[House Hearing, 112 Congress]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR REVIVAL AND U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY
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HEARING
BEFORE THE
COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
__________
MARCH 17, 2011
__________
Serial No. 112-7
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Printed for the use of the Committee on Foreign Affairs
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COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS
ILEANA ROS-LEHTINEN, Florida, Chairman
CHRISTOPHER H. SMITH, New Jersey HOWARD L. BERMAN, California
DAN BURTON, Indiana GARY L. ACKERMAN, New York
ELTON GALLEGLY, California ENI F.H. FALEOMAVAEGA, American
DANA ROHRABACHER, California Samoa
DONALD A. MANZULLO, Illinois DONALD M. PAYNE, New Jersey
EDWARD R. ROYCE, California BRAD SHERMAN, California
STEVE CHABOT, Ohio ELIOT L. ENGEL, New York
RON PAUL, Texas GREGORY W. MEEKS, New York
MIKE PENCE, Indiana RUSS CARNAHAN, Missouri
JOE WILSON, South Carolina ALBIO SIRES, New Jersey
CONNIE MACK, Florida GERALD E. CONNOLLY, Virginia
JEFF FORTENBERRY, Nebraska THEODORE E. DEUTCH, Florida
MICHAEL T. McCAUL, Texas DENNIS CARDOZA, California
TED POE, Texas BEN CHANDLER, Kentucky
GUS M. BILIRAKIS, Florida BRIAN HIGGINS, New York
JEAN SCHMIDT, Ohio ALLYSON SCHWARTZ, Pennsylvania
BILL JOHNSON, Ohio CHRISTOPHER S. MURPHY, Connecticut
DAVID RIVERA, Florida FREDERICA WILSON, Florida
MIKE KELLY, Pennsylvania KAREN BASS, California
TIM GRIFFIN, Arkansas WILLIAM KEATING, Massachusetts
TOM MARINO, Pennsylvania DAVID CICILLINE, Rhode Island
JEFF DUNCAN, South Carolina
ANN MARIE BUERKLE, New York
RENEE ELLMERS, North Carolina
VACANT
Yleem D.S. Poblete, Staff Director
Richard J. Kessler, Democratic Staff Director
C O N T E N T S
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Page
WITNESSES
Mr. Olli Heinonen, senior fellow, Belfer Center for Science and
International Affairs (former Deputy Director General of the
International Atomic Energy Agency and head of its Department
of Safeguards)................................................. 10
The Honorable William J. Perry, former Secretary of Defense,
senior fellow, Hoover Institution.............................. 16
Mr. Henry Sokolski, executive director, Nonproliferation Policy
Education Center............................................... 21
Mr. Gene Aloise, director, Natural Resources and Environment
Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office.................... 40
LETTERS, STATEMENTS, ETC., SUBMITTED FOR THE HEARING
The Honorable Ileana Ros-Lehtinen, a Representative in Congress
from the State of Florida, and chairman, Committee on Foreign
Affairs: Prepared statement.................................... 4
Mr. Olli Heinonen: Prepared statement............................ 12
The Honorable William J. Perry: Prepared statement............... 18
Mr. Henry Sokolski: Prepared statement........................... 23
Mr. Gene Aloise: Prepared statement.............................. 42
APPENDIX
Hearing notice................................................... 72
Hearing minutes.................................................. 73
Questions submitted for the record by the Honorable Gus
Bilirakis, a Representative in Congress from the State of
Florida:
Responses from Mr. Olli Heinonen............................... 75
Responses from Mr. Henry Sokolski.............................. 77
Responses from Mr. Gene Aloise................................. 79
THE GLOBAL NUCLEAR REVIVAL AND U.S. NONPROLIFERATION POLICY
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THURSDAY, MARCH 17, 2011
House of Representatives,
Committee on Foreign Affairs,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:48 a.m. in room
2172, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
(chairman of the committee) presiding.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. The committee will come to order.
After recognizing myself and my good friend, the ranking
member, Mr. Berman, for 7 minutes each for our opening
statements, I will recognize Mr. Royce and Mr. Sherman, the
chairman and ranking member of the Subcommittee on Terrorism,
Nonproliferation, and Trade, for 3 minutes each for their
statements. We will then hear from our witnesses.
I would ask that you please limit your prepared statements
to 5 minutes each before we move to the questions and answers
with members under the 5-minute rule.
Without objection, your prepared statements will be made
part of the record, and members may have 5 legislative days to
insert statements and questions for the record subject to the
limitations of length in the rules.
And I will excuse ourselves. Mr. Berman and I very soon
will have to go to the floor to debate a resolution that is in
our committee. So you will excuse us when we leave and not take
it personally, I hope.
The Chair now recognizes herself for 7 minutes.
The tragedy in Japan continues to dominate the news. The
scale of the devastation and suffering is unimaginable. Even
though we watch in safety from the other side of the planet, I
believe I speak for all of our committee members in saying that
our hearts and our thoughts and our prayers are with the people
of Japan during this terrible crisis, especially those who have
lost loved ones and those whose lives have been unexpectedly
upended and filled with despair.
The ongoing situation is of direct relevance to today's
hearing. Many are already predicting that the global nuclear
revival now under way will be stopped in its tracks by the
images of exploding nuclear reactors, terrified refugees, and
the prospect of huge areas rendered uninhabitable. These events
have already begun to influence the debate over nuclear energy
in the United States and in Europe.
However, China and other countries--especially in the
Middle East--are unlikely to be deterred from their nuclear
ambitions, and it is in these countries that are pursuing
nuclear power for political aims, many for destructive goals,
that the risk of proliferation is the greatest. Rogue nations
attempting to build a nuclear weapons program need a nuclear
energy program to use as cover.
We can be certain that the crisis in Japan will not
persuade the Iranian regime to abandon its nuclear weapons
program, nor should we expect North Korea to dismantle its
recently revealed uranium enrichment program due to concerns
that an accident could devastate the nearby population.
But the nuclear menace we face is broader than simply that
of traditional nuclear weapons. The crisis in Japan is a
dramatic demonstration of the real-world threat resulting from
nuclear material over which we have lost control.
A radiological bomb that uses conventional explosives to
disperse radioactive materials is a far more achievable goal
for al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations than a nuclear
device. We know that these groups are actively seeking these
materials and have also targeted nuclear installations for
destruction in the hope of spreading nuclear devastation. So
the prospect of a sudden and widespread nuclear contamination
in faraway Japan should remind us that we face an even greater
threat from our self-proclaimed enemies who are even now
planning to unleash it in the centers of our cities.
The crisis in Japan also shows us that even a country at
the highest level of development with massive resources and
legions of technicians, scientists, and officials may be unable
to prevent a catastrophe. Therefore, spreading nuclear
facilities to unstable regimes throughout the Middle East and
the Third World, which often have only limited resources and
expertise, is laying the groundwork for potential disaster and
a vast expansion of proliferation opportunities. Russia and
France are the most irresponsible in this regard, with their
most senior officials acting as salesmen for their state-owned
nuclear cooperations. But we are not innocent ourselves. At a
minimum, we should be not be contributing to the program with
politically driven nuclear cooperation agreements.
The Atomic Energy Act, which governs these agreements, was
written in an era when safe, clean nuclear energy was the hope
of the future and proliferation concerns were minimal. Over the
years, tougher provisions have been written into the Act, but
the situation remains far from satisfactory.
A key problem is that Congress has little influence largely
because these agreements automatically go into effect unless
those seeking to stop them can secure veto-proof majorities in
both Houses, a high hurdle indeed. But when writing the law
Congress never intended for our long-term national security
interests to be made subordinate to short-term political
concerns. So Congress must act to fix this problem, especially
by requiring that nuclear cooperation agreements receive an
affirmative vote before going into effect.
I plan to introduce legislation to give Congress that power
and also to strengthen the nonproliferation provisions in all
future nuclear cooperation agreements. Several other Members on
both sides of the aisle are considering similar legislation,
and I hope to work with them to craft a bipartisan bill that
can be passed by this committee quickly, and hopefully
unanimously.
The crisis in Japan has also graphically demonstrated that
the nuclear threat we face is far more than just simply an
accident at electricity plants. We have enemies, non-state
actors and rogue regimes, who are working to bring about an
even greater disaster here, not as an act of God but, instead,
of conscious design. Our laws and our policies must address
this threat before it is too late.
I am now pleased to recognize my friend, the ranking
member, Mr. Berman, for his opening remarks.
[The prepared statement of Chairman Ros-Lehtinen follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Berman. Well, thank you very much, Madam Chairman.
Before I start my opening statement, I would like simply to
apologize in the same sense that the chairman just did. We have
a resolution on the floor that invokes the War Powers Act
provisions. We will have to manage it. I cannot think of a
hearing we will be holding that I more wanted to be present at
for its entire time, but there are people other than us who
scheduled these things, and we are stuck with living with the
consequences of their scheduling.
Madam Chairman, thank you very much for holding this
hearing. For several years it has been an article of faith that
the world is experiencing a nuclear renaissance or revival, a
post-Chernobyl era in which civilian nuclear power is
increasingly seen as a solution to energy challenges around the
globe. That faith collided with a hard reality in Japan this
week, and the frightening events in that country which are
still unfolding today will undoubtedly force a rethinking both
here and abroad about the expansion of civil nuclear power as
well as a fundamental reexamination of the dangers that nuclear
reactors must be able to withstand.
The nuclear revival may ultimately be little more than a
nuclear blip. However, for the time being, many countries,
including the United States, are interested in nuclear power,
in part due to its attractiveness as a carbon-neutral energy
source. Given that over 50 new reactors are under construction
worldwide, it is critical that we take steps to deal with the
potential nonproliferation consequences of this expansion.
More reactors require more nuclear fuel, which requires
more capacity to enrich uranium. More reactors produce more
nuclear waste, which means more opportunities to extract
plutonium through reprocessing. Both mean more potential
material for nuclear bombs. Therein lies the danger.
The nuclear revival has a double meaning, a revival of
civil nuclear energy and, as a consequence of more enrichment
and reprocessing, the possible resurrection of the nightmare
once voiced by President Kennedy, a world populated with dozens
of nuclear-armed countries. And to that nightmare we can add
one he didn't foresee, the age of the nuclear terrorist.
Last week, I watched a very important documentary, ``The
Nuclear Tipping Point,'' which I recommend to my colleagues and
everyone during this hearing today. In this film, four of our
most respected statesmen on national security--William Perry,
who is with us today; George Schultz; Sam Nunn; and Henry
Kissinger--discuss the terrifying prospect of terrorists
obtaining nuclear material for a nuclear weapon or, as the
chairman mentioned, for use in a radiological bomb.
As the film points out, the knowledge required to make a
crude nuclear weapon has proliferated over the last 10 or 15
years. The material to fuel a nuclear explosive is spread all
over the world, and it is clear that terrorist groups like al
Qaeda are seeking this material and wish to make weapons.
It has been estimated there are 1,600 tons of highly
enriched uranium and 500 tons of separated plutonium in stocks
worldwide. Most of these materials are in the U.S., Russia,
China, U.K., France, and Japan. However, about seven tons of
highly enriched uranium--enough for some 300 nuclear weapons--
reside in other countries.
The Obama administration has made securing these stockpiles
of nuclear materials a top priority. At last year's
unprecedented Nuclear Security Summit, the U.S. got agreement
from over 40 heads of state for our 4-year effort to secure
nuclear material worldwide. So far, that has resulted in the
removal of 120 kilograms of enriched uranium from other
countries and agreements to remove 220 more.
Another high priority should be negotiating a new agreement
with Russia to eliminate all tactical nuclear weapons. These
small but powerful weapons, of which Russia has thousands, are
undoubtedly on the wish list of al Qaeda and other terrorist
groups.
In addition to securing nuclear materials and loose nukes,
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Regime must be strengthened--and
here I stand with the chairman--to better address the
enrichment of uranium and the reprocessing of spent fuel. So
far, efforts to limit the spread of these technologies have met
with limited success. With Iran's and North Korea's development
of these technologies, aided in large part by the A.Q. Khan
network, they have become even more difficult to control. That
is why the recent U.S.-UAE Nuclear Cooperation Agreement is so
important.
The UAE, on its own, decided to foreswear enrichment and
reprocessing. When the U.S. asked them if they would formalize
that in a legally binding commitment within the cooperation
agreement, they readily agreed. And this applies not only to
nuclear fuel and equipment provided by the United States but by
any country.
A State Department spokesman has since called this the gold
standard for nuclear cooperation agreements, and I agree. The
U.S. should seek its equivalent for every new nuclear
cooperation agreement that it negotiates in the future. We
should consider making this and a number of other items a
statutory requirement in the Atomic Energy Act, along with the
requirement that every country must adopt an Additional
Protocol for safeguards to ensure that the IAEA has all the
necessary authority to investigate any and all proliferation
concerns.
Finally, the administration will use all its influence to
convince the other nuclear supplier states to adopt the same
nonproliferation and security conditions in their agreements
that we observe in ours, especially when those same suppliers
are seeking nuclear business in the United States.
And if I could just parenthetically add in my remaining
time, yesterday we had a hearing on the whole issue of aid
levels and the deficit, and there were a lot of differences
between our parties on some of these issues. On the issue which
the chairman talked about moving ahead on and the whole
question of our approach to this tremendously important subject
on proliferation, I believe the opportunity for close and
bipartisan work exists, and I look forward to working with the
chairman and the other members of the committee to move ahead
on this issue.
With that, I yield back the balance of my time.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I do look
forward to that as well.
Mr. Sherman, the ranking member of the pertinent
subcommittee, is recognized for his opening statement.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you, Madam Chairwoman.
I want to echo your comments and those of others about our
concern for our friends and allies in Japan. We hope Japanese
authorities get the upper hand and resolve this crisis. The
people of Japan are in our prayers. We should do whatever we
can to help the people of northern Japan, especially to help
contain the reactor problem.
It is too early for a verdict on how this is going to
affect nuclear power expansion. No doubt many countries will be
reluctant, at least for a while, to move forward. But, given
global warming, given the cost of energy, I suspect that within
a few years countries will go forward with nuclear power.
I commend the chairwoman for holding these hearings. We
held hearings in the Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade
Subcommittee and the full committee last year on this very
topic. We need to reform the Atomic Energy Act, and I commend
the chairwoman for her decision to introduce legislation to do
just that. I look forward to working with all of our colleagues
here on this committee in that effort.
The Atomic Energy Act should provide that, unless a nuclear
cooperation agreement includes four particular provisions, it
will require congressional approval by an act of Congress. The
chairwoman explained how illusory Congress' involvement is
under the present system, and this will give an incentive to
our negotiators and to the other side to have these four
provisions in the agreement.
First, the other states should adopt the Additional
Protocol. Second, the other states should agree to forego the
supposed right to enrich and reprocess. Third, the partner
countries should agree to control access to facilities in such
a way that personnel from Iran, North Korea, Syria, and,
depending upon developments in the next few weeks, Libya, are
not invited to the facilities. And, finally, the partner nation
should provide for a liability scheme that allows private
companies, such as U.S. companies, to participate in the
development of nuclear power.
What is the point of us going forward with an agreement if
the only companies that can participate--and we are seeing this
problem in India--are those who can claim sovereign immunity,
such as those from Russia, France, and perhaps in the future
China?
We are told that the UAE agreement is the gold standard. It
contains only the first two of those provisions, so I would
call it the ``bronze standard.'' Let's say that, unless an
agreement meets the gold standard, it requires an act of
Congress to put into effect.
I yield back.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Thank you so much, Mr. Sherman; and
now the chairman of the Nonproliferation Subcommittee, Mr.
Royce, is recognized for 3 minutes.
Mr. Royce. Thank you very much, Madam Chair.
I think all of us feel and want to convey that our thoughts
are with the Japanese people. We all understand that our ally
has had to endure an earthquake, a tsunami and now a nuclear
crisis. That crisis is growing, and certainly we have some
lessons to learn.
As members of this committee, a top task of this committee,
something we should all be mindful of, is that one of our
responsibilities is to help ensure that nuclear material is out
of the hands of terrorists and also out of the hands of
terrorist states. I think the global expansion of nuclear power
has greatly complicated that task. There are nearly 550 nuclear
power reactors under construction or planned or proposed around
the world today; and, post-Japan, we will see how many of these
on the drawing board survive in the coming months and the
coming years. But, with rising populations and rising energy
costs, nuclear power will remain attractive for many of these
countries.
Some of the countries that are looking at nuclear energy
include Belarus and Kazakhstan and Vietnam. The technical and
infrastructural sophistication of these countries pales in
comparison to Japan. How able would they respond? How capable
are they going to be to respond to disaster? The seemingly poor
performance of the IAEA in response to Japan's crisis is what
heightens our concerns.
Of course, the central problem is that it can be a sprint
from a civilian to a military nuclear program, certainly not a
marathon. It is the enrichment and reprocessing aspects of the
fuel cycle that puts nuclear weapons within reach. This is the
key bomb-making technology.
Notwithstanding its reported troubles, Iran continues to
increase its supply of enriched uranium; and, last fall, North
Korea unveiled a uranium enrichment plant, the sophistication
of which took many of us by surprise. Experts estimate that
these centrifuges are four times as powerful as those spinning
at Natanz. And another piece of information, other North Korean
sites are likely.
To handle concerns about enrichment and reprocessing, the
U.S. Nuclear Cooperation Agreement with the UAE included a
commitment to forego those sensitive technologies and ratify
the Additional Protocol. But other countries, including Jordan
and Vietnam, are balking at accepting these conditions.
The administration will soon have to decide whether it
wants to advance the nonproliferation ball or not. And, Madam
Chair, as you have argued, Congress should reclaim powers it
surrendered to the executive branch long ago in a different
era. We need to act so Congress positively, not passively,
approves nuclear cooperation agreements.
Thank you.
Chairman Ros-Lehtinen. Amen. Thank you so much.
And thank you to the excellent set of panelists that we
have here before us this morning.
Our first witness is Olli Heinonen. He is the former Deputy
Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency and
head of its Department of Safeguards. He is currently a senior
fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International
Affairs at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard.
In addition to his many years of responsibility at the IAEA
regarding the nuclear program of Iran, the A.Q. Khan nuclear
black market network, and other nonproliferation challenges,
Mr. Heinonen lived and worked in Japan for many years and has
direct experience with the crippled reactors now in the news.
We thank you for appearing before us today. We look forward
to your expert testimony.
Next we have William Perry, who is well-known to all of us.
From 1994 to 1997, Mr. Perry served as the Secretary of Defense
in the Clinton administration. Currently, he is the Michael and
Barbara Berberian professor emeritus at Stanford University. He
is a senior fellow at the Institute for International Studies
at Stanford and serves as co-director of the Nuclear Risk
Reduction Initiative and the Preventative Defense Project.
Mr. Perry, we are all aware of your long and distinguished
record of public service, and we are fortunate to have you here
with us today.
Also appearing before us today is Henry Sokolski, who is
the executive director of the Nonproliferation Policy Education
Center. He currently serves as an adjunct professor at the
Institute of World Politics in Washington, DC, and was a member
of the Congressional Commission on the Prevention of Weapons of
Mass Destruction, Proliferation and Terrorism. He previously
served as Deputy for Nonproliferation Policy in the Department
of Defense. Mr. Sokolski has been a valuable resource for this
committee for many years, and we are pleased to have him with
us again today.
Finally, we welcome Gene Aloise. Mr. Aloise is the Director
of the National Resources and Environment Team at the
Government Accountability Office, where he is GAO's recognized
expert in international nuclear nonproliferation and safety
issues. Mr. Aloise is the lead author of the GAO's March, 2009,
report on the extensive nuclear assistance being provided to
Iran, Syria, Sudan, and Cuba by the IAEA Technical Cooperation
Program. Our committee, as well as the rest of Congress, turns
routinely to GAO for its expert investigation and analysis; and
we thank you, Mr. Aloise, for taking the time to appear before
us today.
As I have stated, your written remarks will be made a part
of the official record, and we would appreciate if you would
summarize your testimony to 5 minutes.
We will begin with Mr. Heinonen. Thank you.
STATEMENT OF MR. OLLI HEINONEN, SENIOR FELLOW, BELFER CENTER
FOR SCIENCE AND INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS (FORMER DEPUTY DIRECTOR
GENERAL OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY AND HEAD OF
ITS DEPARTMENT OF SAFEGUARDS)
Mr. Heinonen. Chairman Ros-Lehtinen, Mr. Berman, and
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for inviting
me to discuss the nuclear challenges posed by Iran, North
Korea, and Syria.
During those three decades which I served in the IAEA,
global nuclear dangers have only become greater and more
complex, while the policies to manage these threats have
remained stagnant.
The international community must pay greater attention to
future cases of noncompliance with the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty and other nonproliferation obligations,
cases which, if not resolved in a timely manner, will erode the
credibility of the whole verification system. We also need to
be better prepared to deal with states that acquire nuclear
technology as a member of the treaty and then may withdraw to
pursue a military nuclear program.
The cases of Iran, North Korea, and Syria highlight the
fact that the international community has allowed too much
stalling and obfuscation in resolving safeguards compliance
issues and broader nuclear concerns. In my written statement I
focus on those cases, so I won't here, but I will go straight
to the recommendations which I have in my mind.
So what can be done? There are actually several policy
options which we could consider.
First, whenever special arrangements are negotiated--
whether it is an agreed framework, whether it is P5 plus 1
agreements with Iran, negotiators must draw red lines with
clearly stated consequences when those lines are crossed.
In addition, it should be made clear that punitive actions
would be reversed when proliferators abide by the rules.
Then there are a lot of proposals to make IAEA reporting
more transparent, safeguards implementation report. Tackle the
problem cases in the beginning, then it is much easier to solve
them.
Similarly, the IAEA should perhaps brief the United Nations
Security Council in a frequent manner; and the IAEA has also to
take care of its own Technical Cooperation Program. Every state
who receives this report could be reviewed to ensure that the
support will be provided only to states in good standing with
their obligations, and those supports will be provided
exclusively for the peaceful use of atomic energy.
Additional protocols should be universalized. There are
still close to 20 countries which have substantial nuclear
programs without an Additional Protocol. We must work at making
the Additional Protocol a precondition for future nuclear
supply arrangements. In addition, we need to keep in mind that
the IAEA should use vigorously all legal instruments in its
use, including the provision for special inspections.
With regard to the black market and covert trade networks,
the IAEA is currently maintaining an Illicit Trafficking
Database. This should be extended to include not only
successful cases but the attempts to acquire nuclear materials
and radioisotopes, and perhaps even to extend it to cover
single-use items, dual-use items, et cetera. The IAEA should
also have a mandate to investigate those cases, not just report
only. And, most importantly, the IAEA has to have adequate
financial and human resources to take care of these tasks.
Those are just a snapshot of the recommendations which I
make. Some of these challenges are technical in nature, others
deal with resources and funding, and others are a question of
political will. Whatever the scenario, we cannot be complacent
about our concerns over the potential spread of nuclear weapon
technologies and capabilities.
It is also important to see nuclear safety, security, and
safeguards--Triple S, as we call them--as an integral system to
ensure that nuclear energy is used safely, securely, and
peacefully, in particular in the states which are just
embarking on their nuclear programs.
Along with my colleagues, my past years at the IAEA have
been dedicated to putting in place a strong and workable
international safeguards system that was achievable, but the
job is far from being done. Ultimately, the choice of pursuing
nuclear power under a predicted nuclear renaissance cannot be a
choice that results in endangering and unraveling efforts aimed
at strengthening global nuclear governance.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Heinonen follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Royce [presiding]. Secretary Perry.
STATEMENT OF THE HONORABLE WILLIAM J. PERRY, FORMER SECRETARY
OF DEFENSE, SENIOR FELLOW, HOOVER INSTITUTION
Mr. Perry. I want to start off by commending this committee
for taking on such a vitally important issue.
The potential danger of nuclear power has been dramatically
illustrated in Japan. Indeed, my heart goes out to my Japanese
friends. I believe that the problem with reactors in Japan is
going to get much worse before the situation finally is under
control.
Additionally, I have a concern about North Korea. Besides
the uranium enrichment program already mentioned in North
Korea, the North Koreans have taken to building their own light
water reactor. One can only imagine the safety issues there are
going to be with this homemade design they are pursuing.
An even greater danger, however, is if nuclear weapons fall
into the hands of a terror organization. This is a serious
threat to the country for which the traditional forms of
deterrence are simply not applicable. Preventing nuclear
terrorism is closely tied to stopping the proliferation of
nuclear weapons and the proliferation of fissile material, and
recent developments in North Korea and Iran suggest that we may
be at a tipping point in nuclear proliferation.
While the programs that maintain our deterrence are
national, the programs that prevent proliferation and safeguard
weapons and fissile material are both national and
international. Indeed, it is clear we cannot meet the goal of
reducing the proliferation threat without substantial
international cooperation. We cannot go it alone on this
crucial issue. The nations whose cooperation is most critical
are at risk of nuclear proliferation as much as we, so we
should be able to get that cooperation.
The international programs that are most effective in
containing and rolling back proliferation can sometimes be in
conflict with national programs designed to maintain
deterrence. Therefore, a strategic posture for the United
States that meets both of these security requirements will
necessarily have to strike a balance that supports both of
these needs.
The need to strike such a balance has been recognized at
least since the end of the Cold War. President Clinton's policy
on nuclear posture spoke of the need to lead but hedge. That
policy called for the United States to lead in the reduction of
nuclear arms, to lead in programs that prevent proliferation,
but hedge against adverse political developments.
The leadership aspect of this policy was demonstrated most
vividly by a cooperative program with Russia established under
the Nunn-Lugar Act that dismantled about 4,000 nuclear weapons
in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, a significant contribution
to a safer world. U.S. leadership has also been demonstrated by
three treaties: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Moscow
Treaty, and New START. I believe that the United States must
continue to support programs that both lead and hedge, that is,
programs that move in two parallel paths, one path that
protects our security by maintaining deterrence and the other
path which protects our security by reducing the danger of
nuclear weapons.
The first path of deterrence is spelled out in the Nuclear
Posture Review, and I do not plan to discuss that further in
this hearing. The second path, reducing the danger, does
include the following components: First, re-energized efforts
to reverse the nuclear proliferation in North Korea and prevent
the nuclear proliferation in Iran. Secondly, negotiate further
arms reduction treaties with Russia that make additional
reductions in the nuclear stockpiles of Russia and the United
States. Third, seek an international Fissile Material Cutoff
Treaty and redouble domestic and international efforts to
secure all stocks of fissile material. And, finally, strengthen
the International Atomic Energy Agency. In particular, work
with the IAEA to promote universal adoption of the Additional
Protocol to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
In sum, we should reject the vision of a future world
defined by a collapse of the nonproliferation regime and work
for a world of cooperation among the major powers. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Perry follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Royce. Thank you very much, Secretary Perry.
We are going to hold everyone to 5 minutes here and go
right to questions. As a matter of fact, I am going to make
this suggestion: Why don't you make an opening statement,
summarize your written statement in a couple of minutes, and we
will come back to those points and give you a little more time
to embellish on your opening points, simply because we are
coming to this vote and I would like to have a few questions
put before we get to it.
Mr. Sokolski, go ahead.
STATEMENT OF MR. HENRY SOKOLSKI, EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR,
NONPROLIFERATION POLICY EDUCATION CENTER
Mr. Sokolski. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I ask that not only
my testimony but a two-page note on the policy implications of
the accidents in Japan be entered into the record.
Mr. Royce. Without objection.
Mr. Sokolski. Your timing, sadly, is all too perfect for
this hearing.
Mr. Royce. Well, Mr. Sokolski, the timing of your new book
is all too perfect.
Mr. Sokolski. Well, that is due to no planning at all. It
is a year behind schedule. And that is the--I have to plug it,
I guess--Nuclear Power's Global Expansion: Weighing Its Costs
and Risks. That was not due to planning, I can assure you.
In any case, sometimes it takes bad news and fearful
emotions to get us to think. I think we have seen France,
China, Germany, even India and a number of other countries,
freeze their construction plans while they do a safety review.
What is a little odd is we haven't yet done that. Instead, our
State Department is signing an MOU in earthquake-prone Chile to
do nuclear cooperation.
We don't know where the Jordan and Saudi Arabia agreements
or the Vietnam agreements are. They quietly went into the rear
of the freezer with all of the demonstrations, but I don't
think they are dead.
The administration is moving ahead with loan guarantees
beyond the $18 billion they already have, even though the head
of the largest merchant nuclear utility in the world gave a
speech last week at AEI saying they are not only not necessary,
they are harmful; and that he doesn't think they need nuclear
power plants and will not build them for one to two decades to
meet the carbon goals. Not only that, a public poll has come
out and said the favorite cut, when suggested, from the
public's perspective is loan guarantees.
In any case, whatever we do, review or not, it is pretty
clear that comments of the committee are spot-on correct. You
do not want to sell or cooperate or encourage countries that
are really not up to snuff to take on building a reactor after
the incidents that we have had in Japan. Nor after Iran do you
want to do anything but toughen the nonproliferation conditions
on nuclear cooperation, not just for the U.S. but for other
nuclear suppliers.
Now the chair, the ranking member, Mr. Sherman, Mr. Royce,
Mr. Fortenberry, and Senator Akaka have already laid and tabled
very, very good legislation; and I urge the committee to file
that into any revision of the Atomic Energy Act. I certainly
think the idea of forcing votes which focus debate on these
agreements is a great idea, and I commend Mr. Sherman's
recommendations to the committee as well.
I think, in addition, however, if you are going to be
serious about getting others to join in, you need to be a bit
of a bad cop. I think requiring that no U.S. nuclear regulatory
license, Federal contract, or loan guarantee can be approved
for any foreign entity unless the President of the United
States has first certified that the government of that entity
has explicitly endorsed adopting the key nonproliferation
provisions of the UAE agreement really needs to be put into
place. If this committee does this, I believe that the
administration will pay close attention; and with any luck much
of what you do might be co-opted. I think that is the spirit in
which you should operate.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Sokolski follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Sokolski.
We will come back after the vote for some other comments,
for you to finish that thought, and to go to Mr. Aloise. And
Mr. Aloise, we will do that after the vote.
I would like to go to some questions, and I would like to
ask the ranking member to open with his questions at this
point.
Mr. Berman. Well, thank you very much, Mr. Chairman. I
appreciate that, because I won't be able to come back because I
will be on the floor.
Mr. Sokolski has started down the path of answering this
question that I wanted to ask the panel, but let me get it out
there and see what he and other members of the panel and he
might add.
The issue of convincing other countries to place
nonproliferation concerns in the forefront of their political
and commercial interests in the development and exploitation of
civil nuclear energy. Other supplier countries like to look the
other way. They reason strong nonproliferation conditions of
the kind we have been talking about would fatally undermine
their business success. Developing countries are--or give the
appearance of being--hypersensitive about the West denying them
their rights to technology in general to keep them less
developed and to sensitive technologies like enrichment and
reprocessing.
How do we forge a new consensus among all concerned to
minimize the spread of these dangerous technologies that are
unfortunately also necessary to supply fuel to nuclear power
reactors? I would be interested in--again, Mr. Sokolski started
to get into this. Any other thoughts about----
Mr. Perry. Mr. Berman, I will make one comment about that.
We can have a reasonably successful implementation of the
goals you talk about if we can get the Nuclear Suppliers Group
to agree on a set of principles. It is not enough for the
United States to agree on it. We have to have the Nuclear
Suppliers Group.
One silver lining around this Japanese cloud is I think we
might be able to go back to the NSG--which has been reluctant
to make such agreements in the past--and try again. I would
urge the United States to go back to the Nuclear Suppliers
Group now, arguing for a very stiff set of standards dealing
both with the safety issue and with the proliferation issues.
Mr. Sokolski. I think what I have suggested dovetails
perfectly with doing that. I think Dr. Perry is right. It
shouldn't be an either/or.
Keep in mind the country that is most keenly interested in
getting loan guarantees, licenses, and DOE contracts happens to
be one of the largest suppliers. It is France. However, if you
can get them to turn around, you automatically get Germany, for
a number of political reasons. And if you get Germany, you
automatically lock in Russia. The reason why is the Russians
are desperately eager to work with Siemens to develop the
reactors for domestic and export purposes, and by law they
cannot export them without the consent and approval of the
Germans, and that consent is controlled by law.
I have got to believe you can get Japan. And South Korea is
very anxious to look good on nonproliferation, for a variety of
reasons which this committee knows all too well. One of them is
they want to reprocess or recycle. Second, they have the
Nuclear Summit coming in 2012.
This is a perfect time to work with countries, including
the UAE, to parade the success. Your timing is good. And I
think Mr. Perry is absolutely right, you should also parallel
work with NSG. I wouldn't do one or the other. I would do both.
Mr. Royce. Any other thoughts?
Mr. Heinonen. Thank you.
As I said in my written statement, I fully agree and
support what Dr. Perry said. I think the NSG is the easiest and
fastest way to achieve this goal.
Mr. Berman. Since they operate by consensus, if we can
persuade them--because we had spent a lot of time at the NSG,
we have in the past, and not achieved some of the things we
have wanted to get there.
Mr. Perry. Had I been testifying here 2 weeks ago, I would
have been reluctant to make that recommendation because I would
not believe it could have been achieved. Now I think it is
worth going back and trying again.
Mr. Berman. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Berman.
I think we are going to adjourn. We have got about 4
minutes. We are going to stand in recess until the conclusion
of this vote, at which time we will meet here again.
[Recess.]
Mr. Royce. The committee is going to reconvene, and we will
go to Mr. Aloise for his testimony. You want to summarize for
the record.
STATEMENT OF MR. GENE ALOISE, DIRECTOR, NATURAL RESOURCES AND
ENVIRONMENT TEAM, U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE
Mr. Aloise. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, I am
pleased to be here today to discuss our concerns with IAEA's
Technical Cooperation Program and the State Department and
IAEA's actions to implement the recommendations from our March
2009 report.
As you know, a key mission of IAEA is to promote the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy. Through its TC program, the
agency provides nuclear equipment, training, fellowships, and
other services to its member states. The U.S. is the largest
contributor to the program, and in 2010 contributed over $31
million.
While the bulk of the TC projects have not involved the
transfer of sensitive nuclear materials and technology, TC
assistance can have dual-use implications and has been provided
to countries of proliferation concern. As we reported in 2009,
neither State nor IAEA seeks to limit or deny TC assistance to
countries that the United States has designated as state
sponsors of terrorism, including Cuba, Iran, Sudan, and Syria;
are not party to the NPT, such as India, Israel, and Pakistan;
and do not have comprehensive safeguard agreements. The former
head of the TC program told us that all requests for TC
assistance are based on technical merits and that there were no
good countries or bad countries participating in the program.
We also reported that IAEA officials told us that the
agency did not limit TC assistance to Iran and Syria, even
though they have been found or suspected of violating their
safeguards commitments and may be engaged in undeclared nuclear
activities.
Our report noted that assessing proliferation concerns with
TC projects was difficult because of the lack of sufficient and
timely information on project proposals. For example, of the
over 1,500 projects that DOE and its national laboratories
reviewed between 1998 and 2006 for proliferation risk, 97
percent of the proposals contained only project titles, which
is not enough data to assess proliferation risk. In addition,
DOE and its national laboratories did not have enough time to
sufficiently review the projects.
While IAEA's Safeguards Department reviews TC proposals,
and ongoing projects, the results of these reviews are
confidential and not shared with the United States or other
governments, so we cannot assess the effectiveness of this
internal IAEA review.
From 1998 through 2006, DOE and its national laboratories
identified 43 of the over 1,500 proposals as having some degree
of proliferation concern or needing more data to determine such
risk. IAEA approved 34 of the 43 projects, and it is unclear to
us if State addressed DOE's concerns because in all but one
case State did not document how it responded to these concerns.
We also reported on shortcomings in State's monitoring of
the TC fellowships' program. Over 1,000 TC program fellows have
studied nuclear issues at universities and other institutions
in the United States over a 10-year period. We found that 23 of
them were from countries that did not sign the NPT and in one
case was from a U.S.-designated state sponsor of terrorism,
namely Syria. There were six fellows from Syria.
In addition, the IAEA does not track the status,
whereabouts, and activities of former TC fellows to verify that
they are not involved in weapons-related research after they
have completed their studies.
Our 2009 report made several recommendations to State to
correct these weaknesses in the management of the TC program,
and some progress has been made in implementing our
recommendations.
It is important to note that State cannot require the IAEA
to implement a recommendation, but as the largest financial
contributor to the agency the U.S. does have leverage in making
improvements to the program. According to State, the IAEA is
now providing information on project proposals earlier in the
approval process. However, according to DOE, the amount of
information about each project is still limited and
insufficient to assess proliferation risks.
In addition, State appears to be doing a better job of
tracking TC projects of proliferation concern and has developed
new guidance regarding fellowships.
Importantly, however, State still strongly disagrees with
our suggestion to the Congress to consider requiring State to
withhold a proportionate share of U.S. contributions to the TC
fund for assistance to U.S.-designated state sponsors of
terrorism. We continue to believe that Congress should
seriously consider this matter, because there is precedent for
such withholding, and such action would follow through a more
consistent and cohesive U.S. policy toward nations that the
United States has deemed inherently dangerous.
Mr. Chairman, that concludes my remarks, and I would be
happy to address any questions you or other members may have.
[The prepared statement of Mr. Aloise follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Mr. Royce. We appreciate your testimony, Mr. Aloise.
I think we will go first to Jean Schmidt for her questions.
Mrs. Schmidt. Thank you so much, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Sokolski--did I say that right?
Mr. Sokolski. Sokolski.
Mrs. Schmidt. Sokolski. I apologize, sir. We are all Irish
today. Are you Irish, sir? Well, Schmidt is an Irish name, too.
Anyway, sir, a key element of U.S. policy related to the
expansion of civilian nuclear energy overseas is providing
ready access to a fuel supply, so that emerging nations,
nuclear nations, do not have to build their own enrichment
capabilities. This policy serves a major nonproliferation goal
in that enrichment can be used both for peaceful purposes and
for developing highly enriched uranium for weapons. However, in
order for the U.S. to maintain a leadership position in this
arena, it is necessary for a domestic U.S. enrichment capacity
to be available to the world market. Sir, do you agree that it
is in the policy interests of the United States to maintain a
strong domestic enrichment industry?
Mr. Sokolski. Let me answer that question by noting that I
am an avid car buff. I actually do now own one American
automobile. The rest are Japanese, made in the United States.
They are better.
We are now very strong in enrichment because of URENCO. I
would say that is okay. In other words, I don't really think we
are anything other than supplied well, and there are a lot of
other suppliers besides those housed in the United States.
I wish the supply of fuel was the major lever for
nonproliferation that it might have been in the 1970s. I
suspect, although you can't be against multinational fuel
banks, or for that matter almost anything multinational, we
have gone a bit too far in arguing everyone has an inalienable
right to make fuel, which I don't read in the treaty and I have
written extensively on, and many others have. I think we have
overdone it.
And the economics of making fuel, unfortunately, are not
that much worse than boiling water, and these reactors are
costing $4 billion to $10 billion. Making fuel under some
circumstances can cost a fraction of that. I think we are in
trouble for that reason, and I think it would be nice to think
that we could be cast back into the 1960s when we made almost
all the fuel and the Russians were the only others. Those days
are, unfortunately, well behind us.
And I would not be apprehensive about URENCO, which is
owned by foreigners, but I think they are friends. They are
very close friends. Mr. Domenici certainly was not upset about
it, and I think he is a pretty good measure for what is okay
when it comes to the nuclear industry. So I wouldn't be
apprehensive about that.
Mrs. Schmidt. Thank you.
Mr. Heinonen, did I say that correctly?
Mr. Heinonen. Yes.
Mrs. Schmidt. Oh, good. Thank you, sir.
Recently, Syria announced that on April 1st it will allow
IAEA inspectors to visit an acid purification plant in the city
of Homs. One of the byproducts of this plant is yellowcake and
uranium concentrate. Commercial satellite photos recently
released by the Institute for Science and International
Security, however, may prove that Syria has been working to
perfect atomic weapons since before Israel's military strike in
2007. There may also be another two or three sites in Syria
with nuclear facilities. If Syria chooses to revoke its
permission to the IAEA to conduct the April 1st inspection, or,
should it continue to refuse the IAEA inspection access to its
other potentially nuclear sites, how should the IAEA respond?
Mr. Heinonen. Thank you.
First of all, I think that this step to allow the IAEA to
visit this production plant in Syria is a very modest step. It
doesn't solve this problem at all, in my view. It is important
that the IAEA have full access to the destroyed reactor and
facilities which might be related to that, and these are the
locations which you just mentioned in your question. In order
to solve this problem and to ensure that all nuclear material
in Syria is placed under the IAEA safeguards. What needs to be
done, if Syria doesn't heed to this IAEA request, in my
personal view the IAEA would use all the powers which it has
and then the next logical step is to do a special inspection.
Thank you.
Mrs. Schmidt. I yield back my time.
Mr. Royce. Thank you.
I am going to go to Mr. Sherman. He is the ranking member
of the Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Subcommittee.
Mr. Sherman. Thank you.
First, I want to commend the chairwoman for moving forward
with legislation. But, let's face it, the only bills the
President is going to sign this year are appropriations bills
and post offices. Everything else is a statement. If we are
going to be able to have Congress play a role in this area we
are going to have to take whatever bill this committee comes up
with and insist that it be made part of the appropriations
bill. If we are not able to do that, unwilling to do that,
unwilling to cross party lines in order to demand it, it is not
going to happen and service on this committee will be
educational but otherwise irrelevant. As I said, if it is not
in the appropriations bill, it is never going to become law;
and the President is not going to want us to reinject Congress
into the decision-making process.
One thing I found is, whatever people believe when they are
running for President, whatever party they are for, they are
against Congress actually having any control of anything just
as soon as they walk into the White House. Whether there is
some sort of new form of Legionnaire's Disease inhabiting that
building that skews one's view of the division of power and the
balance of power, I don't know.
I want to commend Mr. Sokolski for your comment that our
Government has, in effect, given away the store by seeming to
acknowledge that Article 4 of the NPT allows countries to
enrich and get within striking distance of a nuclear weapon all
while claiming to be in compliance with the NPT. I can
understand why the Iranian Foreign Ministry takes that
position. If you look at the text, your interpretation is just
as valid and has the additional advantage of not leading to
nuclear weapons in the hands of some of the most nefarious
governments.
I raised this question informally with some of your
colleagues, so I will ask you, why is it that countries are
reluctant to agree to a liability protocol that allows American
companies to do business in their country when sovereign
immunity grants that same liability protection automatically to
French and Russian companies? And is there a way for these
companies to simply agree that whatever defenses the relevant
French or Russian company would have are also available to
others building nuclear plants in their country?
Mr. Sokolski. I want to make sure I understand the
question, so I don't just talk.
Mr. Sherman. It is my understanding nobody wants to build a
nuclear plant if they can get sued for $20 trillion unless they
have a damn good defense. The French company can claim
sovereign immunity. I don't know exactly the French
Government's involvement. The Russian company likewise. The
American company goes in unless the laws of the host country
provide for special liability treatment, and even the so-called
gold standard agreement we reached with the UAE did not provide
that.
As you may have heard, some of my constituents are
concerned about jobs, and what is the good of all these nuclear
agreements if American companies are completely shut out of the
process? So why are host countries reluctant to give our
companies the same liability protection which they in effect
give to the French, the Russians, and someday maybe the
Chinese?
Mr. Sokolski. Simple. It saves money. The product that they
can buy from the Koreans, French, and if the Germans help the
Russians, is pretty good. It costs less.
Mr. Sherman. I am not asking why they buy the other
product. I mean, you can lose a bid. Why do they shut us out of
the bidding by not adopting the liability law?
Mr. Sokolski. Well, because they have to spend--it is not
just something you sign. You have to take money and put it into
an account and create a pool of money to implement that CFC
law, which is really what you are asking them to do.
Mr. Sherman. No, what I am asking is simply to provide by
law that a lawsuit against General Electric would be treated
just the same as a lawsuit against a Russian company that
happens to be government owned.
Mr. Sokolski. You can change the law. If that is the
character of the question, have at it.
I think that the problem is just that, though. What we
tried to do is use an international vehicle, and we created the
CFC. I can sense the frustration with that because no one wants
to sign up to it because it requires putting money aside.
Effectively, you may very well have a point. But you have to
understand you are then putting the U.S. Government in the
position of assuming risk, and you are hoping----
Mr. Sherman. Again, my question is just a simple one-
sentence statement in the liability law. I realize you----
Mr. Sokolski. Well, I do think that the recourse--I guess
the simple one-sentence answer is ``heads up.'' Our court
system would take seriously suits in a way that people going to
a French or Russian court would be very unlikely to get relief.
So the Treasury is open for raiding if you do this, I think, if
there is an accident.
To give you an example, the Japanese did channel away the
liability, so GE is not subject to suit.
Mr. Sherman. I believe my time is expired.
Mr. Royce. We are going to go to Mr. Jeff Duncan from South
Carolina for his questions.
Mr. Duncan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman; and I thank the
panelists for being here today.
The issues around the world and Japan are very concerning
to me, because I have been to Japan and my heart goes out to
the folks there. We are watching that issue very, very closely.
And, Mr. Chairman, as you know, we have the Nation's most
important site for nonproliferation in my district in South
Carolina, and that is the Savannah River Site and Savannah
River National Laboratory. The Savannah River Site handles the
most sensitive nuclear materials and seeks to ensure that the
legacy weapons materials once used in the nuclear weapons that
kept our country safe are used in the future hopefully for
energy production.
In addition to these legacy materials, the Savannah River
Site receives spent fuel from the countries that were involved
in IAEA's Atoms for Peace programs dating back to the 1950s.
This issue is of particular importance, as you can see, to my
district, and I commend the chairwoman for holding the hearing
today.
But let me be clear, while we are proud of the ongoing
missions and future missions at the Savannah River Site,
especially the role that the Site plays in helping the Nation
address energy independence, the Site is not--and I repeat
not--suitable for long-term storage of legacy weapons
materials, nor spent fuel from the Atoms for Peace countries.
As we continue to pursue MOX reprocessing in this country,
we need to also address the long-term stable and secure storage
of these materials. I specifically point to Yucca Mountain and
the billions of taxpayer dollars that have been spent there and
ask this: With further and future nonproliferation agreements
in place resulting in a future increase in legacy weapons
materials, I would be interested in hearing your ideas for how
these materials should be dealt with, specifically storage and
the validity of Yucca Mountain. And I will address that to Mr.
Sokolski first.
Mr. Sokolski. First, you have got time. Don't get in a rush
to get this wrong. I think there is a kind of imperative about
solving these waste problems which does not parallel the
reality of what is going on.
Certainly with the civil fuel it is pretty clear. When
environmentalists and utility managers are doing and thinking
the same thing and storing it on-site in casks, and the
National Research Council says that is a good, safe way and
cheap way to do things, you should take yes for an answer. That
will do, I was told by DOE. But that is only good, they said,
for 500 to 1,000 years. I said, well, for government work, that
is a start. Not bad. Last I checked, we haven't been around
that long. So let that happen. Don't get in the way of that.
Second, with regard to the military things--I think Dr.
Perry may have ideas as well--I think it is very important,
first, to make what you have secure, whatever form it is in.
Moving stuff around, particularly moving stuff around in places
like Russia, I don't know, I would be not too quick to do that
unless you had to.
With those two rules of thumb, you can get by for quite a
while. And in government doing a pretty good job in getting by
is a pretty high standard these days. Generally, we don't meet
that standard. So I would shoot for that first.
Mr. Duncan. Are you familiar with the processes that are
being handled at H Canyon, Savannah River Site?
Mr. Sokolski. A little, yes.
Mr. Duncan. It is very concerning to me, Mr. Chairman and
the panelists here, that we are seeing the Department of Energy
reevaluate and I guess divert assets and revenues to
environmental management, which is an important aspect going on
at both Savannah River Site, Hanford, and all across the land.
But it is concerning to us that they are taking resources
from H Canyon, which has been up and running for 40 years,
processing the nuclear material; and with the nonproliferation
materials coming to Savannah River Site and the role that H
Canyon would play in reprocessing that and a lot of other
missions that are going on there, it is very, very concerning
to me and the delegation from South Carolina that Secretary Chu
and his staff have decided to take $100 million away from H
Canyon. Because what is going to happen there is we are going
to lose the valuable human resources that would seek employment
in other areas, and we will lose those from Savannah River
Site.
And so as we move forward, as we talk about the
nonproliferation and the legacy weapons materials, that we keep
in mind that H Canyon plays a vital role in this country and
has for 40 years. It doesn't need to be put in warm standby. It
needs to be continuing to conduct the missions it was designed
for.
Thank you. I yield back.
Mr. Royce. Mr. Faleomavaega from Guam.
Mr. Faleomavaega. No, I am from American Samoa, Mr.
Chairman.
Mr. Royce. American Samoa, I stand corrected.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Chairman, thank you; and thank our
panel of witnesses for their expertise in also sharing with us
the issue that we are discussing this morning.
I have somewhat of a different perspective in terms of how
we are to address the issue of nuclear technology and the
problems that we are faced with right now, especially with the
situation in Japan and the aftermath of the earthquake and the
tsunami. I say that I take a different perspective because it
is almost like a broken record now. We have been talking about
nuclear proliferation, we talk about regulatory aspects and the
importance of the strategic and military interests that we
have. The number of nuclear weapons that are now in place--and
correct me if I am wrong--that we now currently have the
capacity with all the nuclear powers they have in their
possession, these nuclear weapons, enough to blow this planet
10 times over with its capacity and to say that madness that
continues in terms of why we continue to have in our possession
these nuclear weapons or weapons of mass destruction----
I wanted to ask you gentlemen if you can help me. What
country--my understanding is France currently depends--about 80
percent of its energy resources come from nuclear technology. I
wanted to ask in your opinion which country currently has the
most advanced technology dealing with nuclear energy?
It is quite obvious that, what, for the last 30 or 40 years
Japan has revealed the fact that there is tremendous weakness
in the capacity and ability of the Japanese Government to
address the dangerous situation that we are now faced with with
the four nuclear reactors that have dangerously come down to
the problems of what is happening in the Fukushima nuclear
reactor there in Japan.
But I am curious, gentlemen, in your best judgment, which
country currently has the best technology on nuclear technology
for its use for peaceful purposes, for example, France being
one of those countries?
Mr. Sokolski. I will take a stab.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Please.
Mr. Sokolski. I think it is not fair to pick just one.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Your microphone.
Mr. Sokolski. I am sorry.
I think that each country has some comparative strengths,
and they are different. When it comes to design, the U.S. is
pretty good. In advanced design, the U.S. advanced design is
pretty good. When it comes to constructing something quickly
and for a reasonable firm price, boy, I think the Koreans have
a lot to offer. When it comes to large plants that are
reasonably modern that can be built, France has something to
offer. It doesn't come cheap. And if you want price, the price
leader is Russia. By the way, reliability is a different
problem. So it depends what you are looking for, and that is
the reason why there is all these different firms.
Now, I didn't mention China because they are not quite in
the game yet, but they will come into the game because we gave
them a lot of good reactor technology, and we really did give
it to them. My guess is once they get into the mode of
mastering that you will see them on the market, and their price
will be low.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Mr. Heinonen.
Mr. Heinonen. Thank you.
Well, I have a couple of remarks, though Mr. Sokolski I
think summarized this pretty well.
One can look at this from another angle, which is maybe
important from the nonproliferation point of view. When we look
at the risks of nuclear energy, it is not only the enrichment.
We need also to look at what to do with the spent fuel and how
to deal with the plutonium contained in the spent fuel with the
longer term.
And, therefore, when we look for solutions we should look
to a leasing option for the nuclear fuel. So whoever sells you
a reactor actually leases the fuel for the lifetime of the
reactor by providing investment services and taking the fuel
back and then disposing of it. This is the kind of solution we
should look for at this point in time. As Henry said, I think
that might be the widest nuclear fuel cycle support that can be
provided today both by Russia and, to a certain degree, France.
Many other countries have a lot of limitations to take back,
for example, spent fuel to their own territory.
Mr. Faleomavaega. Secretary Perry.
Mr. Perry. I concur with what both the previous witnesses
have said.
Mr. Faleomavaega. My time is up. I appreciate it. Thank
you, Mr. Chairman. I barely started.
Mr. Royce. Thank you very much.
We are going to go to Mr. Fortenberry from Nebraska.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Before I begin my questions, let me make an observation. As
I look out here, we have got a group of young people here, and
that is good. I am glad you are interested in the question. As
I look over here, we have a few members of the press. We have a
former Secretary of Defense, a high-ranking official, former
official in the International Atomic Energy Agency
nonproliferation experts. A few Members. What is at issue here
is the future of civilization, but I guess no one has the time.
This is a very, very real problem that has heightened
awareness in this body, and I assume in other places, but is
just not quite a priority. Now, maybe with the disasters in
Japan, it will become more so. But this is not something that
we can react to. This is something that we have to prevent,
nonproliferation of this powerful technology that can be used
for good or for devastating harm.
And so, Mr. Chairman, I think those of us who care deeply
about this--and I know others do, but it just doesn't get to be
prioritized--have an important job to do here in heightening
the awareness of a need to be focused constantly on how we
think clearly and strategically as to reduce proliferation in
our world or to increase nonproliferation objectives in our
world.
With that said, I think if I could summarize as succinctly
as possible what you all are talking about, is in effect what
we have to have, what we are looking for, what is very delicate
to achieve for the objective of nonproliferation, is a global
private-public partnership that effectively is enforced through
a shared geopolitical strategy. And that is tricky. That sort
of transcends the boundaries of treaties. It transcends the
boundaries of trade. It sort of becomes a hybrid model of
enforcement that is based upon good will, based upon a
willingness to not cheat in terms of business agreements, and
pressure by governments consistently to achieve the objective
of nonproliferation.
Now, the Nuclear Suppliers Group I guess approximates this
entity or this kind of concept as much as possible. China is
now apparently cheating, so there might be even cracks in what
has worked to a degree in seeking nonproliferation objectives
in a communal worldwide sense.
So, with that said, let me ask you this. Mr. Sokolski, you
had said earlier I don't think there is an inalienable right to
make your own nuclear fuel. How did this paradigm come about?
How can we shift and change that? I heard your earlier answer
that perhaps it is foregone now. It is too late. This is
related to the idea of how again do we strengthen the
capabilities of the other entities that are out there.
And this would be your question Mr.--is it pronounced
Heinonen? The governor of Nebraska is named Heineman, by the
way. Is the IAEA capable of achieving the objective of
nonproliferation or is it constrained by--just tell me the
constraints that are there that prevent the ultimate objective,
what we are trying to achieve.
Mr. Sokolski. In answer to your question, if you are on a
bad, bad roll, it is very important--I know when you ski if you
are making mistakes the first thing you are supposed to do is
stop. You don't keep skiing and try to correct yourself. You
stop, and then you rethink what you are doing. I think with
regard to this argument about rights, it is a way of
interpreting the treaty. But I think, as Mr. Sherman pointed
out, it is corrosive to a lot more of the provisions of the
treaty to interpret it that way than to say, Well, whatever it
is has to be safe.
Mr. Fortenberry. So why hasn't the paradigm shifted?
Mr. Sokolski. Well, because we have chosen in this country,
as well as encouraging other nuclear suppliers to follow our
lead, to make our mistakes in this regard hereditary. What we
have done is, well, because we said yes to Japan and yes to
South Africa and yes to Brazil, we cannot stop and say maybe we
need to rethink that. Maybe, at a minimum, we need to stop
saying out loud, they clearly have the right. Maybe we need to
start saying, you know, it is really not in the treaty. And
maybe we have to make sure that, at a minimum, whatever
activity it is, it is safeguardable and beneficial.
Mr. Fortenberry. The right depends upon certain conditions.
Mr. Sokolski. Right.
Mr. Fortenberry. Now, in that regard, we put out an
agreement with the UAE that was supposed to become a gold
standard for nonproliferation objectives while pursuing civil
nuclear technology.
Mr. Sokolski. Right.
Mr. Fortenberry. There is some problem there in that we
don't have other countries who are willing to accept the same
standards and therefore can outcompete us.
Now, you were talking earlier about leverage. If you can
get the French to go along with certain provisions by, I
assume, leveraging our loan guarantees for their business in
this country to accept that gold standard, then the Germans and
the Russians potentially follow. Did I follow you correctly in
that regard?
Mr. Sokolski. Yes, roughly. There are other things the
French want, too. It seems to me that the key advantage of the
gold standard is that, in lieu of having an international
organization that runs and owns everything, you are at least
making a clear distinction between what is safe and dangerous.
You have got to get everyone to go down that road. Keep in mind
in 1945 we actually tried to do this.
Mr. Fortenberry. How? What are the entities out there that
can leverage this if you shift the paradigm and actually cause
enforcement? Back to my earlier comment----
Mr. Royce. If the gentleman would yield, shift the attitude
in the Department of Energy.
Mr. Sokolski. I was going to say charity starts at home.
You have an opportunity to make it very clear what you think
safe and dangerous is, that you like the gold standard. And I
think this point about the Appropriations Committee is,
unfortunately, right on point that Mr. Sherman made. Go talk
amongst yourselves and see if anybody knows anybody on the
Appropriations Committee. Believe you me, if you start moving
down this road, you will probably leverage the most important
group. They are over in the White House. And they will go, oh,
my God, if they are going to do this, we need to preempt them.
You might be able to get some of this done without necessarily
getting the law passed if they think you are serious and it
looks like you are really going to do it.
Once you do it, the NSG has an opportunity that becomes
riper because, oh, my God, they are really going to do this.
Let's preempt it.
You have a golden opportunity here, I think, to get the
gold standard looked at more seriously by more countries. And I
think, unfortunately, it has taken this accident and the
reduced value of stocks in nuclear vendors, the lack of credit,
the opportunity that has been afforded by natural gas not to
have to go nuclear immediately. All of this is in your favor.
If you don't act now, I think it is a mistake.
Mr. Fortenberry. Thank you.
Mr. Royce. If I could follow up on that observation or that
point. Right now, we have the leverage. We have the President's
statement in Prague in 2009 that we were going to face this new
paradigm in civil nuclear cooperation in which all countries
are going to be able to enjoy the benefits of nuclear power
while avoiding the spread of nuclear weapons and technology.
Well, we have a basis for that--or we had--the UAE
agreement. If you look at a situation like the one that the
administration is contemplating for Vietnam, which is what we
are talking about now, I think what you called that was driving
a stake through the heart of our efforts to stop the spread of
nuclear fuel. I mean, once we back off of the position that you
had to forego enrichment and reprocessing, we really are in a
new paradigm.
And so if we use the leverage we have now to get back to
the agreements that will at least halt that spread, I don't
think that the problem is as dire as my colleague would
indicate in terms of the situation with the votes in either the
House or the Senate. And certainly with a two-thirds override
the administration would, I think, be confronted with the real
politics of dealing with this issue. And I think it is very
important that we deal with it quickly, especially when we have
the leverage.
So it is true we might be able to do it through the
appropriations process, but we could also run legislation into
the Senate and talk to Mr. Lugar and talk to Mr. Kerry and
other members of the Senate.
I do think--well, I will go to a question to you, Mr.
Sokolski; and that is, one of the excuses for not following
through with the type of agreement we had with the UAE vis-a-
vis Vietnam was, well, it is a different situation. In the
Middle East, you are facing proliferation, but you don't have
that problem in Asia. I think the quote was, ``It doesn't apply
to Asia. The concerns about an arms race in the Middle East
aren't the same concerns in Asia.''
Well, I am not sure that that is the right premise. I think
about North Korea: First plutonium and then uranium enrichment.
We see the reactions to that in South Korea, Japan, and Taiwan.
I think about the transfer from North Korea to Burma that we
are all concerned about in terms of this capability, of the
fact that China is looking to sell reactors to Pakistan. Isn't
this just as combustible an area, potentially, as the Middle
East, and shouldn't we apply the same standard? Isn't this an
opportunity right now to leverage that standard?
Mr. Sokolski. It is worse than you even have laid out.
Privately, Jordanian officials were reported to have said,
``Why in the world would we in the Middle East agree to a
standard if you are not willing to inflict it on Vietnam? Why
are we different?'' So you do--it is kind of like the house
divided speech that Lincoln gave. Now, that was a more odious
topic, it was slavery and whether or not you could divide the
good States from the bad States and you would have slavery in
the South but not the North. And he said, ``This is not
tenable. You will either have the country entirely free or
entirely enslaved.'' I think this is just such a proposition,
and it is clear enough for any other foreign official to
figure. It should be clear enough for anyone here to figure as
well.
Mr. Royce. Then why is that unclear to these spokesmen? Why
is it unclear to the U.S. Department of Energy? What is the
impetus for going off of the gold standard and going onto this
slippery slope that will get away from us with Vietnam?
Mr. Sokolski. I think Dr. Perry can perhaps address this as
well as anyone. But my own personal experience working in the
Pentagon is it is very hard to think about the long run and
what might be important if what is urgent is just getting
people happy who are right in front of you and you have a
current country that you want to please. So it is really the
reason why we have--I hate to say it--division of power and why
there is oversight.
Mr. Royce. Thank you.
Secretary Perry, your observations on this point.
Mr. Perry. I would just add to what Mr. Sokolski said that
the danger in Asia is at least as great as the danger in the
Middle East.
Mr. Royce. All right. Well, that counters pretty
effectively the quote.
Mr. Heinonen, your thoughts.
Mr. Heinonen. Yes, thank you.
Actually, I agree with what the both witnesses said. And I
would say that we have also to look forward. And what we are
here testing is the credibility of the regime. You cannot have
two standards in the same regime. And then also I think that it
is important to think that times may change, and there is also
a threat also in Asia.
Mr. Royce. Yes, yes. Thank you, Mr. Heinonen.
Mr. Aloise.
Mr. Aloise. I would just add we have addressed this overall
problem in light of our nonproliferation work and that is
sending mixed messages. I think we should be as careful as we
can in making sure in all the different realms of
nonproliferation that we send the same message and that we are
serious about it. What is good for one nonproliferation regime
in one country should be the same in another.
Mr. Royce. Thank you, Mr. Aloise.
I think this is a critical issue that we are dealing with,
and one of the things I just want to convey is our appreciation
for having you witnesses with your expertise join us today and
lay out your views. We have your written testimony as well for
the record, and let me express our deep appreciation to you for
being here for this hearing today.
The hearing will now stand adjourned. Thank you.
[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the committee was adjourned.]
A P P E N D I X
----------
Material Submitted for the Hearing Record
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
__________
[Responses from Mr. Olli Heinonen, senior fellow, Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
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[Responses from Mr. Henry Sokolski, executive director,
Nonproliferation Policy Education Center:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
[Responses from Mr. Gene Aloise, director, Natural Resources and
Environment Team, U.S. Government Accountability Office:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
__________
[Note: Responses from the Honorable William J. Perry, former
Secretary of Defense, senior fellow, Hoover Institution, to Mr.
Bilirakis' questions were not submitted to the committee prior to
printing.]
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