[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
[H.A.S.C. No. 112-18]
HEARING
ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT
FOR FISCAL YEAR 2012
AND
OVERSIGHT OF PREVIOUSLY AUTHORIZED PROGRAMS
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES HEARING
ON
COUNTERPROLIFERATION STRATEGY AND
THE FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL
DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION BUDGET
REQUEST FOR THE DEFENSE THREAT
REDUCTION AGENCY AND CHEMICAL
BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM
__________
HEARING HELD
MARCH 11, 2011
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND CAPABILITIES
MAC THORNBERRY, Texas, Chairman
JEFF MILLER, Florida JAMES R. LANGEVIN, Rhode Island
JOHN KLINE, Minnesota LORETTA SANCHEZ, California
BILL SHUSTER, Pennsylvania ROBERT ANDREWS, New Jersey
K. MICHAEL CONAWAY, Texas SUSAN A. DAVIS, California
CHRIS GIBSON, New York TIM RYAN, Ohio
BOBBY SCHILLING, Illinois C.A. DUTCH RUPPERSBERGER, Maryland
ALLEN B. WEST, Florida HANK JOHNSON, Georgia
TRENT FRANKS, Arizona KATHY CASTOR, Florida
DUNCAN HUNTER, California
Peter Villano, Professional Staff Member
Mark Lewis, Professional Staff Member
Jeff Cullen, Staff Assistant
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF HEARINGS
2011
Page
Hearing:
Friday, March 11, 2011, Counterproliferation Strategy and the
Fiscal Year 2012 National Defense Authorization Budget Request
for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and Chemical Biological
Defense Program................................................ 1
Appendix:
Friday, March 11, 2011........................................... 33
----------
FRIDAY, MARCH 11, 2011
COUNTERPROLIFERATION STRATEGY AND THE FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY
AND CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM
STATEMENTS PRESENTED BY MEMBERS OF CONGRESS
Langevin, Hon. James R., a Representative from Rhode Island,
Ranking Member, Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and
Capabilities................................................... 2
Thornberry, Hon. Mac, a Representative from Texas, Chairman,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities.............. 1
WITNESSES
Handelman, Hon. Kenneth B., Acting Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Global Strategic Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense....... 3
Myers, Kenneth A., III, Director, Defense Threat Reduction Agency 6
Scarbrough, BG Jess A., USA, Joint Program Executive Officer for
Chemical and Biological Defense, Office of the Secretary of
Defense........................................................ 7
Weber, Hon. Andrew, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear
and Chemical and Biological Defense Programs, U.S. Department
of Defense..................................................... 4
APPENDIX
Prepared Statements:
Handelman, Hon. Kenneth B.................................... 40
Langevin, Hon. James R....................................... 39
Myers, Kenneth A., III....................................... 66
Scarbrough, BG Jess A........................................ 90
Thornberry, Hon. Mac......................................... 37
Weber, Hon. Andrew........................................... 55
Documents Submitted for the Record:
[There were no Documents submitted.]
Witness Responses to Questions Asked During the Hearing:
Mr. Franks................................................... 103
Questions Submitted by Members Post Hearing:
Mr. Thornberry............................................... 107
Mr. Ruppersberger............................................ 110
COUNTERPROLIFERATION STRATEGY AND THE FISCAL YEAR 2012 NATIONAL DEFENSE
AUTHORIZATION BUDGET REQUEST FOR THE DEFENSE THREAT REDUCTION AGENCY
AND CHEMICAL BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAM
----------
House of Representatives,
Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities,
Washington, DC, Friday, March 11, 2011.
The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 12:44 p.m., in
room 2212, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Mac Thornberry
(chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.
OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. MAC THORNBERRY, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
TEXAS, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS AND
CAPABILITIES
Mr. Thornberry. The hearing will come to order.
Let me thank all our witnesses and guests for their
patience as we have had votes on the floor.
I appreciate everybody being with us today on this hearing
related to counterproliferation strategy as well as the 2012
budget request for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency and the
chemical biological defense programs.
I think that there has been widespread agreement among
those who have run for President and most others that the
greatest single danger to this country's national security is a
weapon of mass destruction, which could be detonated here on
our shores.
As a matter of fact, I noticed in yesterday's Washington
Times is a press report quoting a study to Congress that says:
While counterterrorism actions have disrupted Al Qaeda's near-
term effort to develop a sophisticated WMD [weapon of mass
destruction] attack capability, we judge the group is still
intent on its acquisition.
So all of us ought to remember their intention and what
they will do if they can get their hands on such a weapon.
I notice that the 2010 QDR [Quadrennial Defense Review]
says that as the ability to create and employ weapons of mass
destruction spreads globally, so must our combined efforts to
detect, interdict, and contain the effects of those weapons.
And that is what this hearing is about.
Since 2002, the government has basically had a three-prong
strategy: Nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and
consequence management. This hearing focuses primarily on
counterproliferation, but it is important I think for us to
look at the whole strategy. And I appreciate the witnesses'
statements that have helped us do that.
I do notice that as far as the budget goes, for 2012 for
DTRA [the Defense Threat Reduction Agency], the request is
about $76 million less than the 2011 request and the amount
that this committee authorized. And for the Chemical Biological
Defense Program, it is about $52 million less than the 2011
request. So it does lead one to wonder, why are these accounts
going down? Although, we all are, of course, aware of the
budget situation the country faces.
So, again, I appreciate our witnesses being here. Before I
turn to them, let me turn to the ranking member for any
comments he would like to make.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Thornberry can be found in
the Appendix on page 37.]
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES R. LANGEVIN, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM
RHODE ISLAND, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON EMERGING THREATS
AND CAPABILITIES
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I want to likewise welcome our witnesses before the
subcommittee today. And, Mr. Chairman, I want to thank you for
holding this very important hearing on a clearly important
topic to our national security. The work obviously being done
at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency, and Chemical Biological
Defense Program is essential to keeping the Nation secure. With
so many other pressing things going on in the world, it can be
often easy to forget that we face many threats around the
world, in particular with respect to chemical, biological,
radiological, and nuclear threats to the country.
Likewise, so I am glad that we are focusing attention on
the work being done at DTRA and the Chemical Biological Defense
Program. I look forward to getting an update on the work that
you all are doing.
I likewise, Mr. Chairman, am concerned about the reduction
and the decrease in the budget request for fiscal year 2012 or
fiscal year 2011, and I would like the witnesses to delve into
those things in particular. And then I have other questions.
So, with that, I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for holding the
hearing. And I look forward to the witnesses' testimony.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Langevin can be found in the
Appendix on page 39.]
Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentleman.
We will now turn to our witnesses.
We have the Honorable Kenneth B. Handelman, Acting
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Global Strategic Affairs;
Mr. Andrew Weber, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Nuclear
and Chemical and Biological Defense programs; Mr. Kenneth
Myers, Director of Defense Threat Reduction Agency; and,
Brigadier General Jess Scarbrough, Joint Program Executive
Officer for Chemical and Biological Defense.
If you all could, we would appreciate summarizing your
statements in the interest of time. And, without objection,
your complete written statements will be made part of the
record.
Mr. Handelman.
STATEMENT OF HON. KENNETH B. HANDELMAN, ACTING ASSISTANT
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR GLOBAL STRATEGIC AFFAIRS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Mr. Handelman. Mr. Chairman, Mr. Langevin, members of the
subcommittee, it is an honor to testify today with three close
colleagues on the Department's counterproliferation strategy
and our efforts more broadly to counter the threat of weapons
of mass destruction. I would like to focus my opening remarks
on an area that has attracted some significant attention; that
is DOD's [the Department of Defense's] work on biodefense.
Now, let me be clear about the administration's WMD
priorities overall. The President has said that the greatest
threat to the United States is a nuclear weapon in the hands of
a terrorist. However, the President has also given a similar
high priority to biodefense. The December 2010 National
Strategy for Countering Biological Threats highlighted the
significant threat to our people, our coalition partners, and
our forces posed by especially dangerous pathogens.
Sometimes it is not so obvious why DOD should care so much
about biodefense issues. Let me briefly highlight why we care,
and very much.
First, biodefense is not merely about the health of U.S.
troops and their families. It is about the ability of U.S.
troops to fight and win in an environment that might be
compromised by diseases against which we have no protection or
treatment.
Second, even if U.S. Forces are prepared to fight in such
an environment, our doctrine and our force structure require
that we fight alongside coalition partners. If our partners are
vulnerable to biothreats, then we can count them out of the
fight right from the start.
Third, biodefense is an area where we can use modest
investments prior to a conflict to maximize our capabilities
during a conflict. Here are some of the things we are already
doing in this area. To limit proliferation of especially
dangerous pathogens, we are working with partner countries in
areas where dangerous diseases are endemic to improve
laboratory, physical security, and security practices.
To improve our understanding of dangerous diseases that
could impact our troops, we are expanding our cooperative
research projects with partner countries and leveraging the
U.S. military's overseas lab network.
To improve our early warning posture we are pursuing a
disease surveillance capability that will give us a heads up
about the origin and potency of outbreaks that could threaten
our forces or our population.
These are just a few examples of how DOD is trying to get
ahead of what we believe is an underaddressed challenge. I want
to emphasize how closely we coordinate with our colleagues in
the public health business without getting into their business.
We have been careful to maintain our focus on national
security and avoid overlap with the efforts of established U.S.
public health outreach overseas. But it is very important that
DOD engage aggressively in this global biodefense effort. DOD
and State are the only U.S. agencies with authority to develop
biodefense relationships with partners around the globe in
support of U.S. national security, and DOD, of course, has a
special equity given how frequently and far afield we deploy
our troops.
Our work in this area is still in its infancy. We have a
great partnership with other U.S. agencies, and we are learning
important lessons. I want to leave you with two of those
lessons as I wrap up.
First, we have learned that, as with other weapons of mass
destruction, threats to our forces are best addressed at the
source in regions where dangerous diseases originate. And,
second, we have learned that even as we carefully deconflict
our biodefense work with the activities of our public health
colleagues, there is really no way to draw a bright line
between national security and public health.
Mr. Chairman, I wanted to use my opening remarks to focus
on DOD's biodefense activities because this is a conversation
that we need to expand with the committee. As biological
science becomes more accessible and borders less secure, we
believe that this threat will only increase and DOD's
biodefense activities will increase as well. And I look forward
to discussing these and other issues with you today.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Handelman can be found in
the Appendix on page 40.]
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. I appreciate it.
Mr. Weber.
STATEMENT OF HON. ANDREW WEBER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
FOR NUCLEAR AND CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE PROGRAMS, U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
Secretary Weber. Chairman Thornberry, Ranking Member
Langevin, and members of the subcommittee, thank you for giving
me this opportunity to discuss with you Department of Defense
efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction. It is an honor
to come before you today to testify with my close colleagues.
Our offices work to ensure the Department of Defense's
posture to counter 21st-century WMD threats to our warfighters
and citizens here and abroad. Accomplishing this has become
more difficult recently due to the constraints of operating
under a continuing resolution.
Rapid advancements in technology and manufacturing
techniques are making it easier for an adversary, whether state
or nonstate, to develop biological and chemical weapons. The
threat is real. As stated in the National Strategy for
Countering Biological Threats, fanatics have expressed interest
in developing and using biological weapons against us and our
allies.
The Chemical and Biological Defense Program provides the
capabilities needed for a layered set of defensive measures
against chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear
attacks. These integrated capabilities improve our ability to
sense chemical and biological warfare agents, shield our
servicemembers, shape our operations, and sustain our forces.
One capability that is fielded now with our forces in over
300 locations worldwide is the Joint Biological Agent
Identification and Diagnostic System. It is capable of rapidly
identifying multiple biological agents, such as anthrax,
plague, and avian influenza.
Detection and diagnostics capabilities like this play a
large role in biosurveillance, which is critically important to
the Department. We need early warning of a biological attack
within minutes, not days, through a comprehensive global
biosurveillance network. Should an attack occur, we must be
prepared to respond.
In last year's State of the Union address, President Obama
directed the enhancement of the Nation's capability to develop,
license, and procure countermeasures against both bioterrorist
attacks and naturally occurring infectious diseases. We are
preparing to execute a medical countermeasures initiative that
will provide agile and flexible advanced development and
manufacturing capabilities to protect our warfighters against
known agents and emerging threats for which countermeasures do
not exist.
President Obama has stated that one of today's greatest
dangers is nuclear terrorism. We believe Al Qaeda and their
associates are seeking nuclear and other weapons of mass
destruction. It is clear that they would use such weapons if
they managed to obtain them. Our offices are the focal point
within the Department for both maintaining a safe, secure and
effective nuclear deterrent, and countering nuclear and weapons
of mass destruction threats.
In February, I visited the 341st Missile Wing at Malmstrom
Air Force Base in Montana. I observed the execution of this
critical deterrence mission and thanked the extraordinary
airmen responsible for providing our Nation with this essential
capability.
In order to reduce the risk of emerging nuclear-armed
adversaries, the Department of Defense is working with the
Departments of Energy and State to implement the President's
Global Nuclear Lockdown Initiative to secure vulnerable fissile
materiel worldwide. We are also working to improve the Nation's
capabilities in nuclear detection and forensics.
To keep Congress fully informed of the U.S. Government's
development and fielding of countering WMD capabilities, the
Counterproliferation Program Review Committee will provide an
updated report in May of this year. It will relate prioritized
capability gaps to programs and resources.
The threat of a nuclear, chemical, or biological attack on
our troops or the homeland is real and constantly evolving.
This means the Department of Defense must develop and implement
agile and effective programs to counter weapons of mass
destruction. In support of the vision of President Obama and
Secretary Gates, the Department is working to strengthen our
capabilities to effectively prevent, deter, defeat, and respond
to these threats. I ask for your support of the fiscal year
2011 appropriations bill and the President's fiscal year 2012
budget request so that we can work to achieve these goals.
I appreciate the opportunity you have given me to testify
today, and would be pleased to answer any questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Weber can be found in
the Appendix on page 55.]
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Mr. Myers.
STATEMENT OF KENNETH A. MYERS III, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE THREAT
REDUCTION AGENCY
Mr. Myers. Mr. Chairman, Ranking Member Langevin, and
members of the committee, it is an honor to be here today.
I will address the roles of the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency and our Nation's counterproliferation and consequence
management efforts in the fiscal year 2012 budget.
The mission of the nearly 2,000 civilian and military
personnel of DTRA is to reduce, eliminate, detect, and counter
weapons of mass destruction and mitigate their effects. We
proudly serve as the combat support agency for the WMD mission.
I am also the Director of the U.S. Strategic Command Center
for Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction. The center is
responsible for the synchronization of planning across the
combatant commands.
The threat is very real. It is growing in scope and
evolving in its potential applications. The presence of
international terrorism, the proliferation of weapons know-how,
and the emergence of infectious diseases have all changed the
game. The consequences of an attack would cause mass
casualties, have a crippling economic impact, and cause major
sociological harm. Terrorists are determined to acquire WMD
and, if successful, will use them.
We have an increasingly effective national strategy for
countering the threat. It harnesses expertise across the whole
of government and the international community. The new National
Strategy for Countering Biological Threats, the Quadrennial
Defense Review, and the national military strategy all
highlight the pressing need to build additional and more
effective barriers between the threat and the American people.
We work to reduce WMD threats at their source, detect,
interdict and defeat them, and minimize the effects and
consequences of possible attacks. We provide subject matter
expertise to national, global, and battlefield levels. We
conduct technology development and assist the warfighter with
planning and help maintain a safe, secure, and effective U.S.
nuclear deterrent.
As you walk down the halls of our facilities, you see
nuclear physicists, microbiologists, and Special Forces
operators working together to solve complex problems. We truly
are a unique institution. I would like to highlight some of our
recent accomplishments.
We successfully transitioned the Massive Ordnance
Penetrator to the Air Force. It is a 30,000-pound penetrating
weapon significantly more lethal and accurate than current
weapons in the inventory to defeat hardened, deeply buried,
potential WMD targets.
In the past year, DTRA responded to 1,500 reach-back
requests from the combatant commanders and the National Guard
WMD civil support teams for subject-matter expertise. The total
number of requests has more than tripled since 2008, and the
product has become increasingly more complex. We provide
support to everything from the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan to
the Super Bowl and the State of the Union address.
Over the last year, we have made great strides in improving
the Department's counter-WMD campaign plan. It details what the
Pentagon will do to address the threat over the next 5 years,
and will have goals, tasks, and assessments that will gauge our
progress.
DTRA is placing great emphasis on protecting our military
personnel against naturally occurring and manmade dangerous
pathogens. Through the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Biological
Engagement Program, we are working with the Departments of
State, Health and Human Services, and Agriculture to improve
biosurveillance and security with new partners in Africa and
Asia.
In addition, through the Medical Countermeasures
Initiative, we will safeguard our troops against disease and
deadly pathogens. Force protection programs such as these are a
top priority for our warfighter and for DTRA.
DTRA is reshaping our efforts through our latest strategic
plan. It responds to evolving threats while taking into account
the difficult economic situation. Our plan has three goals:
First, adapt to and shape the dynamic global security
environment; two, provide counter-WMD capabilities to meet
current threats and challenges; and three, institutionalize a
whole of DTRA and whole of government approach to enhance
mission execution through collaboration.
Members of the subcommittee, I thank you for the invitation
to testify on our mission and for your support of the DTRA SEC
in prior years. I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Myers can be found in the
Appendix on page 66.]
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
General.
STATEMENT OF BG JESS A. SCARBROUGH, USA, JOINT PROGRAM
EXECUTIVE OFFICER FOR CHEMICAL AND BIOLOGICAL DEFENSE, OFFICE
OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
General Scarbrough. I thank the chairman and ranking member
for the honor of testifying on behalf of the Department of
Defense Chemical and Biological Defense Program. This program
provides the joint warfighter with chemical and biological
detection and reconnaissance systems, individual and collective
protection capabilities, decontamination products, information
management systems, and medical countermeasures.
In fiscal year 2010, we provided over 1 million pieces of
integrated chemical and biological defense capability to our
soldiers, sailors, airmen, and marines.
Consistent with our mission to protect the joint warfighter
and the Nation, we are tasked with the mission of developing
and integrating biological defense technologies to enable
biosurveillance, which includes the early warning,
identification, and tracking of biological threats. Toward that
end, we are collaborating with the Department of Homeland
Security's BioWatch program to maintain a domestic capability.
Regarding our acquisition portfolio, we are developing
adaptable and flexible approaches to detect biological threats
early enough to initiate a rapid and effective response as
called for in the National Strategy for Countering Biological
Threats.
Improved detection and precise diagnostics are fundamental
to biosurveillance and are key areas of our expertise in the
Chemical and Biological Defense Program. We develop and
integrate state-of-the-art detection and diagnostic systems to
enable both force protection and force health protection. A new
program start in fiscal year 2012, the Next Generation
Diagnostic System Program will develop a family of systems that
provide improved diagnostics capabilities across all
operational echelons.
Another new start in the budget request before you is the
DOD Medical Countermeasures Initiative. Based on the
President's request to redesign the United States medical
countermeasures enterprise in collaboration with the Department
of Health and Human Services, DOD plans to execute or establish
a dedicated advanced development and flexible manufacturing
capability for medical countermeasures. HHS [the Department of
Health and Human Services] is focused on large-scale production
to address the needs of the national population while we in the
DOD are looking to address the unique needs of the joint
warfighter.
During early fiscal year 2012, the DOD plans to award a
long-term contract to establish and commission this advanced
development and manufacturing capability. This new effort is
aligned with the DOD mission of protecting our people.
In addition to the biological threat, the Chemical and
Biological Defense Program is focusing on other challenges,
such as nontraditional agents. These are chemicals and
biochemicals reportedly researched or developed with potential
application or intent as chemical warfare agents but which do
not fall into the category of traditional chemical warfare
agents. I can assure this subcommittee we are developing
capabilities to counter this threat.
Critical to making required investments in biosurveillance
diagnostics, the DOD Medical Countermeasures Initiative and
nontraditional agent defense is finding efficiencies within the
current programs and operations. Pursuant to the Under
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics
directive for better buying power, we are integrating measures
to ensure all of our programs are affordable and provide a
positive on return on investment for the taxpayer.
This subcommittee understands we face a broad array of
threats within a changing and uncertain environment.
Accordingly, I urge support for funding the development of
improved chemical and biological defense capabilities as
outlined in the fiscal year 2012 DOD budget request.
On behalf of the men and women of the Chemical and
Biological Defense Program, I thank this subcommittee for the
opportunity to testify, and I look forward to our discussion.
[The prepared statement of General Scarbrough can be found
in the Appendix on page 90.]
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
And let me thank you all for your brevity in summarizing
what is an important and somewhat complex topic. Let me just
ask one question, and then I will turn it to Mr. Langevin.
When we talk with folks--and probably for you primarily,
Mr. Handelman--when we talk to folks about cybersecurity, they
tell us that the numbers and the sophistication of the threat
is growing at a very rapid rate, but our ability to deal with
the threat is not growing as fast. So the gap between the
problem and the solution is growing wider.
My question for you all is, how is the gap doing between
the proliferation in numbers and in sophistication of chemical,
biological, and nuclear weapons around the world, and our
nonproliferation and counterproliferation efforts to deal with
that? Is the gap growing bigger, or are we closing in on it?
Mr. Handelman. Mr. Chairman, it is an apt comparison. In
the cyber world, which actually, in another hat, I share some
responsibility for, one of the real intriguing challenges is
that it is almost completely dual-use. Among the WMD areas, the
three areas, nuclear, chem, and bio, bio is the one that is
mostly dual-use. In other words, it is not strictly military.
So, in terms of your construct of the gap, my own view is
that we are actually doing a little bit better in the bio area
than in the cyber area. Part of that is just because, even
though biological science is expanding, accessibility to it is
expanding rapidly, it is not expanding the way access to the
Internet and computer skills is expanding.
As a bonus item, I would say, just as a comment, that one
of the things that keeps me up at night that I have trouble
figuring out is the combination of threats across domains. In
other words, the unimagined, what I haven't been able to
imagine, combination of a bad guy who wants to somehow combine
a biothreat with a cyber attack.
Mr. Thornberry. Let me just ask, Mr. Myers, what is your
opinion? Is it getting worse? Are we closing in on it, or is it
getting further away from us?
Mr. Myers. Mr. Chairman, I will tell you. I go to work
every day with 2,000 people who dedicate themselves to
eliminating that threat. To date, we have been successful. As
you pointed out in your statement, and my colleagues have as
well, the threat is constantly evolving, and the challenge is
to stay ahead of it. To date, we are doing that.
I believe every successful encounter that we have with
states of the former Soviet Union, with our expansion into
places in Africa, Asia and elsewhere, every new technology we
develop, every new relationship that we create brings us closer
to a successful in-depth defense for the American people. But
it is a challenge every single day. To date, we have met that
challenge, and we will continue to do so.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, again thank you for your testimony.
If I could, Secretary Handelman, I would like to return to
an area that I mentioned in my opening statement, and the
chairman did as well, about the budget for fiscal year 2012. As
you know, the pending fiscal year 2011 defense budget contains
a significant increase in funding for our counterproliferation
efforts, especially for DTRA, but it is decreased in the fiscal
year 2012 proposed budget. I am sure you would agree that the
world is not likely to be significantly safer in fiscal year
2012 than in fiscal year 2011. And I would like you to explain
the Department's choice to lower the spending amounts for DTRA
and chem-bio protection efforts in fiscal year 2012.
Mr. Handelman. Sir, with respect to the DTRA budget, as you
may know, the budget request and the appropriated and
authorized amount was really flat for many years. The fiscal
year 2011 request was actually a significant ramp-up. The
fiscal year 2012 request reflects a hard balancing of
priorities across our whole department, decisions made at
levels above all of us.
I guess I am confident in the capability that that budget
request can deliver. I would characterize it as a moderate
ramp-down of what had been a previous ramping up. That is my
view from the strategy and policy level. Mr. Myers has to live
this every day as the director of the agency. He might want to
amplify.
Mr. Myers. Thank you.
We have taken a number of steps over the last 6 months to
make the agency as effective and efficient as we possibly can,
and we found a number of areas where we could combine
operations, lower our overhead, specifically in two to three
different areas. We have also gone and closed down two
facilities, offices that we had. One was in Dugway, Utah. The
other was supporting efforts at NATO [North Atlantic Treaty
Organization] SHAPE [Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers
Europe]. The efforts that they were supporting will continue
on, but we believe that we will be able to provide the same
amount of support and expertise from our headquarters at Fort
Belvoir than we were on site.
Lastly, we did a strong and very strict rack and stack of
all of our priorities, starting from the very top all the way
to the very bottom. And those items that were at the bottom--I
will give you one example, we have an in-house think tank that
is called ASCO [Advanced Systems and Concepts Office]. Its job
was to go out, do research, to find the latest thinking on
various subjects. And we have cut back significantly in that
arena. So savings from each of those three elements will allow
us to continue operations, even at a lower budget level.
General Scarbrough. Sir, if I could just add one comment as
well. From an acquisition and a programmatic standpoint, we
have been able to get some efficiencies by being joint. For
example, we now deliver one ground respirator, the Joint
Service General Purpose Mask, to all four services, the same
protective mask, on the ground side. That has reduced some of
our operations and support costs by being joint and delivering
a common solution. The same thing is with our Joint Chemical
Agent Detectors. We have been able to deliver one of those
detectors across all of the services, thereby presenting a
common solution which can then streamline some costs as we
maintain that in the operational force.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, gentlemen.
I have studied WMD issues and been involved with them for
many years now, whether it is in my role in the Homeland
Security Committee or in the Armed Services Committee or
Intelligence Committee. I clearly think that the threat in the
chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear threat fields
continues to increase. We know our enemies are dedicated and
determined. I am particularly concerned about the chem-bio and,
of that, probably the biological threats that we face because
of dual-use technologies, because of the knowledge that is out
there and how that can be proliferated. What is the Department
doing to ensure that it supports new and evolving technology,
especially in the chem-bio protection field, as well as
surveillance?
Secretary Weber. First, I would like to thank this
subcommittee's leadership in this area and your leadership and
Chairman Thornberry's leadership in this area.
Although the top line for the Chem-Bio Defense Program,
from our 2011 request to our 2012 request declined $52 million,
down from $1.578 billion, so about a 3.3 percent decline,
within that we were able to eliminate some poorly performing
programs and actually add two significant new programs in the
area of biodefense. We have put more emphasis within the CB
Defense Program on biodefense and, in particular, medical
biodefense, because that had been underinvested in over the
last decade.
So we are launching in the fiscal year 2012 request a
Medical Countermeasures Initiative that will leverage the rapid
growth in new technologies in the biotech sector for biodefense
purposes. And there are two sides to the advancement and spread
of biotechnology. One is that our adversaries like Al Qaeda and
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in their Inspire publication
just put out a call for microbiologists and chemists to help
develop weapons of mass destruction. So we are very concerned
about that.
But we have put more focus on leveraging cutting-edge
biotechnology to improve our biodefenses. And this is in
partnership with other departments like Health and Human
Services and Homeland Security. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Conaway.
Mr. Conaway. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for being here.
There were two big spending initiatives, for lack of a
better phrase. One that Secretary Gates said, let's find $100
billion across DOD and redeploy that in better, more effective
uses. The other is the $78 billion in, I guess, efficiency
initiatives. Collectively, were you involved at all in the
first initiative in which you were part of the $100 billion?
And, if so, how did you redeploy those assets? And then take a
couple seconds on each one of those, each of you.
Mr. Myers. Yes, sir.
The Defense Threat Reduction Agency was certainly a part of
that process. And as I was explaining earlier, we really took
three steps. We looked at all of the programs that we were
running, and we tried to identify, where can we combine those
efforts to become more efficient, provide a more integrated
product for our customers? Where can we combine the leadership
and support functions for these efforts? Secondly, we took a
very long look across. We have a number of facilities----
Mr. Conaway. Excuse me. I understand that piece. Help me
out, where did you put the money? Or were you able to use the
money that you found in efficiencies under that $100 billion
umbrella, were you able to redeploy that somewhere else for
more effective use, or that went to a pie somewhere else?
Mr. Myers. No, sir. That was returned to the Secretary.
Mr. Conaway. So that was collectively a loss; you just had
to come up with things that were less priorities than others,
and then that money went somewhere else?
Mr. Myers. Yes, sir.
Mr. Conaway. Then you had to come back and find $78
billion, your share of that. Help me understand the difference
between the two. I can understand the motivation for, if I get
to spend it somewhere else, the motivation to find something
and then redeploy that. That is a different motivation than I
am just going to cut. So it appears that the $178 billion was
asked of you just to cut and give those dollars to the
Secretary and/or taxpayers. How did you distinguish between the
two? Or is it just another layer further up your priority chain
off your bottom stack that you had to go to get your part of
the $78 billion?
Mr. Myers. The approach we took, sir, was really across the
board in terms of identifying just each and every single thing
we do, how can we do it more effectively, more efficiently? So
while they were separate efforts, we didn't really distinguish
between them. We really saw that as an effort that had to be
undertaken because of, obviously, the economic situation that
we are facing. And we are not done there. We are continuing to
look for more ways to do more with fewer funds. And it is
across the board.
So, sir, I don't believe--we didn't look at it that way. We
didn't look at it as two separate things. We looked at it as an
overall across-the-board process that we are not done yet.
Mr. Conaway. Okay.
Others want to enlighten us as to how that might have
worked?
Mr. Handelman. Sir, the organization I work in is OSD
[Office of the Secretary of Defense] policy, so, frankly, we
don't own a whole lot of money. Just in terms of looking across
the whole Department and reflecting on the mission space that
is represented here, I have to tell you, I think that the
importance of the countering-WMD mission area to the Department
was reflected in the fact that, by and large, if you could add
up everything across the entire mission space, which actually
is very difficult--it depends on how you define countering-
WMD--there actually weren't massive reductions. I think Mr.
Weber reflected 3.3 percent----
Mr. Conaway. Let me ask you a different way, because I am a
little frustrated here. The $100 billion, you sent that money
to the Secretary. Did he send any of it back across your
spectrum?
Secretary Weber. Within the Chemical and Biological Defense
Program, the efficiencies that we identified were reinvested
back into the CB Defense Program. So the answer is yes. And for
the services, that was especially true. In terms of the big
picture, they were able to reinvest their efficiencies in
priority procurement areas for the warfighter.
But the point I would like to emphasize is that the
President's fiscal year 2012 budget request to Congress from
this program represented today already includes a significant
amount of belt tightening in it. And we would ask that you
fully support the request. Now, for the fiscal year 2011
request, which it is unfortunate that after 10 years of
flatlining, especially for the Defense Threat Reduction Agency,
we had succeeded in putting an 18 percent increase into the
fiscal year 2011 request, but the effect of the continuing
resolution is that we are actually operating significantly
below the fiscal year 2011 request because fiscal year 2010 was
so much lower.
Mr. Conaway. We share your frustration operating under a CR
for Department of Defense-wide. We understand what a wreck that
is. Any help you can give us with the good folks on the other
end of the building would be helpful. I yield back.
Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentleman.
Mrs. Davis.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all for
being here.
I think, Mr. Myers, you spoke of one of the strategic
goals, the whole of DTRA approach. And we kind of throw around
whole-of-government approaches a lot, too, and I think from
many of our efforts, it is easier said than done. So could you
tell me, where do you see some of the blocks in that? And it is
not so much funding, right? It is more culture? Or what is it
that you see, and how do you really see that making a
difference?
I know that you have spoken of the jointness, and that is
an important part of this, I think. But could you speak a
little bit more to that and how we ought to be thinking and
framing that?
Mr. Myers. Certainly. Thank you.
When I was speaking of the whole of DTRA approach, I
mentioned also that we are a pretty unique organization. We
have a full 24/7, 365-days-a-year operation, capability, that
we run, as well as research and development. So we really have
two parallel processes. And my main goal at DTRA is to make
sure that the research and development is fully supporting the
operations and vice versa. We must work as one, as one entity,
one unit, because we are the WMD.
Mrs. Davis. Where is the biggest disconnect in that?
Mr. Myers. I don't believe I could say or identify one
specific thing. But let me give you a potential example. Arms
control inspections: The operational side of DTRA does the
inspections, and we also host the inspectors that are doing
inspections. On our research and development side, we are
developing the technologies to verify arms control commitments.
We must make sure that the equipment that we are producing in
our research and development side fits the needs and the
constraints and the conditions that our inspectors are going to
have to operate in. So we need to make sure that the equipment
is rugged; it can move long distances and be strapped to
somebody's back; come off on site and work exactly as
advertised. So we need to make sure that those things are all
working together as one with one common picture. And we have
made a lot of progress in that area.
On the whole of government, I would say to you that we have
worked extremely hard on that, specifically with our friends at
the NNSA [National Nuclear Security Administration], the
Department of Energy. The three of us just participated in what
we call the bridge meeting. It is DTRA, policy, NCB [Nuclear,
Chemical, and Biological Defense Programs] and NNSA all sitting
down identifying where we are working in similar areas and
fully coordinating, making sure there aren't gaps, making sure
there aren't overlaps, making sure that the communication is
there. Not only at the strategic level, if you will, but at the
action officer level, that the contracts that we are letting in
certain areas are meeting it, not overlapping and not leaving
gaps.
Similarly, a couple of months back, Mr. Handelman and I
spent an afternoon at the Department of State making sure that
our biological engagement efforts were completely in synch,
completely synchronized with the work that the Department of
State and HHS do in those areas.
I think those would probably be the best examples I could
give you.
Mrs. Davis. Mr. Weber.
Secretary Weber. If I could please just add to that.
Countering weapons of mass destruction by its very nature is a
cross-cutting issue, interagency and globally. So this presents
a challenge within the Department, within the U.S. Government.
Also, within the Congress, there are so many committees that
have jurisdiction in this area, as Ranking Member Langevin
mentioned the Homeland Security piece. And so leadership from
us within the Department, from your subcommittee and committee
is critically important. And I will just give one little
example.
Mrs. Davis. And we know we don't make it easy.
Secretary Weber. Well, we really need to work together on
this, and we are committed to working with you on this. But
just one example, biosurveillance: There is a very small
program that the Centers for Disease Control executes called
the Global Disease Detection and Response Program. It is
critical to our national security. But because it is over in
CDC [the Centers for Disease Control], it gets very little
funding. These are the types of cross-cutting issues.
But I will say that although it is difficult, under this
administration--and I have served in public service for 26
years--I have never seen better leadership from the WMD
coordinator's office, from the counterterrorism coordinator's
office, and interagency cooperation. We have an excellent team
that works across agencies, whether it be at the Department of
Homeland Security, Department of Health and Human Services, or
the Department of Energy or State.
Mrs. Davis. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Mr. Franks.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman.
And thank all of you gentlemen for being here. I appreciate
you keeping watch on behalf of all of us.
Secretary Weber, I wanted to address my first question to
you. I know that many have already expressed a concern about
the aftermath of a chemical or biological or radiological
attack, and I share that concern. But it occurs to me for many
reasons that with the terrorist threat, it seems to me that the
nuclear threat is one that they would most like to affect if
they could, something about the psychology of it I am afraid.
With that in mind, I am concerned about the potential, sort
of the ultimate asymmetric weapon that they might use if they
had one warhead and some ability to put it above our country
and launch an EMP [electromagnetic pulse] attack on our
country. And I know that that is something that has grown to be
more and more aware on the part of many of us.
But I guess I would like to know, in light of the potential
of an EMP attack leaving us with a severely damaged grid and
without electrical power for an extended period of time, what
is the strategy to redress a scenario of Americans without
power for an extended period of time?
Secretary Weber. Well, preventing terrorist use of an
improvised nuclear device is our number one priority. The
hardening against EMP attacks is also a priority for the
Department of Defense and other areas. And we work with
leadership from DTRA in hardening. This year we did testing at
Pax River, EMP testing on the E4B aircraft, and in the coming
year we will be testing the B2 aircraft. So we have significant
expertise in this area.
And although the domestic power grid is not the primary
responsibility of the Department of Defense, we are lending our
expertise in this area to the Department of Homeland Security.
And I would ask my colleague Ken Myers how DTRA contributes to
this effort.
Mr. Myers. Thank you.
DTRA is the technical lead within DOD for the EMP
challenge. We are involved in technology development, technical
assessments, technical assistance, and we develop the standards
by which we judge our ability to withstand an EMP attack or
situation.
As Mr. Weber said, we are not the lead, but we have
provided specific technical assistance to our interagency
partners on exactly the type of threat that you have identified
there.
We continue to work, again, as an interagency process,
bringing those skill sets that we have to bear to the EMP
threat on specifically the grid, as you mentioned.
Mr. Franks. Well, thank you, Mr. Myers.
I am hoping that perhaps you might take a look at the
Shield Act designed to ameliorate the danger of an EMP attack
or, for that matter, a geomagnetic storm, which is certainly an
inevitable reality at some point. But for the purposes of this
committee, the EMP application is the most significant.
I have sponsored that bill and a number of members of this
committee are cosponsoring it. We would love to have your input
on it because it is something that, from my perspective, it
represents a real opportunity for terrorists to do us a
catastrophic harm. And it is one of those things that is
difficult sometimes to articulate without seeming to employ
hyperbole, but it is, as you know, a very real threat, and it
is something that I am afraid that there is still a fundamental
lack of awareness of, and I am hoping that you folks will keep
an eye on it. I would love to have your response on the Shield
Act.
[The information referred to can be found in the Appendix
on page 103.]
Mr. Franks. And with that, Mr. Chairman, I am going to I
yield back. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Mr. Johnson.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
It pains me that during our consideration of the 2011
budget, Congress degenerated into the politics of ``just say
no.'' And as a result, or as one of the results, DTRA's budget,
which had been upped 18 percent, with good reason, ended up
remaining at 2010 levels. So it didn't get the bump that was
justified, apparently, and now, due to political realities, a
movement to reduce the 2011 proposed level of funding downward.
This comes at a time when the detonation of a nuclear device or
the release of a chemical or biological agent on American soil
coupled with a coordinated cyber attack, it could have--it
just, the consequences are unimaginable. And that threat is
certainly a foreseeable event.
And this is a clear example of politics putting the people
of the Nation at risk, and we are further hurting ourselves by
funding the government in 2-week increments. And we just
cannot, as much as this committee is bipartisan, we cannot fail
to look at the results of our overall political strategies in
this country, which have gotten into just which party is going
to be in control as opposed to what is best for this Nation.
Mr. Myers, I think our annual budget or your annual budget
is about worth 1 week of fighting in the war in Afghanistan.
And I have heard you say that you have refigured your
operations; your think tank you dismantled? Is that basic
research? How do you compensate for the dismantling of your
think tank? And also, I would like to know if the likelihood of
a state or nonstate actor could detonate a nuclear device or a
chemical or biological event on U.S. soil? Is the likelihood of
that lower or higher than it was 10 years ago?
Mr. Myers. Thank you, sir.
On the first step, when we were talking about ASCO, ASCO
did not do basic research. That was done at our research and
development enterprise at the agency. ASCO was responsible for
funding think tank research and efforts such as that,
multilateral dialogues and things such as that. Those efforts
will continue. The funding stream will still be there. The
infrastructure that surrounded it will be cut back, and we--I
guess, as I said, we have reprioritized those billets to our
highest priorities. So for the foreseeable future, those
efforts will continue. But we have been able to do them in a
much more efficient and a much more effective manner.
Secondly, with regard to your second question, from my
perspective, the number one threat, the threat that, as we
always say, keeps us up at night is the intersection of the
weapons and the materials and the know-how of mass destruction
and terrorist groups. That is an extremely daunting task, both
in terms of detecting, interdicting, stopping as well as
deterring. So I would answer the question that way.
Mr. Johnson. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry. I thank the gentleman.
Mr. Gibson.
Mr. Gibson. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
And I appreciate the panel being with us today, and I am
learning from your testimony. Thank you very much.
I would like to follow up on some of the points that Mrs.
Davis I think was bringing to the fore, concerns I have with
regard to our whole-of-government approach and particularly how
we streamline command-and-control work requirements and field
those requirements.
So why don't we begin with General Scarbrough. And I am
interested to know both in terms of your agency, and then if
you could comment on across the spectrum of how we defend
ourselves from chemical and biological agents, the
interactivity and command-and-control relationship between your
organization, the Department of Defense, the Department of
Homeland Security, the Northern Command. And as you are working
in your response, I am interested in particularly, who
identifies requirements, and how do you prioritize those
requirements? And then if you could speak to RAID [Rapid
Assessment and Initial Detection] teams, the RAID teams at the
state level in terms of their command and control, state
adjutant generals, State Department of Homeland Security,
Federal Department of Homeland Security, and Department of
Defense.
General Scarbrough. Yes, sir. Thank you very much. I
appreciate the opportunity to address those questions.
First, with respect to interagency coordination
strategically, my particular organization and the Chem-Bio
Defense Program work very closely with the Department of
Homeland Security in the area of BioWatch and biomonitoring.
This is an entity that the Department of Homeland Security has
put in a command and controlled aspect that they have put in 30
major urban areas.
Mr. Gibson. Can you operationally define ``work closely''?
I mean, you have working groups? Is there like a battle rhythm
that you go through? What do you mean by that?
General Scarbrough. Yes, sir. We do have working groups,
and we also have interagency agreements that define roles and
responsibilities of how we move forward.
At the same time, we take some of those particular areas
that the BioWatch program is doing and we put it on some of our
major installations, and those installations are obviously
prioritized by the threat. Case in point, Andrews Air Force
Base is one; some of the other installations in some major
urban areas.
With respect to Department of Health and Human Services, we
work very closely with them, as I have a medical countermeasure
portfolio, and I deliver or I bring certain vaccines, like
anthrax and smallpox, to FDA [the Food and Drug Administration]
approval. At the same time, we work with DHHS as they manage
the Strategic National Stockpile. So the services draw on that
capability based on the needs that they have and the
requirements that they have wherever they go throughout the
entire world.
With respect to requirements. With respect to requirements,
we work very closely with the Joint Staff. They identify, with
the services, the gaps and the requirements. They also take
into account what Mr. Weber was talking about, national
priorities. But at the same time, they look at their--each
service--particular areas that they would like for us to
deliver to them based on their mission sets.
With respect to command and control, I would offer one of
the things that I am trying to do within my particular
organization and within the CBDP [Chemical and Biological
Defense Programs] portfolio and have been working very closely
with Mr. Myers and DTRA on this, is to develop an integrated
holistic solution set for the warfighter. Basically, in the
area of biosurveillance, I have multiple programs that I
deliver that meet that particular integrated concept in the
area of detection, in the areas of diagnostics, and in the
areas of information management. What we want to do is we want
to bring those all together, deliver that to the warfighter, so
the commander can make measured responses quickly in any type
of WMD incident.
Mr. Gibson. In terms of fielding the joint alarm, do you
get requests for fielding from the Department of Homeland
Security for some of their subordinate organizations?
General Scarbrough. Sir, we work very closely with the
Department of Homeland Security, and we would trade. But, for
example, I would deliver capability to the National Guard, and
then the National Guard has a role that they work very closely
with NORTHCOM [United States Northern Command] in the area of
consequence management. So some of my capabilities, I would say
a lot of my capabilities are dual-use, both for the warfighter
but yet at the same time can help the National Guard and be
defense in depth to the first responders under the homeland
defense with NORTHCOM.
Mr. Gibson. Well, thank you very much. I had further
interest, but I think in the interest of yielding back here, I
will just say that the whole-of-government approach and who is
in charge and how the Department of Defense works with the
Department of Homeland Security and all the subordinate
agencies is something of concern to me, and I look to explore
that in future opportunities.
Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
It is of interest to me as well.
Ms. Castor.
Mrs. Castor. Thank you much.
And welcome, gentlemen. I wanted to start by complimenting
the Obama administration and all of you and everyone on your
team for the progress made over the past year on
nonproliferation, and I look forward to fruits from your
further efforts as well.
I am interested in some of the biodefense detection and
diagnostic tools that you have, particularly the Joint
Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System. Can you
discuss the research and development and acquisition? You say
you have 300 in various locations. I have seen some research
devices back home in Florida that may be similar on detection
of disease and diagnostics. But are these efforts, are most of
the efforts coming from the private sector? Or are you all in
the lead, or are you giving direction?
Then with the FDA approvals on some of the things you are
doing, I know that the underfunding of that review process is a
problem for the private sector. Does that hamper what you all
want to accomplish?
And then, could you also highlight to some of the next-
generation detection and diagnostic tools that you are working
on?
General Scarbrough. Yes, ma'am. Thank you.
The first one, when we talk about diagnostics, the Joint
Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System was a
requirement that was levied onto us by the services so they can
increase their diagnostics and surveillance activities globally
throughout the world.
I work very closely on the science and technology and the
research development side with Mr. Myers and his office,
because they do the joint science and technology for the
Chemical and Biological Defense Program. At the same time, what
we are doing with the diagnostics program is that we have FDA-
approved assays in there that can detect plague, tularemia,
avian flu. At the same time, we have 70 prepositioned
emergency-use authorizations for multiple influenza or bio-
incidents that could be dropped immediately within the FDA in
case we have a national emergency. We have to get those
licensed by the FDA.
On the next-generation diagnostics, what we are looking
there is providing a capability on the back end that can tie
into an information management system. JBAIDS [the Joint
Biological Agent Identification and Diagnostic System] kind of
stands on its own; that program stands on its own. But what we
would like to do is now tie it into an information management
system so we can get into command and control and things of
that nature.
Mrs. Castor. Do the rest have another brief answer? Because
I want to try to get one more question.
Secretary Weber. I would just add quickly that time is
everything in biodefense. So to the extent that we can improve
our early warning and detection capabilities and have rapid
accurate diagnostics, and then if we detect an event, delivery
of medical products quickly, we will save lives. So it is an
area we are going to be putting a lot of increased investments
into.
Mrs. Castor. Let me ask one other quick question.
Director Myers, do the current events in the Middle East,
have they informed anything new in what you are doing? Has
CENTCOM [United States Central Command] given you additional
requests for support?
Mr. Myers. We provide support to the combatant commands on
a constant continual basis. As I laid out in my opening
statement, in terms of the reach-back, it is almost a
continuous conversation and sharing of information and
expertise. We do have significant subject-matter expertise that
they reach back to us to identify in terms of how to plan, how
to prioritize and the like. And that is all ongoing and
continual. That is probably as far as I would like to go in
this forum.
Mrs. Castor. Thank you.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Mr. West.
Mr. West. Well, thank you, Mr. Chairman, Mr. Ranking
Member.
Of course, one of the great things having a name that
starts with a W, you are always last. But it really is an honor
to be here with each and every one of you today. And 3 weeks
ago I had the opportunity to go down and have a nice visit with
U.S. SOUTHCOM [United States Southern Command], and then also I
had an office call with the CGF [Commander Ground Forces]
SOUTHCOM and CGF NORTHCOM. Very concerned, because we know that
in the SOUTHCOM AOR [Area of Responsibility], Hezbollah has a
footprint; Iran has a footprint as well. And some of the recent
developments that we have seen coming out of there, these mini
submersibles. I believe one was recently discovered in the last
3 or so weeks. Very hard to detect. And then also, of course,
we have a very porous border down South. And if you go to the
Border Patrol Web site, you have a category called OTMs. OTM
stands for ``other than Mexicans,'' and I think you know where
we are going with this.
I just want to know, how is the agency working with
SOUTHCOM and NORTHCOM? Because I really believe we have a soft
underbelly. Right now it could be drugs coming up in these mini
submersibles, but the next thing you know, we have some of
these nontraditional agents or some other type of weapons of
mass destruction. So what are your resources that you have down
there to cover that SOUTHCOM AOR and then, of course, as it
transitions to NORTHCOM and into the continental United States?
Thank you.
Mr. Myers. Thank you, sir.
Our support to SOUTHCOM is robust. We have a number of what
we call LNOs [Liaison Officers] that are based at SOUTHCOM to
facilitate the coordination and communication. We do work with
them on a number of different fronts. One of the areas that is
getting a lot of attention is proliferation prevention, as you
point out. You know, whether it is a counternarcotic issue or
whether it is a counterproliferation issue, whether it is a
human-trafficking issue, very often the technologies that are
used for one have applicability to all. So we are again trying
to maximize the leverage we have on all the different efforts
that are under way.
In our research and development programs, we also spend an
awful lot of time working with our interagency partners on
detecting tunnels, just as we do in terms of hard deeply buried
targets. Obviously, slightly different skill sets are brought
to bear on each. But it is something that we are working on. It
is something that we communicate and we collaborate and we
share lessons learned, experience and expertise. And perhaps
most importantly, we share the products. If our research and
development organization develops a tool that works for
counter-WMD, we want to share it across the board to get the
maximum impact from that taxpayer investment. And to date, we
are doing that today with a number of technologies and look
forward to continuing.
Secretary Weber. If I could please just briefly add to
that. These are all global problems, and we have to work with
our international partners, because the weakest link is the one
that is going to come back to bite us. So we are increasing
cooperation with all of the geographic combatant commands to
build partner capacity for countering weapons of mass
destruction. And this is a little bit of a different focus. It
is not always military forces that are the leads in these
governments, as we know from counterterrorism and counterdrug.
So this is an area where we are increasing our investment.
But I think it is vitally important that we work around the
world to build capacities to prevent and prepare for and
respond to countering potential weapons of mass destruction.
General Scarbrough. Sir, if I could just add one other
note. Important to all this tactically and programmatically is
to get feedback from the field. So we have a joint acquisition
chemical and biological, radiological, nuclear knowledge
management system that allows soldiers to give us immediate
feedback on their capabilities as they support the COCOMS
[combatant commanders].
This is an invaluable tool, as you can imagine, because the
bottom line is we want to make sure we are giving them good
equipment that is effective and combat-ready. And at the same
time, tactically, I do do and conduct joint quarterly equipment
readiness reviews, where the services as well as the enterprise
come in and we talk about some of their issues as we work
together as a team.
Mr. West. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I yield back.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you.
Let me--I don't know to whom to direct this, so whoever
makes it. My impression is that there is not a uniform
definition across the U.S. Government on WMD. I was thinking
about it a while ago, Mr. Langevin's question. He mentioned
radiological, but often that is not included with what one
hears.
And I guess my question is, does it matter that there is
not a uniform definition of what is included in a weapon of
mass destruction? And in your all's work day to day, does that
create impediments? Should there be some standardization, and
should radiological weapons be included in it?
Mr. Handelman. Sir, perhaps I will take the first stab. I
think your observation is trenchant. But when I look at what we
do on a day-to-day basis, I can't recall an instance or some
situation where the admitted flexibility of the definition has
been an impediment to our work. I think, to some extent, this
is like obscenity. You know, when we are dealing with uranium
of a certain level of enrichment or a certain type of pathogen,
we know how to prioritize it. The radiological threat I think
is certainly different than a full-up nuclear weapon. But it is
certainly within the broad ambit of what we work on and what we
think about it. Because one might look at an RDD [radiological
dispersal device] as not your stereotypical WMD, it doesn't
mean that it is not part of our planning or our thinking. I am
not sure if my colleagues would want to amplify.
Mr. Myers. The definition of weapons of mass destruction in
a lot of ways are defined by some of the international
agreements that we are a party to. You know, one of the
examples that comes to mind is the Chemical Weapons Convention,
and in the Chemical Weapons Convention, you have a number of
different schedules: Schedule I being an actual weapon;
Schedule II being a direct precursor; Schedule III perhaps
being a more distant precursor.
And as Mr. Handelman was saying, identifying where the
threat stops or where it begins is often difficult. And that is
why, specifically in the nuclear and radiological area, the
communication in terms of the types of expertise different
departments and agencies bring to bear on this threat is
critically important. Obviously, most of our work, most of the
work that the Defense Threat Reduction Agency has done in the
past has really been weapons-focused. I mean, implementation of
arms control agreements and things such as that. Our colleagues
at the NNSA have an awful lot of experience in the nuclear
materials and the radiological sources and things such as that.
But from our perspective, we really look at WMD as chemical,
biological, radiological, and nuclear. And we--I think that is
a pretty common understanding if it is not specifically written
down in law.
Mr. Thornberry. And we are preparing for a radiological
weapon just as we prepare for a chemical or biological weapon?
Mr. Myers. Yes, sir. In fact, there are a number of
programs that our partners at the NNSA run specifically are
focused on identifying radiological threats and sources and
materials, and collecting those up and bringing them back into
safekeeping. We have a role as well.
Mr. Thornberry. And I presume also consequence management,
which is going to be a completely different sort of thing than
chem-bio.
Let me turn, if I could, to the Medical Countermeasures
Initiative. I am interested in exactly what gap this initiative
is designed to fill and how it differs from other activities,
both within this Department and other departments. And let me
give you just a little bit of background.
GAO [the Government Accountability Office] came out with a
report recently that said the Federal Government lacks
strategic oversight mechanisms and international and
interagency efforts in the area of biodefense and
biosurveillance; that our efforts are fragmented; and some of
these programs were in its report about duplicative programs
that got so much attention a week or two ago. So, on one hand,
you have got GAO saying we are scattered all over the place.
Then you all come and propose a new program in that very area.
So I need some help in bringing this together, if you please.
Secretary Weber. Let me start answering that. The H1N1
pandemic, it exposed a national gap, a vulnerability. It took
us 8 months to deliver a vaccine to our public. You may recall
the long lines. And so we need and the President has really
taken a lead on this and been personally involved in building a
concerted national approach to creating a capability for agile,
flexible development, enhanced development, and manufacturing
of medical countermeasures. And the Department of Defense has
to contribute to that, because whether it is a member of our
Armed Forces in the field deployed or whether it is a citizen
on the street, the same FDA-approved medical countermeasures
are required to save lives in the event of a bio-attack.
The GAO report I believe is in a little bit of a time warp
because last year, Secretary of Health and Human Services
Sebelius led a review of the medical countermeasures
enterprise. And as DOD, we participate in the biodefense
countermeasures enterprise, and we were part of that review.
The report itself had some recommendations, and with strong
leadership from the White House, we are implementing those
recommendations.
In terms of the gaps that it is meant to address, there are
infectious diseases for which we have no vaccines or effective
antimicrobial drugs or antiviral drugs. So we need to fill
those gaps. Again, whether it is in Northeast Asia or here in
the homeland, we can't afford to have it take 15 years to
develop a vaccine against a particular drug.
DOD is also very, and has been since the late 1990s, very
concerned about the potential for bio-engineered threats, and
that is why we are exploring some of these platform
technologies that could be multi-use against the unknown threat
that would give us an ability to quickly characterize a
pathogen and then develop a countermeasure once we have been
able to characterize that.
And then a specific example I will cite is during the H1N1
pandemic, we did a live-fire exercise with an antiviral
capability that we had developed through our Transformational
Medical Technologies Initiative. We obtained a sample of the
H1N1 strain, and within 14 days, we were able to produce a new
antiviral drug targeted at that particular strain. And then we
conducted testing in ferrets, and it had better efficacy than
Tamiflu, and that particular effort has now resulted in an IND
[Investigational New Drug] drug candidate that General
Scarbrough through his program is pursuing advanced development
of.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, I think I want to learn more about
it. I am concerned that too many medical issues have been put
over on DOD, largely as a result of Congress. And I do
appreciate the fact that it is not easy to draw a line between
what sort of infectious disease scenario could be a matter for
the Department of Defense and what should be CDC, Department of
Health and Human Services, and others. I just, again, want to
understand the issue about duplication and coordination, which
you may well be right, the administration may be ahead of GAO,
but also the proper role of DOD in doing certain things in the
medical area. Because I think, my own view is that it has
shifted probably outside of scope.
Mr. Weber, let me stick with you and ask another question.
In the 2010 Defense Authorization Act, the House report
proposed disestablishing the Counterproliferation Program
Review Committee, and I believe the Department of Defense was
okay with that. Now, it got dropped in conference, so it did
not make it into law. But I still think it is worth asking,
what are they doing now? And how, in the various
reorganizations, have other entities taken over some of that
coordinating function?
Secretary Weber. Well, since the requirement was not
dropped, we will deliver a report to you in May of this year.
And based on some of the GAO comments, we hope it will be a
more useful and effective report in that it will not just track
the budget request but also the actual appropriations and
expenditures.
The leadership has really changed with the filling of the
position of a WMD coordinator at the White House. Gary Samore
and his team have done an excellent job, and also, on the
homeland security side, under John Brennan's leadership, of
coordinating these efforts. And I think that is something that
didn't happen as effectively before that position was
established and filled.
So the CPRC [Counterproliferation Program Review Committee]
is a useful venue. In fact, it is meeting this afternoon at the
Pentagon, and we have representatives from the Department of
Energy, State, Homeland Security, and the Office of the
Director of National Intelligence and others participating in
that. So it is useful, and we hope to make the report this year
more useful. And we hope to use it to better align our
resources and investments against gaps.
Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Langevin.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
For the panel, the last question that I have, in the range
of threats that we face from nuclear, radiological, chemical,
or biological, obviously the consequences of such an attack
would be devastating. Worst-case scenario likely is that of a
detonation of a nuclear device. Results would be, obviously,
the damage would be catastrophic and loss of life. But not to
be overlooked and perhaps almost, if not equally, devastating
would be that of a chemical or biological attack. The thing
that concerns me the most is a biological attack. With nuclear,
Mother Nature didn't make it easy to make highly-enriched
uranium or weapons-grade plutonium, and in many cases, it is
very difficult for terrorists to get their hands on it. If they
stole it, at this point, it would take a nation-state to make
the nuclear fuel. But that is not like the chemical or
biological weapons. And the thing that bothers me the most, of
course, is if they can develop a biological weapon and they can
disburse it, they can do it again and again and again.
My question is, particularly on anthrax, which is a highly
likely biological agent that they would--terrorists would
develop and use, how close are we to developing the next-
generation effective antidote for an anthrax attack and
biological agent? And also, tell me about where we are in terms
of surveillance. Right now, our surveillance capabilities are
really lacking in many ways, very human dependent, human
interactive. It requires a few days before we actually test and
then do the analysis and get the results of the biological
tests. What we really need is real-time surveillance. How close
are we to having a real-time nonhuman interactive surveillance
system deployed?
Mr. Handelman. Let me take a crack briefly at the second
part of your question, the surveillance piece. And I will focus
on one aspect of it.
To have the surveillance system of ultimate elegance, we
are some time off. But I think we are a lot further ahead in
our efforts than we were just a few years ago to sort of move
that surveillance system farther away from our borders, to move
our defensive perimeter as far out as we can. We are starting
to build new relationships in Africa. We just did a trip with
Senator Lugar to establish some cooperative relationships in
some of those countries last fall, and we will be looking to
build similar relationships in Southeast Asia soon, I hope.
There is a long way to go, and it is labor-intensive.
Let me turn to my other colleagues on the antidote piece.
Secretary Weber. Secretary Danzig has written on this
reload problem that you described, because an improvised
nuclear device would probably be a one-time event because of
the finite supply of fissile materiel. But with bio, it is
different. There could be a capability, if you can launch one
attack, that you could launch multiple attacks.
We have looked at some of the historical examples of
biological attacks. One in particular, the Aum Shinrikyo, is
well known for its attack with sarin gas on the Tokyo metro,
but they also launched two attacks using anthrax. And the only
reason those two attacks failed was because they had not
acquired the correct virulent strain of anthrax. So that tells
me that we need to focus and continue to focus more efforts on
keeping virulent strains of Bacillus anthracis out of the hands
of terrorist groups. And we are doing that globally through the
Nunn-Lugar program, by consolidating and securing pathogen
collections around the world.
And as my colleague mentioned, we traveled, the three of
us, with Senator Lugar to east Africa this last fall and saw
for ourselves anthrax being stored in a regular veterinary
laboratory with hardly any security. So that nexus between
terrorism and the materials is of great concern to us.
On your point about biosurveillance and just preparedness
for such attacks, time really is everything. And whether it is
detection to know that an attack has occurred, if you don't
know about it until people are symptomatic and start showing up
in hospitals, your ability to treat has significantly declined.
We are better positioned with antibiotics in our National
Stockpile, and of course, the force is vaccinated against
anthrax. But we need to do everything we can to reduce the
times to use our environmental and medical diagnostics, to
quickly and accurately become aware of an attack and get early
warning, but also in the event of an attack, to deliver medical
countermeasures in time to save lives because it really is the
case where hours matter. And with DARPA [the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency] and some of the efforts in the Chem-
Bio Defense S&T program, we are going to be investing in
presymptomatic diagnostics that will allow us to know even
before somebody is showing symptoms that they have been exposed
to a dangerous agent like anthrax.
Mr. Langevin. I guess my question, though, is on airborne
surveillance systems that we have take days right now between
the time something is detected and tested. That is too long for
to administer prophylactic antibiotics. You have to get it into
someone within the first 24 to 48 hours. Or by the time people
start showing symptoms, it is too late. So what I want to know
is, how close are we to having that real-time airborne
biosurveillance system in place?
Secretary Weber. In terms of the domestic capability and I
believe in 30 of our urban areas, the BioWatch program of the
Department of Homeland Security is developing its next
generation that will have automated detection capability. Right
now, the air samplers have to be taken back to a laboratory for
analysis, and clearly, we can't afford to lose that time. But I
understand they are fairly close to achieving a capability to
have that real-time surveillance.
But I also want to emphasize the domestic biosurveillance
is extremely important, but so is global biosurveillance. And
the Department of Defense has a network of overseas
laboratories around the world that help us provide an early
warning system on a global basis, including in countries where
some of these rare diseases are endemic. And so we have to look
at it in terms of protecting our own urban areas, but also, it
has to be a global approach to be effective, given how quickly
an H1N1, whether it was mild form of the virus, it showed how
quickly these self-spreading contagious diseases can move
around the world.
Secretary Weber. If Mexico had had a bio-surveillance
system, perhaps H1N1 could have been isolated and contained
within that part of Mexico where it originated.
Mr. Langevin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thornberry. Mr. Myers, it has been brought up several
times, the budget ups and downs with your organization. I want
to understand what--there was a substantial increase in the
request last year. This committee authorized that. It has not
been appropriated. What would you have done or would you do
with that extra money that you are not doing now with a
flatline 2010 level?
Mr. Myers. A number of things.
First of all, during the preceding decade, as Mr. Handelman
explained, we faced a flatline budget. We took on a number of
different additional mission areas, and we went ahead and
funded that from within, so we did not receive additional funds
to take on those new mission areas. And, as a result, we had to
make some very, very difficult decisions. Some of that is in
terms of our infrastructure, information technology
capabilities, and the like. So the fiscal year '11 request
helps us fix some of those problems that we incurred.
In addition to that, the fiscal year '11 request gave us
some specific capabilities to move out with strong support for
the combat and the commanders, specifically, our ability to
help detect nuclear radiological threats.
In addition, specific efforts, we have talked a lot about
the lines of defense, moving them as far forward as possible.
The fiscal year '11 budget request included specific increases
in our engagement and biological threats in Africa and Asia and
elsewhere, as well as the Nunn-Lugar program's role in the
global nuclear lock-down effort, our efforts to eliminate
potential threats by securing and making them more safe.
I would say, on a macro level, that 17\1/2\ percent, in
terms of making sure that we have the tools to serve the
warfighter, what it really did was it looked at each line of
defense that we have erected between the threat and the
American people and made substantial improvements to each one.
I would be happy to share some of the details of that with the
subcommittee, but just in terms of the overall view, at the
source was a large part of it.
Detection was another large part of it. Interdiction, it
significantly increased the special relationship we have with
Special Operations Command and the tools that we work with them
on.
And also, quite frankly, it helped us develop the
consequence management, the forensic tools. If we are able, as
Mr. Weber said, in terms of identifying the threat before it
happens--unfortunately, if an event were to occur, the quicker
we are able to identify where that threat came from and who was
responsible, the quicker we are able to respond. And if we are
able to do that with a high level of effectiveness, we will be
able to deter perhaps some of those who would otherwise attack.
So, again, that request was across the board, sir.
Mr. Thornberry. Okay. Well, I think we will obviously need
to be in touch once we see what happens finally with fiscal
year '11, to analyze then your request for fiscal year '12 to
see how it is changed. And it is a very difficult situation for
everybody to be in, there is no question. And so we want to
look at that again.
Let me ask you one other thing. You talked earlier about
your R&D efforts. Talk to me just a little bit, if you would,
about how you coordinate that with lots of other R&D efforts.
We had a whole hearing with all the services S&T folks and
DARPA recently where that was a major thing we talked about, is
how do you coordinate all of this, and so you are another
player in that R&D arena.
Mr. Myers. Yes, sir. Thank you.
The participants in the hearing you referenced we work very
closely with, Assistant Secretary Lemnios, research and
engineering, as well as Regina Dugan, the director of DARPA.
They are very close relationships.
Mr. Lemnios provides us with the guidance in terms of
apportioning our resources in terms of basic research, where to
really focus a lot of our efforts. We coordinate very closely
with DARPA to ensure that we are working in similar lanes, if
you will, in terms of towards common goals, but that we each
have a role to play. I work with her quite a bit, and it is a
good working relationship.
In addition to that, our research and development is guided
in great part by the requirements that we receive from the
services, from the Secretary, from the joint staff, and the
like; and we utilize those as the basis for our commitment of
funding in various areas.
Mr. Thornberry. It seems to me I am sure there is some
coordination with the national laboratories. When you start
just thinking through the different organizations in the
government who do some of this, it is a lot.
Mr. Myers. Sir, let me give you an example. One of them
would be specifically increasing our capabilities in terms of
verification technologies, the technologies that we would have
to verify compliance with arms control treaties. In that case,
you have the Department of State, the Bureau of Verification,
Assistant Secretary Gottemoeller. You also have NNSA in
conjunction with the national labs, and you also have an effort
at the Defense Threat Reduction Agency. And so you have these
three parties, plus the labs.
And we meet regularly. In fact, Assistant Secretary
Gottemoeller hosted a large roundtable for all the partners to
really come in and identify goals, identify paths to those
goals. What are the limitations? What are the conditions that,
A, they might be used in, B, they might be transported or, C,
what kind of technologies are we talking about? So, A, we have
a common set of goals that we are all working towards but that
we all understand the paths and ensure that they are
complementary of each other of.
And obviously, our friends at the NNSA have a tremendous
relationship and resource with the national labs, but DTRA is
also very pleased. We do an awful lot of contracting work with
the laboratories. And, again, we work very hard to deconflict
those contracts and those efforts with our other government
partners.
Mr. Thornberry. General, you talked in your statement and
in your oral summary about nontraditional agents. Can you give
me an example of the sorts of things--because, again, it seems
to me that it could be a wide universe that you would research.
And so what sorts of things are you working on?
General Scarbrough. Sir, nontraditional agents are, as I
explained in my oral, are things outside of the chemical
warfare, biological warfare convention. I really can't go in
open session here and elaborate, because I would breach
security rather quickly to talk about specific areas, but I am
more than happy to----
Mr. Thornberry. And I appreciate that. I presume that the
areas you work on would be informed by the Intelligence
Community on what to pursue.
General Scarbrough. Yes, very much so, sir; and we try to
develop capabilities quickly around those.
If I could, if I may, sir, one other thing. I just want to
take this opportunity to correct the record. Earlier, I
indicated in my response to Mr. Gibson that the Strategic
National Stockpile is managed by DHS, Department of Homeland
Security. It is managed by the Department of Health and Human
Services, not DHS.
Mr. Thornberry. Thank you. If I could switch a little bit
into the broader-strategy-like questions, particularly
cooperative threat reduction, we are still spending money to do
things in Russia that a lot of folks might say they ought to be
doing for themselves at this stage. One of the first trips I
took when I got to Congress was to Ukraine and Russia looking
at some of those efforts, which at that time was absolutely
critical, it seems to me, and very important work. But why are
we still doing that?
Mr. Handelman. Mr. Chairman, it is an excellent question.
Let me explain a couple of things about the process.
First of all, in general, they ask; we don't offer. We
don't always say yes. This is very much a process of looking at
what they have that needs to be secured or eliminated and what
matters most to us. One of the problems we have in evaluating
these requests is that, you know, Russia is back on its feet
economically. The way in which the country handles all of its
affairs in its different regions is not quite as consistent as
certainly we do here in the United States.
So just for example, if we want to have 100-percent
confidence that a mobile missile launcher has in fact been
completely eliminated, whether it is pursuant to a treaty or,
you know, some other reason that it is being taken out of
service, one of the things we think about is that if we can be
part of the process of eliminating it, that gives us that 100-
percent confidence.
The other thing that I would say about nonproliferation
with the cooperation with the Russians is that it has been one
of the few areas in a relationship that certainly has its peaks
and valleys that has been consistent. Cooperation that we have
from the Russian ministry of defense continues to be very
straightforward. The same with the atomic energy ministry,
Rosatom.
Russia has played an important role I think in sort of the
coalition of the willing on nuclear security initiatives that
were started under the Bush administration and continued now. I
am not saying that the Nunn-Lugar program somehow purchases
that goodwill, but it is the foundation of a nonproliferation
relationship we have with the Russians that has endured.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, I realize that the dollars we are
talking about now are not enormous like--compared with the
money we have spent before, and I appreciate that. But I still
get the sense maybe we are being asked to pay for things that
they could and should be doing for themselves. But that is, you
know----
But let me expand. I was very interested in y'all's trip
with Senator Lugar to Africa and where all that is leading. Can
you give me some idea of what you see the role of the
Department of Defense is in that greater security over
potential biological pathogens, whether it was in the countries
you mentioned or beyond that? Can you flesh that out a little
bit? Again, DOD's role versus others. And give me kind of a
vision of where that is heading.
Mr. Handelman. Sure. Let me start. Of course, my colleagues
can amplify.
I mentioned in my opening remarks the point that the
Department of Defense and, to some extent, the Department of
State are the only two departments in a position to look at
biosecurity internationally from a national security
perspective. So you are familiar, I think, with the biosecurity
work that was done in the former Soviet states. The model
there, or at least the point of departure, was that there had
been a very complex and significant bioweapons program complex,
and the foundation of the work there was eliminating
infrastructure and other things that existed.
So looking out in a place like Africa or other regions,
obviously, you know, they are not bioweapons programs. There
are endemic diseases. There is some science capacity. They are
not necessarily evidence of terrorist organizations in any
particular place at any particular time. But, frankly, our goal
is to get ahead of the potential presence of terrorist
organizations, and we think a lot about regions that have
trouble with securing their own borders. So that is sort of the
strategic framework.
Why Africa? Well, to tell you the truth, one reason was
that there already is a significant international and U.S.
public health presence there, and our view was this is a place
to partner with other U.S. agencies. I am thinking of the CDC
that has been in Africa for years, a little more recently the
PEPFAR [President's Emergency Plan For AIDS Relief] program.
So the point is not that the Department of Defense is
coming in and, you know, parachuting in and taking over. Far
from it. In fact, depending on what the particular type of
activity may be, whether it is just providing basic physical
security for a laboratory or helping foreign scientists and
laboratory workers improve their laboratory security practices
or working on disease surveillance, it could be that we
actually work through the CDC or other agencies. And it is not
that they are our subcontractors. It is that they are on the
ground and we don't need to duplicate what they are doing.
So that is an example of sort of the nuts and bolts.
Mr. Thornberry. I would appreciate any comments. But, also,
is there any money in this budget request in this effort--and,
if so, to do what--for fiscal year '12?
Mr. Handelman. For fiscal year '12, yeah. Indeed. Off the
top of my head, I am not sure what it is, but it would be to
establish some of these laboratory relationships. It goes in
the broader rubric of biosurveillance.
Mr. Myers. Yes, sir. The fiscal year '11 request for the
Nunn-Lugar program, overall, was $522 million. That included
specific requests for bioengagement, Africa, Asia, Pakistan,
Afghanistan, Iraq, places such as that.
And the fiscal year '12 request is a little bit smaller
than that at about 508, but, again, reflects a large component
of that is biological, the cooperative biological engagement
program, amplifying and taking advantage of the relationships
we are able to build in Africa and elsewhere and look to expand
those to other areas as well.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, I presume that the more you engage,
the more you will find to do. I mean, that is what happened
with Russia. You find greater gaps, greater vulnerabilities,
places that need security, and then we will be asked to help
provide that security around various pathogens. I presume that
it is going to grow.
Mr. Handelman. Well, Mr. Chairman, let me give you an
example.
The bottomless pit for U.S. assistance is certainly not
something that we want our nonproliferation programs to become,
and I understand the point you are trying to make. But let me
give you an example of a situation with Russia where we had
lots of requests but we prioritized what we thought would have
the biggest bang for the U.S. buck and what addressed the most
troubling threat, and it is the chemical weapons elimination
facility at Shchuchye. They had chemical weapons depots across
Siberia. And I think you are familiar with this one. This one
was not blister agent. It was nerve agent. And it was not bulk
storage. It was, I think, 2.1 million artillery shells and
rockets. So it is the most dangerous stuff in its most
proliferable form. And with a minor, I think, two minor
exceptions, that really has been the core of our chemical
weapons elimination program with the Russians.
So the applicable point I am making to biosecurity in
Africa or anywhere else is that I am sure you are right. Once
our new partners get familiar with how we work we will get lots
of requests. It doesn't mean we are going to say yes to all of
them.
Mr. Myers. Mr. Chairman, I would like to add one quick
point, if I may. I think it is also important that we scope the
size of some of these challenges we are dealing with. When we
are talking about the biological programs and efforts of the
former Soviet Union we are talking about an absolutely massive
infrastructure, numerous facilities across the country. And
those are expensive undertakings.
When we are looking at places like the countries that the
three of us visited with Senator Lugar, we are talking about
individual facilities that don't quite have that same
infrastructure, if you will. I think the scope and the cost of
what we are talking about are a completely different scale than
those that we were talking about in the FSU [former Soviet
Union], and I think a fraction of the money we spent on the
threats we dealt with in the former Soviet Union will have
tremendous impacts on these facilities.
And, as Mr. Handelman said, we get requests from these
governments on a number of different levels. And the three
entities--Policy, NCB, as well as the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency--work very closely together to prioritize and identify
where we are going to make the biggest impact to benefit U.S.
national security.
Mr. Handelman. I might add the State Department is also
part of that dialogue.
Mr. Thornberry. Well, I think this is very important work,
and I am very supportive of expanding it. I think, as you heard
from some of my colleagues earlier today, we are always going
to be interested in how government agencies coordinate
together, and you have just highlighted the importance of that
in this particular instance. But I am very sympathetic with the
idea that some better security around some of these pathogens
is a very important goal for our security as well as for many
others. I just want us, as far as DOD is involved, to
understand what is involved and as well as the dollars that are
being asked.
I think we have worn everybody else out. Again, I
appreciate y'all's patience in being here, waiting on votes and
so forth, and answering our questions.
And, with that, the hearing stands adjourned.
[Whereupon, at 2:38 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]
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A P P E N D I X
March 11, 2011
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March 11, 2011
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=======================================================================
WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING
THE HEARING
March 11, 2011
=======================================================================
RESPONSE TO QUESTION SUBMITTED BY MR. FRANKS
Mr. Myers. The purpose served by the Shield Act is of interest to
the entire American populace considering the potential impact of the
phenomenology that it is trying to protect against. As highlighted
within the Shield Act, the Act's purpose is ``to amend the Federal
Power Act to protect the bulk power system and electric infrastructure
critical to the defense and well-being of the U.S. against natural and
manmade EMP threats and vulnerabilities.'' As both a practical and
authoritative matter, such protection as described within the Act is a
collaborative effort with the overall responsibility for protecting the
U.S. electric infrastructure residing with the Department of Homeland
Security and the Department of Defense (DOD) playing a supporting role.
Among other things, and in collaboration with other U.S. Government
entities such as the Department of Energy, the Defense Threat Reduction
Agency (DTRA) provides technical expertise in relevant phenomenology
such as nuclear-driven electromagnetic pulse (EMP) and naturally
occurring geomagnetic storms--both of which have a potentially large
effect on the bulk-power system and U.S. electric infrastructure.
Accordingly, as the DOD lead agency for EMP effects and the associated
military standards established to protect against those effects, DTRA
conducts research on the magneto hydrodynamic (MHD) E-3 portion of the
EMP pulse and its late-time effects on DOD systems and critical
infrastructure. This portion of the EMP spectrum is of interest from
both a manmade and naturally occurring perspective as the MHD E-3
produces similar frequency content to that of a geomagnetic storm,
albeit not quite of the probable level of intensity generated during a
nuclear blast. As part of its CWMD capability, DTRA maintains an MHD E-
3 testbed that has been used to investigate MHD E-3 phenomology on a
representative portion of the U.S. power grid. DTRA is also in the
process of conducting research with the Idaho National Laboratory to
examine damage to large transformers due to thermal overheating from
such effects.
As a matter of institutional responsibility, the Assistant
Secretary of Defense (Homeland Defense) oversees the Defense Critical
Infrastructure Program (DCIP) and therefore assists DHS as DHS
publishes a National Infrastructure Protection Plan (NIPP) to address
the 18 sectors of the national infrastructure, e.g., electric power
grid, banking, transportation, telecom, water, pipelines, etc. As such,
DHS serves as the overall U.S. government lead in collaboration with
other agencies such as DOE to modernize the electric grid and enhance
its reliability. [See page 15.]
?
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING
March 11, 2011
=======================================================================
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. THORNBERRY
Mr. Thornberry. As you know, the GAO has reported that our
counterproliferation programs need to better align with our strategy.
Since you deal with the larger policy and strategy issues associated
with WMD and counterproliferation, can you outline how you plan to
improve in this area?
Mr. Handelman. We believe that the most recent authoritative
strategy statement on Countering WMD, the 2010 Quadrennial Defense
Review, which highlighted the need to: increase barriers to WMD
proliferation and use; identify and mitigate emergent WMD threats;
develop layered and integrated defenses to WMD; and manage WMD Threats
that emanate from failing or fragile states. We believe these
priorities have been followed quite closely by programmatic changes to
enhance measures aimed at better understanding potential threats,
securing and reducing dangerous materials wherever possible,
positioning forces to monitor and track lethal agents and materials and
their means of delivery, and, where relevant, defeat the threats
themselves.
To further these ends, the FY11 Defense Appropriation provides
funding for WMD Elimination ($99.3M), enhanced nuclear forensics
($109.2M), R&D for non-traditional agents ($300M) and biological threat
reduction ($300M). We continue to work closely with the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisitions, Technology & Logistics (AT&L) to ensure
these policy and strategy issues align with programming.
Mr. Thornberry. The 2002 National Strategy to Combat Weapons of
Mass Destruction outlines three pillars for dealing with WMD:
nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and consequence management. Are
these pillars effective in providing a strategic framework for U.S.
Combating WMD activities? Is the current DOD organization effective in
responding to the nonproliferation, counterproliferation, and
consequence management pillars? Within which of these pillars do our
greatest challenges lie?
Mr. Handelman. The three pillars for WMD provide an effective
framework for managing DOD's countering WMD activities to prevent
proliferation and use of WMD, means of delivery, and related materials,
increase force protection, and prepare to respond to the range of WMD
threats.
Each pillar of CWMD contains unique challenges. However, our
greatest challenge is how we coordinate activities across the CWMD
mission space to create a truly layered defense. As stated in the 2010
QDR, an integrated, layered defense is essential to preventing an
attack before it occurs, through efforts such as securing material at
its source or ensuring robust interdiction capabilities as part of UN
Security Council Resolution enforcement, as well as responding to an
attack should prevention fail. Therefore, efforts to cut across pillars
and examine issues in a holistic manner are of primary importance to
the countering WMD mission.
Mr. Thornberry. In your written testimony, you discuss the
partnership between the U.S. government and large pharmaceutical
companies in developing biological countermeasures. Can you provide
more detail about this partnership and outline some of the challenges?
Mr. Weber. DOD will enter into a cooperative partnership with
industry, including both experienced pharmaceutical companies and
biotechnology innovators, for the advanced development and
manufacturing of medical countermeasures (MCMs). This is the Medical
Countermeasures Initiative (MCMI).
The events of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, along with the ongoing
development of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN)
MCMs, revealed major challenges remaining in advanced development and
domestic manufacturing capacity when facing an emerging disease. These
challenges require new approaches to counter anticipated and
unanticipated attacks, as well as natural disasters or naturally
occurring infectious-disease threats. The most evident challenge was
the ability to meet demand for MCMs during an outbreak. Current
capabilities would not provide sufficient countermeasures to the armed
forces or to the Nation as a whole in an emergency situation.
DOD will address this gap by establishing the MCMI to provide agile
and flexible advanced development and manufacturing capabilities to
support the development, licensure, and production of MCMs for U.S.
military forces and the Nation. The MCMI will also support science and
technology efforts to develop next-generation MCM-platform
technologies, manufacturing systems, and regulatory science
technologies.
DOD's need for MCMs is variable in quantity, ranging from thousands
of doses to several million. The potential spectrum of exposure, from
CBRN threats to emerging infectious diseases, is diverse. Although the
DOD dose requirements are relatively small, there are still great risks
as each MCM candidate navigates product development (e.g., product and
manufacturing scale-up, pivotal animal studies, and clinical studies)
and regulatory pathways-including compliance uncertainty in the Federal
Drug Administration policy on animal testing in the development of
medical countermeasures.
By focusing on advanced development and manufacturing technologies,
while HHS focuses on manufacturing services on a large scale (tens of
millions of doses), DOD will be involved in protecting national
security by first protecting the members of the U.S. Armed Forces.
Mr. Thornberry. What is currently being done in the way of
consequence management planning and preparedness against CBRNE attacks
both abroad and within the U.S.?
Mr. Weber. Within the United States, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) is the lead Federal agency, and DOD provides support.
The Joint Staff and the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy (OUSD(P)) have responsibility for planning and preparedness for
both domestic and foreign consequence-management operations. Overseas,
the Department of State (DOS) is the lead Federal agency, and DOD
provides support. Each Combatant Command is tasked to develop
supporting plans for consequence management activities within their
area of responsibility.
USNORTHCOM has the lead for planning for and executing DOD support
to consequence management activities within the United States. DOD
conducted a comprehensive review of its domestic CBRN Response
enterprise following the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR). The
result is an ongoing two-year effort to increase DOD's lifesaving
capability within the existing 18,000-person response enterprise. The
overall change is a shift from centralized Chemical, Biological,
Radiological, and Nuclear Consequence Management Response Force (CCMRF)
#2 and #3 to create ten Homeland Response Forces (HRFs) postured to
respond in 6-12 hours. This new structure will be certified and in
place by the end of Fiscal Year 2012 (FY12).
Independent of the CCMRF restructuring, my office recognized the
need to assist the Combatant Commands with their Foreign Consequence
Management (FCM) requirements. To that end DTRA will establish the
Consequence Management Assistance Program (CMAP) in FY12. This program
will increase the tactical training and operational capabilities of
targeted partner nations to respond to CBRNE incidents effectively, and
it will support Combatant Commanders' requirements to assist partner
nations by building capacity to respond effectively to the use of WMD.
DTRA is currently coordinating with the Combatant Commanders to
identify and prioritize partner nations to be assisted. It is also
working with DOS and the Embassy Country Teams to develop engagement
plans tailored specifically for these key partner countries. DTRA will
also partner with industry and subject matter expert organizations to
develop training modules, procure response equipment through the
Foreign Military Sales (FMS) program, and conduct hands-on training in
support of the Combatant Commands' objectives and country-engagement
plans. The desired end state is a cadre of regionally based leader
nations, which have effective consequence-management-response
capabilities, and which are able to respond to assist themselves and
regional partners during the critical first 96 hours following a CBRN
incident.
DTRA is also supporting the DOD-wide effort to assist Japan in its
response to the ongoing crises associated with the earthquake, tsunami,
and nuclear facilities.
Mr. Thornberry. How concerned are we with the proliferation of
dual-use technologies that could potentially be used for WMD
development activities? Do we have good tracking mechanisms in place,
and what are some of your programmatic and policy challenges in this
area?
Mr. Weber. With rapid technological advances around the world, the
task of discerning illicit activities from legitimate dual-use
activities grows more complex. Our key programmatic challenge in
monitoring and controlling proliferation is the development of
technology to distinguish dual-use technologies for civilian use from
those intended for weapons development.
New technology advances are critical to our ability to detect and
assess potential WMD proliferation. For nuclear weapons, this involves
assessing uranium-enrichment facilities to verify that the degree of
enrichment is consistent with power and medical-isotope reactor
operation and not with nuclear-weapons production. We must also have
appropriate technology to monitor and control the nuclear-fuel cycle,
limiting the ability of potential proliferant nations to separate
plutonium for weapons from reactor fuel.
The revolution in synthetic biology and bioengineering requires new
monitoring techniques to discriminate precursors for dual-use
biological materials (e.g., vaccines) from bioagents. Emerging chemical
threats also place great emphasis on the ability to identify and detect
possible proliferant material. Developing analytic technology for life-
cycle monitoring of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons supports
the President's non-proliferation agenda and is consistent with the
purposes of applicable international agreements, including the Fissile
Material Cut-off Treaty, the Biological Weapons Convention, and the
Chemical Weapons Convention.
Mr. Thornberry. In your written testimony you discuss the threat
posed by Al Qaeda and their determination to acquire weapons of mass
destruction. In terms of our ability to plan and prepare for such a
threat, do we have a clear understanding of Al Qaeda's technical
abilities, or relationships with state actors that may transfer
technology? What are you most concerned with? Please respond via
classified channels if needed.
Mr. Myers. [The information referred to is classified and retained
in the committee files.]
Mr. Thornberry. Can you discuss how recent changes in the Middle
East are impacting DTRA's operations and planning? Have you received
additional requests for support from CENTCOM? What are some of your
largest concerns?
Mr. Myers. The Defense Threat Reduction Agency's (DTRA) operations
and plans have been affected by recent events in the Middle East. We've
had to curtail one mission support element's travel to Bahrain and we
have increased our travel coordination with USCENTCOM to ensure the
safety of personnel traveling to the region. To date, we have not
changed any of our plans to engage and work with partner nations in the
Middle East, and we will coordinate with our interagency partners
before changing any program plans.
In the last month, DTRA and the USSTRATCOM Center for Combating
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) surged their capabilities to support
Operation ODYSSEY DAWN. We have been providing USAFRICOM and its
subordinate commands with advice and assistance in its planning and
conduct of the operation. DTRA's liaison to the USCENTCOM headquarters
participates in all coordination meetings to ensure USCENTCOM's
operational requirements are considered and met.
We have not received any additional requests for support from
USCENTCOM, but remain acutely interested in what is going on in the
region. We are closely observing the evolving social and political
dynamics in the region, and are maintaining our effective working
relationship with USCENTCOM in order to assist should the need arise.
DTRA's concerns extend to all aspects of chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive impacts, including
mitigation of toxic industrial chemicals or hazardous materials, which
might affect U.S. personnel or interests. Our primary concern is the
acquisition by terrorist groups of weapons, materials, and know-how.
Mr. Thornberry. What are some of your unfunded requirements? Where
are your largest gaps in funding?
Mr. Myers. We fully support the Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 budget
request, and DTRA has no unfunded requirements.
If additional funding was to be provided, I would recommend
applying it to improved technical reachback support for the Combatant
Commanders, the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), National
Guard WMD Civil Support teams, and others; accelerated development of
WMD detection and interdiction technologies and their integration into
operational concepts; and accelerated development of hardened-target
and WMD-defeat capabilities.
Mr. Thornberry. Since our forces have been so focused on
counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan, are you concerned that some
of the specialized and highly technical counterproliferations skills
and capabilities have eroded in the U.S. government?
Mr. Myers. Yes. There are continuing concerns about the future
availability of a cadre of technical experts in the area of nuclear
weapons. These were identified in the ``Report of the Commission on
Maintaining United States Nuclear Weapons Expertise'' to the Congress
and Secretary of Energy Pursuant to the National Defense Authorization
Acts of 1997 and 1998 published March 1, 1999 for the Department of
Energy (DOE), and in the ``Report of the Defense Science Board Task
Force on Nuclear Deterrence Skills,'' published in September 2008 by
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,
Technology and Logistics for DOD.
The demands of ongoing contingency operations in Afghanistan and
Iraq have resulted in particularly officers spending large portions of
their career performing functions that are not combating weapons of
mass destruction (CWMD). Although they are providing critical
leadership on the battlefield conducting combat patrols or planning
counter-insurgency operations, they are not honing technical skills
essential to this mission space. Since most officers entering the
military today do not possess technical degrees in sciences such as
chemistry and biology, the need for self-study or formal education
provided by the military departments is essential. When officers are
afforded the opportunity to attend schools, general Professional
Military Education training does not include CWMD-specific coursework.
The technical CWMD training that is offered at institutions such as the
Naval Post Graduate School and the Defense Nuclear Weapons School are
often difficult to fill because officers are simply not available to
attend due to ongoing deployments.
Mr. Thornberry. By which mechanisms is the intelligence community
coordinating and sharing information pertaining to CBRNE threats with
the appropriate officials in the Department of Defense and other key
U.S. agencies?
Mr. Myers. [The information referred to is classified and retained
in the committee files.]
Mr. Thornberry. In your written testimony you talk about the threat
of non-traditional agents (NTAs) and how your program is working to
mitigate this threat. Can you outline for us some of your concerns in
this area? Can NTAs be exploited by non-state actors or transnational
threats such as Al Qaeda? Please respond via classified channels if
necessary.
General Scarbrough. [The information referred to is classified and
retained in the committee files.]
Mr. Thornberry. In your written testimony you outline several DOD
Efficiencies that you have implemented including the reduction of
thirty-one full-time positions and the reduction of contractor support.
Do you expect any gaps or limitations as a result of these drawdowns?
General Scarbrough. The Joint Program for Chemical and Biological
Defense (JPEO-CBD) does not anticipate any gaps or limitations as a
result of the actions described in the written testimony. The JPEO-CBD
views the consolidation of acquisition programs and reduction to
contractor support as described in the prepared statement as
commonsense efforts to operate more efficiently and cost-effectively.
Mr. Thornberry. What are some of your unfunded requirements? Where
are your largest gaps in funding?
General Scarbrough. We fully support the Fiscal Year (FY) 2012
budget request. If provided with additional funds, the Joint Program
Executive Office for Chemical and Biological Defense (JPEO-CBD) would
apply them (in order of priority) to:
1. Accelerating progress in our current priority areas:
Medical Countermeasures;
Biosurveillance, including improvements to information
technology and diagnostics capabilities; and
Defense against Nontraditional Agents (NTA).
2. Medical countermeasures for radiological threats.
3. Hazard mitigation for chemical, biological, radiological, and
nuclear (CBRN) threats.
4. Standoff detection capabilities.
______
QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. RUPPERSBERGER
Mr. Ruppersberger. Aberdeen Proving Ground in my district is home
to the Army Research Lab, Army Chemical Material Agency and the Medical
Research Institute of Chemical Defense. There is tremendous growth at
APG because of the 2005 BRAC. Buildings are going up all over APG, but
there are old, dated buildings which must be heated and cooled because
of the chemicals within them. The Army does a good job of putting up
building, but I haven't seen any progress on demolition of buildings.
Is demolition of building adequately funded in the Army FY12 budget and
the Future Year Defense Plan?
General Scarbrough. I referred your question to the office with
appropriate jurisdiction, the Aberdeen Proving Ground (APG) Garrison
Commander, who provides the following response:
With fiscal year 2008 and fiscal year 2009 demolition
funding, APG has demolished 53 facilities, with 24 more to be
demolished using fiscal year 2009 funding. There was no fiscal
year 2010 demolition funding provided to APG. For fiscal year
2011, there is tentatively $1.03M for the demolition of 25
facilities designated for APG. This money has not yet been
allocated. For fiscal years 2011-2017, APG has a $85.8M plan to
demolish 188 additional facilities. This funding has not yet
been programmed.
Mr. Ruppersberger. Our National Guard is no longer supplemental.
They are an integral part of today's fighting force. It is important to
provide the National Guard with the equipment they need, just as the
regular Army. What is the funding and fielding plan for the National
Guard's Chemical Biological Protective Shelter which is currently on
the Top 25 Unfunded List?
General Scarbrough.
Funding
The Fiscal Year (FY) 2012 DOD Budget Request outlines current and
planned procurement of Chemical and Biological Protective Shelters
(CBPS) systems (FY10 through FY16). Current plans indicate Procurement,
Defense-Wide funds would buy CBPS systems for both the Army National
Guard (ARNG) and the Army Active Component while Other Procurement,
Army funds would buy CBPS systems for the Army National Guard (ARNG).
Procurement, Defense Wide
FY 2010--$10.6M for 7 systems
FY 2011--$19.7M for 12 systems
FY 2012--$6.0M for 2 systems
FY 2013--$6.0M for 2 systems
FY 2014--$19.7M for 21 systems
FY 2015--$22.6M for 26 systems
FY 2016--$23.8M for 25 systems
Other Procurement, Army
FY 2016--$50.3M
It is important to note that the ARNG can also receive equipment
through the National Guard and Reserve Equipment Account (NGREA).
Fielding
ARNG and Army Active Component units are fielded CBPS systems
depending upon the Headquarters, Department of the Army Master Priority
List and Basis of Issue Plan. The List and Plan are not complete, so
numbers may change. The draft Headquarters Department of the Army
Master Priority List currently identifies approximately 439 CBPS
systems for the ARNG. However, achieving that total depends on the
availability of funds, Army priorities, and DoD priorities.
Program Status
The CBPS program has been transitioning from a High Mobility
Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV) platform to a Medium Tactical
Vehicle (MTV) platform. With the inability to add the required armor
protection due to weight limitations, the Army decided to integrate the
CBPS mission module onto the MTV platform. The Chemical and Biological
Defense Program recently completed first-article testing, and
production of the integrated system is scheduled to begin in FY12. The
ARNG is currently planning to procure additional systems using NGREA
funding once production begins.
Mr. Ruppersberger. The Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical
Defense at Aberdeen Proving Ground uses live monkeys to show the
effects of patients that have been exposed to chemical or nerve agents
and medical trainees observe these effects. It is my understanding that
the monkeys are an ineffective way to treat patients as they do not
show the same symptoms as humans and that the human simulators that are
used in addition to this would provide accurate training if only those
were used. In addition, over the next ten years, the use of only human
simulators would provide a cost savings for the Army. Is there a reason
why the monkeys are still used for this purpose if human simulators can
provide more accurate training?
General Scarbrough. I have referred this question to the office
with appropriate jurisdiction, the U.S. Army Medical Department
(AMEDD), which provides the following response:
``The U.S. Army Medical Research Institute of Chemical Defense
(USAMRICD) is dedicated to employing the best possible training
techniques to prepare medical-care providers to treat battlefield
injuries while minimizing the use of live animals. The Field--and
Medical--Management of Chemical and Biological Casualties courses make
extensive use of manikins, computer-based training, and other training
aids to maximize training effectiveness.
The anesthetized African green nonhuman primate (NHP) model is
currently the best model for simulating a cholinergic crisis in humans.
In the live-animal exercise, physostigmine, a short-acting, FDA-
approved medication for humans, is used to simulate effects of a nerve-
agent exposure in fully anesthetized animals; actual nerve agent is not
administered. The use of physostigmine in this species produces effects
that are identical to the effects that occur in humans after exposure
to nerve agents. After administering physostigmine, students observe
changes that occur in the animal's muscle tone, respirations, mucous
membrane color, salivation, heart rate, and body temperature. Students
provide supportive care and administer antidotes. Following treatment,
they observe the animal's recovery from a cholinergic crisis. The
animals recover without incident and are treated humanely at all times.
USAMRICD is committed to continually evaluating and actively
seeking non-animal alternatives that may provide equivalent or superior
training experiences. USAMRICD uses a variety of different manikins and
continually collaborates with the manufacturer to improve the realism
of these simulators. However, even the most advanced of the currently
available manikins are incapable of adequately modeling the range of
clinical signs or the individually variable response to nerve-agent
exposure and treatment seen in live patients, both human and animal.''
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