[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-36]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES HEARING
ON
BUDGET REQUEST FOR DEPARTMENT OF
ENERGY ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE
ACTIVITIES AND DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE NUCLEAR FORCES PROGRAMS
__________
HEARING HELD
APRIL 5, 2011
[GRAPHIC] [TIFF OMITTED] CONGRESS.#13
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
MICHAEL TURNER, Ohio, Chairman
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
DOUG LAMBORN, Colorado JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
MO BROOKS, Alabama RICK LARSEN, Washington
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas MARTIN HEINRICH, New Mexico
MIKE ROGERS, Alabama JOHN R. GARAMENDI, California
JOHN C. FLEMING, M.D., Louisiana C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
SCOTT RIGELL, Virginia BETTY SUTTON, Ohio
AUSTIN SCOTT, Georgia
Kari Bingen, Professional Staff Member
Leonor Tomero, Professional Staff Member
Alejandra Villarreal, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
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CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011
Page
Hearing:
Tuesday, April 5, 2011, Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense
Authorization Budget Request for Department of Energy Atomic
Energy Defense Activities and Department of Defense Nuclear
Forces Programs................................................ 1
Appendix:
Tuesday, April 5, 2011........................................... 49
----------
TUESDAY, APRIL 5, 2011
FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES AND DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE NUCLEAR FORCES PROGRAMS
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Sanchez, Hon. Loretta, a Representative from California, Ranking
Member, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces....................... 4
Turner, Hon. Michael, a Representative from Ohio, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces............................... 1
WITNESSES
Benedict, RADM Terry, USN, Director, Strategic Systems Programs,
U.S. Navy...................................................... 38
Chambers, Maj. Gen. William A., USAF, Assistant Chief of Staff,
Strategic Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, U.S. Air Force... 36
D'Agostino, Hon. Thomas P., Administrator, National Nuclear
Security Administration, U.S. Department of Energy............. 5
Triay, Hon. Ines R., Ph.D., Assistant Secretary for Environmental
Management, U.S. Department of Energy.......................... 8
Weber, Hon. Andrew, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear
and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, Office of the
Secretary of Defense........................................... 35
Winokur, Hon. Peter S., Ph.D., Chairman, Defense Nuclear
Facilities Safety Board........................................ 10
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Benedict, RADM Terry......................................... 153
Chambers, Maj. Gen. William A................................ 146
D'Agostino, Hon. Thomas P.................................... 58
Sanchez, Hon. Loretta........................................ 56
Triay, Hon. Ines R........................................... 99
Turner, Hon. Michael......................................... 53
Weber, Hon. Andrew........................................... 131
Winokur, Hon. Peter S........................................ 110
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Franks................................................... 167
Mr. Turner................................................... 167
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Heinrich................................................. 190
Mr. Larsen................................................... 188
Ms. Sanchez.................................................. 179
Mr. Turner................................................... 171
FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY ATOMIC ENERGY DEFENSE ACTIVITIES AND DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE NUCLEAR FORCES PROGRAMS
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
Washington, DC, Tuesday, April 5, 2011.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 11:34 a.m. in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Michael Turner
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL TURNER, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
OHIO, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Mr. Turner. I call to order the meeting of the subcommittee
and I would like to extend a warm welcome to our first panel of
witnesses today, Mr. Tom D'Agostino, Administrator of the
National Nuclear Security Administration, Dr. Ines Triay,
Assistant Secretary of Energy for Environmental Management and
Dr. Peter Winokur, Chairman of the Defense Nuclear Safety
Board.
I welcome all of you and thank you for your dedication.
This annual nuclear budget hearing has typically focused
solely on the Department of Energy, DOE, and National Nuclear
Security Administration, NNSA.
However, the Department of Defense also has a significant
role in maintaining our Nation's nuclear deterrent and is the
primary customer for NNSA's weapons activities, is directly
responsible for shaping many of NNSA's plans and programs.
Therefore, I have asked three key DOD [Department of Defense]
leaders to testify in a second panel on the Department's
nuclear programs and budgets and the linkages with NNSA.
And I would also like to welcome these individuals, Mr.
Andrew Weber, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear,
Chemical and Biological Defense Programs and Staff Director of
the Nuclear Weapons Council, Major General William Chambers,
Assistant Chief of Staff of the Air Force for Strategic
Deterrence and Nuclear Integration, and Rear Admiral Terry
Benedict, Director of the Navy's Strategic Systems Programs.
Remarkably, a strong bipartisan and bicameral consensus has
been forged over the need for nuclear modernization. This way
was paved 2 years ago, with the important work done by the
bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission, led by Dr. William
Perry and Dr. James Schlesinger.
Less than 2 weeks ago, all 16 members of this subcommittee
sent a letter to the Budget Committee, urging them to support
NNSA's funding increases and to ensure that such funds are
categorized as national defense.
The Nuclear Posture Review and the Section 1251 Report made
many promises with respect to the modernization of our nuclear
warheads, delivery systems, and infrastructure.
Based on what I have seen thus far of the fiscal year 2012
budget requests, I am encouraged that the Administration
appears ready to honor these promises.
But there is much work that needs to be done, and my focus
today is to understand exactly how these programs are being
implemented and the plans, programs and budgets of NNSA and
DOD.
NNSA has outlined a tightly choreographed warhead life
extension plan over the next two decades that meets DOD's
requirements, matches its availability, its variable capacity
and work force, and syncs to its infrastructure modernization
plans.
Any perturbations in this plan or changes in funding have
wide reaching implications.
To this end, I am particularly concerned about the B61
[nuclear bomb] life extension program, LEP. Despite specific
time line requirements, the magnitude of the B61 LEP will not
be known until cost and design studies are completed later this
year. NNSA has been unable to start the W78 [thermonuclear
warhead] life extension program, which will also explore the
feasibility of a common ICBM [intercontinental ballistic
missile] and SLBM [submarine-launched ballistic missile]
warhead due to limitations in the continuing resolution.
I would ask Administrator D'Agostino to discuss how these
programs are being managed to minimize schedule and cost risk.
I am also concerned about NNSA's two major construction
projects at Los Alamos and Y-12 [National Security Complex].
This year's budget request includes revised cost estimates
for both projects, based on a 45 percent completion design,
which are significantly higher than earlier estimates.
Despite the cost growth, only $340 million has been added
to the Future-Years Nuclear Security Program, FYNSP, and the
majority of the construction funds will come outside the FYNSP.
I would like to understand what is driving these costs and how
NNSA plans to simultaneously manage these large-scale
construction projects.
The $4.1 billion increase in modernization funding
contained in last November's 1251 Report is welcome, but upon
further inspection, is a bit misleading. Of the $4.1 billion
added to the Future-Years Nuclear Security Program, $1.5
billion of this, or 37 percent, is allocated to employee
pension plans, not modernization.
I am open to any ideas that could give NNSA and its
contractors greater flexibility in meeting their pension
obligations.
On the DOD side, the NPR [Nuclear Posture Review] and 1251
Report described plans for the sustainment and modernization of
several DOD systems, including a new bomber, dual-capable
aircraft and a new cruise missile, a potential ICBM follow-on,
the Ohio-class replacement submarine, the Trident D5
[submarine-launched ballistic missile] life extension program,
a new joint Air Force-Navy fuze replacement program, and the
nuclear command and control infrastructure. This is a
tremendous to-do list.
Does the budget request merely contain placeholders for
these plans or are there concrete activities associated with
each?
I am also concerned about the solid rocket motor industrial
base and I know that Admiral Benedict's budget, in particular,
has increased to accommodate rising costs to sustain this
important capability.
Another issue that I am closely watching is the
implementation of the New START [Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty] Treaty. We have yet to see exactly how DOD will
implement the force reductions in the treaty or the associated
funding requirements. However, senior Administration officials,
including the President's national security advisor, have
already commented that, ``We are making preparations for the
next round of nuclear reductions'' and that, ``The Department
of Defense will develop options for further reductions in our
current nuclear stockpile.''
It would seem to me that we need to understand and work
through the details of how to smartly implement New START
before rushing towards another round of reductions.
Additionally, and I have said this in previous years, I
remain concerned about nuclear safety and security.
There is no margin for error in the nuclear business.
I would appreciate our witnesses discussing their efforts
to address nuclear safety and security, including Dr. Winokur's
safety assessment of our nuclear facilities and operations.
In the area of Environmental Management, I would welcome
Dr. Triay's update on EM [Environmental Management] progress to
date, her priorities, and the challenges ahead. Additionally,
our committee included a provision in last year's defense bill
to authorize the establishment of energy parks on former
defense nuclear facilities.
Miamisburg Mound in my district in Ohio was once a key Cold
War-era nuclear production facility and, after an extensive
cleanup effort, has been redeveloped into a business park for
high-tech companies. It is certainly one of the success stories
in the cleanup process and is a candidate for channeling the
community's legacy nuclear expertise into new energy research.
I have also asked Deputy NNSA Administrator Harrington to
participate in today's hearing to address member questions on
nuclear nonproliferation. This issue is handled at the full
committee level, but we have been given approval by Chairman
McKeon to discuss it today with our expert witnesses.
There is strong bipartisan support to keep dangerous
material out of the wrong hands, especially for the urgent task
of identifying, securing, and reducing foreign sources of
potential nuclear and radiological threats.
The committee is also closely monitoring plans to build
nuclear centers of excellence in China and India to understand
their scope and how DOD and NNSA funding would be used.
On a final note, I would want to make it clear that while
our subcommittee supports the increase in nuclear funding, we
do not write blank checks.
We will continue to conduct rigorous oversight of the
nuclear portfolio, seek out areas for cost savings and
efficiencies, and make budget modifications consistent with our
oversight findings.
I would like to thank our witnesses for being with us
today. Your leadership and expertise is greatly appreciated.
And with that, I would like to turn to my ranking member,
Ms. Sanchez, for her opening comments.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Turner can be found in the
Appendix on page 53.]
STATEMENT OF HON. LORETTA SANCHEZ, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
CALIFORNIA, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON STRATEGIC FORCES
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Chairman Turner.
Thank you, again, to all of you for being before us. Thank
you for, several of you, secretary and others, who met with us
ahead of time to discuss some of the issues, and I know that
that brought a whole bunch of other questions.
So I am hoping that--it is a busy morning, but that more of
our members show up to ask those questions. If not, you will
have a lot for the record, I am sure.
I would like to touch on a few specific issues related to
nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear cleanup, and sustaining our
nuclear deterrent and our nuclear forces.
First, I have been very concerned about the delays in the
urgent nuclear nonproliferation effort stemming from the
continuing resolution. Even securing all vulnerable weapons-
usable material in 4 years remains one of the most pressing
national security issues that we have.
I am also interested in hearing about interagency
coordination and how the Department of Defense supports nuclear
nonproliferation activities and what opportunities and
challenges still remain for cooperative threat reduction.
Next, the nuclear cleanup remains an important priority;
sites like Hanford and Savannah River site, played a unique and
irreplaceable role during the Cold War and now we must make
diligent and quick progress toward cleanup. So I would like to
hear a little of that.
I look forward to the opportunity to hear about the
progress made.
Especially, because I know we put monies in the stimulus
package to be able to do that. And what problems and pitfalls
still remain with respect to that?
Third, President Obama and Vice President Biden have made
clear the importance of maintaining a safe, secure and reliable
nuclear arsenal without nuclear testing, especially in the
context of nuclear weapons reductions. And so I look forward to
hearing about how the fiscal year 2012 budget request will
strengthen the Stockpile Stewardship Program.
Several challenges loom ahead, including how NNSA will
oversee concurrent construction, on time and on budget, of the
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement, or the CMRR,
facility at Los Alamos National Laboratory and of the Uranium
Processing Facility at Y-12.
And I would also like to hear about how the fiscal year
2012 budget request supports surveillance activities,
verification and dismantlement of nuclear weapons.
And I would like to hear the discussion of the Department
of Defense's plans for sustaining and replacing our nuclear
forces in the context of the New START force reduction and
potential further nuclear reductions and what cost savings, if
any, are being considered there.
I would also like to specifically point to the challenges
sustaining the industrial base, with regard to our solid rocket
motors in the wake of NASA's [the National Aeronautics and
Space Administration's] cancelling its Constellation program
and what the cost impact will have for the Department of
Defense.
And finally, I would like to hear about progress made on
spring cleaning the nuclear enterprise culture within the Air
Force. Retaining, developing and recruiting all those critical
skills remain essential for the nuclear mission at DOD, as well
as NNSA.
So, again, welcome to all of our guests and, Mr. Chairman,
I also want to remind you or mention that at 12:30, we have a
Democratic meeting. So most of us will be leaving for that, but
should come back once that is done.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Sanchez can be found in the
Appendix on page 56.]
Mr. Turner. Very good.
And now, we will turn to the first of three witnesses and
ask each to summarize his or her statement in about 5 minutes.
We will then proceed to member questions and then
transition to the second panel.
Mr. D'Agostino, the floor is yours.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D'AGOSTINO, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Secretary D'Agostino. Thank you, Chairman Turner, Ranking
Member Sanchez, for the opportunity to address the committee
today.
I would also like to take the opportunity to recognize my
Principal Deputy Administrator Neile Miller and Deputy
Administrator Don Cook, who are both with me, in addition to
Deputy Administrator Harrington, as you mentioned earlier in
your remarks.
They are seated behind me.
I would like to thank you and the committee for your
continued support of the Department of Energy and the National
Nuclear Security Administration and the 35,000 men and women
working across our enterprise to keep our country safe, protect
our allies, and enhance global security.
We couldn't do this work without strong support, bipartisan
support, and engaged leadership in Congress.
I come before you today to discuss the President's budget
request for the NNSA, the capabilities we offer the Nation and,
indeed, the world right now are on display.
As you know, the earthquake and tsunami that struck Japan
on March 11, 2011, caused significant damage to the nuclear
power plants there, releasing radioactive materials into the
environment.
First and foremost, our thoughts and prayers are with the
Japanese people as they deal with this crisis. To assist in the
response, the Department deployed 45 people and over 17,000
pounds worth of equipment to Japan, including NNSA's Aerial
Measuring System and our Consequence Management Response Teams.
They are on the ground, utilizing their unique skills,
expertise, and equipment in partnership with Japan to help
address the situation.
While these teams are at the tip of the spear here at home,
we have teams working around the clock at Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory and at our Remote Sensing Laboratory in
Nevada, working on the information and putting together
products that can be used by the Defense Department, the
interagency team and the Japanese Government to understand what
is happening on the ground.
Everyone in the NNSA understands the important role we are
playing with this tragedy. It shows the commitment to service
and excellence that mirrors our work and the important--and,
frankly, highlights the resources President Obama has requested
for the NNSA.
The budget request seeks to make critical investments in
the future of our enterprise, which will allow us continue to
implement the President's nuclear security agenda. As I see it,
the request can be broken down into three key themes.
First, we are investing in our future. President Obama has
committed to invest more than $85 billion over the next decade
to ensure the safety, security and effectiveness of our nuclear
stockpile, and to modernize the infrastructure and revitalize
the science and technology base that supports the full range of
our nuclear security missions.
As part of that commitment, the budget request provides $76
billion for our Weapons Activities account to support our
efforts to leverage the best science and technology in the
world to maintain our deterrent.
This will enable us to enhance our surveillance of the
stockpile, proceed with key life extension programs, and
continue to design and modernize the facilities we need to
maintain our Nation's expertise in uranium processing and
plutonium research and development.
Investing in a modern, nuclear security enterprise is
critical to our stockpile stewardship program. But it also
supports the full range of the nuclear security mission, which
brings me to the second key theme in this budget request, which
is implementing the President's nuclear security agenda.
President Obama has made strengthening nuclear security and
the nuclear nonproliferation regime one of his top priorities.
As he said in his speech in Prague in April 2009, almost
exactly 2 years ago to the date, the threat of a terrorist
acquiring and using a nuclear weapon is the most immediate and
extreme threat we face.
Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and keeping
dangerous nuclear material out of the hands of terrorists is a
vital national security priority. These are, without a doubt,
national security programs, and I hope this committee and the
Congress will treat them as such.
To address that threat, we are requesting $2.5 billion in
2012 and more than $14.2 billion over the next 5 years for our
Nuclear Non-Proliferation programs.
This will provide the resources required to meet the
commitments secured during the 2010 Nuclear Security Summit.
For fiscal year 2011, it includes $1 billion to remove and
prevent the smuggling of dangerous nuclear material around the
world and enable NNSA to continue to lead the international
efforts to implement more stringent standards for the physical
protection of nuclear material and for nuclear facilities
worldwide.
To power the nuclear Navy, President Obama has requested
$1.1 billion for NNSA's Naval Reactors program. This will allow
us to continue the design work on a propulsion unit for the
Ohio-class replacement submarine, in order to meet the Navy's
required procurement date of 2019.
It includes critical investments in modern and sustainable
spent fuel infrastructure at the naval reactors facility at
Idaho National Laboratory.
And, finally, it seeks the resources to refuel the land-
based prototype in upstate New York.
Mr. Chairman, I realize that this committee has many
competing requirements. And while I believe that nothing is
more important than ensuring our Nation's security, we also
recognize that this request comes at a time of acute financial
stress for our entire country.
It is my responsibility to show to you that we can manage
those resources wisely.
This brings me to the third theme, outlined in this
request, and that is our commitment to improving the way we do
business and manage our resources.
Together, we are working with our M&O [management and
operations] partners to streamline our governance model, to
devote more resources to critical mission work and maximize our
ability to complete our mission safely and securely. We are
making sure that we have the right contracting strategy in
place.
We are improving our project management by ensuring we have
qualified project managers leading our major projects, setting
cost and schedule baselines on construction projects when
design work is 90 percent complete, subjecting those estimates
to rigorous independent reviews and placing a renewed focus
across our organization on sound project management.
That is why we recently created a new policy and oversight
office for managing major projects that reports directly to me.
This will help ensure that project management gets the senior-
level, high-level, focus that it deserves.
And we are continuing to find ways to save money across our
enterprise. For example, since 2007, our Supply Chain
Management Center has used new technologies and pooled
purchasing power to drive efficiencies across our sites.
This result has been more than $213 million in auditable
cost savings.
All of this is part of our effort to create one NNSA, a
true partnership and an integrated enterprise between all our
programs and our partners to fulfill our continuing missions.
Taken together, these steps will ensure that we have a
modern 21st century nuclear security enterprise that is safer,
more secure, more efficient, and organized to succeed.
That is the vision outlined in this budget request. It
supports the full range of NNSA missions. More importantly, it
invests in the infrastructure, the people, and the science and
technology required to fulfill our mission and to make the
world a safer place.
I look forward to working with the members of this
committee, and with that, I would be happy to take your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary D'Agostino can be
found in the Appendix on page 58.]
Mr. Turner. Thank you. Dr. Triay.
STATEMENT OF HON. INES R. TRIAY, PH.D., ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Secretary Triay. Thank you.
Good afternoon, Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez and
members of the subcommittee.
I am pleased to be here today and to address your questions
regarding the Office of Environmental Management's fiscal year
2012 budget request.
The fiscal year 2012 budget request of $6.1 billion will
protect human health and the environment, through the safe
environmental cleanup of past nuclear weapons development and
Government-sponsored nuclear energy research.
The Office of Environmental Management's primary
responsibility is to keep our employees, the public, and the
states where cleanups are located safe from radioactive and
hazardous materials contamination.
We continue to adhere to a safety-first culture that
integrates environment, safety, and health requirements and
controls into all work activities.
Over the last two decades, the Office of Environmental
Management's compliance posture has evolved to where we have a
well-defined and established relationship with our regulators.
The fiscal year 2012 budget request maintains a compliant
position, by honoring regulatory commitments.
There are approximately 40 cleanup agreements that provide
a framework for cleaning up the Cold War legacy that EM will
continue to abide by.
The Office of Environmental Management's goal in fiscal
year 2012 is to meet 100 percent of its enforceable agreement
milestones that are located within cleanup agreements.
For example, our fiscal year 2012 budget fully funds the
Tri-Party Agreement settlement with Washington State as well as
the Transuranic Waste Retrievals at Idaho, that are consistent
with terms of the Idaho Settlement Agreement.
In addition to keeping our program running safely and
efficiently, the Office of Environmental Management enables key
operations of the Department's defense complex, including the
National Nuclear Security Administration.
For instance, our management of special nuclear materials,
spent nuclear fuel and transuranic waste allows NNSA to
continue to carry out their mission. Our fiscal year 2012
budget request supports NNSA's critical defense activities,
through the continued environmental cleanup work that maintains
compliance at NNSA's own sites.
Over the past 2 years, the Office of Environmental
Management has made significant progress in accelerating
environmental cleanup across the departmental complex.
We estimate that by the end of fiscal year 2011, the
acceleration of excess facilities decontamination and
decommissioning and cleanup of contaminated areas will reduce
the legacy cleanup footprint by 40 percent. This will lead to
approximately 90 percent footprint reduction by 2015.
In terms of square miles, we project that by the end of
fiscal year 2011, the footprint will have been reduced from 900
square miles to 540 square miles. By 2015, it is envisioned
that the footprint could be reduced to 90 square miles.
Footprint reduction efforts have resulted in estimated cost
avoidances of approximately $3 billion and cost savings of
approximately $4 billion, for a total of $7 billion in life-
cycle costs.
In fiscal year 2012, the continued management and removal
of legacy transuranic waste from generator sites will directly
support risk reduction and aid in the goal of reducing site
footprint.
We estimate that the disposition of 90 percent of legacy
transuranic waste will be completed by 2015.
The last few years, the Environmental Management program
has been focusing on providing opportunities to small
businesses to perform our environmental cleanup work.
Recovery Act prime and sub contracts have awarded a total
of $1.8 billion to small businesses. In addition, base, prime
and sub contracts have awarded $1.7 billion to small businesses
in fiscal year 2010.
Overall, the feedback we have received from small
businesses participating in the Recovery Act projects has been
very positive. Recovery Act funds have allowed small businesses
to enhance their competitive skills, pursue opportunities in
new markets, sectors, and reinvest in their company's
infrastructure.
The Office of Environmental Management will continue to
promote the usage of small businesses and identify future
opportunities for small businesses to perform our environmental
cleanup work.
The Office of Environmental Management's continued progress
in contracts and project management performance has resulted in
our program meeting three of the five criteria needed to be
removed from the Government Accountability Office highest-risk
list.
The GAO [Government Accountability Office] has noted that
the Office of Environmental Management has demonstrated strong
commitment and leadership, demonstrating progress in
implementing corrective measures and develop a corrective
action plan that identifies root causes, effective solutions
and near-term plans for implementing those solutions.
Currently we continue to work toward meeting all of the
Government Accountability Office's requirements to be removed
from the high-risk list.
Mr. Chairman, ranking member and members of the
subcommittee, I am honored to be here today representing the
Office of Environmental Management. We are committed to
achieving our mission in a safe, effective, and efficient
manner. We will continue to apply innovative environmental
cleanup strategies, so that we can complete quality work
safely, on schedule and within costs, thereby demonstrating
value to the American taxpayer.
I am pleased to answer any questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Triay can be found in
the Appendix on page 99.]
Mr. Turner. Thank you, Dr. Triay.
I want to acknowledge that Congressman Bishop has joined
us, and I ask unanimous consent that Mr. Bishop of Utah, and
other committee and non-committee members, if any, be allowed
to participate in today's hearing after all committee members
have had an opportunity to ask their questions.
Before I recognize Dr. Winokur, I would like to acknowledge
three Safety Board members joining him today and thank them for
their service. If you would upon--acknowledge, raising your
hand, so we can verify you.
Ms. Robertson.
Mr. Mansfield.
Mr. Bader.
Very good. Thank you for being here and thank you for your
service.
Dr. Winokur.
STATEMENT OF HON. PETER S. WINOKUR, PH.D., CHAIRMAN, DEFENSE
NUCLEAR FACILITIES SAFETY BOARD
Dr. Winokur. Thank you. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and members
of the subcommittee.
I am Peter Winokur, the Chairman of the Defense Nuclear
Facility Safety Board, known as the DNFSB.
I submitted a written summary for the record that describes
the Board's mission and highlights a number of safety issues
that are particularly important to ensuring that the defense
nuclear complex can safely accomplish its missions. I will
provide a brief overview for your consideration today.
Our agency was established by Congress to provide safety
oversight for the defense nuclear facilities operated by DOE
and, now, NNSA. We are the only agency that provides
independent safety oversight of DOE's defense nuclear
facilities.
The Board's budget is essentially devoted to maintaining
and supporting an expert staff of engineers and scientists,
nearly all of whom have technical Master's degrees or
doctorates to accomplish our highly specialized work.
The President's budget request for fiscal year 2012
includes $29 million in new budget authority for the Board.
This is $3 million more than fiscal year 2010. It will support
120 personnel, the target we have been growing toward for
several years. We believe this level of staffing is needed to
provide safety oversight of DOE's defense nuclear complex,
given the pace and scope of DOE's activities.
The Board's safety oversight is geared around several broad
safety issues.
To begin with, we expend great effort to ensure that DOE
preserves and continuously improves its safety directives. We
are carefully evaluating the outcome of the DOE 2010 Safety and
Security Reform Plan as well as DOE's follow-on initiative to
compress its review process to expedite revision of seven
health and safety directives essential to public and worker
safety.
At this time, DOE and NNSA are designing and building
facilities with a total project cost of more than $20 billion.
I cannot overstate the importance of integrating safety into
the design of these facilities at an early stage. Failing to do
so will lead to surprises and costly changes later in the
process.
The Board is committed to the early resolution of safety
issues with DOE. To that end, we publicly document significant
unresolved technical differences between the Board and DOE
concerning design and construction projects in quarterly
reports to Congress.
The Board is continuing to urge NNSA to replace unsound
facilities and invest in infrastructure for the future. The
9212 complex at Y-12 and the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Replacement building at Los Alamos are both well overdue for
replacement.
Last September, the Board issued its first report to
Congress on aging and degrading facilities. We will update this
report periodically to highlight the greatest infrastructure
needs affecting safety of DOE and NNSA defense nuclear
facilities.
In addition to legacy facilities that need replacement, DOE
and NNSA have large quantities of legacy nuclear materials
awaiting disposition.
DOE's preferred disposition for many materials has been
chemical processing through the H-Canyon facility at the
Savannah River site.
On February 28, 2011, the Board wrote to the Secretary of
Energy to express its concerns that the premature shutdown of
H-Canyon could have significant, unintended safety
consequences.
I would like to highlight two final topics today.
The first is the Board's evaluation of design changes at
DOE's Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plan. The
second deals with lessons learned from the March 11th
earthquake in Japan.
The Hanford Waste Treatment and Immobilization Plant, or
WTP, is under design and construction at an estimated cost of
more than $12 billion. This project is needed to convert 53
million gallons of high-level waste stored in 177 tanks at
Hanford, into glass for disposal.
DOE began a major redesign of the project in 2009, with the
design more than two-thirds complete and construction of major
facilities between one-quarter and halfway done.
The Board held a public hearing in October 2010, to discuss
our three greatest safety concerns with WTP, which include its
mixing and transfer systems, control strategies for flammable
hydrogen gas and process systems, and whether the tank forms
can deliver waste that meets the criteria needed for WTP to
operate safely and effectively.
The Board issued a formal recommendation to the Secretary
of Energy on the need for large-scale testing of WTP's mixing
and transfer systems after the public hearing. We are still
evaluating the other issues as DOE continues to develop
information.
The March 11th earthquake in Japan provides a sobering
reminder that nuclear facilities need to continually update
their assessments of natural hazards and to be ready to respond
to events that analysts consider beyond their design basis.
Twelve days after the earthquake, the Secretary of Energy
issued a safety bulletin on Events Beyond Design Basis
Analysis, which requires DOE sites with Hazard Category 1 or 2
nuclear facilities to assess their ability to respond to Beyond
Design Basis accidents.
We will track this activity closely and continue our own
ongoing efforts to strengthen emergency preparedness at DOE's
defense nuclear facilities.
That ends my statement. I will be happy to answer any
questions you may have.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Winokur can be found in the
Appendix on page 110.]
Mr. Turner. Okay. Thank you.
We are going to now turn to a 5-minute round of questions
because we have so many members who are in attendance who want
to ask questions. We are going to try to limit it to 5 minutes
and then hopefully get to a second round with our goal of
getting to the second panel with plenty of time for members to
participate with the second panel.
Mr. D'Agostino, both of my questions are going to be
directed to you in the first round. And the first question goes
to the issue of New START. As I indicated in my opening
statement, everyone has a lot of questions about how New START
will be implemented, and yet Administration officials are
discussing further reductions to the stockpile, as evidenced by
their own statements.
NNSA's 2010 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
states, ``a modernized complex will enable further reductions
in the stockpile over time.''
Now, in looking at that statement, I assume that the
converse of that is also true. Meaning that, it could be viewed
as a constraint, also, for the reductions, until modernization
of the complex is completed.
What direction have you been given to look at further
nuclear reductions beyond New START levels?
Two, what specific warhead and facility modernization
activities must be completed in order for NNSA to be
comfortable with further stockpile reductions?
And would it be advisable to make reductions in our hedge
prior to the completion of the Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research Replacement Facility, CMRR, at Los Alamos and the
Uranium Processing Facility, UPF, at Y-12?
And then secondly, I would like you to end with a
commercial for NNSA as a national security funding item. As you
know, with H.R. 1, initially, NNSA was identified as subject to
a cut, as all of DOE was, which I think was problematic in that
NNSA not being identified as national security.
Working with Senator Kyl, we certainly hope to restore that
on the Senate side, but also then continue to work on the House
side, both with the Appropriations and Budget Committee, that
item was corrected and restored in the last CR [continuing
resolution]. No one, of course, at this point knows where we
are going to be after this week.
But we are certainly hopeful that in the next CR and,
certainly, in the budget discussions in 2012 that NNSA will be
viewed as national security and not subject to the cuts, but
actually subject to the increases that are necessary in order
to modernize and support the nuclear weapons infrastructure.
So if you would end with a commercial on that, I would
greatly appreciate it.
Mr. D'Agostino.
Secretary D'Agostino. Yes, thank you very much.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much for the questions.
With respect to your first one, I have not been directed to
reduce or to do studies on the size of the stockpile. It would
be, to answer your question straight up, the plan that we have
right now, the plan that we submitted in our Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Plan, there is a particular--there
is a classified piece of this. I won't go into those classified
details, but I will answer you as specifically as I can.
The Defense Department ultimately determines and makes
recommendations to the President on the size of the stockpile.
But one thing we have clear with the Defense Department and the
National Nuclear Security Administration is our understanding
that it is important to be able to demonstrate that our
infrastructure is responsive and being able to respond to needs
that the country may have.
First of all, responsive in ability to take care of the
existing stockpile that we have right now. And we have
identified that in our plan as having a Uranium Processing
Facility that is up and running, having a Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research Replacement facility that is available to
do the surveillance work on our stockpile and help support a
modest amount of pit manufacturing capability.
We have also identified this on our high explosive pressing
capability. Right now, we are very limited in our ability to
make the size of high explosives that we need in order to
support the stockpile out into the future, and we have a
project at the Pantex Plant in Amarillo to go off and replace
that capability.
These are just some examples of some infrastructure pieces
that I believe will be necessary to demonstrate--not just
build, but demonstrate the operation of--to show that we do
have a responsive infrastructure, an infrastructure that can
respond to national needs.
The advisability piece of your question might be best
deferred to my Defense Department colleagues who will be
joining you on the second panel. But I would say there is a
consistency in what I just said and in the plans that we
submitted to Congress on that front.
With respect to the National Nuclear Security
Administration, the work we do is work on nuclear weapons,
taking care of our stockpile; it is providing the propulsion
systems for our submarines and aircraft carriers.
It is about protecting nuclear material, so they do not get
in the hands of terrorists. And it is providing the
capabilities to respond to nuclear emergencies, including the
emergency we have right now. It would be hard for me to imagine
that that could not possibly be national security work.
In addition to those four core mission areas, the entire
national security mission areas, also assist the Government in
being able to respond to other events, providing the
capabilities to help the Missile Defense Agency knock a
satellite out of the sky, which we did do 3 years ago with the
Missile Defense Agency.
It was the NNSA's classified supercomputers that helped
provide the trajectory, direction, and verified and validated
that when the satellite was hit, it wasn't just hit; it was a
hydrazine tank that was in the satellite that was hit, which
was an ultimate mission.
So my view is that that is national security work through
and through. And I will leave it at that, sir.
Mr. Turner. Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Chairman Turner.
I also am concerned about the money side of what is going
on, as we discussed before, Secretary.
One of the impacts is the inability to remove all the
highly enriched uranium from Belarus, as promised, by 2012.
Are you concerned about those reductions? And has this
impacted our efforts to secure nuclear materials?
And how has this impacted your other non-proliferation
programs? Since a lot of the funding--I am sorry, did you say
something?
Mr. Turner. Yes, we just wanted to note that Ms. Harrington
is then going to join the panel for the purposes of the
transcript.
Ms. Sanchez. Oh, okay.
Okay.
So, back to my question.
What is going on? What do we need to worry about here?
Secretary D'Agostino. I will start the--and ask my
colleague, Anne Harrington, who runs the day-to-day of the non-
proliferation program for me.
We are deeply concerned about the reductions we had,
particularly in fiscal year 2011. We had a very significant
increase from our fiscal year 2010 request, specifically
directed to work off of our goal, or the President's goal, of
securing nuclear material, vulnerable nuclear material, within
the next 4 years.
And that required a sizeable increase in resources. We do
have the scope of our work well-identified. You mentioned one
of the countries. There are a number of others that we are
working on right now as well.
Without these resources, and of course we are 6 months into
the fiscal year right now, without these resources, what we
have been doing is, essentially, doing what I would call day-
to-day program management on this to try to minimize the impact
on the specific projects we have of securing this material.
I will let Ms. Harrington deal with the specifics of the
countries and the like.
So, Anne.
Ms. Sanchez. Welcome, Ms. Harrington.
Ms. Harrington. Thank you. Thank you, Chairman and thank
you, Ms. Sanchez.
The impact of the continuing resolution has been minimized
to this point by a lot of active and almost daily review of
budget allocations within the defense nuclear nonproliferation
budget.
We have tried our best to maintain an aggressive schedule
for removing and protecting the vulnerable materials that have
been identified around the world, but we are rapidly
approaching the point where the trade-offs for continuing that
very forward-looking schedule will become more and more
difficult to maintain.
For example, we are confronted with choices such as do we
not deliver a detector for an Air Force-launched satellite that
gives us our only capability to detect nuclear detonations
around the world? Anywhere from the ground through space.
Or do we reduce our efforts to install radiation detection
equipment at container seaports around the world as we have
been directed by Congress?
Or do we implement other programmatic slowdowns or
eliminations that would cause us to reduce capabilities in one
aspect or another?
But we have tried very hard, so far, because we realize we
all need to make a contribution to reducing the deficit. But as
the Administrator pointed out, these are national security
trade-offs that we are making, and I would be untruthful if I
were to say that the current situation has had no impact.
Thank you.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
I have a question for Dr. Triay.
There was a lot of money put in the stimulus to work on
cleanup. I have a lot of colleagues who say that that stimulus
money wasn't spent well or its purpose wasn't very well
defined.
Can you talk a little bit about those particular monies and
what progress you have made with those monies?
And what challenges still remain for cleanup?
Secretary Triay. Thank you very much.
I believe that the Recovery Act, the portfolio of the
Environmental Management program has been extremely well
defined.
We selected activities in the portfolio for which the
Environmental Management program has a proven successful track
record. The regulatory framework was well defined and we had
contracts in place, so that we could immediately put people to
work.
Bottom line is that we have been able to deal with 260 of
the excess facilities in the weapons complex. And we have been
able to deal with 8,000 cubic meters of transuranic waste and
85,000 cubic meters of low-level waste.
Two million tons of milling and tailings, and with respect
to the amount of active footprint area reduction, as I was
saying before, we have been able to decrease the footprint by
30 percent so far, from over 900 square miles of active cleanup
down to, by the end of 2011, 540 square miles.
We think that not only we are going to meet the
Administration's goal of 40 percent reduction by 2011, but we
are going to surpass it.
At our Hanford facility, we are looking to surpass the 40
percent goal to over 50 percent; at our Savannah River site, we
are going to reach over 60 percent.
So I believe that the work that we have done in the
Recovery Act program has really assisted the complex, the
Department of Energy complex, to accelerate cleanup activities
and demonstrate the progress that can be made due to these
economies of scale.
Ms. Sanchez. Great. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank all of
you for being here.
Secretary D'Agostino, I guess I will start with you, if you
don't mind.
I know that one of the five campaigns of the National
Nuclear Security Administration is readiness, and I understand
you have got a lot of things to keep track of. But one of those
elements, of course, of readiness, includes the production of
the critical nuclear weapons component of tritium. And the GAO
report recently said that the sole U.S. production facility was
leaking large amounts of tritium into the cooling water which,
in my mind, potentially compromises that source and it being
our sole source, and adds to the concern over a shortage of
tritium.
And I guess my first question is, how is this shortage of
that key ingredient being resolved? And is the request for
$142.5 million for the readiness campaign sufficient to not
only increase the tritium production to an acceptable level
but, at the same time, address the other components of the
readiness campaign?
Secretary D'Agostino. Mr. Franks, with respect to your
question on tritium, we had established an incredibly stringent
permeation grade early on in the program to, what I would call,
something that was probably physically impossible.
Mr. Franks. Not realistic, yes.
Secretary D'Agostino. Yes, unrealistic.
And so we have realized, even after a check and a design on
the TP bars, which are the tritium-producing bendable
absorption rods, we have made an improvement in the permeation
rates; in other words, reduce the permeation rates, but not to
the level that we have had before.
So what that does, in effect, to make sure that we remain
within our NRC, Nuclear Regulatory Commission, license piece is
have a reduction in the number of tritium rods that we put
inside each reactor core load at Watts Bar.
We don't have a near-term tritium problem. It will be 5
years, if we stay at this certain rate, before we end up having
any concerns on tritium production.
And this gives us plenty of time to do a couple of things.
We have a couple of backup plans in this area.
One of our backup plans has to do with using other reactors
with the TVA [Tennessee Valley Authority], and we are entering
into negotiations with them to use Watts Bar unit two and
potentially Sequoia, if we have to, which will more than cover
the Nation's needs.
But we are also doing another thing, and that is modifying
the environmental impact statement and taking a look at the
license amendment to what will be a reasonable and still very
safe tritium permeation rate to allow us to increase the number
of tritium rods in each reactor core load.
So one of those two paths--first of all, there is not a
near-term problem, but we are aware that if we continue down
this path, we are going to need to do something different and
we have kind of two tracks on resolving this particular case.
Mr. Franks. Well, I wish all questions could be answered
that favorably. That is pretty encouraging.
Well, Mr. Secretary, let me then switch gears completely on
you. I know that your testimony over the years here, that I
have been here in this committee, has been, I think, dead on
target, related to the potential of terrorists gaining some
type of access to nuclear weapons, whether they develop them or
someone gives it to them.
And one of the concerns that I have had lately, in addition
to that, or I should say in specificity, is the whole concern
that now there is indication that smaller warheads, very small
warheads, 1- or 2-kiloton warheads, can be enhanced to emit
greater gamma ray radiation that makes them a more potentially
dangerous weapon in the hands of enemies trying to launch an
EMP [electromagnetic pulse] attack against the Nation, or even
in a given area.
So my first question is, is that, without getting into any
classified origins, is that a concern that you have?
And secondarily, with all of the misinformation over
Soviet, to use the phrase, ``suitcase bombs,'' it seems like if
anything would fit that category, or fit that description, it
would be one of the small, 1- or 2-kiloton, warheads. And could
they be enhanced for greater gamma ray emission? And do you see
this as any sort of particular national security concern?
Secretary D'Agostino. Mr. Franks, I would say that all of
these items are of concern to us. We can provide a classified
answer, to get into some of the specifics there. It would take
a fair amount of effort to enhance one of these so-called
suitcase devices in order to give it these special
characteristics.
We are concerned about whether it is 1 kiloton, 500 tons,
10 kilotons, we are concerned with that whole range and that is
why we have a program really focused on the material piece of
the problem, obviously coupled with the Intelligence Community
itself.
So, yes, I am concerned. I am concerned about all of these.
The smaller devices, of course, present different
challenges with respect to finding these things, but at the
same time, this is the reason why we have this full spectrum
approach on our program.
In our nonproliferation program, we start off with the
assumption that the information on how to make one of these
things is out there. Not that it is or it isn't; I won't
confirm that, of course, but there is an assumption that we
would say information is out there.
Therefore, we have to focus on the material piece of this,
protecting the material in its place, detecting illicit
transfers of material across borders and land border crossings,
getting rid of excess material that we may have, so it doesn't
contribute to the problem, and looking at ways to convert from
high-enriched uranium to low-enriched uranium across research
reactors and isotope production reactors that we have.
So I will take your specific question, which the answer
would be classified and provide a classified response for the
record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 167.]
Mr. Turner. All right, sir. Well I am glad you got your
radar out anyway.
With that, we recognize Mr. Larsen for 5 minutes.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary D'Agostino, what relation does your 2012
nonproliferation budget have to your 2011 nonproliferation
budget? That is to say, what impacts will be on your 2012
budget for implementation if your 2011 request is not provided?
Secretary D'Agostino. If the 2011 request is not provided,
that puts us very far behind on our security work, for sure, in
a number of areas. We will look to do it in a balanced way to
make sure our highest priority things are completed in fiscal
year 2011.
What that does is it puts an extra strain on the fiscal
year 2012 budget and you will--I don't know if you have
noticed, our fiscal year 2012 budget is slightly less than the
fiscal year 2011 budget. And that is because in the fiscal year
2012 budget, we do not have $100 million increment in there for
our work on the physical material disposition with Russia.
There are a series of payments that go on with that.
So if we don't get the fiscal year 2011 budget and if we
are trying to maintain our focus on securing material
worldwide, without giving up the other elements of our defense
nonproliferation program, those fiscal year 2012 resources
would be severely strained and we would certainly not be able
to honor the commitments we have made internationally and
commitments we have made to ourselves, on securing this
material worldwide.
Would you like additional information from Ms. Harrington?
Mr. Larsen. That is good right now.
Secretary D'Agostino. Okay.
Mr. Larsen. I just wanted to thank the Chairman here, and
the ranking member, for taking a lead on this letter that we
put out in the last 2 weeks regarding the--I mean, the--not
just the desire, but the need to look at this part of the
budget as a part of the defense budget, as opposed to just
another part of the energy budget.
And hopefully we will be successful in moving that forward.
A question for Dr. Winokur. With a short I?
Dr. Winokur. That is right.
Mr. Larsen. Yes.
On page 18 of your testimony, you discussed the Hanford WTP
and the three safety issues that you had found as a result of
your hearing. I didn't really recall, from your testimony, what
has been the follow-up? October 2010 were the hearings; we are
now in March of 2011--or April 2011, perhaps 5 months is not
long enough. But what has been the result of these three
findings?
Dr. Winokur. Well, the first finding was to look at the
mixing and transfer of systems.
Mr. Larsen. Right.
Dr. Winokur. Because there was the concern that there might
be solids building up at the bottom of vessels, which could
provide safety concerns with criticality, exceeding flammable
hydrogen gas and some operational problems with indexes
themselves.
In December, the Board wrote a recommendation to the
Secretary of Energy and would recommend that a large-scale
testing program--actually during the hearing, the project
agreed to a large-scale testing program.
And we wanted to make sure that I advised the Secretary
about what we thought would be important in that large-scale
testing program. So that when it went forward, we would have a
clear resolution of issues and address the safety concerns.
Mr. Larsen. On that point, Ms. Triay, if that is going to
happen, is that going to happen within the existing requested
budget? Or is that going to add costs to this particular
program?
Secretary Triay. No, it will happen within the request that
we have made for fiscal year 2012.
Mr. Larsen. So 2012.
Secretary Triay. Yes.
Mr. Larsen. Okay. Okay. Good.
Dr. Winokur.
Dr. Winokur. And I think the second issue we talked about
were concerns about hydrogen in pipes and ancillary vessels. We
were worried about detonations.
Basically, what happened was the project is using a
different strategy to address this problem, using what is
called a Quantitative Risk Assessment. It is the first time
that the Department has used this approach and it is a
different approach.
The Board is waiting, I think April, hopefully this month,
we will see from the project, basically, the validation of this
methodology, the results and basically, hopefully convince
ourselves that we are comfortable that hydrogen-related issues
in pipes and vessels will be appropriately addressed.
And the last issue, of course, deals with the tank farms
themselves. I think at the hearing, the Board made the point
that we have to look at this as an integrated problem, and the
integrated problem is that not only does this plan have to
operate effectively, but the tank farms need to be able to
control, characterize, and transfer waste into that facility
that it really can handle.
Mr. Larsen. Yes.
Dr. Winokur. And that, I think, is an ongoing problem and
certainly we have met with the Department on that. I think that
is something that you should look at as an issue that we will
be addressing over the next several years.
Because I think the project will continue to refine what
the waste acceptance criteria is that that plant can receive,
and the tank farms will continue to adjust and improve and
understand the capabilities they need.
Mr. Larsen. Good. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Dr. Fleming.
Dr. Fleming. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Yes, I have a couple of questions for Mr. D'Agostino.
With respect to the Nuclear Posture Review, Section 1251
Report to Congress, and NNSA's Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Plan make many commitments to modernize America's
nuclear arsenal and the complex that sustains it.
These commitments include sizeable funding plans.
Please discuss the funding increases in fiscal year 2012 in
the budget request and the intent and purposes for those
additional funds.
Secretary D'Agostino. Mr. Fleming, thank you for the
question.
We have increases across three broad fronts. The first
broad front is in what we call Directed Stockpile Work. This is
direct work on our nuclear weapons themselves, the surveillance
activities, which is the activities needed to look inside the
warheads to see how they are doing, particularly the older
warheads themselves.
We are very interested in how they are aging.
Those resources went up to about $240 million from prior
years, where they are steady state at about $80 million per
year. So it is a significant increase, percentagewise, in
surveillance activities and work on our Directed Stockpile Work
to finish the production rate on the W76 [thermonuclear
warhead] life extension, to do the initial studies and do the
first production unit on the B61 bomb and to start the study on
the W78 warhead study, which is something that we know we will
have to address in about 10 years' time. And it does take a
little bit of time to do the initial preparatory work.
The second area is in our science capabilities, because the
scientific capabilities allows us to maintain the stockpile
without underground testing, so work on a supercomputer
platform, for example, to allow us to use modern codes to do
accelerated aging tests.
The final area, which is our biggest increase, particularly
when we compare it to fiscal year 2011, a 21-percent increase,
is in our infrastructure investments. These are investments,
not only at the uranium and plutonium facilities that you have
heard mentioned in the hearing, but also across our enterprise,
particularly at Pantex, the High Explosive Pressing Facility,
which we will be getting underway very shortly, we have just
received bids in hand. We will make the decision very shortly
and getting this facility up and running by the year 2016.
So, some of that increase supports that activity.
It also includes an activity in fiscal year 2012 in
Tennessee to do what we call Facility Risk Reduction. Chairman
Winokur described some concerns. He is aware of some concerns
that we have in the 9212 building, which is the Nation's only
uranium-capable building, to do the kind of processing the
Nation needs to do. Not just for the stockpile, but for the
non-proliferation program.
We are spending upwards of $75 million over the next few
years, just to keep that capability going, so that when the
Uranium Processing Facility comes in play, we know we have--I
would say we are almost limping along to get to the end.
So it is across those three broad areas on the stockpile
that we are working on.
Dr. Fleming. Okay.
One follow-up question, what are the most significant
challenges in that process that you see?
Secretary D'Agostino. Two significant challenges, as I see
it. We have great people. They are very capable. They have been
working the stockpile for many years. But the two biggest
challenges that I see are in being able to recruit the next
generation of folks, so that the people that we have now can
train this new generation, because we have a golden opportunity
for the next 15 years, and we are doing a tremendous amount of
work.
And this is the time to get that next generation up and
running. Because the next generation are the folks that are
going to take us from 2025 out to 2045, 2050.
And again, this isn't just about nuclear weapons. Of course
it is taking care of the stockpile. But that next generation
will do that vital nuclear counterterrorism work; because the
best person to have on your team to take apart an improvised
nuclear device is the weapons designer that knows how to put it
together to begin with.
So, we want to make sure those people are connected up.
So, the people piece is the first one.
The next challenge is project management. We have, the
Chairman mentioned, a number of very significant, complicated
facilities that we are going to be building over the next 15
years. We have to make sure that our project management house
is in order and running well, and has all the elements of
nuclear safety, project management principles, and the like.
We started down that road to address this problem. You have
to address it early, because the time to catch the problem is
early on in the project, not after you have started; not after
you are done with the design and are trying to pour concrete.
So the things we have taken to move early is get our
project management policy changed--and I mentioned one thing
earlier, which is let us finish the design work before we go
off and start pouring concrete--doing sound cost estimates in
between each of our critical decision pieces. And we have done
this. We have changed our organization.
Neile Miller has brought a tremendous amount of management
expertise into the organization and has looked at this and said
that is, project management is the piece. We need an office
that is fairly focused on this and we need to recruit the best
person to run that office. We are actively looking for the best
person we possibly can to run this particular office, to get
this project management piece right.
We have had some early success, but we need some longer
success. And we have had early success that the Project
Management Institute has awarded to some of our projects. One
project in particular, in Anne's program, the distinguished
award, which is the first time ever a federal agency has ever
won this award, for one of Anne's projects. The National
Ignition Facility has been running steady state and has
executed. And they have won, there, the PMI [Project Management
Institute] award of the year, last year, for the most
complicated project.
But our challenge is not the past. Our challenge is the
future. And that is what we are going to focus on.
Dr. Fleming. Okay. I thank you, Mr. Secretary. I yield
back.
Mr. Turner. Ms. Sutton.
Ms. Sutton. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to all the witnesses for being here today.
My questions are going to focus on the Hanford Waste
Treatment Plant. The Hanford complex is the biggest and most
expensive cleanup project in the DOE complex, and perhaps the
most important.
It is also my understanding from the testimony here today
and information that I have gathered that the project has just
been plagued with cost increases, delays, and technical issues.
So, Dr. Winokur, I know you talked a little bit about this,
but if you could just give us, in quick, order a short rundown
on the present concerns with regard to Hanford.
Dr. Winokur. Well, let me begin by providing some context
as to why I think it has become very challenging.
The Board has actually committed to the early integration
of safety and design at these facilities.
I think we have already mentioned the fact that if you
integrate things early--and I think Tom mentioned this--before
you pour concrete or before the design is largely complete, you
can address the issues. If you have to go back at a later time
and try to retrofit safety, it is very hard.
Now, what happened with this project is it underwent a
major redesign in 2009. When I say major redesign, I mean that
design criteria in the project changed, and this raised safety
issues for the Board.
We began communicating with the Department about these
safety issues as early as January--well, really, immediately
after, but since very significant communications beginning in
January of 2010.
Then we felt in order to really focus these issues--and you
have asked me what those issues are--we had to have a hearing.
Ms. Sutton. I understand.
Dr. Winokur. At the hearing, the three issues that I think
we really focused on were the mixing systems. Basically, this
facility separates waste into a high- and a low-level waste
stream.
In the black cell region of the facility, you have no
access for 40 years while the plant operates.
One of the things you have to do is be able to mix solids,
mix the actual radioactive waste, so that it can be transported
and then operations performed on it.
The Board felt that, when it looked at the new design
criteria that the accumulations of solids was part of that
design criteria. It raised a safety concern for us.
Ms. Sutton. I appreciate that. I want to speed this along
because I have a lot of questions. So, I really appreciate
that.
I understand the mixing concern. There were also concerns
with respect to the hydrogen gas figures, as I understand it,
and also criticality concerns, perhaps.
So, if those are the things that we are looking at right
now in regard to Hanford, would you agree that those are the
major concerns?
Dr. Winokur. Yes, those are major concerns; that is in the
written oral testimony.
Ms. Sutton. Okay. Then let me go a little bit further here,
because I also have some concern about the safety culture at
Hanford. I don't know if that is a concern for you.
Would you say that is a concern, Chairman?
Dr. Winokur. It is a concern for us.
Ms. Sutton. Okay. So, do you think that enough attention is
being paid or has been paid to safety and quality at Hanford?
You talked about how, at some point, it became a big issue.
I mean, I know that, for example, a former research and
technology manager has alleged that he was removed for raising
safety and technical concerns.
I guess one question I would have: Has there been an
investigation into that matter?
Dr. Winokur. Yes, there has been. The Board received a
letter in July of 2010 from Dr. Walt Tamosaitis, who raised
concerns about the safety culture on the project.
So the Board believed he was a credible individual who had
played an important role at the project. The Board felt it was
necessary to conduct an investigation.
I mean, whenever the Board gets whistleblower or other
information, other concerns, the Board always investigates.
Either we investigate it ourselves, or we turn it over to the
IG [Inspector General].
A natural evolution of that letter was to begin the safety
culture investigation, and we had a hearing.
So, the Board wanted to be sure that what happened at the
hearing didn't have safety culture problems. In other words,
the witnesses felt very comfortable with sharing information
with the Board.
So, we certainly looked at that. Subsequent to that, we
have identified other issues.
Now, I can tell you that the Board hopes to share the
information of that investigation with the safety culture, the
waste treatment plant, with the Secretary of Energy in the near
future.
We do have concerns about safety culture. We will be
identifying them for the Secretary's consideration.
Ms. Sutton. I appreciate that, and I will look forward to
seeing more information about the safety culture.
Can you just share with me, in the very brief time we have
left, what do you look for when you evaluate the safety
culture?
Dr. Winokur. Well I think the crux of the safety culture is
an empowered workforce, people who are comfortable with raising
concerns with their management so that you don't have the
messenger being shot. I think that is really what adds to the
safety culture.
Even though you measure it in the way that the work is
performed and how empowered they are, safety culture is driven
by leadership. So we always have to look at that aspect of it.
Ms. Sutton. Thank you.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Brooks.
Mr. Brooks. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This question is for Dr. Triay. In looking at your bio, it
says that you lead the largest, most diverse and technically
complex environmental cleanup program in the world, including
enough radioactive waste to completely fill the Louisiana
Superdome.
In that context, it would seem, then, that we should be
seeking appropriate storage facilities, not, as a country,
seeking to close them down.
President Obama indicated that he does not intend to pursue
Yucca Mountain as a long-term repository for high-level waste.
Yucca Mountain remains designated by law as a repository for
high-level radioactive waste.
In your judgment, would Yucca Mountain serve our repository
needs?
Secretary Triay. As the Secretary has testified, we believe
that the studies that are going to be conducted by the Blue
Ribbon Commission will inform any decisions moving forward that
the Administration will make with respect to high-level waste
repositories.
I will just point out that the waste we have in the
Environmental Management complex is low-level waste,
transuranic waste, and high-level waste.
The Waste Isolation Pilot Plant has been operating safely
for 10 years and has been able to disposition over almost
80,000 cubic meters of transuranic waste since it started
working. We have very viable options for low-level waste.
As we progress in taking those lessons learned, those will
all be taken into account in the Blue Ribbon Commission
studies. I personally have been asked by the Blue Ribbon
Commission to give them the lessons learned from my time as the
field manager of the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant,
dispositioning of transuranic waste.
So, I believe that we are committed as a country,
ultimately, to have a repository for high-level waste. We are
awaiting the Blue Ribbon Commission recommendations to the
Secretary in draft form in the summer and finalized in the next
calendar year.
Mr. Brooks. Do you have a judgment as to when studies on
Yucca Mountain first began and how many have been conducted?
Secretary Triay. The Yucca Mountain project is not part of
the portfolio in the Environmental Management program. But I
understand your point that----
Mr. Brooks. We are talking many years, even a decade or so?
Secretary Triay. Yes.
Mr. Brooks. Why is another study needed?
Secretary Triay. I believe that the studies that you refer
to with respect to Yucca Mountain have been specific to the
geohydrological conditions as well as how to isolate the waste.
The Blue Ribbon Commission is looking, I believe, more
broadly as to what are the options for a high-level waste and
spent nuclear fuel.
They are not looking specifically at the geohydrological
conditions of any particular site. But they are looking at the
process that got us to a point that the Administration felt
that it could not move forward with the Yucca Mountain
decision.
Mr. Brooks. What insight can you share with us that would
help convince us and the American public that the
Administration's stance with respect that Yucca Mountain is
motivated more by capturing Nevada votes or Senator Reid's
capturing Nevada votes rather than sound public policy?
Secretary Triay. I have been working, like you mentioned,
in the field of nuclear waste management for over 25 years.
The main aspect of moving forward with dispositioning of
radioactive waste--whether it is low-level or transuranic,
high-level waste, spent nuclear fuel--is the intent of the
community that surrounds that particular site to move forward
and deal with the mission that has been delineated for that
particular repository.
That is what I have learned from being a field manager at
the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant in Carlsbad, New Mexico, for 5
years before coming to headquarters in the Environmental
Management program.
I believe that part of what the Blue Ribbon Commission is
going to look at is what is the process that would get us to
success, rather than starting and then having to stop and deal
with extensive periods of litigation because we have not had a
clear community as well as national interest merge with respect
to a focus that we need to have in this very difficult field of
dispositioning radioactive waste.
Mr. Brooks. Well I would say my time is expired.
Thank you, Madam Secretary.
Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Thornberry.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary D'Agostino, I think you made an important point a
while ago that it is important for the U.S. to have the best
nuclear capability for a variety of reasons; keeping our own
nuclear deterrent, but also having that capability for a
variety of contingencies is necessary that people, programs,
and facilities all contribute to having that level of
excellence where we want it to be.
You mentioned a few minutes ago some of the challenges on
the facilities part of it, and a 21-percent increase, I think
you said. Of course, that comes off what some people would
argue as decades of neglect. So we have a lot of catching up to
do.
One of the questions--let me ask this. Can you tell me,
over the next 5 to 10 years, what percentage of your
construction budget is devoted to the facility at Los Alamos
and the facility at Y-12?
Secretary D'Agostino. Well, let us see. In a typical year--
I am going to try to get my way to answering you directly.
I think, typically, when we were a steady state and we
don't have these large facilities in our program, we have
spent--recapitalizing at the rate of about $200 million to $250
million to $400 million a year, depending on what facilities we
have because we have, obviously, a multi-billion dollar set of
infrastructure to take care of.
The two line-item projects that we have right here are
probably in the neighborhood of $300 million to $600 million a
year, depending on which over the next 10 years as we look
ahead.
So, what we have got, I would say about these two
facilities will comprise more than 50 percent of the normal
recapitalization that we would be doing.
I would have to check the statistic table I have here in my
book to get the exact percentage. But it is a significant
share.
Mr. Thornberry. And it would take about how long to build?
Secretary D'Agostino. These large facilities, we feel, are
going to be 10-year construction activities from the initial
design work that has to get done, defining the performance base
line, and then actually building them.
Typically, it takes about a year and a half to 2 years to
transition these into operations.
Mr. Thornberry. Yes.
Secretary D'Agostino. A normal recapitalization project
like the high explosive press is more on the order of about
3\1/2\ years or so.
Mr. Thornberry. Yes. It just seems to me an enormous
challenge to have--and we have had these challenges since I
have been on this committee.
Whether it was NIF [National Ignition Facility] or
whatever, we have had some very expensive facilities----
Secretary D'Agostino. Right.
Mr. Thornberry [continuing]. As part of NNSA.
Then we also have kind of the smaller, more routine things
in competition with the same dollars.
The third thing we have is trying to transition the complex
to a smaller footprint where it makes more sense with the
number of weapons and the kinds of activities we are doing now.
All three of those priorities seem to me to be competing
for the same dollars.
I guess I am curious what you can tell us about how you
sort that out----
Secretary D'Agostino. Okay.
Mr. Thornberry [continuing]. Year in, year out. Ten years
to build a building? I mean, I know it is a complicated
building, but good heavens. Surely, there has got to be a
better way.
Secretary D'Agostino. We are looking at better ways on
these things. It is one of the challenges that we have been
given.
Don Cook, who is the deputy administrator, is looking at
this particular challenge. He is exactly the right person for
this job.
He was the individual that was in charge of a $550 million
facility at Sandia many years ago and brought that facility in
under budget and early because of the way he approached the
construction.
He has, in fact, directed both of our M&O contract partners
at Y-12 and Los Alamos to look for ways to leverage each
other's capabilities there.
In some cases for these facilities, we have similar
business teams working on these projects, particularly in the
early design phase.
How do we integrate those two activities so we don't
relearn the lessons from before?
The one thing I would say on how do we balance priorities--
I think it is a very good question.
I recall very specifically when we were in the fiscal year
2011 budget formulation process internally within the
Administration and the same in the fiscal year 2012 process
taking a look at the out-year resources we have dedicated not
to these facilities, but to what I would call our base
workload.
I asked for significant increase in resources for what I
would call just your normal recapitalization. I received
support from the White House for that.
So this 10-year plan does have that in there. The challenge
will be, of course, making sure that it stays in that account
so we don't keep adding to our deferred maintenance problem.
Many of the things that we want to do, particularly at Y-
12, for example, serve similar purposes: recapitalizing and
shrinking of the footprint.
You know, this is always one of those things where, 10
years from now, it will get better. But we do have a plan, and
we have to execute the plan now, sir.
Mr. Thornberry. Yes, and shrinking the footprint reduces
security costs and has a variety of benefits.
I agree. We have got to stick with the plan. It just looks
challenging to get from here to there, for me.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I yield back.
Mr. Turner. Thank you. We will go to Mr. Bishop. Then after
that we will have a second round for questions if members have
second questions for this panel.
Mr. Bishop. Well, Mr. Chairman, I see you have changed my
nameplate. I was expecting to use Mr. Scott's five and then run
down to mine and get another five. Apparently, you have closed
that avenue of abuse of the process to me.
I actually am here to listen to this panel and have
questions for the next one. Thank you.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Then turning to our second round, returning again to Mr.
D'Agostino.
The B61 bomb is a key capability that supports the U.S.
contribution to NATO's [the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization's] nuclear alliance and our extended deterrence
commitments.
The NNSA budget request contains a significant increase in
funds for the B61 Life Extension Program and includes plans for
NNSA to begin engineering development activities, Phase 6.3, in
fiscal year 2012.
However, the cost and design study of Phase 6.2 and 6.2A is
not yet complete, and the Nuclear Weapons Council will not meet
until later this year to authorize entry into the next phase.
What gives NNSA confidence that it can proceed into
engineering development? How is NNSA managing schedule costs
and risk to meet the delivery requirements for a first LEP life
extension production unit by 2017?
Secretary D'Agostino. Mr. Chairman, the approach we are
taking is what I would call is very active project management.
This is a project.
Just like an infrastructure project is a project, this is a
project. It has a defined cost, scope, and a schedule basis.
You correctly point out that we are not--we have not yet
completed our, what we would call design work, if you will, to
determine what the exact cost will be.
What we have done in the past is, you know, parametric
analysis on estimating what the future cost will be. We will
make adjustments at the end of this calendar year once we have
the actual costs for this project.
One thing that is clear with--at the Nuclear Weapons
Council: Mr. Ash Carter is the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons
Council.
We just had a meeting. We have regular meetings, but our
most recent one actually delineated and lined out how we are
going to get ourselves to a final decision point on this life
extension.
We are holding firm to the 2017 date, not because we think
that is a good--a date we pulled out of the air. That is a date
that is required because of our concerns on some components on
this system.
So without a doubt, we are going to be hitting that date;
we have to. The Nation's security on this warhead demands it.
The question will be, can we do all that we had hoped to do
on this warhead and take advantage of this opportunity?
We think it will be challenging, but doable. That is our
plan over the next 6 months, is to really put the meat and
potatoes behind that particular statement on exactly what is
going to get done.
Mr. Turner. Dr. Triay, last year, our committee authorized
the Department of Energy to establish energy parks on former
defense nuclear facility sites.
This is an idea way for the Department to leverage
communities and have legacy nuclear and other technical
expertise and transition them to focusing on new energy
research and development.
Can you provide us with an update on what the Department is
doing in establishing these energy parks and whether any
candidate sites have been identified?
Secretary Triay. I am pleased to do that, Mr. Chairman. On
February 17th, 2011, the Department established an Asset
Revitalization Initiative Task Force that is led by the
Director of Legacy Management, Mr. David Geiser.
It has representation from all the elements in the
Department, especially all of the energy offices.
In addition to energy parks, the task force is going to
look broadly at any beneficial reuse that the communities are
interested in pursuing with the vast tracks of land that we
have cleaned up as a result of our work.
So, in August of this calendar year, that task force is
going to report to senior DOE management on a path forward on
the Asset Revitalization Initiative.
At that time, we should be able to clearly delegate to you
one of the strategies that are going to be utilized and the
advantages that different approaches for beneficial reuse, such
as energy parks, have.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you.
Dr. Winokur, in your testimony in page 12 and 13 and a
little bit beyond that, you discuss the nuclear security
infrastructure in some of our facilities.
So I am curious: In the Board's assessment, what challenges
remain yet with the design of the CMRR and the UPF at Y-12, and
how many issues have you assessed been resolved? How many have
you assessed are yet outstanding?
Dr. Winokur. Well, with the CMRR facility, as you know, or
may not know, the Board did a congressionally directed
certification of that facility.
Actually, both the Board and NNSA independently performed
the certification in September of 2009.
At that time, the Board was comfortable that the safety
strategy had been developed for that facility that the controls
had been identified and that a path forward to implement those
controls in a final design was in place.
So, I think we were comfortable with that facility and how
it was proceeding. But the caution always was there is a lot
of, you know, details that have to be filled in to actually
build this thing and get to a final design.
The concern right now, from the Board's point of view, and
is becoming a recurring concern, is that the NNSA is looking
at, perhaps, a change in the safety strategy of the facility.
They are going to do that by, perhaps, reducing the material at
risk for the facility.
That is certainly their decision. The Board does not, you
know, weigh in on that.
But if they do change the material at risk in the facility,
they are also considering a change in the safety strategy or
the safety controls themselves, perhaps downgrading them.
So, I think this thing is, right now, in a situation where
we really have to get clearer. We wrote a letter to the
Administrator in February asking him to provide a little more
detail to us about exactly how NNSA is going to proceed with
this facility.
So, we are kind of in a situation right now where we are
waiting just to get, you know, recalibrated in terms of what
the Administrator wants to do with that facility. Then we are
going to have to, in a sense, relook at what the safety
controls are and convince ourselves are adequate.
The UPF facility down at Y-12 was a facility that the Board
had some initial structural concerns about. I think most of
those are resolved.
But where the Board has had a little bit of difficulty is
that--and I think the Administrator said this--they didn't want
to make some decisions about the strategies until they were 90
percent, 95 percent done with the design.
The Board felt that, you know, in waiting to do that, which
seemed prudent, that some of the steps along the way, some of
the preliminary design steps were not actually done.
So the Board is a little bit uncertain, to some extent, in
that facility about exactly what the safety strategy is going
to be going forward. We need to work with NNSA to get clear
about that.
Mr. Larsen. Yes. This gets to some of the questions Mr.
Thornberry was asking, you know, these big projects, we want--
everyone wants to see them get done right, absolutely.
So, in that vein, Mr. Secretary, do you have some response
for us today with regards to what the Board has contacted you
about?
Secretary D'Agostino. I don't have concerns. I would use
different words, but the Chairman uses the words that he feels
is appropriate.
I don't believe--the word ``downgrade'' is not something we
apply to safety, whereby appropriately, you know, safety
given--the right safety for the right risk.
We have the responsibility in the executive branch to make
sure that we factor in all the pieces together, nuclear safety
being a primary concern of ours.
When we go off and take a look at what it would take to
build a particular safety, we assume quantities and material at
risk. As time goes on, we get the opportunity to refine that.
If there is no plutonium in the building or if there is
half as much plutonium in the building, that changes the safety
analysis and problem and, therefore, allows us to take a look,
at does that potentially reduce costs?
Of course, the Board is with us every step of the way in
examining this and providing independent input. Frankly, I
value that independent input----
Mr. Larsen. Can I ask you a question? Because I don't want
anyone to think there is a discussion about what the definition
of ``downgrade'' is or anything like that----
Secretary D'Agostino. Right.
Mr. Larsen [continuing]. Or anyone is misconstruing
anything like that.
Secretary D'Agostino. Right.
Mr. Larsen. Just in the sense, is it a reasonable request
the Defense Nuclear Facilities Board is making to NSSA about Y-
12 and about CMMR?
Secretary D'Agostino. Yes, the request we are planning on
giving the Board the information they need, absolutely. We
always do that.
We want to do it in a way after we have taken a look at the
analysis ourselves.
Mr. Larsen. Yes, excellent. Yes, great.
Thank you very much.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Winokur, you know, we have all been following the
tragedy in Japan and the--I think it is the Fukushima power
plant, if I remember the nomenclature correctly.
It occurs to me that, in the midst of all of that, that
they probably had time to, you know, reinsert their control
rods in the reactor. But the ancillary problem of losing their
backup generators because of the--I think because of the
tsunami--left them with battery power and, of course, with the
reactor not in generation mode, they had to rely upon the grid,
which is not a shocking thing. When that wasn't available, that
became a very serious challenge to them.
Some of us on this committee, you know, have endorsed and
introduced legislation to do everything we could do, to protect
the grid from potential, you know, electromagnetic
interference, whether it is manmade or geomagnetic, and the
loss of the grid is a great concern to me.
I guess I am asking you, do we have any protocols in place
that would render us fairly impervious to such a challenge
here?
I know that the Administration has called for a higher
capacity battery backup. But those batteries do run down. I
mean, you know, there is just--I mean,--there is certainly--I
am all for what they are saying.
But is this going to be enough? If we should lose our grid,
what are the implications for, potentially, nuclear power
plants in full generation mode at the time?
And what are our abilities to cold-start if we have to? I
realize this is kind of getting a little out of your lane. But
I think it is primarily still something you can address.
Do we have the ability to respond effectively to a like
issue? Even though I know we have a little better--we are not
quite as vulnerable to what happened in Japan.
But can we respond to that effectively?
Dr. Winokur. Well, let me begin by saying, as I have said
in my oral statement, that the Secretary of Energy has already
tasked with the Department of Energy to take a look and see,
you know, whether or not they had an emergency response, or
will have an emergency response in place, to address the
serious either design-basis accident or beyond-design basis
accident.
What you are saying is very true. You definitely need
backup power. Maybe there will be some thought given to whether
it needs to be doubly redundant or not.
You need water for fire suppression. You have to make sure
you have guaranteed sources. And, probably just as importantly,
you need a very robust defense in depth.
So, when the Board talks to the Department about safety, we
usually use the word ``adequate'' protection of public and
worker safety.
But I think when it comes to the response to the backup,
you really have to think of it as being robust and bullet-
proof. That is one lesson.
I think the other challenge for the Department is that
emergency preparedness for them is really a very significant
issue because you have sites like Savannah River where you have
tritium facilities, which are in close proximity to facilities
that handle plutonium and highly-enriched uranium that are near
tank farms which have toxicological and radiological waste.
So, if a serious accident occurs, there is going to have to
be a very carefully orchestrated plan and a command center to
determine where the damage is and whether the workers should,
perhaps, shelter in place or try to vacate the area. I mean,
you don't really know.
So, I think it puts a real premium, and I think the Board's
been interested in this for years. We became even more
interested in this when we saw the BP spill out in the Gulf,
and the thousand-year flood at Pantex that really, there is a
lot more work that needs to be done in this emergency response
and emergency preparedness area.
Mr. Franks. Let me just encourage the Administration, and
you, Dr. Winokur, and others to take a good look at the Shield
Act that we have put forth to protect the grid from EMP or
geomagnetic-related damage because of the criticality of the
grid to back us up in these situations. You know, it is hard to
sometimes realize all of the cascading effects that occur.
I mean, if you run out of diesel fuel for whatever you have
or your batteries run down and with the plant being not in full
generation mode to be able to maintain its own circulation,
maintain its own cooling capacity, then that becomes something
to look at carefully.
I hope you will do that because it seems that there is a
pretty strong consensus that we need to do this, even though it
is just one area.
But I think that some impetus on your part or some
encouragement on your part might help it. I hope we do that.
Mr. Franks. Thank you.
Dr. Winokur. Thank you.
Mr. Turner. Ms. Sanchez.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Winokur, I have a question along the line of what Mr.
Franks just asked.
Can you refresh my memory about contingency plans? Let us
say, for example, I live in the Southern California area near
something called the San Onofre power plant where Southern
California Edison is the one that is drawing the power from
there, a private company.
It sits on the ocean, probably on what we would consider
county property right within the sphere of influence of a
public municipality that has its own government called San
Clemente, with a federal highway running alongside it, an
interstate highway, and some local arterials and state highways
connecting everything.
So, I know we plan for this, and I know we have plans, and
they are probably adequate. But in light of what happened in
Japan and, really, a perfect storm coming together and
overwhelming what probably their contingency plan is, who is in
charge of that contingency plan?
Who oversees it? Are we going back and looking at every
power plant we have in that way and saying, what would happen
with an overwhelming situation?
Who is in charge of making sure that barriers are correct
or things need to be heightened or spent rods are outside in a
more vulnerable area and highways aren't adequate to evacuate
people we need to evacuate if there is that type of a
population right next to the reactors?
Dr. Winokur. Thank you. It is a little bit out of our
jurisdiction. But I do want to, hopefully----
Ms. Sanchez. Who would I ask?
Dr. Winokur. The Governor of the State. I don't know.
Ms. Sanchez. Well, that is exactly what--you know, is it
the Governor? Is it the State? Or the feds?
Dr. Winokur. I can't really comment. But I would like to
make a relevant comment from the Safety Board's point of view
because we do have responsibilities for defense nuclear
facilities and DOE sites.
I want you to know that what I lose sleep over at night is
what you are talking about.
When I look at facilities and I try to rate which ones I am
the most concerned about, the first thing I say to myself is,
``Which site is near a population center? Which site, if I have
a problem, is going to more immediately impact the public?''
So, there are some places like the Nevada Test Site where,
even if there was an accident, which would be a very
unfortunate thing, we are still pretty far from a population
center. I feel more confident, and I know that I can confine
the emergency response in the site.
But there are others where that can't be done. I think
those are the ones that we need to work with the Department on
to ensure that the emergency response and emergency
preparedness not only, probably like you are suggesting,
includes the site, the Department of Energy, but also--I am
sure that the Department does this--the interacting community
around it.
Ms. Sanchez. Do you feel comfortable that the Department of
Energy and Department of Defense facilities have the
contingency plan for the overwhelming scenario?
Dr. Winokur. You are referring to the beyond design basis
accident?
Ms. Sanchez. Probably.
Dr. Winokur. Well I think that more work needs to be done
in that regard.
If you look at the Code of Federal Regulations 10 CFR 830,
which really defines safety at these facilities, it actually
does direct the Department to look at the beyond design basis
accidents.
I think the Board would probably benefit. I think we will,
by taking your question to heart and having a meaningful
discussion with the Department of Energy about how those kinds
of assurances can be provided.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you, Doctor. I know the Secretary wanted
to----
Secretary D'Agostino. Yes, ma'am.
You asked who is responsible. In the Department of Energy,
my organization is responsible for the emergency operations
organization and responding to emergencies in the Department.
Establishing that infrastructure of people and capabilities
and the communication system and the teams that go out and
deploy and go check, what we do--first of all, one of the
things we are doing is moving nuclear material out of areas
where we have large populations.
The inventory of plutonium at the Lawrence Livermore
Laboratory in Livermore, California, is a prime example of
that.
We recognized 3 years ago that we had a population center
that was growing around our laboratory and that we had two
sites in the country that were working plutonium.
We said, ``Well, this is very special material. We want it
in fewer sites, and we want it away from as many people as
possible.''
So that is why we are de-inventorying it. In fact, our FY
2012 budget goes to support the final year of de-inventory
activities to do that.
The second piece of this on the emergency side is, we have
a-this organization, we conduct exercises regularly.
There are national-level exercises with the FBI [Federal
Bureau of Investigation] and state and local authorities. We do
one of those big exercises once per year, including an example
of, potentially, a power plant problem. This is all exercises,
of course, so they are--we have an opportunity to do that.
The second piece are monthly, what we call, no-notice
exercises, where we don't tell everybody that we are going to
do one. We, I won't say, surprise them, but, in effect, we do
surprise, just check and see, is everybody ready to respond to
this event.
Finally, we are obviously in the middle of responding right
now. We are learning a lot. As we are helping the Japanese, we
are learning a lot about better coordination that we need to
have within the executive branch and within the Department of
Energy.
Ines may have one last piece to add to that, if I could.
Secretary Triay. Thank you. Very quickly, we in the
Environmental Management office are also responsible for the
emergency preparedness so that we can respond to an emergency
for those sites that are under the direction of the
Environmental Management Program, one of those sites being the
Hanford site.
To that end, of course, at the Hanford site we have, like
Chairman Winokur pointed out, 177 tanks, 53 million gallons of
radioactive waste, 175 million queries.
We take emergency preparedness extremely seriously, along
the lines of what the Administrator was talking about. We also
take the ultimate in design and construction of the Waste
Treatment Plant, which will address this huge issue extremely
seriously.
The Secretary has exercised great leadership when it comes
to the Waste Treatment Plant. We avail ourselves of the best
independent experts from industry, academia, as well as our
national laboratories.
As a matter of fact, some of the issues that Chairman
Winokur identified on mixing control for hydrogen tank farms
readiness have benefitted from the work of those independent
experts.
And we are committed to continue utilizing those
independent experts, collaborate with the Board, and be ready
to start the Waste Treatment Plant, finish the design by 2013,
finish the construction by 2016 and start operations by 2019 to
resolve this huge environmental issue of the Hanford tank
farms.
Ms. Sanchez. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Turner. Before we conclude with this panel, I want to
give anyone an opportunity to add to their comments or to make
concluding statements if they have something they would like to
highlight or focus on.
Secretary D'Agostino. Mr. Chairman, if I could, I wanted to
recognize my father, Tom D'Agostino, who is in the room here.
He has served this country for over 45 years, starting off
in the Marine Corps as an officer in the Korean War. He has
been an inspiration to me and dedication.
I have learned a lot from him, and I am here because of
him. So I wanted to thank him publicly.
Thank you. I appreciate your indulgence.
Mr. Turner. Very good.
Well, in recognition with your father, we would like to
continue our recognition of you all for your input and
contribution.
We are just all so appreciative of the fact that you
continue to serve in this capacity and know that you are making
a tremendous difference.
With that, we will turn then to Panel Two. We will take a
5-minute break before we make that switch.
Thank you.
Mr. Turner. I would like to provide a warm welcome to Mr.
Weber, General Chambers and Admiral Benedict.
As I mentioned earlier, this annual nuclear budget hearing
has typically focused solely on DOE and NSSA programs and
budgets.
However, the Department of Defense also has a significant
role in maintaining our Nation's nuclear deterrent, and is
directly responsible for shaping many of NSSA's plans and
programs.
Therefore, I have asked three key DOD leaders to testify in
the second panel on the Department's nuclear programs and
budgets and the linkages with NNSA. Mr. Weber, you are now
recognized for your opening statement, if you would.
Also, we have your written statements. If you could, in
about a 5-minute time period, although we are not going to run
the clock, summarize what your statement is.
We will turn, then, to the first round of questions.
Mr. Weber.
STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW WEBER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS,
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary Weber. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez
and members of the subcommittee, thank you for giving me the
opportunity to discuss the 2012 budget request for the
Department of Defense nuclear forces programs.
It is an honor to come before you with my colleagues,
General Chambers and Admiral Benedict, to provide testimony on
the Department's nuclear deterrence requirements.
Today's testimony will focus on our work with the
Department of Energy, from whom you have just heard, to ensure
a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for as long as
nuclear weapons exist.
Building upon a longstanding Department of Defense-
Department of Energy partnership, the Nuclear Weapons Council
has made substantial progress over the past 2 years.
As stated in this subcommittee's letter to the Honorable
Paul Ryan concerning nuclear weapons-related appropriations, a
safe, secure, and reliable nuclear stockpile is essential to
United States security.
America's strategic forces continue their role as a pillar
of our national security. In the past few months, I have had
the opportunity to witness firsthand our Forces' dedication and
commitment to this mission.
I traveled to Naval Base Kitsap in Washington State, last
fall and, in February of this year, to Malmstrom Air Force
Base, Montana.
During these visits, I spoke with the extraordinary airmen,
sailors and marines, who gave me a great appreciation for the
challenges they face each and every day executing our strategic
deterrent mission.
Before discussing fiscal year 2012 plans, it is important
to step back for a moment and consider the status of the
nuclear security enterprise before the Nuclear Posture Review.
According to the bipartisan Schlesinger-Perry Report, the
physical infrastructure was in serious need of transformation.
DOD also had inadequate plans for modernization of delivery
platforms for nuclear weapons.
Perhaps most importantly, both Departments were dealing
with the absence of a much-needed national consensus on the
future role of our Nation's nuclear deterrent.
By completing last year's Nuclear Posture Review, the
Administration helped restore this national consensus, and
outlined a comprehensive plan to revitalize the nuclear
enterprise and respond to all 21st-century nuclear threats,
including nuclear terrorism.
The Departments of Defense and Energy now have a shared
path forward to recapitalize the nuclear enterprise.
The Department of Defense has a robust plan for
recapitalizing the delivery systems that support our nuclear
deterrent.
The NPR concluded that the United States will retain a
nuclear triad under a New START Treaty comprised of ICBMs,
SLBMs and nuclear-capable bombers.
To keep the nuclear stockpile safe, secure, and effective
for the long term, we are moving forward with SLBM, ICBM and
gravity bomb warhead life extension programs.
We will also bolster the human capital base throughout the
nuclear enterprise while restoring the infrastructure that
supports the stockpile.
Nuclear threats to our Nation have changed significantly in
the last 20 years. Indeed, the world is safer today from the
threat of full-scale nuclear war than it was during the Cold
War.
While the U.S. and Russia reduce the number and role of
nuclear weapons, the U.S. must retain and maintain a safe,
secure and effective arsenal.
We ask you to support the President's 2012 budget request
so that we can further these goals.
I appreciate the opportunity you have given us to testify
today, and would be pleased to answer your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Weber can be found in
the Appendix on page 131.]
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
General Chambers.
STATEMENT OF MAJ. GEN. WILLIAM A. CHAMBERS, USAF, ASSISTANT
CHIEF OF STAFF, STRATEGIC DETERRENCE AND NUCLEAR INTEGRATION,
U.S. AIR FORCE
General Chambers. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez
and distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for
the opportunity to discuss your Air Force's strategic deterrent
forces.
Your Air Force nuclear enterprise consists of 450
intercontinental ballistic missiles, 96 bombers, squadrons of
F-15C [Boeing Eagle fighter jet] and F-15E dual-capable
fighters, and approximately 23,000 dual-capable airmen who
operate and sustain them.
These forces produce the strategic deterrence that remain
vital at a time when the national military strategy identifies
a strategic inflection point.
Maintaining credibility of our strategic deterrent requires
a long-term visible commitment to our nuclear capabilities.
Continuing to strengthen our nuclear enterprise remains the
Air Force's number one priority. Our Secretary and Chief of
Staff articulated strategic guidance to engrain the Air Force's
commitment to the advances we have made and to sustain the
focus on the nuclear enterprise.
My written statement lays out that guidance, and I
respectfully request that statement be entered into the record.
Today, I would like to highlight the following areas: Our
focus on human capital to ensure appropriate nuclear expertise
at all levels; the importance of modernizing and recapitalizing
nuclear deterrent operations capability; and implementation of
the Nuclear Posture Review and New START.
When the Air Force established reinvigoration of the
nuclear enterprise as our top priority, we included our most
precious resource, our Airmen, as an integral part of that
effort.
In response, the nuclear and personnel communities jointly
created an analytical process, resulting in a comprehensive
nuclear enterprise human capital effort, which lays out the
active management steps required to deliberately develop Airmen
and their nuclear expertise.
From investing in our people to investing in our weapons
systems, every one of our systems in the Air Force's nuclear
enterprise is undergoing some form of modernization or
recapitalization.
Successful deterrence over the next two decades require
sustaining and modernizing our fore structure in a consistent
and deliberate manner.
During the next 7 years, implementation of the 2010 Nuclear
Posture Review and the New START will bring a reduction in the
role of numbers of nuclear weapons in our national security
strategy.
The Air Force will remove, for example, multiple warheads
from its ICBMs. The United States and Russia will reduce the
number of accountable strategic warheads.
Final force structure numbers will be based on meeting the
combatant commanders' requirements and maintaining the overall
effectiveness of the deterrent force.
Our ability, as outlined in the national military strategy,
to help enable other nations achieve their security goals,
serve as a convener to cooperatively address common security
challenges while, lastly, act as a security guarantor--
preferably with partners and allies, but alone, if necessary--
rests on a foundation of U.S nuclear capabilities and the
strategic deterrence they provide.
The President's budget request reflects the positive steps
we are taking to improve this Air Force core function.
Across the FYDP [Future Year Defense Plan], Air Force
investment in nuclear deterrence operations totals $28 billion.
The Air Force is committed to ensuring this investment results
in systems and capabilities that best operationalize strategic
deterrents for our Nation.
The national military strategy acknowledges that our
Nation's security and its prosperity are inseparable.
Preventing wars is as important as winning them, and far less
costly.
In this time of constrained resources, the efficacy of
nuclear deterrent operations is evident in the fact that for
approximately 3 percent of the Air Force total obligation
authority, your Air Force continues to deliver the bedrock of
global strategic stability, providing the ICBM and bomber legs
of the triad as well as dual-capable fighter capability 24
hours a day, 7 days a week, 365 days a year.
Thank you for this subcommittee's continued support of
America's Air Force and, particularly, its support to our
Airmen and their contributions to strategic deterrence.
[The prepared statement of General Chambers can be found in
the Appendix on page 146.]
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Admiral Benedict.
STATEMENT OF RADM TERRY BENEDICT, USN, DIRECTOR, STRATEGIC
SYSTEMS PROGRAMS, U.S. NAVY
Admiral Benedict. Chairman Turner, Ranking Member Sanchez,
distinguished members of the subcommittee, it is an honor to
testify before you today representing Strategic Systems
Program.
SSP's [Strategic Systems Program's] mission is to design,
develop, produce, support and protect our Nation's sea-based
strategic deterrent, the Trident II D-5 strategic weapon
system.
The recently ratified New START treaty increases the
dependence on the submarine leg of the triad. The reductions in
warheads and launchers will result in ballistic missile
submarines carrying approximately 70 percent of the Nation's
strategic commitment.
I have focused on four priorities since returning to SSP:
Nuclear weapons security, the D-5 life extension program, the
Ohio replacement program, and the solid rocket motor industrial
base.
The first priority I would like to address and, arguably,
the most important priority, is the safety and the security of
the Navy's nuclear weapons.
Our Marines and Navy Master at Arms provide an effective
and integrated elite security force at our two strategic
weapons facilities in Kings Bay, Georgia, and Bangor,
Washington.
The U.S Coast Guard units have been commissioned at both
facilities to protect our Ohio-class submarines as a transit to
and from their dive points. This team provides a comprehensive
security umbrella.
The second priority I would like to discuss is SSP's life
extension efforts to ensure an effective and reliable sea-based
deterrent. The D-5 weapons system continues to demonstrate
itself as a credible deterrent and exceeds the operational
requirements established for the system almost 30 years ago.
Last month, the USS Nevada conducted the 135th consecutive
successful flight test of the D-5 system.
However, we cannot simply rest on our successes. We must
remain vigilant of age-related issues to ensure a continued
high level of reliability.
SSP is extending the life of the D-5 weapons system through
an update to all the subsystems: Launcher, navigation, fire
control, guidance, missile and re-entry.
These life extension efforts will provide the Navy with the
system we need to meet the operational requirements of the
future.
My next priority, and one of the highest Navy priorities,
is the Ohio replacement program. To lower development costs and
leverage the proven reliability of the Trident II, the Ohio
replacement SSBN will enter service with the D-5 weapons system
beginning in 2029.
Another critical component of the Ohio replacement program
is the development of a common missile compartment that will
support D-5 deployment on both the Ohio-class replacement and
the successor to the United Kingdom's Vanguard class.
Finally, I would like to discuss the importance of the
solid rocket motor industrial base. The Navy is maintaining a
continuous production of rocket motors.
However, we have faced significant cost challenges as both
NASA and the Air Force demands have declined.
We are working with our industry partners, the Department
of Defense, and Congress to sustain the solid rocket motor
industrial base and find ways to maintain successful
partnerships.
We look forward to continuing this collaborative approach
to maintain this critical national capability.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify here today. I
respectfully request that my written statement be submitted for
the record, and I am pleased to answer your questions at this
time, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Benedict can be found in
the Appendix on page 153.]
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
As you can tell we had a vote that was called. That is the
10-minute bell that we have to get to the Capitol for.
I am going to yield my time to Mr. Bishop so he would not
have to return after the votes, since he has sat through so
much of this hearing.
But before I do, Admiral, I just want to point out one
correction to your statement. The Ohio-class submarine
replacement program is not the Ohio replacement program because
Ohio will never be replaced.
So the--and that, of course, is near and dear to me, being
from Ohio.
Mr. Bishop.
Mr. Bishop. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate that
kindness.
I would be willing to come back, obviously, unless we are
talking about Ohio again. It should be Utah class, I think.
Rear Admiral, I appreciate your comments very much,
especially your fourth point there on the base. I realize that
the Navy's Strategic Systems Programs has been impacted by
NASA's space shuttle conclusion as well as the completion of
Minuteman III Propulsion Replacement Program.
Knowing that the current and diminished solid rocket market
has impacted the D-5 missile, what does the Navy plan to do,
actually, to minimize those costs?
Admiral Benedict. Sir, we have been working very
collaboratively with our industry partners, both Lockheed
Martin and ATK.
To that extent, I went out to Utah, went through the plant
and took a series of briefings from ATK.
As a result of that, I requested that those briefings be
provided to General Kehler, who is commander of the U.S.
strategic forces as well as Mr. Stackley, who is ASN, RD&A
[Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research, Development and
Acquisition)].
What those presentations show is an aggressive approach by
ATK to try to minimize their cost. Specifically, they have
reduced their indirect costs approximately 24 percent over the
last 3 years.
They have also significantly reduced their headcount from
approximately 4,900 individuals to about 2,800, a reduction of
42 percent, in order to maintain costs.
They have consolidated within buildings to the maximum
extent possible.
And while all that was happening, sir, over the last 3
years, the D-5 program has taken significant efforts in quality
and process improvements where we have reduced approximately
17,000 hours and cost-avoided about $10 million a year.
So, to get--I am sorry, sir.
Mr. Bishop. If I could just interrupt because I appreciate
that; you are right on with what you are saying you are doing.
Do you also have a plan in the future because NASA is still
dithering on what they want to do with the heavy lift, whether
they want to obey Congress or not.
So, in--regardless of what NASA ultimately decides to do,
do you also have a sustainability plan regardless of NASA's
involvement in the future?
Admiral Benedict. Sir, we have a requirement to maintain
strategic deterrence. We have a requirement today to--we have a
plan today to move forward with minimum sustaining.
An analysis that we conducted said that we need to produce
12 sets of motors per year in order to maintain safety at ATK.
Mr. Bishop. So I am assuming you are planning on
maintaining that----
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir
Mr. Bishop [continuing]. Production level.
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. We are.
Mr. Bishop. Through the current as well as the new Ohio-
class as well?
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir.
Mr. Bishop. That is wonderful.
Would the Navy benefit if the Air Force--and I am not
trying to put the General on the spot here--would continue its
production of the Minuteman ICBMs as well as NASA continuing on
with the same manner in a low rate-production concept?
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. I think any increase in volume
to the projected reduction based on NASA and the logical
termination of the Minuteman line today would significantly
benefit the United States Navy in terms of overhead charge.
Mr. Bishop. I appreciate that.
Mr. Chairman, I know you are anxious to get over here to
vote with everyone else. I have a couple of other questions.
But if I could submit those in writing, I would be
appreciative. We will let you move on with the committee.
Thank you for the kindness of allowing me to be here.
Mr. Turner. Okay. Thank you so much. We will be recessed.
[Recess.]
Mr. Turner. I am going to call the subcommittee back to
session.
Since we have returned from votes and we have myself and
Mr. Larsen, we will just do one round of questions and clean
them all up, if someone else is waiting to ask a question
beyond us.
And with that, I will begin with General Chambers.
The Nuclear Posture Review states, ``The Air Force will
retain a dual-capable fighter as it replaces F-16s and the F-35
Joint Strike Fighter. These decisions ensure the United States
will retain the capability to forward-deploy non-strategic
nuclear weapons in support of its alliance commitments.''
Now, please discuss the Air Force's plans to make the F-35
[Lockheed Martin Lightning II fifth-generation fighter jet]
Joint Strike Fighter fully nuclear-capable and nuclear-
certified. When is this capability needed and when will it
occur?
Now, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter continues to experience
schedule delays. What is the Air Force's mitigation plan to
sustain our current dual-capable aircraft capability in Europe,
should the F-35 continue to experience schedule delays?
And also would you please discuss the current status of and
future plans for our NATO allies in dual-capable aircraft? Are
you seeing decisions and investments by our allies in DCA,
dual-capable aircraft, sustainment or follow-on systems that
would maintain their burden share commitments?
And do you have any concerns in this area?
General.
General Chambers. Thank you, Chairman Turner.
A great question. As you know, the U.S.' commitment to the
NATO alliance for dual-capable aircraft is currently fulfilled
by a combination of F-16s [General Dynamics Fighting Falcon
fighter jet] and F-15Es. The plan to eventually replace those
airplanes with the F-35 is still in place.
The F-35 program, of course, is under scrutiny and under a
review, a technical baseline review which, when completed, will
give us some idea of the potential delays in the program.
The money to develop the F-35 as a platform that can carry
the new life extended B61 is in our program. That, to answer
your question about timeline, the slip of the F-35 in terms of
production and delivery and IOC, initial operating capability,
is unknown at this time. But it is likely to move to the right.
The block of software that makes the F-35 able to carry the
new B61 is the first block of software after the development
phase. And that is still part of the project and the program.
Because of this delay, our command in Europe, the United
States Air Forces in Europe, who presents these forces to the
alliance, has a number of planning options underway to cover
this capability to NATO in the event of a slip. And it involves
existing aircraft, such as the F-16 and F-15E.
And we are confident that, through a number of measures, to
include the potential life extension of the F-16, to include
reverting the primary high readiness mission back to F-15Es,
all those options are being pursued in order to cover a
potential gap that an F-35 slip might create.
Mr. Turner. Thank you, General.
Turning then, from our bombers, to our sea-based leg of the
nuclear triad; Admiral, today the sea-based leg of the nuclear
triad comprises just over half of the total deployed stockpile.
Under New START, the sea-based leg of the triad will comprise
two-thirds of our deployed stockpile.
As the Strategic Posture Commission observed, ``Each leg of
the triad has its own value.'' However, New START places a
significant dependence on one of these legs.
How is the Department thinking through the risks of such a
policy decision, and how is it managing such risks? And does
this greater dependency drive certain programmatic, operational
or, I am certain as you might advocate, resource
considerations, than perhaps were required before looking at a
triad that is certainly not going to be a third, third, third?
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir.
So, as I stated in my opening statement, and as you
reiterated there, under the New START treaty, we do approach
greater than two-thirds of the deployed forces. As I would also
mention, we also are the survivable leg of the triad.
Of course, as we look forward, we are doing life extension
efforts in a very planned manner, in all of our functional
subsystems, in launcher, in fire control, in guidance and
navigation, missile and re-entry.
We believe that taking a phased approach in a very orderly
manner through the Ohio program, which we are required to
maintain through 2042, and then using that base line as the
functional SWS [strategic weapons system] for the Ohio
replacement program, minimizes the risk.
We are able, now, to optimize limited resources. But I
would tell you that, in the Department of the Navy, from the
Secretary on down, we have strong leadership and dedication to
the mission and to our requirements to supply this to the COCOM
[combatant commander].
So, I believe that in a trying time of resources, I have a
fair voice at the table in terms of achieving and updating the
requirements and resources necessary to carry out my mission,
sir.
Mr. Turner. Thank you.
Mr. Weber, the Nuclear Posture Review stated that, ``The
secretary of defense has directed a number of initiatives to
further improve the resiliency of the NC3, the nuclear command,
control, and communications system. An interagency study is
being initiated to determine the investment needed and the
organizational structure best suited to further strengthen the
NC3 capabilities.''
Individual NC3 programs are spread across the services and
the lead architect in OSD [Office of the Secretary of Defense]
Networks and Information Integration, NII, is being eliminated.
To the extent you can discuss this in an unclassified
hearing, please describe the Department's concerns about our
nuclear command and control infrastructure, and when do key
program and resource decisions need to be made and when will
the Department be able to provide the committee with its NC3
investment strategy?
Secretary Weber. Okay. Well, the Nuclear Command and
Control System, as outlined in the NPR, is a very high
priority. The commander-in-chief needs a reliable, assured
capability to communicate to the nuclear forces. I mean, that
is a fundamental part of our deterrent.
And we have a few efforts under way.
One is the former commander of Strategic Command, Admiral
Richard Mies, led a federal advisory committee that did a
comprehensive review of the NCCS [Nuclear Command and Control
System] and we are working within the Department and
interagency partners on implementation of many of those
recommendations.
The dissolution of the NII office will have no impact on
NC3. Some of those core elements will be moved to other
elements within DOD, such as the Chief Information Officer's
domain as well as other parts of the AT&L [Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics] side of the Department of Defense,
where I work.
We are making investments currently. General Kehler, from
STRATCOM appeared before this subcommittee recently and noted
that the new construction that starts in the fiscal year 2012
budget request at Offutt Air Force base, includes an EMP-
hardened command and control facility for Strategic Command.
So that is part--that is really a central node of the NCCS
system. And that is just an example of one of the investments
that we are making.
In addition, we are upgrading our cryptographic
modernization programs and those are included in the
President's fiscal year 2012 address.
We will provide additional details to you in a classified
question for the record.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 167.]
Mr. Turner. We have discussed our bombers and our sea-based
leg triad. Now, General Chambers and Admiral Benedict, would
you please discuss some of the challenges that you are working
through on how you would implement the New START force
structure reductions? When will the Department make its final
decisions on its post-New START force composition? And when
will Congress see the specific implementation schedule and
estimated funding requirements?
General Chambers. Chairman Turner, the final decisions on
the exact force structure numbers are still being reviewed.
The military advice on those force structure numbers is now
being discussed among the services and the Joint Staff and with
our partners in OSD.
That decision which, as you know, we have reported to
Congress in the Section 1251 Report of the NDAA [National
Defense Authorization Act] for our two legs of the triad, that
the numbers will be up to 420 ICBMs and up to 60 bombers.
That ``up to'' must be defined and that decision will be
made in the coming weeks, perhaps in a few months.
We are not yet concerned about the timeline to execute the
treaty. The steps taken to implement the treaty in general are
fairly straightforward. But on the Air Force side, perhaps the
most challenging part of the timeline, although we have a good
plan, is the final conversion method for the B-52 [Boeing
Stratofortress strategic bomber] force.
Once that final B-52 number is determined and we lay that
timeline into our plan, we are confident we will be able to
execute.
We will need to advocate for the funds each year. As you
know, we will be implementing both the eliminations and the
conversions toward the latter part of the entry into the force
period. And so, in the coming years, as we advocate for these
needs in the budget, we will come with those figures.
Admiral Benedict. Sir, excuse me, sir, I would add that as
General Chambers said, we are, again, we are also working with
NNSA, with STRATCOM [United States Strategic Command], and with
DOD in terms of the exact planning requirements, not only in
terms of schedule, but also in terms of numbers, specifically
with us, with hedge.
We are working closely to define those. We have submitted
our budget request as part of the 1251 and in that request, we
made an assumption that the implementation would be more in the
out-years rather than the near-term years.
Again, as the General said, as we get more definitive
definition on the exact numbers and timing, we expect our
budget request to be adjusted adequately.
Mr. Turner. Mr. Larsen.
Mr. Larsen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. And I was just
thinking, Mr. Chairman, how useful it has been to have the two
panels today. As you noted early on, it really is sort of
creating that continuum for the subcommittee to understand the
soup-to-nuts on the nuclear security enterprise and how the
nuclear weapons play into it, how we deploy and then,
obviously, following on to treaty commitments as well and how
it supports it.
So thanks for setting it up this way.
General Chambers, I will start with you. If I can go back
to the Chairman's question about NATO, can you characterize,
what has the response been from allies to the potential or the
slipping of this F-35 timeline? Are you seeing decisions and
investments that allies otherwise would have made on the
burden-sharing commitments slipping as well? Are they in a
wait-and-see?
How is that--what is the impact here?
General Chambers. Mr. Larsen, thank you.
Good question.
As you know, the current burden-sharing nations who
contribute to this commitment to the alliance aren't all
invested in the F-35 program. Specifically, Italy and the
Netherlands are the two countries that are brought into the
program. They have been consulted by the F-35 program office
all along the way and will be fully briefed when the technical
baseline review is completed as to how the delivery schedule is
affected by a potential slip.
They, in their planning, have envisioned this new platform
to fulfill its dual-capable aircraft capability to the
alliance. But they, as well, obviously, argue for the money
needed to do that on an annual basis, with their governments.
Very difficult to predict how that is going to come out.
At the alliance level, politically, all current burden-
sharing nations continue to be committed to this mission. As
you know, at the Lisbon summit, the strategic concept was
confirmed and it still includes the mission of strategic
deterrence based on our nuclear capability, provided by the
dual-capable aircraft and all current burden-sharing nations
are officially on record as continuing to support that.
As this plays out, if the platform slips and governments
shift their position, we will monitor that very closely.
Mr. Larsen. Back to you, General Chambers, and this is a
shift here of subject. Can you provide an update on the Air
Force's nuclear surety inspection process and how things have
improved since the 2007 and 2008 incidents?
General Chambers. Yes, sir. Since those incidents, the Air
Force has committed an increased rigor in its inspection
process that actually has been very impressive.
It has involved the standup of a core inspection team at
Air Force's Inspection Agency, which is a branch of our
Inspector General and stationed at Kirtland Air Force Base.
They form the core and the deepest level of expertise of all
inspectors and they supplement and add to the capability of our
Major Command inspectors.
The standardization of inspector training has taken place.
The development has----
Mr. Larsen. Has that taken hold?
General Chambers. It has taken hold and we have seen it in
the quality of discrepancies that have been written up by the
inspectors, the quality in which we share the information
across commands about how units have done, the ability to trend
our inspection results out, so that we can improve.
Perhaps one of the most important initiatives has been the
addition of root cause analysis which is a formal problem-
solving method of get at the heart of what an inspector has
found as a discrepancy and actually get to the root cause.
It is increasing the performance of our units and we have
seen, in general, a positive trend in results. We will always
look to our inspectors to find problems, so that we can get
better every day.
But this increased rigor, the standardized training,
standardized check list, the use of root cause analysis, has
all enhanced the commanders' ability to do better every time.
Mr. Larsen. All right.
Admiral Benedict, we have had this discussion, not you and
I, I am sorry. But the subcommittee has had a discussion in the
past with regards to the Ohio-class replacement program.
New START, though, when it was negotiated, assumed a
reduction from 24 missile tubes per hull to, I think, a maximum
of 20.
The current configuration, as I understand it, would move
from 24 to 16.
Can you discuss, for the subcommittee here, the Navy's
rationale for that? For moving from 24 to 16 as opposed to the
max of 20?
Admiral Benedict. Sir, as part of the work-up for the
Milestone A with Dr. Carter in OSD, SSP supported extensive
analysis at both the OSD level as well as STRATCOM's analysis.
Throughout that process, we provided, from the SWS
capability, our perspective. Ultimately that was rolled up into
both STRATCOM and OSD and senior Navy leadership and in
previous testimony, the Secretary of the Navy, the CNO [Chief
of Naval Operations], and General Chilton have all expressed
their confidence that the mission of the future, given their
perspectives as they see the environment today can be met with
16.
And so, as the acquisition and the SWS provider, we are
prepared to support that decision by leadership, sir.
Mr. Larsen. Yes.
And did your analysis that fed into this, did you look at
specific numbers then?
Admiral Benedict. Sir, we looked at the ability of the
system; again, SSP does not look at specific targets with----
Mr. Larsen. Right. Yes, yes, yes.
Admiral Benedict. Our input was the capability of the
missile, the number of re-entry bodies and the throw weight
that we can provide against those targets and, based on that
analysis, the leadership decision was 16, sir.
Mr. Larsen. I want to go back to the solid rocket motor
industrial base. And I didn't quite understand the response,
and I forget if it was Admiral Benedict or General Chambers,
about the idea of a production line of 12 and what the
necessity of that production line of 12 meant.
Is that because we needed those for replacements or we need
those on the shelf just in case? How are those--how do those
play out for us?
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir.
When we look at minimum sustaining rate, the first thing we
do is the analysis on what is the minimum number of operations
that we need to do in order to sustain a viable work force and
experience with both the tooling and the processes from a
safety standpoint.
We have looked at a number of ranges and, through an
analysis, have determined that 12--basically one set per
month--is the right number in order to keep a safe throughput.
Now, we don't build one motor set per month. We do build,
essentially, one first stage per month. We build second stages
in groups and we build third stages four at a time, from a cost
efficiency.
In terms of production from sustainment, we built the D5
very quickly at the beginning, before the Cold War ended. And
so we have an aging issue that we also need to address;
propellant, given its chemistry, doesn't last forever.
So as we have done the analysis, we believe that we can get
approximately 30 years of life out of our rocket motors.
So as we look at our production line for the future, both
in support of Ohio through 2042 and then entry into the Ohio
replacement submarine class, we will need to sustain production
of rocket motors to ensure that we don't have a safety issue
with aging propellant in the future.
Mr. Larsen. So as I understand it, the industrial base is
important, but the requirement has to do with the safety of the
motor? The certainty of it? The surety of it?
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir. But in our mind, those are
linked.
Mr. Larsen. Yes. You need the industrial base in order to
achieve this. But to achieve this requirement, you set the
requirement first, and then that defined the industrial base?
Admiral Benedict. Yes, sir.
Mr. Larsen. Yes. Okay.
Admiral Benedict. Yes.
Mr. Larsen. Yes.
Thanks. Is that right? General Chambers, are you part of
that response before? I don't want to have you answer
something, if you don't need to.
General Chambers. I wasn't, sir. But Admiral Benedict did
mention, of course, that our requirements have declined because
the Minuteman III propulsion program has recently been
completed. So our motors are good right now. We are, through
our ICBM demonstration validation program, exploring, through
engineering and design angles, the potential for modernizing
the propulsion for our aging issues, which will come later this
decade. And we want to look at with a mind toward a potential
follow-on Minuteman III as well.
Mr. Larsen. And with any luck, the Chairman and I will
still be here to deal with that one too.
General Chambers. We will look forward to that, sir.
Mr. Larsen. Maybe in different positions. We will see.
That is it. Thanks a lot. Thanks.
Mr. Turner. Gentlemen, I want to thank you so much for
participating and also for your leadership in the areas that
make such a big difference for our nuclear deterrent.
With that, we will be adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:40 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
April 5, 2011
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April 5, 2011
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?
=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
April 5, 2011
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Secretary Weber. Department of Defense (DoD) leadership is working
to formulate the DoD Nuclear Command, Control, and Communications (NC3)
investment strategy in the broader context of the national leadership
command capabilities, with a report due to the Congress by February 6,
2012.
The DoD Chief Information Officer (CIO) is working several key
initiatives to address the findings highlighted within the Nuclear
Posture Review and other national-level studies. The DoD CIO is
developing a National Leadership Command Capability (NLCC) architecture
framework to support the development of an integrated command
capability in support of the national and nuclear mission. The
framework includes the development of an enterprise-level model to
capture the current nuclear architecture. The model will be one tool to
provide the critical analysis needed to assess current capability gaps,
provide trade-off analyses to make informed business decisions, develop
risk mitigation strategies, and provide the foundation for significant
and measurable improvements in our nuclear command and control
capability.
In addition, the Department has developed draft policies that
include a renewed emphasis on capturing and consolidating Nuclear
Command and Control (NC2) configuration data in addition to new policy
that directs management and oversight responsibilities for developing
and maintaining the nuclear command, control, and communications
capability that supports our nuclear deterrent strategy. The DoD CIO is
developing a five-year roadmap for the national and nuclear mission
that will lay out key elements of the concept of operations, a focus on
information assurance requirements, and a comprehensive development and
funding strategy. The CIO will be working with the Combatant Commands,
Services, and Agencies in the Department, and key members within the
Interagency to ensure the viability and soundness of the roadmap. The
management and oversight of national and nuclear C3 mission issues are
being addressed within the NLCC Executive Management Board (EMB)
chaired by the DoD CIO.
DoD CIO and USSTRATCOM are also co-chairing a ``National and
Nuclear C3 Focus Team'' that is analyzing and prioritizing NC3 funding
issues, currently for POM13, to state the case for resourcing important
National and NC3 programs.
These and other initiatives will provide the basis for the DoD CIO
response to the House Armed Services Committee Report (112-78), in
support of House Bill 1540, tasking the Department to ``provide a
report on the NC3 architecture, long-term strategy, and an
identification of the NC3 elements across the services, including
current and needed investments across the Future Years Defense
Program'' by February 6, 2012. This process will be worked by a Tiger
Team under the NC2 Issues Working Group, under the auspices of the NLCC
EMB.
The DoD would be pleased to answer any further questions you have
on this matter to keep you appropriately informed. [See page 43.]
______
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS
Secretary D'Agostino. [The information referred to is classified
and is retained in the subcommittee files]. [See page 18.]
?
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QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
April 5, 2011
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER
Mr. Turner. The November update to the Section 1251 Report
identified plans to provide an additional $4.1 billion increase to
NNSA's budget for nuclear modernization. However, $1.5 billion of this
$4.1 billion--or, 37-percent--is allocated to cost growth in NNSA
defined-benefit pension plans.
Please explain the scope of this issue and why NNSA is in this
situation. Is it unique to NNSA? What options are being considered by
NNSA and what options might the Congress consider to give NNSA and its
contractors greater flexibility in meeting their pension obligations?
Secretary D'Agostino. Many DOE/NNSA contractors sponsor defined
benefit plans for their employees. Pursuant to DOE/NNSA contracts, DOE
and NNSA reimburse the contractors for pension contributions. In recent
years, the market downturn has adversely affected defined benefit
pension plans' asset performance. Poor asset performance combined with
interest rate decreases have caused pension plans to become
increasingly underfunded. This underfunding has resulted in increased
pension contributions for DOE and NNSA contractors as well as many
other private employers that sponsor defined benefit plans for their
employees.
In accordance with its contractual obligations, DOE/NNSA is
committed to continuing to reimburse contractors for these pension
costs. As noted in the November 2010 Update to the Section 1251 Report
required by the National Defense Authorization Act of FY2010, NNSA
estimated that costs associated with contractor pension reimbursements
would equal roughly $875 million during FY 2012. The $875 million
figure has since been revised to $840 million and the revised figure
was submitted in the February 2011 NNSA Congressional Budget Request.
Of the approximately $840 million associated with NNSA contractor
pension obligations for FY 2012, it is anticipated that the NNSA share
of providing pension benefits to University of California retirees from
Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) and Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (LLNL) will approximate $224 million. The remaining amount
of the estimated FY 2012 contribution is spread among 22 other
retirement plans.
Over the past two years, DOE/NNSA has intensified its efforts to
improve oversight of contractors' pension obligations. In particular,
the Department and NNSA have:
developed a central repository for pension and
postretirement plan information that increases the ease in collecting
updated information from contractors as well as provides Department
users with the ability to compare information among the plans and
determine trends among the contractor populations;
acquired the capability to model financial and economic
impacts across the complex's contactor pension plans;
completed two annual comprehensive pension management
plan reviews that further the robust interchange between the Department
and its management and operating (M&O) and facilities management
contractors; and
initiated the second annual survey of the comprehensive
contractor employee benefits analysis that will again be shared with
the contractors and programs as well as compared to industry
benchmarks.
With this information, DOE and NNSA are now better able to evaluate
the breadth of the overall pension funding situation to determine
actual pension cost projections for the future and develop policy
options to mitigate and control pension cost growth, volatility, and
liability to the Government.
Mr. Turner. China's proliferation record in the past has been
rather mixed, to say the least. Howard Berman, Ranking Member of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, once said that China's pattern was to
``proliferate, promise not to, proliferate, promise not to, and
proliferate.'' NNSA and DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
budgets now include proposed funding for a nuclear Center of Excellence
in China. What confidence do you have that China has changed its
behavior--that it is now committed to nonproliferation in its actions
as well as its words?
Secretary D'Agostino. In the past, the nuclear and arms trade
practices of the People's Republic of China (PRC) did not conform to
international nonproliferation regime standards. Over the years, China
has joined multilateral institutions and treaties such as the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984 and the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992, while also engaging in bilateral
cooperation, such as conducting activities under the 2004 Statement of
Intent signed by DOE and the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA), and
the 1998 Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology (PUNT) Agreement between
DOE and the State Development Planning Commission of the PRC. Improving
China's nuclear security and export controls standards has been a long-
term, bipartisan security goal of the United States along with partner
countries in the nonproliferation regime.
As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a
nuclear weapon state, China is a critical member of the nuclear
security community. Formalizing the nonproliferation advances that
China has made in the past decade is important to international efforts
in nonproliferation. Recent high-level interactions, such as the state
visit to the United States by President Hu Jintao in January 2011, and
agency-to-agency technical exchanges, have reinforced the view that
China is engaged in improving nuclear security. NNSA is therefore
working with China to improve its indigenous capacity by sharing best
practices in nuclear security and to assist the Chinese in implementing
accepted global standards throughout their nuclear complex.
Through U.S.-China cooperative engagement, including the Center of
Excellence (COE), NNSA aims to improve global nuclear security by
raising China's awareness of material security issues and associated
nuclear security and safeguards methods and technologies; promoting an
export control system that prevents illicit transfers of WMD dual-use
commodities; minimizing the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in
civilian applications; establishing a platform for promoting further
U.S.-China technical cooperation; strengthening China's training
capabilities on nuclear and radiological material security; and
improving security of radioactive sources. Cooperation on the COE
reflects the U.S. and Chinese governments' commitment to strengthening
their cooperation on nonproliferation, nuclear security and in
combating nuclear terrorism.
Additional cooperation between the U.S. and China includes:
NNSA and CAEA conducted a joint technology demonstration
(Tech Demo) at the China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) in October
2005 to promote adoption of modern security practices and technologies
at China's nuclear facilities. The Tech Demo initiated cooperation in
numerous areas, including material protection, control, and accounting;
nuclear safeguards; nuclear security culture; domestic inspections; and
secure transportation. Since the successful completion of the Tech
Demo, NNSA's International Material Protection and Cooperation Program
has cooperated with CAEA to conduct several technical workshops
supporting the exchange of best practices in various areas of nuclear
security.
NNSA provided radiation detection equipment to China for
the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the Shanghai Expo and the Asia Games and is
also working to install radiation detection equipment at the Port of
Yangshan in Shanghai.
NNSA is also collaborating with the Chinese to establish
a Customs training center at the Qinhuangdo Training Center.
Mr. Turner. The U.S. has been doing the Nunn-Lugar program for a
couple decades now, primarily focused on securing and dismantling
nuclear systems in Russia and the former Soviet Union. Many of these
efforts are nearing completion and ramping down.
Do you have any concerns about potential Russian proliferation
threats that are not covered under the Nunn-Lugar program that worry
you? If Russia has become a responsible actor with improved cash flow,
shouldn't they be shouldering more of the responsibility for securing
and destroying their own nuclear materials?
Secretary D'Agostino. While the majority of major security upgrades
in Russia, including all Russian Federation Ministry of Defense warhead
storage sites, were completed by the end of 2008, as agreed to in the
2005 Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative, several important areas
and buildings have been added to the scope of our activities and are
reflected in our revised Joint Action Plan, which lays out the scope of
security work to be undertaken by the United States and Russia by site.
These areas contain large quantities of weapons usable nuclear
materials. The recent extension of the statutory deadline for bilateral
cooperation in Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A) to
January 1, 2018, will permit the MPC&A program to continue to work
closely with the Russian Federation to ensure the successes of the past
15 years of cooperation are maintained until all cooperative upgrade
projects are completed.
While some security upgrade work is still underway, NNSA and
Rosatom have established well-defined criteria to guide the transition
of sustainability responsibilities to Russia for completed security
upgrades by site, which are formalized in a Joint Sustainability Plan.
This plan outlines seven key principles that characterize a sustainable
MPC&A program and guide U.S.-Russian project teams assessments of each
site's ability to transition to full Russian support (MPC&A
organization; site operating procedures; human resource management and
site training; operational cost analysis; equipment maintenance,
repair, and calibration; performance testing and operational
monitoring; and MPC&A system configuration management). When
deficiencies are identified, U.S.-Russian project teams agree to
specific activities that should be undertaken to address those gaps.
Though the NNSA is continuing efforts to fully transition
responsibility for MPC&A sustainability support to the Russian
Federation, it is in the national security interest of the United
States to remain engaged. While there are no specific threats of
concern outside the Nunn-Lugar Program scope, there are threats within
the scope that continue to concern the U.S. and influenced the interest
in MPC&A Program extension, namely the insider threat. While not a new
consideration for the MPC&A Program, the threat of a knowledgeable,
authorized person (insider) stealing even small quantities of nuclear
material remains a concern. The MPC&A Program is looking at new and
creative ways to further thwart insider theft or diversion of materials
through additional layers of security, programmatic and procedural
changes, and further improvements to nuclear material control and
accounting.
We agree that as Russian national budgets increase, their share of
funds devoted to nuclear security activities should increase as well.
At every opportunity, NNSA seeks to cost share with our Russian
counterparts, and has a long list of successful examples.
Examples include:
At various Russian Rosatom and Civilian sites, cost
sharing arrangements are in place for the installation and
sustainability of MPC&A upgrades. In addition, the Ministry of Defense
has committed to take over full financial responsibility for sustaining
permanent warhead sites (11 sites with DOE-funded upgrades, 18 sites
with DOD-funded upgrades).
The Second Line of Defense Program has a cost-sharing
arrangement with the Russian Federal Customs Service (FCS) for
installing radiation detection equipment at Russia's border crossings
whereby approximately half of the sites have been funded and equipped
by the FCS and half funded and equipped by NNSA. Transition of all
maintenance and sustainability responsibility to the FCS for deployed
radiation detection systems is planned to be completed by 2013.
In support of Russian plutonium disposition efforts, the
Fast Reactor and Gas Turbine-Modular Helium Reactor (GT-MHR) programs
both rely on cost-sharing. For Russian plutonium disposition, the U.S.
pledged to provide up to $400 million to assist Russia in disposing of
its excess weapon-grade plutonium. The total estimated cost of the
Russian contribution for implementing the program is approximately $2.5
billion. The U.S. may fund up to 100% of a limited number of non-
proliferation activities (BN-600 blanket removal and BN-800 core
redesign), but in most cases the U.S. will fund no more than 50% of the
total cost of any given Russian plutonium disposition activity. For the
GT-MHR program, joint research and development in Russia is funded on a
50/50 cost sharing basis with the U.S. Since 2000, the U.S. has
provided $29.1 million and Rosatom has provided $32.6 million for GT-
MHR work in Russia. The U.S. does not release funds until Rosatom
commits, in writing, to provide an equivalent amount of Russian funds.
U.S. funds for the GT-MHR program do not count against the $400 million
U.S. pledge.
With respect to securing vulnerable radiological materials in
Russia, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) is continuing its
cooperative efforts to recover radioisotope thermoelectric generators
(RTGs) in the Russian Federation. GTRI funds have supported the
recovery, disassembly, and disposal of RTGs, as well as the replacement
of these units with alternative power sources (APS). As an example of
cost-sharing, GTRI no longer pays for the installation of APS units.
Instead, Russia is responsible for securing the necessary
transportation and technical crew to complete the installations.
Additionally, Russia has provided discounted or `at cost' rates for
some RTG transportation during multiple U.S.-funded recovery campaigns.
Although the U.S. plays a large role in recovering RTGs, it is an
international effort involving Norway, France, Canada, and Russia. To
date, the U.S. has recovered 273 RTGs, Norway has recovered 213 RTGs
(some using funds from Finland), France has recovered 16 RTGs, and
Canada has funded the recovery of 64 RTGs through the U.S. and Norway.
Using these contributions, Russian technical specialists perform the
RTG recovery, transport, disassembly, and disposal activities.
Additionally, Russia pays for the recovery of RTGs using funds from the
Federal Target Program (FTP). In the past few years, Russia has
recovered 32 RTGs. The RTG recoveries are coordinated at the
international level through the IAEA.
Mr. Turner. Administrator D'Agostino, in your testimony you noted
that it would not be advisable to make reductions in our hedge
stockpile until NNSA is able to ``demonstrate that our infrastructure
is responsive and being able to respond to needs that the country may
have,'' which included ``having a uranium processing facility that is
up and running, having a chemistry and metallurgy research replacement
facility that is available to do the surveillance work on our stockpile
and help support a modest amount of pit manufacturing capability,'' as
well as a capability at the Pantex Plant to make the size of high
explosives necessary to support the stockpile out into the future.
Secretary D'Agostino. To elaborate, as described in the Nuclear
Posture Review, the non-deployed stockpile currently includes more
warheads than required to hedge against technical or geopolitical
surprise, due to the limited capacity of the NNSA complex to conduct
LEPs for deployed weapons in a timely manner. Progress in restoring
NNSA's production infrastructure will allow these excess warheads to be
retired along with other stockpile reductions planned over the next
decade.
The recommended size of the projected future stockpile is updated
annually in a Nuclear Weapons Council memorandum to the President based
on a joint DoD-DOE assessment that factors in progress on LEPs, NNSA
progress in infrastructure recapitalization, and the geopolitical
security environment. Ultimately, the President has the final say
regarding the size of the stockpile. The President's final decision
comes in the form of a Presidential Policy Directive.
Mr. Turner. The May 2010 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
(SSMP), Table D-1, specifies a ``baseline capacity provided by a
capability-based infrastructure'' to include the ability to deliver to
the stockpile up to 80 plutonium pits and 80 Canned Sub-Assemblies
(CSAs) per year. The SSMP further states that the manufacturing
capability for 80 pits and 80 CSAs per year are dependent on the
construction completion of the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Replacement (CMRR) facility and Uranium Processing Facility (UPF).
Furthermore, in reply to a committee request for information (delivered
to the committee on April 12, 2011), NNSA noted that reductions in the
hedge stockpile would be conditioned on the ``realization'' of certain
``events,'' including ``successful'' Life Extension Programs for
several warheads, and the ``full operational functionality'' of CMRR
and UPF, planned for 2023 and 2024, respectively.
Secretary D'Agostino. To elaborate, as described in the Nuclear
Posture Review, NNSA has a limited capacity for nuclear warhead
component production. Current facilities cannot support future
stockpile life extension requirements, and have no ``surge'' capacity
in the event of a technical failure or geopolitical surprise.
Therefore, USSTRATCOM requires that NNSA maintain a hedge stockpile. As
noted in the NPR, progress in restoring NNSA's infrastructure--
construction of CMRR and UPF, among other facilities--should allow this
hedge to be reduced.
Mr. Turner. The compilation of this testimony and material from
NNSA would lead one to conclude that reductions in the hedge stockpile
should not be made until these conditions are met. Please tell us if
this conclusion is correct, and elaborate on these and any other
specific capabilities that must be demonstrated or fully operational,
and identify the associated infrastructure milestones for the
realization of such capabilities, before such cuts could safely be made
while preserving current or better levels of safety, security, and
reliability to our deterrent.
Secretary D'Agostino. As described in the Nuclear Posture Review,
NNSA has a limited capacity for nuclear warhead component production.
Current facilities cannot support future stockpile life extension
requirements, and have no ``surge'' capacity in the event of a
technical failure or geopolitical surprise. Therefore, USSTRATCOM
requires that NNSA maintain a hedge stockpile. As noted in the NPR,
progress in restoring NNSA's infrastructure--construction of CMRR and
UPF, among other facilities--should allow this hedge to be reduced.
The recommended size of the projected future stockpile is updated
annually in a Nuclear Weapons Council memorandum to the President based
on a joint DoD-DOE assessment that factors in progress on LEPs, NNSA
progress in infrastructure recapitalization, and the geopolitical
security environment. Ultimately, the President has the final say
regarding the size of the stockpile. The President's final decision
comes in the form of a Presidential Policy Directive.
Mr. Turner. Administrator D'Agostino, how quickly would we be able
to respond to unfavorable changes in the geopolitical nuclear security
environment? Please comment on whether significant reductions to our
deployed and non-deployed weapons would constrain or expand our
technical flexibility to respond to unfavorable changes in the
geopolitical environment, and how this technical flexibility would be
affected as our weapons continue to age.
Secretary D'Agostino. The first and second questions are for DoD
and STRATCOM, not the NNSA to answer.
Regarding the questions on how this technical flexibility would be
affected as our weapons age, one of the reasons the reserve stockpile
is maintained in such a high state of readiness is because NNSA has a
limited capacity for nuclear warhead component production. As noted in
the NPR, progress in restoring NNSA's infrastructure--construction of
CMRR and UPF, among other facilities--should allow this hedge to be
reduced as we transfer risk from the reserve stockpile to the
infrastructure. However, our ability to retire additional weapons or
conduct follow on strategic or non-strategic reductions is a policy
decision not directly affecting NNSA at this time. Previous
Administrations have exercised this flexibility in consultation with
allies, and reduced the number of weapons needed to provide extended
deterrence and meet security commitments.
Projected future reductions to the total stockpile are premised on
a number of assumptions and events, listed below. As these assumptions
and events are realized, reductions in the size of the hedge should
begin to occur.
New START implementation occurs as scheduled (New START
entered into force on February 5, 2011).
Warhead life extensions increase stockpile safety,
security, and reliability as planned and required.
Infrastructure improvements provide the capability to
produce components and extend the life of existing weapons. The CMRR
and UPF are expected to be at full operational functionality by 2023
and 2024, respectively. The Pantex High Explosive Pressing Facility is
expected to be fully operational in 2017.
The geopolitical nuclear security environment remains
favorable.
The realization of these events will allow us to mitigate the risk
that significant reductions to the deployed and non-deployed stockpiles
will constrain our technical flexibility to respond to unfavorable
changes in the geopolitical environment. Moreover, modernization of the
Nuclear Security Enterprise and continued success in the science based
stockpile stewardship and management program will provide a solid
foundation for our continued ability to increase our technical
flexibility to manage our aging stockpile at lower numbers.
In addition to maintaining a strong nuclear deterrent, the NNSA is
developing a broad array of capabilities underpinning an agile response
to future changes in the global nuclear security environment. NNSA's
Defense, Nonproliferation, Counterterrorism, and Emergency Response
Programs are collaborating to provide capabilities to analyze foreign
nuclear weapons programs and to strengthen nuclear forensics
capabilities. The Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 P. L. 111-32
provided $30 million to support a sustainable capability to analyze
nuclear and biological weapons intelligence, resulting in more
effective management and technical coordination between NNSA and the
intelligence community.
Beyond FY12, NNSA plans to advance a program that would continue to
strengthen the science and technology capabilities needed for assessing
foreign nuclear weapons activities. Building on the infrastructure
supporting stewardship of the US stockpile, this program will ensure an
enduring technical foundation for intelligence missions. Capabilities
developed under this program will advance the development and
interpretation of intelligence indicators, the assessment of foreign
weapons capabilities, and the mitigations of threats associated with
technical advances. The NNSA also has an effort underway to strengthen
related nuclear counterterrorism and counterproliferation efforts that
cut across a number of its major programs.
Mr. Turner. China's proliferation record in the past has been
rather mixed, to say the least. Howard Berman, Ranking Member of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, once said that China's pattern was to
``proliferate, promise not to, proliferate, promise not to, and
proliferate.'' NNSA and DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
budgets now include proposed funding for a nuclear Center of Excellence
in China. What confidence do you have that China has changed its
behavior--that it is now committed to nonproliferation in its actions
as well as its words?
Ms. Harrington. In the past, the nuclear and arms trade practices
of the People's Republic of China (PRC) did not conform to
international nonproliferation regime standards. Over the years, China
has joined multilateral institutions and treaties such as the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in 1984 and the Nuclear Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992, while also engaging in bilateral
cooperation, such as conducting activities under the 2004 Statement of
Intent signed by DOE and the China Atomic Energy Authority (CAEA), and
the 1998 Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Technology (PUNT) Agreement between
DOE and the State Development Planning Commission of the PRC. Improving
China's nuclear security and export controls standards has been a long-
term, bipartisan security goal of the United States along with partner
countries in the nonproliferation regime.
As a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council and a
nuclear weapon state, China is a critical member of the nuclear
security community. Formalizing the nonproliferation advances that
China has made in the past decade is important to international efforts
in nonproliferation. Recent high-level interactions, such as the state
visit to the United States by President Hu Jintao in January 2011, and
agency-to-agency technical exchanges, have reinforced the view that
China is engaged in improving nuclear security. NNSA is therefore
working with China to improve its indigenous capacity by sharing best
practices in nuclear security and to assist the Chinese in implementing
accepted global standards throughout their nuclear complex.
Through U.S.-China cooperative engagement, including the Center of
Excellence (COE), NNSA aims to improve global nuclear security by:
raising China's awareness of material security issues and associated
nuclear security and safeguards methods and technologies; promoting an
export control system that prevents illicit transfers of WMD dual-use
commodities; minimizing the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) in
civilian applications; establishing a platform for promoting further
U.S.-China technical cooperation; strengthening China's training
capabilities on nuclear and radiological material security; and
improving security of radioactive sources. Cooperation on the COE
reflects the U.S. and Chinese governments' commitment to strengthening
their cooperation on nonproliferation, nuclear security and in
combating nuclear terrorism.
Additional cooperation between the U.S. and China includes:
NNSA and CAEA conducted a joint technology demonstration
(Tech Demo) at the China Institute of Atomic Energy (CIAE) in October
2005 to promote adoption of modern security practices and technologies
at China's nuclear facilities. The Tech Demo initiated cooperation in
numerous areas, including material protection, control, and accounting;
nuclear safeguards; nuclear security culture; domestic inspections; and
secure transportation. Since the successful completion of the Tech
Demo, NNSA's International Material Protection and Cooperation Program
has cooperated with CAEA to conduct several technical workshops
supporting the exchange of best practices in various areas of nuclear
security.
NNSA provided radiation detection equipment to China for
the 2008 Beijing Olympics, the Shanghai Expo and the Asia Games and is
also working to install radiation detection equipment at the Port of
Yangshan in Shanghai.
NNSA is also collaborating with the Chinese to establish
a Customs training center at the Qinhuangdo Training Center.
Mr. Turner. The U.S. has been doing the Nunn-Lugar program for a
couple decades now, primarily focused on securing and dismantling
nuclear systems in Russia and the former Soviet Union. Many of these
efforts are nearing completion and ramping down.
Do you have any concerns about potential Russian proliferation
threats that are not covered under the Nunn-Lugar program that worry
you? If Russia has become a responsible actor with improved cash flow,
shouldn't they be shouldering more of the responsibility for securing
and destroying their own nuclear materials?
Ms. Harrington. While the majority of major security upgrades in
Russia, including all Russian Federation Ministry of Defense warhead
storage sites, were completed by the end of 2008, as agreed to in the
2005 Bratislava Nuclear Security Initiative, several important areas
and buildings have been added to the scope of our activities and are
reflected in our revised Joint Action Plan, which lays out the scope of
security work to be undertaken by the United States and Russia by site.
These areas contain large quantities of weapons usable nuclear
materials. The recent extension of the statutory deadline for bilateral
cooperation in Material Protection, Control and Accounting (MPC&A), to
January 1, 2018, will permit the MPC&A program to continue to work
closely with the Russian Federation to ensure the successes of the past
15 years of cooperation are maintained until all cooperative upgrade
projects are completed.
While some security upgrade work is still underway, NNSA and
Rosatom have well defined criteria used to transition sustainability to
Russia for completed security upgrades by site, which are formalized in
a Joint Sustainability Plan. This plan outlines seven key principles
that characterize a sustainable MPC&A program and guide U.S.-Russian
project teams assessments for each site's ability to transition to full
Russian support (MPC&A organization; site operating procedures; human
resource management and site training; operational cost analysis;
equipment maintenance, repair, and calibration; performance testing and
operational monitoring; and MPC&A system configuration management).
When deficiencies are identified, U.S.-Russian project teams agree to
specific activities that should be undertaken to address those gaps.
Though the NNSA is continuing efforts to fully transition
responsibility for MPC&A sustainability support to the Russian
Federation, it is in the national security interest of the United
States to remain engaged. While there are no specific threats of
concern outside the Nunn-Lugar Program scope, there are threats within
the scope that continue to concern the U.S. and influenced the interest
in MPC&A Program extension, namely the insider threat. While not a new
consideration for the MPC&A Program, the threat of a knowledgeable,
authorized person (insider) stealing even small quantities of nuclear
material remains a concern. The MPC&A Program is looking at new and
creative ways to further thwart insider theft or diversion of materials
through additional layers of security, programmatic and procedural
changes, and further improvements to nuclear material control and
accounting.
We agree that as Russian national budgets increase, their share of
funds devoted to nuclear security activities should increase as well.
At every opportunity NNSA seeks to cost share with our Russian
counterparts, and has a long list of successful examples. Examples
include:
At various Russian Rosatom and Civilian sites, cost
sharing arrangements are in place for the installation and
sustainability of MPC&A upgrades. In addition, the Ministry of Defense
has committed to take over full financial responsibility for sustaining
permanent warhead sites (11 sites with DOE-funded upgrades, 18 sites
with DOD-funded upgrades).
The Second Line of Defense Program has a cost-sharing
arrangement with the Russian Federal Customs Service for installing
radiation detection equipment at Russia's border crossings whereby
approximately half of the sites have been equipped by the FCS and half
by NNSA. Transition of all maintenance and sustainability
responsibility to the FCS for deployed radiation detection systems is
planned to be completed by 2013.
In support of Russian plutonium disposition efforts, the
Fast Reactor and Gas Turbine-Modular Helium Reactor (GT-MHR) programs
both rely on cost-sharing. For the fast reactor program, the U.S.
pledged to provide up to $400 million to assist Russia in disposing of
its excess weapon-grade plutonium. The total estimated cost of the
Russian contribution for implementing the program is in excess of $2
billion. The U.S. may fund up to 100% of a limited number of non-
proliferation activities (BN-600 blanket removal and BN-800 core
redesign), but in most cases the U.S. will fund no more than 50% of the
total cost of any given Russian plutonium disposition activity. For the
GT-MHR program, joint research and development in Russia is funded on a
50/50 cost sharing basis. Since 2000, the U.S. has provided $29.1
million and Rosatom has provided $32.6 million for GT-MHR work in
Russia. The U.S. does not release funds until Rosatom commits, in
writing, to provide an equivalent amount of Russian funds. U.S. funds
for the GT-MHR program do not count against the $400 million U.S.
pledge.
With respect to securing vulnerable radiological
materials in Russia, the Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) is
continuing its cooperative efforts to recover radioisotope
thermoelectric generators (RTGs) in the Russian Federation. GTRI funds
have supported the recovery, disassembly, and disposal of RTGs, as well
as the replacement of these units with alternative power sources (APS).
As an example of cost-sharing, GTRI no longer pays for the installation
of APS units. Instead, Russia is responsible for securing the necessary
transportation and technical crew to complete the installations.
Additionally, Russia has provided discounted or `at cost' rates for
some RTG transportation during multiple U.S.-funded recovery campaigns.
Although the U.S. plays a large role in recovering RTGs, it is an
international effort involving Norway, France, Canada, and Russia. To
date, the U.S. has recovered 273 RTGs, Norway has recovered 213 RTGs
(some using funds from Finland), France has recovered 16 RTGs, and
Canada has funded the recovery of 64 RTGs through the U.S. and Norway.
Using these contributions, Russian technical specialists perform the
RTG recovery, transport, disassembly, and disposal activities.
Additionally, Russia pays for the recovery of RTGs using funds from the
Federal Target Program (FTP). In the past few years, Russia has
recovered 32 RTGs. The RTG recoveries are coordinated at the
international level through the IAEA.
Mr. Turner. China's proliferation record in the past has been
rather mixed, to say the least. Howard Berman, Ranking Member of the
House Foreign Affairs Committee, once said that China's pattern was to
``proliferate, promise not to, proliferate, promise not to, and
proliferate.'' NNSA and DOD's Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
budgets now include proposed funding for a nuclear Center of Excellence
in China. What confidence do you have that China has changed its
behavior--that it is now committed to nonproliferation in its actions
as well as its words?
Secretary Weber. We understand the concerns regarding China's past
actions.
We believe that China shares our interest in improving the security
of nuclear materials worldwide. The Center of Excellence partnership
between the United States and China is intended to promote best
practices in nuclear security in China and throughout the region.
Those best practices are intended to strengthen security procedures
and reduce the likelihood of proliferation of nuclear material.
China is funding all construction and land acquisition for the
Center of Excellence, which is significantly in excess of fifty percent
(50%) of the expected total cost for establishment of the Center.
Closely monitoring and managing funds for cooperative programming
initiatives is a hallmark of the way we work, and we ensure
accountability with all our partners.
Mr. Turner. The U.S. has been doing the Nunn-Lugar program for a
couple decades now, primarily focused on securing and dismantling
nuclear systems in Russia and the former Soviet Union. Many of these
efforts are nearing completion and ramping down.
a) Do you have any concerns about potential Russian proliferation
threats that are not covered under the Nunn-Lugar program that worry
you?
b) If Russia has become a responsible actor with improved cash
flow, shouldn't they be shouldering more of the responsibility for
securing and destroying their own nuclear materials?
Secretary Weber. (a) The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
(CTR) Program continues to be a primary mechanism by which the U.S.
Government partners with the Russian Federation to address shared
proliferation concerns.
The CTR Program's site-specific work in Russia is a key component
of the U.S. interagency strategy to support the focused and intensified
international effort to secure or eliminate nuclear materials.
Working with the U.S. Department of Energy (DOE), we continue to
partner with the Russian Ministry of Defense (MOD) to ensure that the
necessary capabilities exist to transition responsibility to MOD to
maintain and sustain the physical protection system upgrades that have
been installed at nuclear weapons storage sites.
Further, our continued support for transportation security in
Russia supports U.S. nonproliferation objectives by securely shipping
warheads to dismantlement locations or more secure storage sites,
pending dismantlement.
(b) In addition to providing transparency into Russian Federation
WMD threat reduction activities, the CTR Program enhances United States
security by providing a mechanism to engage in confidence and security
building measures, enabling us to share best practices in dismantling,
destroying, securing, and safeguarding nuclear delivery systems.
We continue to believe that engagement with the Russian Federation
through the CTR Program supports U.S. non-proliferation and strategic
interests.
Moreover, cooperation with the Russian Federation funded through
the CTR Program has endured as a steady, open channel even during
periods of instability in other aspects of the United States-Russia
relationship.
We closely manage and oversee the manner in which funding for
cooperative programming initiatives is handled. Care in this regard is
a hallmark of the way we work, and we ensure accountability with all
our partners.
The CTR Program considers each Russian request independently; not
all requests for support are granted.
Mr. Turner. Discuss some of the challenges that you are working
through on how you would implement the New START force structure
reductions. When will the Department make its final decisions on its
post-New START force composition and when will Congress see the
specific implementation schedule and estimated funding requirements?
General Chambers. Providing a specific implementation schedule,
along with an accurate cost estimate, is not feasible until a force
structure has been established. The Air Force is currently working with
the Joint Staff to evaluate potential force structure options. The Air
Force remains confident we will be able to meet New START central
limits requirements before the 5 Feb 2018 deadline.
Mr. Turner. Discuss some of the challenges that you are working
through on how you would implement the New START force structure
reductions. When will the Department make its final decisions on its
post-New START force composition and when will Congress see the
specific implementation schedule and estimated funding requirements?
Admiral Benedict. The Secretary of Defense, based on
recommendations from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, established a baseline
force structure which is outlined in the updated 1251 Report. While
final force structure decisions do not impact Navy force structure, the
DoD continues to study the final force structure under New START and
will announce the end state force structure at the appropriate time.
To implement New START force structure reductions, the Navy will
reduce the overall number of deployed SLBM warheads. This activity will
be accomplished over the 7-year reduction window allowed by the Treaty,
and to the maximum extent possible, will be accomplished as part of
normal missile processing operations in order to minimize operational
fleet impacts, as well as reduce the cost associated with Treaty
implementation.
The Navy also plans to convert four SLBM launchers on each of its
existing SSBNs such that these converted launchers will no longer be
capable of launching an SLBM, resulting in a force of 14 SSBNS each
with 20 SLBM launchers. This effort will require design and procurement
of a new launcher closure. Additionally, the Navy must procure ballasts
for each of the converted launcher tubes to ensure proper stability and
operation of the submarine.
These activities are a multi-year design and procurement effort.
Successful completion of conversions of these launchers and subsequent
removal from Treaty accountability requires careful management and
synchronization of all planned maintenance efforts with the SSBN force
during the conversion period. SSP has identified the funding required
to perform New START Treaty implementation activities in the 1251
Report and is working within the Navy resourcing process to request
resources.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MS. SANCHEZ
Ms. Sanchez. What has been the impact of operating below the FY10
appropriations levels for until April 2011 and the delayed and reduced
FY11 appropriations (reduction in $300 million below the FY11 budget
request), on progress to urgently secure or remove vulnerable nuclear
weapons-materials. One impact has been NNSA's inability to remove all
highly-enriched uranium from Belarus as promised by 2012.
Are you concerned about these reductions and how has this impacted
our efforts to secure nuclear materials? How has this impacted your
other non-proliferation programs, since a lot of the funding has been
reprioritized to cover GTRI efforts? How will funding be allocated in
FY11?
Secretary D'Agostino. During the Continuing Resolution, NNSA
allocated its reduced FY 2011 budget authority to the highest
priorities. NNSA ensured that programs supporting the President's
commitment to secure the most vulnerable nuclear materials around the
world in four years were funded to the greatest extent possible. In
accordance with the agreements reached by the President at the April
2010 Nuclear Security Summit and the December 2010 Joint Statement with
Belarus, NNSA has allocated funding to complete highly enriched uranium
(HEU) removals/downblending from Ukraine, Belarus, Serbia, Kazakhstan,
and South Africa in FY 2011 and has fully funded efforts needed in FY
2011 to remove all remaining HEU from Ukraine, Mexico and Belarus by
April 2012 despite the lower than expected FY 2011 budget. However, the
Global Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) postponed long-lead
procurement and preparation activities for HEU removals from Vietnam
and Hungary due to NNSA's prioritization of other nonproliferation
activities under the lower than requested funding levels, which will
delay these shipments from 2012 to 2013, assuming full and on-time
arrival of FY 2012 requested funding.
Additionally, GTRI efforts related to research reactor conversion
and radiological material security have been significantly reduced in
FY 2011, and may be reduced in FY 2012 and FY 2013 in order to
accommodate accelerated nuclear material lockdown efforts. Reductions
include fewer HEU reactors converted to LEU in FY 2011 and FY 2012 than
planned, an approximately two-year delay in creating domestic non-HEU
based Mo-99 supply, an approximately two-year delay in development of a
new LEU high density fuel to convert high performance research
reactors, and fewer radiological recoveries and security upgrades both
domestically and internationally.
Ms. Sanchez. Please give us more details on how the NNSA
contributes and improves verification. What are the challenges that
remain? What is the constraint on making faster progress?
Secretary D'Agostino. NNSA develops technologies and methodologies,
negotiates measures, and implements agreements to verify information
and compliance with a range of arms control and nonproliferation
initiatives. Examples include:
Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Purchase Agreement: NNSA
implements the monitoring provisions of the 1993 HEU Purchase
Agreement, under which 500 Metric Tons (MT) of Russian weapons-origin
HEU is converted to low enriched uranium (LEU) in Russia and then
shipped to the United States where it is fabricated into nuclear fuel
and produces electricity for U.S. consumers. NNSA uses a variety of
monitoring approaches to ensure that the HEU provided by the Russians
is in fact weapons-origin material. These approaches include: 24 annual
on-the-ground special monitoring visits to the four Russian nuclear
materials production sites under the Agreement; the right to use U.S.
monitoring technology and equipment inside the four Russian nuclear
material production facilities; and the receipt and analysis of Russian
nuclear material processing and accountability documents. This three-
pronged approach provides high confidence that the Russians are meeting
their commitments under the Agreement.
New START: NNSA provided policy and technical support to
the interagency deliberation process, and NNSA representatives were
responsible for negotiating specific portions of the Treaty. NNSA
supported the achievement of U.S. arms control objectives while at the
same time ensuring the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S.
nuclear weapons stockpile. For the purpose of implementing the Treaty,
NNSA is leading efforts to develop and use radiation detection
equipment for inspections to confirm that objects declared to be non-
nuclear are non-nuclear. In support of follow-on arms limitation
treaties, NNSA is developing technology for counting deployed and
stored weapons, ascribing a weapon to a particular class of treaty
controlled items, verifying chain-of-custody of a nuclear weapon from
production to dismantlement, and enabling transparent and verifiable
dismantlement of a nuclear weapon and disposition of its nuclear
material.
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT): NNSA
supports the U.S. interagency and the CTBT Organization's Provisional
Technical Secretariat in Vienna, Austria, to improve the effectiveness
of all parts of the CTBT and nuclear testing detection verification
regime. The NNSA provides technical solutions for the development of
U.S. verification/monitoring capabilities that could be used to support
CTBT verification/monitoring and provide technical support for
implementation of the CTBT. This is accomplished though the sharing of
expertise gained on procedures and technology developed by the United
States during its long experience of nuclear testing and nuclear
explosion monitoring. This capability development focuses on reducing
detection thresholds through research and demonstrations related to
source physics, propagation, sensors, and analytical methods.
Verification challenges that persist involve both scientific and
programmatic issues.
On the scientific front, confirming the presence or
absence of HEU components in a manner that does not reveal sensitive
weapons information remains a significant challenge. Unlike plutonium
components, HEU does not emit signatures that are readily detectable
absent interrogation using a neutron source. Interrogation with a
source, however, complicates the measurement in terms of safety
considerations as well as the range of information that may be revealed
as a result of the interrogation and detected response. Verifying the
presence of high explosives as an attribute of a warhead poses similar
technical challenges. Additional resources to apply to these types of
scientific challenges can help, but to an extent they will remain
constrained by physics.
On the programmatic side, issues requiring further
investigation include balancing the level of access and information the
United States is likely to require from another country in a future
verification regime against the level of access and information the
United States may be willing to provide. This involves managing access
to sensitive sites in a manner that supports verification without
compromising sensitive activities at the site or significantly
impacting ongoing operations and schedules. One way to address this is
to build transparency and verification into new facilities, but this is
not a simple process and requires a good understanding of potential
future verification requirements and designs that would support such
requirements. Further, such measures could create additional resource
requirements in the design and construction phases. Resources can also
be applied after specific requirements are identified, for example, to
build a dedicated facility to support monitored storage of items or
verification of specific operations. However, building a dedicated
facility after monitoring and verification requirements are specified
is likely to cost much more than building capability into a facility
that is already being designed to meet existing operational
requirements. Further, such an approach simply may take too long to be
effective.
Ms. Sanchez. What can be done to increase the rate of
dismantlements? What is the limiting factor?
Secretary D'Agostino. The dismantlement rate has been defined
through an NNSA commitment to Congress to eliminate by FY 2022 the
retired warheads that existed at the end of FY 2009. The dismantlement
plan outlined in the FY 2012 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
(SSMP) supports this FY 2022 goal, and the President's Budget Request
fully funds this dismantlement plan.
There are several limiting factors associated with increasing the
rate of dismantlements including safety considerations; facility
capacity; competing program commitments such as alterations, life
extension programs, limited life component exchanges, and surveillance;
weapon complexity; the storage of the warheads and associated
components from the dismantlement operations; and secure
transportation.
Efforts within Defense Programs for dismantlement activities are
interlinked; in order to achieve increased dismantlements NNSA would
need additional support not only for Weapons Dismantlement and
Disposition, but also for the Office of Secure Transportation,
Production Support and Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities
(RTBF). Dismantlement funding enables this increase shifts, the Office
of Secure Transportation funds the addition weapons movements,
Production Support accommodates the additional production & engineering
management, tooling provisioning, material procurement, receiving
inspection, and product transportation, while RTBF provides for
additional facility operations cost, equipment maintenance costs,
additional container costs, storage capacities, and disposition waste
stream levels.
Ms. Sanchez. What improvements have been made on surveillance and
how does the FY12 budget request support this?
Secretary D'Agostino. Surveillance activities are essential to
enabling continued certification of the reliability of the stockpile
without nuclear testing. Surveillance involves withdrawing weapons from
deployment and subjecting them to laboratory tests, as well as joint
flight tests with the DoD to assess their reliability. These activities
allow detection of possible manufacturing and design defects as well as
material degradation over time. The NNSA continues to implement a
surveillance program that builds on those core activities, which allows
us to support the current state of the stockpile, detect in advance
potential problems, and take remedial actions.
The NNSA has reviewed the stockpile surveillance program and its
funding profile. When adjusted for inflation, FY 2005 through FY 2009,
funding for surveillance activities fell by 27 percent. Beginning in FY
2010, the surveillance budget was increased by 50 percent, from $158
million to $239 million. In the FY 2012 budget request, the President
seeks to sustain this increase and a more robust surveillance program
throughout the Future Years Nuclear Security Program (FYNSP).
With increased funding many improvements have been made on
surveillance. The NNSA increased the number of planned laboratory and
flight tests from 48 in FY 2010 to 74 in FY 2011. The total number of
planned major surveillance activities (including pit, canned
subassembly, gas transfer systems, detonator cable assembly tests and
disassembly and inspection) also increased from 276 in FY 2010 to 432
in FY 2011. In addition, surveillance activities supported the
development of diagnostic capabilities at Y-12 for critical components
of the nuclear explosive package. These capabilities will aid the
current W76-1 production and surveillance of other warheads in the
stockpile. This increased testing rate and improved diagnostics
continue to be supported in the FY 2012 budget request. Furthermore,
NNSA has taken action to hire a Surveillance Senior Advisor to assure a
cohesive program, to enable a cost effective program, and to integrate
surveillance activities across the nuclear weapons enterprise.
Ms. Sanchez. What measures are you taking now to ensure that CMRR
and UPF do not exceed cost and schedule projections?
Secretary D'Agostino. Construction of large, one-of-a-kind
facilities such as CMRR and UPF presents significant challenges.
Several reviews by the GAO have found that initiating construction
before designs are complete contributes to increased cost and schedule
delays. In response to these review findings, and in order to assure
the best value for the taxpayer, NNSA has concluded that reaching the
90 percent engineering design stage before establishing a project
baseline for these facilities is critical to the successful pursuit of
these capabilities.
Responsible stewardship of taxpayer dollars necessitates close
examination of requirements of all types and understanding of their
associated costs, so that NNSA and DoD can make informed decisions
about these facilities. To this end, DoD, in cooperation with NNSA, is
carrying out an independent review of the safety, security,
environmental and programmatic requirements that drive the cost of
these facilities. In parallel with, and in support of this effort, a
separate independent review for UPF is being conducted by the Army
Corps of Engineers. In addition, the Secretary of Energy, with support
from independent senior experts, is evaluating program requirements.
The overriding focus of this work is to ensure that UPF and CMRR
are built to achieve needed capabilities without incurring cost
overruns or scheduling delays. We expect that construction project cost
baselines for each project will be established in FY 2013, after 90
percent of the design work is completed. The CMRR and UPF will be
planned in a few critical phases that will enable NNSA to set and track
performance baselines for these subprojects or ``chunks'' of clearly
defined work scope to enhance transparency and project execution.
Ms. Sanchez. What measures are you taking now to ensure that CMRR
and UPF do not exceed cost and schedule projections?
Dr. Winokur. Although the Department of Energy (DOE) is responsible
for the design and construction of defense nuclear facilities required
to carry out its mission, the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board's
(Board) enabling statute (42 U.S.C. 2286 et seq) contains specific
provisions regarding the Board's responsibilities with respect to DOE
design and construction projects. These responsibilities apply to all
defense nuclear design and construction projects, including the
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Project and the
Uranium Processing Facility (UPF).
REVIEW OF FACILITY DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION. The Board
shall review the design of a new Department of Energy defense nuclear
facility before construction of such facility begins and shall
recommend to the Secretary, within a reasonable time, such
modifications of the design as the Board considers necessary to ensure
adequate protection of public health and safety. During the
construction of any such facility, the Board shall periodically review
and monitor the construction and shall submit to the Secretary, within
a reasonable time, such recommendations relating to the construction of
that facility as the Board considers necessary to ensure adequate
protection of public health and safety. An action of the Board, or a
failure to act, under this paragraph may not delay or prevent the
Secretary of Energy from carrying out the construction of such a
facility. [42 U.S.C. 2286a(a)(4)]
Of note, the Board has spent considerable effort on reviewing (and
encouraging DOE to review) the design of planned major facilities such
as UPF and CMRR for safety-related concerns as early as possible in the
design process. This approach results in a high degree of safety being
engineered into the facilities' structures, systems, and components,
and helps avoid unplanned costs associated with retrofitting or
redesigning facilities to address safety issues recognized belatedly.
Directly related to this responsibility, in July 2007 a report was
prepared jointly by the Board and DOE, as requested in the Conference
Report of the John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2007. The applicable portion of the Conference Report is as
follows:
The conferees note their concern regarding the untimely
resolution by the Department of Energy of technical issues raised by
the Board. The conferees believe that the Board and the Department
would benefit from a more structured process for issue resolution that
would allow issues to be raised, evaluated, and adjudicated at logical
points in the design and construction process. The conferees urge the
Board to evaluate whether more frequent use of the Board's formal
recommendation process would drive both parties towards this more
structured process. The conferees also encourage the Board to take a
constructive role in the problem-solving process by quickly evaluating
corrective actions proposed by the Department and its contractors.
The conferees are encouraged by efforts between the
Department and the Board to develop a process to provide for more
timely identification and resolution of technical differences over
design standards amid other issues at the Department's nuclear
facilities. Specifically, conferees support the pending revision of the
Department's Order 413.3 to require critical safety determinations be
made prior to Critical Decision 1 in the Department's project
management system. The conferees direct the Board and the Department to
continue these discussions and to report jointly to the congressional
defense committees on their efforts to improve the timeliness of issue
resolution, including recommendations, if any, for legislation that
would strengthen and improve technical oversight of the Department's
nuclear design and operational activities. Until such time as this
report is submitted, the conferees further direct the Board to provide
to the congressional defense committees quarterly reports to identify
and report the status of significant unresolved issues. [H.R. Rep. No.
109-702, at 976 (2006) (Conf. Rep.)]
The report, prepared jointly by the Board and DOE, describes
actions that provided for more timely identification and resolution of
technical issues raised by the Board. Broadly, the actions promoted (1)
the early identification of safety requirements and strategies at the
conceptual and preliminary design phases of a project to avoid cost
increases and schedule delays, and (2) more effective processes or
protocols for the communication to DOE of issues identified by the
Board and for the tracking and management of these issues. These
concerns had arisen primarily as a result of significant cost increases
and schedule delays due to the untimely resolution of technical safety
issues during the design of the Waste Treatment and Immobilization
Plant (WTP) at the Hanford Site. The significant actions include the
following:
DOE Order 413.3, Program and Project Management for the
Acquisition of Capital Assets, was revised to incorporate elements that
help ensure the early integration of safety into the design process.
The following are examples of significant changes:
- Safety requirements for each critical decision have been
identified.
- Safety design reports are required at the conceptual and
preliminary design stages.
- A Technical Independent Project Review, which focuses on
safety documentation, is required as part of the Critical
Decision-1 review for high-risk, high-hazard, and Hazard
Category 1, 2, and 3 nuclear facilities.
- The Integrated Project Team membership now includes
technical safety experts.
- Safety responsibilities during the design process are now
defined for DOE's Central Technical Authorities, Chief of
Defense Nuclear Safety, and Chief of Nuclear Safety.
DOE Manual 413.3-1, Project Management for the
Acquisition of Capital Assets, was revised and converted to a series of
guides to clarify the requirements of the associated DOE Order and to
make clearer reference to safety standards and requirements.
A new standard, DOE-STD-1189, Integration of Safety into
the Design Process, was developed to provide a detailed description of
the safety-related design information required to meet the requirements
of DOE Order 413.3 for integrating safety early into the design.
Significant elements of this new standard included the following:
- The development of a Safety Design Strategy that provides a
roadmap for addressing important safety issues as the project
progresses.
- The development, in the conceptual design stage, of
facility-level design basis accidents to provide the necessary
input for the classification of important safety functions and
systems.
- The guidance for the preparation of a Conceptual Safety
Design Report, a Preliminary Safety Design Report, and the
Preliminary Documented Safety Analysis.
DOE and the Board are jointly evaluating the
effectiveness of DOE Order 413.3 and DOE-STD-1189 by demonstrating
their application to two ongoing defense nuclear facility design
efforts: the Integrated Waste Treatment Unit at the Idaho National
Laboratory and the UPF at the Y-12 Nuclear Security Complex. These
demonstration efforts are providing feedback on the effectiveness of
actions taken to improve the early integration of safety into design.
DOE and the Board have reaffirmed the importance of the
Board's ready access to information as described in the Board's
legislation: ``The Secretary of Energy shall fully cooperate with the
Board and provide the Board with ready access to such facilities,
personnel, and information as the Board considers necessary to carry
out its responsibilities....'' [42 U.S.C. 2286.c(a)]
The Board continues to provide Congress with periodic
reports on the status of significant unresolved issues with DOE design
and construction projects.
The Board continues to issue ``project letters'' early in
the design process to apprise DOE of the status of safety issues raised
by the Board. These project letters are updated by the Board as the
project situation requires.
DOE and the Board are conducting joint periodic
discussions to review the status of significant unresolved safety
issues and to allow the Board to evaluate actions being taken to
resolve these issues. DOE and the Board use these joint periodic
reviews as a mechanism to maintain senior management awareness of the
status of these unresolved issues.
Specific to the CMRR design and construction project (but not UPF),
on September 4, 2007, the Board submitted to Congress its certification
report on the design of CMRR. This report was mandated by Congress in
Section 3112 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act
for Fiscal Year 2009 [Public Law 110-417]. Section 3112 directed the
Board to submit a certification to the congressional defense committees
that concerns raised by the Board regarding design of CMRR safety-class
systems (including ventilation systems) and seismic issues had been
resolved. Section 3112 also required that the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) perform a parallel CMRR certification review to
certify that the Board's concerns had been resolved. At that time, the
CMRR Project was at the end of the preliminary design stage. NNSA has
continued to develop the CMRR Documented Safety Analysis and the design
of safety-related structures, systems, and components as the project
prepares for and proceeds to final design.
The Board worked closely with NNSA throughout the CMRR
certification review process to identify the Board's concerns and the
actions necessary to resolve them. As part of this process NNSA revised
or agreed to revise the CMRR preliminary design, design requirements,
and design processes to address these concerns as more fully described
in the certification report. NNSA also committed to implement detailed
designs during final design consistent with the specific design
requirements agreed to as part of the certification process.
The Board's certification relies upon the future full
implementation of these final design commitments by NNSA. The Board
continues to review the design progression for implementation by NNSA
consistent with these commitments. The Board will reopen issues if
commitments, as described in the certification report, are not properly
met during final design.
Ms. Sanchez. What has been the impact of operating below the FY10
appropriations levels for until April 2011 and the delayed and reduced
FY11 appropriations (reduction in $300 million below the FY11 budget
request), on progress to urgently secure or remove vulnerable nuclear
weapons-materials. One impact has been NNSA's inability to remove all
highly-enriched uranium from Belarus as promised by 2012.
Are you concerned about these reductions and how has this impacted
our efforts to secure nuclear materials? How has this impacted your
other non-proliferation programs, since a lot of the funding has been
reprioritized to cover GTRI efforts? How will funding be allocated in
FY11?
Ms. Harrington. During the Continuing Resolution, NNSA allocated
its reduced FY 2011 budget authority to the highest priorities. NNSA
ensured that programs supporting the President's commitment to secure
the most vulnerable nuclear materials around the world in four years
were funded to the greatest extent possible. In accordance with the
agreements reached by the President at the April 2010 Nuclear Security
Summit and the December 2010 Joint Statement with Belarus, NNSA has
allocated funding to complete highly enriched uranium (HEU) removals/
downblending from Ukraine, Belarus, Serbia, Kazakhstan, and South
Africa in FY2011 and has fully funded efforts needed in FY 2011 to
remove all remaining HEU from Ukraine, Mexico and Belarus by April 2012
despite the lower than expected FY 2011 budget. However, the Global
Threat Reduction Initiative (GTRI) postponed long-lead procurement and
preparation activities for HEU removals from Vietnam and Hungary due to
lack of funding, which will delay these shipments from 2012 to 2013,
assuming full and on-time arrival of FY 2012 requested funding.
Additionally, GTRI efforts related to research reactor conversion
and radiological material security have been significantly reduced in
FY 2011, and may be reduced in FY 2012 and FY 2013 in order to
accommodate accelerated nuclear material lockdown efforts. Reductions
include fewer HEU reactors converted to LEU in FY 2011 and FY 2012 than
planned, an approximately two-year delay in creating domestic non-HEU
based Mo-99 supply, an approximately two-year delay in development of a
new LEU high density fuel to convert high performance research
reactors, and fewer radiological recoveries and security upgrades both
domestically and internationally.
Ms. Sanchez. DOD in its budget request roll-out documents listed
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) as one of the
top strategic challenges to US national security.
a) How does DOD support nuclear non-proliferation efforts and
please detail what progress has been made on interagency coordination
and what challenges remain?
b) DOD plans to transfer funds to NNSA to support weapons
activities in FY13 through FY16. Will DOD have a say on where its money
is spent?
Secretary Weber. (a) DoD actively supports interagency and
international efforts to enhance U.S. leadership in global non-
proliferation activities. The Administration's efforts to strengthen
the global non-proliferation regime through the Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT), Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and Fissile Material
Cutoff Treaty (FMCT) are instrumental to raising barriers to WMD
proliferation.
We continue to participate actively with the Department of State
and other interagency colleagues to implement the Action Plan adopted
by the May 2010 NPT Review Conference.
In addition, the United States' ``negative security assurance'' set
forth in DoD's 2010 Report of the Nuclear Posture Review is clear:
``The U.S. will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-
nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty and in compliance with their nuclear non-proliferation
obligations.'' This assurance underscores the security benefits of
adhering to, and complying fully with, the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
With regard to the CTBT, DoD will remain fully engaged in development
of the Treaty's verification regime. At the same time, we remain
committed to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
deterrent for our security and that of our allies. Finally, DoD
continues to support FMCT-related discussions among technical experts
in the UN Conference on Disarmament FMCT. These discussions are not a
substitute for actual negotiations, but hopefully they will foster
greater appreciation of key technical issues.
Our nonproliferation activities are not limited to these formal
regimes. The United States recognizes the importance of multilateral
activities and mechanisms that help to prevent proliferation, such as
the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the Nuclear Security
Summit. DoD is working with interagency partners to focus our PSI
efforts on promoting key interdiction capabilities, identifying
resources to support these capabilities, and designing strategies to
engage nations proactively in the capacity-building process. The
momentum and specific non-proliferation accomplishments generated by
the Nuclear Security Summit were impressive, and DoD will support
follow-on actions in preparation for the next Nuclear Security Summit
in Spring 2012.
DoD also supports nuclear non-proliferation efforts by conducting
and enabling on-site inspections in implementation of arms control
treaties such as New START Treaty, and through the development of
technology to support these inspections.
In a related fashion, collaborative training interaction (e.g., the
International Counter-Proliferation program) with other countries in
concert with other U.S. Government (USG) agencies encourages important
border security improvements in the overall international capacity to
identify and interdict WMD materials before they become a real threat.
The Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program serves as a critical
DoD contribution to the overall USG non-proliferation framework. Under
the CTR Program, DoD contributes, in cooperation with other U.S.
Government entities and international partners, to the implementation
of the President's global nuclear lockdown initiative to eliminate,
remove, and secure vulnerable nuclear materials.
Interagency coordination on all of these activities has been
effectively led by the National Security Staff (NSS) through the
Interagency Policy Committee structure. At the working level, DoD
coordinates on a daily basis with the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA), the Department of Homeland Security Domestic
Nuclear Detection Office, the Department of State, and the intelligence
community.
DoD has strengthened its collaboration at the senior level with
NNSA by holding quarterly, Assistant Secretary-level bridge meetings
and by institutionalizing several working groups to develop new joint
projects to support nuclear nonproliferation. DoD also cooperates
closely with counterparts in NSS, NNSA, and Department of State to
support preparations for the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit.
(b) DoD plans to transfer $2.2B from FY13-16 to support NNSA's
nuclear weapons activities. Funds will be allocated annually to NNSA
for program activities endorsed by the DoD-led Nuclear Weapons Council.
These funds are in addition to the $5.7B DoD transfer to NNSA for
nuclear weapons and naval reactor programs and demonstrate the
commitment of the Administration to fund fully the investments needed
to sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal for the long
term.
The NWC will continue its current role of reviewing nuclear weapons
requirements for DoD, and will be increasingly active in assisting NNSA
in its efforts to constrain costs. NNSA budget requests to Congress
will be adjusted as necessary--up or down--based on the best
information available at the time.
Ms. Sanchez. What is the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA)
doing to support verification and detection improvements that will
support further nuclear weapons reductions and the Comprehensive test
Ban Treaty? What are the challenges that remain?
Secretary Weber. Until the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty
(CTBT) enters into force, DTRA's role is focused on developing CTBT-
related detection and verification technologies, establishing on-site
inspection procedures, and testing and preparing for potential
inspections in the United States through various tabletop and planning
exercises.
DTRA is a member of the DoD Nuclear Test-Ban Implementation Working
Group and supports the Interagency Verification and Monitoring Task
Force (VMTF) and Backstopping Group. DTRA serves as the co-chair of the
VMTF's On-Site Inspection Subgroup and as a member of the Radionuclide
Subgroup.
DTRA is developing technology to improve our ability to detect
evasive and low-yield nuclear testing in support of the CTBT, and to
support warhead counting and identification for future arms reduction
agreements that may include non-strategic weapons. DTRA's technology
development program emphasizes the improvement of DoD capabilities to
conduct on-site inspections for a variety of treaties.
Remaining technology challenges include improving our ability to
detect evasive underground nuclear weapon testing and our ability to
characterize and identify nuclear warheads without revealing sensitive
information. Another key challenge is improving our ability to detect
on-site or remote signatures associated with the production of special
nuclear materials.
Ms. Sanchez. With the Advanced Systems and Concepts Office (ASCO)
being eliminated due to efficiencies, who will implements the important
function of long-term thinking on non-proliferation and arms control in
DOD/DTRA? How will this function be affected by this organizational
change?
Secretary Weber. With the closure of the Advanced Systems and
Concepts Office (ASCO), the Strategy and Plans (SP) Enterprise in DTRA,
which previously managed ASCO, will continue to manage and sustain the
function of long-term thinking on non-proliferation and arms control.
While reducing overhead costs by eliminating the old organizational
structure of ASCO, DTRA is improving management efficiency to implement
most of the functions that ASCO previously performed, and those
functions will still be accomplished within DTRA.
Ms. Sanchez. Could you outline what force structure shifts you are
considering to implement New START? Will these changes enable us to
meet requirements into the future, and be flexible to allow further
reductions later?
General Chambers. Per Section 1251 of the 2011 National Defense
Authorization Act, to meet the New START central limits, the
Administration plans to convert or eliminate some ICBM launchers, SLBM
launchers and nuclear-capable heavy bombers. Air Force planning efforts
are focused on complying with the limits dictated in the Section 1251
report of up to 420 ICBMs and up to 60 nuclear capable bombers. The
procedures established in New START allow for simpler and less
expensive conversion and elimination than provided for in the previous
START. These new procedures are expected to enable DoD to meet national
security requirements and implement future conversions and eliminations
more expeditiously and at lower cost.
Ms. Sanchez. According to budget documents, the Air Force has been
provided with over $10 billion (when adjusted for inflation) since FY
1997 to refurbish the Minuteman III ICBM. Can you talk about the
upgrades that have already been made and upgrades that are planned to
extend the life of the Minuteman III to 2030?
General Chambers. Since FY97 required system updates and life
extension programs were executed to the MM III weapon system based on
results from aging surveillance and other assessment programs. In 2002,
based on decisions stemming from a Nuclear Posture Review, Air Force
life requirements for MMIII were extended to require sustainment of a
500 missile force through FY20. To meet this requirement various
upgrades and Life Extension Programs (LEPs) were conducted to cover
multiple aspects of the MM III weapon system and involved numerous
tests, calibration, flight testing and other related support equipment
upgrades. Significant upgrades to the MM III included a complete
Propulsion Replacement, a Guidance upgrade/replacement and an ICBM
Cryptography Upgrade (Phase I and Phase II).
In 2007, the National Defense Authorization Act directed the
sustainment of a 450 MMIII missile force at ``operational
specification'' through FY30. To meet this new requirement the Air
Force plans on continued LEPs to extend MM III life through 2030. Some
significant aspects of the MM III to be upgraded in future programs
include an ICBM Fuze Modernization program, a Solid Rocket Motor
Modernization program and a Guidance Life Extension Program. The Air
Force will continue refurbishments where modern components replace
obsolete parts and conduct upgrades to the MM III as aging,
surveillance and other assessment programs identify a need to do so.
Ms. Sanchez. Could you outline what force structure shifts you are
considering to implement New START? Will these changes enable us to
meet requirements into the future, and be flexible to allow further
reductions later?
Admiral Benedict. As outlined in the updated 1251 Report, the Navy
will convert four SLBM launchers on each of its existing 14 SSBNs,
thereby stabilizing the number of SSBNs to be maintained and
facilitating Navy planning for the OHIO Class submarine replacement. By
maintaining all 14 OHIO Class SSBNs, each with 20 SLBM launchers, the
Navy continues to meet current and future requirements while
simultaneously being flexible to allow for further reductions. The Navy
is ensuring plans for the OHIO Replacement submarine are informed by
new START as OHIO Class SSBNs begin to retire in 2027.
Consistent with the guidance in the Nuclear Posture Review, the
resultant force structure will retain the ability to ``upload'' some
nuclear warheads as a technical hedge against future problems with U.S.
delivery systems or warheads, or as a result of a fundamental
deterioration of the security environment. If further reductions are
desired, either additional reductions of warheads on the deployed
missiles or conversion of more launchers on each of the existing 14
SSBNs are possible. These decisions will be made external to the Navy,
but Navy implementation plans provide considerable flexibility to the
decision makers and do allow for a wide range of options if future
force changes are needed.
Ms. Sanchez. What are your concerns about the solid rocket
industrial base and what is the plan moving forward as DOD will bear
higher costs to sustain a lower production rate?
Admiral Benedict. The Navy is concerned that the decline of the
Solid Rocket Motor industry has placed a heavy burden on Navy
resources. The Navy is maintaining a continuous production capability
at a minimum sustaining rate of twelve rocket motor sets per year
through the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). However, SSP has faced
significant cost challenges as both NASA and Air
Force demands have declined. Reduced industrial demand has resulted
in overhead costs spread over a smaller customer base. The Navy's
growing percentage of the Solid Rocket Motor business base has already
resulted in increased unit costs. SSP will continue to experience those
cost increases if demand shrinks further in coming years.
SSP is working with our industry partners, DoD, NASA, and Congress
to sustain the Solid Rocket Motor industrial base, mitigate cost
increases, and find ways to maintain successful partnerships. The OSD
(Industrial Policy)-led Inter Agency Task Force, with membership from
Navy, the Air Force, OSD, working with the Missile Defense Agency and
NASA, developed a Solid Rocket Industrial Base Sustainment Plan. SSP
has been an integral part of this process. Continued collaboration is
necessary to find an inter-agency solution to maintain this crucial
national capability.
Ms. Sanchez. According to the Navy, the SSBN(X) program ``is
inextricably linked to legacy SSBN retirements. The latest start for
the lead SSBN(X) is FY 2019 and the replacements must start reaching
the operational force by FY 2029. There is no leeway in this plan to
allow a later start or any delay in the procurement plan.''
a) Has there been any impact from the delay in FY11 appropriations
on the Navy's plan to develop and procure the first SSBN(X) in FY 2019?
b) Are you concerned about any impacts in naval reactor development
that might have resulted from the delayed appropriations?
Admiral Benedict. a) The OHIO Replacement (OR) FY 2011 request was
$493 million. Due to the Continuing Resolution, only $237.8 million has
been released to date. The Continuing Resolution has resulted in a
delay in procuring of fixture manufacturing and long lead time material
that supports Common Missile Compartment prototyping efforts.
The OHIO Replacement program was marked $51.6 million ($49.3
million Congressional reduction and $2.3 million for economic
assumptions), for a revised FY 2011 control of $441.4 million. This
$51.6 million FY 2011 reduction increases the technical risk to meet
the established cost targets. It also impacts execution of the OR build
strategy which requires design maturity to support a FY 2019
construction start. Due to the reduction in FY 2011 funding the program
will be required to delay procurement of fixtures that facilitate
Common Missile Compartment (CMC) component development, fabrication and
integration. The program will also have to reduce manning levels which
will adversely impact missile tube design completion, ship length
decision, and ship specifications. The serial nature of some design
products will result in a lower design maturity than goal at
construction start with attendant increased construction cost and
future potential delay in construction start.
The program will be required to request funding for restoration of
this FY 2011 $49.3 million Congressional reduction in future budget
requests.
b) The OHIO Replacement is being designed to have a life-of-ship
core, which will reduce the SSBN force level by 2 ships. In addition to
the delayed appropriations this year, in each of the last two years
Naval Reactors' Department of Energy funding (which supports the life-
of ship core) has been cut by the Appropriations Committee ($58 million
in FY2010 and over $100 million in FY11). Some of this funding was for
OHIO Replacement and therefore these cuts will impact the timely
completion of Naval Reactors' development. Naval Reactors has stated
that the current cuts to OHIO Replacement will result in delays of at
least six months to the design and delivery of the reactor plant, and
commensurate delays to the delivery of the lead ship.
Ms. Sanchez. Last month Deputy Defense Secretary William Lynn
stated that the cost of the SSBN(X) program will be shouldered by
diverting funds from other naval and Pentagon programs and perhaps by
boosting the defense budget, but the program should not get its own
special funding stream. However, some voices within the Navy have
talked about treating the new submarine as a national strategic asset
that is funded outside the Navy's budget as has been done with other
programs, such as our missile defense program. Has a decision been made
one way or another on this issue?
Admiral Benedict. As the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology, & Logistics (USD(AT&L)), Dr. Ashton Carter, testified
before the House Appropriations Committee's Defense Subcommittee (HAC-
D) on 13 April 2011, the position of the Office of the Secretary of
Defense remains that the OHIO Replacement Program will be funded within
the Navy's shipbuilding account.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. LARSEN
Mr. Larsen. Dr. Triay, I understand that DOE conducted an
independent review of the safety culture at the Hanford Waste Treatment
Plant project. What were the results of that review and how would you
describe the state of the safety culture on this project?
Secretary Triay. During August 2010 and September 2010, the
Department's Office of Health, Safety and Security (HSS) conducted an
independent review of the nuclear safety culture of the Waste Treatment
Plant (WTP) project. The report, issued in October 2010, concluded that
the framework for a strong safety culture has been established, and
that overall, managers encourage employees to raise questions or
concerns. The report also noted that,
``Most ORP personnel indicated their belief that the nuclear safety
culture within ORP is strong and improving. Although a limited number
of individuals had varying concerns, the majority of ORP personnel who
were interviewed expressed positive views of the nuclear safety culture
and current senior management.''
``Although improvements are needed in some areas, BNI and its
subcontractors have established the framework for a strong nuclear
safety culture at WTP.''
The report included the following six recommendations.
For the Office of River Protection (ORP):
1. Based on the outcome of the Federal Project Director's WTP
Management Assessment Report, ORP should institutionalize the processes
and formally define the roles and responsibilities and clarity
interfaces between the WTP Federal organization and the other ORP
organizations (e.g., Engineering and Nuclear Safety, Environmental
Safety and Quality, and Tank Farm Project); and
For the WTP prime contractor, Bechtel National Inc. (BNI):
2. Perform a systematic assessment of the existing processes for
identifying and resolving nuclear safety issues, with particular
emphasis on root cause analysis of problems involving the initial
identification of issues;
3. Establish a formal change management process that identifies the
actions needed to ensure that safety programs are not degraded by
changes in project status or priorities;
4. Identity mechanisms to strengthen trust among the workforce and
better communicate information to employees;
5. Include actions and elements in the development and
implementation of the NSQC Plan to ensure that it results in
sustainable and continuous improvement in the nuclear safety and
quality culture at the WTP; and
6. Examine all credible concerns to ensure that the nuclear safety
culture does not degrade over time and to better determine the extent
of the concerns.
In addressing the first recommendation, ORP has updated its Project
Execution Plan to institutionalize processes, formally define roles and
responsibilities, and clarify interfaces between the WTP Federal
organization and the other ORP organizations. In December 2010, BNI
responded to recommendations two through six above with an action plan
and a forecast date to have all actions complete by September 30, 2011.
The ORP Project Team reviewed the proposed responses and notified BNI
that the improvements proposed were ``well aligned with the intent of
the HSS recommendations'' and that in early FY 2012, ORP will conduct a
review to verify their effectiveness.
The Department of Energy has a strong history and culture of safety
in working with unique nuclear hazards and facilities. EM stands by its
safety record and the nuclear safety culture of the Department
including the Waste Treatment Plant project. The safety of our workers
and the public is of fundamental importance to our projects.
Mr. Larsen. Dr. Triay, can you please share the status of technical
issues regarding the Waste Treatment Plant project? Are these issues
considered to be open or closed? What remaining work needs to be done
to address these issues?
Secretary Triay. The Waste Treatment Plant (WTP) project continues
to make significant progress toward resolution of technical issues.
Design and engineering of the WTP is now approximately 81 percent
complete. In 2010, the Department of Energy (DOE) commissioned a review
of the WTP to evaluate several aspects of the project, including a
technical design review to address and provide advice on the following
areas: 1) whether technical risks have been adequately addressed in the
design, and 2) whether the design is sufficiently mature to allow
proceeding with needed procurement and construction activities to meet
WTP requirements. That review identified no additional specific
technical issues beyond those already being addressed by the project.
The three technical issues currently open are:
1) adequacy of pulse jet mixing technology in process
vessels;
2) potential for a flammable gas event in piping in ancillary
vessels; and,
3) selection of a value for a parameter that is used to
determine radiological impacts to members of the public in an
accident scenario (deposition velocity).
Final closure actions for these three technical issues are nearing
completion. Further details are provided below.
Pulse Jet Mixing (PJM):
The DOE believes the remaining uncertainty regarding use of PJM
technology at the WTP is being addressed by the approach presented
during the October 7-8, 2010, Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board
(DNFSB) public hearing on WTP, and in our supplement to the public
hearing record submitted to the DNFSB in January 2011. In December
2010, the DNFSB issued a recommendation (DNFSB 2010-2) to the Secretary
with specific sub-recommendations it believes need to be addressed
during the conduct of our Large Scale Integrated Testing (LSIT)
process. The Implementation Plan for addressing DNFSB 2010-2 is under
development and is being communicated to DNFSB staff. The first
increment of LSIT will test mixing system performance limits. The
satisfactory completion of this increment will provide the assurance
needed to complete fabrication and proceed with on-time installation of
vessels in the Pretreatment Facility. Follow-on increments of the LSIT
will focus on optimizing operational performance of WTP, and tank waste
processing and feed delivery system performance. An Independent Review
Team of national experts has been retained to review the technical
parameters and decisions resulting from the LSIT process.
Hydrogen in Piping and Ancillary Vessels (HPAV):
In its April 15, 2010, periodic report to Congress, the DNFSB
expressed concern ``that many changes to the design of WTP are being
approved by the DOE prior to the resolution of numerous outstanding
technical issues.'' In an effort to resolve this concern, the DNFSB
suggested a comprehensive, independent, expert-based review of the
safety design strategy for control of hydrogen in pipes and ancillary
vessels. This led to the formation of the HPAV Independent Review Team
(IRT).
The IRT consisted of experts that evaluated the WTP approach for
addressing HPAV events in three areas: 1) quantitative risk assessment
to evaluate the potential frequency and magnitude of hydrogen events;
2) gas phenomena; and 3) structural. The HPAV IRT concluded that the
design approach for HPAV piping and components is acceptable, provided
that the project resolves the findings identified by the team. The
project is currently in the process of completing its efforts to
address and close the HPAV IRT findings.
The Office of Environmental Management (EM) has high confidence
that the HPAV design approach yields a superior design for WTP that not
only complies with DOE safety policies but assures the operational
reliability necessary for efficient achievement of the critical waste
treatment mission to safely treat Hanford's radioactive liquid waste.
Deposition Velocity:
In May 2010 and again in July 2010, the DNFSB communicated its
concerns to the Department regarding the WTP's selection of a value
that is used in determining the radiological dose consequences to a
member of the public in the event of an accident. In response to these
concerns, the Department's Chief of Nuclear Safety prepared a technical
analysis using recognized subject matter experts, recommending an
appropriate value for this parameter, but suggesting that the WTP
project could adopt a more conservative value as it deemed appropriate.
Subsequently, DOE forwarded this recommendation to the WTP contractor
requesting that it evaluate the analyses and make a recommendation back
to DOE on selection of an appropriate value. The contractor is expected
to complete its evaluation and make a recommendation for use of the
value by the end of May 2011. The Department expects this value will be
consistent with the DNFSB's recommended values.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. HEINRICH
Mr. Heinrich. Mr. Administrator, I am concerned that the FY12
President's Budget Request does not include funding for the
recapitalization of Sandia's MESA fabrication facility. Without
funding, the fabrication facility may be at risk of becoming obsolete
by industry standards and unable to fully support next generation
microelectronics for stockpile systems.
Can you please speak to the importance of funding equipment and
infrastructure recapitalization at MESA's fabrication facility in the
current and upcoming budget cycles?
Can you also explain what plans the Administration has in place to
do so?
Secretary D'Agostino. The MESA fabrication facilities are comprised
of a Microelectronics Development Laboratory (Silicon fabrication
facility) built in 1986 and a recently completed Micro-fabrication
facility which came on line in 2005. The MESA recapitalization
addresses facility upgrades, equipment retooling, and the Silicon
Fabrication Retooling (SSiFR), in the 1986 Silicon fabrication
facility.
The NNSA will upgrade the Silicon fabrication facility by replacing
high risk items such as the acid exhaust system and the chase ceiling
tiles, both of which are original to this 25-year old facility.
Additionally, the SSiFR effort is also necessary, and will enable
production of the Application Specific Integrated Circuits (ASICs) that
are needed to support the life extension needs of the B61, W78 and W88.
The current Life Extension Program (LEP) schedule shows all three
LEPs running in parallel. In addition, the W78 and W88 LEPs will
require prototyping of the strategically hardened ASICs and other
components in parallel with B61 War Reserve production. As a result,
heavy demands will be placed on the existing facilities thus
necessitating their upgrade and equipment retooling.
Recapitalization is planned to be executed in distinct phases over
four years, with emphasis on replacement of the highest risk tools as
part of the SSiFR effort. Facility infrastructure and upgrades will
proceed in parallel with SSiFR work. The phased execution would be
implemented in such a way that the production capability of the
facility would not be impacted during the prototype and War Reserve
production.
A prioritized plan for the phased execution of SSiFR
recapitalization will be completed in FY2011. The SSiFR effort will
begin in FY2012, and is expected to cost $80M. The facility upgrades (a
series of expense and general plant projects expected to cost $20M)
will begin in 2013. NNSA expects to complete these upgrades by FY 2016.
Mr. Heinrich. I was pleased to see $25M included in the FY12
President's Budget Request for the construction of the AF Nuclear
Weapons Center Sustainment Center at Kirtland Air Force Base.
I understand this facility will allow our nation to track, monitor
and provide ``positive inventory control'' for all Air Force Nuclear
Weapons Related Material world-wide.
Can you please talk a little more about the value this facility
will bring to our nuclear weapons enterprise?
General Chambers. The Sustainment and Integration Center (STIC)
will provide a single hub for tracking nuclear weapons and related
material. The STIC will be manned 24 hours-a-day, 365 days-a-year to
monitor and provide real-time information on the condition and location
of nuclear weapons and Nuclear Weapons Related Materials, maintain
communication with key DoD and DOE command centers, and to provide
state-of-the-art capabilities in support of effective crisis management
and corrective action responses, if required.
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