increase its influence inside of Iraq and very
troubling and inadequate the responses by the current
Government of Iraq.
So that as our forces leave, here is a good example. We
gave protection to the refugees at Camp Ashraf. Our military
disarmed them, took their pledges of renunciation of terrorism,
and believe they cooperated with us in a range of things.
General Hugh Shelton, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs,
has said publicly the MEK aided us before the invasion of Iraq.
So it is a very troubling history.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Yes. And I suggest that we, Madam
Chairman, keep an eye on this. We will be holding a hearing
with my Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of this
committee, into the massacre at Camp Ashraf.
Let me just note that, Mr. Satloff, your remarks were a
breath of fresh air. I will just have to say I am tired of
being the only one who is suggesting this strategy that you
seem to be advocating today. That is an active promotion of
democratic movements as a means to achieve ends, foreign policy
ends, very similar to the Reagan doctrine, who we were
supporting those who were fighting against Soviet tyranny
during the Reagan years.
When we were talking about Syria and Iran, let me just
underscore the point that you made was so important for us to
understand. Yes, we are supporting democracy except when it
really, when the crisis, is upon us.
And aren't you disappointed that the United States, your
testimony indicates that, we don't seize the moment to fight
for what we believe in or at least help those who are fighting
for democracy but we sort of step back at a time of crisis in
order to let history run its course? Is this the way you
identify that, as I do?
Mr. Satloff. Well, I appreciate your kind words,
Congressman. Thank you very much.
I do see in Syria and Iran enormous strategic opportunities
for the United States. These are places where our values and
our interests are synonymous. We don't have to make the choice.
We don't have to wring our hands, as we did perhaps with Egypt,
where we might have regretted the loss of a peace process
partner but cheered the Democrats. Here we will lose an
adversary and gain democracy.
Mr. Rohrabacher. During the Cold War era, again, Reagan did
this with the Soviets. We ended the Cold War without having a
confrontation with the Soviet Union.
On another subject, let me just say over the years I have
depended on the IAEA for information and found it a good source
of information, although not necessarily a good source for
policy. Why is it that when you take a look at North Korea and
Pakistan and Iran, you know, obviously these are--everyone has
complained about that, but, again, my colleague mentioned
earlier it's China who is behind all of these people.
I mean, if we are so gutless that we cannot bring up the
Chinese relationship in this type of proliferation to these
countries, we are going to have this proliferation. It is going
to continue. And I would hope that we start paying attention to
the role that China is playing. North Korea----
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Rohrabacher [continuing]. Didn't develop these on its
own. Neither did Pakistan. And neither is Iran. China is
playing a horrible role.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Rohrabacher. Thank you, Madam.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I have
raised the attack on Camp Ashraf directly with Secretary of
State Clinton, with the Iraqi authorities, with the U.N. High
Commissioners, Commissioner for Refugees, and Ranking Member
Berman and I have worked together and will continue to do so to
ensure the safety of the residents of Camp Ashraf. And we thank
you for being here with us today.
So pleased to yield time to my Florida colleague,
Congressman Deutch of Florida.
Mr. Deutch. I thank you, Madam Chair. And thanks to all of
you for being here this morning.
Dr. Satloff, current sanctions law allows the State
Department alone to determine whether to investigate and
whether to sanction companies involved in the energy sector of
Iran. Process can often lead and, in fact, does to diplomatic
relations, potentially trumping national security concerns,
particularly when it comes to these Chinese companies.
It is estimated that more than 100 Chinese companies
operate in Iran currently. And, in fact, in February, the
President of Iran's petroleum engineering and development
company was quoted as saying that ``China will invest $2.5
billion in developing the South Azadegan Oil Field that
straddles the border with Iraq.''
If we are unwilling to sanction these companies, what
leverage do we have with the Chinese?
Mr. Satloff. Well, first of all, I agree very much with
your assessment of the problem, Congressman. What I would urge
to complement our efforts on sanctions or beyond the need to
actually pursue this is to go to the Chinese with the choice.
And this means working with the Saudis to be a larger
diplomatic actor in this arena, to go to the Chinese with a
choice: Do business with us or do business with Iran. And if
the Saudis were willing to make that choice, to put the choice
to the Chinese, then we might actually get a greater Chinese
cooperation vis-a-vis Iran.
But because we go back to the earlier problem of Saudi
disagreement with the United States or reluctance or disbelief
in our commitment vis-a-vis Iran, we don't get full cooperation
from the Saudis on what they might be willing to do vis-a-vis
China either.
So I think we need to go back to a more serious discussion
with the Saudis to get them to engage and compel the Chinese to
make a choice: Business with us or business with the Iranians?
Mr. Deutch. So is there additional leverage that the United
States has? The suggestion of the Saudis putting the choice to
them I understand, but is there additional leverage that we
have?
Mr. Satloff. Sure. Within the larger context of U.S.-
Chinese relations, I would like to see this administration
raise this level, raise this issue much higher on the ladder of
our agenda.
Nonproliferation I would like to think this President views
as one of his very top priorities. If that is the case, then
there are things that we should be willing to play with in the
U.S.-Chinese relationship in order to get China to be far more
cooperative on the Iranian issue.
Mr. Deutch. Dr. Heinonen, I know you may have touched on
some of these I am told, but I just would like to confirm. You
spent 20 years with IAEA. An awful lot of that time was spent
focused on Iran's nuclear ambitions. Can you give us your
assessment from the latest report, particularly Iran's
increased production of high enriched uranium, their claim to
have faster, higher update and faster centrifuges?
You spoke earlier apparently about breakout. And there
seemed to be some slight disagreement between you and
Ambassador Bolton on how long that might be.
My question really is not just how long it would take if
they choose to break out but how likely it is that we would
know.
Mr. Heinonen. Thank you. First of all, I think that we have
a little bit of disagreement with Ambassador Bolton only
because whether they use current centrifuges or the ones which
we may not know they have. So the number differs.
Mr. Deutch. And, again, I understand that, if I may, from I
think the perspective of most of us here, whether it is, in
fact, 1 year or 1\1/2\ months, should they choose to do it,
there is no reason to view either of those as less urgent.
Mr. Heinonen. So the known centrifuges are almost all the
time under the control of IAEA. So if they manipulate the
sensitive cascades, the international community knows it
roughly in 2 weeks time that the IAEA has a program provided
that the Secretariat takes the action and informs its Board of
Governors.
There are unannounced inspections. There are cameras. There
are seals. Once they are compromised, these pictures will
report it. So we know subsequent of a situation very fast.
Mr. Deutch. But we can know there are additional facilities
like Qom, right?
Mr. Heinonen. Yes. That is where the unknowns are. And that
is where probably we have also some differences in those
numbers. And that is what has happened now during last I would
say 4 or 5 years with Iran, since they suspended the
implementation of the additional protocol, that knowledge of
international community about the nuclear program of Iran has
come down while their capabilities are ramping up. So these two
things go in the wrong direction.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Heinonen. That is the dilemma.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you.
Mr. Fortenberry, the vice chair of the Subcommittee on
Africa, Global Health, and Human Rights, is recognized.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Madam Chair. Gentlemen, thank
you for coming today. I appreciate your testimony.
Ambassador Bolton, given that sanctions seemingly are not
slowly significantly the march toward Iran's nuclear ambitions
and their capability, we appear to be drifting toward a de
facto containment policy should they obtain weapons. Can you
unpack what that scenario looks like?
Unfortunately, I read through your statement, but I didn't
have the last point. The paper wasn't stapled to it. You said
it is significantly different from the containment policies in
the Cold War. Can you elucidate on what that scenario would
look like?
And then the parallel question is I would like all of you
to just project out based upon the current trajectory of the
situation what this is going to look like in 5 years.
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I think the differences between an
Iran with a relatively small number of nuclear weapons and the
Soviet Union during the Cold War cover a variety of grants. I
was just giving one example there. They have got a different
view of the value, the relative value, of life in the hereafter
versus life here on Earth. That is one thing that----
Mr. Fortenberry. So do you think that religious value would
beg the potential uses of a nuclear weapon?
Ambassador Bolton. I think it is a very different calculus
than the communist in Moscow in the Cold War who, whatever else
you want to say about them, were atheists and thought they were
only going around once and weren't all that enthusiastic about
throwing it away.
But the real problem is the logic of deterrence itself,
which, however successful it may have been as we understand the
Cold War better, we can see how risky it was and how nearly on
any number of occasions it didn't work. When you have got an
asymmetric threat, in particular, a threat that could be aimed
not at the United States but at a friend or ally of the United
States, that calculus is even harder.
So that the perception that Iran has or is very close to
nuclear weapons would give them a leverage in the Middle East
that would completely undo the existing framework we have. And
I think that is something that should undermine our confidence
in our ability to contain and deter a nuclear Iran.
But an even more fundamental point is if I am wrong about
that, it doesn't stop with Iran. And when other countries, like
Saudi, Egypt, Turkey, and maybe others, have the prospect of
getting nuclear weapons, then you are in a multi-polar nuclear
Middle East where, you know, in the Cold War, it was a bipolar
deterrence at work. In a multi-polar environment, it is
inherently far more dangerous and unstable.
Mr. Fortenberry. I basically knew what you were going to
say before I asked the question, but I think it is important to
paint that scenario.
Dr. Satloff, you had mentioned that you believe the Iranian
people will rise again. And it is related to your point
earlier, Ambassador Bolton, that the only prospects here from
your perspective on stopping this is a military intervention or
an imminent regime change.
A lot of us have placed a great deal of hope in
anticipation and a lot of encouragement through this committee
and in other places in the hands of good Iranian people who are
simply seeking a new form of governance that is consistent with
their tradition of justice.
How real do you think that is now, though?
Mr. Satloff. I think that the prospects are better today
than they were a year ago for the very simple reason that
Iranians are looking at what is going on elsewhere in the
Middle East. The idea that not just friends of the United
States, Egyptians, Tunisians arising up but friends of Iran,
Syrian people. I think the Syrian model is hugely powerful and
will have a major impact on whether the Iranian people
themselves choose this path. And that is another reason why
this is a strategic opportunity for the United States to help
bring about change in Syria, which will help trigger change in
Iran.
Mr. Fortenberry. Short of those two objectives, military
intervention of some kind and a regime change through a rising
of the people, Mr. Deutch was pointing out the other leverage
points that we may have. All of this tends to focus on our
efforts. And, yet, we sometimes don't think about these
leverage points.
You said, ``Let's tell the Chinese: Business with us or
business with Iranians?'' I think that is great. The problem
here is we basically have shifted so much manufacturing
overseas to them they make the stuff. Wal-Mart sells the stuff.
They have the cash. And they buy our debt.
So this completely dysfunctional relationship that we have
with China does not empower us to actually ask them for
leverage in helping us against Iran. We are almost supplicants.
Mr. Satloff. Actually Congressman, I was referring rather
specifically to what we hope the Saudis would do, which is the
Iranians are----
Mr. Fortenberry. I'm sorry. I didn't----
Mr. Satloff [continuing]. In deep search for oil resources.
Mr. Fortenberry. Yes.
Mr. Satloff. If the Saudis would say, ``Business with us or
them?'' that would hurt the Iranians greatly. The Saudis would
provide all of the oil resources the Chinese need.
Mr. Fortenberry. But clearly there are linkages to China
here as well that we could potentially leverage. And I'm sorry.
I mixed the point up. Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Sherman, the ranking member on the Subcommittee on
Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade, is recognized.
Mr. Sherman. I want to comment briefly on Mr. Fortenberry's
comments. I mean, an Iran with nuclear weapons is not only
terrorism with impunity and this has been pointed out an end to
the nonproliferation regime.
I am old enough to have lived through the Cuban missile
crisis, where you had a confrontation of two, military
confrontation of two, hostile nuclear powers. We have gunboats
versus American destroyers in the Persian Gulf from time to
time. And I would hate to have one of those be a confrontation
between two hostile nuclear powers, in part because we rolled
the dice once with the Cuban missile crisis. I don't want to do
it again in my lifetime. But also Khrushchev was considerably
saner than the Iranian regime.
And then, of course, we dream, as Mr. Satloff does, of an
uprising, but it may not come this year. It may come 5 years
from now.
Ambassador Bolton, if there really were 2 million people on
the streets of Teheran in Shallah and if this regime was going
to be swept out of power, would they act like Gorbachev, shrug
their shoulders and walk off the world stage, or would they go
out with a bang?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, I think they demonstrated in the
aftermath of the fraudulent elections in the summer of 2009,
they are prepared to kill the stay in power. And I think that
is what is going on in Syria as well. So I think it----
Mr. Sherman. Are they prepared to use nuclear weapons
against Israel in order to perhaps regain popularity in Iran or
are they willing to use nuclear weapons against the United
States if they feel that, ``Well, they are going out anyway.
They might as well go out that way''?
Ambassador Bolton. You know, I don't honestly know the
answer to that question, but, as you suggested, I would rather
not find out. That is why I think it is so critical, so
critical to stop the regime in Teheran from getting these
weapons to begin with.
Mr. Sherman. Ambassador, the MEK is still on the terrorist
list. Should they be? Why are they still on the terrorist list?
You have some understanding of the inside of the State
Department. And over the last 15 years, has the MEK done more
to help American security or to hurt American national
security?
Ambassador Bolton. It has done more to help American
security, particularly on the nuclear weapons front I know of
my own personal knowledge. And I can say this. I think the
State Department is now under a court order to revisit the
terrorist designation.
And I think they should and should do it promptly. I think
whether it's a designation of a foreign terrorist organization
or a state sponsor of terrorism, the State Department has got
to look at the facts and let the facts fall where they may. And
political considerations, one way or the other, should not
enter into it.
MEK was put on the terrorist list and kept on the terrorist
list on several occasions in the hopes of getting friendlier
diplomatic response.
Mr. Sherman. How is that working out?
Ambassador Bolton. It has not worked out. So let's look at
the facts. Let's let the chips fall where they may. And if they
don't deserve to be on the list, let's not let political
considerations keep them there.
Mr. Sherman. I want to commend you for your comments on the
infamous NIE and then ask you about a license that is pending
in the Obama administration. And, unfortunately, it is very
close to being issued. I believe the ranking member and
chairwoman have joined me in trying to stop this. And that is a
license to GE to repair the engines on the civilian Iranian
aircraft.
If we repair those engines, can we be confident that the
planes will not be used to take weapons to Assad or Hezbollah?
Ambassador Bolton. Certainly not. You know, I opposed those
licenses back in 2002 and 2003. I guess they are just
persistent people. But I was against granting them then. I am
against granting them now.
Mr. Sherman. Should we be providing money or weapons to
dissident elements in Syria?
Ambassador Bolton. I think we should be providing whatever
assistance they think would be helpful to them. And I would
have done this on both an overt and covert basis going back
years. And I would say the same with respect to Iran.
Mr. Sherman. Mr. Satloff, do you have any comment on that?
Mr. Satloff. In my testimony, I suggested the establishment
of humanitarian zones on each of Syria's borders that would be
a base with which we could work with the Syrian opposition. If
what they need are materiel, then let's provide materiel. If
what they need are just goods, let's provide the goods. All of
their neighbors want to help. We should be there for them.
Mr. Sherman. Are you talking humanitarian assistance or the
tools to overthrow the Assad regime?
Mr. Satloff. If they are looking for the tools, then we
should help provide them. I think that what they are looking
for most of all, Congressman, are not the weapons but the
communications tools.
The best weapon that the Syrian people are using in their
fight against the regime is YouTube. And we should provide them
the means to circumvent the Syrian Government's efforts to
repress information in the country.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
Finally I want to comment on how important it is that we
sanction Chinese companies for their business in Iran because
if we don't, not only do they take up the slack in Iran, but
our European friends get very angry that the sanctions are not
putting pressure on Iran. They're just shifting the business
opportunity to Beijing.
Ambassador Bolton. Could I just say on that----
Mr. Sherman. Yes.
Ambassador Bolton [continuing]. When I was Under Secretary,
we sanctioned a lot of Chinese companies. And it provoked howls
of outrage from the State Department but also from China. It
had a very important effect because it focused Chinese
attention on things that were happening that sometimes I think
the central government didn't necessarily have control of. I
wish we had sanctioned China more.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much.
Mr. Burton, chairman of the Subcommittee on Europe and
Eurasia?
Mr. Burton. Thank you, Madam Chairman--Chairwoman. Excuse
me. I always get that wrong.
Mr. Bolton, good seeing you again, Ambassador. I watch you
on television quite a bit. You are saying what I think. And I
feel like I am helping write your speeches. So I just want you
to know I agree with----
Ambassador Bolton. I take all the help I can get,
Congressman. Thank you very much.
Mr. Burton. First of all, my big concern is the United
States energy policies. Right now we still get somewhere around
30-35 percent of our energy from the Middle East. And if Iran
continues with their nuclear program--and I read today where
Ahmadinejad has said that they are not afraid to make a nuclear
weapon.
If they continue to do that with their goal, stated goal,
to destroy Israel, what is your view on what might happen? Do
you think Israel would take a first strike action against Iran
before they had a weapon that could be delivered to Israel? And
if so, how would that affect the United States energy policy?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, it certainly has been Israeli
policy up until now not to permit hostile states to get
capacities that would put them in the vicinity of nuclear
weapons. That is why they bombed the Osirak reactor out of
Baghdad in '81. That is why they bombed the North Korean
reactor in September of '07. They have allowed Bushehr to go
into operation. The Iranians are building a heavy water
reactor, heavy water production facility at Arak. And obviously
their uranium enrichment program is well underway.
I obviously don't know what the Government of Israel is
going to do, but based on their past performance, faced with
that kind of existential threat, it wouldn't surprise me.
Mr. Burton. Well, I guess that is the concern that many of
us have in the Congress that if that were to occur, there might
be a real widespread conflict over there involving other
countries. And that could bottle up maybe the Persian Gulf or
the Suez Canal. And we would be right hip deep in there to get
the energy we need to survive as a nation.
Syria. I read in my notes here that they are getting
chemical weapons from Iran. Is that correct? And if so, how do
we deal with that? Because that again is a weapon of mass
destruction. I wish my colleague Don was still here because
those were weapons that were in Iran, at least we thought,
Iraq, we thought when we first went in there.
Ambassador Bolton. Well, there is no doubt that both Iran
and Syria have active chemical weapons programs. Whether they
are working together or not at this point I don't know, but
that wouldn't surprise me at all. Syria is one of the few
countries that has used chemical weapons against its own
citizens. And as long as they have that capability, it should
be a concern of ours.
Mr. Burton. Well, it is pretty obvious to me that Iran and
Syria have been working together. They have been a conduit for
Hezbollah's and Hamas' weapons going through there. And, as I
recall, Hamas still has headquarters in Damascus. So they are
working hand in glove. So it really concerns me.
I would like to just make one more comment. I have heard a
number of you mention that we ought to use the Saudis or have
the Saudis put pressure on Iran. The Saudis are business
associates of ours. We buy our oil from there. But they
continue to support the establishment of madrassahs, not only
in the Middle East but around the world. And those madrassahs
are teaching radical Wahhabism. And that is a threat to the
entire world.
So if we are putting our confidence in the Saudis to work
with us, I think we need to do that with a jaundiced eye
because so far they certainly haven't stopped their expansion
policy with the madrassahs.
I had one more question here. The ballistic missile program
of Iran, they have short-term missiles now. How far along are
they with intercontinental ballistic missiles? And how likely
is it that they would have the ability to deliver a missile to
the United States at any time in the future?
Ambassador Bolton. Well, they just recently launched their
second satellite. The first was in 2009. That is a critical
demonstration that they have got ballistic missile
capabilities. The real issue for them and for North Korea is
whether they can downsize the nuclear device into a warhead-
sized package or increase the thrust of their rocket
capabilities to put the two together and deliver it over the
long distances.
But we know that both countries have been working hard on
this for a long time. And reports concerning North Korea, in
particular, are very troubling about their Taepodong 2
capabilities, which I think we have got to assume, at least in
part, have been shared with Iran.
So they are working from both ends perfecting the nuclear
device, downsizing it, and increasing their rocket
capabilities.
Mr. Burton. Let me make just one comment regarding regime
change in Syria. I sincerely hope that the administration if
they decide to take any military action, that it comes to
Congress first.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you very much, Mr. Burton.
Mr. Connolly of Virginia?
Mr. Connolly. Thank you, Madam Chairman.
A question for all three panelists. What should we
understand is going on internally in the Iranian Government
right now in terms of the public feud between Ahmadinejad and
the so-called supreme leader?
Mr. Satloff. Congressman, I think the public feud is a
reflection of the fact that President Ahmadinejad's second term
is coming to a close. And as it is coming to a close, Khamenei
is exerting his authority, reminding people who the true
supreme leader is, preparing for the next Presidential election
to ensure that throughout the political system in Iran, they
know who will be determining who the next President will be. So
we are seeing clerics that for the last several years might
have been edging toward Ahmadinejad because of his popularity
now jumping ship from him knowing that Khamenei is the true
source of power in this country.
There isn't a divide on policy vis-a-vis the United States.
One of them is not arguing to negotiate the nuclear agreement
with the United States because out of a different ideological
view, I think this is much more having to do with the
distribution of power in the future next election and
Khamenei's continuing control over that political system.
Ambassador Bolton. I agree with that. I would just add one
thing. I think in the past few years, there has been a shift of
power toward the revolutionary guards in a variety of ways:
Economic power. Certainly they control the nuclear weapons
program. And I think part of the struggle that is playing out
is the role of the revolutionary guards and whether indeed they
are moving toward not just the theocracy, which they have now,
but a kind of militarized theocracy. And I don't think that is
finished. I don't think that power shift is finished yet.
Mr. Heinonen. And I believe that not very much will change
in the nuclear program for a very simple reason, that when Iran
started the last program in 1985-87, the President of the
country was Khamenei. And the prime minister was Mousavi. So
they both are the founding fathers of the current nuclear
program.
Mr. Connolly. And would you agree with your two colleagues
on the panel that we should read this as jockeying for
reassertion of dominance as pretty much an internal political
thing in Iran with no significance in terms of shifting of form
of government or policy? I am asking you, Mr. Heinonen. Mr.
Heinonen?
Mr. Heinonen. I think that the way I see--I am not the
policy person, but the way I see is that one of the few things
which unifies Iran today is the nuclear program. It is a
patriotic program. And they have seen in the last 8 to 10 years
that it has brought the impact to the world states. And,
therefore, I believe that they continue on this line, and they
will be very unified.
Mr. Satloff. I do want to concur with the thrust of
Ambassador Bolton's comment, which is that the Iranian regime
is becoming more narrowly and narrowly militarized with less
and less popular support. Even as it exerts control as it
smashes dissent, it relies on a narrower and narrower base of
support.
It is still powerful. It is still in control of the
country. But this is not the regime that can bring millions of
people into the streets to chant ``Death to America'' as it did
20-30 years ago. The support is much narrower than ever before.
Mr. Connolly. Does that suggest, Mr. Satloff, that there is
long-term an instability built into that form of government,
that regime, that, sooner or later, may manifest itself?
Mr. Satloff. Absolutely. Just as there was a fundamental
instability built into the Soviet system, there is fundamental
instability built into the Iranian system. Our job is to hasten
the decline so we don't have to wait 70 years, as we did with
the Soviets.
Mr. Connolly. How do we hasten the decline?
Mr. Satloff. Well, here one way is to try to roll back
Iranian successes. And I suggested in my testimony how to do
that in Syria and Iraq and elsewhere.
Secondly, I think that the projection of American power so
that Iranians are convinced that we will use it to prevent
their acquisition of a nuclear weapons capability is itself the
key ingredient to a peaceful resolution.
Here I have a somewhat disagreement with Ambassador Bolton.
I don't think we yet have the test of whether the Iranians have
had to make the choice because I don't think the Iranians are
yet convinced that there is a significant price to pay for them
approaching the line. Once they are convinced, then we will
have the test.
Mr. Connolly. Thank you very much. Thank you, Madam
Chairman.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you. Excellent questions, Mr.
Connolly.
And we are so pleased to have had you gentlemen as our
witnesses. It really was an enlightening committee hearing. And
we thank you for taking the time to be with us.
And, with that, the committee has adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 12:17 p.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
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