[Senate Hearing 111-897]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-897
THE NEW START AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
----------
JUNE 17; JULY 15, 20, 27, 29, 2010
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
S. Hrg. 111-897
THE NEW START AND THE IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL SECURITY
=======================================================================
HEARINGS
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
JUNE 17; JULY 15, 20, 27, 29, 2010
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC(S) NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
65-071 PDF WASHINGTON : 2011
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20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
(Before July 22, 2010)
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
BILL NELSON, Florida LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JIM WEBB, Virginia GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
______
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
(After July 22, 2010)
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JACK REED, Rhode Island JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
BILL NELSON, Florida SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
EVAN BAYH, Indiana JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
JIM WEBB, Virginia ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
MARK UDALL, Colorado SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
MARK BEGICH, Alaska DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
CARTE P. GOODWIN, West Virginia
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Joseph W. Bowab, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
----------
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty and Implications for National
Security
june 17, 2010
Page
Clinton, Hon. Hillary Rodham, Secretary of State................. 5
Gates, Hon. Robert M., Secretary of Defense...................... 10
Chu, Hon. Steven, Secretary of Energy............................ 14
Mullen, ADM Michael G., USN, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.......................................................... 18
Sustaining Nuclear Weapons Under the New Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty
july 15, 2010
Schwitters, Hon. Roy F., Ph.D., Chairman, Jason Defense Advisory
Group, and S.W. Richardson Foundation Regental Professor of
Physics, University of Texas at Austin......................... 96
Anastasio, Hon. Michael R., Ph.D., Director, Los Alamos National
Laboratory..................................................... 101
Miller, Hon. George H. Ph.D., Director, Lawrence Livermore
National Laboratory............................................ 110
Hommert, Hon. Paul J., Ph.D., Director, Sandia National
Laboratories................................................... 119
Implementation of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
july 20, 2010
Miller, Hon. James N. Ph.D., Principal Deputy Under Secretary of
Defense for Policy............................................. 192
D'Agostino, Hon. Thomas P. Administrator, National Nuclear
Security Administration, Department of Energy.................. 199
Chilton, Gen. Kevin P., USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.. 203
Independent Analyses of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
july 27, 2010
Foster, Dr. John S., Jr., Independent Consultant................. 280
Miller, Franklin C., Independent Consultant...................... 284
Payne, Dr. Keith B., Professor and Head, Graduate Department of
Defense and Strategic Studies, Missouri State University
(Washington Campus)............................................ 285
Pifer, Ambassador Steven, Senior Fellow, Foreign Policy Center on
the United States and Europe, and Director, Arms Control
Initiative, the Brookings Institution.......................... 292
(iii)
Continue to Receive Testimony on the New Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty
july 29, 2010
Gottemoeller, Hon. Rose E., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of
Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Department of
State.......................................................... 344
Warner, Hon. Edward L., III, Ph.D., Secretary of Defense
Representative to Post-START Negotiations, Department of
Defense........................................................ 349
THE NEW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY
----------
THURSDAY, JUNE 17, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:33 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman,
Akaka, E. Benjamin Nelson, Bayh, McCaskill, Udall, Hagan,
Begich, Burris, McCain, Inhofe, Chambliss, Thune, Brown, Burr,
and Collins.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; and
Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant.
Minority staff members present: Christian D. Brose,
professional staff member; Michael V. Kostiw, professional
staff member; and Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard, Hannah I. Lloyd,
Brian F. Sebold, and Breon N. Wells.
Committee members' assistants present: James Tuite,
assistant to Senator Byrd; Christopher Griffin and Vance
Serchuk, assistants to Senator Lieberman; Nick Ikeda, assistant
to Senator Akaka; Greta Lundeberg, assistant to Senator Bill
Nelson; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Patrick
Hayes, assistant to Senator Bayh; Tressa Guenov, assistant to
Senator McCaskill; Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator
Udall; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Lindsay
Kavanaugh, assistant to Senator Begich; Amanda Fox, assistant
to Senator Burris; Jonathan Epstein, assistant to Senator
Bingaman; Halie Soifer, assistant to Senator Kaufman; Anthony
Lazarski and Rob Soofer, assistants to Senator Inhofe; Sandra
Luff, assistant to Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV,
assistant to Senator Chambliss; Andy Olson, assistant to
Senator Graham; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune;
Erskine Wells III, assistant to Senator Wicker; Brian Walsh,
assistant to Senator LeMieux; Scott Clendaniel, Scott Schrage,
and William Wright, assistants to Senator Brown; Kevin Kane,
assistant to Senator Burr; and Ryan Kaldahl, assistant to
Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. Today the Armed
Services Committee begins hearings on the New Strategic Arms
Reduction Treaty (START). I would like to welcome our
witnesses: Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton, Secretary
of Defense Robert Gates, Secretary of Energy Steven Chu, and
Admiral Michael Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff. It's a real pleasure to have all of you with us this
morning.
This, I think, is Secretary Chu's first appearance before
the committee. I believe it is. In any event, you get a special
welcome for that.
The New START that is before us today is an important
treaty that will, as Admiral Mullen said earlier this month,
make our Nation more secure and advance our core national
security interests. This treaty is in keeping with a long
tradition of bilateral, verifiable arms control agreements with
Russia and its predecessor, the Soviet Union, and it
strengthens the United States' commitment to nonproliferation.
The U.S. Senate has previously approved 10 bilateral arms
control agreements with Russia, and before that the Soviet
Union with overwhelming bipartisan majorities. Only 1 was
opposed by more than 6 votes and, in that case, there were 19
votes opposed to it, and that was in 1993.
Three of these treaties were considered during some of the
most difficult days of the Cold War and yet they were all
approved with overwhelming support.
This New START supports a credible nuclear deterrent and
maintains the nuclear triad, while allowing both the United
States and Russia to reduce the total number of nuclear
weapons. Between them, the United States and Russia have more
than 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons. While each
nation clearly has more weapons than needed, reductions will
happen only through treaties, as neither side wants to be
unilaterally disarming.
This new treaty will help ensure that needed reductions
continue one measured step at a time. Reductions of both
nations' nuclear inventories are also required by the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), and that is a treaty that we
strive to have non-nuclear nations adhere to.
This treaty continues the reductions started in the Moscow
Treaty, which President George W. Bush negotiated. Unlike the
Moscow Treaty, however, this treaty is a verifiable treaty with
inspections and other mechanisms that will ensure transparency
in the nuclear arsenals of each side. This treaty will
continue, although with different mechanisms than the START I,
the means to allow both the United States and Russia to monitor
each other's nuclear systems.
This new treaty and the attention that President Obama has
brought to the threat from the proliferation of nuclear weapons
and nuclear materials are critically important. The
proliferation threat is real and includes the possibility that
nuclear weapons and materials could fall into the hands of
terrorists or others who wish to threaten the use of or use
nuclear materials. Through this treaty and the related efforts
to secure weapons-grade fissile materials, these dangers will
be reduced.
Fundamentally, this treaty is a treaty that limits
strategic offensive nuclear arms. It does not limit anything
else. Some might want it to limit more. Some might fear that it
does limit more. But it does not. For instance, there have been
statements made suggesting that the treaty imposes constraints
on our missile defense plans and programs. That is simply
incorrect. From the very beginning of the negotiations, this
administration has been very clear this treaty limits strategic
offensive nuclear arms, not missile defenses.
A unilateral statement made by Russia concerning missile
defense does not limit or constrain our missile defense
efforts. Indeed, a U.S. unilateral statement makes it clear
that ``Our missile defense systems are not intended to affect
the strategic balance with Russia,'' and the United States
missile defense systems would be employed to defend the United
States against limited missile launches and to defend its
deployed forces, allies, and partners against regional threats.
The unilateral statement that we made also states that the
United States intends to continue improving and deploying its
missile defense systems in order to defend itself against
limited attack and as part of our collaborative approach to
strengthening stability in key regions.
The unilateral statement of the United States will be made
part of the record at this point.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Levin. While the United States must maintain the
stockpile with or without this treaty, this treaty does bring
renewed attention to that nuclear stockpile. This new focus on
maintaining the nuclear stockpile through increased scientific
and technical rigor ensures a credible nuclear deterrent and
paves the way to future reductions.
In the early days of the stockpile stewardship program,
significant strides were made in the ability of the nuclear
weapons complex to maintain nuclear weapons without testing. It
has been almost 18 years since the last explosive nuclear
weapons test was conducted and still the stockpile remains
safe, secure, and reliable. In many ways, the scientists and
engineers know more today about nuclear weapons and how they
function than they did in the days of testing.
President Obama, Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, and
Secretary Chu have laid out a plan to increase funding for the
nuclear weapons complex and ensure a robust capability for the
foreseeable future. Linton Brooks, the former Administrator of
the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), has said
that he would have truly welcomed the budget as robust as this
budget plan of the Obama administration.
We look forward to a good discussion of all these issues
with our distinguished witnesses, and I call upon Senator
McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank our
distinguished witnesses for their service to our country and
for joining us today to discuss the New START and its
implications for our national security. In my years in the
Senate I have supported previous bipartisan efforts to reduce
our nuclear weapons in step with the Russian Government, and I
have been proud to do so. As we evaluate the New START and
consider how to vote on it, I think there are three areas of
concern that need to be resolved.
First, we need to be confident that the treaty is
verifiable, and we will have a better sense of that once
Congress receives the new national intelligence estimate.
Second, we need to be confident that the treaty in no way
limits the administration's ability and willingness to deploy
missile defense capabilities, regardless of the statements made
by the Russian government.
Finally, we need to be confident that any future reductions
in our nuclear stockpile will be accompanied by a serious long-
term commitment to modernizing our nuclear stockpile so we can
have confidence in its safety, security, and reliability.
On missile defense, as we are all aware, the concern that
the New START could constrain our capabilities is an issue of
significant importance. Secretary Gates, you have been quite
clear ``that the treaty will not constrain the United States
from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible,
nor impose additional costs or barriers on those defenses.''
While such assurances are welcome, they don't change the
fact that the treaty text, not just the preamble but Article 5
of the treaty itself, includes a clear legally-binding
limitation on our missile defense options. Now, this might not
be a meaningful limitation, but it's impossible to deny that it
is a limitation, as the administration has said.
I continue to have serious concerns about why the
administration agreed to this language in the treaty text,
after telling Congress repeatedly during the negotiations that
they would do no such thing, and I fear it could fuel Russia's
clear desire to establish unfounded linkages between offensive
and defensive weapons.
I look forward to discussing the rationale behind the
treaty's references to missile defense, and, as we do, I would
reiterate my long-held view that any notion of a Russian veto
power over decisions on our missile defense architecture is
unacceptable, and we should oppose any attempts by any
administration to do so.
As part of the administration's submittal of the New START
to the Senate, the National Defense Authorization Bill for
Fiscal Year 2010 required a report on the plan for modernizing
the nuclear weapons complex and delivery vehicles. With respect
to the nuclear weapons complex, I am skeptical that the 10-year
funding plan for NNSA adequately addresses the recapitalization
needs of the weapons complex. The double counting of funds,
combining those already planned for sustainment with the
modernization effort, paints a misleading picture. $80 billion
over the next 10 years is certainly a substantial sum. However,
only a fraction of that amount is actually above what would be
allocated simply to sustain the current stockpile.
Given the long-term neglect of the past decade, it is
imperative that our investment fulfills our immediate and
future national security needs. The administration's funding
proposals establish an adequate baseline and, while more
funding is likely needed, affordability must be closely
scrutinized. A blank check is not the appropriate way to
recapitalize our strategic deterrent. Modernizing our nuclear
delivery vehicles, enhancing missile defense, and developing
conventional weapons to augment our nuclear force far exceeds
the necessary cost for the weapons complex alone.
This future financial commitment is daunting, so we need to
allocate each and every dollar wisely and to the greatest
benefit of our national security, careful not to simply pass
the funding burden on to future administrations and Congresses.
We must have a clear understanding of these priorities from
this administration, as well as a commitment that such
investments will be represented in forthcoming budget requests.
Let me conclude by saying this treaty will have
implications on our nuclear force structure, and I look forward
to hearing additional details on the composition of our
strategic forces from our witnesses this morning.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Now let me start with Secretary Clinton.
STATEMENT OF HON. HILLARY RODHAM CLINTON, SECRETARY OF STATE
Secretary Clinton. Thank you very much, Chairman Levin,
Senator McCain, members of the committee. It's a great pleasure
for me to return to testify before a committee that I was very
honored to serve on.
We are here today, Secretary Gates, Secretary Chu, Admiral
Mullen, and myself, because we share a strong belief that the
New START will make our country more secure, and we urge the
Senate to ratify it expeditiously. Now, I know that some argue
we don't need a New START, but let's be clear about the choice
before us. It is between this treaty and no obligation for
Russia to keep its strategic nuclear forces below an agreed
level, and between this treaty and no on-the-ground
verification of Russia's strategic forces.
As Secretary Gates and then, as you, Chairman Levin, have
pointed out, every previous President of both parties who faced
this choice has concluded that the United States is better off
with a treaty than without one, and the U.S. Senate has always
agreed.
More than 2 years ago, President Bush began this process
that led to this treaty that we are discussing today. The New
START has already received broad bipartisan endorsement. As
James Schlesinger, the Secretary of Defense for Presidents
Nixon and Ford, and the Secretary of Energy for President
Carter, declared recently in his congressional testimony, ``It
is obligatory for the United States to ratify.''
Now, why do so many people who have studied this issue over
so many years, coming from opposite ends of the political
spectrum, agree so strongly? Well, today I'd like to discuss
briefly what the New START is and also what it is not. This is
a treaty that, if ratified, will provide stability,
transparency, and predictability for the two countries with
more than 90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons. It is a
treaty that will reduce the permissible number of Russian and
U.S. deployed strategic warheads to 1,550, a level not seen
since the 1950s.
In addition, each country will be limited to 700 deployed
strategic delivery vehicles and 800 deployed and nondeployed
strategic missile launchers and heavy bombers. These limits
will help the United States and Russia bring our deployed
strategic arsenals, which were sized for the Cold War, to
levels that are more appropriate for today's threats.
This is a treaty that will help us track remaining weapons
with an extensive verification regime. Now, this regime draws
upon our experience over the last 15 years in implementing the
original START. The verification provisions reflect today's
realities, including the much smaller number of facilities in
Russia compared with the former Soviet Union. For the first
time, we will be monitoring the actual numbers of warheads on
deployed strategic missiles.
By bringing the New START into force, we will strengthen
our national security more broadly, including by creating
greater leverage to tackle a core national security challenge:
nuclear proliferation. This will also demonstrate our
leadership and strengthen our hand as we work with others to
hold irresponsible governments accountable, whether in further
isolating Iran and enforcing the rules against violators, or in
persuading other countries to implement better controls on
their own nuclear materials.
It makes clear that we are committed to real reductions, to
upholding our end of the bargain under the NPT, which has
already brought about important benefits in my discussions with
foreign leaders about strengthening the nonproliferation regime
and a range of other topics.
I want to be also very clear that there are numerous things
this treaty will not do. As Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen
will discuss more fully, the New START does not compromise the
nuclear force levels we need to protect ourselves and our
allies. It does not infringe upon the flexibility we need to
maintain our forces, including bombers, submarines, and
missiles, in the way that best serves our own national security
interests.
This treaty does not constrain our missile defense efforts.
I want to underscore this because I know there have been a lot
of concerns about it, and I anticipate a lot of questions. This
is something this committee recently reiterated in the National
Defense Authorization Bill for Fiscal Year 2011. Section 231
reads: ``It is the sense of Congress that there are no
constraints contained in the New START treaty on the
development or deployment by the United States of effective
missile defenses, including all phases of the Phased Adaptive
Approach to missile defense in Europe and further enhancements
to the ground-based midcourse defense system, as well as future
missile defenses.''
Now, I worked with some of you on this committee when I had
the honor of serving in the Senate on behalf of a very strong
missile defense system, so I want to make this point very
clearly. Russia has, as the chairman said, issued a unilateral
statement expressing its view, but that is not an agreed upon
view, that is not in the treaty. It's the equivalent of a press
release, and we are not in any way bound by it. In fact, we've
issued our own statement, which is now part of the record,
making clear that the United States intends and, in fact, is
continuing to improve and deploy effective missile defense
systems.
The treaty's preamble does include language acknowledging
the relationship between strategic offensive and defensive
forces, but that's simply a statement of fact. It, too, does
not in any way constrain our missile defense programs.
The treaty also includes language--and I think this is
Senator McCain's reference to Article 5--prohibiting the
conversion or use of offensive missile launchers for missile
defense interceptors, and vice versa. In fact, we had no
intention of doing that anyway. As General O'Reilly, our
missile defense director, has made clear in testimony, we
reached the conclusion it is actually cheaper to build smaller,
tailor-made missile defense silos than to convert offensive
launchers. I mean, we could have had a long list stating we're
not going to launch from any moving vehicle like a car or a
truck or a cow. We could have said a lot of things that we're
not going to do. The fact is, we weren't going to do them, and
we weren't going to do this either.
The treaty does not restrict us in any way from building
new missile defense launchers, 14 of which are currently being
constructed in Alaska. I think the very facts on the ground
undermine and refute any argument to the contrary.
The Obama administration has requested $9.9 billion for
missile defense in fiscal year 2011. That is almost $700
million more than Congress provided in fiscal year 2010.
Finally, the New START does not restrict our ability to
modernize our nuclear weapons complex to maintain a safe,
secure, and effective deterrent. As Secretary Chu will discuss,
this administration has called for a 10 percent increase in
fiscal year 2011 for overall weapons and infrastructure
activities, in a time of very serious budget constraints. We've
called for a 25 percent increase in direct stockpile work.
During the next 10 years, this administration proposes
investing $80 billion in our nuclear weapons complex.
Let me just conclude by taking a step back and putting the
New START into a larger context. This treaty is one part of a
broader effort to reduce the threat posed by the deadliest
weapons the world has ever known, especially the potential
intersection of violent extremism and nuclear proliferation. We
have several coordinated efforts that have been briefed to this
committee, including the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), the
recently concluded Nuclear Security Summit, and the NPT review
conference, as well as extensive bilateral engagements.
While a ratified New START stands on its own terms and,
when you look at the very real benefits it provides to our
national security, it is part of a broader strategy.
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee, we
stand ready to work with you as you undertake your
constitutional responsibilities with respect to this treaty,
and we are ready to answer any and all questions. We hope that
at the end of your deliberations you will come to the same
conclusion that we and many others have reached, including many
others who have sat in these chairs and voted in the Senate
chamber, that this treaty makes our country more secure and
merits the Senate's consent to ratification.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Clinton follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Hillary Rodham Clinton
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the committee, thank
you for the opportunity to appear before you. It is a pleasure to be
back here, and a pleasure to testify with Secretary Gates, Secretary
Chu, and Admiral Mullen. We share a strong belief that the New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) will make our country more
secure, and we urge the Senate to ratify it.
I know that some argue we don't need the New START. But let's be
clear about the choice before us. It is between this treaty and no
legal obligation for Russia to keep its strategic nuclear forces below
an agreed level, and between this treaty and no on-the-ground
verification of Russia's strategic forces.
As Secretary Gates has pointed out, every previous President who
faced this choice has found that the United States is better off with a
treaty than without one. The U.S. Senate has always agreed. The 2002
Moscow Treaty was approved by a vote of 95 to 0. The vote on the 1991
START treaty was 93 to 6.
More than 2 years ago, President Bush began the process that led to
the treaty we are discussing today. The New START treaty has already
received broad bipartisan endorsement. As James Schlesinger, the
Secretary of Defense for Presidents Nixon and Ford and Secretary of
Energy for President Carter, declared recently in congressional
testimony, ``It is obligatory for the United States to ratify.''
Today, I'd like to discuss what the New START treaty is, and what
it isn't.
This is a treaty that, if ratified, will provide stability,
transparency, and predictability for the two countries with more than
90 percent of the world's nuclear weapons.
It is a treaty that will reduce the permissible number of Russian
and U.S. deployed strategic warheads to 1,550--a level not seen since
the 1950s. In addition, each country will be limited to 700 deployed
strategic delivery vehicles and 800 deployed and nondeployed strategic
missile launchers and heavy bombers. These limits will help the United
States and Russia bring our deployed strategic arsenals, which were
sized for the Cold War, to levels that are more appropriate to today's
threats.
It is a treaty that will help us track remaining weapons with an
extensive verification regime. This regime draws upon our experience
over the last 15 years in implementing the original START treaty. The
verification provisions reflect today's realities, including the
smaller number of facilities in Russia compared with former Soviet
Union. For the first time, we will be monitoring the actual numbers of
warheads on deployed strategic missiles.
By bringing the New START treaty into force, we will strengthen our
national security more broadly, including by creating greater leverage
to tackle a core national security challenge: nuclear proliferation.
It will demonstrate our leadership and strengthen our hand as we
work with our partners to hold irresponsible governments accountable--
whether in further isolating Iran and enforcing the rules against
violators or in persuading other countries to implement better controls
on their own nuclear materials. It makes clear that we are committed to
real reductions, and to upholding our end of the bargain under the
Nonproliferation Treaty--which has already brought important benefits
in my discussions with foreign leaders, about strengthening the
nonproliferation regime and a range of other topics. In my recent
meetings with other NATO officials, they expressed an overwhelmingly
positive and supportive view of the New START treaty.
There are also things that this treaty will not do.
As Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen will discuss more fully, the
New START treaty does not compromise the nuclear force levels we need
to protect ourselves and our allies.
It does not infringe upon the flexibility we need to maintain our
forces, including bombers, submarines, and missiles, in the way that
best serves our national security interests.
The treaty does not constrain our missile defense efforts. Those of
you who worked with me on this committee know my strong support of
missile defense, so I want to make this point very clearly.
Russia has issued a unilateral statement expressing its view. But
we have not agreed to this view, and we are not bound by it. In fact,
we've issued our own statement making clear that the United States
intends to continue improving and deploying effective missile defense
systems.
The treaty's preamble does include language acknowledging the
relationship between strategic offensive and defensive forces. But this
is simply a statement of fact. It does not constrain our missile
defense programs in any way.
The treaty also includes language prohibiting the conversion or use
of offensive missile launchers for missile defense interceptors, and
vice versa. But as General O'Reilly, our Missile Defense Director, has
said, it is actually cheaper to build smaller, tailor-made missile
defense silos than to convert offensive launchers. The treaty does not
restrict us from building new missile defense launchers, 14 of which
are currently being constructed in Alaska.
The Obama administration has requested $9.9 billion for missile
defense in fiscal year 2011, almost $700 million more than Congress
provided in fiscal year 2010.
Finally, the New START treaty does not restrict our ability to
modernize our nuclear weapons complex to maintain a safe, secure, and
effective deterrent. As Secretary Chu will discuss, this administration
has called for a 10-percent increase in fiscal year 2011 for overall
weapons and infrastructure activities, and a 25-percent increase in
direct stockpile work. During the next 10 years, this administration
proposes investing $80 billion in our nuclear weapons complex.
I want to conclude by taking a step back and putting the New START
treaty into a larger context. This treaty is one part of a broader
effort to reduce the threat posed by the deadliest weapons the world
has ever known--especially the potential intersection of violent
extremism and nuclear proliferation.
We have several coordinated efforts--including our new Nuclear
Posture Review, the recently concluded Nuclear Security Summit and
Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference, and extensive bilateral
engagements. While a ratified New START treaty stands on its own in
terms of the national security benefits it brings to our country, it is
also part of this broader strategy.
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and members of the committee, thank
you again for having us here today. We stand ready to work with you as
you undertake your constitutional responsibilities, and to answer all
your questions today and in the coming weeks.
We are confident that at the end of this process, you will come to
the same conclusion that we and many others have reached--that the New
START treaty makes our country more secure and merits the Senate's
consent to ratification.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Secretary Clinton.
Secretary Gates.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROBERT M. GATES, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
Secretary Gates. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and members
of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to speak today
regarding the New START between the United States and Russia,
an agreement that reduces the strategic nuclear forces of our
two nations in a manner that strengthens the stability of our
relationship and protects the security of the American people.
America's nuclear arsenal remains a vital pillar of our
national security, deterring potential adversaries and
reassuring allies and partners. As such, the first step of the
year-long NPR was an extensive analysis which, among other
things, determined how many nuclear delivery vehicles and
deployed warheads were needed. This in turn provided the basis
for our negotiation of New START. The results of those studies
give me confidence that the Department of Defense (DOD) will be
able to maintain a strong and effective nuclear deterrent while
modernizing our weapons to ensure that they are safe, secure,
and reliable, all within the limits of the new treaty.
The U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent will continue to be
based on the triad of delivery systems, intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs), and nuclear-capable heavy bombers, within the
boundaries negotiated in the New START treaty. These are an
upper boundary of 1,550 deployed warheads, up to 700 deployed
ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers, and
up to 800 deployed and nondeployed ICBM launchers, SLBM
launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.
Under this treaty, we retain the power and the freedom to
determine the composition of our force structure, allowing the
United States complete flexibility to deploy, maintain, and
modernize our strategic nuclear forces in a manner that best
protects our national security interests. DOD has established a
baseline force structure to guide our planning, one that does
not require changes to current or planned basing arrangements.
DOD will retain 240 deployed SLBMs, distributed among 14
submarines, each of which will have 20 launch tubes. This is
the most survivable leg of the triad.
Recognizing the need for flexibility in the bomber leg, we
will retain up to 60 deployed heavy bombers, including all 18
operational B-2s. Finally, the United States will retain up to
420 deployed single-warhead Minuteman III ICBMs at our current
3 missile bases.
Let me also address some of the things the treaty will not
affect. First, as Secretary Clinton has said, the treaty will
not constrain the United States from deploying the most
effective missile defenses possible, nor impose additional
costs or barriers on those defenses. I remain confident in the
U.S. missile defense program, which has made considerable
advancements, including the testing and development of the SM-3
missile, which we will deploy in Europe.
As the administration's ballistic missile defense review
and budget plans make clear, the United States will continue to
improve our capability to defend ourselves, our deployed
forces, and our allies and partners against ballistic missile
threats. As Secretary Clinton has pointed out, our request for
missile defense in the 2011 budget is $700 million over the
enacted fiscal year 2010 number, and we are looking at an
increase beyond that of potentially up to another billion
dollars for fiscal year 2012. We have made all of this clear to
the Russians in a unilateral statement made in connection with
the treaty.
It is not surprising that Russia continues to object to our
missile defense program, as they have objected to all U.S.
missile defense efforts for decades. The Russians know that our
missile defenses are designed to intercept a limited number of
ballistic missiles launched by a country such as Iran or North
Korea. Our missile defenses do not have the capability to
defend against the Russian Federation's large advanced arsenal.
Consequently, U.S. missile defenses do not and will not affect
Russia's strategic deterrent. To build such a capability, a
missile shield of the kind envisioned in the 1980s, is
technologically unfeasible, cost prohibitive, and
destabilizing. Therefore, we have no plans to do so.
Separately from the treaty, we are discussing missile
defense cooperation with Russia, which we believe is in the
interests of both nations. But such talks have nothing to do
with imposing any limitations on our programs or deployment
plans.
Furthermore, the New START does not restrict our ability to
develop and deploy conventional prompt global strike
capabilities that could attack targets anywhere on the globe in
an hour or less. The treaty's limit of 700 deployed delivery
vehicles combined with the ceiling of 1,550 deployed warheads
accommodates the limited number of conventional warheads we may
need for this capability. We are also concurrently examining
potential future prompt global strike systems that would not be
limited by this treaty.
In my view, a key contribution of this treaty is its
provision for a strong verification regime. While the
Intelligence Community will provide a detailed classified
assessment, I would like to emphasize some of the key elements
of this regime, which will monitor Russia's compliance with the
treaty while also providing important insights into the size
and composition of Russian strategic forces.
The treaty allows each party to conduct up to 18 on-site
inspections each year at operating bases for ICBMs, ballistic
missile submarines (SSBNs), and nuclear-capable heavy bombers,
as well as storage facilities, test ranges, and conversion and
elimination facilities. The agreement establishes a database,
updated every 6 months, which will help provide the United
States with a rolling overall picture of Russia's strategic
offensive forces. Unique identifiers for the first time will be
assigned to each ICBM, SLBM, and nuclear-capable heavy bomber,
allowing us to track accountable systems throughout their life
cycle. The treaty provides for non-interference with national
technical means of verification, such as reconnaissance
satellites, ground stations, and ships. While telemetry is not
needed to verify the provisions of this treaty, the terms
nonetheless call for exchange of telemetry on up to five
launches per year from each side.
I'm confident that the New START will in no way compromise
America's nuclear deterrent. Maintaining a credible deterrent
requires an adequate stockpile of safe, secure, and reliable
nuclear warheads. This calls for a reinvigoration of our
nuclear weapons complex, that is our infrastructure and our
science, technology, and engineering base. I might just add,
I've been up here for the last four springs trying to get money
for this, and this is the first time I think I have a fair shot
of actually getting money for our nuclear arsenal.
To this end, DOD is transferring $4.6 billion to the
Department of Energy's (DOE) NNSA through fiscal year 2015.
This transfer will assist in funding critical nuclear weapons
life extension programs (LEPs) and efforts to modernize the
nuclear weapons infrastructure.
The initial applications of this funding, along with an
additional $1.1 billion being transferred for naval nuclear
reactors, are reflected in the President's 2011 budget request,
which I urge Congress to approve.
These investments in the NPR for warhead life extension
represent a credible modernization plan to sustain the nuclear
infrastructure and support our Nation's deterrent.
Let me close with a final personal observation. I first
began working on strategic arms control with the Russians in
1970, 40 years ago, on a U.S. effort that led to the first
Strategic Arms Limitation Agreement with Moscow 2 years later.
The key question then and in the decades since has always been
the same: Is the United States better off with a strategic arms
agreement with the Russians or without it? The answer for
successive presidents, as Secretary Clinton has said, of both
parties has always been with an agreement. The U.S. Senate has
always agreed. The same answer holds true for New START. The
United States is better off with this treaty than without it,
and I'm confident that it is the right agreement for today and
for the future. It increases stability and predictability,
allows us to sustain a strong nuclear triad, preserves our
flexibility to deploy the nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities
needed for effective deterrence and defense.
In light of all these factors, I urge the Senate to give
its advice and consent to ratification of the new treaty.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Gates follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Robert M. Gates
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to speak today regarding the new
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty between the United States and Russia--
an agreement that reduces the strategic nuclear forces of our two
nations in a manner that strengthens the stability of our relationship
and protects the security of the American people.
America's nuclear arsenal remains a vital pillar of our national
security, deterring potential adversaries and reassuring allies and
partners. As such, the first step of the year-long Nuclear Posture
Review was an extensive analysis which, among other things, determined
how many nuclear delivery vehicles and deployed warheads were needed.
This in turn provided the basis for our negotiations of New START. The
results of those studies give me confidence that the Department of
Defense will be able to maintain a strong and effective nuclear
deterrent while modernizing our weapons to ensure that they are safe,
secure and reliable, all within the limits of the new treaty.
The U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent will continue to be based on
the triad of delivery systems--intercontinental ballistic missiles,
submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and nuclear-capable heavy
bombers--within the boundaries negotiated in the New START treaty.
Those are:
An upper boundary of 1,550 deployed warheads;
Up to 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and nuclear-
capable heavy bombers; and
Up to 800 deployed and nondeployed ICBM launchers,
SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear
armaments.
Under this treaty, we retain the power to determine the composition
of our force structure, allowing the United States complete flexibility
to deploy, maintain and modernize our strategic nuclear forces in a
manner that best protects our national security interests. The Defense
Department has established a baseline force structure to guide our
planning, one that does not require changes to current or planned
basing arrangements.
The department will retain 240 deployed submarine-
launched ballistic missiles, distributed among 14 submarines,
each of which will have 20 launch tubes. This is the most
survivable leg of the triad.
Recognizing the need for flexibility in the bomber
leg, we will retain up to 60 deployed heavy bombers, including
all 18 operational B-2s.
Finally, the United States will retain up to 420
deployed single-warhead Minuteman III ICBMs at our current 3
missiles bases.
Let me also address some of the things that the New START treaty
will not affect.
First, the treaty will not constrain the United States from
deploying the most effective missile defenses possible, nor impose
additional costs or barriers on those defenses. I remain confident in
the U.S. missile defense program, which has made considerable
advancements, including the testing and development of the SM-3
missile, which we will deploy in Europe.
As the administration's Ballistic Missile Defense Review and budget
plans make clear, the United States will continue to improve our
capability to defend ourselves, our deployed forces and our allies and
partners against ballistic missile threats. We made this clear to the
Russians in a unilateral statement made in connection with the treaty.
It is not surprising that Russia continues to object to our missile
defense program as they have objected to all U.S. missile defense
efforts for several decades. The Russians know that our missile
defenses are designed to intercept a limited number of ballistic
missiles launched by a country such as Iran or North Korea. Our missile
defenses do not have the capability to defend against the Russian
Federation's large, advanced arsenal. Consequentially, U.S. missile
defenses do not, and will not, affect Russia's strategic deterrent. To
build such a capability--a missile shield of the kind envisioned in the
1980s--is technologically unfeasible, cost prohibitive, and
destabilizing. Therefore we have no plans to do so. Separately from the
treaty, we are discussing missile defense cooperation with Russia,
which we believe is in the interest of both nations.
Furthermore, the New START treaty does not restrict our ability to
develop and deploy conventional prompt global strike capabilities that
could attack targets anywhere on the globe in an hour or less. The
treaty's limit of 700 deployed delivery vehicles, combined with the
ceiling of 1,550 deployed warheads, accommodates the limited number of
conventional warheads we may need for this capability. We are also
currently examining potential future prompt global strike systems that
would not be limited by this treaty.
In my view, a key contribution of this treaty is its provision for
a strong verification regime. While the Intelligence Community will
provide a detailed classified assessment, I would like to emphasize
some of the key elements of this regime, which will monitor Russia's
compliance with the treaty while also providing important insights into
the size and composition of Russian strategic forces.
The treaty allows each party to conduct up to 18 on-
site inspections each year at operating bases for ICBMs, SSBNs
and nuclear-capable heavy bombers, as well as storage
facilities, test ranges and conversion and elimination
facilities.
The agreement establishes a database, updated every 6
months, which will help provide the United States with a
rolling overall picture of Russia's strategic offensive forces.
Unique identifiers for the first time will be assigned
to each ICBM, SLBM and nuclear-capable heavy bomber, allowing
us to track accountable systems throughout their life cycles.
The treaty provides for noninterference with national
technical means of verification such as reconnaissance
satellites, ground stations and ships.
While telemetry is not needed to verify the provisions
of this treaty, the terms nonetheless call for the exchange of
telemetry on up to five launches per year, for each side.
I am confident that the New START treaty will in no way compromise
America's nuclear deterrent. Maintaining a credible deterrent requires
an adequate stockpile of safe, secure and reliable nuclear warheads.
This calls for a reinvigoration of our nuclear weapons complex--that
is, our infrastructure and our science, technology and engineering
base.
To this end, the Department of Defense is transferring $4.6 billion
to the Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration
through fiscal year 2015. This transfer will assist in funding critical
nuclear weapons life-extension programs and efforts to modernize the
nuclear weapons infrastructure. The initial applications of this
funding along with an additional $1.1 billion being transferred for
naval nuclear reactors are reflected in the President's fiscal year
2011 budget request, which I urge Congress to approve. These
investments and the Nuclear Posture Review strategy for warhead life
extension represent a credible modernization plan to sustain the
nuclear infrastructure and support our Nation's deterrent.
I would close with a final observation. I first began working on
strategic arms control with the Russians in 1970, 40 years ago, a U.S.
effort that led to the first strategic arms limitation agreement with
Moscow 2 years later. The key question then and in the decades since
has always been the same: is the United States better off with a
strategic arms agreement with the Russians, or without it? The answer
for successive presidents of both parties has always been, with an
agreement. The U.S. Senate has always agreed, approving each treaty by
lopsided bipartisan margins.
The same answer holds true for New START. The United States is
better off with this treaty than without it, and I am confident that it
is the right agreement for today and for the future. It increases
stability and predictability, allows us to sustain a strong nuclear
triad, and preserves our flexibility to deploy the nuclear and non-
nuclear capabilities needed for effective deterrence and defense.
In light of all these factors, I urge the Senate to give its advice
and consent to ratification on the new treaty.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Secretary Gates.
Secretary Chu.
STATEMENT OF HON. STEVEN CHU, SECRETARY OF ENERGY
Secretary Chu. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify on the New START. New START is an important part of
President Obama's nuclear security agenda. If ratified and
entered into force, the treaty will commit the United States
and the Russian Federation to lower levels of deployed
strategic nuclear weapons in a transparent and verifiable way.
This will increase stability between our countries while
demonstrating our joint commitment to the NPT.
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen are
testifying to the diplomatic and security advantages of this
treaty. I want to focus on how it will allow us to continue to
modernize our nuclear security enterprise and to maintain
scientific capabilities that ensure the safety, security, and
effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent.
The successes of our nuclear programs depend on the
incredible technical capabilities at DOE's national
laboratories. Our capabilities enable us to assess the
stockpile annually, to extend nuclear weapon lifetimes, to
assess other nations' nuclear capabilities, and to dismantle
retired weapons. As the stockpile decreases in size, the role
of science, technology, and engineering in deterrence will
increase in importance.
The New START will enhance, not harm, our ability to
maintain the safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear
weapons stockpile. This conclusion is based on three important
considerations. First, the treaty supports our modernization
agenda. Yesterday, I delivered a detailed stockpile stewardship
and management plan that provides a multi-decade investment
strategy needed to extend the life of key nuclear weapons
systems, rebuild and modernize our facilities, and provide for
the necessary physical and intellectual infrastructure. These
modernization efforts provide a strong foundation for the
limits on deployed nuclear weapons under the New START, and
nothing in the treaty will constrain these efforts. None of
DOE's sites will be subject to inspection under the New START
and none of our operations will be subject to limitation. We
will be able to maintain and improve the scientific base of our
nuclear weapons activities.
Second, the United States will remain free to determine the
size of its inactive stockpile. The weapons in the inactive
stockpile will continue to be retired and dismantled consistent
with DOD's requirements and presidential direction, and we
remain on track to meet our program's requirement to dismantle
all the retired warheads currently in the dismantlement queue
by 2022. Nothing in this treaty imposes any restrictions on
this work.
Third, the treaty provides the explicit right of both
parties to determine the composition and structure of their
nuclear forces within the treaty's overall limits. Further, the
New START contains no limitations that could constrain our
warhead LEP options or work to assess and correct any future
warhead issue. As was made clear in the NPR, this
administration is committed to studying all options available
for future LEPs, including reuse, refurbishment, and
replacement on a case by case basis.
We are committed to fully funding the ongoing LEP for the
W76 submarine-based warhead for completion in 2017 and for the
full scope LEP study and follow-on activities for the B61 bomb
to ensure first production begins in 2017. We will also
participate in the Nuclear Weapons Council on a study of the
LEP options for the W78 ICBM warhead. The New START does not
place any limits on any of these programs.
I believe these factors point to a treaty that enhances
U.S. national security without jeopardizing the nuclear
deterrent that helps underwrite it. As you consider this
treaty, you can be certain that the Nation's nuclear stockpile
will remain safe, secure, and effective. To modernize our
enterprise, we are investing in science, technology, and
engineering. The President's fiscal year 2011 budget request
would increase science funding in the NNSA by more than 10
percent. We are investing in the infrastructure we need. The
highest infrastructure priorities are the construction of major
new nuclear facilities for plutonium and uranium. We are
investing in human capital and creating an environment that can
attract highly trained and motivated personnel.
I should also depart and say that these personnel, over 150
of them, for over 40 days and in large part 40 nights have been
turning their attention to the Gulf spill, and it's been
remarkable to see that work.
We have begun this work already, but it will take sustained
leadership from this Congress to see it through. The
President's fiscal year 2011 budget request reflects a 13
percent increase over fiscal year 2010 and includes more than
$7 billion for weapons activities and infrastructure. Over the
course of the next decade, our plans call for an investment of
$80 billion. With Congress' support, we will transform from a
Cold War capacity-based infrastructure to a modern
capabilities-based nuclear security enterprise. This will
provide the confidence and the tools that allow the United
States to consider further nuclear reductions as we work toward
a world without nuclear weapons.
Thank you and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Secretary Chu follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Steven Chu
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the treaty
between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on
Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms, known as ``New START.''
In Prague last April, President Obama outlined a comprehensive
agenda for addressing nuclear dangers in the 21st century. He pledged
to take concrete steps toward a world without nuclear weapons, while
maintaining the safety, security, and effectiveness of our arsenal as
long as nuclear weapons exist. The President has called for reducing
the role of nuclear weapons in our national security strategy and for
building a new international framework for civil nuclear cooperation,
and he has promised to lead an international effort to secure all
vulnerable nuclear material around the world within 4 years.
Building on that commitment, the President's Nuclear Posture Review
put preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to terrorists and to
states that don't already possess them at the very top of our national
security agenda. The danger of a nuclear weapon falling into the wrong
hands is the greatest threat facing the American people. The President
has laid out an unprecedented commitment to taking real, practical and
clear-eyed steps to keep the American people safe.
The New START treaty is an important part of this nuclear security
agenda. If ratified and entered into force, the treaty will commit the
United States and Russian Federation to lower levels of deployed
strategic nuclear weapons in a transparent and verifiable manner. This
will increase stability between our countries while demonstrating our
joint commitment to the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty.
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen are
testifying to the diplomatic and security advantages of this treaty. I
want to focus on how this treaty will allow the United States to
continue to modernize our nuclear security enterprise and to maintain
the scientific capabilities that ensure the safety, security, and
effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent.
The success of our nuclear programs depends upon the incredible
technical capabilities at the Department of Energy's national
laboratories. We are proud to employ some of our Nation's brightest
minds and to be home to some of the world's most sophisticated
scientific equipment. This equipment includes the world's fastest
supercomputers and the ability to conduct the most advanced
investigations of self-sustained nuclear reactions at the National
Ignition Facility.
Our capabilities enable us to assess the stockpile annually, to
extend nuclear weapon lifetimes, to assess other nations' nuclear
capabilities, and to dismantle retired weapons. As the stockpile
decreases in size, the role of science, technology and engineering in
deterrence will increase in importance.
The New START will enhance, not harm, our ability to maintain the
safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear weapons stockpile.
This conclusion is based on three important considerations:
First, the treaty supports our modernization agenda. The Nuclear
Posture Review recognizes the importance of supporting ``a modern
physical infrastructure--comprised of the national security
laboratories and a complex of supporting facilities--and a highly
capable workforce with the specialized skills needed to sustain the
deterrent.'' This month, I am delivering a detailed plan to Congress
for transforming today's nuclear weapons complex into a modern,
efficient and responsive 21st century Nuclear Security Enterprise. This
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan provides the multi-decade
investment strategy needed to extend the life of key nuclear weapon
systems, rebuild and modernize our facilities, and provide for
necessary physical and intellectual infrastructure.
These modernization efforts provide a strong foundation for the
limits on deployed nuclear weapons under the New START treaty, and
nothing in the treaty will constrain these efforts. None of the
Department of Energy's NNSA sites--including our production and
national laboratory facilities--will be subject to inspection under the
New START treaty, and none of our operations will be subject to
limitation. We will be able to maintain and improve the scientific base
of our nuclear weapons activities.
Second, the United States will remain free to determine the size of
the inactive stockpile. This inactive stockpile supports stockpile
maintenance, surveillance and life extension activities, including
component reuse. It is an important technical and geopolitical hedge.
The weapons in the inactive stockpile will continue to be retired
and dismantled consistent with Department of Defense requirements and
Presidential direction, and we remain on track to meet our program
requirement to dismantle all the retired warheads currently in the
dismantlement queue by 2022. Nothing in this treaty imposes any
restrictions on this work.
Third, the treaty provides the explicit right of both parties to
determine the composition and structure of their nuclear forces within
the treaty's overall limits. This means that, should a problem arise
with a particular warhead type, we will have complete flexibility to
restructure our deployments and upload weapons to other systems if
necessary to compensate and ensure the sustainment of an effective
deterrent.
Further, the New START treaty contains no limitations that would
constrain our warhead life extension program (LEP) options, or the work
to assess and correct any potential future warhead issue. The New START
treaty will have no impact on any decisions regarding warhead life
extension.
As was made clear in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), this
administration is committed to studying all of the options available
for future LEPs--including reuse, refurbishment, and replacement--on a
case-by-case basis. This approach has been endorsed by the Directors of
our three National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) laboratories,
who said, ``The approach outlined in the NPR, which excludes further
nuclear testing and includes the consideration of the full range of
life extension options . . . provides the necessary technical
flexibility to manage the nuclear stockpile into the future with an
acceptable level of risk.''
These decisions will be based on U.S. national security and
stockpile requirements, informed by our best scientific judgment and
consistent with the guidance contained in the Nuclear Posture Review
and the plans outlined in the Stockpile Stewardship and Management
Plan. Nothing in the New START treaty would limit those options in any
way.
We are committed to fully funding the ongoing LEP for the W76
submarine-based warhead for completion in 2017, and the full scope LEP
study and follow-on activities for the B61 bomb to ensure first
production begins in 2017. We will also participate with the Nuclear
Weapons Council on a study of LEP options for the W78 ICBM warhead. The
New START treaty does not place any limits on any of those programs.
I believe these factors point to a treaty that enhances U.S.
national security without jeopardizing the nuclear deterrent that helps
underwrite it.
As you consider this treaty, you can be certain that the Nation's
nuclear stockpile will remain safe, secure, and effective. I want to
take a few minutes to elaborate on some of the steps the Department of
Energy and the NNSA are taking to modernize our enterprise.
We are investing in science, technology, and
engineering. The Nuclear Posture Review concluded that we need
increased investments to strengthen an aging physical
infrastructure and to sustain scientific and technical talent
at our Nation's national security laboratories. This will allow
us to continue to assess and certify the stockpile without
underground nuclear testing utilizing advanced scientific
capabilities. The President's fiscal year 2011 budget request
would increase science funding at NNSA by more than 10 percent.
We are investing in the infrastructure we need. A
successful stockpile stewardship and management program
requires a modernized infrastructure, including major long-term
construction projects. The highest infrastructure priorities
are the construction of major new nuclear facilities for
plutonium and uranium. As Administrator Tom D'Agostino and I
have stated, we must replace outdated 1950s-era facilities with
modern, efficient, cost-effective, and properly-sized
facilities.
We are investing in human capital. World-class
laboratories and production plants are sustained by the best
and brightest minds. Through the renewed sense of urgency
reflected in the President's April 2009 Prague speech and
through the very challenging technical program that includes
LEPs and with national security challenges beyond directed
stockpile work, we are creating an environment that can attract
highly-trained and motivated personnel. We must bring new
scientists and engineers into this field.
We have begun this work already, but it will take sustained
leadership from this Congress to see it through. The President's fiscal
year 2011 budget request reflects a 13 percent increase over fiscal
year 2010 and includes more than $7 billion for weapons activities and
infrastructure. The National Nuclear Security Administration's Future
Years Nuclear Security Program budget includes more than $36 billion
for these activities over the next 5 years. Over the course of the next
decade, our plans call for the investment of $80 billion.
With Congress' support, we will transform from a Cold War capacity-
based infrastructure to a modern, capabilities-based Nuclear Security
Enterprise. This will provide the confidence and the tools to allow the
United States to consider further nuclear weapons reductions as we work
toward a world without nuclear weapons.
In conclusion, the New START treaty will serve the interests of the
United States without jeopardizing our ability to sustain the safety,
security and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.
Irrespective of the treaty, we need to invest in modernizing our
enterprise and extending the life of the nuclear weapons stockpile, but
we are up to this task. Together, we will ensure our ability to retain
a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent for as long as nuclear
weapons exist.
Thank you, and I look forward to answering your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Secretary Chu.
Admiral Mullen.
STATEMENT OF ADM MICHAEL G. MULLEN, USN, CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT
CHIEFS OF STAFF
Admiral Mullen. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and
distinguished members of the committee, I am pleased to add my
voice in support of ratification of the New START and to do so
as soon as possible. We are in our 7th month without a treaty
with Russia.
This treaty has the full support of your uniformed
military. Throughout its negotiations, Secretaries Clinton and
Gates ensured that professional military perspectives were
thoroughly considered. During the development of the New START,
I was personally involved, to include two face-to-face
negotiating sessions and several conversations, other
conversations with my counterpart, the chief of the Russian
general staff, General Makarov, regarding key aspects of the
treaty.
The Joint Chiefs and I also had time to review the analytic
work done in the NPR regarding the shape of future U.S.
strategic nuclear forces. Its recommendations were transmitted
as guidance to the negotiating team in Geneva regarding the
three central limits on strategic systems and the warheads
associated with them that are contained in the treaty.
In short, the conclusion and implementation of the New
START is the right thing for us to do, and we took the time to
do it right. The chiefs and I believe the New START achieves
important and necessary balance between three critical aims. It
allows us to retain a strong and flexible American nuclear
deterrent. It helps strengthen openness and transparency in our
relationship with Russia. It also demonstrates our national
commitment to reducing the worldwide risk of a nuclear incident
resulting from the continuing proliferation of nuclear weapons.
I firmly believe that the central limits established in
this treaty and the provision that allows each side the freedom
to determine its own force mix provides us with the necessary
flexibility to field the right future force to meet the
Nation's needs. We plan to retain our triad of bombers, SSBNs,
and land-based ICBMs in sufficient diversity and numbers to
assure strategic stability between ourselves and the Russian
Federation. We will also maintain sufficient capability to
deter other nuclear states.
In addition, the agreement provides for an array of
important verification measures that are critical to both sides
in monitoring compliance with the new treaty, and those have
been spoken to in earlier statements.
This treaty is also a critical element in the President's
agenda for reducing nuclear risks to the United States, our
allies, and partners and the wider international community. Our
recently concluded NPR acknowledges the continuing role for
nuclear weapons in the defense of America, while placing
additional emphasis on positive steps to prevent nuclear
terrorism and the risks from nuclear proliferation.
In summary, this New START agreement is important in itself
and should also be viewed in a wider context. It makes
meaningful reductions in the U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear
arsenals while strengthening strategic stability and the United
States' national security. Coupled with the administration's
clear commitment to prudently invest in our aging nuclear
infrastructure and in warhead life extension programs, this
treaty is a very meaningful step forward. I encourage the
Senate to fully study the treaty. I believe you will see the
wisdom of ratifying it, and I sit before you today recommending
that you do so.
Thank you, sir.
[The prepared statement of Admiral Mullen follows:]
Prepared Statement by ADM Michael G. Mullen, USN
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the
committee; I am pleased to add my voice in support for ratification of
the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) treaty.
This treaty has the full support of your uniformed military.
Throughout its negotiation, Secretaries Clinton and Gates ensured that
professional military perspectives were thoroughly considered. During
the development of the New START treaty I was personally involved, to
include two face-to-face negotiating sessions and three telephone
conversations with my counterpart, the Chief of the Russian General
Staff, General Makarov, regarding key aspects of the treaty.
The Joint Chiefs and I also had time to review the analytic work
done in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) regarding the shape of future
U.S. strategic nuclear forces. Its recommendations were transmitted as
guidance to the negotiating team in Geneva regarding the three central
limits on strategic systems and the warheads associated with them that
are contained in the treaty. In short, the conclusion and
implementation of the New START treaty is the right thing for us to
do--and we took the time to do it right.
The Chiefs and I believe the New START treaty achieves important
and necessary balance between three critical aims. It allows us to
retain a strong and flexible American nuclear deterrent. It helps
strengthen openness and transparency in our relationship with Russia.
It also demonstrates our national commitment to reducing the worldwide
risk of nuclear incident resulting from the continuing proliferation of
nuclear weapons.
You should know that I firmly believe that the central limits
established in this treaty and the provision that allows each side the
freedom to determine its own force mix provides us with the necessary
flexibility to field the right future force to meet the Nation's needs.
We plan to retain our Triad of bombers, ballistic missile submarines
and land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles in sufficient
diversity and numbers to assure strategic stability between ourselves
and the Russian Federation. We will also maintain sufficient capability
to deter other nuclear states. In addition, the agreement provides for
an array of important verification measures that are critical to both
sides in monitoring compliance with the new treaty.
This treaty is also a critical element in the President's agenda
for reducing nuclear risks to the United States, our allies and
partners, and the wider international community. Our recently concluded
NPR acknowledges the continuing role for nuclear weapons in the defense
of America, while placing additional emphasis on positive steps to
prevent nuclear terrorism and the risks from nuclear proliferation.
In summary, this New START agreement is important in itself, and
should also be viewed in wider context. It makes meaningful reductions
in the U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals while strengthening
strategic stability and U.S. national security. Coupled with the
administration's clear commitment to prudently invest in our aging
nuclear infrastructure and in nuclear warhead life extension programs,
this treaty is a very meaningful step forward. I encourage the Senate
to fully study the treaty. I believe you will see the wisdom of
ratifying it, and I sit before you today recommending that you do so.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Admiral Mullen.
Because of the large number of Senators that are here this
morning and because Secretary Gates must leave a few minutes
after 11:30 a.m., we're going to having a first round of
questioning that's going to be limited to 5 minutes, and then
if there are additional questions and there's time after that
first round, we will try to have a second round, which might be
a few minutes each.
Secretary Clinton, let me start with you. During the course
of the negotiations on the New START, were there any side
agreements, any informal agreements, any secret agreements with
Russia that are not included in the treaty relative to any
limitations on U.S. missile defenses or any other subject?
Secretary Clinton. No.
Chairman Levin. Let me ask this of Secretary Gates. Article
5, paragraph 3, of the treaty would prohibit the future
conversion of ICBM silos or SLBM launchers to be used for
missile defense interceptors, and vice versa. Now, you've
testified, I believe, that--I think Secretary Clinton testified
perhaps, maybe you did too--we have no plans to do such
conversions and that it would not make any sense to do so
because the cost is greater than a new silo for the purpose of
missile defense.
But there's also a larger issue of the potential
misunderstanding or miscalculation, it seems to me, if either
side could use silos of one type for the other purpose. Would
you agree, Mr. Secretary, that it could be potentially
destabilizing and dangerous if either side were to launch
missile defense interceptors from ICBM silos or from SSBNs
because such launches could appear to the other side to be
launches of ICBMs or SLBMs?
Secretary Gates. First, I would like to just reinforce
Secretary Clinton's testimony to the effect that not only did
we not have any plans currently to transform or convert ICBM
silos into missile defense silos; as you said, it doesn't make
any sense from a financial standpoint. It's a lot cheaper to
build missile defense silos on their own, as we are doing at
Fort Greeley, AK.
Yes, I think it would be destabilizing if you didn't know
what was coming out of a missile silo. I think this is one of
the challenges, frankly, that we face as we go forward with
conventional prompt global strike. Any of these things that are
confusing to a party on the other side, I think, needs to be
dealt with very carefully.
Chairman Levin. You made a very brief reference in that
comment to what we're planning to build at Fort Greeley in
Alaska. I believe that reference is to the plans to build eight
spare silos there. Does that not make it clear, even more clear
than I think it already is, that there is no constraint on our
ability to build those missile defense silos or even more if
needed?
Secretary Gates. Yes. We are not only building out the
second site at Fort Greeley, but then there will be eight spare
silos once that work is complete.
Chairman Levin. Admiral, let me ask you a question about
the verification issues. We don't yet have a national
intelligence estimate on verification under New START, but is
it your judgment that this treaty is verifiable? Was the
Intelligence Community involved during these negotiations?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir, the Intelligence Community was
involved throughout, both obviously internally in our
discussions, as well as in our negotiations with the Russians.
It is my judgment that this treaty provides the necessary means
to adequately verify, consistent with previous treaties, even
though some of the verification means are different. Secretary
Gates pointed out the numbers of inspections. Something that is
very specifically different is the agreement in the treaty to
put unique identifiers on every single weapon. Clearly, it
continues to support the national technical means and an
ability to verify.
Speaking specifically of telemetry, while not required, the
agreement also included the exchange of telemetry on up to five
launch missile tests or launches every year. In totality, I'm
very comfortable with the verification regime that exists in
the treaty right now.
Chairman Levin. As a matter of fact, is there not a concern
from an intelligence perspective as to the status quo; that
there are no verification provisions that currently exist, and
there are no inspections that currently exist without this
treaty?
Admiral Mullen. Absolutely, absolutely. As I said, we're in
our 7th month right now with no treaty with the Russians. I
will just reemphasize what Secretary Gates said, that we are
much better, in my view, with it than without it.
Chairman Levin. Including from a verification perspective?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses. Secretary Clinton, I understand
we've yet to receive requested data on Russian compliance and
verification since 2005. When do we expect that data to be
available to the Senate?
Secretary Clinton. Senator McCain, that will be available
shortly. We are moving as quickly as possible. I know how
important that is for your consideration, and we will get it to
you very shortly.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Both you and Secretary Gates have talked about Article 5,
that it would never be considered, that it would not be
something that we would ever plan on. Why is it in the treaty
then?
Secretary Clinton. Well, it's in the treaty in effect, I
would argue, Senator, because there have been longstanding
discussions between the Russians and the United States that
arose during the implementation of START I. Specifically, there
were questions asked about whether or not these silos that
cover the countryside in many of our States, that are no longer
operative, were going to be converted. We said no; we had no
intention of continuing with the conversion, and this would now
be no longer a subject of continuing contention or discussion.
It seemed to us to be a smart negotiating decision to put
something in that frankly we never intended to pursue. There
were a number of issues that were very, very difficult to
resolve in this treaty. Just mentioning two of them, the kind
of verification, along with the numbers of visits and
telemetry. In the course of the negotiation, to state that
we're not going to do something we're not going to do seemed to
be an appropriate position for us to take.
Senator McCain. If we were going to state in a treaty
everything we were not going to do, it could be a very heavy
document.
Here's my fundamental dilemma that I think many of us face.
At the time of the signing of the treaty, the statement was
made by the Russians, ``This treaty between the Russian
Federation and the United States of America signed at Prague on
April 8, 2010, may be effective and viable only in condition
where there is no qualititative or quantitative buildup in the
missile defense system capabilities of the United States of
America.''
That is a strong statement at the time of the signing of
the treaty.
Then President Medvedev made the statement on April 12, in
an interview with George Stephanopoulos, where he said the two
countries negotiated a formula in the preamble of the New START
that states there is ``an interconnection between the strategic
offensive arms and missile defense. So if these circumstances
will change, then we will consider it is a reason to jeopardize
the whole agreement.'' That's what President Medvedev said.
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov said on March 30 in a press
conference after the G-8 foreign ministers meeting in Canada
that there are obligations regarding missile defense in the
treaty text and the accompanying interpretive text that
constitute ``a legally binding package,'' et cetera.
Now, I, for one, am going to have to get some kind of
statement from the Russians as to exactly what this treaty
means in their view. If the statement, the signing statement at
the time that states there's an interconnection between this
treaty and missile defense systems, that clearly states that
``only in condition that there is no qualitative or
quantitative buildup in the missile defense capabilities of the
United States of America,'' that's a pretty clear statement.
President Medvedev has made the same statement. Foreign
Minister Lavrov has made the same statement. So Russian
leadership have all made the statement that this treaty is
contingent upon the United States not changing or undertaking
qualitative or quantitative buildup in missile defense systems.
That's bound to be worrisome to anyone, particularly in light
of the decision that was made concerning the Polish and Czech
missile defense systems' cancellation or replacement with
another system that was done earlier in this administration.
It's clear from many statements that Russian leadership has
made that there is a very different interpretation of this
treaty from what has been stated here concerning the connection
to missile defense systems and that of the Russians. I'd be
more than happy to hear your response.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, thank you for giving us
the opportunity to respond. Let me start by saying that
historically there have been these kinds of unilateral
statements made by the Russians. In fact, in connection with
the signing of the original START, the Russians made similar
statements that it would consider U.S. withdrawal from the
Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty as sufficient grounds for
its withdrawal from START. However, when the United States
withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2001, the Russia Federation, as
the successor to the Soviet Union, did not withdraw.
Second, these unilateral statements have no binding effect,
no legal effect. The agreement that Presidents Obama and
Medvedev signed is the treaty.
Third, as with many other arms control treaties, it
provides that either party, including obviously us, may
withdraw from the treaty if that party decides that
extraordinary events have jeopardized its security interests.
Now, the Russian unilateral statement merely reflects its
current view that they disagree, as we've heard for years, with
our commitment to building up missile defense system
capabilities.
It is not in any way affecting us by undermining that
commitment. We remain committed, as you heard, in word and
deed, most particularly in financial ways.
Finally, what we read from President Medvedev in an April
statement--I'm not sure it's exactly the same one that you
quoted from--when asked about the unilateral statements, said,
``That doesn't mean that because of this, if the American side
starts to build up the missile defense, statement that the
treaty would automatically lose its power.''
Then he went on to say, ``I would like to make sure that
there is no impression that any change in the U.S. missile
defense system would be a reason to abandon a signed
agreement.''
I view the unilateral statement--and we have one of our
own, which is now in the record--as really a kind of press
release, if you will. Here's our position, but we just signed a
treaty which, as even the President of the Russian Federation
says, is truly the agreement that we're going to be following.
I understand the question, but I think that both
historically and substantively and then even in the words of
President Medvedev, this is not an issue that in any way
constrains or limits our commitment to missile defense.
Secretary Gates. I would just make two very quick comments.
First, to reinforce the point, the Russians can say what they
want. If it's not in the treaty, it's not binding on the United
States.
Second, what's interesting is, even in their own unilateral
statement, they hedged because, at the end of the statement,
they say about the buildup in missile defense capabilities,
``such that it would give rise to a threat to the strategic
nuclear force potential of the Russian Federation.'' I said in
my opening statement that we have no intention of creating such
a capability that would threaten the strategic deterrent
capability of the Russia rocket forces, so even they basically
gave themselves an out.
Senator McCain. Of course, that's in the eye of the
beholder. We obviously have a situation here where the official
statement of the Russian Government states unequivocally, and
follow-up statements by members of the Russian Government, that
this treaty would be directly affected ``only in conditions
where there is no qualitative or quantitative buildup in the
missile defense system capabilities of the United States of
America.''
It is at best an ambiguous situation.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman, and thanks to all
of you for being here.
Let me begin with this statement. My own feeling is that if
this New START is ratified, it will be a small step forward for
mankind, but a long way, I'm sure you'd agree, from the dream
that people harbor of having a nuclear-free world. The sad fact
is that the current state of international relations, as well
as human history, suggests that we're not on the verge of
seeing a transformation of human behavior to lead us to a point
where we will have a nuclear-free world.
As we take this small step forward in reducing the number
of deployed strategic warheads, it of course makes the status
of our nuclear stockpile, somewhat smaller as a result of this
treaty if it's ratified, even more important. I want to just
state the observation that there will be a lot of issues, some
already raised here today, about this treaty, but ultimately I
think that whether or not the New START is ratified will depend
on Members of the Senate of both parties having the confidence
that the administration is committed to modernizing our current
nuclear stockpile.
As you suggested, Secretary Gates, in an interesting way,
in kind of a twist of fate, the ratification of this arms
control treaty may actually enable you and the administration
and the last administration to receive the funding from
Congress that you have been asking for to modernize our current
nuclear stockpile.
Let me begin with a baseline question. I assume that you've
been asking for this money because you feel that our current
nuclear stockpile is aging and in various ways is in need of
modernization. Secretary Gates?
Secretary Gates. Let me start and then ask Dr. Chu to chime
in. The short answer is yes. This has been an evident need for
the United States for some time. We are essentially the only
nuclear power in the world that is not carrying out these kinds
of modernization programs. We have never claimed to want any
new capabilities, but simply to be able to make our weapons
safer, more secure, and more reliable.
The Perry-Schlesinger study that was conducted and reported
here to Congress really laid out in considerable detail, I
think, a lot of the worries that we have, not about our
stockpile today, but about where we may be in 5 or 10 years, as
both the human capital and the components themselves age, both
having to do with these weapons systems. This is a long-term
need on the part of the Nation. We've needed it for quite some
time.
Congress voted down the Reliable Replacement Warhead
program. There has been no progress toward providing any
additional funding for our nuclear weapons modernization
programs since that time. I think you've put your finger on it,
frankly, and just realistically, I see this treaty as a vehicle
to finally be able to get what we need in the way of
modernization that we have been unable to get otherwise.
Dr. Chu.
Secretary Chu. I would also add that, although we're not
seeking any new military capability, we are seeking to make the
weapons safer, more secure, and more reliable. That means we
are replacing old electronics that we can't even buy any more:
tubes with integrated circuits. We are going to insensitive
high explosives, so it's much less likely that an accident, a
fire, something of that nature, could set these weapons off.
We're increasing the surety, so that, should any terrorists or
anybody get hold of these, it would be impossible for them to
set them off.
Modernization includes all these factors. We're actually
improving the safety, security, and reliability of these
weapons. No new military capability, but that's the program
we're engaged in.
Senator Lieberman. I appreciate the answer from both of
you.
A while ago, when the NPR came out, there was some language
in it that indicated there are three means to keep the
stockpile secure, reliable, and effective, which were reuse,
refurbishment, and replacement. The language in the NPR seemed
to make it harder even to replace parts, it sounded like, and I
think, in the section 1251 report, which you provided to
Congress, you clarified that. I just wanted to ask you two
questions.
One is the obvious one, which you've said, Dr. Chu, that
there are some parts that can't be reused or refurbished, and
you have to replace those parts. While no one is asking for a
replacement warhead now, there's nothing in the language in the
treaty or in any administration documents that essentially says
to the scientists who we rely on here: Don't even think about
it. In other words, that the scientists 4 years from now, 6
years from now, if they believe to protect our security we need
to build a replacement warhead, that they're going to be free
to make that recommendation.
Secretary Chu. That's correct. If you look at the language
both in the treaty and in the NPR, the scientists at the
national labs are asked to look at all the scientific
possibilities within the menu of refurbish, replacement, and
new designs. There is something that says, okay, before you go
to detailed engineering design, that there's a pause button.
But, certainly to look at the scientific capabilities; it would
be very prudent to not hold them back on any of those options,
and that's the position we're taking.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you. My time is up.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Clinton, you were very clear in answering the
chairman's first question about whether there was any secret
agreement or side deal associated with the negotiations of the
New START that would affect missile defense. You were very
clear in saying that, no, there was not.
There's a press report that came out last night that claims
that the administration is secretly working with the Russians
to conclude an agreement that would limit U.S. missile
defenses. It goes on to say that the administration last month
presented a draft agreement to the Russians. Is this report
accurate?
Secretary Clinton. No. I'm not aware of the report, Senator
Collins, but, as Secretary Gates said, we have consistently
told the Russians that, if they wish to work with us on missile
defense, we are open to working with them. Maybe there is
something lost in the translation here because we have
consistently reached out to them. We would like them to be part
of a broad missile defense system that protects against
countries like Iran, North Korea, both of which they border, by
the way, so it is in their interest.
But Secretary Gates mentioned that in his opening remarks,
so if I could ask him to just perhaps add onto what I said.
Senator Collins. Yes.
Secretary Gates. Well, I have just seen a reference to the
newspaper story that you described, and what I emphasized, what
I added, frankly, in my opening statement was that whatever
talks are going on are simply about trying to elicit their
willingness to partner with us along with the Europeans in
terms of a regional missile defense.
There is nothing in the approaches that have been made to
the Russians that in any way, shape, or form would impose any
limits whatsoever on our plans.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Secretary Clinton, and perhaps Secretary Gates on this
issue as well, one of my chief concerns is that tactical
nuclear weapons are not addressed by this treaty. The Perry-
Schlesinger commission noted that Russia has some 3,800
tactical nuclear weapons. That's about 10 times what is in our
inventory. My concern is not just about the numbers, but study
after study has pointed out that tactical nuclear weapons are
particularly vulnerable for theft and diversion. The
administration's own NPR has noted the fear of nuclear
terrorism.
If the administration believes that today's most immediate
and extreme danger is nuclear terrorism--and I would agree with
that assessment--why doesn't the New START address tactical
nuclear weapons at all, since they are by far more vulnerable
to theft and diversion?
Secretary Clinton. Senator, we share your concern. The New
START was always intended to replace START I, and that was the
decision made by the Bush administration, which we then decided
to pursue in order to deal with strategic offensive nuclear
forces. But, we share your concern about tactical nuclear
weapons, and we have raised with the Russians our desire to
begin to talk with them, now that the New START has been
negotiated, about tactical nuclear weapons.
We have to do this in conjunction with our NATO allies
because, of course, our principal use of tactical nuclear
weapons historically has been in Europe, and that's also where
most of the Russian tactical nukes are located, close to their
border with Europe.
I raised this issue at the last NATO ministerial in Talinn,
Estonia, and received a very positive response from our NATO
allies, that we will work on our posture toward tactical nukes,
because there are some in NATO who wanted NATO unilaterally to
begin to withdraw our own tactical nuclear weapons from Europe,
and it's the Obama administration's position that we will not
do that, that we will only pursue reductions in our tactical
nuclear weapons in concert with cuts in Russia's tactical
nuclear weapons. That was well received by the majority of NATO
allies.
Secretary Gates. I would just add the personal opinion that
I think any negotiation on tactical nuclear weapons with the
Russians is going to be a very difficult one, and principally
because they have such a disproportionately larger number
deployed than we do in Europe, and a lot of them are forward
deployed.
I think for the Russians, getting the Russians to agree to
anything that ends up providing an equitable status on both
sides, if you will, will be a very steep hill to climb. I would
just add further that, in terms of our own capabilities, that
the F-35, including the aircraft that we're selling to some of
our allies, will be dual capable.
Secretary Clinton. If I could just add one more point, Mr.
Chairman. I agree with Secretary Gates that negotiating with
the Russians on tactical nuclear weapons will be difficult.
But, I would underscore the importance of ratifying the New
START to have any chance of us beginning to have a serious
negotiation over tactical nuclear weapons. I would add, it's a
point that Secretary Gates made earlier: If you look at what we
have done in reaching out to our NATO allies, it is to prepare
us to be able to have that discussion within the context of our
strategic concept review within NATO, so that we can work
toward a unified NATO position when we begin having serious
discussions with the Russians.
I would underscore the importance of ratifying this treaty
in order to have any chance of building the level of exchange
with the Russians that could lead to any kind of verifiable
limits or reductions.
Senator Collins. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Collins.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and thank you
to all of you for your service and for being here today.
I wanted to follow up a little bit on Senator Collins'
comment and your response about working cooperatively with the
Russians in missile defense. In April, I hosted the U.S.-
Russian Inter-Parliamentary Group, which is a combination of
our U.S. Senate and the Russian Federation Council. Our
discussions, like those held in many other meetings both in
Moscow as well as here, have involved the discussions about the
prospects of missile defense cooperation.
It seemed to be a very strong thought with the Federation
Council that they are interested from the parliamentary side,
from the legislative side, they're clearly interested in
working cooperatively with us on missile defense. Now, I
understand they come from their own perspective and we come
from ours, but at least they're talking, not only at their
executive level with President Medvedev, but now at the
legislative side as well. I just thought I would mention that.
I appreciate Senator Collins raising the question, because
there are going to be all kinds of rumors and discussions going
on and characterizations of those discussions that are not
always as accurate as we would hope that they might be.
Secretary Gates and Secretary Clinton, the question was
raised by Senator McCain that relates to an agreement as to
whether or not there's a meeting of the minds on this treaty
between the Russians and the United States, President Medvedev
and President Obama, on the question of what's in the contract.
It appears that there's a meeting of the minds within the
contract, but some posturing going on outside the contract.
Perhaps it would be helpful for us if you could, if not
just today, afterwards, submit something to show that this is
nothing new, that there is always posturing around the
agreements and there have been instances of posturing in the
past, but we entered into agreements and, as you say, even in
spite of some of the comments about whether or not we did
certain things or didn't do certain things, they might do
certain things.
Examples of that might be helpful in putting this to rest
because the question seems to be, is there a meeting of the
minds? Let me ask you just the question bluntly: Is there a
meeting of the minds in your opinion? Senator Clinton or
Secretary Gates first?
Secretary Gates. Well, I would just make two comments.
First of all, I think that there is a meeting of the minds on
the value of New START between the two Presidents. Second
point: There is no meeting of the minds on missile defense. The
Russians hate it. They've hated it since the late 1960s. They
will always hate it, mostly because we'll build it, and they
won't.
On the issue before the Senate, if you will, there is a
meeting of the minds. On the peripheral issue that is not part
of the contract, there is no meeting of the minds.
Senator Ben Nelson. Senator Clinton, can you be quite as
candid as that?
Secretary Clinton. Of course I can.
Senator Ben Nelson. Of course. [Laughter.]
Secretary Clinton. I think Secretary Gates said it very
well. We have an agreement. We have a signed agreement.
Somebody can have a signed, enforceable agreement to buy and
sell a car or buy and sell a house, and then they can go out
and make all sorts of statements, but it has nothing to do with
their obligations under the agreement.
The only point I would add to what Secretary Gates has said
is that, historically in these agreements, the Russians have
said things like that. In my opening testimony, I talked about
the original START, where before it was signed the same kind of
sequence. The Russians said if the United States pulls out of
the ABM Treaty, we're pulling out of START. Well, the United
States pulled out of the ABM Treaty in 2001, and Russia didn't
pull out of START.
There is a history. We'll be happy to, for the record, give
you some additional information.
[The information referred to follows:]
On April 7, 2010, the Russian Federation made a unilateral
statement on missile defense, in which the Russian Federation recorded
its view that the treaty may be effective and viable only in conditions
where there is no qualitative and quantitative build-up in the missile
defense system capabilities of the United States. The Russian
Federation further noted its position that the ``extraordinary events''
that could justify withdrawal from the treaty, pursuant to Article XIV,
include a build-up in the missile defense system capabilities of the
United States that would give rise to a threat to the strategic nuclear
forces potential of the Russian Federation.
The withdrawal standard in Article XIV contains language identical
to the withdrawal provisions in many arms control agreements, including
the START treaty, the INF Treaty, and the NPT. The withdrawal provision
is self-judging in that each party may decide when its supreme
interests have been jeopardized by extraordinary events related to the
subject matter of the treaty. Accordingly the Russian statement merely
records that the circumstances described in its statement would, in its
view, justify such a decision on its part. The Russian statement does
not change the legal rights or obligations of the Parties under the
treaty.
As a historical matter, the Soviet Union made a similar unilateral
statement regarding withdrawal from the START treaty. In that
statement, the Soviet Union noted its position that the ``extraordinary
events'' in the withdrawal provision included U.S. withdrawal from the
ABM Treaty. When the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in
2002, however, the Russian Federation (as a successor state to the
Soviet Union) did not withdraw from the START treaty.
In sum, the Russian unilateral statement is not an integral part of
the treaty and it is not legally binding. The United States did not
agree to the Russian statement. It has the same legal status as the
unilateral statement made by the Soviet Union in connection with the
signing of the original START treaty in 1991.
Secretary Clinton. But we are very comfortable. I don't
think the four of us would be here--and I think you know all of
us--telling you how comfortable we are with where we believe
the meeting of the minds occurred and what this treaty means,
and the fact that, as Admiral Mullen now has said twice in this
hearing, we have no treaty, we have no verification going on at
this moment. Is it the perfect treaty? I don't know that such a
thing exists, but in our very considered opinion, it is so much
in America's interest to get on with entering into this treaty.
Senator Ben Nelson. Sort of a reminder of Contracts 101.
Secretary Clinton. Yes. Well, as an old law professor, I
couldn't resist.
The other thing I would say, Senator Nelson, is thank you
for participating in these inter-parliamentary activities. I
have to confess, when I sat behind the table I was not as aware
of the importance to our counterparts that these parliamentary
meetings hold. I don't know that we, in our Congress,
appreciate the significance of these and the potential
opportunities that they offer to us. Thank you.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Admiral Mullen. Senator Nelson, if I can, just briefly back
to the meeting of the minds. As I both participated but also
watched these negotiations, the number of times that the two
countries' leaders personally engaged each other and in the
details of this, I thought was extraordinary. To the points
that have been made in terms of, within the bounds of the
treaty, the meeting of the minds was very evident to me right
up to the end, through very difficult negotiations.
Again, the commitment was extraordinary from my perspective
in terms of their both understanding, participation, and the
negotiations.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Clinton, welcome back to the committee. Secretary
Gates, nice to have you. Admiral, thank you for your service.
Secretary Chu, welcome to the Armed Services Committee.
Secretary Gates, the administration's factsheet on the
section 1251, the report, explains that the U.S. nuclear force
structure under the treaty could comprise up to 420 ICBMs, 240
SLBMs, and 60 bombers. Since deployment at the maximum level of
all 3 legs of the triad under that explanation add up to about
720 delivery vehicles, it is, of course, mathematically
impossible for the United States to make such a deployment and
to be in compliance with the treaty's limit of 700 deployed
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.
Clearly, significant additional decisions are going to have
to be made with respect to U.S. force structure under the
treaty. I would be reluctant to cast a vote in favor of the
treaty without being fully briefed in more precise detail about
the plans for our nuclear delivery force structure.
My question is, when can this committee expect to receive a
more precise outline of how the U.S. nuclear force posture will
be made to comply with this treaty's limits of 700 deployed
nuclear delivery vehicles, and will the administration provide
a classified briefing to those of us who are concerned on the
specific planned force structure for these deployed nuclear
delivery vehicles?
Secretary Gates. Certainly we would be happy to provide a
classified briefing in terms of the options that we have under
consideration. Let me say just from the outset that we do not
anticipate any changes in the force structure under this treaty
that would affect current basing either of aircraft or our
missiles here in the United States.
The reductions in the treaty do not need to be made until
the 7th year, and I'm going to ask Admiral Mullen to chime in
here, but I think our interests are best served as we watch the
developments of the next decade. My opening statement, as the
factsheet did, said here are the categories and the numbers
that we are working with, and frankly I see no reason for us to
make final decisions within those narrow frameworks until we
have a better sense of strategic developments with Russia and
with other countries as well, especially since we have all this
time under the treaty.
I think that one key point of reassurance again is, of all
of the options that we're looking at, the ones that we think
we're likely to implement, that it would not involve closing
any of our missile bases or changing our basing of our bombers
at this point.
Admiral?
Admiral Mullen. Sir, I would just add that the uniformed
leadership feels very strongly about not making those decisions
before they are due. That's really 7 years out. The strength of
the treaty, as represented in the 1251 report and the numbers
that you described, gives us some flexibility. Clearly, as we
evolve, we're at the beginning of looking at what the next
submarine looks like in that part of the triad. What we wanted
was as much flexibility for as long as we could have to make
that decision, and we saw no need to do that now.
I understand the math. I understand exactly where you are.
But it just was not needed. We felt very strongly we wanted to
wait as long as we could to continue to assure the certainty of
each leg of the triad as it's laid out in this treaty.
Senator Thune. The press has reported that the
administration is going to spend about $100 billion over the
next 10 years in nuclear delivery systems. About $30 billion of
that would go toward development and acquisition of a new
strategic submarine and, according to estimates by U.S.
Strategic Command, the cost of maintaining our current
dedicated nuclear force is approximately $5.6 billion per year
or about $56 billion over the decade.
That leaves roundly $14 billion of the $100 billion the
administration intends to invest, even less if you factor in
inflation. That $14 billion is not nearly sufficient to develop
and acquire a next generation bomber, a follow-on ICBM, a
follow-on air-launched cruise missile, and develop a
conventional prompt global strike capability. So the question
is, in light of those figures I just mentioned and the fact
that you've yet to make additional modernization decisions, why
do you believe that $100 billion is sufficient investment in
our delivery systems over the next decade?
Admiral Mullen. From my perspective, Senator, the current
investment is a projection of what we understand right now. We
are undertaking in DOD a very thorough look of what the future
with respect to the long range of the next generation bomber
is, recognizing that all the systems are going to go through
some modernization over the next couple of decades.
From what I've seen inside DOD over time is, obviously,
when those decisions get made resources get made available to
support them. One of the big challenges and concerns right now
is the next generation missile submarine and, quite frankly,
replacing it, containing it, containing its costs, and making
sure that we can, in the long run, sustain that part of the leg
as we look at how we're going to move ahead in the next
generation bomber, as well as the next generation ICBM.
I'm comfortable right now that the investment there
certainly supports us moving ahead, and we'll have to make
adjustments over time based on where the triad goes
specifically.
Secretary Gates. Senator, I would just say that with that
figure that you mentioned, there are placeholders for each of
the modernization programs because no decisions have been made.
They're basically to be decided, and along the lines that
Admiral Mullen is just describing, those are decisions we're
going to have to make over the next few years, in terms of
we're going to have to modernize these systems, and we're going
to have to figure out what we can afford.
Senator Thune. At this point, we don't know whether or not
the administration is going to pursue some of these programs?
Is that what you're saying?
Secretary Gates. I am saying that we have not yet made
decisions on how we are going to modernize long-range strike,
how we are going to modernize the ICBM force. We are in the
process. We have money in the budget for a new nuclear reactor
for the Navy for the next generation nuclear submarine, so we
are on track in that particular area of modernization.
Senator Thune. I see my time has expired, Mr. Chairman.
There may be some questions I'd like to submit for the record.
Senator Udall [presiding]. So ordered. Thank you, Senator
Thune, for your thoughtful comments.
Chairman Levin has taken a much more dangerous step than
his support for ratifying this treaty. He's deputized me to
serve as the chairman of the committee until he can return. I
will recognize myself for 5 minutes.
I noted that Dr. Kissinger testified in front of the
Foreign Relations Committee last month about this treaty, and
he said that it's an evolution of treaties that have been
negotiated in previous administrations of both parties, and its
principal provisions are an elaboration or a continuation of
existing agreements. Therefore, a rejection of them would
indicate that a new period of American policy had started that
might rely largely on the unilateral reliance on its nuclear
weapons and would therefore create an element of uncertainty in
the calculations of both adversaries and allies.
Would any of you like to comment on his statement? Maybe
I'll start with the Secretary of State.
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, we very much agree with
that assessment. Our Department has been briefing along with
our colleagues from DOD, from the Joint Chiefs, and from DOE, a
series of former diplomats and DOD officials and DOE officials,
including Dr. Kissinger.
I think the overwhelming sentiment is that this treaty is
in our national security interests and that a failure to ratify
this treaty would have both foreseen and unforeseen
consequences. One of the foreseen consequences is a return to a
period of instability and unpredictability between the United
States and Russia, which would not be in our security interests
because, given what we view as the major threats we face today,
nuclear war with Russia is not one of them, thank goodness.
That is an evolution, as Dr. Kissinger has said, of political,
strategic, and economic changes over the last years since the
Cold War.
Human nature being what it is, as Senator Lieberman said,
if you introduce instability and unpredictability, there is no
way that we wouldn't have to be responsive. I think you'll hear
from all of us that we think this treaty continues the
tradition that other treaties have exemplified of making it
possible for us to have an understanding with, and legally
binding agreements with, the Russians that are very much to our
interest as well as to theirs.
We are working with the Russians on a range of matters. I
think it would have been very unlikely a year ago that we would
have seen Russia supporting our sanctions in the United Nations
against Iran. We have been building confidence with Russia
around a range of important issues, and this negotiation over
the New START, especially as Admiral Mullen said, bringing in
both of our Presidents at a very high level probably a dozen
times to hammer out some of the particulars in the treaty, has
really been to our national security interest.
So that is, I think, very much in support of what Dr.
Kissinger testified to.
Secretary Gates. I would just add one point. Secretary
Clinton in her opening statement talked about the contribution
the treaty provides in terms of transparency, predictability,
and stability. One of the strategic developments that we see
going on that hasn't been mentioned in this hearing is that the
Russians are, over a period of time, reducing their reliance on
and reducing the size of their conventional forces, for a
variety of economic, demographic, and other reasons.
As they reduce their size of their conventional forces,
they are particularly focused on the modernization of their
strategic forces, and particularly their nuclear capabilities.
I think that, from our national security standpoint, having
this treaty that provides the transparency, predictability, and
stability in that kind of an evolving environment is very much
in the interests of the United States.
Senator Udall. Admiral Mullen, would you care to comment if
there's any ramifications here for military-to-military
relationships?
Admiral Mullen. Actually, I've worked this multiple times
with my counterpart and our staffs. I guess I'd characterize it
the same way as I did between the two countries' leaders: very
difficult, very challenging, strong positions. Many of the
issues that have been raised here, the one of tactical nuclear
weapons, the issues of missile defense, the issues of
telemetry.
But, I was actually in the end very encouraged, though the
negotiations were difficult, with the willingness to move to a
position to get to this treaty from the Russian military
perspective, obviously the two countries, but in particular the
Russian military perspective. I am encouraged by that.
Part of that, I think, is also represented in the increased
military-to-military relationships across the board, this being
a big piece of it. For myself and my counterpart to say when we
get through with this, which we have, that this is indicative
of the kinds of things we can do in many other areas.
Counterterrorism is something that immediately comes to mind,
counter-piracy. From where we were to where we are over even
the last couple of years, it's improved dramatically. This is a
big piece of it.
Senator Udall. My time has expired, and I'm going to
recognize Senator Brown next. Let me make two short final
comments. It's a very powerful picture to have the four of you
sitting here representing a broad set of viewpoints supporting
the treaty. Thank you for taking your time to be here.
Second, I read with great interest and Secretary Clinton,
Secretary Gates, Admiral Mullen, and I think Secretary Chu as
well, you are aware of the Hagel-Hart commission work on our
policy towards Russia. They talk about a realpolitik that Dr.
Kissinger, in effect, is the leading practitioner of, and there
are ways in which they point out we can work with Russia, there
are ways in which we can't, there are cultural and historical
differences.
The points you make about expanding our relationship
through the approval of this treaty are really powerful ones.
Thank you again for being here.
Senator Brown, you're recognized.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you to our panel. Secretary Clinton, thank you for
your leadership on this treaty and everything you've been
doing, keeping us informed, which is very helpful to me as the
kind of new kid on the block.
I have a great concern about Iran, and I find that their
nuclear ambitions are more destabilizing than actually us
getting a handle on the U.S.-Russian relationship. I'm
wondering, in your negotiations with Russia, have you been able
to broach that subject with Russia? I can't imagine that they
would like a nuclear Iran to help destabilize that region and
potentially export their brand of terrorism in many instances
around the world and the region.
Any comment on that?
Secretary Clinton. Thank you very much, Senator, and
welcome to this committee.
Senator Brown. Thank you.
Secretary Clinton. I think your concerns are very well
placed. Obviously, the four of us and many, many others in the
government spend a great deal of our time thinking about Iran
and how to prevent it from obtaining nuclear weapons. I believe
that our close cooperation with Russia on negotiating this New
START added significantly to our ability to work with them
regarding Iran.
Three quick examples. Because we developed very good
working relationships, despite our disagreements on the New
START, between our militaries and our civilian leadership, I
think it gave us just a better base on which to raise the
concerns about Iran. It took a while to make the case to the
Russians that Iran indeed was pursuing not just a peaceful
civil nuclear capacity, but, in our view, poised to pursue
nuclear weapons.
Once they became convinced that there was some concern
there, they began working with us. In the fall, we reached an
agreement with Russia and France to try to get Iran to
demonstrate some good faith by shipping out its low enriched
uranium to outside of Iran to be enriched and then returned,
and the Russians stood with us. They stood with us through all
the ups and downs of that negotiation.
Finally, the Russians have consistently made it clear that
they share our concerns now about a nuclear-armed Iran. It's
hard to draw a straight line from the many ways we've been
cooperating with them, but I think in human relations, Senator,
you do have to build the relationship, and we've been doing
that at the highest levels between our presidents and then
between our counterparts. You saw the results with the United
Nations Security Council vote.
You'll see President Medvedev coming here next week for a
summit with President Obama, where we now have a very
comprehensive set of issues that we engage on very openly,
candidly, not always in agreement, but nevertheless we feel
like we've made a very strong basis for further work on what we
see as some of our major threats, namely a country like Iran
getting nuclear weapons, terrorists getting access to nuclear
materials, and Russia is now very much working with us.
Senator Brown. Well, thank you. I would encourage you to
continue that relationship because I find it disturbing that,
with all the efforts we're trying to do, Russia and France are
still contributing greatly financially to the regime and
allowing them to circumvent some of those sanctions. I would
appreciate your continued leadership on that.
Secretary Gates. Senator, I might just point out, because
you've just put your finger on a kind of schizophrenic Russian
approach to this.
Senator Brown. I'm glad you said that. Thank you.
Secretary Gates. When I was in Moscow 3 years ago, then-
President Putin told me that he considered Iran Russia's
greatest national security threat. Within the same timeframe,
one of their deputy prime ministers told me, he said, ``You
know, they don't need a missile to deliver a nuclear weapon to
Russia.''
At the same time, the Russians are seeing this growth of
terrorism in the Caucasus that is a deep concern to them. Yet,
they have these commercial interests in Iran that go back more
than 20 years. In 1992, I raised, when I visited Moscow as the
first head of CIA, this with my counterpart about their support
for the nuclear reactor in Iran. We went back and forth, and
finally he said, ``It's all about the money.''
I think that it is this balancing act in Russia. They
recognize the security threat that Iran presents, but then
there are these commercial opportunities which, frankly, are
not unique to them in Europe.
Senator Brown. Thank you for that add-on, Mr. Secretary.
I have one final question, and that is, I'm always
wrestling with our reduction in the strategic nuclear warheads
to 1,550 while the Russians will continue to deploy at least
3,800 tactical nuclear warheads in addition to their strategic
nuclear warheads. As a result, the Russians maintain a 10 to 1
superiority in tactical nuclear weapons and their tactical
nuclear weapons will outnumber our strategic nuclear weapons by
2 to 1.
I'm just trying to wrestle with that. How does that work in
terms of the numbers? Because you can deploy some of these
weapons on submarines, move close to our coast. I'm trying to
get a handle on how that's creating nuclear stability--and I
direct this to the Secretary--and a favorable manner for us and
our allies.
Secretary Gates. Well, it is a concern, obviously. The
strategic arms talks have always focused strictly on the
strategic weapons, ICBMs, SLBMs, and long-range heavy bombers.
I would just say the Europeans are clearly concerned about
this. There is a huge disparity in the number of those deployed
weapons in Europe, as you suggest.
I think that there is a general feeling on our part, and
certainly on the part of our European allies, that the next
step needs to involve--in our discussions on arms control with
the Russians--and needs to address this issue. I would just
echo something Secretary Clinton said earlier in the hearing.
We will never get to that step with the Russians on tactical
nukes if this treaty on strategic nuclear weapons is not
ratified.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has
expired.
Chairman Levin [presiding]. Thank you, Senator Brown.
Just a quick comment if I can on something which was
raised, I think, and I came back in the middle of the answer,
on the commercial relationship between Russia and Iran. I
understand--and, Secretary Clinton, perhaps you can confirm
this--that following the U.N. resolution adoption of sanctions
that Russia finally has actually cancelled the sale of the S-
300 to Iran. Now, there are different reports we get on that,
the Russian sale to Iran of those anti-air systems.
Do you know if that's accurate?
Secretary Clinton. I will check on this, Mr. Chairman. My
recollection is that they announced once again a postponement,
an indefinite suspension. I think we have to sort of separate
it out. We can get more information for both Senator Brown and
the committee. Iran is entitled to civil peaceful nuclear
energy.
Chairman Levin. We understand that.
Secretary Clinton. The Russians have consistently been
working on the reactor at Bushehr, Iran, and providing such
support. Until the recent U.N. Security Council resolution, you
could make an argument that Iran was also entitled to defensive
weapons, which the S-300 are claimed to be. The Russians over
the past 15 months, in part I would argue because of our
relationship-building, have never delivered those and have
consistently postponed it.
I will doublecheck. If they've cancelled the sale, I'm not
aware of it. But I am very much aware and supportive of their
continuing suspension.
Chairman Levin. It's a very significant development if they
not only have postponed it, which they have regularly, and
we're very happy they've done so because of the statement that
that makes to Iran. I think there was a report that they
actually went beyond that following the U.N. resolution.
Secretary Clinton. Well, I think that what they said is
they would not deliver the system. So is that a cancellation or
is that an indefinite suspension? Either way it's good news
because they will not deliver the security.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Once again, thank you to all of you testifying today and
certainly for the work that you're doing for our country. I
think we all appreciate that very, very much.
I wanted to talk just a minute about the recruitment and
retention of nuclear scientists and engineers. Responsible
stockpile stewardship management requires modernized
infrastructure and a highly capable workforce to sustain the
nuclear deterrent. Our labs cannot anticipate potential
problems and reduce their impact on our nuclear arsenal without
being appropriately resourced.
I'm concerned that our ability to recruit and retain
nuclear scientists and engineers is threatened by a lack of
financial stability in the stockpile stewardship and LEP, as
well as the perceived lack of importance. This has affected
NNSA's ability to recruit and retain the best and the
brightest.
Secretary Chu, could you describe, please, what the heads
of Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia have said
regarding the negative impact budgetary pressures are having on
their ability to manage our nuclear arsenal without testing?
Secretary Chu. Certainly. Well, Senator, this is a very big
concern. When I became Secretary of Energy and looked at the
fraction of the NNSA budget that was devoted to the scientific
and technology programs that goes directly to what you speak
of, the intellectual capabilities, that fraction of budget was
declining and was on a 10-year path to going in half.
I said we have to stop this, we have to reverse this. In
the last year, and in this budget for 2011, we're on a path to
rebuild that. It's vital because there is a population bulge
that is nearing retirement and we need the very best people in
order to carry this stockpile stewardship program, the
nonproliferation program, our obligations to provide safe,
secure, and reliable weapons going forward.
We believe we can do this in the proposed budget of 2011
and in the out years. That's the path we're taking. There is
also an issue of the fact that, in order to recruit the best
and brightest, they have to be convinced that the Country cares
about this. They have to be convinced because essentially these
people go black in a certain sense. They disappear, and they
can't publish; a lot of their best work cannot be published in
the open literature.
If they are convinced that the United States does deeply
care about this, and it is such a vital part of our national
security, we can get those people. It also depends on the
facilities. You have to continue to maintain and modernize
those facilities.
The plans in this budget go to all and speak to all those
things.
Senator Hagan. It's also interesting, I was talking to some
individuals with an energy company just recently and, due to
the fact that we haven't been building nuclear power plants,
there has been a vacuum of nuclear engineers. This company is
actually helping to fund nuclear engineering programs at
several universities because of the need for nuclear engineers
and scientists.
Secretary Chu. That doesn't directly impact the NNSA
mission, but certainly within the nuclear engineering side in
another part of DOE, the nuclear energy side, we have been
consistently giving out on the scale of $5 million to students
for advanced degrees--this is master's and Ph.Ds mostly--and
we're looking to improve that.
There's certainly been--we anticipate there is now--a
shortage, and there will be an increasing shortage, as the
world looks to nuclear energy as part of the solution to
decreasing carbon emissions.
Senator Hagan. Some experts indicate that if the Senate
does not ratify the New START it can potentially send
conflicting messages about the administration's emphasis and
commitment to nonproliferation and the NPT. Some experts add
that ratifying the New START will send a positive message in
achieving consensus with other countries on nuclear issues. In
other words, if the two nations that possess the most nuclear
weapons, us and Russia, agree on verification and compliance
with nuclear weapons and are committed to nonproliferation, it
is possible to achieve consensus with other countries.
It is important to encourage non-nuclear states to sign and
abide by the NPT. Ratifying this treaty will demonstrate our
commitment to nonproliferation, sending a message and isolating
Iran. In April 2009 during a Senate Foreign Relations Committee
hearing on the New START, Dr. James Schlesinger indicated that
at this juncture for the United States to not ratify the treaty
it would have a detrimental effect on our ability to influence
other nations with regard to nonproliferation.
Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates, if the Senate does
not ratify the New START, what implications will that have on
gaining international consensus on the NPT?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, I think your question
really summarized our concerns. We have seen positive response
because of our commitment to this treaty, because of President
Obama's speech in Prague, because of our active involvement in
the NPT review conference, because we have been willing to work
toward further disarmament goals with Russia, that all has
given a boost to nonproliferation efforts globally.
Just speaking personally from my exchanges with my
counterparts in NATO and elsewhere, it was a great boost to our
leadership in moving the nonproliferation agenda. I think we
saw that in getting an agreement out of the NPT Review
Conference, which the United States was not able to do in 2005,
in the very positive response from our NATO allies, many of
whom still very clearly have doubts about Russia, those in
Eastern and Central Europe, and in our conversations coming out
of our NPR and the national security statement that has
recently been put out.
I think the premise of your question is absolutely the
case, that we have been able to obtain concessions and move
this greater agenda forward because of our work with Russia on
this treaty.
Secretary Gates. I have nothing to add to that.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Hagan.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
To the panel, thanks for what you do, not only on this
particular issue, but your service to our country. We
appreciate you very much.
It's pretty obvious that, based on the questions that have
been asked, there's a real issue regarding not just missile
defense, but the comments that have been made by the Russians
and, as Senator McCain said, that they've been so strong and so
direct. I don't know whether there's been any challenge to that
on the part of the administration to President Medvedev, but
certainly he's going to be here, as you say, next week. He's
going to be meeting with the President. He'll also be meeting
with some members on the Hill. There will be an opportunity to
clarify this. I hope the President challenges him on it,
because it is a key issue with respect to where we go.
With that in mind, to Secretary Clinton and Secretary
Gates, I want to focus on what I see as relevant decision
points with respect to missile defense and what factors the
United States will consider when making these decisions. First
of all, some of my colleagues have stated that in the overall
context of U.S. national security, the issue of missile defense
may be more important than any agreement that the United States
and Russia enter into regarding nuclear weapons. That's because
we're much less likely, as both Secretary Clinton and Secretary
Gates have alluded to today, to face a nuclear conflict with
the Russians than we are to be attacked or threatened by a
rogue nation or a terrorist group that possesses nuclear
weapons.
I agree with that perspective, and that's why we need a
robust missile defense system, not to protect us from the
Russians, but to protect us from primarily rogue nations.
Secretary Gates, I think you even spoke to this issue directly
in previous testimony.
Now to my question. In the 2020 timeframe, the United
States is currently planning to deploy the SM-3 Block 2B
missile in Europe and, although it is intended to defend
against launches from the Middle East, the missile will have an
ICBM intercept capability and could represent under this treaty
from the Russian perspective a qualitative or quantitative
improvement in U.S. missile defenses that could provoke a
Russian withdrawal from the treaty.
Assuming the threat to the United States and our European
allies still warrants deploying the SM-3 Block 2B missile
around the 2020 timeframe, and assuming that you were in your
current position when that decision needed to be made, would
you recommend the United States deploy this system regardless
of the Russian response?
Secretary Gates. Yes, sir, I would. I think that the kind
of missile threat that we face from rogue states such as Iran
and North Korea is such a problem, and I think by 2020 we may
well see it from other states, especially if we're unsuccessful
in stopping Iran from building nuclear weapons. I think you'll
see proliferation in the Middle East of nuclear weapons and
probably missiles. I think that the need will be even greater
perhaps by that time.
Fast forwarding 10 years, it seems to me that the plan that
we have laid out and the developments that we've laid out as
part of the Phased Adaptive Approach, plus keeping the ground-
based interceptors in Alaska and Vandenberg, and continuing to
upgrade those for the longer range missiles, would be
absolutely essential.
I would say, there's one other reason why I think we would
need to do this, and that is because one of the elements of the
intelligence that contributed to the decision on the Phased
Adaptive Approach was the realization that if Iran were
actually to launch a missile attack on Europe it wouldn't be
just one or two missiles or a handful; it would more likely be
a salvo kind of attack, where you would be dealing potentially
with scores or even hundreds of missiles. The kind of
capability that we're talking about with the SM-3 Block 2B
would give us the ability to protect our troops, our bases, our
facilities, and our allies in Europe.
For all those reasons, that would be my recommendation if,
God forbid, I were still in this job 10 years from now.
Senator Chambliss. Mr. Secretary, you didn't think you
would be there now, so who knows.
Secretary Clinton, I assume you concur with that?
Secretary Clinton. Yes, I do, Senator, completely.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. What, with the ``God forbid'' part?
Secretary Clinton. The whole thing, Mr. Chairman.
[Laughter.]
Senator Chambliss. Well, frankly, that makes it much more
comforting. I assumed that that was the case, Mr. Secretary,
but it is much more comforting to us.
My time is up, so I don't have time to get into the issue
of rail mobile launched weapons, which this treaty is silent
on. We know the Russians have a history of that. As I read the
treaty, those would be exempt, would not be counted, and that
could be a serious issue for a number of us. I will submit a
question for the record to you relative to rail as well as sea-
and air-launched ICBMs.
Lastly, just to comment, with the complexity of this issue
and the obvious determination on the part of the
administration, as has been expressed by each of you today, I
don't know whether you've given any thought to doing a red team
on this. With all the complexities and the difficulties on this
side, I would hope maybe you'd give some thought to having a
red team look at this, so that we can be better prepared to
move as quickly as what you folks obviously want us to move.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Burris.
Senator Burris. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I would like to add my thanks to these four distinguished
Americans for your service to the country. Admiral Mullen, I
would just like to ask you, was any of the wargaming done to
determine whether we still will be able to respond effectively
to a provocation if our nuclear arsenal is reduced to the level
that's indicated in the treaty?
Admiral Mullen. Actually, the analysis that was done prior
to and in support of the negotiations with respect to that from
a military capabilities standpoint was extensive. The uniformed
leadership, one, is aware of that; and two, certainly took that
into consideration as we arrived at our positions and comfort
level with the provisions that are in the treaty.
Senator Burris. Senator Chu, you just heard Senator Hagan
raise a question about the training and the talent pool of our
scientists and engineers. Are we really training enough at our
universities, and do we have a role in--that is, DOE--in
assisting in their training process so that we can have the
brain power to deal with this new technology?
Secretary Chu. Well, I think the American research
universities that train the type of people that we seek in the
NNSA and the national labs are doing an excellent job. It's
really a matter of recruiting the best of those, or some of the
best of those people, into service.
Senator Burris. Is money a problem, salaries?
Secretary Chu. No. I think the intellectual challenge, the
importance of the work, the facilities you will have access to
are the real issues. If you were in it to look for money, you
would not go into science.
Senator Burris. Secretary Clinton, you said that the treaty
will reduce the number of nuclear weapons. I'm not one to
really depend on newspaper articles, but let me just see what
your and Secretary Gates' thoughts are on this article that
just came out yesterday. It was an op-ed piece published in the
Washington Times on June 16, and Keith Payne comments that
Russian strategic analysts have noted that the New START does
not require any real reduction in the Russian nuclear arsenal.
To quote him, he says: ``The new treaty is an agreement to
reducing the American and not the Russian strategic nuclear
force. In fact, the latter will be reduced in any case because
of the massive removal from the order of battle of obsolete
arms and a one-at-a-time introduction of a new system.''
Russian defense journalist Alexander Gaut also noted in the
Washington Times that Russia will ``fulfill its pledge without
eliminating a single actual weapon.'' The same is true
regarding warheads.
Is there any truth to this article?
Secretary Gates. Well, let me start. It looks like three of
us are ready. I would just comment in very simplistic terms:
The Russians, the number of their strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles is in fact below the treaty limits, but the number of
warheads is above the treaty limits. They will have to take
down warheads.
Secretary Clinton. That's correct, Senator. We can give you
additional material to respond. You will find there are,
unfortunately, a number of commentators or analysts who just
don't believe in arms control treaties at all and, from my
perspective, are very unfortunately slanting a lot of what they
say. This is a perfect example of that, because, as Secretary
Gates just pointed out, there would be reductions on the
Russian side.
Senator Burris. That's very interesting, how they can have
these conflicting analyses of what really is there.
Secretary Gates, Secretary Clinton, you answered the
question on Iran. I'd like to raise one here. Iran and North
Korea have been pursuing the technology for nuclear weapons.
Will the treaty change if they manage to develop these nuclear
weapons? Will there be any changes in our treaty, New START,
with Russia if these two countries come up with nuclear
weapons?
Secretary Gates. No. We think that the North Koreans
already have them. As we've talked earlier in the hearing, we
clearly are committed to preventing Iran from getting them, but
it would have no impact on this treaty.
Senator Burris. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman. My time has expired.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Burris.
It's now 11:30 a.m., and we're going to have just maybe a
couple minutes each during a second round, Mr. Secretary, if
you're able to stay. If not, we understand that. Do you want to
stay on for a few more minutes?
Secretary Gates, is there any military need for a new
nuclear weapon at this time?
Secretary Gates. To the best of my knowledge, no.
Chairman Levin. Admiral?
Admiral Mullen. Same answer.
Chairman Levin. I want to go back to this language in these
unilateral statements, because I went back and looked at the
statements in START I and they are incredibly similar, so much
that the opening words to the statement are exactly the same.
On the U.S.-Soviet negotiations, they said that ``This
treaty''--the Soviets--``may be effective and viable only under
the conditions of compliance with the ABM Treaty.''
They said: ``The extraordinary events referred to in'' such
and such an article, which is the supreme national interests
allowing withdrawal--``include events relating to withdrawal by
one of the parties.''
We then issued our statement saying no, it doesn't,
basically. But their statement has the same format, with the
same opening words, as a matter of fact, for each.
START I was negotiated by the first President Bush, is that
correct, with the same kind of statements, unilateral
statements, that were made after the treaty was agreed to? I
think you've all indicated that either side has a right under
that treaty to withdraw if its supreme national interests
indicate it, and under this pending treaty; is that correct?
If the Russians, for whatever reason, decided their supreme
national interest required them to withdraw, they can withdraw.
If they withdraw--and even if they don't withdraw--we could
withdraw if our supreme national interests so indicated to us.
Is that correct, Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates?
Secretary Clinton. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Can we take your nodding of the head?
Secretary Gates. Yes.
Chairman Levin. I would hope that we would treat these kind
of unilateral declarations the same with the current
administration, as was the case with the first President Bush.
The analogies are so close, they're almost perfect. Nothing is
quite perfect in this life, but that's about as close as you
can come.
Finally, on the statement of Russia, cooperating with
Russia in terms of missile defense. The cooperation which
you're talking about to the Russians is the possible addition
of information from their radar to a missile defense system.
They're essentially joining up to make more capable what we are
going to proceed with in the area of missile defense; is that
correct?
Secretary Gates. Yes.
Chairman Levin. It's not a limitation on us; it's a
possible addition to the capability of our anti-ballistic
missile system.
Secretary Gates. It would be an expansion.
Chairman Levin. An expansion or additional capability,
which would be a very powerful statement to Iran, just like the
recent sanction vote in the U.N. was a powerful statement to
Iran. They are more and more isolated, not just from people who
have traditionally been very outspoken about the threat, but
now even from the Russians and the Chinese.
If we could negotiate something with the Russians for them
to expand and add capability to a missile defense system that
was essentially a defense against an Iranian threat, would you
agree, Secretary Gates, that collaboration would be an
extraordinarily powerful statement to Iran about their
tightening and tightening isolation?
Secretary Gates. Yes, I do.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree with that, Secretary Clinton?
Secretary Clinton. Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, if I could, just on a follow-up to your last
questions, which I very much appreciate. I want to ensure that
the record is clear on one additional point. Senator Collins
raised a certain press report about a U.S.-Russia deal to limit
U.S. missile defenses, and I want to be as clear as I possibly
can. Number one, there is no secret deal.
Number two, there is no plan to limit U.S. missile
defenses, either in this treaty or in any other way.
Number three, on that score, the story is dead wrong. I
want to be very clear about that because I don't want anyone
using what is yet again another inaccurate story to argue
against this treaty. As Secretary Gates and I have both said,
we will continue to explore missile defense cooperation with
Russia, but the talks are not secret and there is nothing on
the table or even in the wildest contemplation that would
involve any limits on our missile defense. Instead, we're
trying to see whether they can be expanded with additional
capabilities for our security.
Chairman Levin. Which would then be an additional powerful
weapon against the great threat that is out there, which is
Iran.
Secretary Clinton. That's correct.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Brown.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I merely wanted to continue listening and learning. First
of all, I know the Secretary is under time restraints, and I
know we're going to have additional hearings. But I do want to
just throw this out there. For me, it's also a trust and
verification issue. In the back of my mind I'm saying, yes,
we're going to do all these wonderful things, but how can we
actually verify and ensure that we're not being misled.
I don't have a question. I just want you to know that's
where my head's at. If you can reach out off line to let me
know, that would be wonderful.
Mr. Chairman, thank you for your leadership in holding
these hearings.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Brown.
Now, Senator McCaskill has questions, but not of you,
apparently, Secretary Gates.
Senator McCaskill. Well, I do.
Chairman Levin. Oh, you have to go, too, yes. I wasn't
going to say it, but they are for you, Admiral.
So again, Secretary Gates, thank you so much. I know you
stayed beyond what you thought you would be able to.
Senator McCaskill, your timing, as always, is perfect.
Senator McCaskill. Thank you.
Thank you all for being here. I appreciate it. I have been
following most of the hearing, even though I have not been here
physically.
I know Secretary Gates said earlier that all 18 B-2s will
be retained, Admiral Mullen. Obviously this is of great concern
because we are proud to house all of the B-2 fleet in the 509th
Bomb Wing at Whiteman Air Force Base in Missouri. Talk a little
bit about a practical perspective. What should Whiteman expect
in terms of inspections and verification visits from Russia,
and how can I reassure all the great folks at Whiteman that the
technology and the secrets that we have with the B-2 fleet will
not be in any way compromised?
Admiral Mullen. With respect to the future capability, the
capability which you describe, is absolutely critical. One of
the areas that we looked very carefully at throughout the
analysis and negotiation was the preservation of the three
legs, and then in the future what does that mean for the future
force structure.
We don't have to make any significant decisions with
respect to that until 7 years into the treaty. In terms of
preserving the capability that we have, the technical
capability that we have, there is nothing, from my perspective,
in this treaty in terms of verification which would threaten
that understanding. The treaty has a provision for 18
inspections a year, 10 of which are what I would call
operational kinds of inspections and 8 of which are
administrative kinds of inspections in support of the
verification regime.
There are more in terms of verifying the number of
warheads, if you will. That's a provision literally for each
system. That's, I think, an important strength of this
verification treaty on both sides.
In terms of protecting our capability and the investment
that we've made in technology, systems, and people, this treaty
will more than do that. We do have a great, great group of
people at Whiteman, as we do in this enterprise, the nuclear
enterprise, throughout the military, and I don't think they
need to worry about that at all.
Senator McCaskill. First, Secretary Clinton, let me
reiterate again for the record how proud you make our Country,
the job you do around the world. I think you reflect so well on
our Nation, and I think you're doing masterful work under very
difficult circumstances. We have so many places to worry about
right now.
I would be curious to hear from you what you see as the
consequences of not ratifying the treaty, particularly as it
relates to the deterrence of the rogue extremists that we are
dealing with around the world. If you would speak to what
happens if we can't get this done?
Secretary Clinton. Well, Senator, I think you've really put
into words what our greatest fear is, because we believe that
the consequences of not ratifying this treaty would have very
serious impacts on our relationship with Russia and would
frankly give aid and comfort to a lot of the adversaries we
face around the world.
With respect to the first, it would not only disadvantage
us because we wouldn't have the transparency, the verification
regime, to know what is going on inside Russia, but it would
very much undermine the relationship that President Obama has
been leading us to establish to provide more confidence between
the United States and Russia so that together we can tackle the
threats posed by Iran, North Korea, and networks of terrorists.
Second, it would, unfortunately, turn back our efforts to
try to unify the international community against those threats.
We've made progress with Russia, and Russia has influence with
a number of other countries, to begin to recognize that the
Cold War is over, the standoff between the United States and
the former Soviet Union is a thing of the past. Thankfully, we
can look for other ways to build confidence and trust between
us, which is imperative given the very real threats of nuclear-
armed rogue states and networks of terrorists.
At the nuclear security summit, which the President called
and led, for the first time we got more than 45 nations to come
together to acknowledge the obvious, that we all face the
threat of these nuclear materials falling into the wrong hands,
and therefore we have to come to some new understandings, work
more closely together. I think Russia is an absolutely critical
partner in our efforts to do that.
Senator McCaskill. What is the confidence level that we
have in terms of the Russian military, their ability to
implement, especially if you look at the current economic state
of Russia? Do we have the kind of confidence we need to have in
their ability to implement within the Russian military?
Admiral Mullen. Overall, yes, ma'am. I have watched from my
perspective since 2004, the evolution of the Russian military,
both when I was stationed in Europe and dealing with them more
directly, literally from an operational force perspective, up
to now. They have, from my perspective, made a significant
decision and a shift to invest in their strategic forces. I've
watched them modernize them, put the money in, conduct the
training, where they have certainly been challenged
economically and fiscally in their own defense budget.
This is an area that they continue to focus on and invest
in. I've seen it, and I've also had that reaffirmed by the head
of their navy when I was the head of our Navy, as well as when
I was in Europe in my Navy job and, certainly from the current
and the last two heads of the Russian general staff, in my
current job.
They're very committed to getting this done.
Secretary Clinton. Senator, if I could just add something
to what Admiral Mullen said, because I think this is another
very key point. Secretary Gates referred to it. This treaty may
seem modest in scope, but given the changes in Russian military
posture where they are moving away from reliance on a large
land-based army and conventional weapons to focus what may be
scarcer resources on their strategic capacity, I think this
treaty actually is more significant, because as the Russian
military makes these changes, our relationship with them in
this going on strategic nuclear offensive weapons gives us
actually more insight into what their future plans are. It's a
look forward as opposed to a static look or a look backwards.
Senator McCaskill. Well, I think this treaty represents yet
another opportunity where we have to talk about proving a
negative. That is, what happens if we don't? What are we
preventing by doing it? That's always tough, but I'm firmly
convinced that this treaty is so much preferable to the
alternative, and I appreciate all of you being here today and
enduring. Secretary Chu, thank you for all your good work.
Maybe more so than the others on the panel, you are wearing
lots of different hats right now. So maybe it's a relief to not
spend all morning talking about oil. We welcome you, Hillary,
and thank you all for your service to our country.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCaskill.
Senator Brown had a question or a request.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I'm hopeful I could
submit some questions for the record a little later.
Chairman Levin. Absolutely. Those questions will be
welcome, and the witnesses are alerted that we would hope for
prompt answers.
We're very grateful to all of you for again your service.
We do want to mention that, not just for being here today, but
really for your extraordinary service. I'm not going to go
through that service because we all want to probably get to
lunch. But if you can delay for a couple moments before you
leave, Secretary Clinton, I have something that I would like to
talk to you about if we could.
Our hearing is adjourned. It was a very, very useful
hearing. We thank all our witnesses.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
no constraints on missile defense
1. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, will the New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) constrain the development or
deployment of any planned or programmed U.S. missile defense
capabilities, including the phased adaptive approach to missile defense
in Europe, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) system, or future
missile defenses, or would the treaty allow the United States to
develop and deploy the most effective missile defenses to implement our
missile defense policies and objectives without constraint?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The New START treaty (NST) will
not constrain the United States from developing and deploying the most
effective missile defenses possible, nor does the NST add any
additional cost or obstacles to our missile defense plans. This
includes the Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe, the GMD system, and
any future missile defenses.
preamble statement on relationship between offensive and defensive
forces
2. Senator Levin. Secretary Clinton, the New START contains a
preamble that, among other things, recognizes the interrelationship
between strategic offensive forces and strategic defensive forces. This
is consistent with the July 2009 agreement between President Obama and
President Medvedev to include such an acknowledgment of this factual
relationship. Is this preambular statement in the treaty a binding
provision, or does it contain any binding obligations, relative to our
missile defenses?
Secretary Clinton. The Preamble of the treaty contains a statement
acknowledging the interrelationship of strategic offensive and
strategic defensive arms. This statement does not establish any legally
binding obligations.
3. Senator Levin. Secretary Clinton, did the START include a
similar statement in its preamble recognizing the relationship between
strategic offensive and strategic defensive forces?
Secretary Clinton. No. The Preamble to the START treaty refers to
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), the ABM Treaty, and the
Washington Summit Joint Statement of June 1, 1990.
russian unilateral statement
4. Senator Levin. Secretary Clinton, Russia made a unilateral
statement concerning missile defense to accompany the New START. Is
that unilateral statement part of the treaty?
Secretary Clinton. No. The unilateral statements are not integral
parts of the treaty, and they are not legally binding. The unilateral
statement made by the Russian Federation reflects its current position
that the ``extraordinary events'' that could justify Russia's
withdrawal from the treaty include a build-up in the missile defense
system capabilities by the United States that would give rise to a
threat to the Russian strategic nuclear force potential. The United
States did not agree to Russia's unilateral statement, and the
statement does not change the legal rights or obligations of the
Parties under the treaty.
5. Senator Levin. Secretary Clinton, does the Russian unilateral
statement have any binding effect on the United States?
Secretary Clinton. No. The Russian unilateral statement does not
change the legal rights or obligations of the parties under the treaty
and is not legally binding.
With regard to these types of unilateral statements, it is
noteworthy that in 1991 in connection with the START treaty, the Soviet
Union released a unilateral statement on ``the interrelationship
between reductions in strategic offensive arms and compliance with the
treaty between the United States and the U.S.S.R. on the Limitation of
Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,'' which stated that the START treaty
may be effective and viable only under conditions of compliance with
the ABM Treaty, and further that the extraordinary events referred to
in the relevant provision in the START treaty also include events
related to withdrawal by one of the Parties from the ABM Treaty or
related to its material breach. When the United States withdrew from
the ABM Treaty in 2002, however, the Russian Federation (as a successor
state to the Soviet Union) did not withdraw from the START treaty.
In both U.S. unilateral statements--made in connection with the New
START treaty and with the START treaty--the United States provided
reasons why its activities related to missile defense should not raise
concerns for Russia (or, in the case of START, the Soviet Union).
6. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, does the Russian unilateral
statement accompanying the treaty limit our missile defenses or change
our missile defense policy, plans, or programs?
Secretary Gates. No.
u.s. unilateral statement
7. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, the United States issued a
unilateral statement concerning missile defense in connection with the
New START, noting the Russian unilateral statement. The United States
statement says, ``United States missile defense systems would be
employed to defend the United States against limited missile launches,
and to defend its deployed forces, allies, and partners against
regional threats. The United States intends to continue improving and
deploying its missile defense systems in order to defend itself against
limited attack and as part of our collaborative approach to
strengthening stability in key regions.'' Does the U.S. unilateral
statement still reflect U.S. policy, and is it an accurate indication
of what the United States plans to do with respect to missile defense?
Secretary Gates. Yes.
prohibition on conversion of silos for missile defense
8. Senator Levin. Admiral Mullen, Article V, Paragraph 3, of the
New START would prohibit the future conversion of intercontinental
ballistic missile (ICBM) silos or submarine-launched ballistic missile
(SLBM) launchers to be used for missile defense interceptors, and vice
versa. Beyond the fact that we have no plans to do such conversions,
and that it would not make sense to do so, there is the larger issue of
potential misunderstanding or miscalculation if either side could use
silos of one type for the other purpose.
At the hearing, Secretary Gates agreed that it would be
destabilizing if either side were to launch missile defense
interceptors from ICBM silos or from ballistic missile submarines
(SSBN), and that such launches could appear to the other side to be
launches of ICBMs or SLBMs. Do you agree?
Admiral Mullen. Yes, I agree with Secretary Gates testimony, ``I
think it would be destabilizing if you didn't know what was coming out
of a missile silo.'' This was one of the primary considerations when
the decision was made not to modify or convert ICBM silos into missile
defense silos. As Secretary Gates stated, ``Any of these things that
are confusing to a party on the other side I think needs to be dealt
with very carefully.''
9. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, do you agree
that the silo conversion prohibition in Article V, Paragraph 3 of the
treaty would avoid such destabilizing miscalculation and risk, and thus
serves our national security interests?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Keeping our ground-based
interceptor (GBI) silos geographically separated from our ICBM silos
could reduce the risk of miscalculation by Russia. The potential
miscalculation would be an erroneous Russian assessment that a GBI for
missile defense launched from within a known U.S. ICBM field was a U.S.
ICBM. It is difficult to assess the magnitude of this risk, but
mitigating the risk of any miscalculation related to missile launches
serves our national security interests.
impact on military policy and operations
10. Senator Levin. Admiral Mullen, what impact would not ratifying
the New START have on how you think about military policy and
operations?
Admiral Mullen. The New START treaty achieves important and
necessary balance between three critical aims. It allows us to retain a
strong and flexible American nuclear deterrent. It helps strengthen
openness and transparency in our relationship with Russia. It also
demonstrates our national commitment to reducing the worldwide risk of
nuclear incident resulting from the continuing proliferation of nuclear
weapons.
Without this treaty or other similar agreement, the uncertainly of
Russian actions with respect to their nuclear forces would result in
U.S. planners having to conduct worse case analyses thus forcing the
United States to maintain higher numbers of nuclear forces than would
be necessary. Therefore, the purpose of the New START treaty is to
provide predictability and stability at lower force levels. Without
such this treaty there would still be stability but at much higher
costs driven by the perceived need for higher force structures.
Without a successor agreement to the START treaty, transparency and
strategic stability in the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship would
erode over time. The lack of such an agreement would increase the
probability of suspicion and misunderstanding which would adversely
affect the U.S.-Russian relationship.
As the NPR stipulates, the United States can--reduce the role of
U.S. nuclear weapons in our national security strategy, maintain
strategic deterrence and stability at reduced nuclear force levels,
strengthen regional deterrence and reassure U.S. allies and partners,
and sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.
Finally, fundamental changes in the international security
environment in recent years--including the continuing improvement of
U.S. conventional military capabilities, major improvements in missile
defenses, and the easing of the Cold War rivalry--enable us to fulfill
our national security objectives at significantly lower nuclear force
levels and with reduced reliance on nuclear weapons. Therefore, without
jeopardizing our traditional deterrence and reassurance goals, we are
now able to shape our nuclear weapons policies and force structure in
ways that will better enable us to meet our most pressing security
challenges.
maintaining the stockpile
11. Senator Levin. Secretary Chu, from a technical perspective, do
you and the laboratory directors believe that the nuclear stockpile can
be maintained safely, securely, and reliably?
Secretary Chu. Yes. By pursuing sound stockpile stewardship and
management programs for extending the life of existing U.S. nuclear
weapons, ensuring our scientific and engineering capabilities, and
making necessary infrastructure and modernization investments in the
Nuclear Security Enterprise, we will be able to maintain the safety,
security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) describes the policies, and the
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan details the approach the
United States will pursue to extend the life of the U.S. nuclear
weapons stockpile. The directors of the Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore,
and Sandia National Laboratories determined that the plan ``provides
the necessary technical flexibility to manage the nuclear stockpile
into the future with an acceptable level of risk.''
12. Senator Levin. Secretary Chu, what are the impacts on your
ability to maintain the stockpile safely, securely, and reliably if
there are substantial reductions to the Department of Energy (DOE)
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) budget request for
fiscal year 2011?
Secretary Chu. Substantial reductions to the President's request
would have significant, immediate and long-term implications for the
ability of DOE/NNSA to maintain the stockpile safely, securely, and
effectively. Specific implications would depend on the amount and
target of any reductions, and determining how the reduced resources
would affect the stockpile; science, technology, and engineering
(ST&E); and modernization milestones. The President's fiscal year 2011
budget proposal initiates a multi-year investment plan with substantial
budget increases to extend the life of the stockpile, redress
shortfalls for stockpile surveillance activities and stockpile
certification through investments in the ST&E base, and maintain and
modernize the supporting infrastructure. The fiscal year 2011 budget
request is necessary and executable based on the requirements and the
ability of the Nuclear Security Enterprise to ``ramp up'' efficiently
within the constraints of time, capacity, and capability to spend
increased funds. However, we are still in the process of developing a
baseline budget for four significant budget drivers: the Uranium
Processing Facility (UPF), the Chemistry and Metallurgy Replacement
Facility (CMRR), and the B61 and W78 life extension programs (LEPs).
Thus, there is an expectation for some of these numbers to change as we
achieve more fidelity in the budget.
13. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates, from a Department of Defense
(DOD) perspective, what is the impact on DOD if there are substantial
reductions in the NNSA budget request for fiscal year 2011?
Secretary Gates. Substantial reductions would be a serious setback
to efforts to modernize the nuclear weapons complex and address the
requirements of stockpile sustainment, both of which are key priorities
of the NPR and essential to underwriting the national interest as New
START is implemented. To be more specific: Substantial reductions in
the NNSA budget would affect delivery of the W76-1 LEP, which is
currently in production and being delivered to the fleet. There will be
more W76-1 deployed weapons than any others in our strategic arsenal,
replacing the W76-0, which has already exceeded its original design
life by at least a decade. It would also affect completion of the Phase
6.2/2A study for the B61 LEP and threaten the needed delivery of the
First Production Unit (FPU) in 2017, which could result in a gap in
coverage for the extended deterrence mission. Substantial budget
reductions could also affect recent ongoing studies for replacing the
W-78 ICBM warhead. In addition, the Joint NNSA/DOD Surveillance
Program, which has been underfunded for the past several years, could
also be threatened by substantial reductions. We rely on the
Surveillance Program to provide much of the data for annual assessment
of safety and reliability of all of the systems in the stockpile as
well as the determination of any need for an underground test. Finally,
portions of the NNSA fiscal year 2011 budget will be committed to the
early design and development of critical infrastructure projects,
specifically the Chemical and Metallurgical Research Facility
Replacement (CMRR) at Los Alamos, which is critical to future plutonium
operations, and the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at Oak Ridge,
which replaces Manhattan Project-era facilities that are increasingly
expensive to operate, secure, and update. Both of these facilities, as
well as other NNSA infrastructure, will be critical to upgrading the
safety, security and effectiveness of the stockpile for the 21st
century.
nuclear posture review and the treaty
14. Senator Levin. Secretary Chu, the NPR says that the full range
of life extension options should be studied, but that in deciding which
life extension option should move to the engineering phase, the Nuclear
Weapons Council (NWC) should give ``strong preference for refurbishment
or reuse,'' that is, refurbishing the nuclear component or reusing
existing nuclear components. Replacement of nuclear components would be
``undertaken only if critical Stockpile Management Program goals could
not be met, and if specifically authorized by the President.'' Do the
laboratory directors feel constrained in their discretion to study
options for life extensions by the direction to the NWC?
Secretary Chu. No. While the NPR is clear that the United States
will give preference to nuclear component refurbishment or reuse, it is
equally clear that the full range of options will be considered for
each warhead LEP, including replacement of nuclear components. The
report entitled: ``The New START Treaty Framework and Nuclear Force
Structure Plans,'' submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1251 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, further
explains that ``[w]hile the NPR expresses a policy preference for
refurbishment and reuse in decisions to proceed from study to
engineering development, the Laboratory Directors will be expected to
provide findings associated with the full range of LEP approaches, and
to make a set of recommendations based solely on their best technical
assessments of the ability of each LEP approach to meet critical
stockpile management goals (weapon system safety, security, and
effectiveness).'' Moreover, as noted in their April 9, 2010, statement
on the NPR, the Laboratory Directors affirmed that this approach
``provides the necessary technical flexibility to manage the nuclear
stockpile into the future with an acceptable level of risk.''
15. Senator Levin. Secretary Gates and Secretary Chu, have you
provided any guidance to the laboratory directors that would limit the
life extension options that they study only to refurbishment or reuse?
Secretary Gates. No.
Secretary Chu. No; I have placed no such limitations on the
laboratory directors. To the contrary, as made clear in the report
entitled: ``The New START Treaty Framework and Nuclear Force Structure
Plans,'' submitted to Congress pursuant to section 1251 of the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, ``the Laboratory
Directors will be expected to provide findings associated with the full
range of LEP approaches, and to make a set of recommendations based
solely on their best technical assessments of the ability of each LEP
approach to meet critical stockpile management goals (weapon system
safety, security, and effectiveness).''
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Mark Begich
homeland defense
16. Senator Begich. Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates, does the
New START limit the ability of the United States to defend the Homeland
against current and future Iranian and North Korean ICBM threats?
Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates. No. The New START treaty
does not constrain the United States from developing and deploying the
most effective missile defenses possible, nor does the treaty add any
additional cost or obstacles to our missile defense plans.
17. Senator Begich. Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates, does the
New START limit our hedge strategy against future ballistic missile
threats by hindering completion of Missile Field 2 at Fort Greely, AK,
or testing the two-stage ground-based interceptor (GBI)?
Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates. No. The New START treaty
does not constrain any of our missile defense plans, including our
ability to hedge against future ballistic missile threats by completing
missile field 2, testing the two-stage GBI, and other steps as
appropriate.
unilateral statement
18. Senator Begich. Admiral Mullen, what is your assessment of
Russia's unilateral statement regarding missile defense and the ability
of the United States to defend itself from threats in the near-, mid-,
and long-term?
Admiral Mullen. Russia has issued a unilateral statement on missile
defense expressing its view. We have not agreed to this view and we are
not bound by this unilateral statement. In fact, we've issued our own
unilateral statement making it clear that the United States intends to
continue improving and deploying our missile defense system and nothing
in this treaty prevents us from doing so.
The United States is currently protected against limited ICBM
attacks as a result of investments made over the past decade in a
system centered on GMD. Given uncertainty about the future ICBM threat,
including the rate at which it will mature, it is important that the
United States maintain an advantageous position. Accordingly, the
United States will:
Deploy new sensors in Europe to improve cueing for
missiles launched at the United States
Invest in further development of the Standard Missile-
3 (SM-3) for future land-based deployment as the ICBM threat
matures
Increase investments in sensors and early-intercept
kill systems to help defeat missile defense countermeasures
Pursue a number of new GMD system enhancements,
develop next generation missile defense capabilities, and
advance other hedging strategies including continued
development and assessment of a two-stage ground-based
interceptor
Additionally, Russia has repeatedly expressed concerns that U.S.
missile defenses adversely affect their own strategic capabilities and
interests. The United States will continue to engage them on this issue
to help them better understand the stabilizing benefits of missile
defense. A strategic dialogue with Russia will allow the United States
to explain that our missile defenses and any future U.S.
conventionally-armed long-range ballistic missile systems are designed
to address newly emerging regional threats, and are not intended to
affect the strategic balance with Russia.
19. Senator Begich. Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates, are
there any types of ballistic missile defense (BMD) activities or
policies the United States plans to avoid or delay to diminish the
chances that the Russians will withdraw from the New START?
Secretary Clinton. No.
Secretary Gates. No.
joint missile defense assessment
20. Senator Begich. Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates, in his
speech in Prague on April 8, President Obama said the United States and
Russia would conduct a joint assessment of emerging ballistic missiles.
Please describe this assessment.
Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates. President Obama and
President Medvedev agreed at their July 2009 Moscow Summit that the
United States and Russia should undertake a joint assessment of
ballistic missile challenges and threats. The Joint Threat Assessment
(JTA) is intended to identify our mutual understandings of the existing
and emerging challenges and threats posed by ballistic missiles. We
hope that this exchange of information and assessments will provide
each other a better understanding of our respective perspectives on
threats to the security of the United States, Russia, and Europe. It is
our hope that an improved understanding of missile threats will inform
how we can work together to address them.
21. Senator Begich. Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates, how will
the joint missile defense assessment with Russia affect U.S. policy
towards missile defense?
Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates. The purpose of the Joint
Threat Assessment (JTA) is to increase our mutual understanding of the
ballistic missile threat. The JTA may also provide a potential basis
for additional cooperative activities between our two nations--
including, but not limited to, missile defense. However, the results of
the JTA discussions will not affect U.S. BMD policy, as described in
the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report, nor will it determine
our response to the threat, which will be flexible, adaptable, and
scalable to counter the evolving ballistic missile threat from the
Middle East and northeast Asia.
22. Senator Begich. Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates, when
will the joint missile defense assessment be completed and available
for Congress' review?
Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates. Our goal is to complete this
joint effort this fall. We plan to brief the relevant congressional
committees on the results of this joint effort after it is completed.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
verification changes
23. Senator Burris. Secretary Clinton, the New START addresses
nuclear stockpile levels and the number of weapons each nation can
maintain. What verification changes have been made from past agreements
to ensure both parties meet their obligations?
Secretary Clinton. The New START treaty's verification regime,
which includes onsite inspections, a comprehensive database, a wide
range of notifications, and unique identifiers, as discussed below, is
designed to permit verification of each party's compliance with the
treaty's provisions, including the three central numerical limits
contained in Article II of the treaty, as well as the numbers and
status of treaty-accountable strategic offensive arms.
Onsite Inspections - The treaty provides that each party can
conduct up to 18 onsite inspections each year at operating bases for
ICBMs, ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs), and nuclear-capable heavy
bombers, as well as storage facilities, test ranges, and conversion and
elimination facilities. These inspection activities contribute to the
verification of compliance with the treaty's central limits by
confirming the accuracy of declared data on the numbers of deployed and
nondeployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers and on the
warheads located on or counted for them, as well as conversions and
eliminations of strategic offensive arms.
Comprehensive Database - A comprehensive database, which will be
initially populated 45 days after the treaty enters into force, will
receive new data as notifications of certain changes in treaty data of
the two parties are conveyed in accordance with Treaty provisions. It
will also be updated comprehensively every 6 months. Thus, it will help
provide the United States with a ``rolling'' overall picture of
Russia's strategic offensive forces.
Notifications - The treaty mandates numerous notifications which
will help to track the movement and changes in status of systems
covered by the treaty.
Unique Identifiers (UID) - Unique alpha-numeric identifiers
assigned to each ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber, when combined with
required notifications and the comprehensive database, will contribute
to our ability to track the disposition of treaty-accountable systems
throughout their life cycles.
russian parliament
24. Senator Burris. Secretary Clinton, where is Russia in the
ratification process at this point?
Secretary Clinton. The Russian Duma has begun to consider the
treaty, including conducting hearings. According to press reports, the
Duma's Committee on International Affairs and the Duma's Defense
Committee have both recommended that the full Duma approve the treaty.
The upper house of the Russian Parliament, the Federation Council, must
also approve the treaty. Russian officials from both the executive
branch and legislative branch have consistently indicated a desire to
coordinate their ratification process with ours so that both countries
consider and vote on the treaty around the same time.
25. Senator Burris. Secretary Clinton, does it appear the Russian
Parliament will ratify the New START?
Secretary Clinton. Russian officials from both the executive branch
and legislative branch have consistently indicated a desire to
coordinate their ratification process with ours so that both countries
consider and vote on the treaty around the same time. I am very hopeful
that the Russian Parliament will approve the treaty, but that, of
course, will be a decision for the elected representatives of the
Russian people.
after the new start
26. Senator Burris. Secretary Clinton, President Obama has
indicated that the New START is only a first step and is meant to set
the stage for further cuts. What new issues do you see being addressed
in a follow-on treaty, including levels of nuclear arms and tactical
nuclear weapons?
Secretary Clinton. As stated in the NPR, the President has directed
a review of post-New START arms control objectives to consider further
reductions in nuclear weapons.
Specifically, the U.S. goals in post-New START bilateral
negotiations with Russia will include reducing non-strategic/tactical
nuclear weapons and nondeployed nuclear weapons, as well as deployed
strategic nuclear weapons on ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy
bombers. Any specific U.S.-Russian discussions on U.S. non-strategic/
tactical nuclear weapons will take place in the context of continued
close consultation with U.S. allies and partners.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
missile defense in negotiations
27. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, irrespective of threats from
the Russians to withdraw from the New START, is this administration
committed to funding, developing, and deploying all elements of the
phased adaptive approach for missile defense in Europe as well as
implementing the strategy as portrayed in the BMD review?
Secretary Gates. Yes. As outlined during the announcement of the
Phased Adaptive Approach in Europe last September and in the Report of
the 2010 BMD Review, while further advances in technology or future
changes in the threat could modify the details or timing of later
phases, we plan to deploy all four phases of the PAA in Europe,
including Phase Four.
28. Senator McCain. Secretary Clinton, in her prepared remarks
before the Atlantic Council in April, Under Secretary of State Ellen
Tauscher stated that ``Our Russian friends needed some assurances as it
negotiated deeper reductions in the absence of an Anti-Ballistic
Missile (ABM) Treaty. The United States made a unilateral statement to
clarify that our missile defense systems are not intended to affect the
strategic balance with Russia . . . '' Why was it necessary to provide
such assurances to Russia?
Secretary Clinton. A number of public statements made by Russian
leaders about the treaty have shown that they considered such
assurances necessary in the context of reaching agreement on the
treaty. Under Secretary Tauscher's statement to the Atlantic Council
was based on standing U.S. policy as articulated in the 2010 Ballistic
Missile Defense Review that ``while the GMD system would be employed to
defend the United States against limited missile launches from any
source, it does not have the capacity to cope with large scale Russian
or Chinese missile attacks, and is not intended to affect the strategic
balance with those countries.''
The United States has made clear that U.S. missile defense efforts
are not directed against Russia. As Secretary Gates stated in his May
18 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
``Under the last administration, as well as under this one, it
has been U.S. policy not to build a missile defense that would
render useless Russia's nuclear capabilities. It has been a
missile defense intended to protect against rogue nations such
as North Korea and Iran, or countries that have very limited
capabilities. The systems that we have, the systems that
originated and have been funded in the Bush administration, as
well as in this administration, are not focused on trying to
render useless Russia's nuclear capability. That, in our view,
as in theirs, would be enormously destabilizing, not to mention
unbelievably expensive.''
Russia has expressed concerns that U.S. BMD capabilities could
eventually be a threat to Russia's nuclear deterrent; the United
States, therefore, sought to convey to Russia the underlying approach
outlined by Secretary Gates. To this end, we have provided, and will
continue to provide, policy and technical explanations regarding why
U.S. BMD capabilities such as the European-based Phased Adaptive
Approach do not and cannot pose a threat to Russian strategic deterrent
forces.
29. Senator McCain. Secretary Clinton, did our negotiators receive
assurances from Russia that they will not object to the full deployment
of all four phases of the phased adaptive approach in Europe?
Secretary Clinton. No; these negotiations were about strategic
offensive arms, not missile defense. This past April Russian Foreign
Minister Lavrov characterized the first two phases of the European-
based Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA) as ``regional systems'' that pose
no threat to Russia's strategic nuclear forces. On the latter two
phases, he noted that Russia would need to evaluate them should they
contain ``strategic features.'' We have provided, and will continue to
provide, policy and technical explanations regarding why U.S. ballistic
missile defense capabilities such as those to be deployed throughout
all four phases of the EPAA will not pose a threat to Russian strategic
deterrent forces.
30. Senator McCain. Secretary Clinton, did our negotiators receive
assurances from Russia that they will not object to the potential need
to increase the number of GBIs in California and Alaska if the threat
from North Korea or Iran materializes sooner than expected?
Secretary Clinton. This issue was not discussed in the New START
negotiations. U.S. negotiators did not seek such assurances, but the
United States made clear in its unilateral statement that it intended
to continue improving and deploying missile defense systems.
31. Senator McCain. Secretary Clinton, if we were going to offer
assurances on missile defense, why didn't we demand similar assurances
from the Russians on tactical nuclear weapons?
Secretary Clinton. The U.S. assurances on missile defense have been
a reiteration of standing U.S. policy as articulated in the 2010 BMD
Review, and explanations of the capabilities of current and planned
systems. A more ambitious treaty that addressed tactical nuclear
weapons would have taken much longer to complete, adding significantly
to the time before a successor agreement, including verification
measures, could enter into force following START's expiration in
December 2009. This approach was consistent with the bipartisan
Strategic Posture Commission's recommendation to ``pursue a step-by-
step approach,'' and to make the first step ``modest and
straightforward.'' President Medvedev has expressed interest in future
discussions on measures to further reduce both nations' nuclear
arsenals. We intend to raise strategic and tactical weapons, including
nondeployed nuclear weapons, in those discussions.
russian tactical nuclear weapons
32. Senator McCain. Secretary Clinton, in written testimony before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Former Secretary of State Henry
Kissinger stated, ``As strategic arsenals are reduced, the distinction
between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons is bound to erode. The
large Russian stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons, unmatched by a
comparable American deployment, could threaten the ability to undertake
extended deterrence. This challenge is particularly urgent given the
possible extension of guarantees in response to Iran's nuclear weapons
program and other programs that may flow from it.'' Given the
significant interrelationship between strategic and tactical offensive
weapons, why does the treaty not address the Russian and U.S.
disparity?
Secretary Clinton. From the outset the New START treaty was
intended to replace the START treaty, which was about strategic
offensive forces. The desire to conclude the New START treaty quickly
in light of the pending expiration of the START treaty, combined with
the need to consult closely with our allies before addressing tactical
nuclear weapons, did not support broadening the scope of the New START
treaty to address tactical nuclear weapons. Deferring negotiations on
tactical nuclear weapons until after a START successor agreement had
been concluded was also the recommendation of the Perry-Schlesinger
Congressional Strategic Posture Commission.
33. Senator McCain. Secretary Clinton, what leverage do we have to
compel Russia to discuss reductions of its tactical arsenal in the
future if we were to ratify the New START?
Secretary Clinton. The New START treaty sets the stage for further
negotiations with Russia on measures to reduce both our strategic and
tactical nuclear weapons, including nondeployed nuclear weapons.
President Medvedev has expressed interest in future discussions on
measures to reduce both nations' nuclear arsenals. We intend to raise
strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, including nondeployed nuclear
weapons, in those discussions.
Leverage for future negotiations will come from several directions.
The Russians are concerned with the totality of the U.S. nuclear
stockpile, particularly the upload capability of our strategic
ballistic missiles, as well as U.S. tactical nuclear weapons forward-
deployed in NATO countries. Also, Article VI of the Nuclear NPT
stipulates that nuclear weapons states are to work toward achieving
nuclear disarmament. The Russians want to be seen favorably as working
toward this goal.
force structure
34. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, the 1251 Report, received by
Congress in conjunction with the New START documentation, outlined a
baseline nuclear force structure and specified retaining up to 420
deployed ICBMs after a cut of at least 30 silos; retaining up to 60
nuclear-capable bombers after a reduction of 34 bombers from the
current deployable force; and retaining all of the current 14 SSBNs
with no more than 240 SLBMs deployed at any time. Given the provided
ranges in the 1251 Report account for 720 delivery vehicles, 20 above
the deployed limit under the New START, when does DOD intend to provide
the Senate with its final force structure?
Admiral Mullen. The NPR assessed the appropriate force structure
for each Triad leg, namely the required numbers of strategic nuclear
submarines (SSBNs) and SLBMs, ICBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers.
DOD continues to study the final force structure under New START and
will announce the end state force structure at the appropriate time.
But the final force structure will allow for:
Supporting strategic stability through an assured
second-strike capability
Retaining sufficient force structure in each leg to
allow the ability to hedge effectively against technical and
geopolitical developments by preserving our capability to
upload all three legs of the Triad as well as change our force
posture as necessary
Retaining a margin above the minimum required nuclear
force structure for the possible addition of non-nuclear
prompt-global strike capabilities (conventionally-armed ICBMs
or SLBMs) that would be accountable under the treaty.
Maintaining the needed capabilities over the next several decades
or more, including retaining a sufficient cadre of trained military and
civilian personnel and adequate infrastructure.
35. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, have you yet estimated how the
Russians will configure their strategic forces under the New START?
Admiral Mullen. The classified National Intelligence Estimate (NIE)
drafted by the Intelligence Community published on 30 June 2010
provides an analysis of how the Russian Federation will potentially
configure their strategic forces under the New START. In formulating
the U.S. negotiating position and during treaty negotiations, we looked
at a wide array of how Russia could arrange its nuclear force
structure. We are confident that the forces we deploy during the life
of the treaty can address any potential threat to U.S national security
from Russian nuclear forces.
Additionally, the U.S. nuclear force structure, as articulated in
the NPR, was designed to account for possible adjustments in the
Russian strategic force configuration that may be implemented in
response to New START. The configuration of U.S. strategic forces in
the Triad, and the administration's continuing commitment to
maintaining U.S. forces in the Triad structure under New START,
maintains strategic deterrence and stability, strengthens regional
deterrence, reassures U.S. allies and partners, and sustains a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. NPR analysis focused on
retaining sufficient force structure in each leg of the Triad to allow
the ability to hedge effectively against technical and geopolitical
developments by preserving our capability to ``upload'' our nuclear
forces as well as change our force posture as necessary.
36. Senator McCain. Admiral Mullen, have you conducted a net
assessment to determine if the United States can carry out its
deterrence mission under a likely mixed Russian strategic and tactical
nuclear weapons force structure? If so, please provide details.
Admiral Mullen. The base objectives for NPR analysis included
reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national security
strategy while maintaining strategic deterrence and stability,
strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies and
partners, and sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.
The United States achieves deterrence vis-a-vis Russia through DOD's
Triad force structure. The administration is committed to the Triad,
namely maintaining the required numbers of strategic nuclear submarines
and SLBMs, ICBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers. The administration
firmly believes in retaining sufficient force structure in each leg to
allow the ability to hedge effectively by shifting weight from one
Triad leg to another if necessary due to unexpected technological or
operational problems.
While Russia maintains a large stockpile of non-strategic (or
``tactical'') nuclear weapons, the United States has reduced non-
strategic nuclear weapons dramatically since the end of the Cold War
and keeps only a limited number of forward deployed nuclear weapons in
Europe, plus a small number of nuclear weapons stored in the United
States for possible overseas deployment in support of extended
deterrence to allies and partners worldwide.
In support of U.S. extended deterrence goals, the NPR called for
retaining the capability to forward-deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on
tactical fighter-bombers and heavy bombers, and proceed with full scope
life extension for the B-61 bomb including enhancing safety, security,
and use control. Additionally, the United States will continue to
maintain and develop long-range strike capabilities that supplement
U.S. forward military presence and strengthen regional deterrence, and
also continue, where appropriate, to expand consultations with allies
and partners to address how to ensure the credibility and effectiveness
of the U.S. extended deterrent.
russian verification and compliance reports
37. Senator McCain. Secretary Clinton, I understand that we have
yet to receive requested data on Russian compliance and verification
since 2005 under START. Please explain why this delay occurred.
Secretary Clinton. The 2010 Report on Adherence to and Compliance
with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and
Commitments, including information on Russia's compliance with START
through the expiration of the treaty, was submitted to Congress on July
1, 2010. This administration was committed to ensuring that Congress
received a comprehensive report.
38. Senator McCain. Secretary Clinton, when does the administration
plan to make START compliance and verification data available to the
Senate?
Secretary Clinton. Issues related to Russia's compliance with
verification and inspection procedures associated with the START treaty
are addressed in the Report on Adherence to and Compliance with Arms
Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments
that was provided to the Senate on July 1, 2010.
negotiating record
39. Senator McCain. Secretary Clinton, consistent with past
practice on arms control treaties, including the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces Treaty and START, when does the administration intend to
provide the Senate with the negotiating record of the New START,
including all elements of the record dealing with missile defenses,
tactical nuclear weapons, and limiting prompt global strike?
Secretary Clinton. So far as we are aware, Senators were not
provided full access to the negotiating record during Senate
consideration of the START treaty. Nor was the negotiating record
provided to the Senate during its consideration of the ABM Treaty.
Rather, information from the negotiating record was provided to the
Senate in relation to a controversial interpretation of the ABM Treaty
more than a decade after the Senate had provided its approval and the
treaty had entered into force.
As the Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted in its report on
the treaty between the United States and the U.S.S.R. on the
elimination of their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, ``a
systematic expectation of Senate perusal of every key treaty's
`negotiating record' could be expected to inhibit candor during future
negotiations and induce posturing on the part of U.S. negotiators and
their counterparts during sensitive discussions.'' The committee report
further noted that regularly providing the negotiating record would
ultimately ``weaken the treaty-making process'' and ``damage American
diplomacy.''
Of course, Senators being asked to provide advice and consent to
ratification of a treaty should have a full understanding of what
obligations would be undertaken by the United States upon ratification
of that treaty. Thus, when a treaty is submitted to the Senate by the
President it is accompanied by a detailed article-by-article analysis
of the treaty. The analysis of the New START treaty transmitted to the
Senate by the President on May 13, 2010, is nearly 200 pages and
provides information on every provision of the treaty, Protocol, and
Annexes. This analysis includes relevant information drawn from the
negotiating record. The treaty text and these materials provide a
comprehensive picture of U.S. obligations under the treaty. Should you
have any outstanding questions, we are committed to providing answers
in detailed briefings, in a classified session, if needed.
dual-capable joint strike fighter
40. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, the development of the dual-
capable nuclear and conventional variant of the F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter (JSF) to replace aging dual-capable F-16s is a primary driver
for the B-61 2017 deadline. How critical is the timely delivery of the
dual-capable F-35 to the extended deterrence mission?
Secretary Gates. Timely delivery of a dual-capable F-35 is
important to the extended deterrence mission, because U.S. F-16 dual
capable aircraft (DCA) currently performing the extended deterrence
mission are expected to begin to reach service life limits in the 2017
timeframe, and as such, need to be replaced.
It is important to note that the development of the F-35 is only
one of several drivers for the B61 LEP 2017 First Production Unit (FPU)
requirement. Several components of both the B61-3 and -4 non-strategic
variants, and the B61-7 strategic variants are reaching end of life and
need to be replaced to support both the extended and strategic
deterrence missions.
41. Senator McCain. Secretary Gates, how confident are you that the
dual-capable F-35 will be available as scheduled in 2017?
Secretary Gates. Based on the recent F-35 program restructure and
Nunn-McCurdy breach, a new program baseline is currently in work and
those results will help inform the Air Force on any possible effects to
the Dual Capable Aircraft timeline.
infrastructure modernization
42. Senator McCain. Secretary Chu, with the release of the NPR,
Secretary Gates announced that DOD would be transferring $5 billion
over the next 5 years to DOE to address infrastructure modernization
needs. This increase is welcome, and absolutely necessary, and must
supplement significant long-term increases in DOE's own budget. How
will DOD funding be utilized by NNSA?
Secretary Chu. The Department of Defense transferred almost $4.6
billion of top line budget authority over the period of fiscal years
2011-2015 to the NNSA weapon activities for infrastructure
modernization, LEPs, and enhanced stockpile stewardship. This transfer,
if appropriated by Congress, would be utilized to support:
Design and initial construction of the Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility;
Design and initial construction of the Uranium
Processing Facility;
Creation of a sustainable plutonium pit manufacturing
capacity at the PF-4 facility;
Completion of the ongoing LEP for the W76 warhead and
the B61 bomb;
Beginning LEP studies to explore the path forward for
the W78 ICBM warhead;
Revitalizing the warhead surveillance effort and
associated science and technology support; and
Protecting the human capital base at U.S. nuclear
weapons laboratories--including the ability to design nuclear
warheads as well as development and engineering expertise and
capabilities--through a stockpile stewardship program that
fully exercises these capabilities.
The Departments of Defense and Energy have agreed that their staffs
will conduct and participate in the following reviews: semi-annual
programmatic reviews by the Nuclear Weapons Council and annual NNSA
programming and budgeting reviews.
In addition, the Department of Defense transferred another nearly
$1.1 billion to Naval Reactors over the period of fiscal years 2011-
2015 for reactor design and development.
43. Senator McCain. Secretary Chu, can you confirm that DOE will
not reduce its future years spending requests for NNSA as a result of
DOD contribution?
Secretary Chu. That is correct. DOE will not reduce its request for
NNSA's Future Years Nuclear Security Program as a result of the
transfer of top line budget authority from the Department of Defense.
The President's fiscal year 2011 budget proposal initiates a multi-year
investment plan that includes substantial budget increases to address
shortfalls in stockpile surveillance activities and in the science,
technology, and engineering base that support stockpile certification,
and to maintain and modernize the supporting infrastructure.
russian resolution on ratification
44. Senator McCain. Secretary Clinton, as you are aware, the
Russian law passed pursuant to START II ratification obligated in
statute that Russia withdraw from START II if the United States
withdrew from the ABM treaty. Has the Russian Resolution on
Ratification for the New START been made public yet?
Secretary Clinton. No.
45. Senator McCain. Secretary Clinton, what is the projected
timeline for the Russian Resolution on Ratification to be made public,
if at all?
Secretary Clinton. We do not know, although we would anticipate
that the resolution may be made public when the Duma votes on it.
46. Senator McCain. Secretary Clinton, while START II never entered
into force, is there any reason to believe that Russia will not pass a
similar statute with respect to missile defense this time?
Secretary Clinton. We have no information regarding what might be
in the Russian resolution of ratification for the New START treaty.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
tactical nuclear weapons
47. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral
Mullen, the 2010 NPR concluded that ``large disparities in nuclear
capabilities could raise concerns on both sides and among U.S. allies
and partners, and may not be conducive to maintaining a stable, long-
term relationship, especially as nuclear forces are significantly
reduced.'' Henry Kissinger stated on May 25, 2010, ``The large Russian
stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons, unmatched by a comparable
American deployment, could threaten the ability to undertake extended
deterrence.'' The Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission report
notes, ``The combination of new warhead designs, the estimated
production capability for new nuclear warheads, and precision delivery
systems such as the Iskander short-range tactical ballistic missile,
open up new possibilities for Russian efforts to threaten to use
nuclear weapons to influence regional conflicts.'' Senator Biden said
in March 2003, ``After entry into force of the Moscow Treaty, getting a
handle on Russian tactical nuclear weapons must be a top arms control
and nonproliferation objective of the United States Government.'' Why
was limiting tactical nuclear weapons not an objective for this
agreement?
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen. We did not
make limiting tactical nuclear weapons an objective for this agreement
because from the outset the New START treaty was intended to replace
the START treaty, which was about strategic offensive forces. The
desire to minimize the time before a successor agreement, including
verification measures, could enter into force following START's
expiration in December 2009, combined with the need to consult closely
with our allies before addressing tactical nuclear weapons did not
support broadening the scope of the New START treaty to address
tactical nuclear weapons. Deferring negotiations on tactical nuclear
weapons until after a START successor agreement had been concluded was
also the recommendation of the Perry-Schlesinger Congressional
Strategic Posture Commission.
48. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral
Mullen, wasn't the Senate told when it approved the Strategic Offensive
Reductions Treaty (SORT) or Moscow Treaty that the next treaty would
finally make possible reductions in tactical nuclear weapons?
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen. Then-
Secretaries Powell and Rumsfeld made clear they intended to raise
issues related to tactical nuclear weapons with their Russian
counterparts. In 2002, the United States and Russia agreed to establish
a Consultative Group for Strategic Security (CGSS) to serve as the
principal mechanism through which the sides could discuss a broad range
of international security issues. One of the priorities that the United
States pursued in the CGSS was transparency in tactical nuclear
weapons. However, no progress was made on developing an arms control
agreement governing tactical nuclear weapons.
As stated in the 2010 NPR, the President has directed a review of
post-New START arms control objectives to consider further reductions
in nuclear weapons. Specifically, the U.S. goals in post-New START
bilateral negotiations with Russia will include reducing non-strategic/
tactical nuclear weapons and nondeployed nuclear weapons, as well as
deployed strategic nuclear weapons on ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable
heavy bombers.
President Medvedev has expressed interest in future discussions on
measures to further reduce both nations' nuclear arsenals. We intend to
raise strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, including nondeployed
nuclear weapons, in those discussions.
Of course, any specific U.S.-Russian discussions on U.S. non-
strategic/tactical nuclear weapons will take place in the context of
continued close consultation with allies and partners.
49. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral
Mullen, what leverage will the United States have in the future to
address this disparity when we have only a couple of hundred tactical
nuclear weapons in Europe while the Russians have thousands?
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen. The New
START treaty sets the stage for further negotiations with Russia on
measures to reduce both our strategic and tactical nuclear weapons,
including nondeployed nuclear weapons. President Medvedev has expressed
interest in future discussions on measures to reduce both nations'
nuclear arsenals. We intend to raise strategic and tactical nuclear
weapons, including nondeployed nuclear weapons, in those discussions.
Leverage for future negotiations will come from several directions.
The Russians are concerned with the totality of the U.S. nuclear
stockpile, particularly the upload capability of our strategic
ballistic missiles, as well as U.S. tactical nuclear weapons forward-
deployed in NATO countries. Also, Article VI of the NPT stipulates that
nuclear weapons states are to work toward achieving nuclear
disarmament. The Russians want to be seen favorably as working toward
this goal.
50. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral
Mullen, would the administration be willing to put missile defense on
the negotiating table to get reductions in Russian tactical nuclear
weapons?
Secretary Clinton. No. While it is certainly desirable to get
reductions in Russian tactical nuclear weapons, this administration has
consistently informed Russia that the United States will not agree to
constrain or limit U.S. BMD capabilities.
Secretary Gates. No.
Admiral Mullen. No.
51. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral
Mullen, would the administration be willing to use our large hedge of
nondeployed nuclear warheads to get reductions in Russian tactical
nuclear weapons?
Secretary Clinton. Presidents Obama and Medvedev have expressed
their interest in future discussions on measures to further reduce both
nations' nuclear arsenals. We intend to raise the issue of strategic
and tactical nuclear weapons, including nondeployed nuclear weapons, in
those discussions. It is premature at this stage to discuss what our
negotiating strategy might be.
Secretary Gates. The Department of Defense will carry out analyses
to explore the adequacy of various U.S. strategic and tactical nuclear
capability levels--including both deployed and nondeployed weapons--
within the context of similar nuclear force levels on the Russian side
in preparation for the next round of nuclear arms reduction
negotiations.
Admiral Mullen. In the NPR, the Obama administration stated its
desire to engage in a strategic dialogue with Russia to discuss steps
it could take to allay concerns in the West about Russia's non-
strategic nuclear arsenal. I would note that this strategic dialogue is
unrelated to DOD reasoning for maintaining our stockpile of nondeployed
warheads.
The United States maintains nondeployed nuclear warheads in the
U.S. stockpile to provide logistics spares, support the aging
surveillance program, and hedge against technical or geopolitical
surprise. The nondeployed stockpile currently includes more warheads
than would otherwise be required for these purposes, if not for the
limited capacity of the NNSA complex to conduct LEPs for deployed
weapons in a timely manner. Progress in restoring NNSA's production
infrastructure will allow the U.S. to reduce its reliance on, and thus
the supply of, reserve warheads. It is only within this broader context
that the U.S. would consider nondeployed warheads as part of any future
negotiating strategy.
52. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral
Mullen, what impact will the disparity in tactical nuclear weapons have
on the ability of the United States to extend deterrence, or nuclear
security guarantees, to allies that are within the range of Russian
tactical nuclear weapons?
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen. Extended
nuclear deterrence will remain strong under the New START treaty,
including for those within range of Russian tactical nuclear weapons. A
credible U.S. extended nuclear deterrent protecting allies and partners
is provided by a combination of means--the strategic forces of the U.S.
strategic Triad, non-strategic nuclear weapons forward deployed in
Europe, and U.S.-based nuclear weapons that could be deployed forward
quickly to meet regional contingencies.
53. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral
Mullen, could the Russians benefit, in terms of the influence they are
able to exert over specific regions, due to their superiority in
tactical nuclear weapons?
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen. U.S.
extended deterrence and assurance will remain strong under New START.
NATO retains a nuclear capability and the United States retains a
variety of capabilities to forward-deploy nuclear weapons into other
regions if the situation ever demands. The New START limit on deployed
nuclear warheads was made with consideration of the U.S. ability to
fulfill our deterrence commitments around the world.
54. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral
Mullen, what impact will this tactical nuclear weapon disparity have on
the views of our 30 allies currently protected under the United States
nuclear umbrella?
Secretary Clinton. We have discussed our nuclear force reductions
with our allies and assured them that U.S. nuclear force reductions
will be implemented in ways that maintain the reliability and
effectiveness of our extended deterrent for all of our allies and
partners.
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Traditionally, a credible U.S.
``nuclear umbrella'' has been provided by a combination of means--the
strategic forces of the U.S. Triad, non-strategic nuclear weapons
deployed forward in key regions, and U.S.-based nuclear weapons that
could be deployed forward quickly to meet regional contingencies. The
mix of deterrence means has varied over time and from region to region.
Today, there are separate choices to be made in partnership with
allies in Europe and Asia about what posture best serves our shared
interests in deterrence and assurance and in moving toward a world of
reduced nuclear dangers. The U.S. and its NATO allies maintain forward
deployed tactical nuclear weapons to enhance deterrence. Within the
regional context, the United States relies on additional capabilities
to support extended deterrence and power projection, including:
conventional force capabilities, BMDs, allied capabilities, advanced
technologies, and modernization and maintenance of existing forces, to
name a few. Finally, the United States retains the capability to
rapidly upload additional strategic nuclear weapons if necessary.
During consultations during the development of the 2010 NPR and
since the release of the NPR and the signing of New START, Allies have
told us they are comfortable with our planned nuclear force posture,
which is consistent with the NPR recommendations and the New START
treaty. Allied governments have noted that future U.S.-Russian nuclear
arms reduction negotiations should seek to reduce Russian tactical
nuclear weapons.
Lastly, the United States will sustain safe, secure, and effective
nuclear forces to deter any potential adversary so long as nuclear
weapons exist. U.S. nuclear force reductions will be implemented in
ways that maintain the reliability and effectiveness of our extended
deterrent for all of our allies and partners.
nonproliferation
55. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral
Mullen, Admiral Mullen stated in his written testimony that this treaty
demonstrates our national commitment to reducing the worldwide risk of
nuclear incident resulting from the continuing proliferation of nuclear
weapons. How does this treaty reduce the proliferation of nuclear
weapons?
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen. U.S.
leadership in reducing its nuclear arsenal is essential to our efforts
to bolster the nonproliferation regime and reduce global nuclear
dangers. The New START treaty positions the United States to continue
its international leadership role in advancing the goals of the NPT
regime. Having concluded this agreement with Russia strengthened the
U.S. position during the NPT Review Conference in May 2010, and helped
aid our efforts to conclude a consensus final document, which did not
occur at the previous Review Conference in 2005. The new treaty set the
stage for engaging other nuclear powers in fulfilling the goals of the
NPT, and expanding opportunities for enhancing strategic stability.
Enhanced cooperation between the United States and Russia in the
nuclear arena will contribute to the positive international environment
needed to reinforce programs to secure and safeguard nuclear material
stockpiles worldwide, and to strengthen the NPT. More generally,
improved U.S.-Russian relations will help in pursuing critical U.S.
foreign policy objectives related to U.S. security, including efforts
to address the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea.
56. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral
Mullen, did the Moscow Treaty aid in reducing proliferation when it was
ratified?
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen. Yes. Like
other strategic nuclear arms control agreements, the Moscow Treaty
demonstrated U.S. leadership in reducing its nuclear arsenal and
contributed therefore to efforts to bolster the nonproliferation regime
and reduce global nuclear dangers.
57. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral
Mullen, how does the New START stop other countries from continuing to
develop or produce nuclear weapons?
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen. U.S.
leadership in reducing its nuclear arsenal is essential to our efforts
to bolster the nonproliferation regime and reduce global nuclear
dangers. The New START treaty positions the United States to continue
its international leadership role in advancing the goals of the NPT
regime. Having concluded this agreement with Russia strengthened the
U.S. position during the NPT Review Conference in May 2010, and helped
aid our efforts to conclude a consensus final document, which did not
occur at the previous Review Conference in 2005. The new treaty set the
stage for engaging other nuclear powers in fulfilling the goals of the
NPT, and expanding opportunities for enhancing strategic stability.
Enhanced cooperation between the United States and Russia in the
nuclear arena will contribute to the positive international environment
needed to reinforce programs to secure and safeguard nuclear material
stockpiles worldwide, and to strengthen the NPT. More generally,
improved U.S.-Russian relations will help in pursuing critical U.S.
foreign policy objectives related to U.S. security, including efforts
to address the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea.
58. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral
Mullen, how does the New START safeguard existing nuclear weapons and
keep them out of the hands of terrorists?
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen. New START
is just one element of a comprehensive strategy to implement the
President's nuclear security agenda. The New START treaty reduces
limits on deployed strategic nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles in
the U.S. and Russian arsenals. For almost 20 years, the Nunn-Lugar
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program has worked to help eliminate
strategic systems in Russia and other states of the former Soviet
Union. Past eliminations have been completed in accordance with
applicable START provisions, including the START Conversion or
Elimination Protocol. Going forward, CTR will complement New START,
while continuing to operate under its own authorities.
Together with Department of Energy nonproliferation programs, CTR
has contributed to the upgrading of physical security systems at
Russia's nuclear weapons storage sites, as well as provided training
facilities for guard forces, equipped an emergency response force, and
helped the Ministry of Defense to establish a personnel reliability
program. In tandem with the eliminations under New START, these past
and continuing efforts will support the objective of keeping nuclear
weapons and delivery systems out of the hands of terrorists.
relations with russia
59. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, you said during the hearing,
``I would underscore the importance of ratifying the New START to have
any chance of us beginning to have a serious negotiation over tactical
nuclear weapons.'' As you know, START II never entered into force, but
that did not stop the United States and Russia from concluding other
treaties, such as the Moscow Treaty or the New START. The Strategic
Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) II was not ratified either. Why will we
not be able to negotiate tactical nuclear weapons reductions if this
treaty does not enter into force when history disproves that argument?
Secretary Clinton. Our first order of business is to bring the New
START treaty into force. If we fail to do so, Russia could question
whether we would be able to bring a future treaty into force and
therefore might be less inclined to negotiate one in the near term.
Regarding the historical examples you cite, it is important to note
that there was a 15-year gap between the time SALT II was concluded and
START entered into force; and there was a 9-year gap between the time
START II was concluded and the Moscow Treaty entered into force. We do
not want to wait that long to make progress on tactical nuclear
weapons.
60. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, are U.S.-Russia relations so
fragile after more than a year of a reset policy that they would not
recover if the Senate or the Duma did not ratify the New START?
Secretary Clinton. The relationship between the United States and
Russia continues to improve, and the conclusion of the New START treaty
reflects our growing cooperation on matters of mutual interest,
including top priorities like nuclear security and nonproliferation.
The treaty, by helping improve bilateral relations, has facilitated
cooperation on other top priorities, including Iran, most recently with
the passage of UNSC Resolution 1929, which imposes new sanctions on
Iran.
Failure to bring the treaty into force would be a setback for the
relationship and could make it more difficult to cooperate in areas of
mutual interest, as well as to engage productively on issues where we
do not see eye to eye with Russia.
Moreover, without the New START treaty's verification regime,
including inspections, data exchanges and notifications, the United
States and Russia would have to rely solely on National Technical Means
to monitor each other's strategic forces. Over time, this could lead to
greater uncertainty regarding each other's strategic forces and could
cause a decline in confidence, with potentially negative consequences
for strategic stability.
missile defense
61. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral
Mullen, the New START preamble recognizes ``the interrelationship
between strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms, that
this interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear
arms are reduced and that current strategic defensive arms do not
undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive
arms of the Parties.'' Article V, Section 3 of the treaty text places
restrictions on converting ICBM and SLBM launchers for placement of
missile defense interceptors. The unilateral statement issued by the
Russian side on missile defense, released the same day as the full
agreed-upon the New START text in Prague on April 8, states that the
treaty ``can operate and be viable only if the United States of America
refrains from developing its missile defense capabilities
quantitatively or qualitatively.'' Russian Foreign Minister Sergei
Lavrov stated, ``We have not yet agreed on this [missile defense] issue
and we are trying to clarify how the agreements reached by the two
presidents . . . correlate with the actions taken unilaterally by
Washington,'' and added that the ``Obama administration had not
coordinated its missile defense plans with Russia.''
When taken together, the New START preamble, Russian unilateral
statement, and pronouncements by senior Russian officials suggest the
Russians believe there is a linkage between certain U.S. missile
defense activities and their adherence to the treaty. While the Obama
administration had made it clear that the treaty in no way limits any
U.S. missile defense activity, what is more important is what the
Russians think. One way to address this concern is by making it clear
in the Resolution of Ratification that the United States will not be
limited, in any fashion, in its missile defense deployments by the New
START. Are you aware of any agreements reached between the two
presidents concerning missile defense, whether in the context of the
New START or otherwise?
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen. Apart from
the provisions contained in the New START treaty, in the last year the
Presidents have issued two documents addressing BMD.
On July 6, 2009, the Presidents of the United States and the
Russian Federation issued at a summit in Moscow a Joint Statement on
Missile Defense Issues. In that joint statement, the Presidents
instructed their experts ``to work together to analyze the ballistic
missile challenges of the 21st century and to prepare appropriate
recommendations, giving priority to the use of political and diplomatic
methods.'' Accordingly, the United States and Russia are conducting a
Joint Threat Assessment pursuant to the Joint Statement.
At that same Presidential summit on July 8, 2009, Presidents Obama
and Medvedev signed a Joint Understanding on concluding a new legally
binding agreement to replace the START treaty. They directed that the
new treaty include a number of elements, including a ``provision on the
interrelationship of strategic offensive and strategic defensive
arms,'' which is reflected in the preamble of the New START treaty.
Additionally, the April 7, 2010, U.S. Unilateral Statement by the
United States of America Concerning Missile Defense in response to
Russia's unilateral statement makes it clear that the United States
intends to continue to improve and deploy the most effective missile
defense capabilities possible. The administration has consistently
informed Russia that while we seek to establish a framework for U.S.-
Russia BMD cooperation, the United States cannot agree to constrain or
limit our development or deployment of the most effective missile
defenses possible to protect our homeland, deployed forces, and allies
and partners.
62. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral
Mullen, are you aware of any push by Russia for a renewed demarcation
between theater missile defense and national missile defense?
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen. Russia has
proposed that we jointly discuss how to differentiate between strategic
and non-strategic BMDs. However, the administration's view is that the
evolution of BMD technologies has made such a distinction problematic,
as some regional BMD systems are capable of enhancing the protection of
the U.S. homeland and could thereby assume a strategic role. The
administration's view has been communicated to the Russian Government.
63. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral
Mullen, would an agreement between the United States and Russia on
missile defense have to be approved by the Senate?
Secretary Clinton. The administration has consistently informed
Russia that while we seek to establish a framework for U.S.-Russian BMD
cooperation, the United States will not agree to constrain or limit our
development or deployment of the most effective missile defenses
possible to protect our homeland, deployed forces, and allies and
partners. With respect to missile defense cooperation, the precise form
of any potential agreement would depend on the specific content of such
an agreement. We would, of course, work closely with the Senate to
address any concerns in this important area.
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. We concur.
64. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral
Mullen, do the United States and Russia have an agreement on what
constitutes strategic missile defense?
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen. No. The
administration's view is that the evolution of BMD technologies has
made such a distinction problematic, as some regional BMD systems are
capable of enhancing the protection of the U.S. homeland and could
thereby assume a strategic role. The administration's view has been
communicated to the Russian Government.
65. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral
Mullen, will you pledge to the Senate that under no circumstances will
the United States agree to any geographic limitation sought by Russia
as to where we can deploy our missile defenses?
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen. The
administration has consistently informed Russia that while we seek to
establish a framework for U.S.-Russia BMD cooperation, the United
States will not agree to constrain or limit our development or
deployment of the most effective missile defenses possible to protect
our homeland, deployed forces, and allies and partners.
66. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral
Mullen, will you pledge that the United States will accept no
limitation pertaining to our ability to deploy national missile
defenses?
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen. This
administration has consistently informed Russia that while we seek to
establish a framework for U.S.-Russia BMD cooperation, the United
States will not agree to constrain or limit current or planned U.S. BMD
capabilities quantitatively, qualitatively, operationally,
geographically, or in any other way.
67. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gates, when and where will the United
States deploy the early warning radar to support Phase I of the phased
adaptive approach?
Secretary Gates. We are still in discussions with potential host
nations for the AN/TPY-2 radar at this time. We expect the 2011
deployment goal to be met.
68. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral
Mullen, will you pledge to brief Senators and staff about any
agreements related to missile defense that come out of President Obama
and President Medvedev's discussions?
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen. Yes. The
administration would brief relevant Senators and staff regarding any
U.S.-Russian agreements on missile defense.
69. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, will you share with us the
memorandum of conversations and cables that were produced during Under
Secretary Tauscher and Deputy Foreign Minister Ryabkov's discussions on
missile defense for the New START?
Secretary Clinton. The treaty text, the detailed article-by-article
analysis, and testimony provided at hearings on the treaty all provide
a comprehensive picture of U.S. obligations under the treaty, including
those obligations that relate to missile defense. However, should you
have any additional questions we are committed to providing answers in
detailed briefings, in a classified session, if needed.
70. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral
Mullen, will you share with us any draft proposals for U.S.-Russia
missile defense cooperation provided by U.S. Government personnel to
officials of the Russian Federation?
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen. The
administration will keep interested Members of Congress and staff
informed about U.S.-Russian discussions and proposals regarding BMD
cooperation.
71.Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, do you agree with Secretary
Gates that there is not a meeting of the minds between the United
States and Russia on missile defense?
Secretary Clinton. Yes. I agree with Secretary Gates that there is
not a meeting of the minds between the United States and Russia on the
general issue of missile defense. Secretary Gates and I agree that
there is a meeting of the minds between the United States and Russia
regarding all the provisions of the New START treaty.
national nuclear security administration appropriations
72. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gates and Secretary Chu, given the
criticality of funding to modernize the weapons complex, is the
President committed to ensuring that NNSA receives the full $624
million increase as proposed in his fiscal year 2011 budget?
Secretary Gates. Yes.
Secretary Chu. Yes, and we are working closely with Congress to
secure appropriations at the requested level.
73. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gates and Secretary Chu, will you
recommend that the President veto any appropriation that does not meet
his full request for the nuclear weapons complex?
Secretary Gates. I concur with Secretary Chu. I strongly support
the full funding for the nuclear weapons complex including in the
President's budget request, and would advise the President accordingly.
Secretary Chu. I would not support an appropriation that did not
allow the United States to ensure the safety, security, and
effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons deterrent, and if asked by
the President for my recommendation on this matter, I would advise him
accordingly.
74. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gates, you said in the hearing,
``I've been up here for the last four springs trying to get money for
this, and this is the first time I think I've got a fair shot of
actually getting money for our nuclear arsenal.'' Why do you think
Congress, or at least one House subcommittee, has been unwilling to
provide these needed funds?
Secretary Gates. The House Energy and Water Development
Appropriations subcommittee has stated in reports over the past several
years that the administration had provided ``no clear policy statements
that articulate the role of nuclear weapons in a post-Cold War and
post-September 11 world. [and] no convincing rationale for maintaining
the large number of existing Cold War nuclear weapons.'' While I
believe the rationale for nuclear weapons complex investments that was
provided during my tenure to be more than adequate, I am hopeful that
the combination of the NPR, the section 1251 and section 3113 reports,
including the 10-year spending plans and 20-year stockpile roadmap--and
extensive statements by senior leadership of this administration on
these issues and New START--will help us move forward with these
critical investments.
75. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gates and Secretary Chu, should
Congress consider changing jurisdiction for nuclear weapons
appropriations?
Secretary Gates. No.
Secretary Chu. No.
76. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gates and Secretary Chu, Secretary
Gates said in the hearing, ``this is a long-term need on the part of
the Nation . . . and there's been no progress toward providing any
additional funding for our nuclear weapons modernization programs since
that time.'' How long is the process of modernization expected to take?
Secretary Gates. I agree with Secretary Chu that this multi-
dimensional modernization of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile, and
the nuclear weapons complex that supports it, will extend over many
years.
Secretary Chu. Modernization of the NNSA Nuclear Security
Enterprise will be a multi-year process, and different elements will
mature at different times. Maintaining the stockpile is an enduring
NNSA commitment, and we will fully support DOD requirements by
extending the life of the stockpile as long as required. The current
LEP planning schedule contained in the Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Plan (SSMP) extends to 2030. Regarding infrastructure
projects, both the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement
Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) and the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF)
are scheduled to complete construction in 2020 and begin full
operations in 2022. Regarding other aspects of the process, such as
rebuilding the intellectual infrastructure and ensuring retention of
critical skills, the requirements in the NPR, and the details in the
SSMP, provide challenging work of national importance that will allow
NNSA to attract and retain the skilled workforce necessary to maintain
a safe, secure, and effective stockpile as long as required. NNSA will
continue to report modernization progress to Congress in future
submissions of the SSMP.
77. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gates and Secretary Chu, should
Congress and the administration take a fresh look each year as to how
the nuclear enterprise modernization program is progressing and to make
sure there is the appropriate appropriation of resources, especially as
decisions are made about the warhead LEP and delivery system
replacement?
Secretary Gates. Yes, I concur with Secretary Chu.
Secretary Chu. Yes. Retaining the core nuclear weapons
capabilities, while transitioning to the more compact and agile
infrastructure needed to ensure a safe, secure, and effective
deterrent, will require sustained attention and investment. We would
welcome Congress's involvement and support.
department of energy investment
78. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Chu, the fiscal year 2011 budget plan
for weapons activities shows a very flat profile for the next 3 years
with approximately $7 billion each year. Apart from the $5 billion set
aside for NNSA by DOD, there appears to be no attempt to grow the
budget and improve the infrastructure in the near term. How does DOE
plan to match its commitments with its proposed budgets?
Secretary Chu. The fiscal year 2011-2015 Future Years Nuclear
Security Program (FYNSP) was shaped by the NNSA's assessment of the
ability of the Nuclear Security Enterprise to efficiently ``ramp-up''
within the constraints of time, capacity and capability to spend
increased funds to redress mission shortfalls. It balances requirements
with executability. Compared to the fiscal year 2010 appropriation, it
includes a $624 million increase for fiscal year 2011, a $648 million
increase for fiscal year 2012, and a $698 million increase for fiscal
year 2013. With the approval of Congress, this increased funding over
the next 3 years will be used for essential planning, design, and
development activities to support both life-extension of the stockpile,
including the W76, B61 and W78 LEPs, and modernization of the NNSA
infrastructure, including design activities for the Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) and Uranium
Processing Facility (UPF) to establish validated baselines for future
construction. Upon completion of planning, design and development work,
in the 2012-2013 timeframe, as we achieve more fidelity in the budget,
there is an expectation for some of these numbers to change. Additional
funding will be required to ramp up production and construction
activities, which is reflected in the fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year
2015 portion of the FYNSP, as well as the out-year funding requirements
outlined in the report to Congress made pursuant to section 1251 of the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, entitled:
``The New START Treaty Framework and Nuclear Force Structure Plans,''
and in the recently completed NNSA Stockpile Stewardship and Management
Plan. Validated baselines for major projects may drive a different out-
year view of requirements. The funding requirements identified to date,
however, represent the most complete view of needs until these projects
reach validation.
79. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Chu, will a flat weapons activities
budget be able to reverse declines or will it be absorbed by the
problems at hand?
Secretary Chu. The fiscal year 2011-2015 FYNSP was shaped by the
NNSA's assessment of the ability of the Nuclear Security Enterprise to
efficiently ``ramp-up'' within the constraints of time, capacity and
capability to spend increased funds to redress mission shortfalls. It
balances requirements with executability. Compared to the fiscal year
2010 appropriation, it includes a $624 million increase for fiscal year
2011, a $648 million increase for fiscal year 2012, and a $698 million
increase for fiscal year 2013. With the approval of Congress, this
increased funding over the next 3 years will be used for essential
planning, design, and development activities to support both life-
extension of the stockpile, including the W76, B61 and W78 LEPs, and
modernization of the NNSA infrastructure, including design activities
for the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility
(CMRR-NF) and Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) to establish validated
baselines for future construction. Upon completion of planning, design
and development work, in the 2012-2013 timeframe, as we achieve more
fidelity in the budget, there is an expectation for some of these
numbers to change. Additional funding will be required to ramp up
production and construction activities, which is reflected in the
fiscal year 2014 and fiscal year 2015 portion of the Future Years
Nuclear Security Program, as well as the out-year funding requirements
outlined in recent reports to Congress. Validated baselines for major
projects may drive a different out-year view of requirements. The
funding requirements identified to date, however, represent the most
complete view of needs until these projects reach validation. The
administration's submittal demonstrates a long-term, executable
commitment to a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent.
80. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Chu, have the nuclear weapons
laboratories or other sites communicated to DOE any unfunded
requirements from the fiscal year 2011 budget request?
Secretary Chu. The NNSA receives many field requests on an annual
basis that are evaluated and prioritized within a constrained budget.
The priority list is developed using an evaluation process that
considers mission requirements, regulatory commitments, and risk.
Management makes a resource allocation determination based on a
balancing of these priorities.
81. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Chu, are you confident there is
sufficient capacity in the complex to undertake the LEPs for the W76
and the B61 weapon systems, to start the W78 weapon system, and to
continue dismantlement?
Secretary Chu. Yes. The NNSA Stockpile Stewardship and Management
Plan (SSMP) accounts for conducting multiple, phased LEPs at the same
time. This includes completing by 2017 the ongoing LEP for the W76
warhead, completing a full scope LEP study for the B61 bomb and
beginning production in 2017, and completing, with the Nuclear Weapons
Council, a study of LEP options for maintaining the W78 ICBM warhead.
While carrying out this work, NNSA will continue its dismantlement
activities at the Pantex Plant and Y-12 National Security Complex.
82. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Chu, if the United States decided to
add an LEP to the W80 weapon system, what would have to change in DOE
funding to add that requirement?
Secretary Chu. All warheads in the enduring nuclear stockpile will
require some level of technical attention in the next three decades to
ensure their continued safety, security, and effectiveness. The LEP
process determines the specific extent of this activity appropriate to
each weapon system. We have not at this time scheduled or embarked upon
a life extension activity for the W80 warhead, so it is difficult to
assess the scope of such an endeavor. We are confident that full
implementation of the SSMP through fiscal year 2030 will maintain our
country's nuclear weapons safely, securely, and effectively without a
need to resume underground nuclear tests.
modernization
83. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gates and Secretary Chu, our nuclear
weapons average age is over 30 years and most are 15 or more years
beyond design life. Secretary Gates warned last October, ``there is
absolutely no way we can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the
number of weapons in our stockpile without either resorting to testing
our stockpile or pursuing a modernization program.'' The Perry-
Schlesinger Commission was unanimously alarmed by serious disrepair and
neglect of nuclear weapons stockpile and complex. Press reports
indicate the administration will invest $100 billion over the next
decade in nuclear delivery systems. About $30 billion of this total
will go toward development and acquisition of a new SSBN, leaving about
$70 billion. According to estimates by U.S. Strategic Command
(STRATCOM), the cost of maintaining our current dedicated nuclear
forces is approximately $5.6 billion per year or $56 billion over the
decade. This leaves roughly $14 billion of the $100 billion the
administration intends to invest, which will be even less if you factor
in inflation. In light of these figures, and the fact that you have yet
to make additional modernization decisions, do you believe $100 billion
over 10 years is truly a sufficient investment in our delivery systems
over the next decade?
Secretary Gates. The Section 1251 report, ``New START Framework and
Nuclear Force Structure Plans,'' to Congress, which is the basis for
the estimate of $100 billion costs over 10 years for delivery systems,
included costs for which there are currently programs of record. As
stated in the one page, unclassified summary of the 1251 report, the
administration intends to invest well over $100 billion in modernizing
strategic delivery systems. The Department of Defense is currently
conducting an Analysis of Alternatives for a possible follow-on air
launched cruise missile, and is assessing future heavy bomber
requirements in a study of long-range strike that will be completed in
fall 2010. In addition, the Air Force is initiating a study of future
ICBM concepts and requirements. As these studies are completed, and
subsequent decisions taken, the estimate for costs of strategic
delivery systems in the next decade will likely change.
Secretary Chu. With regard to investments to revitalize the nuclear
weapons complex, the President's fiscal year 2011 budget proposal
initiates a multi-year investment plan with substantial budget
increases to extend the life of the stockpile, redress shortfalls for
stockpile surveillance activities and stockpile certification through
investments in the science, technology, and engineering (ST&E) base,
and maintain and modernize the supporting infrastructure. This
investment plan begins with a significant increase of $624 million for
fiscal year 2011 as compared with the fiscal year 2010 appropriation.
As outlined in the Section 1251 report and in the recently completed
NNSA Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, the United States plans
to invest $80 billion over the next 10 years--a net increase of $10
billion--to sustain and modernize the NNSA Nuclear Security Enterprise.
However, we are still in the process of developing a baseline budget
for four significant budget drivers: the Uranium Processing Facility
(UPF), the Chemistry and Metallurgy Replacement Facility (CMRR), and
the B61 and W78 LEPs. Thus, there is an expectation for some of these
numbers to change as we achieve more fidelity in the budget.
84. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gates and Secretary Chu, what details
can you provide that show the administration's intent to modernize our
nuclear enterprise with its laboratories, delivery platforms, and
weapons, as well as maintain its intellectual expertise?
Secretary Gates and Secretary Chu. The administration's commitment
to stockpile stewardship, modernization of the Nuclear Security
Enterprise, and investment in the human capital base is made clear
through the programs and plans contained in the NPR, the report to
Congress made pursuant to section 1251 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, entitled: ``The New START
Treaty Framework and Nuclear Force Structure Plans,'' and in the
recently completed NNSA Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan. As
outlined in those reports, the United States plans to invest $80
billion over the next 10 years--a net increase of $10 billion--to
sustain and modernize the NNSA Nuclear Security Enterprise, and over
$100 billion in nuclear delivery systems to sustain existing
capabilities and modernize strategic systems.
verification procedures
85. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and
Secretary Chu, given that the verification measures for this treaty
have been simplified, does this make it harder for our intelligence
community to monitor Russian nuclear forces?
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Secretary Chu. The
verification measures for the New START treaty will contribute to our
understanding of Russian nuclear forces. Please see the classified
National Intelligence Estimate on Monitoring the New START treaty,
which was provided to the Senate on June 30, 2010.
86. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and
Secretary Chu, do you expect the intelligence services in your
departments or the intelligence community as a whole will require more
resources to ensure we are adequately monitoring Russian nuclear force
developments if the New START is ratified?
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Secretary Chu. Please see
the classified National Intelligence Estimate on Monitoring the New
START treaty which was provided to the Senate on June 30, 2010.
87. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and
Secretary Chu, are you confident the intelligence community and your
respective departments will have sufficient resources and capability to
monitor Russian nuclear forces over the duration of this treaty, if
ratified?
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Secretary Chu. Please see
the classified National Intelligence Estimate on Monitoring the New
START treaty which was provided to the Senate on June 30, 2010.
88. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and
Secretary Chu, will you need greater resources to monitor Russian
nuclear forces because of the simplification of verification and
confidence building tools in the New START as compared to START?
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Secretary Chu. Please see
the classified National Intelligence Estimate on Monitoring the New
START treaty which was provided to the Senate on June 30, 2010.
89. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, Secretary
Chu, and Admiral Mullen, what statistical methodology was used to help
guide U.S. negotiators when they settled with the Russians on the
number of inspections that would be undertaken each year?
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, Secretary Chu, and Admiral
Mullen. The U.S. Government interagency assessed the number of Type One
and Type Two inspections needed annually to meet U.S. inspection
objectives as the nature of these inspection types emerged during the
New START negotiations. These assessments ultimately concluded that an
annual quota of 18 such inspections would be adequate to meet U.S.
inspection needs.
The New START treaty provides for an annual quota of up to 18 short
notice, on-site inspections to aid in verifying Russian compliance with
its treaty obligations. These inspections will provide U.S. inspectors
with periodic access to key strategic weapons facilities to verify the
accuracy of Russian data declarations and deter cheating. Although the
new treaty provides for fewer inspections than the annual quota of 28
permitted under the original START treaty, the number of inspectable
facilities in Russia under the New START treaty (35) is also
significantly lower than the declared number of such facilities in
Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine--the former Soviet Union--when
the START treaty entered into force (70). Furthermore, some
verification activities covered by two separate inspection types under
the START treaty have been combined into a single inspection under the
New START treaty.
The New START treaty annual inspection quota includes up to 10 Type
One inspections of deployed and nondeployed strategic offensive arms,
which will be conducted at operating bases for ICBMs, ballistic missile
submarines (SSBNs), and nuclear-capable heavy bombers. The quota also
includes up to 8 Type Two inspections focused on nondeployed strategic
systems, conversion or elimination of strategic systems, and formerly
declared facilities. Type Two inspections will be conducted at
facilities such as storage sites, test ranges, and conversion or
elimination facilities, as well as formerly declared facilities.
90. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and
Secretary Chu, are the 18 inspections per year sufficient, with high
confidence, to detect cheating?
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Secretary Chu, Please see
the classified National Intelligence Estimate on Monitoring the New
START treaty which was provided to the Senate on June 30, 2010.
91. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and
Secretary Chu, what is our confidence that we will know precisely how
many missiles, including multiple independently targetable reentry
vehicle (MIRV) road-mobile missiles, Russia will be building under the
New START?
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Secretary Chu, Please see
the classified National Intelligence Estimate on Monitoring the New
START treaty which was provided to the Senate on June 30, 2010.
92. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, if the Russians deploy rail-
mobile, air-launched, or ship-launched ballistic missiles during the
life of this treaty, will they count to the limitations of 700 or 800
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles?
Secretary Clinton. Rail-mobile ICBMs would be subject to the treaty
and would count against the central limit of 700 for deployed ICBMs,
deployed SLBMs and deployed heavy bombers. Rail-mobile launchers would
count against the central limit of 800 deployed and nondeployed ICBM
launchers, SLBM launchers and heavy bombers.
Existing types of ICBMs or SLBMs that were air-launched or launched
from a surface ship would also count against the central limit. There
are no definitions or provisions in the treaty pertaining specifically
to new types of air-launched ballistic missiles or to ship-launched
ballistic missiles other than SLBMs. Whether such ballistic missiles,
if developed, would be subject to the provisions of the New START
treaty would depend upon whether such missiles are considered to be a
new kind of strategic offensive arm. The treaty provides that the
Bilateral Consultative Commission shall resolve questions related to
the applicability of provisions of the treaty to a new kind of
strategic offensive arm.
93. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, will the United States be
able to inspect any Russian ballistic missile using the inspections
provided by the treaty?
Secretary Clinton. The treaty establishes that both deployed and
nondeployed Russian ICBMs and SLBMs are subject to inspection. The
right to conduct inspections to confirm the accuracy of data on
deployed and nondeployed strategic offensive arms is contained in
Article XI of the treaty. Inspection procedures for all existing types
of strategic ballistic missiles covered by this treaty are contained in
Part Five of the Protocol. The specific procedures for how to conduct
Type One and Type Two inspections of such ballistic missiles are set
forth in the Annex on Inspection Activities.
94. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and
Secretary Chu, did our understanding of Russia's nuclear forces
increase or diminish under START?
Secretary Clinton. Without question, our understanding of Russia's
nuclear forces increased very significantly under the START treaty. The
extensive exchange of data and inspections conducted under START
provided significant insights into Russian strategic nuclear forces and
operational practices. START's comprehensive verification regime
provided the foundation for confidence, transparency, and
predictability.
Building on START's legacy, the New START treaty will provide
significant transparency and insights regarding each side's strategic
forces through its comprehensive verification regime.
Secretary Gates. I concur.
Secretary Chu. I also concur.
95. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and
Secretary Chu, will our understanding of Russia's nuclear forces
diminish over the term of the New START?
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Secretary Chu. The
verification measures for the New START treaty will contribute to our
understanding of Russian nuclear forces. Please see the classified
National Intelligence Estimate on Monitoring the New START treaty,
which was provided to the Senate on June 30, 2010.
96. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and
Secretary Chu, is it true that at lower levels of weapons, what might
otherwise be minor cheating becomes more significant?
Secretary Clinton. In general, as the number of strategic forces
diminishes, the military significance of cheating could be more
significant. The United States would view any deliberate effort by
Russia to exceed the treaty's limits or circumvent its verification
regime with great concern, especially if the cheating had military
significance. For that reason, it is important under any treaty that
militarily significant cheating can be detected in time to respond
appropriately. Should there be any signs of Russian cheating or
preparations to break out from the New START treaty, the Executive
branch would immediately raise this matter through diplomatic channels,
and if not resolved, raise it immediately to higher levels. We would
also keep the Senate informed.
Secretary Gates. I concur.
Secretary Chu. I concur.
97. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and
Secretary Chu, under this treaty, and its limits on warheads and
delivery systems, what specifically will be considered militarily
significant cheating under the new treaty?
Secretary Clinton. I concur.
Secretary Gates. In response to questions from the Senate during
the ratification deliberations for the START treaty in 1992, the Bush
administration defined a ``militarily significant violation'' as ``one
which endangers the security of the United States or its allies.'' This
remains an appropriate standard. In particular, the primary factor in
determining whether cheating has military significance is its impact on
strategic stability, namely whether cheating would allow the Russian
Federation to eliminate the United States' ability to execute a
devastating second strike against Russia.
Admiral Mullen, the Joint Chiefs, and I assess that Russia will not
be able to achieve militarily significant cheating or breakout under
New START, due to both the New START verification regime and the
inherent survivability and flexibility of the planned U.S. strategic
force structure.
Secretary Chu. I also concur.
section 1251 report
98. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gates, the anticipated funding
directed to nuclear weapons in the 1251 Report accompanying the New
START is $80 billion for weapons and $100 billion for delivery
vehicles. How much of the $80 billion over 10 years will come from DOD?
Secretary Gates. The DOD has transferred $4.6 billion in top line
budget authority to NNSA for Weapons Activities/Nuclear Security
Enterprise, and an additional $1.1 billion for Naval Reactors. These
transfers of budget authority from DOD to NNSA are for fiscal year 2011
to fiscal year 2015. There are no plans for additional transfers from
DOD to NNSA beyond fiscal year 2015.
99. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gates, what specific programs are
anticipated to be part of delivery vehicle modernization efforts and in
what year will these programs commence?
Secretary Gates. The Navy has initiated research and development
for the next generation ballistic missile submarine. Funding began for
the Ohio-class Replacement SSBN in fiscal year 2010 with $495 million
for research and development to support the 2019 lead ship procurement.
Continued Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation (RDT&E)
investment is also included in the President's fiscal year 2011 budget.
The Navy's annual long-range plan for construction of naval vessels for
fiscal year 2011 incorporates procurement of the Ohio-class Replacement
into the overall Navy shipbuilding strategy. Plans call for the design
of the Ohio-class Replacement to begin in fiscal year 2015.
The Air Force plans to sustain the Minuteman III through 2030 as
directed by section 139 of the John Warner National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007, and is initiating studies of
possible ICBM follow-on systems over the next few years. Similarly, the
Air Force will retain the B-52 for nuclear mission requirements through
2035 and beyond and the B-2A for such missions over the coming decades.
The Air Force is currently conducting an Analysis of Alternatives for a
possible follow-on air-launched cruise missile. The Department of
Defense is assessing future heavy bomber requirements in the Long-Range
Strike Study that will be completed in the fall of 2010. As these
studies are completed and subsequent decisions taken, the estimates for
costs of strategic delivery systems over the next decade will likely
change.
reliable replacement warhead
100. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, when you were a member of
the Senate, this committee and several other committees supported the
Reliable Replacement Warhead (RRW) program. Do you still support the
RRW, which you consistently supported when you served in the Senate? If
you no longer support RRW, please explain why.
Secretary Clinton. This administration has made clear that the
United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
arsenal, and the President's fiscal year 2011 budget request for the
NNSA, which contains approximately a 10 percent increase in funding for
weapons activities with better than 60 percent of this increase focused
on directed stockpile work, is indicative of this commitment. After
months of extensive analysis, the NPR, which was led by DOD and
included the Departments of Energy and State, concluded that we can
maintain the safety and reliability of our nuclear arsenal through
LEPs. RRW was a program to replace existing nuclear warheads with
designs that enhance safety, security, and reliability, beginning with
sea-based and air-carried systems. In contrast to that approach, the
NPR recommended a nuclear warhead LEP process under which our experts
will study options for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability
of nuclear warheads on a case-by-case basis, consistent with the
congressionally-mandated Stockpile Management Program. The full range
of LEP approaches will be considered: refurbishment of existing
warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads, and
replacement of nuclear components. In any decision to proceed to
engineering development for warhead LEPs, the United States will give
strong preference to options for refurbishment or reuse. Replacement of
nuclear components would be undertaken only if critical Stockpile
Management Program goals regarding safety, security, or effectiveness
could not otherwise be met and if specifically authorized by the
President and approved by Congress. I wholeheartedly support the
administration's approach to nuclear warhead life extension.
minuteman iii
101. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, the
administration has requested approximately $330 million in fiscal year
2011 to continue modifications to the Minuteman III and conduct
technology development for a possible follow-on system. What are the
key considerations to take into account with the Minuteman III and any
follow-on system when contemplating lower U.S. nuclear forces?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The NPR concluded that the
United States should retain a nuclear Triad under the New START treaty.
It examined possible ``dyads'' and determined that there was
substantial value in retaining a diverse Triad force structure to hedge
against any technical problem or operational vulnerability in one leg.
The NPR also concluded that the United States should ``de-MIRV'' all
Minuteman III ICBMs to a single warhead in order to enhance stability.
We will continue the Minuteman III LEP with the aim of keeping the
missile in service to 2030, as required by statute. We will also begin
an initial study for a follow-on ICBM in fiscal years 2011 and 2012.
This study will consider a range of possible deployment options, with
the objective of defining a cost-effective approach that supports
stable deterrence.
102. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, are you
concerned that, at lower nuclear force levels, the military will not be
able to carry out its deterrence missions?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. We are confident that the U.S.
military will be able to carry out its deterrence missions under the
New START treaty, with support from Congress for planned investments in
nuclear delivery systems and the nuclear weapons complex.
103. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, has
analysis been performed to support another round of reductions after
the one required by the New START? If so, please share the analysis.
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. As stated in the NPR, the
President has directed a review of post-New START arms control
objectives to consider further reductions in nuclear weapons. That
review will begin once New START enters into force. As indicated in the
NPR, the administration has set some specific goals in post-New START
bilateral negotiations with Russia, including reductions in non-
strategic/tactical nuclear weapons and nondeployed nuclear weapons as
well as deployed strategic nuclear weapons. Several factors will
influence the magnitude and pace of such reductions. First, any future
nuclear reductions must continue to strengthen deterrence of potential
regional adversaries, strategic stability vis-a-vis Russia and China,
and assurance of our allies and partners. Second, the Stockpile
Stewardship Program and the nuclear infrastructure investments
requested by the administration are essential to facilitating
reductions while sustaining deterrence under New START and beyond.
Third, Russia's nuclear forces will remain a significant factor in
determining how much and how fast we are prepared to reduce U.S.
forces.
104. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what level
of disarmament in each leg of the nuclear triad did DOD find
unacceptable during the New START negotiations?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The NPR considered a wide range
of possible options for the U.S. strategic nuclear posture, and
concluded that the United States should retain a Triad of SLBMs, ICBMs,
and nuclear-capable heavy bombers under the New START treaty.
Reductions that failed to maintain the viability of each leg of the
Triad, including the ability to hedge against both technical and
geopolitical risk, and sustain technical expertise and operational
excellence, would have been considered unacceptable.
105. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, at what
level of reduction would you begin to get concerned about the viability
of the ICBM force?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. We are confident that the New
START treaty will allow the United States to sustain a viable and
effective ICBM force. We would be concerned about the viability of the
U.S. ICBM force if it were too small to support effective hedging
against technical and political risk as part of a Triad, or if it were
so small that it was difficult to retain technical expertise and
operational excellence.
106. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, when will
we know whether the Minuteman III can be extended to the 2030
timeframe?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The Air Force plans to sustain
the Minuteman III through 2030 in accordance with Section 139 of the
John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2007.
The U.S. Air Force is fully committed to achieving that objective and
has budgeted over $1.3 billion in investments through the FYDP (fiscal
year 2010-fiscal year 2015) to sustain the Minuteman III weapon system
through 2030.
107. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, when do
you expect to start examining options for a follow-on ICBM after the
Minuteman III?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Although a decision on any
follow-on ICBM is not needed for several years, studies to inform that
decision are needed now. Accordingly, the Department of Defense will
begin an initial study of alternatives in fiscal years 2011 and 2012.
This study will consider a range of possible deployment options, with
the objective of defining a cost-effective approach that supports
continued reductions in U.S. nuclear weapons while promoting stable
deterrence.
108. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, how long
does it take to design and develop a new ICBM, based on prior
experience?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Development time for a new ICBM
is dependent on the scope and complexity of the system, technology
readiness levels, and the state of the industrial base infrastructure
required to support a new developmental program. Development of the
Minuteman began in 1958 with the first version, the Minuteman I, being
placed on alert in 1962. Subsequent versions, the Minuteman II and
Minuteman III, took 4 years and 7 years, respectively, to design,
develop, and deploy, leveraging the knowledge and experience gained
from the missile's initial design and development. In contrast, the
larger Peacekeeper ICBM took over 14 years to design and develop prior
to initial deployment.
109. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, will we
maintain the option of placing multiple warheads on our Minuteman
missiles?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Yes. Although the United States
will ``de-MIRV'' the Minuteman III ICBM force to a single warhead to
enhance the stability of the nuclear balance as stated in the NPR
report, the United States will retain an ability to ``upload''
nondeployed nuclear warheads on existing delivery vehicles as a hedge
against technical or geopolitical surprise.
past russian compliance
110. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, Congress has not received
the verification and compliance reports for START from the Department
of State (DOS) Verification, Compliance, and Implementation Bureau
since 2005. How many Russian compliance issues were unresolved when
START expired?
Secretary Clinton. The 2010 Report on Adherence to and Compliance
with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and
Commitments, including information on Russia's compliance with START
through the expiration of the treaty, was submitted to Congress on July
1, 2010. This administration was committed to ensuring that Congress
received a comprehensive report.
Issues related to Russia's compliance with START verification and
inspection procedures are addressed in the classified version of the
2010 Compliance Report.
111. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, please describe in detail,
in classified form if necessary, all outstanding Russian compliance
issues with START.
Secretary Clinton. The 2010 Compliance Report was submitted to
Congress on July 1, 2010. The details of the issues related to Russia's
compliance with START verification and inspection procedures are
addressed in the classified version of the 2010 Compliance Report.
briefing past officials
112. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, you said at this hearing
that the administration has been briefing ``a series of former
diplomats and Defense officials and Energy officials, including Dr.
Kissinger.'' Please share the briefings you have been providing them.
Secretary Clinton. The administration has provided briefings on the
New START treaty to several witnesses who were called to testify before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Those briefings drew from the
various fact sheets that are readily available to the public on the
DOS's web site (http://www.state.gov/t/vci/trty/126118.htm).
russia and iran
113. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, is Russia's sale of the S-
300 missile system to Iran prohibited by the new United Nations
Security Council Resolution 1929 on Iran?
Secretary Clinton. Russia has confirmed that it will comply with
the conventional arms transfer provisions of UNSCR 1929 and therefore
will not deliver the S-300 air defense missile system to Iran. We
appreciate the restraint that Russia has implemented over the course of
several years in not transferring the S-300 to Iran. We hope that
Russia's restraint will serve to encourage other potential arms
suppliers to adopt a rigorous approach to implementing 1929's
provisions on conventional arms transfers.
114. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, if Russia has agreed to
freeze the completion of the S-300 missile system sale, has Russia
communicated to the United States for how long that freeze will last?
Secretary Clinton. See response to question #113.
115. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, did Russia ask for the 123
Agreement between Russia and the United States to be resubmitted to
Congress in exchange for its support for Resolution 1929?
Secretary Clinton. No. The decision to move forward with the 123
Agreement was made on its own merits, in order to advance
nonproliferation objectives.
116. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, did Russia ask for the
United States to pledge not to carry out any unilateral sanctions on
Russian entities in the future in exchange for its support on
Resolution 1929?
Secretary Clinton. There has been no quid pro quo with the Russian
Government on the issue of sanctions.
We believe that UNSC resolution 1929 will have a significant impact
on Iran's ability to develop weapons of mass destruction and acquire
conventional weapons. The UNSC resolution puts international legal
constraints on potential exports of concern by entities in all U.N.
member states, including Russia.
Nonproliferation is a high priority for the United States, and the
Russian Government is a key partner in this effort. We will continue to
work cooperatively with the Russian Government to prevent entities from
contributing to weapons of mass destruction, missile programs, or
conventional weapons programs of concern. At the same time, we will
continue to implement U.S. nonproliferation penalties when appropriate.
We will continue to monitor the activities of Russian entities and will
make determinations consistent with existing legislation and other
legal authorities.
117. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Clinton, does DOS have any evidence
that Russian entities are selling refined petroleum products to Iran or
otherwise doing business in Iran? If it does, please provide a detailed
list.
Secretary Clinton. Iran is not a major trading partner for Russia,
according to official Russian statistics. Trade with Iran has never
reached even one percent of total Russian trade.
Russia has enjoyed a significant surplus in its trade with Iran
since 2001 (and before). Russian exports to Iran consist principally of
consumer goods, oil and gas equipment, and arms. Russian imports from
Iran are dominated by agricultural goods. Both countries produce oil
and gas, so trade in those commodities has represented only a very
small share of total trade, outside of the years 2003 and 2004 when
Russian exports surged briefly.
In the first quarter of 2010, trade between Russia and Iran
continued the downward trend evident during 2009. Total trade of $724.1
million during that quarter was 6.38 percent less than the $773.5
million recorded during the first quarter of 2009.
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Russian Russian Trade with Iran's Rank
Exports to Imports from Total Trade Change from Iran as among Russia's
Year Iran (U.S.$ Iran (U.S.$ (U.S.$ Previous Year percent of All Trading
millions) millions) millions) (percent) Russian Trade Partners
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
2009.................................................... 2,785.1 202.8 2,987.9 15.92 0.77 27
2008.................................................... 3,177.0 376.8 3,553.8 9.69 0.57 30
2007.................................................... 2,894.7 345.1 3,239.8 83.42 0.69 27
2006.................................................... 1,535.4 230.9 1,766.3 10.34 0.50 35
2005.................................................... 1,870.0 100.0 1,970.0 3.24 0.71 29
2004.................................................... 1,844.3 63.9 1,908.2 49.17 0.93 26
2003.................................................... 1,231.0 48.2 1,279.2 73.65 0.88 29
2002.................................................... 702.3 34.3 736.6 13.35 0.63 32
2001.................................................... 823.3 26.8 850.1 43.86 0.81 31
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
Source of Data: Global Trade Atlas
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
intercontinental ballistic missile exemptions
118. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates, the
New START does not define or limit rail-mobile, air-launched, or sea-
borne ICBM launchers as START did. Specifically, the definitions in
START with respect to rail-mobile ICBMs and rail-mobile launchers are
completely absent in the New START. This seems to be a significant
departure from the last treaty, and appears to mean that the Russians
could build an unlimited number of rail-mobile launchers that would not
be captured under the New START, as well as build a new ICBM to place
on a rail-mobile launcher that would not be counted under the treaty.
In the case of both the rail-mobile launcher and the new ICBM, the
United States could appeal to the Bilateral Consultative Commission to
add the launcher and ICBM as new types recognized by the New START, but
the Russians could refuse to do so. Are you concerned about this issue?
Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates. No. Rail-mobile ICBMs are
not specifically mentioned in the New START treaty because neither
party currently deploys ICBMs in that mode. Nevertheless, the treaty
covers all ICBMs and ICBM launchers, and would include any rail-mobile
system, should either party decide to develop and deploy such a system.
119. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates, if
the United States intended rail-mobile ICBMs and rail-mobile launchers
to be limited under the New START, why did the United States not press
for those systems to be defined in the treaty?
Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates. Rail-mobile ICBMs are not
specifically mentioned in the New START treaty because neither party
currently deploys ICBMs in that mode. Nevertheless, the treaty covers
all ICBMs and ICBM launchers, including a rail-mobile system, should
either party decide to develop and deploy such a system.
The New START treaty defines an ICBM launcher as a ``device
intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch an ICBM.''
This is a broad definition that would cover all ICBM launchers,
including potential future rail-mobile launchers.
Under this definition, a rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs would be
accountable under the treaty. Although the previous definition of a
rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs in the START treaty (``an erector-
launcher mechanism for launching ICBMs and the railcar or flatcar on
which it is mounted'') was not carried forward into the New START
treaty, the United States would nevertheless regard any launcher
meeting the START treaty definition of an ICBM launcher as constituting
an ICBM launcher subject to the New START treaty.
A rail-mobile launcher containing an ICBM would meet the treaty's
definition of a ``deployed launcher of ICBMs,'' which is ``an ICBM
launcher that contains an ICBM'' and, along with any nondeployed rail-
mobile launchers of ICBMs would fall within the limit of 800 on
deployed and nondeployed launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs and deployed and
nondeployed heavy bombers. Any ICBMs contained in rail-mobile launchers
would count as deployed ICBMs and therefore fall within the 700 ceiling
on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.
Separate from the status of the rail-mobile ICBM launcher, all
ICBMs associated with the rail-mobile system would be accountable as
either existing or new types of ICBMs and therefore be subject to
initial technical characteristics exhibitions, data exchanges,
notifications, Type One and Type Two inspections, as appropriate, and
application of unique identifiers on such ICBMs and, if applicable, on
their launch canisters.
If a party chose to develop and deploy rail-mobile ICBMs, such
missiles and their launchers would be subject to the treaty and its
limitations. Specific details about the application of the above
mentioned verification provisions would be worked out in the Bilateral
Consultative Commission (BCC). Necessary adjustments to the definition
of ``mobile launchers of ICBMs''--to address the use of the word
``self-propelled'' in that definition--would also be worked out in the
BCC.
120. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates, if
the United States did not intend for the New START to limit rail-
mobile, air-launched, or sea-borne ICBM launchers, please explain why.
Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates. Given the treaty's principle
of flexibility regarding the right of each party to determine its own
force structure, it was not considered necessary to extend the START
treaty's ban on deploying air-launched ballistic missiles or ballistic
missiles on surface ships. Neither party has ever operationally
deployed such systems. Should either party develop and deploy such a
system, the United States and Russia would have the right to discuss,
within the Bilateral Consultative Commission, the emergence of such a
new kind of strategic offensive arm, including the applicability of
provisions of the treaty to these new kinds of strategic offensive
arms.
Rail-mobile ICBMs are not specifically mentioned in the New START
treaty because neither party currently deploys ICBMs in that mode.
Nevertheless, the treaty covers all ICBMs and ICBM launchers, including
a rail-mobile system, should either party decide to develop and deploy
such a system.
The New START treaty defines an ICBM launcher as a ``device
intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch an ICBM.''
This is a broad definition that would cover all ICBM launchers,
including potential future rail-mobile launchers.
Under this definition, a rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs would be
accountable under the treaty. Although the previous definition of a
rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs in the START treaty (``an erector-
launcher mechanism for launching ICBMs and the railcar or flatcar on
which it is mounted'') was not carried forward into the New START
treaty, the United States would nevertheless regard any launcher
meeting the START treaty definition of an ICBM launcher as constituting
an ICBM launcher subject to the New START treaty.
A rail-mobile launcher containing an ICBM would meet the definition
of a ``deployed launcher of ICBMs,'' which is ``an ICBM launcher that
contains an ICBM'' and along with any nondeployed rail-mobile launchers
of ICBMs would fall within the limit of 800 on deployed and nondeployed
launchers of ICBMs and SLBMs and deployed and nondeployed heavy
bombers. The ICBMs contained in rail-mobile launchers would count as
deployed ICBMs and therefore fall within the 700 ceiling on deployed
ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.
Separate from the status of the rail-mobile ICBM launcher, all
ICBMs associated with a potential future rail-mobile system would be
accountable as either existing or new types of ICBMs and therefore be
subject to initial technical characteristics exhibitions, data
exchanges, notifications, Type One and Type Two inspections, as
appropriate, and application of unique identifiers on such ICBMs and,
if applicable, on their launch canisters.
Because of these treaty provisions, if a party chose to develop and
deploy rail-mobile ICBMs, such missiles and their launchers would be
subject to the treaty and its limitations. Specific details about the
application of the above mentioned verification provisions would be
worked out in the BCC.
verification
121. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and
Secretary Chu, under START, we were able to confidently count the
number of mobile missiles, particularly because of our ability to
monitor at Votkinsk, Russia. Additionally, the telemetry we were able
to obtain provided good intelligence on warhead, throw weight
capability, and good insight to ensure missiles did not test more
warheads than the Russians attributed to a missile. Without similar
verification provisions in the New START, how will our ability to
verify Russian mobile missiles or any information about new Russian
systems capabilities be affected?
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Secretary Chu. This topic
is included in a classified National Intelligence Estimate on
Monitoring the New START treaty that was provided to the Senate on June
30, 2010.
122. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and
Secretary Chu, with the Russian's stated goal of developing new missile
systems and turning toward more MIRV missiles, how can the United
States be confident about the number of warheads a new Russian missile
will be capable of carrying without telemetry in the New START?
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Secretary Chu. This topic
is included in a classified National Intelligence Estimate on
Monitoring the New START treaty that was provided to the Senate on June
30, 2010.
123. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and
Secretary Chu, under START, warhead limits were constrained by the
number of warheads a missile was actually capable of holding. Under the
New START, only actual, deployed warheads are counted. For example, the
Russian SS-18 is capable of holding 10 warheads, but only the actual
number of deployed warheads counts against the New START limits. With
the SS-18, there is a possibility that the Russians could only deploy
one warhead per missile--which would count toward the limit--and then
have the remaining nine warheads stored nearby waiting to be loaded, if
they chose to, at a moment's notice. How do the verification procedures
prevent the Russians from doing this?
Secretary Clinton. I concur, and would add that the standard for
the New START treaty verification regime remains, as under the START
treaty, ``effective verification.'' As explained by Ambassador Paul
Nitze in the context of the INF Treaty ratification deliberations in
1988, effective verification means ``we want to be sure that, if the
other side moves beyond the limits of the treaty in any militarily
significant way, we would be able to detect such violation in time to
respond effectively and thereby deny the other side the benefit of the
violation.'' This standard was reaffirmed in the START treaty context
by Secretary of State James Baker in 1992.
Secretary Gates. The treaty permits the Parties to structure their
forces as they see fit, a flexibility which benefits the United States.
The treaty's verification regime is not intended to ``prevent'' such a
scenario but would enable the United States to detect large-scale
Russian downloading of its SS-18 ICBMs or other ballistic missiles. For
additional information, please see the classified National Intelligence
Estimate on Monitoring the New START treaty which was provided to the
Senate on June 30, 2010.
Secretary Chu. I concur.
124. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and
Secretary Chu, is there a way to confirm the actual number of warheads
that the Russians have?
Secretary Clinton. The New START treaty's procedures for
inspections of ICBM and SLBM ``reentry vehicles''--which count as
warheads on deployed missiles--are part of the treaty's Type One
inspections. These inspections will give U.S. inspectors up to 10
opportunities each year to spot check the accuracy of declared data on
the numbers of warheads emplaced on selected deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and
heavy bombers. These inspections will help to confirm compliance with
the Article II central limit of 1,550 warheads on deployed ICBMs,
deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy
bombers. The treaty does not include any limitations on the number of
nondeployed warheads a party may have. Nor are tactical (non-strategic)
nuclear weapons limited by New START. For more discussion of this
topic, please see the classified National Intelligence Estimate on
Monitoring the New START treaty, which was provided to the Senate on
June 30, 2010.
Secretary Gates. I concur.
Secretary Chu. I concur.
125. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates, will
there be an incentive to deploy fewer warheads, so the Russians do not
have to count all their warheads under the New START limits?
Secretary Clinton. New START was created with a view to maintain
flexibility by allowing each party to determine for itself how to
structure its strategic nuclear forces within the treaty's limits. The
treaty applies equally to both Parties.
New START has three central limits: the number of accountable
deployed warheads (1,550); the number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and
heavy bombers (700); and the number of deployed and nondeployed ICBM
launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers (800).
These three limits, while separate, are interrelated with respect
to how they balance the choices each party can make with respect to its
force structure.
For example, if the Russian Federation elected to increase the
number of deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers within the limit,
and Russia was already at the treaty limit for deployed warheads, it
would have to decrease the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on
deployed ICBMs or SLBMs in order to stay within the limit for deployed
warheads.
Secretary Gates. I concur.
126. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates, the
Russians do not have to tell us where all their warheads are, just the
number of deployed warheads. Our inspectors will be able to confirm the
number of warheads that the Russians asserted they had on one missile
during an inspection. Are we supposed to trust the Russians if they
assert that they have less warheads deployed than the missile is
capable of carrying, given the other 1,549 warheads they are permitted?
Secretary Clinton. The New START treaty's procedures for
inspections of ICBM and SLBM ``reentry vehicles''--which count as
warheads--are part of the treaty's Type One inspections. These short
notice inspections give inspectors up to ten opportunities each year to
spot check the accuracy of declared data on the numbers of warheads
emplaced on selected deployed ICBMs and SLBMs. These inspections will
help to confirm compliance with the Article II central limit of 1,550
warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and nuclear warheads
counted for deployed heavy bombers.
For more discussion, see the classified National Intelligence
Estimate on Monitoring the New START treaty, which was provided to the
Senate on June 30, 2010, and the State Department's Section 306 report
which addresses the determinations of the U.S. Government as to the
degree to which the limits of the New START treaty can be verified. The
Section 306 report was published on July 12, 2010, and has been
provided to the Senate.
Secretary Gates. I concur. In addition, Admiral Mullen, the Joint
Chiefs, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, and I assess that
Russia will not be able to achieve militarily significant cheating or
breakout under New START, due to both the treaty's verification regime
and the inherent survivability and flexibility of the planned U.S.
strategic force structure. The survivable and flexible U.S. strategic
posture planned for New START will also help deter any future Russian
leaders from cheating or breakout from the treaty, should they ever
have such an inclination.
127. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and
Secretary Chu, given the number of inspection sites, and the fact the
New START only allows for a maximum of 10 warhead inspections a year,
how confident are you that the United States will have a good
accounting of the number of deployed Russian warheads?
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Secretary Chu. This topic
is included in a classified National Intelligence Estimate on
Monitoring the New START treaty that was provided to the Senate on June
30, 2010.
128. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and
Secretary Chu, what will verification of the number of warheads on one
missile tell us, especially when one missile is permitted to be
deployed with any number of warheads?
Secretary Clinton. The New START treaty's procedures for
inspections of ICBM and SLBM ``reentry vehicles''--which count as
warheads--are part of the treaty's Type One inspections. During pre-
inspection procedures for a Type One inspection, the Russian Federation
must declare the number of reentry vehicles emplaced on each deployed
ICBM or SLBM (which U.S. inspectors can correlate with the missile's
Unique Identifier) located at the ICBM base or submarine base at the
time pre-inspection restrictions are initiated. The Type One
inspections provide ten opportunities annually for inspectors to spot
check the accuracy of the declared data on the numbers of warheads
emplaced on designated, deployed ICBMs and SLBMs.
This topic is also included in a classified National Intelligence
Estimate on the Intelligence Community's ability to monitor the New
START treaty that was provided to the Senate on June 30, 2010.
Secretary Gates. I concur.
Secretary Chu. I concur.
deployed delivery vehicles
129. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and
Admiral Mullen, much has been said about the New START further reducing
the number of nuclear weapons the United States and Russia have in
their inventory. However, it is true that, based on the counting
rules--specifically in relation to bombers--this treaty actually allows
for a significant increase in deployed warheads over the previous
START. Also, given the fact that the Russians were already planning to
reduce their number of deployed systems and would have soon met these
new limits even without the treaty, only the United States has to make
real reductions to our nuclear forces to comply with the New START.
General Cartwright testified last year that he would be very
concerned if we got below 800 deployed delivery vehicles, and the New
START would take us down to 700 deployed delivery vehicles. While I can
agree that limits are good things, perhaps even if they are high, I do
not think we should be celebrating since the limits in the New START
really only constrain the United States and, in fact, can be complied
with in ways that result in many more warheads being deployed. Please
explain the reasoning behind why we agreed to 700 deployed delivery
vehicles.
Secretary Clinton, Secretary Gates, and Admiral Mullen. The New
START limit of 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy
bombers will allow the United States to retain all 14 current SSBNs,
while reducing the number of accountable SLBMs by 96 relative to the
previous START treaty's counting rules (from 336 to 240). The United
States will be able to do this, taking advantage of the treaty's
provisions, by converting or eliminating 56 SLBM launchers and not
deploying SLBMs in an additional 40 launchers. In addition, the United
States will convert 34 or more a subset of B-52H bombers to a
conventional-only role, so that they are no longer accountable under
the treaty. By taking advantage of these treaty provisions, the United
States will have to eliminate or keep in a nondeployed status only 30
to 50 ICBM launchers of the 450 Minuteman III active silos today. In
sum, the decision to agree to a limit of 700 deployed strategic
delivery vehicles resulted from an updated assessment of U.S. force
deployment options in the light of different counting rules under New
START. U.S. force structure plans under New START are supported by
General Cartwright, as well as by Admiral Mullen and the rest of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command General
Chilton, and me.
130. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates, what has changed since
last year when General Cartwright indicated that 800 deployed delivery
vehicles should be the bare minimum?
Secretary Gates. The decision to agree to a limit of 700 deployed
strategic delivery vehicles resulted from an updated assessment of U.S.
force deployment options in the light of different counting rules under
New START. Gen Cartwright's statement was made in the context of the
previous START treaty's counting rules; subsequently, New START
provisions were agreed. These include an agreement not to count
nondeployed ICBMs and SLBMs as part of the central limit on delivery
vehicles, not to count converted individual SLBM launchers on strategic
submarines, and not to count bombers that have been converted to
conventional-only missions. Because of these provisions, under the 700
limit of the New START treaty, the United States will be able to retain
all 14 current SSBNs, while reducing the number of accountable SLBMs by
96 (from 336 to 240). In addition, the United States will convert 34 or
more B-52H bombers to a conventional-only role, so that they are no
longer accountable under the treaty.
In sum, the treaty's limits of 700 deployed strategic delivery
vehicles will support strategic stability by allowing the United States
to retain a robust Triad of strategic delivery systems.
131. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates, how
do you respond to the fact that the New START would permit a
significantly larger number of deployed nuclear warheads than previous
treaties?
Secretary Clinton. We would not characterize the New START treaty
as permitting a significantly larger number of deployed nuclear
warheads than previous treaties. The limit of 1,550 for warheads on
deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and counted for deployed heavy bombers
is lower than the Moscow Treaty limit of 1,700-2,200 strategic nuclear
warheads, and lower than the START limit of 6,000 warheads attributed
to ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers.
It is important to note that under each of these treaties, the
method of counting warheads differs, which can make attempts at direct
comparisons somewhat misleading. For example, under the expired START
treaty, an attribution rule credited each missile type with an agreed
number of warheads, regardless of how many warheads were actually
emplaced on that missile. Under the Moscow Treaty, each party could
determine for itself what counted against the limit on strategic
nuclear warheads, with the result that the Parties did not use
identical counting rules with respect to this limit.
In the New START treaty, the treaty requires the parties to count
the actual number of reentry vehicles on each deployed ICBM and
deployed SLBM, and to attribute one warhead to each deployed heavy
bomber.
As for the bomber counting rule under New START, this attribution
rule was adopted because on a day-to-day basis neither the United
States nor the Russian Federation maintains any nuclear armaments
loaded on its deployed heavy bombers. If the counting approach adopted
for deployed ballistic missiles had been applied to deployed heavy
bombers, each deployed heavy bomber equipped for nuclear armaments
would have been counted with zero nuclear warheads. The New START
treaty approach strikes a balance between the fact that neither side
loads nuclear armaments on its nuclear capable heavy bombers on a day-
to-day basis and the fact that these heavy bombers nonetheless have the
capability to deliver nuclear armaments that are stored in weapons
storage bunkers on or near their air bases.
Secretary Gates. I concur. I would further add that New START
procedures for the inspection of deployed warheads are part of the
treaty's Type One inspections. These short notice inspections are
intended to spot check the accuracy of declared data on the number of
warheads emplaced on deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs and heavy bombers
designated for inspection.
level of risk
132. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, unlike
the Russians, the United States has treaty obligations with at least 30
other nations. Are you convinced that the United States can meet these
treaty obligations and carry out extended deterrence at the levels
required by the New START?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Yes. Traditionally, a credible
U.S. ``nuclear umbrella'' has been provided by a combination of means--
the strategic forces of the U.S. Triad, non-strategic nuclear weapons
deployed forward in key regions, and U.S.-based nuclear weapons that
could be deployed forward quickly to meet regional contingencies. The
mix of deterrence means has varied over time and from region to region.
Today, there are separate choices to be made in partnership with
allies in Europe and Asia about what posture best serves our shared
interests in deterrence and assurance and in moving toward a world of
reduced nuclear dangers. The United States and its NATO allies maintain
forward deployed tactical nuclear weapons to enhance deterrence. Within
the regional context, the United States relies on additional
capabilities to support extended deterrence and power projection,
including: conventional force capabilities, BMDs, allied capabilities,
advanced technologies, and modernization and maintenance of existing
forces, to name a few. Finally, the United States retains the
capability to rapidly upload additional strategic nuclear weapons if
necessary.
During consultations during the development of the 2010 NPR and
since the release of the NPR and the signing of New START, Allies have
told us they are comfortable with our planned nuclear force posture,
which is consistent with the NPR recommendations and the New START
treaty. Allied governments have noted that future U.S.-Russian nuclear
arms reduction negotiations should seek to reduce Russian tactical
nuclear weapons.
Lastly, the United States will sustain safe, secure, and effective
nuclear forces to deter any potential adversary so long as nuclear
weapons exist. U.S. nuclear force reductions will be implemented in
ways that maintain the reliability and effectiveness of our extended
deterrent for all of our allies and partners.
133. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what is
the assumed level of risk to the United States defenses and its
extended deterrence beneficiaries to reach the New START levels?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The United States, and our
Allies and partners, will not assume any additional risk due to the
United States being limited to New START treaty force levels. The
treaty will allow the United States to retain a strong Triad, and will
not constrain our conventional capabilities (including prompt global
strike), our missile defenses, or our ability to modernize our nuclear
weapons complex. The risk of misunderstanding and worst-case military
planning will be reduced by application of the treaty's data exchange
and verification provisions.
nuclear modernization
134. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Chu, the issue of nuclear weapons
modernization as it relates to the New START is receiving lots of
attention. First of all, as some of my colleagues have commented, it
does not appear that the proposed modernization plan represents much,
if any, increase over what was already going to occur. The plan
submitted to Congress also discusses modernizing only one leg of the
strategic triad, the submarine leg, and the bulk of the funding in the
plan is to maintain current platforms rather than develop new ones.
I am also very concerned about the bias against the full spectrum
of modernization for our nuclear warheads. There is clearly a bias
against replacement, which requires special presidential and
congressional authorization. From a national security perspective, this
is clearly unnecessary and works against our safety, security, and
ability to ensure the security of our allies. It only makes sense from
a domestic, political perspective. As the leader of the nuclear weapons
modernization and sustainment complex, how will you instruct those who
work for you when it comes to considering the ``full range of options''
for modernization?
Secretary Chu. The path forward is articulated in the NPR and is
further described in the report submitted to Congress pursuant to
section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for fiscal year
2010, entitled: ``The New START Treaty Framework and Nuclear Force
Structure Plans.'' Those documents make clear that the Laboratory
Directors, and for my purposes, all of those responsible for the
technical work that lies behind the development and evaluation of life
extension approaches, ``will be expected to provide findings associated
with the full range of LEP approaches, and to make a set of
recommendations based solely on their best technical assessments of the
ability of each LEP approach to meet critical stockpile management
goals (weapon system safety, security, and effectiveness).''
135. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Chu, will you empower the experts
in DOE to make their best technical and strategic recommendations for
our nuclear enterprise, regardless of how they may be received
politically, or are you going to communicate that, indeed, there is a
bias against weapon replacement and discourage them from recommending
that option, even if replacement is the best option?
Secretary Chu. Not only are DOE and NNSA experts empowered to make
their best technical and strategic recommendations, they are and will
continue to be expected to do so. As the report entitled: ``The New
START Treaty Framework and Nuclear Force Structure Plans'' makes clear,
they ``will be expected to provide findings associated with the full
range of LEP approaches, and to make a set of recommendations based
solely on their best technical assessments of the ability of each LEP
approach to meet critical stockpile management goals (weapon system
safety, security, and effectiveness).''
136. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Chu, under what conditions would
weapon replacement be the best option?
Secretary Chu. As described in the NPR, replacement of nuclear
components will be undertaken if critical Stockpile Management Program
goals--that is, weapon system safety, security, and effectiveness--
cannot otherwise be met, and if specifically authorized by the
President and approved by Congress.
good will
137. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Chu, in your testimony before
this committee, you reiterate that President Obama and the NPR ``put
preventing the spread of nuclear weapons to terrorists and to states
that don't already possess them at the very top of our national
security agenda.'' The administration has also highlighted the good
will that the New START will create with the Russians and the
international community. Yet, the security of Russia's nuclear
materials remains a concern, and we have seen criminals attempt to
smuggle materials thought to have come from Russia. Can you explain how
the New START, and the good will it will allegedly create, will
increase cooperation with the Russians on securing their nuclear
material?
Secretary Chu. Our renewed focus on improving our relations with
Russia, including the negotiations on the New START treaty, has led to
a greater understanding and increased cooperation between the United
States and Russia in a number of areas, especially toward the
President's goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials
worldwide. This renewed relationship is a key factor as we work toward
curbing nuclear threats around the globe. The New START treaty
demonstrates the continuing commitment of the United States and Russia
to reduce our respective nuclear arsenals consistent with obligations
under the Nuclear NPT. Enhanced cooperation between the United States
and Russia in the nuclear arena will contribute to the positive
international environment needed to reinforce programs to secure and
safeguard nuclear material stockpiles worldwide, and to strengthen the
NPT.
Clearly, the responsibility for Russia's implementation of the New
START treaty will belong to the Government of the Russian Federation.
The U.S. Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, in concert with
the nonproliferation programs of the Department of Energy, has
historically played a very significant role in securing Russian nuclear
weapons and stocks of fissile materials. The role of these programs
will be, as it was throughout the implementation of the START treaty,
to incentivize the Russian Government to continue the excellent
cooperation it has had with the United States in eliminating Russian
strategic delivery systems and in enhancing nuclear weapons storage and
transportation security.
legal framework
138. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Clinton and Admiral Mullen, you
both stated during the hearing that, without the New START, the United
States would have no treaty with the Russians that constrains our
nuclear forces. Secretary Clinton, you specifically stated that the
choice before the Senate ``is between this treaty and no legal
obligation for Russia to keep its strategic nuclear forces below an
agreed level.'' I note that the United States and Russia are currently
bound by the limits in SORT, which sets a limit of 1,700 to 2,200
warheads by the end of 2012. In my view, there is, in fact, a legal
framework to govern the United States-Russia nuclear relationship for
the next 2.5 years. While it is true that the Moscow Treaty expires
after 2012, the limits are in force until it does. The Moscow Treaty
also has no verification provisions, but the United States and Russia
have agreed to abide by START verification provisions, even though
START expired. Do you agree that the Moscow Treaty provides a legal
framework to limit U.S.-Russia nuclear warheads until it expires at the
end of 2012?
Secretary Clinton. The Moscow Treaty (or SORT), which will remain
in force until December 31, 2012, unless superseded earlier by a
subsequent agreement such as the New START treaty, requires the United
States and Russia to reduce and limit strategic nuclear warheads to
1,700-2,200 for each party by December 31, 2012. The Moscow Treaty has
no other limits, nor does it contain any verification or transparency
measures. While Presidents Obama and Medvedev issued a Joint Statement
on the eve of START's expiration expressing ``our commitment, as a
matter of principle, to continue to work together in the spirit of the
START treaty following its expiration,'' there are currently no legally
binding verification measures in place with respect to the Moscow
Treaty. In the absence of New START's entry into force, we have to rely
solely on National Technical Means to monitor Russian strategic forces.
Admiral Mullen. The Moscow Treaty limit will remain legally-binding
until its expiration on 31 December 2012, unless it is superseded by
entry into force of the New START treaty. The United States and Russia
have agreed to the provisional application of select New START treaty
provisions, in accordance with Part Eight of the Protocol to the
treaty. However, these provisions do not include verification
procedures and the United States and Russia did not agree to continue
implementing START verification procedures after START expired.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Thune
delivery vehicle force structure
139. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates, the NPR stated that it
``conducted extensive analysis of alternative force structures under
the New START,'' but so far you have only detailed what the United
States nuclear force structure will look like up to 720 deployed
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Please share the NPR analysis
concluding that the United States can carry out its national security
strategy and national military strategy with only 700 deployed
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles, as would be required to comply
with the New START central limits.
Secretary Gates. The NPR identified a priority goal for U.S.
negotiators to ensure that strategic delivery vehicles accountable
under the previous START treaty but no longer associated with deployed
nuclear weapons not be counted under New START. The achievement of this
goal resulted in U.S. confidence that over 300 so-called ``phantom''
strategic delivery vehicles accountable under the previous treaty,
including for example 96 launchers associated with conventional-only
SSGNs, would not be included under New START limits.
In considering acceptable New START limits after ``phantom''
delivery vehicles were removed from consideration, the NPR focused on
four considerations:
Supporting strategic stability through an assured
second-strike capability;
Retaining sufficient force structure in each leg to
allow the ability to hedge effectively by shifting weight from
one Triad leg to another if necessary due to unexpected
technological problems or operational vulnerabilities;
Retaining a margin above the minimum required nuclear
force structure for the possible addition of non-nuclear
prompt-global strike capabilities (conventionally-armed ICBMs
or SLBMs) that would be accountable under the treaty; and
Maintaining the needed capabilities over the next
several decades or more, including retaining a sufficient cadre
of trained military and civilian personnel and adequate
infrastructure.
First, the New START treaty enables us to continue to maintain a
very effective and survivable force structure that can assure the
United States the ability to conduct a devastating second strike, even
after an attempt by an opponent at a disarming first strike, as well as
to conduct more limited and discrete strikes.
The second criterion was met because the United States will be able
to retain sufficient capabilities in each leg of the Triad. As noted in
the Section 1251 report, ``New START Framework and Nuclear Force
Structure Plans,'' the United States plans to sustain 14 SSBNs with 240
deployed SLBMs, up to 420 deployed ICBMs, and up to 60 deployed
nuclear-capable heavy bombers. One of the specific force structures
evaluated in the NPR and deemed adequate, included 240 deployed SLBMs,
400 deployed ICBMs, and 60 deployed nuclear-capable heavy bombers.
Because the New START treaty allows the freedom to establish the
desired mix of strategic forces by the end of its 7-year implementation
period, and change over time, the United States does not need to decide
the exact mix of strategic forces at this time.
The third criterion was met because the treaty's ceilings allow for
a sufficient margin to accommodate the deployment of a limited number
of conventionally-armed ICBMs and SLBMs, should the United States elect
to deploy them, while excluding from accountability conventional B-1B
and B-52H heavy bombers equipped to deliver only non-nuclear armaments
and SSGN submarines that are incapable of launching SLBMs. The United
States also stated during the negotiations that it would not consider
future, strategic range, non-nuclear systems that do not otherwise meet
the definitions of the treaty to be ``new kinds of strategic offensive
arms'' for purposes of the treaty.
Finally, the administration has proposed a robust plan to
revitalize the nuclear weapons complex in order to meet the fourth
criterion.
140. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates, please provide the analysis of
alternative force structures that would comply with the New START
central limits.
Secretary Gates. Please see answers to questions #133 and #139.
section 1251 report
141. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates, press reports indicate the
administration plans to invest $100 billion over the next decade in
nuclear delivery systems. About $30 billion of this total will go
toward development and acquisition of a new strategic submarine.
According to estimates by STRATCOM, the cost of maintaining our current
dedicated nuclear forces is approximately $5.6 billion per year. This
leaves roughly $14 billion of the $100 billion the administration
intends to invest. This $14 billion is not nearly sufficient to develop
and acquire a next-generation bomber, a follow-on ICBM, a follow-on
air-launched cruise missile, and a conventional prompt global strike
capability. Why did you not make a decision to pursue these programs in
the 1251 Report accompanying the New START?
Secretary Gates. As stated in the one page, unclassified summary of
the 1251 report, the administration intends to invest well over $100
billion in modernizing strategic delivery systems. Alternatives for a
follow-on bomber are being developed in the ongoing Long Range Strike
Study for consideration with the President's fiscal year 2012 budget.
An Analysis of Alternatives on the follow-on nuclear-armed air-launched
cruise missiles (ALCM) is currently underway. Although a decision on
any follow-on ICBM is not needed for several years, studies to inform
that decision will begin in fiscal year 2011 and fiscal year 2012. The
studies and development programs for these systems will consider a
range of possible options, with the objective of defining a cost-
effective approach that supports continued reductions in U.S. nuclear
weapons while promoting stable deterrence.
142. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates, is there a chance you could
decide against a new bomber, air-launched cruise missile, or follow-on
ICBM?
Secretary Gates. While I will not speculate regarding future
decisions, as I have stated numerous times, I support a strong Triad
under the New START treaty, and I am committed to making necessary
investments for both delivery systems and the nuclear weapons complex.
It is worth noting that the investments needed to sustain the U.S.
nuclear arsenal and nuclear weapons complex under New START and beyond
will be the work of multiple administrations and Congresses.
143. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates, how do we know the
administration will pursue these necessary programs, such as the bomber
or follow-on ICBM?
Secretary Gates. The NPR clearly attests to the commitment of the
executive branch to sustain an effective nuclear deterrent for the long
term-and New START preserves our ability to do so. Today's Minuteman
III ICBMs will be sustained until 2030 as directed by Congress,
nuclear-capable B-52Hs can be sustained to the 2030s, and B-2As to the
2040s. Analysis of any follow-on ICBM will start in 2011. There is time
to do this analysis, and given both the resources and military
capabilities involved, an imperative to make well-informed decisions at
the appropriate time.
144. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates, according to the most recent
briefs I have seen, DOD expects the current nuclear bomber force to
remain in service through 2040. Thirty more years is a long time for a
bomber that was built 50 years ago. Proponents of this plan say they
can last that long with upgrades. However, physically remaining in
service is significantly different than remaining survivable in a
future high threat combat scenario. Since the NPR recognizes the need
for a nuclear triad, what is your plan to replace the aging nuclear
bomber force so that the nuclear triad stays survivable in the future?
Secretary Gates. The NPR determined that retaining all three legs
of the Triad will best maintain strategic stability at reasonable cost,
while hedging against potential technical problems or vulnerabilities.
Accordingly, the Air Force will retain the B-52 for nuclear mission
requirements beyond 2020 and is investing more than $1.2 billion over
the next 5 years to modernize the B-52. In addition, DOD will invest
more than $1 billion over the next 5 years to support upgrades to the
B-2 stealth bomber. These enhancements will help sustain its
survivability and improve mission effectiveness. The Department of
Defense is examining alternative follow-on bomber approaches in its
ongoing Long Range Strike Study, which is to be completed this fall and
will provide an important basis for the development of plans for moving
forward in this area.
145. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates, my understanding is that an
ICBM-based prompt global strike platform would be counted against the
700 deployed delivery vehicles. If we decide to develop that system,
which of the three legs of the nuclear triad would be further reduced
to accommodate prompt global strike?
Secretary Gates. No decision regarding prompt global strike system
has been taken and cannot be taken before other decisions are made
about what type of conventional long-range strike capabilities are
useful and available during the period that the New START treaty (NST)
is in force. A variety of prompt global strike systems are being
assessed within the Long-Range Strike Study that is to be completed
this fall. As you know, NST provides flexibility to each party to
determine its own strategic force structure. As stipulated in the
report submitted with the New START treaty pursuant to Section 1251 of
the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010, the United
States will pursue a future force structure under the NST that will
preserve adequate flexibility, including possible accountable
conventional prompt global strike systems currently under study by DOD.
In addition, NPR analysis concluded that NST delivery vehicle and
strategic warhead limits allowed retention of a margin above the
minimum required nuclear force structure for the possible addition of
non-nuclear prompt-global strike capabilities (conventionally-armed
ICBMs or SLBMs) that would be accountable under the treaty.
If the United States decides to develop a prompt global strike
system that would be accountable under New START, the Joint Chiefs and
I agree that it should involve small numbers of strategic delivery
vehicles. Under the baseline plan summarized in the Section 1251
report, ``New START Framework and Nuclear Force Structure Plans,'' to
Congress, the United States will retain 240 deployed SLBMs, up to 60
heavy bombers, and up to 420 deployed ICBMs under New START. Given the
7 year implementation period of the treaty, and each side's freedom to
select its desired force structure and change it over time, decisions
about changes involving small numbers of the 700 allowed deployed
strategic delivery vehicles should be made after such a decision to
deploy these systems.
146. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what is
your estimate of how the Russians will configure their strategic forces
under the New START?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. This topic is addressed in the
National Intelligence Estimate on monitoring the New START treaty,
which was provided to the Senate on June 30, 2010.
147. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what
impact, if any, would Russian configuration of their strategic forces
in response to the New START have on the way the President decides to
configure our strategic forces?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The United States will continue
to configure and posture its forces to maintain the overall force's
combined qualities of survivability, responsiveness, flexibility, and
effectiveness for both large-scale and limited contingencies. We do not
anticipate significant alterations as being necessary due to any
Russian changes, because U.S. forces have been developed and deployed
to minimize their sensitivity to changes in other nations' force
postures.
delivery vehicles
148. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, during
testimony before this committee last July, General Cartwright expressed
the view that he ``would be very concerned'' about the viability of the
nuclear triad if we got below 800 deployed delivery vehicles. The New
START establishes a level of 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles.
I note that General Cartwright stated his concern after the NPR team
had already conducted detailed analysis in spring 2009 to determine
negotiating positions for the New START on an appropriate limit on
strategic delivery vehicles. What beneficial geopolitical developments
have taken place in the interim that compel reductions in the United
States nuclear arsenal down to 700 deployed strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. The decision to agree to a
limit of 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles did not result from a
change in the security environment, but from an updated assessment of
U.S. force deployment options in the light of progress achieved in the
negotiations. The testimony you refer to in your question was delivered
before the definitional difference between deployed and nondeployed
ICBM and SLBM launchers had been agreed, and before the sides had
agreed to the conversion of individual SLBM launchers on strategic
submarines. Thus, the ``800 deployed delivery vehicles'' figure
referred to in the testimony would, for example, have included U.S.
strategic delivery systems that will now count as nondeployed (e.g.,
two SSBNs in overhaul). Once these provisions were agreed, it became
clear that we could sustain a strong Triad and meet deterrence and
hedging requirements within a limit of 700 deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and
nuclear-capable heavy bombers. The U.S. senior military leadership has
stated its support for this result.
149. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, why are the
Joint Chiefs not concerned by the New START, given the number of
allowable deployed delivery vehicles is 100 below General Cartwright's
comfort level?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. General Cartwright, as well as
the rest of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander, U.S. Strategic
Command, and both of us support the New START treaty including the
limit of 700 on deployed strategic delivery vehicles. The New START
limit will allow the United States to retain all 14 current SSBNs,
while reducing the number of accountable SLBMs by 96 relative to the
previous START treaty's counting rules (from 336 to 240). The United
States will be able to do this by taking advantage of the treaty's
provisions by converting or eliminating 56 SLBM launchers and not
deploying SLBMs in an additional 40 launchers. In addition, the United
States will convert 34 or more a subset of B-52H bombers to a
conventional-only role, so that they are no longer accountable under
the treaty. By taking advantage of these treaty provisions, the United
States will have to eliminate or keep in a nondeployed status only 30
to 50 ICBM launchers of the 450 Minuteman III active silos today. In
sum, the decision to agree to a limit of 700 deployed strategic
delivery vehicles resulted from an updated assessment of U.S. force
deployment options in the light of different counting rules under New
START.
150. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, what were
the assumptions going into the New START negotiations that drove our
level of acceptance to reduced deployed delivery vehicle numbers?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. Please see the answer to
question #149.
potential conflicting messages to the air force
151. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen, in an
effort to build up the nuclear enterprise, the Air Force recently
accomplished an extensive restructuring, which included, among other
things, adding a new Global Strike Command, adding an additional B-52
nuclear capable bomber squadron, and multiple changes to procedures and
testing. This was all part of a tremendous and ongoing effort to
reinvigorate the nuclear enterprise. However, by ratifying the New
START, it would seem we are providing conflicting guidance to our
nuclear force and telling them we want to draw down and scale back the
nuclear mission. For example, this treaty would specifically reverse
the direction the Air Force was just given to build up the B-52 nuclear
capability by cutting the number of nuclear capable B-52s. Are you at
all worried about undercutting the Air Force's improved emphasis on the
nuclear mission after the problems the Air Force had with the nuclear
mission a few years ago?
Secretary Gates and Admiral Mullen. No. The conclusion of the New
START treaty in no way reduces the emphasis the Department of Defense
will place upon continuing to strengthen the Air Force nuclear
enterprise. As we reported in the Section 1251 report, the United
States plans to maintain up to 60 nuclear-capable heavy bombers and up
420 silo-based Minuteman III ICBMs, each carrying a single re-entry
vehicle. Consequently, the Air Force will remain responsible for
maintaining the trained and ready force to man two of the three legs of
the U.S. strategic triad, an enduring obligation that will continue to
require very strong emphasis on the nuclear mission. Sustaining the
U.S. Air Force's nuclear enterprise is critical to U.S. security, and
we and Air Force Chief of Staff, General Norton Schwartz, are confident
that this objective can be met under the New START treaty.
strategic offensive reductions treaty
152. Senator Thune. Secretary Clinton, in your prepared remarks you
asserted that in considering the New START, the choice before the
Senate ``is between this treaty and no legal obligation for Russia to
keep its strategic nuclear forces below an agreed level.'' If the New
START does not enter into force, won't SORT govern the nuclear security
relationship between the United States and Russia?
Secretary Clinton. While the Moscow Treaty (or SORT) would remain
in force until December 31, 2012, that treaty only requires the United
States and Russia to reduce and limit strategic nuclear warheads to
1,700-2,200 for each party by December 31, 2012. The Moscow Treaty has
no other limits, nor does it contain any verification or transparency
measures.
153. Senator Thune. Secretary Clinton, if the New START does not
enter into force, wouldn't extending SORT some time before December 31,
2012, as provided for in Article IV(2) of SORT, be a choice?
Secretary Clinton. In accordance with its terms, the Moscow Treaty
(or SORT) may be extended by agreement of the Parties or superseded
earlier by a subsequent agreement. However, as noted above, the Moscow
Treaty contains no verification or transparency measures.
reductions of nuclear weapons
154. Senator Thune. Secretary Clinton, in your prepared remarks you
asserted that the completion of the New START ``makes clear that we are
committed to real reductions, and to upholding our end of the bargain
under the NPT.'' The United States has been reducing its nuclear
weapons stockpile for 40 years, and that fact is very well known. It
did not take the declassification of our stockpile numbers at the NPT
Review Conference to demonstrate it. What benefits to the
nonproliferation regime can we expect to come from the particular
reductions embodied in the New START that have not come from the
previous 40 years of U.S. nuclear reductions?
Secretary Clinton. U.S.-Russian, and the earlier U.S.-Soviet
strategic arms control agreements, provide a clear demonstration of our
commitment to fulfilling our obligations under Article VI of the NPT.
The commitment of the nuclear weapons states to pursue effective
measures relating to disarmament is part of the basic bargain inherent
in the NPT, i.e., that the nuclear weapons states would commit to move
to nuclear disarmament and the non-nuclear weapons states would commit
not to pursue nuclear weapons capability. Ratification of New START
provides demonstrable proof of our continuing commitment to that
bargain. Failure to ratify New START would call into question our
commitment to leadership of the nonproliferation regime, and could
undermine support for the nonproliferation regime.
russia's support for iran
155. Senator Thune. Secretary Clinton, during the hearing you
explained Russia's continued support to Iran's nuclear reactor program
at Bushehr by asserting that Iran is ``entitled to civil, peaceful
nuclear energy.'' Whatever that right to peaceful nuclear energy may
be, surely it is not an unqualified right. The NPT makes clear that the
right to peaceful nuclear energy must be exercised ``in conformity
with'' the nonproliferation obligations of the NPT. Since Iran is in
violation of these requirements, it is obviously detrimental to
international security for Russia to continue its nuclear cooperation
with Iran while Iran remains in non-compliance with United Nations
Security Council resolutions. Before the Senate gives its consent to
the New START, please certify that either Russia has ceased nuclear
cooperation with Iran or Iran has come into compliance with its
nonproliferation obligations.
Secretary Clinton. Russia shares U.S. concerns regarding Iran's
nuclear and missile programs. To that end, Russia has supported all six
United Nations Security Council resolutions on this subject, four of
which imposed sanctions on Iran. The United States and Russia stand
firmly with the rest of the international community in supporting the
development of peaceful, safe, safeguarded nuclear power, including for
the benefit of the Iranian people. Both former-President George W. Bush
and President Obama have confirmed that the United States recognizes
and supports the exercise of that right, and that responsibilities to
ensure compliance with NPT obligations are inextricably tied with those
rights. Russia's arrangement to supply nuclear fuel for the entire
period of Bushehr's operation under IAEA safeguards continues to be a
keystone in our statements that Iran does not need to enrich uranium
indigenously.
U.N. Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1737 (2006) exempted
assistance and fuel for Iranian light water reactors, such as Bushehr,
from being included in the list of prohibited actions/items. Following
lengthy negotiations with Iran, Russia secured very important
nonproliferation measures in the Russia-Iran agreement, namely just-in-
time fuel delivery and spent fuel take-back. Russia has made clear to
Iran that IAEA safeguards are a requisite part of reactor operation.
These measures have gone a long way in satisfying the immediate
nonproliferation concerns we would have had with the plutonium in spent
fuel rods from Bushehr's reactor.
missile defense
156. Senator Thune. Secretary Clinton, in your opening statement,
you were adamant that the limitation on missile defense contained in
Article V of the New START is not a constraint on the United States
system because we ``had no intention'' of converting offensive
launchers for missile defense interceptor use in the future. You went
so far as to say we could have had a long list of things in the treaty
we weren't going to do, to include that ``we're not going to launch
[missile defense interceptors] from . . . a cow.'' If the Article V
limitation is in the treaty at the insistence of Russia, what did we
get in return for that concession?
Secretary Clinton. Paragraph 3 of Article V of the treaty prohibits
the conversion of ICBM or SLBM launchers to serve as launchers for
missile defense interceptors and the conversion of missile defense
interceptor launchers to launch ICBMs or SLBMs. The paragraph also
``grandfathers'' the five former ICBM silos at Vandenberg Air Force
Base, California that were converted to house and launch the Ground
Based Interceptors (GBI) several years ago.
As stated in the Article-by-Article Analysis of the treaty, this
statement has the effect of ensuring that the paragraph's prohibition
does not apply to the five converted former ICBM launchers at
Vandenberg. It also resolves a long-standing ambiguity that arose
during implementation of the START treaty. Specifically, it ensures
that these five previously converted ICBM silo launchers at Vandenberg
Air Force Base that now are used for missile defense interceptors will
not be a continuing subject of dispute with Russia and will not count
against the New START treaty's limit on nondeployed ICBM and SLBM
launchers and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments.
This provision will have no operational impact on U.S. missile
defense efforts. As Lieutenant General O'Reilly has testified, the
Missile Defense Agency has never had any plans to convert additional
ICBM silos to missile defense interceptor launchers. Doing so would be
much more expensive than building smaller GBI silos from scratch.
Moreover, as Lieutenant General O'Reilly has also stated, newly-built
GBI silos are easier both to protect and maintain.
In regard to the conversion of SLBM launchers into missile defense
interceptor launchers, as Lieutenant General O'Reilly stated in his
testimony, the Missile Defense Agency had examined earlier the concept
of launching missile defense interceptors from submarines and found it
an operationally unattractive and extremely expensive option. He added
that the United States already has a very good and significantly
growing capability for sea-based missile defense on Aegis-capable
ships, which are not constrained by the New START treaty.
Lieutenant General O'Reilly also noted that the New START treaty
offers certain advantages for development of the U.S. BMD system:
``Relative to the recently expired START treaty, the New START treaty
actually reduces constraints on the development of the missile defense
program. Unless they have New START accountable first stages (which we
do not plan to use), our targets will no longer be subject to START
constraints, which limited our use of air-to-surface and waterborne
launches of targets which are essential for the cost-effective testing
of missile defense interceptors against MRBM and IRBM targets in the
Pacific area. In addition, under New START, we will no longer be
limited to five space launch facilities for target launches.''
157. Senator Thune. Secretary Clinton, why didn't we get a
statement in the treaty text on an issue of equal importance to us,
such as at least some reference to the myriad of issues raised by
Russia's massive numerical superiority in tactical nuclear weapons,
which should be as concerning to us as stopping our missile defense
deployments is to Russia?
Secretary Clinton. From the outset, the New START treaty was
intended to replace the START treaty, which was about strategic
offensive forces. The desire to conclude the New START treaty quickly
in light of the START treaty's pending expiration, combined with the
need to consult closely with our allies before addressing tactical
nuclear weapons, did not support broadening the scope of the New START
treaty to address tactical nuclear weapons. Deferring negotiations on
tactical nuclear weapons until after a START successor agreement had
been concluded was also the recommendation of the Perry-Schlesinger
Congressional Strategic Posture Commission.
158. Senator Thune. Secretary Clinton, at the hearing you compared
the Russian unilateral statement on missile defense to its previous
unilateral statement with START, but our unilateral statement in
response this time was very different. In START, as you know, Russia
issued a unilateral statement saying U.S. withdrawal from or breach of
the ABM Treaty would constitute grounds for withdrawal from START. We
issued a unilateral statement in conjunction saying, ``the full
exercise of the United States of its legal rights under the ABM Treaty
. . . would not constitute a basis for such withdrawal.'' This time, on
the other hand, we issued a feckless unilateral statement saying that
we plan to continue to develop our missile defense system to defend
against limited attack. Since we lawfully withdrew from the ABM Treaty,
why didn't we challenge the Russian unilateral statement, saying there
are absolutely no circumstances under which the development of our
missile defense systems constitutes adequate grounds for Russian
withdrawal from the New START, similar to our START unilateral
statement?
Secretary Clinton. The Russian unilateral statement does not change
the legal rights or obligations of the Parties under the treaty and is
not legally binding. The United States did not agree to Russia's
unilateral statement. The United States will continue its missile
defense programs and policies, as outlined in the BMD Review. Russia's
unilateral statement has not changed our course, as laid out in the
Review, nor will it.
The New START treaty, as with many other arms control treaties,
allows a party to withdraw from the treaty if that party decides that
its supreme interests are jeopardized by extraordinary events related
to the subject matter of the treaty.
The unilateral statement made by the Russian Federation merely
reflects its current position that the ``extraordinary events'' that
could justify Russia's withdrawal from the treaty include a build-up in
the missile defense system capabilities by the United States that would
give rise to a threat to the Russian strategic nuclear force potential.
We have continuously assured Russia, however, that the U.S. BMD System
is neither designed nor intended to threaten the strategic balance with
Russia.
President Medvedev explained the Russian view regarding the
significance of the Russian unilateral statement during a television
interview in April 2010 in which he said: ``That does not mean that if
the USA starts developing missile defense the treaty would
automatically be invalidated, but it does create an additional argument
that binds us and that makes it possible for us to raise the question
of whether quantitative change to missile defense systems would affect
the fundamental circumstances underlying the treaty. If we see that
developments do indeed represent a fundamental change in circumstances,
we would have to raise the issue with our American partners. But I
would not want to create the impression that any changes would be
construed as grounds for suspending a treaty that we have only just
signed.'' (Emphasis added)
strategic offensive and defensive arms
159. Senator Thune. Secretary Clinton, the New START preamble
recognizes: (1) the existence of the interrelationship between
strategic offensive arms and strategic defensive arms; (2) that this
interrelationship will become more important as strategic nuclear arms
are reduced; and (3) that current strategic defensive arms do not
undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic offensive
arms of the Parties. Why is the third clause in the preamble?
Secretary Clinton. The treaty's preamble records the shared view of
the United States and Russia that ``current strategic defensive arms do
not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the strategic
offensive arms of the Parties.'' This preambular statement indicates
that Russia is not concerned that existing U.S. BMD programs and other
U.S. strategic defensive programs such as those for the air defense of
the U.S. homeland pose any threat to the survivability and
effectiveness of the Russian strategic deterrent. This statement in the
preamble does not establish any legally binding obligations and creates
no constraints regarding future U.S. strategic defense programs,
including those for any form of missile defense.
Russia has expressed concerns that future U.S. BMD capabilities
could eventually be a threat to Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent.
There is no prospect of this occurring within the timeframe of the New
START treaty. In an effort to make this clear to the Russians, we have
provided, and will continue to provide, policy and technical
explanations regarding why U.S. BMD capabilities such as the European-
based Phased Adaptive Approach will not undermine Russia's strategic
nuclear deterrent. The United States has also offered to provide
transparency and confidence-building measures to demonstrate that
existing and planned U.S. BMD programs are not directed against Russia
and do not threaten Russia's strategic deterrent.
160. Senator Thune. Secretary Clinton, is the third clause of the
preamble at our insistence or the Russian's?
Secretary Clinton. See answer to question #159.
161. Senator Thune. Secretary Clinton, presuming we acceded to the
inclusion of the third clause at the insistence of the Russians, what
did we get in return for that major concession?
Secretary Clinton. See answer to question #159.
162. Senator Thune. Secretary Clinton, what does ``current'' mean
in the third clause of the preamble?
Secretary Clinton. See answer to question #159.
163. Senator Thune. Secretary Clinton, does ``current'' in the
third clause allow for the deployment of any land-, sea-, or space-
based interceptor system the United States may one day choose?
Secretary Clinton. See answer to question #159.
164. Senator Thune. Secretary Clinton, as we build up our missile
defense system through all four phases of President Obama's phased
adaptive approach, do you know if there is a potential for the Russians
to consider this build-up grounds for withdrawal from the New START?
Secretary Clinton. The New START treaty, as with other arms control
treaties, allows a party to withdraw from the treaty if that party
decides that its supreme interests are jeopardized by extraordinary
events related to the subject matter of the treaty.
Each party must determine, based on its own criteria, when its
``supreme interests'' have been jeopardized to the point that it
believes it must withdraw from the treaty.
With respect to the New START treaty, the Russian Federation has
provided a unilateral, non-legally binding statement that reflects
Russia's current position that a buildup in missile defense
capabilities by the United States that threatens the Russian strategic
nuclear forces potential could be one such basis for withdrawal from
the treaty.
To address Russia's concerns, the United States has provided, and
will continue to provide, policy and technical explanations regarding
why U.S. BMD capabilities such as the European-based Phased Adaptive
Approach will not undermine Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent.
Historically, the Russian Federation did not withdraw from the
START treaty when the United States withdrew from the ABM Treaty in
2002.
bilateral presidential commission
165. Senator Thune. Secretary Clinton, at the July 2009 summit
between Presidents Obama and Medvedev, the two presidents agreed to
create a bilateral presidential commission with a working group on arms
control and international security issues. The working group was to be
co-chaired by Sergei Ryabkov, Russian Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs, and Ellen Tauscher, U.S. Under Secretary of State for Arms
Control and International Security Affairs. Please provide details on
the discussions in this forum involving missile defense.
Secretary Clinton. Within the Arms Control and International
Security Working Group, the Obama administration has provided briefings
to, and discussed U.S. missile defense (BMD) policy, plans, and
programs with the Russian government. In addition to covering U.S.
programs, we have used this diplomatic channel to discuss the mutual
benefits of BMD cooperation, BMD confidence-building and transparency
measures, and proposals to exchange data on a limited number of
launches of ballistic missiles and space launch vehicles obtained from
United States and Russian early warning systems. Such briefings and
discussions are also part of the administration's efforts to explain
why U.S. missile defenses do not pose a threat to Russia's strategic
deterrent.
prompt global strike
166. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates, President Obama asserted in
his NPR that the United States could deter potential adversaries and
reassure allies with a ``reduced reliance on nuclear weapons,''
partially due to ``unrivaled U.S. conventional military capabilities.''
Conventional prompt global strike capabilities are obviously part of
U.S. conventional military capabilities. DOS points out those long-
range conventional ballistic missiles would count toward the New START
delivery vehicle limit, and conventional warheads on those missiles
would count against the warhead limit. The NPR further notes that DOD
is exploring a range of technologies in developing conventional
military capability, some of which would not be accountable under the
New START, such as hypersonics. Please provide an overview of current
work at DOD on developing and deploying long-range conventional
ballistic missiles.
Secretary Gates. Conventional prompt global strike (CPGS) concepts
funded in the fiscal year 2010 President's Defense Budget request
($165.6 million) focus on the development and demonstration of
technologies that could lead to the eventual fielding of a CONUS-based
operationally deployed CPGS system. Fiscal year 2010 funding supports
technology application flight experiments by DARPA's Hypersonic
Technology Vehicle 2, and the Army's Advanced Hypersonic Weapon, and an
``operationally-relevant'' flight demonstration by the Air Force.
In addition, a study of long-range strike options, including those
that would provide CPGS capabilities, is currently underway in the
Department of Defense, and will be completed in time to inform the
fiscal year 2012 President's budget. No decisions have been made on
which, if any, CPGS delivery systems to acquire or when such systems
would be fielded. However, based on analysis of alternative options,
the Department of Defense has concluded that any deployment of
conventional warheads on ICBMs or SLBMs during the 10-year life of this
treaty would be limited, and could be accommodated within the aggregate
limits of the treaty while sustaining a robust nuclear Triad.
167. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates, has DOD assessed whether the
study of hypersonics is the most efficient use of resources in
developing conventional military capability or is it merely to avoid
counting toward the central limits in the New START?
Secretary Gates. The Conventional Prompt Global Strike (CPGS)
Defense-Wide Account (DWA), established by Congress for the development
of promising CPGS technologies, is considering hypersonic technologies.
This program was directed by Congress to be established in 2008, prior
to the start of the New START negotiations in 2009.
Conventional strike concepts leveraging hypersonic technologies may
offer some advantages over other concepts. For example, such systems
would have the advantage that they could ``steer around'' other
countries to avoid over-flight and have flight trajectories
distinguishable from an ICBM or SLBM.
A study of long-range strike options, including those that would
provide CPGS capabilities, is currently underway in the Department of
Defense, and will be completed in time to inform the fiscal year 2012
President's budget. The cost effectiveness of various types of systems,
including hypersonics, will be one of the key criteria for evaluation.
168. Senator Thune. Secretary Gates, what is DOD's current
assessment of the viability of these exotic hypersonic technologies,
given that the signal from the Falcon Hypersonic Technology Vehicle-2
was lost 9 minutes into the April 22, 2010, Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency test?
Secretary Gates. Preliminary review of technical data indicates the
Minotaur IV Lite launch vehicle successfully delivered the Falcon
Hypersonic Technology Vehicle-2 (HTV-2) to the desired separation
conditions. The launch vehicle executed first of its kind energy
management maneuvers, clamshell payload fairing release, and HTV-2
deployment. Three test ranges, six sea-based and two airborne telemetry
collection assets were employed and operational on the day of launch.
Approximately 9 minutes into the mission, telemetry assets experienced
a loss of signal from the HTV-2. An engineering review board is
reviewing available data to understand this anomaly. Technical data
collected during the flight will provide insight into the hypersonic
flight characteristics of the HTV-2, and be applicable to other
hypersonic glide concepts.
land-based icbms
169. Senator Thune. Admiral Mullen, the President announced in his
NPR that he would move to de-MIRV all our land-based ICBMs. Are you
concerned that the New START does not prevent Russia from shifting its
force structure to large numbers of land-based MIRVs?
Admiral Mullen. The New START treaty does not include limitations
on the number of warheads emplaced on ICBMs because the Parties sought
to maintain flexibility by allowing each party to determine for itself
how to structure its strategic nuclear forces within the treaty's
limits. It preserves our ability to hedge against technical and
geopolitical developments while reducing U.S. and Russian strategic
forces. Within the New START treaty central limits there are no
specific obligations, prohibitions, or restrictions on the composition
of the force structure. For instance, the treaty does not limit the
development of new types of missiles and there are no constraints upon
the technical characteristics of new missiles such as their launch
weight or throw-weight.
Russian strategic forces configuration in response to New START
will not impact U.S. strategic configuration. The configuration of U.S.
strategic forces in the Triad, and the administration's continuing
commitment to maintaining U.S. forces in the Triad structure under New
START, maintains strategic deterrence and stability, strengthens
regional deterrence, reassures U.S. allies and partners, and sustains a
safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. NPR analysis focused on
retaining sufficient force structure in each leg of the Triad to allow
the ability to hedge effectively by shifting weight from one Triad leg
to another if necessary due to unexpected technological or operational
problems.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
tactical nuclear weapons
170. Senator Vitter. Secretary Clinton, have any of our allies
expressed any concerns to you or DOS about the New START and its
failure to address tactical nuclear weapons?
Secretary Clinton. No. Allies have not expressed concerns with New
START. To the contrary, the response from our Allies to the conclusion
of the New START treaty has been overwhelmingly positive, with many
seeing it as an important step forward in global nonproliferation
efforts. For example, on behalf of NATO Allies, NATO Secretary General
Anders Fogh Rasmussen welcomed the agreement as an important
contribution to arms control and an inspiration for further progress.
With regard to tactical/non-strategic nuclear weapons, during
consultations throughout the development of the 2010 NPR and since its
release and the signing of New START, Allies have told us they are
comfortable with our planned nuclear force posture, which is consistent
with NPR recommendations and the New START treaty. More recently, at
Tallinn in their initial discussions on the role of nuclear weapons in
NATO, Allied foreign ministers welcomed the principle of including non-
strategic nuclear weapons in any future U.S.-Russian arms control
talks.
171. Senator Vitter. Secretary Clinton, why was the issue of
tactical nuclear weapons not addressed in the New START?
Secretary Clinton. From the outset, the New START treaty was
intended to replace the START treaty, which was about strategic
offensive forces. The desire to conclude the New START treaty quickly
in light of the pending expiration of the START treaty, combined with
the need to consult closely with our allies before addressing tactical
nuclear weapons, did not support broadening the scope of the New START
treaty to address tactical nuclear weapons. Deferring negotiations on
tactical nuclear weapons until after a START successor agreement had
been concluded was also the recommendation of the Perry-Schlesinger
Congressional Strategic Posture Commission.
nuclear parity
172. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gates, do you believe that the
reductions in the New START will incite other nuclear nations to
increase their arsenals to attempt to achieve parity with the United
States or Russia?
Secretary Gates. No. The only nation that could potentially compete
with the United States or Russia in size of its nuclear weapons arsenal
is the People's Republic of China. The New START limits will permit the
United States to maintain forces well above China's. Chinese spokesmen
have stated that China does not seek to attain numerical parity with
Russia or the United States, and its nuclear arsenal remains much
smaller than the U.S. and Russian arsenals. As a declared nuclear
weapon state under the NPT, China's restraint in its nuclear
modernization is important to nuclear disarmament and global
nonproliferation efforts. We look to China to be more transparent about
its strategic programs and to show restraint in them.
[Whereupon, at 11:50 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
SUSTAINING NUCLEAR WEAPONS UNDER THE NEW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION
TREATY
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 15, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:38 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
E. Benjamin Nelson, Udall, Hagan, Burris, Bingaman, McCain,
Inhofe, Sessions, Chambliss, Thune, Brown, and Collins.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; and Peter K. Levine, general counsel.
Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
staff director; and Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff
member.
Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard, Jennifer R.
Knowles, and Hannah I. Lloyd.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Griffin,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Nick Ikeda, assistant to
Senator Akaka; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson;
Jennifer Barrett, assistant to Senator Udall; Roger Pena,
assistant to Senator Hagan; Nathan Davern, assistant to Senator
Burris; Jonathan Epstein, assistant to Senator Bingaman;
Anthony Lazarski, assistant to Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum
and Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator Sessions; Clyde A.
Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; Jason Van Beek,
assistant to Senator Thune; Scott Clendaniel, assistant to
Senator Brown; Brooks Tucker, assistant to Senator Burr; and
Ryan Kaldahl, assistant to Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody, and a very warm
welcome to our witnesses. This morning we are going to explore
the impact of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
on the Nuclear Weapons Life Extension Program (LEP) and the
ability to maintain a safe, secure, and reliable, albeit
smaller, stockpile of nuclear weapons.
We have with us this morning four distinguished witnesses:
Dr. Roy Schwitters, the S.W. Richardson Professor of Physics at
the University of Texas-Austin, and the Chairman of the JASON
Life Extension Study Panel; Dr. Michael Anastasio, the Director
of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL); Dr. George
Miller, the Director of the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (LLNL); and Dr. Paul Hommert, the Director of Sandia
National Laboratories (SNL).
JASON is an independent group of renowned technical experts
who perform studies for the Department of Defense (DOD), the
National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA), and the
Intelligence Community (IC). The three national labs support
the NNSA in maintaining the nuclear stockpile and working to
prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons and technology.
The labs also conduct a broad range of research and development
activities for DOD and the Department of Energy (DOE), as well
as for a variety of other Federal Government agencies.
The national laboratories are responsible for providing
technical management of the nuclear weapons stockpile. In order
to ensure that the stockpile remains safe, secure, and reliable
in the future, the laboratories must fully understand the
status of the thousands of parts and components in nuclear
weapons and recommend how these parts and components should be
maintained.
The LEP was established to maintain the nuclear stockpile.
Under the LEP, there are three options to deal with maintaining
the weapons. Nuclear components can be replaced with rebuilt
parts similar to those being replaced; this is called
refurbishment. Nuclear components can be replaced with parts
from other weapons; this is called reuse. Or nuclear components
can be replaced with newly designed nuclear components, and
this is called replacement.
We will talk more today about these three Rs:
refurbishment, reuse, or replacement. Today we'll also explore
how the labs go about understanding the status and reliability
of the nuclear weapons and making technical recommendations to
sustain them.
Beginning in the early 1990s, DOE has made significant
investments in experimental tools and facilities and led the
world in developing computational capability in order to
sustain nuclear weapons without underground nuclear testing.
This 18-year experience has provided the laboratories with the
technical knowledge to be able to have confidence with the
right support from the administration and Congress to maintain
the nuclear stockpile in a safe, secure, and reliable status
for the foreseeable future.
Under the New START treaty, the number of deployed nuclear
weapons will be reduced, which will also result in a smaller
overall stockpile. The ability to confidently maintain a
smaller stockpile is an important underpinning of the New
START. With the increased funding in the fiscal year 2011
budget request and long-term support for the labs, maintaining
the stockpile should be achievable.
I look forward to discussing with our witnesses the
challenges associated with maintaining a nuclear stockpile that
is safe, secure, and reliable and what is needed, in their
judgment, to ensure the Nuclear Weapons LEP is a success.
Now, we're going to begin this hearing in open session and
then we will move to a closed session in room SVC-217 of the
Capitol Visitor Center. I understand that there's a vote at 11
o'clock, so it's perhaps possible that we can complete the open
session by 11 o'clock or shortly thereafter. If not, we will
come back here to complete it.
Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank our
distinguished witnesses for joining us today and the
outstanding work that they do.
The purpose of this hearing, as the chairman mentioned, is
to discuss the New START treaty and evaluate the current and
long-term ability of the national nuclear security laboratories
to sustain the nuclear weapons stockpile. Given the many years
of neglect, the weapons complex is in dire need of investment
in both its intellectual and physical infrastructure. This
investment is critical and long overdue, and without it further
reductions to the stockpile could significantly undermine the
effectiveness of our strategic deterrent.
Our strategic posture, how we design, manufacture, field,
and evaluate the nuclear arsenal, becomes increasingly
important as we reduce the size of our stockpile. If
ratification of the New START treaty is to serve rather than
undermine our national security, we need adequate resources and
a consistent long-term commitment to modernize the weapons
complex, address its crumbling infrastructure, and stem its
impending brain drain.
At the request of Congress, the administration provided an
$80 billion, 10-year plan for modernizing the nuclear weapons
complex. However, the plan raises questions as to its adequacy
for meeting our full recapitalization and missile modernization
needs. Of the administration's commitment to provide $80
billion over the next 10 years, more than $70 billion of it
represents funding needed simply to sustain the nuclear weapons
complex at today's capability.
Assuming that out-year budgets will continue to support
full funding of the 10-year modernization plan, about $1
billion per year is allocated for modernization needs, hardly
what many would consider a meaningful or robust reinvestment. I
understand that prior to the release of the fiscal year 2011
budget the national lab directors reportedly requested a
significantly greater investment than what the administration
ultimately proposed.
I look forward to hearing from our witnesses why they felt
more was needed, if they perceive potential funding shortfalls,
and how they believe the forthcoming budget request will
address, among other issues, our critical physical and
intellectual infrastructure needs.
During this committee's hearing on the Nuclear Posture
Review (NPR), concerns were raised about the administration's
decision to discourage LEPs involving the replacement of
warheads. Counter to the recommendations of the bipartisan
Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission, the NPR seems
to undermine a pragmatic approach to the life extension of our
weapons, while threatening our ability to recruit the best and
brightest next generation of talent.
All modernization options that are achievable without
testing or the establishment of a new military characteristic--
including replacement, which in some cases may be the best
option, should be encouraged and pursued. As General Kevin
Chilton, Commander of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), told
the House Armed Services Committee in March: ``We should not
constrain our engineers and scientists in developing options on
what it will take to achieve the objectives of the stockpile
management program, and let them bring forward their best
recommendations for both the President and Congress to assess
as to what is the best way forward.''
I'd be very interested to hear from our lab directors
whether a policy that encourages refurbishment and reuse over
replacement could be detrimental to our ability to provide the
safest, most secure, and most reliable deterrent.
I've been a supporter of previous bipartisan efforts to
reduce our nuclear weapons in step with the Russian Government.
Many of us have concerns about the New START treaty's methods
of verification, its constraints on ballistic missile defense,
and the accompanying plan for modernization of our nuclear
stockpile. It's my hope that over the course of our hearings
and through further dialogue and negotiation with the
administration, Congress will receive both the assurances and
the funding commitment to address these concerns.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Dr. Schwitters, we're going to begin with you.
STATEMENT OF HON. ROY F. SCHWITTERS, Ph.D., CHAIRMAN, JASON
DEFENSE ADVISORY GROUP, AND S.W. RICHARDSON FOUNDATION REGENTAL
PROFESSOR OF PHYSICS, UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN
Dr. Schwitters. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and Senator McCain.
I very much appreciate this opportunity to report to you on the
2009 JASON review of the LEP. I've prepared remarks, which I've
presented to the committee. I'll try to summarize those briefly
here.
The impetus for our study was a request from the House
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces to the NNSA administrator for
a technical review of LEP strategies for maintaining the
nuclear deterrent analogous to the 2007 study on the Reliable
Replacement Warhead (RRW) program which we performed for NNSA.
Chairman Levin. Could you tell us what--I think we know
what your acronyms mean, but--
Dr. Schwitters. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin.--``LEP'' is the Life Extension Program.
Dr. Schwitters. ``LEP'' is the Life Extension Program, and
your introductory remarks are a very good summary of the
detailed work that goes into that program.
Chairman Levin. That last acronym that you used?
Dr. Schwitters. The last acronym is ``RRW'' and that
indicated Reliable Replacement Warhead, which was another
important concept that was considered for securing the
stockpile.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Dr. Schwitters. With respect to RRW, a concern has always
been, of course, the maintenance of an aging stockpile, no
question about that. That's where we come in and work with the
labs to understand the technical details of this.
An important question that was brought to us immediately in
last year's study of LEPs was the question of the build-up of
aging effects and how they affect the security and reliability
of the stockpile. The first finding in the study was that there
is no evidence that accumulation of changes incurred from aging
and life extension activities have increased risk to
certification of today's deployed nuclear warheads. We can go
into detail on the meaning of that.
The second finding is that the lifetimes of today's nuclear
warheads could be extended for decades with no anticipated loss
in confidence by using approaches similar to those employed in
LEPs to date. Now, this is an important point and I want to
explain the basis for it. The reason that we find confidence in
the ability to extend the lifetimes of the current stockpile is
based on the tremendous investment that the country has made in
science-based stockpile stewardship since the end of the Cold
War.
When we say methods similar to what has been done in the
past, we're talking about the science, the new tools, the new
computing capabilities, the experimental facilities, and the
detailed work by the folks in the laboratories that have given
us the present confidence we have. This is an important
investment, and I think the message, if you will, the lesson
that we've seen in the LEP, life extensions, to date is the
fact that the system--the full power of these people and
tools--has learned a lot about the current stockpile that we
didn't know entirely before and are able to apply it in
excellent ways to provide the stockpile that we need.
Our study followed on a series of studies for the past
several years on technical aspects of the nuclear weapons
program. I want to just point out that JASON, of course, relies
on the laboratories for information. We probe their people,
look at the experiments, try to consider the results from a
technical point of view.
I want to acknowledge, first of all, that our group finds
the work to be excellent in quality and we have had total
cooperation as we explore these details. Their folks come down
to our briefing sessions and get quite an onslaught of
questions, and we just assure them that we treat ourselves just
as tough as we treated them in this process. So it's really,
for me personally, an exciting and important give-and-take of
the highest scientific caliber.
Now, you mentioned, Mr. Chairman, in your opening remarks
the three Rs. We looked in detail at, again, the technical
differences and whether special issues come up depending on
whether you're refurbishing a system, replacing systems, or
reusing systems in different ways in the stockpile. I think the
lesson we found is that, while this terminology is useful, that
in fact the history of LEPs to date is such that good, sensible
applications of all three Rs go into the LEPs that have already
successfully been completed.
For example, the ongoing LEP on a system called the W76 is
mainly of the refurbishment type. It includes, in my view and
the view of our group, very sensible cases where some
components have been rebuilt and replaced with new
technologies. So we've seen the ability of the enterprise to
understand issues that come up in an aging stockpile and to
manage surprises in the system that you inevitably find in
complex technical systems like these. The LEPs performed to
date have been excellent, but don't really strictly map onto
one of three Rs.
The key in our view for the technical validation of these
ideas, however, is strongly dependent on the process--which is
going on--of reviewing any proposed changes, be they
refurbishment, the reuse, or the replacement, against a very
strict set of technical guidelines relating: (1) to the
original nuclear underground test database; (2) and this is so
important--to our better and new understanding of how these
systems work; and (3) to a host of non-nuclear experiments
which can be carried out to greater or lesser degrees depending
on the particular systems.
In our study, rather than sticking with the sort of
generalities of the three Rs, we went in detail, case-by-case,
of the systems that have been examined and those soon to go
into LEP to reach our conclusions.
Let me emphasize one technical point in this that I'd like
to make, and then I'll tell you a little bit about our
recommendations. In making stockpile assessments, it's always
important to compare the estimated value of a performance
margin with the corresponding uncertainty. In a system as
complicated as a nuclear weapon there are several margins that
matter a lot. However, it's important to recognize that margin
by itself is not all that you need to know. This is the great
advance of the science-based stockpile stewardship: that we now
have understanding of the uncertainties in the estimation of
those performance margins. That's new. That is good news, and
at least now, as the program goes forward, and certainly as
JASON examines these systems and their changes, we emphasize
comparing margin always to uncertainty.
Suppose you start to design a new system, and go down a
path quite a ways toward implementation. If the uncertainty in
performance grows faster than the margin that you gain, one has
to reevaluate the design. This is a very important detail as
you get into the nitty-gritty on these systems.
Let me just close with a brief comment on our first two
recommendations. The first is: determine the full potential of
refurbishment, as exemplified by the LEPs executed to date.
This recommendation is possible largely because of the
investment and the knowledge we have of those systems.
The second and related recommendation is to quantify the
potential benefits and challenges to life extension strategies
that may require reuse and replacement to prepare for the
possibility of future requirements, as for example reduced
yield or enhanced surety systems. Our proposed strategy we
believe is, first of all, not a refurbishment-only strategy; it
is a prudent strategy where we try to leverage the knowledge
gained in these complex systems against the changing needs of
the stockpile. That was the basis for those recommendations.
I think with that I should stop and I'd be more than
pleased to answer your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Schwitters follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Roy Schwitters
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee:
I appreciate this opportunity to discuss with you the findings and
recommendations of the 2009 JASON report on the NNSA Lifetime Extension
Program (LEP). The impetus for our study was a request from the House
Subcommittee on Strategic Forces to the NNSA Administrator for a
technical review of LEP strategies for maintaining the U.S. nuclear
deterrent ``analogous to'' the 2007 JASON review of the Reliable
Replacement Warhead (RRW) program.
In brief, our study found (and I quote): ``no evidence that
accumulation of changes incurred from aging and LEPs have increased
risk to certification of today's deployed nuclear warheads'' and that
``lifetimes of today's nuclear warheads could be extended for decades,
with no anticipated loss in confidence, by using approaches similar to
those employed in LEPs to date.''
Our main conclusion that the aging U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile
can be maintained through LEPs without explosive nuclear testing
fundamentally depends on the knowledge and experience gained from our
Nation's substantial post-Cold War investment in science-based
stockpile stewardship, notably through advanced simulation tools, major
new experimental facilities, the discipline of quantification of
margins and uncertainties (QMU), and excellent work by scientists and
engineers in the nuclear weapons program. But the future credibility of
our nuclear deterrent faces technical risks and challenges, which we
address in the report.
As mentioned, the LEP study followed on our review of the RRW,
which was part of a series of JASON studies going back several years
sponsored by NNSA that also included assessments of pit lifetimes,
verification and validation of nuclear weapons simulation codes, and
the physics of boost. In all of these studies, members of JASON were
provided excellent cooperation and access to laboratory technical
expertise on a continuing basis.
NNSA specified its definitions of ``refurbishment,'' ``warhead
component reuse,'' and ``warhead replacement'' in the study charge. We
consider this terminology to be convenient shorthand for the type of
LEP under consideration, but it is not indicative of the certification
challenges facing life-extension of any particular weapon type--it
implicitly assumes a clear distinction exists between the options,
where, in fact, the reality is more complicated. For example, the
currently ongoing W76-1 LEP mainly involves component refurbishment,
but includes significant component reuse and replacement.
In any specific LEP, it is critical to assess each modification to
the warhead on the basis of its effect on our confidence to certify the
modified weapon for deployment without benefit of underground explosive
tests in accord with U.S. national policy. The benchmarks for assessing
proposed modifications are:
Existence of data from previous underground tests
(UGT) or non-nuclear performance trials, which can be compared
to predicted performance characteristics of the modified
system. We used these criteria to assess certification
challenges of past ongoing and planned LEPs on a case-by-case
basis for all current stockpile systems,
Scientific understanding of relevant phenomena, which
provides guidance for comparing predictions with experiment and
for estimating uncertainties,
Results of non-nuclear experiments, which assist in
validating nuclear simulations, improving scientific
understanding, and qualifying non-nuclear systems.
We used these criteria to assess certification challenges of past,
ongoing, and planned LEPs on a case-by-case basis for all current
stockpile systems.
Considerable attention was given to assessing risk that might be
associated with ``accumulation of changes'' during the lifetime of a
warhead. We identify four types of changes that can take place
following the underground tests of a currently stockpiled weapon: (1)
component aging, (2) differences between tested devices and stockpile
warheads, including the differences introduced at the time of
manufacture and differences introduced when LEPs (and ALTs) were
performed, (3) variations among production units, and (4) changes in
understanding of actual performance characteristics compared to
original design expectations. The different categories of changes call
for different responses.
In making stockpile assessments, it is important to compare the
estimated value of the performance margin (M) to its associated
uncertainty (U) through the ratio M/U; short of a predictive theory of
weapons performance, a particular value of M without reference to U is
not meaningful. Indeed, comparing M to U is the essence of what is
meant by QMU and forms the basis of our (understated) finding:
Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties (QMU) provides a suitable
framework for assessment and certification. Producing new weapons
systems with increased margin is a possible mitigation strategy should
M/U fall below levels considered adequate as long as the corresponding
uncertainty doesn't grow in equal or greater proportion. These
considerations--documented in our report--support our first two
findings I stated at the outset.
Our first two recommendations are:
Determine the full potential of refurbishment, as
exemplified by LEPs executed to date, for maintaining or
improving the legacy stockpile.
Quantify potential benefits and challenges of LEP
strategies that may require reuse and replacement, to prepare
for the possibility of future requirements such as reduced
yield or enhanced surety.
This proposed LEP strategy seeks to leverage to the extent possible
the investments already made in the program, especially in the
knowledge of and experience with certifying weapons already in the
stockpile.
There is broad agreement across the nuclear weapons community,
JASON, and various review bodies that stockpile surveillance and
retention/renewal of key science, technology, engineering, and
production facilities and manpower are areas of critical importance to
stockpile stewardship needing attention now. Secretary Chu testified to
this committee on June 17 that ``the New START treaty contains no
limitations that would constrain our warhead life extension program
options, or the work to assess and correct any potential future warhead
issue.'' This commitment to future science-based stockpile stewardship
is critical to maintaining confidence in our nuclear deterrent.
I would like to comment on reactions to our LEP report and its
executive summary, which was released publicly by NNSA in November
2009. The classified report details our assessments of the
certification challenges associated with LEP strategies for all the
systems in the enduring stockpile; the executive summary provides
verbatim the complete list of findings and recommendations contained in
the classified report. As to comments made by the laboratory directors
in letters sent to Ranking Member Turner of the House Subcommittee on
Strategic Forces earlier this year, I hope I have made clear that we do
not propose a refurbishment-only strategy for future LEPs.
Regarding Director Anastasio's suggested strategy of ``preemptively
increasing margins,'' we offer two cautionary observations: (1) many
past stockpile issues would not be addressed by additional margin, and
(2) uncertainty is just as important as margin in establishing
confidence. Director Miller's letter raises the concern over additional
risk from ``accumulation over time of small changes'' for which JASON
found no objective evidence, after careful study of the details. We
note that: (1) changes induced from component aging can be erased by a
LEP, and (2) changes introduced by LEPs are carefully chosen and
assessed--they are not random--so that each LEP to date has produced a
warhead with higher confidence factors than the original. Former
director Hunter correctly points out that the JASON study focused on
certification of nuclear components for which full performance testing
is not possible; we agree that non-nuclear components can be
substituted with greater flexibility as long as they are thoroughly
tested.
We were concerned that some of the commentary on our work implied
an inconsistency between the classified report and its unclassified
executive summary. We discussed these concerns with Administrator
D'Agostino in April. Subsequently, NNSA forwarded to its staff and
laboratory leadership a statement that concludes:
``NNSA has reviewed the JASON LEP report including the
question of consistency between the unclassified executive
summary of the report and the full classified version of the
report JASON submitted to us. The two documents are consistent.
Both versions support NNSA's commitment to maintaining the
safety, security, and reliability of the Nation's nuclear
weapons stockpile under the terms of the (Nuclear Posture
Review).''
JASON considers it a privilege to have the opportunity to examine
important technical aspects of the Nation's nuclear weapons program. A
healthy technical give-and-take between knowledgeable people is crucial
to the future of science-based stockpile stewardship.
I shall be pleased to answer any questions you have.
background information
I am a professor of physics at The University of Texas at Austin
and a member of the JASON study group. I have participated in all the
recent JASON studies related to stockpile stewardship.
JASON comprises mainly university researchers--scientists and
engineers--who conduct studies on technical issues related to national
security for agencies of the U.S. Government. Currently, I chair the
JASON steering committee and, as such, am the public spokesman for
JASON. The steering committee is the executive body of JASON; among
other functions, it is responsible for selecting study leaders and
approving the terms-and-conditions for all studies.
Professors Marvin Adams of Texas A&M University and Dan Meiron of
Caltech led the 2009 LEP study and have briefed the classified report
to congressional staff, NNSA staff, interagency officials, and weapons
lab scientists and engineers. Three active nuclear weapons scientists
from the labs joined us as expert consultants on the LEP study--they
provided essential knowledge and insight, but JASON's findings and
recommendations are, of course, solely our responsibility.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Dr. Schwitters. The
Nation owes you and your colleagues at JASON a great debt of
gratitude. You are really independent and distinguished and
recognized for both of those characteristics. We're grateful to
you all.
Dr. Schwitters. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Let's continue now with Dr. Anastasio.
STATEMENT OF HON. MICHAEL R. ANASTASIO, Ph.D., DIRECTOR, LOS
ALAMOS NATIONAL LABORATORY
Dr. Anastasio. Thank you, Chairman Levin and Ranking Member
McCain and other members of the committee. I appreciate the
opportunity to appear before you today. I'm Dr. Michael
Anastasio. I'm the director of LANL, and it's a real honor to
be here.
I've devoted the bulk of my career to the nuclear weapons
enterprise, since 2006 as director at LANL, but originally as a
weapons designer at LLNL, before becoming director there in
2002.
In the President's April 2009 Prague speech and the
recently released NPR, the administration has directly linked
reductions in nuclear weapons to the maintenance of the nuclear
arsenal, both supporting its overall goal to reduce the global
nuclear danger.
Secretary of Energy Steven Chu testified recently that as
the stockpile decreases in size the role of science,
technology, and engineering in deterrence will increase in
importance. The reductions proposed in New START highlight the
importance of the laboratories' mission and the need for a
healthy and vibrant science, technology, and engineering base.
There are three points I'd like to emphasize for you today,
and you do have my written testimony that goes into more
detail. First, the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Program
(SSMP) created by Congress in the mid-1990s has had many
successes that were by no means assured when we started that
program. We've maintained a safe, secure, and effective
stockpile for the Nation without resorting to nuclear testing.
So far, we have retained the knowledge and critical skills of
an outstanding scientific and engineering workforce. We've
built many of the tools required for this task in the form of
the world's fastest supercomputers and new experimental
capabilities such as the Dual Axis Radiographic Hydro-Test, the
National Ignition Facility, and the Microsystems and
Engineering Sciences Application at our three laboratories.
But we're not finished. Because of the science we have
developed, and as Dr. Schwitters pointed out, we now know more
about the nuclear weapons systems than we ever have. In
particular, we've learned that our systems are aging and almost
every one will require some form of life extension activity in
the next 25 years. The available mitigation actions are
reaching their limits and we have not challenged the full skill
set of our workforce. Therefore, I think it's important that we
go beyond the refurbishments that have been considered to date
as we look to the future.
The second point I'd like to make is that the Obama
administration has put in place a new nuclear policy in its NPR
and brought forward a fiscal year 2011 budget proposal that
calls for significant increase in weapons activity spending.
The NPR calls for a case-by-case analysis of the full range of
life extension approaches, refurbishment, reuse, and
replacement. It also expresses a strong preference for
refurbishment or reuse in a decision to proceed to engineering
development.
I understand the sensitivity of this issue and we heard
this in some of the opening comments. But I do not feel overly
constrained by the language in the NPR. Rather, I believe that
it provides the necessary flexibility to manage the stockpile
with acceptable levels of risk. It is always my obligation to
ensure that the best technical recommendations to meet
requirements are brought forward for your considerations,
regardless of the statements in the NPR.
The fiscal year 2011 budget request, which calls for a $624
million increase, is essential. This is a positive step and a
show of commitment that helps stabilize the weapons program. It
also puts necessary new funds towards starting some of the
needed hands-on work for the stockpile and repairing the
decaying infrastructure of the complex.
My third and final point is that, even with these positive
actions, I am concerned. This effort will require sustained
focus by multiple administrations and multiple Congresses for
several decades. I fear that program expectations may already
be out of line with the fiscal realities faced by the country.
The nuclear infrastructure needs and the stockpile needs
have the potential to unbalance the rest of the program,
squeezing out the science that is the basis for stockpile
stewardship. In addition, we must balance the need to hire the
future national security workforce with looming pension
shortfalls of nearly $200 million in fiscal year 2012 at LANL.
So in conclusion, I'm cautiously optimistic about the
future of the nuclear weapons program, that we can carry out
our responsibilities under New START with adequate levels of
risk. But we need help, and I urge Congress to work with the
administration to form a national consensus on nuclear policy
and to support the fiscal year 2011 budget request as a
necessary first step forward. I would welcome a dialogue on how
to best sustain focus on these issues well into the future.
Thank you, and of course I'd be happy to answer any
questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Anastasio follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Michael R. Anastasio
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to
respond to the committee's questions on the New START treaty and the
ability of the national laboratories to maintain the safety, security,
and effectiveness of the stockpile into the future. I am Dr. Michael R.
Anastasio, the Director of the Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL),
and it is an honor to appear before you today to present my views.
In President Obama's April 2009 Prague speech and in the recently
released Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), this administration has
articulated its goal to reduce the global nuclear danger. In both the
speech and the policy document, the administration has directly linked
reductions in nuclear weapons to the maintenance of the nuclear
arsenal. This then is a propitious time to discuss what is necessary to
maintain the stockpile into the future as the Senate considers
ratification of the New START treaty.
From a Laboratory standpoint, it is important to understand that
New START will reduce the number of delivery vehicles and warheads, but
it will not alter the Nuclear Triad. Secretary of Energy Steven Chu
testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee on June 17, 2010,
that ``As the stockpile decreases in size, the role of science,
technology and engineering in deterrence will increase in importance.''
This means that the United States will have to devote appropriate
attention and resources to protecting the physical and intellectual
science, technology and engineering (ST&E) infrastructure that
underpins the stockpile.
Los Alamos and the other National Security Laboratories also have
historically played an important role in arms control, providing
technical support to negotiators, to those who implement treaties, and
to those who monitor the treaties and assess compliance. While I will
not discuss this further, we continue to bring the innovative technical
capabilities of the Laboratory to these challenges.
I do not see New START fundamentally changing the role of the
Laboratory. What New START does do, however, is emphasize the
importance of the Laboratories' mission and the need for a healthy and
vibrant ST&E base to be able to continue to assure the stockpile into
the future. These issues will be the focus of my remarks.
stockpile stewardship
Stockpile Stewardship Successes
The United States and its allies continue to depend on a nuclear
deterrent as part of the overall security posture. The manner in which
the Nation executes this mission has changed dramatically over the last
several decades. In 1989, the United States ended the production of new
nuclear weapons; 3 years later, the United States adopted a moratorium
on nuclear weapons testing that remains in effect to this day. In
response to these new circumstances, the National Defense Authorization
Act for Fiscal Year 1994 charged the Secretary of Energy to establish a
Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) ``to ensure the preservation of the
core intellectual and technical competencies of the United States in
nuclear weapons.'' To meet this challenge the Nation has invested
significant resources in the advanced scientific, experimental,
engineering, and computational capabilities of the national
laboratories. These capabilities are the basis for the Laboratories to
assess the overall safety, security, and effectiveness of the stockpile
as well as to execute the Stockpile Life Extension Program (LEP), which
I will describe in more detail below.
It is primarily through the SSP that the Laboratory provides
technical support for U.S. nuclear forces, posture and policy. Our
approach involves the continual assessment of the stockpile through
surveillance enabled by a more fundamental scientific understanding.
This has required us to build upon past nuclear test experience with
the development of more advanced experimental and simulation tools and
the expertise of the scientists, engineers, and technicians at our
laboratories and production plants.
Our surveillance results show ever-increasing effects from aging.
These results are assessed with an extensive range of non-nuclear
testing and vastly improved simulation capability. Ultimately, expert
judgment and rigorous inter-laboratory peer review assure that critical
conclusions are drawn from the best available data, appropriate high-
resolution simulations and a suite of evolving experimental
capabilities. Sound science is the core of our confidence.
The SSP at the Laboratories has had many successes to date; these
successes were by no means assured when the Program began in 1995 as an
ambitious effort to sustain the nuclear weapons stockpile while
minimizing the need for nuclear testing. Examples of these successes
include:
Annual Assessment
I am responsible for an assessment, based on a rigorous technical
process, of all weapons in the stockpile for which the Laboratory is
responsible. This ``annual assessment'' letter is provided to the
Secretaries of Defense and Energy, as well as the Chair of the Nuclear
Weapons Council, and then is forwarded to the President. I have
personally signed eight assessment letters during my tenure at both
Lawrence Livermore and now at Los Alamos and have had direct
involvement in all 15 cycles since the inception of the program in
1996. In many regards, this letter and its detailed set of backup
documents is the annual summation of all that we do in Stockpile
Stewardship.
Pit manufacturing
In 1989, the United States halted plutonium pit manufacturing at
the Rocky Flats plant in Colorado, leaving the United States as the
only nuclear weapons state without the ability to manufacture the core
component of nuclear weapons. Using our science and technology to
qualify the new build processes, Los Alamos restored this essential
capability in 2007 and has nearly completed the build of pits required
for the W-88, a central component of the sea-based deterrent.
Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test
The Dual Axis Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT) facility is
now fully functional and allows our experimental teams to obtain three-
dimensional, high-resolution, time-sequenced images taken within
billionths of a second at specifically selected times within an
implosion of a mock nuclear weapons assembly. Last December, the first
dual-axis experiment was successfully carried out at DARHT. Data from
the experiment will allow Los Alamos to close a Significant Finding
Investigation (SFI) on a stockpile system. DARHT data is also critical
to the W76 LEP effort.
Supercomputing
In partnership with IBM, Los Alamos built and deployed the world's
first petascale (million-billion calculations per second)
supercomputer--Road Runner. After an initial series of unclassified
science runs to assure machine performance, Road Runner is now
dedicated to classified weapons work. Later this summer, Los Alamos in
partnership with Sandia, will take delivery of out next supercomputer--
Cielo--another petascale machine. The breadth and quality of
experimental data being obtained has allowed Los Alamos to validate the
significant progress on integrated three dimensional software tools
within the Advanced Simulation and Computing campaign.
Los Alamos Neutron Science Center
The Los Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE) facility, an 800 MeV
proton accelerator, makes a number of important contributions to our
understanding of weapons performance. Proton radiography (pRad) at
LANSCE allows us to make time-resolved measurements of dynamic events
of weapon components, such as high-explosive detonation and burn. Data
from pRad informs the W76 LEP and B61 work. The LANSCE protons are also
used to create spallation neutrons that allow the imaging of weapons
components and are used to understand the basic nuclear physics. The
Weapons Neutron Research station at LANSCE provides invaluable new
radiochemical data used to refine the nuclear yield determinations,
thereby allowing LANL staff to glean additional information from
archived nuclear test data. LANSCE is the only facility in the country
where these types of classified experiments that involve special
nuclear material can currently be conducted.
Plutonium Aging Physics
LANL conducted years of detailed experiments that examined the
physics of how plutonium ages. This assessment, paired with work
conducted at Lawrence Livermore, enabled the National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) to better understand the lifetime of plutonium
components and its impacts upon nuclear weapons performance. This work
allowed for better estimates of the sizing of production capabilities
and of needed resources.
Maintaining the Stockpile through Life Extension Programs
As we learn about our strategic systems through Stockpile
Stewardship, we then work with the Department of Defense (DOD) and
Department of Energy (DOE)/NNSA to determine appropriate steps for
extending the lives of these systems for an additional 20 to 30 years
beyond their original lifetimes through LEPs. To date, the LEP focus
has been to effectively refurbish them so they are ``just like'' they
were originally designed, to meet the requirements of the Cold War
(high yield to weight ratios). LEP activities include: research,
development, and production work required to ensure that weapon systems
continue to meet national security requirements.
The Nation has successfully completed LEPs for the W87 ICBM warhead
and the B61-7/11 gravity bomb. The W76 LEP is well underway and is
contributing significantly to the long-term viability of the Nation's
sea-based deterrent force. Major components refurbished as part of the
LEP include: the nuclear explosive package; the arming, firing, and
fuzing system; and the gas transfer system. This LEP is expected to
extend the life of the W76 for an additional 30 years without reliance
on underground nuclear testing. LANL played a major role in this
effort, which required reconstitution of specialized material
production after several decades. The First Production Unit (FPU) for
the W76 LEP was completed in fiscal year 2008.
With the bulk of the Laboratory's efforts on the W76 LEP complete,
Los Alamos will shift its focus to the the B61 LEP, consistent with the
NPR. Major components that will be refurbished as part of the LEP
include: new detonator cable assembly, main charge, foams and polymers,
and a new gas transfer system. This LEP also provides the opportunity
to install enhanced, intrinsic safety and security features by
modifying components in existing designs to meet today's dynamic
security environment. Los Alamos expects to support an FPU in 2017
assuming timely Congressional approval of the funding needed to carry
out the program.
LEP requirements derive from the joint DOD-DOE Nuclear Weapons
Council (NWC). Each nuclear weapon system they identify and Congress
funds is studied to develop options that meet the requirements
established by the NWC. Per the guidance in the NPR and in the
administration's Stockpile Stewardship and Management Report, it is my
obligation to ensure that the teams at Los Alamos examine all the
relevant technical options for an LEP, including refurbishment, reuse
and replacement, and bring them forward to the NWC for a decision.
These efforts will include modifying Cold War-era weapons for
enhanced margin against failure, increased safety, and improved
security and use control. For example, introducing insensitive high
explosives into systems that currently use conventional high explosives
can improve safety. Future LEP studies will consider the possibility of
adapting the resulting warhead to multiple platforms in order to reduce
the number of warhead types. In all LEP studies, the Laboratories will
rely on fundamental and applied ST&E to improve its understanding of
nuclear weapon behavior and to assure the safety, security, and
effectiveness of our nuclear deterrent supported by a reduced and more
sustainable, efficient and appropriately-sized nuclear security
infrastructure.
Leveraging our Science for National Security
The issues that have arisen in the last 18 years of assuring the
reliability of nuclear weapons without conducting a nuclear test are
complex science and engineering problems. Some of these problems were
anticipated--like the aging of certain components in a warhead--and
others were totally unexpected. The success of the Stewardship program
has been the ability to draw on a deep and rich science base at the
Laboratories. This science base is enriched by engaging on a broad
range of scientific problems, many of which have a direct relevance to
broader national security interests. A vibrant science, technology and
engineering enterprise is essential to supporting the stewardship
program, and at the same time it provides a powerful resource for
issues such as nonproliferation, counterproliferation,
counterterrorism, and intelligence assessment.
There is a tendency when people hear about the role the NNSA
Laboratories play in solving other national problems that these are
simply nice ``spinoffs.'' These provide more than just positive
benefits for the Nation; rather, this work outside of the weapons
program is essential to the conduct of the core nuclear weapons
mission. We have a vibrant scientific workforce at Los Alamos,
including around 2,500 PhDs that are the core of our science base. The
weapons program benefits directly when these scientists have the
opportunity to extend their skills by working on challenging technical
problems, like climate modeling, which then can validate and improve
the methods in our 3-D weapons codes and solve challenges in the
stockpile.
The following are a handful of recent Laboratory scientific
successes that leverage our weapons science capabilities for broader
national security interests, and also feed directly back into the
nuclear weapons program.
Intelligence
Our weapons program capabilities give us the ability to assess
foreign weapons programs and to assist the intelligence community.
There is much truth to the statement that ``it takes a nuclear weapons
lab to find a nuclear weapons lab.''
Nuclear forensics and attribution
Los Alamos delivered a suite of models and databases for National
Technical Nuclear Forensics applications, such as modeling debris
signatures and other nuclear security applications. LANL's capabilities
in this area are a direct outgrowth of the former nuclear weapons
testing program where scientists had to study the detailed chemistry of
soil samples to determine various characteristics of a detonation. Our
experts in this area can not only help with current nuclear forensics,
but they also support the weapons program by helping to re-interpret
data from previous underground tests. This information is then used to
validate our weapons codes.
Plutonium Center of Excellence
LANL's efforts in non-weapons plutonium work help ensure the
country maintains a core human capital ability to work with this
material. The same researchers and technicians who work on plutonium
238 for use in deep-space missions for NASA also support the
manufacture of plutonium pits for the stockpile.
Detection Technology
Much of the work at Los Alamos in the basic sciences arena has had
a significant impact on detecting threats from emerging phenomena. For
example, building x-ray and gamma ray detectors on satellites has
promoted the discovery of fundamental cosmological phenomena like the
collapse of black holes. In turn, these detectors have been refined and
are part of our front line defense in monitoring other nations' weapons
programs.
Advanced simulation and energy/climate research
The ability to simulate complex systems--like a nuclear explosion
with thousands of parts exploding in a fraction of a second--is
something that has also driven national security science forward. LANL
has developed two of the four modules (sea ice and oceans) used in
international climate models. Many of the lessons learned from
observing a complex climate system can be applied to our weapons
models. In particular, we have discovered heretofore unknown
phenomena--in terms of regional climate impacts and within weapons
systems--as we have gone to finer and finer levels of resolution in our
simulations. On the energy front, LANL is also a partner in the
recently announced DOE Office of Nuclear Energy Hub focused on nuclear
power. LANL will play a key role in helping to build a ``virtual
reactor.''
Gulf Oil Spill
Scientists from Los Alamos and other laboratories have played a
significant role in the Federal Government's efforts to assess and stem
the oil leaking in the Gulf of Mexico. Several efforts are continuing
as the crisis continues. One particular area of emphasis is in
diagnostics of the well system. LANL designed and developed the first
ever two-dimensional radiography system deployed in deep water (below a
few hundred feet). The radiography leveraged numerous capabilities
including machining, advanced image analysis, and modeling techniques.
Next Chapter of Stockpile Stewardship
For the future, we need to build on the core scientific successes
achieved through Stockpile Stewardship that have maintained the safety
security and effectiveness of the stockpile for 18 years without
nuclear testing. However, we are now at a crossroads as a nation. The
next few years will determine our approach to the stockpile for decades
to come. There is an opportunity right now for a national consensus to
develop around nuclear policy that has been needed since the end of the
Cold War. As I will discuss further below, I am encouraged by the
significant strides this administration has made in issuing a new
policy, in the form of the NPR, as well as by its fiscal year 2011
budget request for the Department of Energy, which I believe is an
important first step. With this as a basis, I hope that Congress and
the administration can reach a bi-partisan national consensus.
Even with such a consensus, my concern is that with all there is to
be done, the level of interest and budget support that we have seen
this year will need to be sustained by future administrations and
future Congresses. As I have seen over my nearly 30-year career at the
Laboratories, solutions and fixes in this arena cannot be accomplished
quickly. This will require a sustained effort on the part of the Nation
for decades to come.
new policy for nuclear weapons
The administration's NPR, issued in April of this year, ``provides
the roadmap for implementing President Obama's agenda for reducing
nuclear risks . . . '' It focuses on five key objectives of nuclear
weapons policies and posture, one of which is ``Sustaining a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear arsenal''.
The Directors of Livermore and Sandia joined me in issuing a tri-
lab statement about the NPR in April. We felt it was important to first
outline the roles and responsibilities of the national laboratories in
terms of providing the technical underpinnings to ensure the safety,
security, and effectiveness of the nuclear deterrent. With regard to
the NPR's overall framework, I repeat here what we said:
``We believe that the approach outlined in the NPR, which
excludes further nuclear testing and includes the consideration
of the full range of life extension options (refurbishment of
existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different
warheads and replacement of nuclear components based on
previously tested designs), provides the necessary technical
flexibility to manage the nuclear stockpile into the future
with an acceptable level of risk.
We are reassured that a key component of the NPR is the
recognition of the importance of supporting a modern physical
infrastructure--comprised of the national security laboratories
and a complex of supporting facilities--and a highly capable
workforce with the specialized skills needed to sustain the
nuclear deterrent.''
While the joint statement reflects the Laboratory Directors'
collective views, I will elaborate on my own thinking on the NPR. It
clearly emphasizes the three key elements of Stockpile Stewardship--
hands-on work on the stockpile; the science, technology and engineering
base; and the infrastructure at the laboratories and plants. I agree
with the NPR's view that these are the three critical elements of the
nuclear weapons enterprise. It is essential that all of these elements
be in balance and adequately funded to maintain a safe, secure, and
effective stockpile. I will focus my remarks on each of these elements
in turn.
Stockpile work
The NPR is explicit about the weapons that need life-extension over
the next 10 years: completion of the W76, proceeding on the full scope
life extension of the B61, and study of the W78. I strongly agree with
the NPR assertion of the need to increase the safety and security of
our systems. The LEP process provides opportunities to do so, for
example by switching all conventional high explosive (CHE) primaries
with insensitive high explosive (IHE) primaries to increase safety
margins and deploying certain intrinsic surety systems in the stockpile
to better meet today's security challenges.
The NPR's statements on needed LEPs align well with the assessments
that the Laboratories have made in recent years. We have seen that in
many cases, the uncertainties associated with the current issues
identified through surveillance threaten to overwhelm the small
performance margins that characterize many of the weapons in the
current stockpile. Essentially, this uncertainty dictates that almost
every weapon system in the current stockpile will require completion of
some type of life extension activity in the next 25 years.
The available mitigation actions for the results observed in
surveillance, such as changes external to the nuclear package or
relaxation of certain military requirements are reaching their limits.
Consequently, as the Perry Commission observed, ``The Stockpile
Stewardship Program and the Life Extension Program have been remarkably
successful in refurbishing and modernizing the stockpile . . . but
cannot be counted on for the indefinite future.'' We will need to take
advantage of the flexibility articulated in the NPR to go beyond just
refurbishment that has been considered to date and evaluate the full
range of options (refurbishment, reuse, and replacement) to increase
nuclear performance margins to mitigate the need for nuclear testing.
The NPR states that in ``any decision to proceed to engineering
development for warhead LEPs, the United States will give strong
preference to options for refurbishment or reuse.'' The NPR also
strongly endorses, and the NNSA Stockpile Stewardship and Management
Plan reinforces, the importance that on a case-by-case basis, the full
range of LEP approaches will be considered: refurbishment, reuse, and
replacement. I recognize the sensitivity of this topic but am convinced
that allowing the laboratories the flexibility to present policy makers
with our best technical recommendations to meet requirements is
critical to our role in the stockpile management process. This approach
greatly reduces the possibility of having to conduct nuclear testing,
while at the same time exercising our nuclear designers and engineers.
I do not feel overly constrained by the language in the NPR; rather, I
believe it provides the necessary flexibility to manage the stockpile
with acceptable levels of risk.
The starting point for all of this hands-on work, of course, is the
stockpile surveillance program that pulls actual units from service and
puts them through rigorous destructive and non-destructive testing.
Through these efforts we are able to anticipate issues as well as learn
when issues may require action, but I have been concerned for some time
that we are not doing as much surveillance as we should be doing. The
NPR states that investments are required in ``Strengthening the ST&E
base needed for conducting weapon system LEPs, maturing advanced
technologies to increase weapons surety, qualification of weapon
components and certifying weapons without nuclear testing, and
providing annual stockpile assessments through weapons surveillance
[emphasis added].'' I agree with this assessment. Since our knowledge
base begins with surveillance, it is essential that we sustain support
in this area.
Science, Technology, and Engineering
I strongly endorse the view of the NPR on strengthening the ST&E
base; it is this base that provides the underpinning of confidence in
the stockpile in the absence of nuclear testing. This expertise can
only be maintained by continued scientific advances; it cannot be
static. However, it has been allowed to erode in recent years, putting
at risk our ability to make the necessary future advances in our
capabilities. It is important to note that often years of technical
work, for example in actinide sciences, are required ahead of time to
enable the successful completion of today's requirements. Without
investment today future confidence is at risk.
In addition, it is essential that we acquire experimental data from
non-nuclear experiments to provide the `ground truth' about stockpile
issues. Today, we are beginning to see many of the investments of
Stockpile Stewardship come to fruition--notably the Dual-Axis
Radiographic Hydrodynamic Test at Los Alamos, the NIF at Livermore, and
the MESA facility at Sandia--yet, we have inadequate resources to carry
out the all key experiments at these facilities. Just as the Nation is
positioned to reap the benefits of these investments, funding declines
make it extremely difficult to maintain, use, or enhance these facility
capabilities that are necessary to preserve our deterrent and to
further other national security goals.
Similar to the world of experiments, today we are faced with an
equal computational challenge and opportunity. To maintain the
scientific vitality, international competitiveness, and leadership
needed to support the administration's nuclear posture, continued
advancement to exascale class computation is necessary. Such a
capability will position us to provide better support for the
stockpile, particularly in the form of surety options, and to provide
reliable support for intelligence analysis including emerging foreign
threats in the broad area of nuclear security.
Compounding that challenge of a healthy, vibrant ST&E base is the
aging workforce at Los Alamos and elsewhere in the complex. At Los
Alamos, the average age of career employees is now over 48, and 32
percent of all career employees are expected to retire within the next
5 years. Without an infusion of younger talent who can become
recipients and beneficiaries in the transfer of knowledge from those
with decades of experience, we will be at risk for loss of that
knowledge.
Aging Infrastructure
Much of the nuclear infrastructure needed by the United States
resides in facilities that date back to the 1950s. While we take great
efforts to ensure our employees are safe in these aging facilities and
that the public is not put at risk, the challenges and costs to
maintain their active status is mounting rapidly.
The NPR and administration's fiscal year 2011 budget support the
Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) in Tennessee and the Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Nuclear Facility in New Mexico.
They represent the critical next step in shrinking the Nation's nuclear
infrastructure footprint while allowing these vital operations to
continue in the most safe and secure environments possible. I strongly
endorse investments in these two facilities and believe without them
the costs associated with maintaining the existing facilities will
eventually overwhelm the weapons program budgets.
The CMRR project at Los Alamos will replace the existing Chemistry
and Metallurgy Research (CMR) facility, completed in 1952, that is at
the end of its useful life. This facility houses the analytical
chemistry, materials characterization, and actinide research and
development activities that are required to support a wide spectrum of
work at Los Alamos. The work in CMRR is critical to sustaining the
Nation's nuclear deterrent, but it also is critical to nonproliferation
efforts, development of power sources for U.S. space missions, training
of IAEA inspectors and the work of nuclear forensics. We have been
working closely with our industry partners to bring strong project
management to this effort and to deliver this important project on cost
and schedule. I am proud to report that on the first phase of this
project, construction of the Radiological Laboratory Utility Office
Building (RLUOB), we did just that: it was completed on time and budget
last year. We are in the process of outfitting that facility and expect
to occupy RLUOB in 2012. We continue to work closely with NNSA on the
design of the next and final stage of the project, the Nuclear
Facility. To successfully deliver this project, it will be important to
have certainty in funding and consistency of requirements throughout
the project.
At the same time, there are many other essential facilities across
the complex and at Los Alamos that cannot be neglected because of our
necessary focus on the major nuclear facilities. Infrastructure
considerations must include operation of current facilities and the
consolidation of old, inefficient ones. For example, we are working to
identify adequate funding to maintain and operate the LANSCE facility
for material properties, carry out planned actinide research and renew
an aging infrastructure where over 50 percent of the buildings are more
than 40 years old.
To reduce costs we have already eliminated a million square feet of
antiquated laboratory and office space. Using funds from the American
Recovery and Reinvestment Act we are in the process of decontaminating
and demolishing the earliest plutonium and uranium facilities at the
Laboratory.
fiscal year 2011 budget proposal
In addition to the NPR, the administration has developed a fiscal
year 2011 budget that moves us in the right direction. I view the
NNSA's fiscal year 2011 budget request as a positive first step and I
urge its approval by Congress. The $624 million increase to Weapons
activities is primarily focused on addressing the crumbling
infrastructure of the Complex - most notably the plutonium
infrastructure at LANL and the uranium infrastructure at Y-12, as well
as beginning to attend to the needs of an aging stockpile with
increased funds for Life Extension Programs. These are welcome
increases and will begin to address some of the concerns that the
Strategic Posture Commission and the Laboratory Directors have raised
in recent years.
Restoring the scientific and physical infrastructure--all while
managing pension and other challenges--will take time and sustained
support by Congress. Sustaining strong science funding in the form of
Science Campaigns and advanced computing, as well as the infrastructure
account, known as Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities that
underlies all of the work we do, is essential. This funding enables us
to carry out the fullest of scientific research and development efforts
necessary to meet our nuclear weapon mission and broader national
security needs and to attract and retain the best and brightest
scientists.
challenges
The NPR provides the necessary policy framework, which I hope leads
to a national consensus, and the fiscal year 2011 budget request
provides the first step in the fiscal implementation of the roadmap to
sustain the long-term safety, security, and effectiveness of the
stockpile. It is important to recognize that to fully implement this
roadmap requires investments that carry across multiple administrations
and multiple Congresses. Today, I fear that there is already a gap
emerging between expectations and fiscal realities. I fear that some
may perceive that the fiscal year 2011 budget request meets all of the
necessary budget commitments for the program; however, there are still
significant financial uncertainties, for example, the design of the UPF
and CMRR are not complete and the final costs remain uncertain.
As I look to the future, I remain concerned that science will be
squeezed when trying to compete with capital infrastructure investments
and life extension program funding priorities. Having experienced three
decades of Federal budgets and their impacts on the weapons program, it
will be challenging to sustain the increases the administration has
called for. Just as I am encouraged by the significant increase we see
in fiscal year 2011, I am concerned that in the administration's
section 1251 report, much of the planned funding increase for Weapons
Activities do not come to fruition until the second half of the 10 year
period.
Another example of the fiscal challenges that I see on the horizon
is related to pensions. Like many other organizations across the
country, we at Los Alamos are facing a pension shortfall during the
current fiscal year and it is expected to grow over the next 2 years.
In fiscal year 2010, the Laboratory has worked closely with the
NNSA to resolve a pension shortfall of $76 million. Part of the
solution has been to require employees to make contributions; the
Laboratory is increasing its fringe rates to cover costs and NNSA has
provided assistance on the order of $46 million. Next year, the pension
shortfall is expected to be $77 million, and in fiscal year 2012, the
shortfall is expected to grow to about $200 million. NNSA is aware of
this issue and we are working closely on possible options to address
it. My chief concern is that if the Laboratory must shoulder the bulk
of this increase, this will dramatically reduce the funds available for
programmatic deliverables and cause significant disruption of the
Laboratory workforce.
As I noted earlier, it will be important that as a nation we can
align expectations with the fiscal realities that we see. At the same
time, it is essential that we balance investment across all three major
elements of the program--hands-on stockpile activities, ST&E, and
infrastructure. For example, without investment in ST&E today we put at
risk timely execution of the program beyond the very near term. On the
other hand, focus on near term stockpile LEPs without infrastructure
investment limits the near term program scope and efficiency and puts
at risk longer term timely execution. Stability of funding plans is
also important so that the balance that is struck can actually be
executed. One approach to maintain focus on these issues across
multiple administrations and Congresses could be a set of
``safeguards,'' that have been used in past arms control treaties.
conclusion
Thank you again for the opportunity to appear before you to testify
on this important subject. As I stated, I am very encouraged by the
progress this administration has made both on the policy and the budget
fronts. The NPR provides the policy framework with the technical
flexibility to manage the stockpile with an acceptable level of risk
and the fiscal year 2011 budget request is a positive step forward.
I am cautiously optimistic that with Congress' support we--as a
Nation--can recapture the bipartisan consensus that once existed about
the Nation's strategic deterrent and the overall nuclear weapons
complex. At the same time, I have concerns about sustaining the focus
and an appropriate budget over the several decades for which it will be
required. As a Laboratory, we are dedicated to ensuring the innovative
science and engineering necessary to sustain our strategic deterrent
and that can be applied to the many challenges the Nation now faces.
Maintaining the necessary focus and resources of the administration and
Congress is critical in order to achieve these national goals.
I look forward to engaging further with the committee on this
important topic and I welcome your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Dr. Anastasio.
Dr. Miller.
STATEMENT OF HON. GEORGE H. MILLER, Ph.D., DIRECTOR, LAWRENCE
LIVERMORE NATIONAL LABORATORY
Dr. Miller. Thank you, Chairman Levin and Ranking Member
McCain and distinguished members of the committee, for your
continuing support of the Nation's stockpile stewardship
program. Like Dr. Anastasio, I have devoted much of my career
to the nuclear weapons program. Several of the weapons that are
currently in the U.S. arsenal I designed personally. So this is
an issue about which I care deeply.
There are three points that I'd like to emphasize today.
Technically, we have an approach that can maintain the safety,
security, and effectiveness of our arsenal without nuclear
testing and without introducing new military capabilities. To
meet those mission requirements and carry out the program of
work will require sustaining the nuclear security enterprise
for decades with a balanced investment in the stockpile itself,
in refurbishing and maintaining the critical physical
infrastructure, and in supporting the underpinning science,
technology, and engineering. Above all, we together must
nurture and sustain the outstanding stewards at our
laboratories and production facilities.
From a scientific and technical point of view, I have
confidence that we can maintain a safe, secure, and effective
deterrent through the stockpile stewardship program because of
the successes that we have had to date and our ability to build
on that success. We have greatly improved our simulation and
experimental capabilities. These are unique national assets
that allow us to understand details about the performance of
weapons that went undiscovered in the era of nuclear testing.
We have found and corrected issues in the stockpile and are
continuously improving our abilities to assess weapons
performance and certify the changes that are necessary in order
to extend the life of the stockpile. We have successfully
extended the life of some of the systems in the stockpile. We
are providing hands-on experience to train the next generation
of stockpile stewards.
The President's 2011 budget request seeks increased funding
to reverse the recent declining budget trends and create a
sustainable stockpile stewardship enterprise. The Nation's
deterrent requires this SSMP, which is adequately funded by
successive administrations and Congress to provide the funding
to meet the mission requirements.
Today as we sit here, additional investments are needed in
all three areas of the SSMP: in the science and technology that
underpins our understanding, in the LEPs that are necessary to
keep the systems themselves alive, and in the modernization of
the facilities and infrastructure. I urge Congress to work with
the administration to support this vital first step.
The science and technology which underpins our confidence
in the stockpile is of vital importance to understand the
nature of the stockpile itself. We call this surveillance. We
need, in my opinion, to step up the rate of surveillance and
become more proficient at detecting issues early through the
technologies that we have developed. We need to take full
advantage of the two-laboratory system to provide assessments
of the stockpile as it moves forward and ages. Much like
something else that we're very familiar with, when we are
diagnosed with a serious illness we frequently ask for the
opinions of more than one doctor.
We need to continue to pursue remarkable advances in our
assessment tools and in using the experimental facilities and
continuing to advance the simulation capability beyond what we
currently have. We will need to undertake LEPs over the next 2
decades to extend the life of the systems that are currently in
the stockpile.
These options will be based on previously tested nuclear
designs and it's very important that we have the ability to
consider all of the technical options, from refurbishment to
component reuse to replacement, while carefully considering
through this process the possibilities of improving the safety,
security, manufacturability, maintainability of the stockpile,
and carefully considering issues of cost and risk and our
ability to meet the overall goals of the country.
These LEPs also offer the opportunity to provide important
resiliency to the stockpile as the size is reduced by having
warheads that are easily adaptable from one system to another.
Finally, we need to modernize our facilities. We need to
replace the Cold War-era facilities, particularly for
processing uranium and plutonium, and upgrade the physical
infrastructure of the complex. This will require major
increases in funding while sustaining the balance with the
other parts of the program.
Above all, we need to nurture and sustain the outstanding
stewards at our laboratories and production facilities and help
effectively mentor them so that we can create our future. Long-
term success is ultimately dependent upon the quality of this
workforce. That workforce needs a program that is stable,
that's technically engaging, and is of recognized importance to
the Nation.
While the President's budget for fiscal year 2011 is a good
start, the 10-year plan calls for continued significant budget
increases. These are needed in order to carry out the program
of work that I outlined before. It is a major undertaking and
one that requires our collective sustained attention and focus.
Again, thank you very much for your continued support for
this important program and for your continued interest in
discussing these important issues. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. George H. Miller
opening remarks
Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to provide a statement on the status and future prospects
of the Department of Energy/National Nuclear Security Administration's
(NNSA) Stockpile Stewardship Program to sustain the safety, security,
and effectiveness of the Nation's nuclear stockpile. My name is George
Miller and I am the Director of the Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (LLNL).
LLNL is one of NNSA's two nuclear design laboratories and a
principal participant in the Stockpile Stewardship Program. National
security depends greatly on the success of our stockpile stewardship
efforts. I want to thank the committee for your interest in and
continued support for these activities and your commitment to the
program's success.
In addition to stockpile stewardship, our Laboratory's nuclear
security responsibilities include engaging in vital national programs
to reduce the threats posed by nuclear proliferation and terrorism. The
Laboratory also applies its multidisciplinary science and technology to
provide solutions to a broader range of pressing national and global
security challenges.
introduction
From a scientific and technical viewpoint, I am confident that we
can maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent through a
science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program that is balanced,
integrated, and sustained over time; this will require the support of
successive administrations and Congress and sufficient funding to meet
mission requirements. Stockpile stewardship is a cornerstone of the
Nation's strategic deterrent for the future. As demonstrated by the
program's achievements to date, I believe that the highly capable
scientists and engineers at the NNSA national laboratories and
production facilities will be able to address issues that arise in an
aging, smaller nuclear stockpile by utilizing and further advancing our
exceptional computational and experimental tools and employing the full
range of life-extension program (LEP) options.
My optimism is tempered by recent funding trends in--what to date--
has been a very successful Stockpile Stewardship Program. Continuing
success in the program's scientific and technically challenging
activities will require additional new investments in major facilities
and particular attention to sustaining the skills of our workforce.
Budget constraints to date have resulted in deferral of LEPs and slower
warhead surveillance rates than is technically desired. These
constraints have also delayed production schedules; postponed important
deliverables in science, technology, and engineering; delayed
resolution of identified stockpile issues; and hindered efforts to
develop modern and efficient manufacturing processes. In addition,
there are fewer highly skilled stockpile stewards supporting the
program than were present as recently as 5 years ago. Our Laboratory
now has 2,608 scientists and engineers--609 fewer than in May 2005.
Concurrently, stewardship is becoming technically more challenging as
weapons continue to age beyond their intended lifetimes. In my 2009
Annual Stockpile Assessment letter to the Secretaries of Defense and
Energy and the Chairman of the Nuclear Weapons Council, I expressed
concerns about the impact that these trends will have on sustaining
confidence in the stockpile.
The fiscal year 2011 budget request seeks to reverse recent funding
trends and reflects the need for increased investment to maintain
sufficient capability to ensure the viability of the U.S. stockpile.
The Nation's nuclear strategy--with or without the planned stockpile
reductions--requires a Stockpile Stewardship Program that is balanced,
integrated, and sustained over time. NNSA has provided to Congress its
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, which is funded in the
fiscal year 2011 budget request with a 9.8 percent increase ($624
million) compared to fiscal year 2010. This is a good start, but only a
start. The increased level of investment must not only be sustained but
grow over time to provide for construction of new facilities and
support increased LEP activities.
My testimony emphasizes several key points about a balanced,
integrated, and sustained Stockpile Stewardship Program:
Accomplishments. Stockpile stewards have achieved many
outstanding successes since the program began. These
accomplishments give me confidence that the ``science based''
approach being pursued is a workable path forward for
sustaining the safety, security, and effectiveness of the
Nation's nuclear deterrent.
A Sustainable Program. Stockpile stewardship is
scientifically and technically very demanding. It is a very
active, integrated program and to sustain it, its
interdependent facets must be adequately funded to progress in
a balanced manner.
The Budget. With the President's fiscal year 2011
budget, we can begin to reinvigorate the Stockpile Stewardship
Program. The requested additional funds will enable greater
progress on many fronts--from stockpile life-extension
activities, to recapitalizing the infrastructure, improving
assessment capabilities, and building the knowledge base
required to answer increasingly difficult questions about
weapon performance over its full life cycle.
Life-Extension Programs. Options for LEPs will be
based on previously tested nuclear designs. We will consider,
on a case-by-case basis, the full range of LEP options
(refurbishment, reuse, and replacement) to provide findings and
technical recommendations for engineering development
decisions.
The Workforce. The Stockpile Stewardship Program's
most valuable and irreplaceable assets are the unique
individuals who sustain it. Confidence in the stockpile
ultimately depends on confidence in the stockpile stewards at
the NNSA laboratories and production facilities. We must
attract top talent to the program and sustain over time
specialized technical skills and expertise, which provide the
basis for judgments about the stockpile and stewardship actions
taken, through mentoring and hands-on experience.
science-based stockpile stewardship accomplishments
The science-based Stockpile Stewardship Program was launched on the
premise that by developing a much more thorough understanding of the
underlying science and technology that governs nuclear weapons
performance, the country could maintain confidence in the stockpile
without requiring nuclear testing. The knowledge gained must be
sufficiently detailed to assess with confidence the safety, security,
and effectiveness of the stockpile. We must have the ability to deal
with whatever issues arise using existing nuclear test data together
with advanced computational and experimental tools. Very ambitious
goals were set to expeditiously develop increasingly sophisticated
tools and apply them to arising issues in an aging stockpile.
We have made significant progress since the Stockpile Stewardship
Program began. Use of the many tools and capabilities developed since
the end of nuclear testing has greatly increased our understanding and
knowledge of the stockpile. These tools and capabilities, together with
the existing nuclear test database, have enabled the NNSA laboratories
to annually assess and, as required, extend the life of the warheads in
the U.S. stockpile. Some highlights--featuring work at LLNL--include:
High-Performance Computing
At its onset, the Stockpile Stewardship Program set the extremely
challenging goal--many thought unachievable--of improving scientific
computing performance by a factor of a million over a decade. That goal
was achieved with the delivery of the 100-trillion-operations-per-
second ASC Purple supercomputer to LLNL in 2005. The machine has served
as a workhorse for all three NNSA laboratories, performing very
demanding 3D weapons simulations. This highly successful partnership
between NNSA and the high-performance computing industry continues with
the 20,000-trillion-operations-per-second Sequoia machine, which is on
track to become operational at LLNL in 2012.
High-Fidelity Weapons Physics Simulations
Laboratory physicists and computer scientists stepped up to the
challenge of developing weapons simulation codes that model the physics
with far greater fidelity and run efficiently on computers with
thousands of processors working in parallel. In 2002, LLNL scientists
performed the first-ever complete 3D simulation of a nuclear weapon
explosion--with a level of spatial resolution and degree of physics
realism previously unobtainable. Supercomputers have also been used to
gain valuable insights into the properties of materials at extreme
conditions and details about the formation and growth of hydrodynamic
instabilities. These improved capabilities have made possible
expeditious development of LEP design options and their certification.
Vastly Improved Experimental Capabilities
Thoroughly diagnosed non-nuclear tests are used to gather input
data for weapons physics simulation models and validate their
performance. Experiments at LLNL's Contained Firing Facility and the
Dual-Axis Radiographic Hydrodyanamic Test (DARHT) Facility at Los
Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) have provided key hydrodynamic
performance information for applications ranging from LEPs to weapon
safety studies. Data from the Joint Actinide Shock Physics Experimental
Research (JASPER) gas-gun experiments were instrumental in the very
successful plutonium aging study, and tests conducted at LLNL's High
Explosives Applications Facility (HEAF) enable improved modeling of
aging high explosives. With commissioning of the National Ignition
Facility (NIF) in 2009, stockpile stewards now have an experimental
facility capable of creating the temperatures and pressures necessary
to study the physics of the nuclear phase of weapons performance.
Improved Understanding of Materials Aging and Weapons Performance
A long-term study by LLNL and LANL concluded that the performance
of plutonium pits in stockpiled weapons will not sharply decline due to
aging effects--a result with important implications in planning the
future of the production complex. Through simulations and experiments,
we have a much deeper understanding of the behavior and aging
properties of weapons materials ranging from plutonium and high
explosives to crystalline metals and polymers. Recently an LLNL
scientist received an E.O. Lawrence Award for breakthrough work to
resolve a previously unexplained 40-year-old anomaly that was one of
the factors that drove the need for continued nuclear testing. Now, in
simulation codes, a physics-based model can replace the use of an ad
hoc calibration factor that had to be adjusted depending on weapon
design specifics and nuclear test data. The effort involved combining
high-fidelity non-nuclear experiments, the latest simulation tools, and
re-examination of archival nuclear test data. Experiments at NIF are
serving to confirm the model.
Successful Life-Extension Program
In 2004, NNSA successfully completed its first program to extend
the lifetime of a stockpiled weapon without resorting to nuclear
testing. Refurbishment of the W87 ICBM warhead--the design in the
stockpile with the most modern safety features--extends the weapon's
life by 30 years. LLNL (with Sandia National Laboratories) developed
and certified the engineering design and worked closely with the
production facilities to ensure the product quality. The program has
served as a model of the processes to be followed by subsequent and
future LEPs. Today, the NNSA, its laboratories, and production
facilities have continued this success with a major program to extend
the life of the very important W76 Trident II SLBM warhead.
The successes to date have also given us insight into the better
tools that are needed and science and technology areas that require
continued work. These improvements will put our annual assessment of
the stockpile on the firmest footing and provide us the insight and
tools to make wise decisions and ensure the safety, security, and
effectiveness of the stockpile as we move forward. For instance, from
simulations performed to date, we have learned that we will need at
least exascale--1,000,0000 trillion operations per second--to fully
resolve the phenomena we have discovered.
a balanced, integrated, and sustained stockpile stewardship program
Stockpile Stewardship Program accomplishments to date give us
confidence that the ``science based'' approach being pursued is a
workable path forward to sustaining the safety, security, and
effectiveness of the Nation's nuclear deterrent. Stockpile stewardship
is scientifically and technically very demanding, yet the high-caliber
experts at the national laboratories have proven themselves worthy of
this major challenge time and time again.
Since 2005, the buying power of NNSA's Defense Programs has
declined approximately $1 billion. Yet, the program will grow even more
demanding as nuclear weapons continue to age far beyond their intended
lifetime. As the stockpile continues to be downsized, even more
pressure will arise to understand the state of each individual weapon.
More difficult manufacturing issues are arising in LEPs and we have
largely exhausted available options to improve performance margins
through changes external to the warhead package.
There is growing widespread recognition that the Stockpile
Stewardship Program--its workforce and facilities--must be
reinvigorated to sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal
over the long run. Reports commissioned by Congress (e.g., America's
Strategic Posture and the Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan
prepared by NNSA) and reviews pursued by the Executive Branch (e.g.,
the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR)) have concluded that
significantly increased investments are needed to support (in the words
of the NPR) ``a modern physical infrastructure--comprised of the
national security laboratories and a complex of supporting facilities--
and a highly capable workforce with the specialized skills needed to
sustain the nuclear deterrent.''
A balanced and sustainable Stockpile Stewardship Program integrates
stockpile support activities--which include weapons surveillance,
assessments, and as necessary, LEPs--with investments to modernize
facilities and efforts to greatly improve scientific understanding of
the details of nuclear weapons components and their performance. The
many facets of the program are tightly interconnected. Even with stable
overall funding at an adequate level of support, long-term success
requires judicious balancing of evolving priorities and appropriate
levels of effort.
Weapons Surveillance--to predict and detect the effects of aging
and other stockpile issues. We need to step up the rate of stockpile
surveillance and continue to become more proficient at detecting and
predicting potential problems early. The use of embedded sensors, which
we are developing, would enable persistent surveillance and improve our
knowledge of the specific state of each stockpiled weapon. Data would
be indicative, for example, of aging and degradation, mechanical
integrity, and exposure to harsh environments. In addition, we are
developing ever more sophisticated tools to study how aging alters the
physical characteristics of weapon materials and how these changes
affect weapon effectiveness and safety.
Assessments--to analyze and evaluate effects of changes on weapon
safety and performance. The Stockpile Stewardship Program includes a
comprehensive set of activities to annually assess each weapons system
and to address issues that arise. It is particularly important, in my
view, for processes to actively engage both centers of nuclear design
expertise--LLNL and LANL--to provide independent assessments. This is
much like having a serious illness: advice from more than one
independent source is crucial to the decisionmaking process. As we move
further and further from a workforce that has actually tested a nuclear
device, the independence of the two design centers is increasingly
important. Our assessments are also benefiting from the development of
Quantification of Margins and Uncertainties, a methodology that is
increasing the rigor of weapon certification and the quality of annual
assessments. To the extent possible, our assessments require rigorous
scientific and engineering demonstration and evaluation. As described
below, we have been acquiring increasingly powerful tools to do so.
LEPs--to sustain the stockpile through refurbishment, reuse, and/or
replacement. The laboratories must work closely with production
facilities to integrate the production of parts with the development of
new materials and manufacturing processes. Manufacturing is a
particularly demanding challenge because the plants have to overcome
extensive infrastructure and operational challenges and production
technologies need modernization. Options for LEPs must be thoroughly
analyzed to present decisionmakers with low risk, cost efficient
alternatives to consider.
Science and Technology Foundations--to provide stockpile support
through a thorough understanding of nuclear weapon performance and
sustain the necessary base of specialized skills. In ``keystone
question'' areas such as boost physics and energy balance, Predictive
Capability Framework campaigns utilize our advanced stockpile
stewardship tools to fill gaps in knowledge about nuclear weapon
performance relevant to existing or expected issues about stockpiled
weapons. These activities integrate the use of state-of-the-art high-
performance computers, high-fidelity simulation models, and data
gathered from exceptional experimental facilities. This cutting-edge
research both provides data for stockpile stewardship and enables the
retention of nuclear weapons expertise in a staff that increasingly
will have no nuclear test experience. We must nurture and exercise the
scientific judgment of stockpile stewards.
Modernized Facilities and Infrastructure--to replace major
facilities for processing plutonium and uranium and upgrade the
physical infrastructure of the weapons complex.
NNSA's plans are to pursue the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Replacement-Nuclear Facility (CMRR-NF) project at LANL and build a new
Uranium Processing Facility (UPF) at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge,
Tennessee. Currently, these more-than-50-year-old facilities for
processing plutonium and uranium are oversized, increasingly obsolete,
and costly to maintain. They are also safety, security, and
environmental concerns. These two are high priority and the most costly
of numerous infrastructure modernization projects throughout the
complex. Because of these projects, substantial increases above the
fiscal year 2011 budget will be required to sustain a balanced,
integrated overall program. As the cost baselines are better defined,
the changes that occur must be accommodated without upsetting overall
program balance--the balance among science, technology, and
engineering; life extensions of the stockpile; and recapitalization of
the infrastructure.
implications of the president's fiscal year 2011 budget proposal
NNSA has provided to Congress its 10-year Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Plan, developed as a complement to the NPR and New START.
The plan is funded in the fiscal year 2011 budget request with a 9.8
percent increase ($624 million) compared to fiscal year 2010. This is a
good start and will address a number of immediate needs for fiscal year
2011. It is noteworthy that the plan calls for significant increases in
the out-years, as increasing levels of funding will be required for the
LEPs and construction of major facilities. The fiscal year 2011 budget
request will serve to meet most needs in the three overarching areas:
Science, Technology, and Engineering--for technical assessments and
certification of the stockpile. Assessments of the condition of weapons
and certification of the engineering design of implemented LEPs depend
on the critical judgments of stockpile stewards and their nuclear
weapons expertise. Both are developed by hands-on experience working
challenging nuclear weapons science, technology, and engineering
issues. In addition to supporting stockpile needs and building
expertise, this work also advances our fundamental understanding of
nuclear weapons performance so that future stockpile stewards will be
able to tackle even more difficult issues as they arise. The increased
funding from fiscal year 2010 levels will provide a critically needed
boost to activities:
Stockpile Assessments. The funding increase in fiscal
year 2011 will support implementation at the NNSA laboratories
of a new dual validation process that was established in the
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010. The
Independent Nuclear Weapon Assessment Process (INWAP) will
strengthen annual assessments. Two sets of challenge teams (one
from LLNL and SNL and the other from LANL and SNL) are being
formed. Both the challenge team and the ``home team'' will have
access to all relevant data and analysis about a weapon
system--to be applied to annual assessments and peer reviews of
significant finding closures and LEP certifications.
Keystone Science Issues. Science campaigns in the
Stockpile Stewardship Program aim at filling major gaps in our
knowledge about nuclear weapon performance--for example, in the
areas of energy balance and boost physics. The goal is to
remove ``adjustable parameters'' in our simulations and replace
them with first-principles physics models. Such improvements
are critically important to providing high confidence in the
difficult decisions that might arise in sustaining an aging
stockpile.
This extremely challenging research calls for a
concerted effort that combines continuing advances in high-
performance computing with well-diagnosed experiments at the
laboratories' unique experimental facilities. We have a golden
opportunity to dramatically advance our knowledge base.
Progress, in particular, depends on effective use of NIF
(allowing stockpile stewards to experimentally explore the
physics of nuclear phases of nuclear weapons performance),
DARHT, JASPER, and our other smaller scale experimental
facilities. Importantly, efforts to support these keystone
science issues are increased in the fiscal year 2011 budget
request.
Research and Development on Technology Advances for
Stockpile Support. An important responsibility of the NNSA
laboratories is to explore what is technically possible in
nuclear design. Exploratory studies hone the skills of
stockpile stewards and help us to avoid technical surprise from
other nations' nuclear weapons activities. In addition, we
develop advanced technologies that could be applied to the U.S.
stockpile, consistent with the goal of no new weapons or
improvements in military capabilities. These include means for
substantially improving weapon safety and security that could
be implemented as part of an LEP. The proposed budget increases
will help accelerate progress in this area to ensure
availability of these technologies as LEPs are proposed and
carried out over the coming decade.
Advances in High-Performance Computing. We have made
remarkable advances in high-performance computing and
simulations, yet it is imperative that we continue to make
rapid progress. Early success in the Stockpile Stewardship
Program brought us ``terascale'' computing (trillions of
operations per second); we now reached ``petascale'' (thousands
of trillions); and we need ``exascale'' (millions of trillions)
for two reasons. Petascale makes 3D high-fidelity simulations
of weapons performance practical. However, better models of
boost physics and thermonuclear burn processes still need to be
developed (in concert with experiments). That will require much
greater computing horsepower. Second, as mentioned above, the
underpinning of our assessment and certification is uncertainty
quantification. Rigorous implementation of the methodology for
each weapon system requires the running of many thousands of
high fidelity 3D simulations to map out the impact of
uncertainties on weapon performance; hence, the need for much
greater computing power.
The proposed fiscal year 2011 budget adequately supports
computer center operations at LLNL and acquisition of the 20-
petaflop Sequoia machine, which will become operational in
2012. More than a factor of ten faster than the current best,
it is the next major advance in high-performance computing. Now
is the time to start planning and preparing for the next step
toward exascale, which is a grand challenge requiring
additional resources.
An Active LEP Effort together with Aggressive Surveillance. As
mentioned below, a number of stockpile systems require LEPs in the next
one-to-two decades. Over the past two decades, two LEPs have been
completed. Over the next 10 years, plans call for the the completion of
one in progress, start of two full-scope LEPs, and preparation
activities for additional LEPs the following decade. In addition to LEP
support, funding needs to be increased from fiscal year 2010 levels to
address current surveillance shortfalls and mature safety and security
technologies for production readiness for future LEPs. We look forward
to participating in a study to identify and evaluate LEP options for
the W78 Minuteman III ICBM warhead, which is planned to begin in fiscal
year 2011. NNSA has announced its intention to assign the W78 LEP to
LLNL. The fiscal year 2011 budget request provides adequate support for
our B61 LEP peer review responsibilities as well as our
responsibilities to support existing LLNL-designed stockpile systems.
Recapitalization of Plant and Laboratory Infrastructure.
Recapitalization is necessary to build a responsive infrastructure able
to meet program and production needs. This includes fulfilling science,
technology, and engineering program objectives and production
requirements. Such an infrastructure is essential to the complex's
ability to respond in a timely manner to technical issues and/or
emerging threats. In addition to planning for and construction of new
facilities (including the very major investments in CMRR-NF and UPF),
adequate investments are needed for Readiness in Technical Base and
Facilities (RTBF) for operations in and maintenance of existing
facilities. My direct concern at LLNL is obtaining sufficient funding
in fiscal year 2011 to support operations at HEAF, which is a one-of-a-
kind facility for research and development in high explosives and
energetic materials, and to support Site 300, the Laboratory's remote
experimental site which is home to the Contained Firing Facility.
life-extension programs
Warhead LEPs are undertaken to address issues discovered through
surveillance and review processes supporting annual assessments. The
role of the LEP is to fix issues that impact overall system
effectiveness and extend stockpile life.
Effectiveness is influenced by many factors. Nuclear weapons are
not static devices; their chemical and physical properties or
characteristics change over time. While plutonium pits have been
determined to have a very long service life, aging affects the
performance of a number of important components including metals other
than plutonium, polymers, neutron generators, and gas transfer systems.
In addition, there are many other potential causes of decreased
confidence in effectiveness--ranging from design flaws to material
compatibility issues. Experience has shown that at least one major new
and unanticipated issue is discovered approximately every 5 years.
Thus far, we have been able to retain confidence in warhead safety
and effectiveness by offsetting identified increased uncertainties with
corresponding increases in performance margins. They have been obtained
by changes external to the nuclear explosives package or by relaxing or
eliminating military requirements (in coordination with the Department
of Defense (DOD)). Options to further improve these margins have
largely been exhausted.
Several LEPs activities are in progress and/or recommended by the
NPR, and they are supportable with the proposed fiscal year 2011
budget. The W76 Trident II SLBM warhead LEP is well underway. The
initial design activities began in fiscal year 2000 and the final
refurbished weapon is expected to be delivered in fiscal year 2017. In
fiscal year 2011, concept development is scheduled for completion in
preparation for a full-scope LEP for the family of B61 nuclear bombs.
The first production unit is planned for fiscal year 2017. In addition,
a study to identify and evaluate LEP options for the W78 Minuteman III
ICBM warhead will begin in fiscal year 2011. The NPR proposes that this
study consider the possibility of having the resulting warhead be
adaptable to multiple platforms in order to provide a cost effective
hedge against future problems in the deployed stockpile. The first
production unit is projected in fiscal year 2021.
These plans for future LEPs are based on consideration of weapon
system age and early indicators of impending issues that will need to
be addressed. LEP activities formally start with a Phase 6.1 (or Phase
6.2) study conducted jointly with the DOD, which follows processes and
procedures that were established for developing weapons during the Cold
War and have been adapted for LEPs. These joint concept development
efforts consider military requirements and explore LEP options to meet
the requirements. They involve extensive supercomputer simulation
efforts and supportive experimental activities, thorough interactions
with the NNSA production facilities and DOD contractors, and extensive
peer review.
Within the Laboratory, we consider the full range of technical
options to address military requirements that need to be balanced--for
example, form fitting and functioning with an existing delivery system
while providing enhanced safety (e.g., insensitive high explosive). In
doing so, we consider tradeoffs that emphasize one requirement over
another. The output of these evaluations is a set of recommended
options for the U.S. Government to consider in deciding on the specific
LEP option to proceed to engineering development (Phase 6.3). After a
decision to proceed to full-scale development is made, we follow a very
disciplined engineering process that involves the design agencies,
production agencies, and the responsible military service.
LEPs provide the opportunity to consider adding new safety and
security features without degrading overall effectiveness or
introducing new military capabilities. Some of these safety and
security improvements are ready for deployment now and would make a
significant improvement; other even more effective approaches require
further research. Considered features would be based on previous
nuclear tests. Intrinsic surety, which incorporates the safety and
security features inside the nuclear explosives package, provides the
highest level of safety and protection against terrorist threats.
Examples range from enhanced fire safety to technologies that make
acquisition of special nuclear materials from U.S. nuclear weapons of
little-to-no-value to a terrorist.
The decision to add surety features is up to the U.S. Government,
and the technical feasibility of specific safety and security features
depends on the weapon and approach taken to extend its life. The
current LEP approach (refurbishment only) limits the range of safety
and security features that can be incorporated into certain weapons
systems.
The options studied for LEPs will be based on previously tested
nuclear designs. To best manage risk, we will consider, on a case-by-
case basis, the full range of LEP approaches characterized by the three
discrete options along the spectrum of possibilities:
Warhead Refurbishment--Nuclear explosive package (NEP)
composed of existing or newly manufactured components
originally designed for that warhead.
Warhead Component Reuse--NEP composed of components
previously manufactured for the stockpile (includes new
production of previously manufactured components).
Warhead Replacement--NEP component not previously
produced for the stockpile (based on tested designs).
All potential approaches--or, more likely, combinations of
approaches--need to be examined because the areas of most significant
risks vary, and often times, have to do with costs, manufacturing
issues, the importance of improvements in margins, safety and security,
and long-term maintenance and surveillance. These factors differ from
system to system, and the various LEP approaches differ in the degree
to which they provide flexibility to manage identified risks. They also
differ in the degree to which they exercise the skills and capabilities
of our people, which is an important consideration in sustaining an
experienced workforce. Assessment and certification challenges depend
primarily on design details and associated margins and uncertainties
rather than the type of LEP approach considered.
Consideration of the full range of LEP options provides the
necessary technical flexibility to manage the stockpile with an
acceptable level of risk. Our findings and recommendations in studies
of options will be based solely on our best technical assessments of
cost, risk, and ability to meet stockpile management goals. In
decisions to proceed to engineering development, the U.S. government
can consider a number of factors for particular LEP approaches.
the importance of people
Long-term success in stockpile stewardship fundamentally depends on
the quality of people in the program. If the Nation is not confident in
the expertise and technical judgments of the stewards, the Nation will
not have confidence in the safety, security, and effectiveness of our
nuclear deterrent. Over the years, exceptional scientists and engineers
have been attracted to LLNL by the opportunity to have access to the
world-class facilities, to pursue technically challenging careers, and
to work on projects of national importance. A Stockpile Stewardship
Program that is stable, technically challenging, and of recognized
importance to the Nation is critical to the future success of the
program--and to the Laboratory in carrying out its national security
responsibilities.
The specialized technical skills and expertise required for
stockpile stewardship, which come through mentoring and hands-on
experience, take a long time to develop. Program stability is
critically important, and it requires a balanced, integrated Stockpile
Stewardship Program that has sustained bi-partisan support and is
sufficiently funded over the long term. We welcome a strong affirmation
by the administration and Congress of the importance of the NNSA
laboratories' work in maintaining the U.S. nuclear deterrent through
stockpile stewardship.
An important benefit of a strong Stockpile Stewardship Program is
that this foundational program helps the NNSA laboratories in meeting
broader national security objectives. Clearly, nuclear weapons
expertise is directly applicable to the nuclear security challenges of
proliferation and terrorism. Other areas of national defense, domestic
and international security, and energy and environment security also
benefit from LLNL's broad scientific and technical base and
international leadership in areas such as high-performance computing.
These activities further strengthen our science and technology
workforce, add vitality to the Laboratory, spin new ideas and
additional capabilities into the weapons program, and serve as a
pipeline to bring top talent to LLNL so that we continue to provide the
Nation outstanding stockpile stewards. A broader base of national
security programs at the NNSA laboratories is not a substitute for a
strong Stockpile Stewardship Program; neither is it a distraction from
our defining mission and responsibilities to sustain the Nation's
nuclear deterrent.
closing remarks
My testimony describing the successes and future challenges in
stockpile stewardship supports and amplifies a joint statement my
fellow NNSA laboratory directors and I issued when the Nuclear Posture
Review was released. We made two key points:
First, that a Stockpile Stewardship Program which `` . . . includes
the consideration of the full range of life extension options
(refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from
different warheads, and replacement of nuclear components based on
previously tested designs), provides the necessary technical
flexibility to manage the nuclear stockpile into the future with an
acceptable level of risk.''
Second, that ``We are reassured that a key component of the NPR is
the recognition of the importance of supporting `a modern physical
infrastructure--comprised of the national security laboratories and a
complex of supporting facilities--and a highly capable workforce with
the specialized skills needed to sustain the nuclear deterrent.''
Finally, I would like to again thank the committee for your
interest in and continued support for stockpile stewardship and your
commitment to the program's success.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Dr. Miller.
Dr. Hommert.
STATEMENT OF HON. PAUL J. HOMMERT, Ph.D., DIRECTOR, SANDIA
NATIONAL LABORATORIES
Dr. Hommert. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and
distinguished members of the committee: Thank you for the
opportunity to testify. I am Paul Hommert, Director of SNL, a
multi-program national security lab. I'm honored to be here
with my colleagues from LANL, LLNL, and Dr. Schwitters to
testify on sustaining nuclear weapons under the New START.
Within the policy outlined in the NPR, the collective DOD
and NNSA guidance documents, the fiscal year 2011 budget
request, and the force structure terms of the New START, I am
confident that SNL can provide the required support for the
Nation's nuclear deterrent. This confidence comes from our
assessment of stockpile management requirements against our
mission, product space, and capabilities.
Within the nuclear weapons complex, SNL is responsible for
the design and qualification of non-nuclear components that
ensure the weapons perform as intended, when authorized, and
remain safe and secure otherwise. We are responsible for
hundreds of highly specialized components with extremely high
reliability requirements and unique, often very harsh
environmental requirements.
Today we are facing new challenges. The weapons in the
stockpile are aging and were designed when long life was not a
high priority. The radar for the first B61 bomb, for example,
was designed for a 5-year lifetime. There are B61s in the
stockpile today with components that date back to the 1960s. It
is a credit to the stewardship program that we have the
technical knowledge to support continued confidence in these
weapons systems as they age.
What are the keys to managing the stockpile into the
future? First, a strong and modernized surveillance program
tailored to the needs of an aging, smaller stockpile, to
underpin our annual assessment findings and recommendations.
While this is essential for the future, it is not sufficient.
Through surveillance activities to date, we have already
established a number of stockpile concerns that must be
addressed.
Thus, the second element is the LEPs, foremost for us being
the B61. This is an immediate challenge for SNL, with a
demanding schedule and a technical scope more than twice that
of the W76 LEP. I support the full scope approach called for by
the NPR and would be very concerned if we only replaced the
non-nuclear components with the most immediate aging issues and
chose to reuse other non-nuclear components, some of which are
even now over 40 years old.
In addition to the surveillance programs and the life
extension efforts, we must give strong attention to sustaining
capabilities for the future. The highest priority is the
viability of our design competencies. In recent years,
uncertainty surrounding requirements for the stockpile resulted
in the programmatic instability noted by the JASON panel as a
threat to the stewardship program. Today, nearly half of the
SNL staff with experience in major weapons system efforts are
over the age of 55. Their remaining careers will not span the
upcoming LEPs. This puts a premium going forward on stable,
multi-year program direction and resources to provide
opportunities for new technical staff to work with experienced
designers.
Also key to sustainment is keeping pace with modern-day
technologies. As an example, consider microelectronics, where
since we began our most recent full system development effort,
the W88, in 1983, there has been a quantum leap in
miniaturization and microelectronics functionality that offer
real potential for enhancements to stockpile safety and
security which we will realize in the B61 LEP.
Infrastructure sustainment is also critical. We have world-
class facilities where we perform a range of scientific
research and product qualification. But we also have outdated
facilities that were commissioned in the 1950s and 1960s. We
are working with NNSA to complete revitalization of our
environmental test capabilities required to support the design
of the B61 and subsequent LEPs, and to recapitalize the tooling
in our trusted microelectronics facility.
At SNL our broad national security work is critical to
sustainment. We are well poised to support the New START regime
and to continue our contributions to the national security,
nuclear security, nonproliferation, and counterterrorism
objectives of the Nation. This work exercises and strengthens
many of our nuclear weapons capabilities.
New START would not constrain the upcoming life extension
imperatives. However, it does reinforce the importance of a
modern stockpile, a responsive infrastructure, as we move
towards a smaller nuclear arsenal.
Let me close by summarizing the keys to success going
forward: a robust surveillance program, stable LEPs, an
unyielding attention to sustaining the key aspects of our
capabilities for the future--people, technologies,
infrastructure, and our broader national security programs.
Thank you and I welcome your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Hommert follows:]
Prepared Statement bt Dr. Paul J. Hommert
introduction
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and distinguished members of
the Senate Armed Services Committee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify. I am Paul Hommert, President and Director of Sandia National
Laboratories. Sandia is a multiprogram national security laboratory
owned by the United States Government and operated by Sandia
Corporation \1\ for the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA).
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\1\ Sandia Corporation is a subsidiary of the Lockheed Martin
Corporation under Department of Energy prime contract no. DE-AC04-
94AL85000.
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Sandia is one of the three NNSA laboratories with responsibility
for stockpile stewardship and annual assessment of the Nation's nuclear
weapons. Within the U.S. nuclear weapons complex, Sandia is responsible
for the design, development, and qualification of nonnuclear components
of nuclear weapons. It is also responsible for the systems engineering
and integration of the nuclear weapons in the stockpile. While nuclear
weapons remain Sandia's core mission, the science, technology, and
engineering capabilities required to support this mission position us
to support other aspects of national security as well. As a
multiprogram national security laboratory, Sandia also conducts
research and development in nuclear nonproliferation, nuclear
counterterrorism, energy security, defense, and homeland security.
The policy framework outlined in the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) Report, the high-level implementation plan established by the
fiscal year 2011 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan and the
Report in Response to NDAA fiscal year 2010 section 1251, New START
treaty and Nuclear Force Restructure Plans (to be referred to as
section 1251 report), and the funding profile described in the
Department of Energy fiscal year 2011 Congressional Budget Request
weave the fabric of a compelling strategic future for U.S. nuclear
weapons policy. In this context and in view of the New START treaty, my
statement today will address five closely related issues: (1) the U.S.
nuclear stockpile today and in the future; (2) stockpile surveillance;
(3) the life extension programs; (4) a retrospective of stockpile
stewardship; and (5) verification technologies.
the u.s. nuclear stockpile today and in the future
As noted in the NPR Report, ``The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear
weapons, which will continue as long as nuclear weapons exist, is to
deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and our
partners'' (p. vii). Since the end of the Cold War, the stockpile has
become smaller in total numbers and comprises fewer weapon types, and
its size will continue to decrease. It is natural that nuclear weapons
policy in the post-Cold War era should be reevaluated in light of 21st
century threats. The administration's joint objectives of maintaining a
safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal and, at the same time,
strengthening the global nonproliferation regime and preventing nuclear
terrorism provide a challenging, significant role for Sandia and,
indeed, for all those involved in the nuclear weapons program.
Within the context of the nuclear weapons policy outlined in the
NPR Report and the collective guidance for implementation provided in
the fiscal year 2011 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, the
Section 1251 Report, and the Department of Energy Fiscal Year 2011
Congressional Budget Request, and under the New START treaty terms, I
am confident that Sandia can fulfill its responsibilities in support of
the Nation's nuclear deterrent. That confidence comes from our
assessment of the stockpile management requirements against our mission
and product space and our capabilities. In their totality, the
documents describing the future of the U.S. nuclear deterrent represent
a well-founded, achievable path forward, which I understand and
support. However, as we stand on the threshold of the next era of
stockpile stewardship and management, we must recognize the challenges
inherent in this framework. A significant body of work is required to
sustain the deterrent into the next two decades, and we must ensure
that the resources are commensurate with the requirements and
expectations. Specifically, I can be confident that the totality of the
stockpile management and deterrent policy can be supported only if the
fiscal year 2011 budget is authorized and appropriated at the level of
the administration's request and the national significance of our
mission is sustained.
Mission and Product Space
Sandia is responsible for the systems engineering and integration
of the nuclear weapons in the U.S. stockpile. As systems integrator, we
are responsible for numerous unique and challenging assignments,
including the engineered interfaces from the warheads to the delivery
platforms and surveillance management at the weapon system level for
the nuclear weapons complex--both flight testing and system-level
ground testing.
Sandia is the nonnuclear component design agency for NNSA. The
components that we design ensure that the weapons will perform as
intended when authorized through the U.S. command and control
structure, and that they remain safe and secure otherwise. These
critical functions are provided through our core products of arming,
fuzing, and firing systems (AF&Fs), neutron generators, gas transfer
systems, and surety systems. We are responsible for literally hundreds
of major components in the stockpile. Our products are highly
specialized electrical, microelectronic, electro-mechanical, chemical,
and explosive components with extremely high reliability specifications
and unique, very harsh environmental requirements. For example, an
``intent stronglink'' is a component that prevents a nuclear weapon
from being armed until a unique string of code is entered indicating
human intent. Even in the most recent designs, there are more than 200
parts in a component the size of a cell phone. We are also responsible
for ``weaklink'' components, which are designed to fail in a manner
that precludes inadvertent nuclear detonation in accident scenarios
such as those involving fire or lightning. These safety components must
meet stringent requirements.
Sandia designs, engineers, and integrates these specialized
products into the Nation's nuclear arsenal through the efforts of a
world-class workforce and highly specialized tools, facilities, and
equipment. However, to fulfill our responsibilities for the deterrent
into the future, we are facing new challenges.
Consider first that most of the weapons in the current stockpile
were designed at a time when long design life was not typically a high-
priority design requirement. The radar for the first B61 bomb, for
example, was originally designed for a 5-year lifetime; today there are
B61s in the stockpile with components manufactured in the late 1960s.
It is a credit to our Stockpile Stewardship Program that we have the
technical knowledge base to support continued confidence in these
weapon systems as they age. Indeed, it is also a credit to those who
designed the current stockpile that it has lasted well beyond original
design lifetimes. Now we are working to provide solutions that will
extend the lifetime of our nuclear arsenal for another 30 years.
The state of the stockpile is reported to the President through the
annual assessment process. Through this process, we have been, and
remain, able to assess the Nation's stockpile as safe, secure, and
reliable. That said, as we move forward with the challenging business
of extending the lifetimes of U.S. nuclear weapon systems, we must
address stockpile aging and degradation, as well as technology
obsolescence. In addition, long weapon lifetimes will become a specific
design objective.
While the options to refurbish, reuse, and replace are applicable
to the nuclear explosive package, almost all of Sandia's life extension
work will involve replacements with modern technologies. Nonnuclear
components, by their very nature, are subject to a whole range of
potential aging and failure modes. Although we may be able to reuse
some of the original components, doing so uniformly would be a
fundamentally unwise option when their service life must be extended by
another 30 years. In addition, only modern technology will enable
introduction into the stockpile of the safety and security required by
the NPR Report.
stockpile surveillance
Stockpile surveillance and assessment play a crucial role in
assuring the nuclear deterrent. Through these activities, we develop
knowledge about the safety, security, and reliability of the stockpile.
This knowledge provides the technical basis for our annual assessment
findings and recommendations regarding the state of the stockpile. It
also informs decisions made about the stockpile: from deployment and
targeting to safe handling operations (routine or otherwise) and from
there to development of new component and system design options. In
their 2009 annual assessment letters, all three NNSA laboratory
directors highlighted concerns about inadequate progress toward
surveillance transformation. Former Sandia Laboratories Director Tom
Hunter said, ``I believe that the level of commitment to a tailored and
balanced stockpile evaluation program for our aging, smaller stockpile
is inadequate.'' Indeed, the JASON panel reached the same conclusion in
their 2009 life extension study.
The Department of Energy fiscal year 2011 Congressional Budget
Request places high priority on stockpile surveillance, and we
understand and agree to strengthen our knowledge and confidence in the
current stockpile. The Surveillance Transformation Plan was established
to better align our surveillance program with the challenges of an
aging and smaller stockpile. The plan aims to shift the surveillance
program's focus from finding defects to acquiring deeper scientific
understanding of stockpile performance margins, distributions, and
trends by creating higher fidelity diagnostics and physical and
computational simulation capabilities. In this new framework, we will
be better able to anticipate stockpile performance degradation and to
schedule required actions. Yet, although essential, a strong
surveillance program is only one component of stockpile management into
the future. The life extension programs are another component.
the life extension programs
The B61 Life Extension Program
The NPR Report concluded that the United States will ``proceed with
full scope life extension for the B61 bomb including enhancing safety,
security, and use control'' (p. xiii). This is the most immediate
stockpile challenge for Sandia. For this life extension, we are
deliberately building multidisciplinary teams of both highly
experienced staff and new talent, sustaining the necessary knowledge in
the management team, providing an optimal teaming environment, ensuring
that facilities are ready for the work, and piloting new processes that
will benefit our life extension work.
Nevertheless, we find ourselves in a state of urgency, with a
demanding schedule and expansive product requirements. The primary
driver for the schedule of the B61 LEP is the fact that critical
nonnuclear components are exhibiting age-related performance
degradation. For example, the radar in the B61, which includes the now
infamous vacuum tubes, must be replaced. In addition, both the neutron
generator and a battery component are fast approaching obsolescence and
must be replaced. A secondary driver for the schedule is the deployment
of the F35 Joint Strike Fighter, which requires a new digital interface
for the B61. Replacing the three aging components and adding the new
digital interface represent the absolute minimum approach to this LEP.
However, it is my judgment that we need to approach this LEP with a
resolute commitment to replace old nonnuclear components and field a
nuclear weapon system that employs modern technologies to improve
safety and security and to extend service life.
The weapon systems addressed through the LEPs of the coming two
decades will be in our stockpile well into the second half of this
century. The ``full'' scope for the B61 LEP called for in the NPR
Report is a prudent approach to this life extension that addresses
aging concerns, obsolete technologies, and enhancements in safety,
security, and use control. Notably, the scale of this LEP will be much
larger than that of the W76 Trident II SLBM warhead LEP, which is now
in production. Whereas the W76 LEP involved redesign and replacement of
18 major Sandia components, the B61 LEP involves 46 such components.
To extend the lifetime of the B61, the requested fiscal year 2011
funding is critical. We must complete the design definition in fiscal
year 2011 to create a firm understanding of system requirements and
thus fully establish future-year budget needs. Total cost estimates for
the B61 LEP are subject to change until the design definition and
requirements are finalized.
We also have considerable technology maturation work to perform in
fiscal year 2011. Technology maturation is a rigorous approach we apply
to developing new technologies, from the earliest conceptual designs
through full-scale product realization and ultimately insertion into
the stockpile. We use a construct of technology readiness levels, first
implemented at the Department of Defense and then NASA, and implement a
series of technical and programmatic reviews to ensure that new
technologies reach the appropriate maturity level before they are used
in a life extension baseline design. For the B61 LEP, we have 13 major
categories of technology maturation work underway. Our cost estimates
for fiscal year 2011 in this area depend heavily on the progress we are
trying to make in fiscal year 2010. I am therefore concerned that, if
the requested fiscal year 2010 reprogramming is not implemented,
significant additional risk will be introduced into our fiscal year
2011 efforts on the B61 LEP. For example, we began fiscal year 2010 by
staffing up our B61 LEP team to position ourselves for strong
performance in fiscal year 2011. Specifically, we started fiscal year
2010 with 139 full-time equivalent employees for the B61 LEP, and that
number peaked in April at 192. Now the numbers are declining in the
absence of fiscal year 2010 reprogrammed dollars and concern over
fiscal year 2011 continuing resolution. Unless this situation changes,
we will enter fiscal year 2011 with roughly 50 percent of the staffing
level that was originally intended for this critical program.
The possibility of a prolonged continuing resolution for fiscal
year 2011 is a real concern. The funding growth required for the B61
LEP from fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2011 is so essential that a
continuing resolution funding level referenced back to fiscal year 2010
will almost surely require removing staff from the program, a slip in
the fiscal year 2017 target for first production unit, or even a down-
scoping of the program. The LEP schedule and scope are also, of course,
heavily dependent on the appropriated funding in fiscal year 2012 and
beyond. Fiscal year 2011 funding is needed to get this program off to a
good start, but enduring multiyear sustained funding is required to
bring this program to successful completion. The success of the B61 LEP
also requires a fully supported production complex with particular
importance placed on the Kansas City and Pantex Plants.
Other Life Extension Programs
The B61 bomb is our current focus, but certain reentry systems in
our stockpile also require near-term life extension activities. The NPR
Report recommended ``initiating a study of LEP options for the W78 ICBM
warhead, including the possibility of using the resulting warhead also
on SLBMs to reduce the number of warhead types'' (p. xiv). The
Department of Energy fiscal year 2011 Congressional Budget Request
includes funding for a W78 LEP. Based on the guidance in the NPR
Report, the planning for this LEP will also examine the opportunities
and risks associated with the resulting warhead referenced above.
At the request of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, we
completed a feasibility study for a common integrated arming, fuzing,
and firing (AF&F) system. Using an envelope of the requirements for the
W78 and the W88, and even the W87 and the U.K. system, our study
concluded that this approach was technically feasible, including
improvements in safety and security enabled by miniaturization of
electronics. Savings in weight and volume, at a premium in reentry
systems, can be used for those additional safety and security features.
The study results have been briefed to the Nuclear Weapons Council and
are being used to inform decisions regarding the scope, schedule, and
interplay between the W78 and W88 life extensions.
a retrospective of stockpile stewardship
My confidence in our ability to successfully execute the life
extension programs is based on the suite of tools and capabilities that
have resulted from the investments made in stockpile stewardship. For
the first 15 years of the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program,
creating the scientific tools and knowledge required in the absence of
underground nuclear testing was a compelling grand challenge for the
U.S. nuclear weapons program. While the moratorium on underground
nuclear testing had a more direct impact on Los Alamos and Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratories than on Sandia National Laboratories,
hundreds of experiments have been run on Sandia's Z accelerator,
providing critical experimental data that are tied directly to the
milestones of NNSA's Predictive Capability Framework road map. Advances
in our pulsed power capabilities are supporting the Advanced
Certification, Dynamic Materials Properties, and Primary and Secondary
Assessment Technologies programs.
At Sandia, the primary impact of the moratorium on underground
nuclear testing was the need to create tools and acquire the knowledge
necessary to sustain confidence in the radiation hardness of our
designs. We created advanced stockpile stewardship tools and
effectively applied them to our annual assessment of the stockpile and
to the qualification of the W76-1 life extension program. Those tools
gave us the understanding and knowledge to assess with confidence the
state of the stockpile. Advances in our computational tools and
improved experimental capabilities, coupled with high-fidelity
diagnostics for model validation and improved characterization of test
results, provided this new understanding.
Looking back at the Science-Based Stockpile Stewardship Program, it
is clear that we collectively understood the magnitude of the change
that needed to occur in the nuclear weapons program to address the
moratorium on underground nuclear testing. What we at Sandia perhaps
did not fully appreciate at the time was the impact that the end of the
Cold War would bring to the vitality of our system and component design
community. During the Cold War, we were pursuing simultaneously as many
as 14 full-scale weapon development programs. Since 1992, we have had a
total of only two programs of similar scale: the W76-1 and the W80-3
LEPs. The latter was cancelled in 2005. Thus, as we began to implement
stockpile stewardship in the early 1990s, our weapon systems
development workload dropped dramatically, and that meant less work for
systems engineers and component designers. At the same time,
technological advances were happening that would bear directly on the
products within Sandia's responsibility.
As stated earlier, the products Sandia designs and engineers are
highly specialized for the unique demands of nuclear weapons; however,
they are related to commercial products because of similarities in
underlying technologies. To express this idea differently, our
components have a point of reference in commercial technology. This
reality bears directly and significantly on Sandia's responsibilities
as we embark on the next era of stewardship.
The pace of technological advances in recent decades has been
staggering. Let me give just one example. In 1983, we were embarking on
the full-scale design and development for the W88 Trident II submarine-
launched ballistic missile (SLBM) warhead, which is the last newly
designed warhead to have entered the stockpile, and it took advantage
of the microelectronics available at the time. That year, the cell
phone industry, also relying on microelectronics, was proud of the
first network in the United States: 7,000 phones, each weighing about 2
pounds. In the time that has passed since, miniaturization and
functional density of microelectronics have taken a quantum leap. Today
there are about 285 million cell phones, each weighing about 3 ounces.
Such technological advances mean simply that some of the technologies
on which Sandia products are based have become radically more advanced
than they were the last time we built a large number of nonnuclear
components for weapons.
The strong tie between the products developed by Sandia and those
developed by the private sector is both a challenge and an
opportunity--a challenge, because we must have the right set of people,
skills, production equipment, and an up-to-date technology base at a
time when budgets are not predictable; yet an opportunity, because it
keeps us agile, adaptable, in tune with the needs of the Nation and
because modern technologies provide opportunities for improvements in
stockpile safety and security. This strong tie manifests itself in
several ways. To reduce cost and whenever the required functionality is
available from a trusted supplier in the commercial sector, we
incorporate commercial off-the-shelf parts into our products.
Furthermore, for the parts we must manufacture (for example,
specialized microelectronics), only modern production tooling and
equipment can be readily maintained. Perhaps most important is the fact
that we can attract the best and brightest new graduates when we can
offer them challenging innovative projects that use the latest
technologies, which they understand and on which they have been
trained.
Cyber risk is another aspect of technological advances that we must
consider. Since the 1980s Sandia has pioneered the use of vulnerability
assessments to determine systematic cyber weaknesses in command and
control and surety systems. We believe it is vital to the next
generation of life extension programs that cyber risk be assessed and
capabilities developed to mitigate the dangers.
Workforce
The demographics within Sandia's nuclear weapons program clearly
reflect both the strengths of the Stockpile Stewardship Program and the
challenges of a period with few full-scale weapon design programs. We
have attracted the very best scientists, engineers, and technologists
to the laboratories with large-scale science-based engineering programs
that bring together computational with experimental test capabilities.
However, retaining talent in our weapon and component design community
has been challenging. The uncertainty surrounding the requirements for
the future stockpile resulted in programmatic instability and lack of
full-scale engineering development programs. In their recent life
extension study, the JASON panel noted that a ``lack of program
stability'' threatened the continued strength of the stewardship
program.
While we must rise to meet near-term challenges of the Stockpile
Stewardship Program, we also must establish the basis for long-term
stability. For Sandia, stability should be viewed in the context of
three pillars: people, infrastructure, and broad national security
work. The NPR Report highlighted the importance of the first two of
these: ``In order to remain safe, secure, and effective, the U.S.
nuclear stockpile must be supported by a modern physical infrastructure
. . . and a highly capable workforce'' (p. xiv).
Today, 37 percent of the experienced technical staff in Sandia's
weapon system and component design organizations are over the age of
55. Their remaining careers will not span the upcoming life extension
programs. This reality puts a huge premium going forward on stable,
multiyear, large-scale LEPs that provide opportunities for our new
technical staff to work closely with our experienced designers on a
full range of activities--from advanced concept development to
component design and qualification, and ultimately to the production
and fielding of nuclear weapon systems. The team we are assembling for
the B61 LEP is representative of the new multidisciplinary approach we
will take to ensure that: (1) the powerful stewardship tools developed
through our Nation's investment and applied effectively to stockpile
assessment are adapted going forward to meet the needs of the design of
weapon system architectures and components; and (2) the latest
technologies and innovative designs are coupled with rigor that comes
from experience. To give only one example, recently validated thermal
models developed by the Stockpile Stewardship Program were applied to
the design of thermal batteries for the B61 LEP. These models allowed
us to identify a nearly twofold increase in battery run time that could
be achieved with a simple material substitution.
New tools and modern technologies, coupled with our management
vision for the engineering environment required for success, will
foster innovation; lead to safety and security for the upcoming LEPs;
and provide foundational technical and scientific strength to support
the stockpile over the long term.
Essential Capabilities and Infrastructure
Sandia's capabilities are essential to its full life cycle
responsibilities for the stockpile: from exploratory concept definition
to design and qualification, and ultimately through ongoing stockpile
surveillance and assessment. Let me point out a few examples.
The NNSA complex transformation plan designated Sandia as the Major
Environmental Test Center of Excellence for the entire nuclear weapons
program. The facilities and equipment we have in this area are
extensive: (1) 20 test facilities at Sandia-New Mexico; (2) the Tonopah
flight test range in Nevada; (3) the Weapon Evaluation Test Laboratory
in Amarillo, TX; and (4) the Kauai test facility. We use environmental
test capabilities to simulate the full range of mechanical, thermal,
electrical, explosive, and radiation environments that nuclear weapons
must withstand, including those associated with postulated accident
scenarios.
Significantly, capabilities originally developed in Sandia's
nuclear weapons program also support other national needs. For example,
the Thermal Test Complex, one of our major environmental test
capabilities, is a $38 million world-class suite of facilities
supporting a full spectrum of technical research: from the basic
studies of fire chemistry and model validation, to full-scale highly
instrumented simulations of weapon system safety performance in fuel
fire accident scenarios. The Thermal Test Complex was funded by Test
Capabilities Revitalization (TCR) Phase 1, came online in 2006, and
immediately provided necessary capabilities for the W76-1 LEP.
Interestingly, expertise in flow visualization, plume evaluation,
thermal sciences, and fire sciences developed at the Thermal Test
Complex was recently also used in an area unrelated to nuclear weapons:
the BP oil disaster.
Today, TCR Phase 2 funding is needed to renovate our suite of
mechanical environment test facilities, many of which were commissioned
in the 1950s and 1960s. These facilities will support the design and
qualification of the B61 life extension and subsequent LEPs.
Another unique capability that Sandia stewards for the nuclear
weapons program and also for DOE's nonproliferation payloads is the
microelectronics research and fabrication facility, where we design and
fabricate an array of unique microelectronics, as well as specialty
optical components and microelectromechanical system, or MEMS, devices.
This capability includes a national ``trusted foundry'' for radiation-
hardened microelectronics. We have been providing microelectronic
components to the nuclear stockpile at the highest level of trust since
1978 and to DOE's nonproliferation payloads since 1982. In 2009, Sandia
received Class 1A Trusted Accreditation (the highest level of
accreditation) from the Department of Defense for Trusted Design and
Foundry Services and is the only government entity with this
accreditation for both design and foundry operations. We must
recapitalize the tooling and equipment in our silicon fabrication
facility, much of which dates back about 15 years in an industry where
technology changes almost every 2 years. Recapitalization will ensure
production of the radiation-hardened components required by the
upcoming reentry-system life extension work.
Expertise in materials science is required to engineer new
materials for future stockpile applications, create the physics-based
understanding of material aging in the current stockpile, and project
potential performance impacts. Our materials science capabilities are
essential to our national security mission. Yet, past funding
constraints in Sandia's nuclear weapons program led to significant
erosion in materials science. That erosion might have been even more
serious had Sandia not successfully leveraged materials science
research in support of its broader national security role. We are
currently working with NNSA on centralizing our nonnuclear materials
science funding and thereby enabling a more integrated capability.
We also have a critical but eroding capability in radiation effects
sciences. It is my belief that the U.S. strategic arsenal should
continue to maintain its requirements for radiation hardness. By its
very nature, U.S. nuclear deterrence requires a nuclear arsenal that
cannot be held at risk or denied by any adversary. Relaxation in the
strategic hardness of our designs could be interpreted as a weakening
of our deterrent posture.
Nuclear survivability is best addressed through intrinsic design
properties and cannot be added through modifications to the stockpile
once a threat changes. During the era of underground nuclear testing,
we exposed Sandia components to nuclear environments as part of the
qualification process. Today, in order to create a fundamental
understanding of the phenomena and failure mechanisms of concern, we
simulate nuclear environments in aboveground test facilities, create
computational models of the experiments, and then validate the
computational models with experimental results.
However, experimental and modeling and simulation capabilities that
allow us to assess with confidence must be sustained. In the recent
past, funding in this area has been erratic, resulting in difficulties
managing the program and sustaining the critical skills of our staff in
the important area of nuclear effects simulation.
Broad National Security Work
Today, national security challenges are more diverse than they were
during the Cold War. The NNSA laboratories are uniquely positioned to
contribute solutions to these complex national security challenges. In
the new environment, synergistic work supporting other national
security missions is crucial. Indeed, as mentioned in the fiscal year
2011 Stockpile Stewardship Management Plan Summary, ``while NNSA
nuclear weapons activities are clearly focused on the strategic
deterrence aspects of the NNSA mission, they also inform and support
with critical capabilities other aspects of national security'' (p. 7).
I will refer to only one of many success stories at Sandia (others
come from materials science, microelectronics, and computer science),
showing how capabilities for the nuclear weapons program benefit from
synergy with other national security programs. It is the story of our
work in radars.
Competency in specialized radar applications is a required
capability for the nuclear weapons program. As a result of initial
investments in radar fuze capability for nuclear weapons, in 1983 we
began working on miniature radars based on synthetic aperture concepts
for nuclear weapons and broader national security activities. In 1985
we became involved in a program for the Department of Defense to
develop a high-resolution, real-time synthetic aperture radar (SAR)
suitable for use in unmanned aircraft. Sandia flew the first such SAR
prototype in 1990. Follow-on work sponsored by the Department of
Defense reduced the size and cost of SAR systems, improved resolution,
and significantly expanded the applications and military benefits of
radar. Partnerships with industry have transitioned each generation of
the technology into field-deployable systems. Sandia-designed airborne
SAR systems are now widely used for real-time surveillance by the U.S.
military.
In this example, the original radar competency of the nuclear
weapons program was improved by this work for the Department of
Defense. The resulting advanced radar competency made it possible to
apply new technology to the updated fuzing system for the W76-1 life
extension. This updated fuzing system would not have been possible
without the competency that was maintained and advanced by work for the
Department of Defense.
verification and monitoring
Sandia has had a long tradition of ingenuity and engineering
excellence in developing technologies for verification and monitoring
to support efforts in nonproliferation and nuclear security as
demonstrated, for example, by our successful record of involvement with
international treaties: from the VELA Satellite Programs (1960s) to the
Intermediate-Range Forces Treaty (INF, 1987) and from there to the
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START, 1994). The New START treaty
signed in Prague in April 2010 aims to enhance predictability and
stability and thus security, and verification activities will monitor
compliance with limits and other obligations set forth in the treaty.
While details of Sandia's activities in verification can best be
presented in a classified environment, I will state here that we have
carefully reviewed the New START treaty and understand the limits and
obligations as well as the changes to the inspection protocols. Sandia
will continue to support the government by providing the best technical
solutions and expertise required. The current language of the New START
treaty mentions the radiation detection equipment, which was developed
and manufactured at Sandia and used in the previous START, as a key
piece of equipment for verification purposes under the terms of the new
treaty. In addition, between September 2009 and April 2010, two Sandia
experts served as technical advisors on the delegation that negotiated
the New START treaty.
conclusions
As stated in the NPR, ``as long as nuclear weapons exist, the
United States will maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
arsenal'' (p. iii). The upcoming decade will be demanding as we conduct
a number of life extension programs under compressed schedules,
modernize our aging facilities, and invest in human capital.
Within the context of the nuclear weapons policy presented in the
NPR Report and the collective guidance for implementation provided in
the fiscal year 2011 Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan, Section
1251 Report, and the Department of Energy fiscal year 2011
Congressional Budget Request, and under the New START treaty terms, I
am confident that Sandia can provide the required support for the
Nation's nuclear deterrent. That confidence is based on our assessment
of the stockpile management requirements against our mission and
product space and our capabilities.
The New START treaty, if ratified and entered into force, would not
constrain or interfere with the upcoming stockpile life extension
imperatives. It would not change our planned approach or the tools we
will apply. It would not limit the required introduction of modern
technologies into existing warhead designs and the realization of the
attendant benefits. However, it would reinforce the imperative to
ensure a modern stockpile and a strong, responsive infrastructure as we
move toward a smaller nuclear arsenal.
As a whole package, the documents describing the future of U.S.
nuclear policy represent a well-founded, achievable path forward, which
I understand and support. However, as we stand on the threshold of the
new era of stockpile stewardship and management, we must recognize the
challenges inherent in this framework. A significant body of work will
be required to sustain the deterrent into the next two decades, and we
must ensure that resources are commensurate with the requirements and
expectations. The administration's fiscal year 2011 budget request
reflects a strong alignment among the White House, the Department of
Defense, and the NNSA, and it recognizes the magnitude of our future
work scope. The fact that the three national security laboratory
directors were invited to speak before you today is a clear indication
of the leadership role of Congress in authorizing a path forward for
U.S. nuclear deterrence. Our success in sustaining the stockpile rests
on program stability, multiyear sustained funding, a clear national
commitment to the U.S. nuclear deterrent, and the opportunity to
perform innovative technical work in the service of the Nation.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Dr. Hommert. We thank
all of our lab directors and their staffs for the great work
that you do.
Let's see if we could finish--I'm not sure we can--by 11
o'clock, but let's try, and we'll try with a first round of 6
minutes towards that goal. If we don't finish, we'll just come
back after the vote.
The NPR states a preference for refurbishment or reuse as I
understand it. Is that correct?
Dr. Anastasio. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Of the three Rs.
Now, does that preference constrain the labs in any way in
your review of life extension options? Dr. Anastasio?
Dr. Anastasio. I don't believe that overly constrains us,
Senator. We still have the directive to look at the full range
of options as we consider the requirements and the best
technical path forward. As I said in my opening comments, I
feel it's my obligation, not just the request but my
obligation, to bring forward the best technical ideas in every
case. So it's not a perfect solution, but I think it's one that
gives us the flexibility we need, that we can have adequate
levels of confidence in, to stimulate the workforce to do the
creative and innovative things they always do to support such a
national important issue.
Chairman Levin. Dr. Miller, do you basically agree with
that?
Dr. Miller. Yes, sir, I agree with Dr. Anastasio's
statement.
Chairman Levin. Dr. Hommert, would you agree with that?
Dr. Hommert. Yes, I agree. I want to point out that for our
components, the non-nuclear components, we are typically in a
replacement mode by the very nature of it, and reuse where
appropriate and refurbishment as well.
Chairman Levin. It's been alleged by some that the NPR is
going to stifle creative and imaginative thinking. Do you agree
with that, Dr. Anastasio?
Dr. Anastasio. No, sir. I think that by looking at the full
spectrum of options on a case-by-case basis, that's just the
opportunity we need to stimulate the creativity of our
workforce.
Chairman Levin. Dr. Miller?
Dr. Miller. I very much agree with Dr. Anastasio. As he
said, I really do believe very strongly that it is my
responsibility to make sure that the workforce at the
laboratory considers the full range of options. They will
naturally want to do that on their own.
Chairman Levin. That you feel that that is what you have
the authority to do?
Dr. Miller. Yes, sir. I believe we have not only the
authority, but I believe we also have the direction to do that.
Chairman Levin. Dr. Hommert?
Dr. Hommert. Yes, I agree.
Chairman Levin. Dr. Schwitters, the JASON Life Extension
Study Panel found that the lifetime of today's nuclear weapons
could be extended for decades with no anticipated loss in
confidence by using approaches similar to those employed in
life extensions to date, and that's a critically important
conclusion that appears to confirm that the current weapons in
the stockpile will be able to continue to meet military
requirements and maintain safe, secure, and reliable using one
of the three R approaches that you've all mentioned now.
Did the JASON study find that the replacement option would
introduce the most significant degree of change in the
stockpile?
Dr. Schwitters. I'd like to take a narrower answer on that.
Chairman Levin. Sure.
Dr. Schwitters. Again, some of the systems are being
replaced successfully, and they stand the scrutiny that the
labs give them and that we've seen in coming back. So I would
like to say I think it's very important that the labs explore
these replacement strategies and they may be needed in some
future requirements. But I think it's our feeling that basing
further work on the knowledge base that exists through the
other two strategies is the path of least risk at this point.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Now, our lab directors have all mentioned shortfalls in
previous years' budgets. As I understand it, there were
significant layoffs in the fiscal year 2008 budget year, that
the budgets in fiscal year 2009 and fiscal year 2010 provided
some small financial improvement, although I understand that
some layoffs continued in fiscal year 2009.
First of all, you can comment on that when answering the
question. The budget in fiscal year 2011 as I understand it
will allow you to begin to recover from the shortfalls in
previous years' budgets; is that correct, Dr. Anastasio?
Dr. Anastasio. Mr. Chairman, since 2006 at LANL we've
reduced the workforce by over 2,200 people. That's a
significant fraction of the workforce. Yes, with the proposed
2011 budget by the administration that will in fact stabilize
the workforce and I think put us back on a track that starts to
improve the situation that we've been seeing in recent years.
Chairman Levin. Dr. Miller?
Dr. Miller. Yes, sir. At LLNL we have reduced the workforce
since 2007 by about 2,000 people. About a third of those were
highly-trained scientists and engineers, so that has been a
significant concern. The fiscal year 2011 budget starts us back
in the right direction. It allows us to grow a little bit with
inflation, and puts us back on the right course. It does not
include all of the things that we will need over the long term,
but it is an extraordinarily good first step.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Dr. Hommert?
Dr. Hommert. Yes, since the period from 2006 through 2008
at Sandia we've reduced by about 800 the staff associated with
the core nuclear weapons activities at the laboratories. The
majority of those staff moved to other national security
imperatives that we are working on.
When I look at the fiscal year 2011 budget, for us the
change is dominated by the commitment we have to execute the
B61 LEP, which needs to begin immediately, and that budget is
adequate for us to begin that effort.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
A letter, which I'd like to submit for the record, dated
May 19, 2010, to Secretaries Gates and Chu from 10 former and
well-respected lab directors, cited significant concern with
the guidance set forth in the administration's NPR to give
strong preference to options for refurbishment or reuse. The
former directors state that such guidance imposes unnecessary
constraints on our engineers and scientists and that, based on
their experience as former lab directors, they believe that
this higher bar for certain life extension options will stifle
the creative and imaginative thinking that typifies the
excellent history of progress and development at the national
laboratories, and indeed will inhibit the NPR's goal of honing
the specialized skills needed to sustain the nuclear deterrent.
[The information referred to follows:]
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Senator McCain. I take it from the witnesses' statements
today you disagree. Are these 10 former lab directors
misinformed, wrong, or why does there seem to be some
difference of opinion here? Beginning with you, Dr. Anastasio.
Dr. Anastasio. Thank you, Senator. It's certainly true that
there are restrictions in the NPR on how to proceed forward
with engineering development. But I still believe that it's
very clear that we have both the authority and the
responsibility to explore on a case-by-case basis what's the
best technical approach for each weapons system to extend its
life well into the future, to include the full range of options
that will spark and stimulate the innovation and creativity of
our workforce.
Recall, where we've been is that we have not pursued even
reuse as a strategy in recent years. So I think opening these
options up will be very important to the workforce for us to be
able to train and transfer knowledge to a newly, highly capable
workforce that we will need for the future.
Senator McCain. I understand all that and I appreciate it.
But the 10 directors are misinformed or you just have a simple
disagreement?
Dr. Anastasio. It's a matter of emphasis, that certainly
having no restrictions would be the more perfect solution, but
I believe with the way the NPR is written that we have an
adequate level of technical flexibility to carry out our
mission.
Senator McCain. Dr. Miller.
Dr. Miller. Yes, sir. Thank you, Senator. I believe that
the concern expressed by the former lab directors is obviously
a legitimate concern. It's a concern that I have. However, I
agreed with Dr. Anastasio; I believe that the situation we have
is a workable one. As I said, it is my responsibility to make
sure that the full range of options and creativity are
exercised by our workforce, by our designers, in bringing forth
for consideration by Congress and the administration for all of
the potential options for improving the stockpile in the
future. So I believe it's a workable situation.
Senator McCain. So you agree, but you think it's workable?
Is that sort of your answer?
Dr. Miller. Again, as I said, it is a concern. It's
something I pay a lot of attention to. I believe we can work
with the situation as it's currently described.
Dr. Anastasio. I would agree with that.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Dr. Hommert.
Dr. Hommert. I think this issue sits largely in the space
of my colleagues because it mostly focuses on the nuclear
components. From our standpoint, the most dominant issue is
that when we look at the next decade and the B61 LEP, the W78
LEP, that we commit to a full-scope effort on those, first in
largely a refurbishment space, using the language applying to
the nuclear package, and in the reuse space on the W78 LEP, and
that we commit to full-scope replacement of non-nuclear
components.
Senator McCain. I understand your position. Now I'd like
the answer to the question.
Dr. Hommert. I believe that, from my perspective, there is
sufficient intellectual challenge and opportunity for
innovation that our staff can--in the context of work over the
next decade, that affords the strength of our deterrent and the
intellectual capability of the staff; that language is not
restrictive in that regard.
Senator McCain. Thank you.
Dr. Schwitters.
Dr. Schwitters. Sir, I disagree with the statement in the
former directors' letter. I think it fails to properly account
for the knowledge that has been a result of ongoing stockpile
stewardship and into the future. In working with the labs and
knowing the people as we know them at the labs, there are tough
technical scientific challenges that are well within the scope
of the NPR, that need to be met, and, I think, under this
question of stability in the workforce that came up before,
offers opportunities for people to really grow professionally
and to explore the full range of physically sensible solutions.
So I don't agree with them, and I've spoken with some of
the directors on that list about it.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Dr. Schwitters. I wasn't asking
about knowledge or challenges. I was asking about whether this
policy would constrain our ability to replace as well as to
refurbish.
But you've also addressed my next question, and it's a very
delicate question as to whether you are pleased at the
increased commitment of funding and whether that is sufficient
in order to get the job done to comply with our Nation's
national security needs?
I am pleased with the commitment to increased funding, as I
know you are. But there is, I think, a large question that
looms out there, Mr. Chairman, of whether that is just a
welcome increase, which we all welcome, but whether it is also
sufficient to meet the needs, the increased needs we have in
compliance with the New START treaty.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the witnesses.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
First let me thank the four witnesses for the service that
you do to our country. I think it is largely unknown,
unappreciated, but extremely critical to the security of the
American people and the security of a lot of people elsewhere
in the world.
Look, we all wish that we lived in a world without nuclear
weapons, but wishing does not make it so. As you look around
the world, it seems that the conflicts between people and
nations grow and that, once again, the nuclear weapons capacity
seems to be growing. That is, after the reduction after the
collapse of the Soviet Union.
So while I for one am in the process of reviewing the New
START treaty and hope that I can be in a position to vote to
ratify it, it seems to me that, based on what we know about the
reality of the world today, that as we reduce the number of
deployed nuclear weapons in our stockpile, we have to make sure
that, to put it in simplistic terms, they work. That's what
this really is all about.
Incidentally, as you well know, just to state for the
record, there are a lot of people in the world who depend on
the safety, security, and effectiveness of America's nuclear
stockpile for their own security. In fact, the safety,
security, and effectiveness of our nuclear stockpile is one of
the major inhibitions or blocks to more nuclear proliferation,
because there are nations in Asia and the Middle East
particularly that have not developed their own capacity because
they rely on our protection. So what we're talking about here
is really important.
Dr. Hommert, you said something that I thought was really
important, which is that most of the weapons--because a lot of
this is education or re-education for Members of Congress--most
of the weapons in the current stockpile--I'm quoting from you--
``were designed at a time when long design life was not
typically a high priority design requirement.''
I heard from someone who is an expert in this field that
today the average age of the nuclear weapons in our stockpile
is older than it's ever been before. Is that right?
Dr. Hommert. Yes, sir, that's correct.
Senator Lieberman. So that's part of the pressure on us to
make the kinds of investments that we're talking about and that
the four of you have asked for, correct?
Dr. Hommert. Yes, Senator.
Senator Lieberman. Other nations have gone in other
directions in the development of their nuclear weapons
stockpiles, correct?
Dr. Hommert. Yes.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. Now let me go to Dr. Miller. You
point out in your prepared statement that the NNSA's budget
crunch that we've imposed on you in recent years has--and I'm
going to mention two parts of what you said--``postponed
important deliverables in science, technology, and
engineering.'' To the extent that you can in open session, Dr.
Miller, give us a little more detail on what you meant.
Dr. Miller. Yes. Part of the science, technology, and
engineering program, what we call the science-based stockpile
stewardship program, is intended to understand in a more
fundamental way the workings of a nuclear weapon. It is in many
respects the key intellectual challenge. The delivery of that
understanding has been delayed from what was originally
anticipated because of the slower pace of work.
An example of what I'm talking about, again in an
unclassified form, a scientist from LLNL whose name is Omar
Hurricane this year received the E.O. Lawrence Award from
Secretary Chu. The details are classified, but he received that
award for proposing a theoretical solution to one of these
weapons physics challenges. That theory has yet to be validated
because the experiments that would validate that theory have
not yet been done. So that's an example of the delays that I
was talking about.
Senator Lieberman. The next phrase in your statement is
that the budget crunch you've been under ``has delayed
resolution of identifiable stockpile issues.'' Did you cover
that in your answer to the first one?
Dr. Miller. It's similar. The more detailed answer is we
look at the stockpile every year, all three labs, the plants.
We find what we would call politely ``anomalies,'' things that
are different than we expect them. We have to answer the
question of does that matter? Again, it's like a piece of rust
on your car. It matters where it is and how big it is. The time
for resolving those issues has been longer than I think is
justified.
Senator Lieberman. One of the bottom line questions for me,
anyway, in this matter is that, since we're discussing the
sustainability of our nuclear deterrent under New START, I want
to ask the three directors the most objective question based on
budget that I can, which is about fiscal year 2011. Implicitly,
I'm asking about the kinds of goals that are set for longer-
range funding.
If Congress fails to provide the increased funding
requested in the fiscal year 2011 budget and described in the
section 1251 report, are you certain that our national
laboratories will be able to continue to certify the safety,
security, and effectiveness of the smaller stockpile envisioned
in New START without testing?
Dr. Anastasio?
Dr. Anastasio. Senator, if that were the case I would be
very concerned about the future. One of the things that has
been happening in recent years with the budget scenarios that
we've faced is that, with the focus on the stockpile, the
urgency of the near term, the concerns about the state of our
facilities, we've been squeezing more and more on the science,
technology, and engineering part of the budget. That is the
investment in the long term. The activities that we're able to
carry out today are based on the investments we made 5 and 10
years ago.
Senator Lieberman. My time is actually up, so let me ask a
quick question. Are you concerned that if we don't meet the
funding increase goals that we're talking about for fiscal year
2011 and beyond that you may reach a point where you won't be
able to certify the safety, security, and effectiveness of our
nuclear stockpile without testing?
Dr. Anastasio. I'll be very concerned about my ability to
do that. We will be in a position where we're not looking at
the issues, and so if you don't look you don't know what the
issues are. The tools that we have available for us may well
not be adequate to answer the questions that are before us.
It's both important what the near-term budget looks like,
but it's important that we understand the funding over the full
life of the program, which in this case is several decades
long.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Dr. Miller, Dr. Hommert, can you give a quick answer? I
apologize because I know it's a big question.
Dr. Miller. I would point you to some testimony that I gave
a couple of years ago to the Senate, in which I said that if
the funding trends continue it is my judgment that the
fundamental premise of stockpile stewardship is at risk.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Dr. Miller. I believe that's true.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you.
Dr. Hommert?
Dr. Hommert. Without the fiscal year 2011 request, we will
see immediate impact on the strength of our surveillance
program and very much on our ability to sustain the B61 as a
viable weapons system through the decade.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you all.
Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Lieberman.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, we have sent a letter to you requesting a
hearing on the New START. I just want to get this in the
record. I also serve on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.
We've had, I think, about 12 hearings. We've had 25 witnesses.
Although two of the witnesses were kind of open; they had some
objections--that was Robert Joseph and Eric Edelman; we all
know them--the other ones, there was not one witness who was
opposed to the New START treaty.
So the request I have--and that has been signed by some 11
members--is that we hold a hearing where we will have some of
the witnesses, and we even made some suggestions. So I'm hoping
we'll be able to do that.
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Chairman Levin. We're hoping also to be able to do that.
Senator Inhofe. Yes.
Chairman Levin. We've been working with the minority on the
witnesses. The dates which----
Senator Inhofe. I appreciate that and I know you will. We
went through this----
Chairman Levin. Well, if I could just complete my sentence.
Senator Inhofe. I'm sorry.
Chairman Levin. The dates which we proposed, they were not
able to make it. So we are working closely with minority and
minority staff to make it possible, because we also want to
make that happen. So we'll continue to try to work with those
witnesses.
Senator Inhofe. Mr. Chairman, this is not any way a
partisan suggestion, because we went through this same thing on
the Law of the Sea Treaty and that was actually proposed during
the Bush administration, and we had from the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee no one opposed to it. But we did then hold
very productive hearings on that. So I appreciate that very
much.
Chairman Levin. We are trying very hard to make that
happen. I agree with you, it's not a partisan issue.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, sir.
Getting back to the budget, because we've all talked about
that and we talked about the adequacy and the fact that
previous budgets were not adequate. Yet it appears to me that
most of the increases that I see here are really in the out-
years. The National Security Enterprise Integration Committee
in its recommendation had recommended, I believe, in fiscal
years 2011, 2012, and 2013 $7.3 billion, $7.8 billion, $8.3
billion, and yet it was reduced substantially in the
President's budget for those particular years.
So when you talk about the adequacy--I'd like to have each
one of you respond to this--are you talking about it would be
in the out-years? The administration has proposed a budget
increase of $10 billion over 10 years, a total of $80 billion.
Yet under the administration's projections 70 percent of the
$10 billion increase will not show up until fiscal year 2016.
Is that a concern to you, or are you perhaps looking at these
future years in terms of the adequacy of the budget?
Dr. Anastasio. Senator, I'm very concerned about that
budget profile, that there needs to be adequate funding to
align the expectations of the program with the fiscal realities
that we have. That profile delays many of the issues that are
of concern to us, especially in the science and engineering
arena.
The key for any program any particular year is an
interesting question, but the question is really what does the
profile look like over the full extent of the multi-decade
program.
Senator Inhofe. Keeping in mind that there's no assurance
that that will be there in out-years.
Dr. Anastasio. Correct, I understand that, especially with
the fiscal environment the country faces. So that is a concern
and we understand that.
I think it's important that in the near term as we go
through this period, that if those budgets are the reality that
we have a balanced program during that time and that we don't
sacrifice one part of the program to accomplish another.
Senator Inhofe. I understand that.
Dr. Hommert, you probably talked about the B61 more. I
always feel a little inadequate when we have experts like you,
that there is probably an assumption that you think we know
more than we do know. On this B61 program, in talking with my
military legislative assistant earlier today, he was dropping
those out of F-111s 25 years ago.
Now, I assume that we've had a lot of technological
improvements, but it's more of a complete overhaul that you've
been referring to. Is that accurate?
Dr. Hommert. Yes, Senator, that's accurate. In my view, we
need to execute the full-scope refurbishment and replacement of
non-nuclear componentry.
Senator Inhofe. Are you confident you're going to have the
resources to do that?
Dr. Hommert. Let me answer that in two steps. The fiscal
year 2011 budget does have the resources for us to very
critically complete, in our vernacular, what we call a Phase 6-
2A, or a costing study, which firms the requirements and sets
the cost basis. Then through the rest of what we call full-
scale engineering development out through fiscal year 2017, we
then will have a firm picture. We'll have to have sustained
commitment from here to there to execute this program.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. I would agree with that.
You mentioned, Dr. Hommert and also Dr. Anastasio, a
problem that I really wasn't aware of until we started
preparing for this hearing, and that is what's happening to our
technological base, the people, the scientists, and that we're
not replacing them. I think you said that some 38 percent will
be over 55 years old. Is there an adequate base, or what are we
going to draw from? Do we have a recruitment-like program going
on to resolve that problem?
Dr. Anastasio. Yes. Certainly we have a very outstanding
workforce and we're still able to attract very good people. But
the question is, with the budgets that we've had--and we
mentioned the reductions that we've had at the laboratory--
right now we're doing very little to renew and replace turnover
with new people in the workforce.
Senator Inhofe. So you don't think we're really competitive
then, are we?
Dr. Anastasio. We are competitive at the moment, but I'm
worried about the future. That's my concern.
Senator Inhofe. Do you all agree with that?
Dr. Miller. Yes, sir. At LLNL we live in a very dynamic
area, the Bay Area of San Francisco. However, we have
historically been able to recruit and retain people in the
nuclear weapons program. Our decline is principally financially
driven. So if the commitment on the part of the country is
there, we as a laboratory can deliver what is expected of us in
terms of bringing in the highest quality science and
technology.
I would just comment, and to the earlier question on the
issue of the long-term sustainability, I am also very concerned
about the out-years. An additional reason that I am concerned
is because most of these major projects that are taking up
funding in the out-years do not yet have very good cost
baselines.
Dr. Hommert talked about the B61. The same thing is true
for the major facilities. Those projects generate a tremendous
amount of uncertainty in our minds about not only what the
costs are, but equally important, what are the resources that
are going to be required.
Senator Inhofe. That's good.
Dr. Anastasio, just one thing that you mentioned twice in
your oral testimony. You used the term ``acceptable level of
risk'' and ``adequate level of risk.'' Could you just make a
short comment on how you define the risk and what is adequate
or acceptable?
Dr. Anastasio. Sir, of course there are very many different
types of risk and we face that every day, as you do in your job
as well. There are the technical risks, there are the
programmatic risks of funding, and there are the risks of
surprises that you don't anticipate. How do you manage your way
through all of those issues?
Acceptable levels of risk. It's certainly true as a
scientist that we are taking technical risks in what we do.
We're not doing a nuclear test. We're not testing the full
system. We already talked about what the path forward will take
for refurbishments, life extensions. But I believe when I say
``adequate levels of risk,'' I believe that the risks are
there. There is not a no-risk version. The risks that are there
are manageable, and we can deliver on our responsibilities.
Senator Inhofe. That's fine. My time has expired, but for
the record, Mr. Chairman, I'm going to ask each one to take the
letter from these previous directors and respond in writing as
to how you agree or disagree with these assertions that were
made, if you would please do that.
Thank you very much.
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Dr. Miller's additional response.
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Dr. Schwitters. I disagree with the assertion made in the letter by
former laboratory directors that language in the Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) imposes ``unnecessary constraints on our engineers'' that will
``inhibit the NPR's goal of honing the specialized skills needed to
sustain the nuclear deterrent.'' The NPR states: ``The United States
will study options for ensuring the safety, security, and reliability
of nuclear warheads on a case-by-case basis, consistent with the
congressionally mandated Stockpile Management Program. The full range
of Life Extension Program approaches will be considered: refurbishment
of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different
warheads, and replacement of nuclear components.'' This is as clear a
statement of policy as one can imagine and it explicitly encourages
weapons scientists and engineers to examine the full range of technical
possibilities for extending and modernizing the Nation's stockpile.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today and for the
opportunity yesterday to preview the conversations we're having
today.
The question of funding is always going to be an issue
because of the way in which budgeting is accomplished at this
level, because we don't have multi-year budgets. You are
concerned about the future, as we all are, because the next
year and the following year we'll have to sustain the level of
funding that we've started in order for you to fulfill your
obligations.
Do you have any reason other than concern about the way in
which budgeting works that there won't be this commitment in
the future to fund the program so that you can deal with
compliance and the requirements that are there? In other words,
apart from the uncertainty of the budgeting process, is there
anything else out there that would cause you to believe that we
won't fund at that level? Dr. Anastasio?
Dr. Anastasio. I think that there are several things that
could help contribute to sustainability of these programs for
the future. One would be the national consensus on the policy.
The administration has brought forward a nuclear policy view
with the NPR. If that can serve the basis of a national
bipartisan consensus on the path forward, then there's a
baseline understanding of what we're all trying to accomplish,
and that will help guide all future Congresses and
administrations about what we're trying to do.
I also believe that it will be important to keep our focus
on these issues. How do we do that? I'm not sure I know the
answer, but one suggestion would be to have a hearing like this
over the years.
Senator Ben Nelson. There is something about things getting
on the record that provides some degree of certainty.
Dr. Anastasio. A third suggestion is that some treaties in
the past have had safeguard approaches that are built into
them. Those could be another kind of approach that we could
take to allow the administration and Congress and the American
people to keep a focus on these issues to make sure we're on
track for what we're trying to accomplish.
Senator Ben Nelson. It won't do us any good to go 100 miles
north one year and 100 miles south the next year on funding or
on the structure of what your work would be with keeping the
stockpile current.
Dr. Anastasio. I would agree with that completely, and that
would be a very challenging environment to be in to maintain an
outstanding workforce as well.
Senator Ben Nelson. Does anybody have anything different to
say or are you generally in agreement?
Dr. Miller. I would say I'm very much in agreement with
what Dr. Anastasio talked about. I think, as he indicated,
there are a number of mechanisms that seem to me to be
available to Congress to maintain sustainability.
Another example is in the context of the national decision
to stop doing nuclear testing. There is an annual assessment
that each of us do of the stockpile each year. It's classified.
It is made available to all levels of government, again a
status report on how are we doing, what are the issues. So
again, I believe there are multiple mechanisms available to
create the kind of consensus and stability and understanding
and focus.
Senator Ben Nelson. Dr. Hommert?
Dr. Hommert. I agree with my colleagues. I would just add
that if we get 2011 right and begin the LEP, it creates a
momentum very visibly for moving down that path, which
hopefully will again create a basis for greater sustained
support, in addition to what my colleagues have added.
Senator Ben Nelson. At the very least, I think it's
accurate to say that the fiscal year 2011 budget is reversing
the negative trend that you've experienced with budgeting in
the past. Is that fair to say, too?
Dr. Hommert. Yes.
Dr. Miller. Yes, sir, it is.
Dr. Anastasio. Yes, sir.
Senator Ben Nelson. In monitoring through the New START
treaty, can you give us your efforts of how we would monitor if
we didn't have the New START treaty? Do we have any capability
of monitoring that would be exclusive of, let's say, the New
START treaty?
Dr. Miller. Yes, sir. The New START treaty has some very
specific provisions. We do gather intelligence through national
technical means, satellites, and other mechanisms. All three
laboratories work with the IC to analyze that. I think it is
fair to say that the treaty does add to the ability to inspect
sites, so it is a significant addition. But there is capability
to understand what's going on independent of the treaty.
Senator Ben Nelson. But the New START treaty would enhance
your ability to monitor, is that fair to say?
Dr. Miller. Yes. It's not ours, but, yes, the country's
ability to monitor.
Senator Ben Nelson. Dr. Anastasio?
Dr. Anastasio. I would agree with that, yes, sir. We don't
have the lead role for the country in that. That's done by
other agencies. But we are very much supportive of that, and I
would agree that with New START we will have further extended
opportunities to understand.
Senator Ben Nelson. A final question here. My time is up.
Do each of you support the New START treaty?
Dr. Anastasio. As a lab director, it's not really my
position to support a treaty. That's not our role. But I
believe that with the treaty outlined and the program that the
administration has put together that we can carry out all our
responsibilities that are underneath the treaty if we can deal
with these long-term sustainment issues. So in that context,
I'm very comfortable with the treaty.
Senator Ben Nelson. Dr. Miller?
Dr. Miller. Yes, sir. My view is very similar. My job as a
laboratory director is to provide the government, Congress, and
the administration my best technical advice. Under the treaty,
I can do the job that has been outlined for me. Similarly, we
were part of the concurrence in the National Intelligence
Estimate (NIE) about the monitoring of the treaty and we
concurred in those key judgments.
Senator Ben Nelson. At the risk of getting you into
politics, too, Dr. Hommert, what are your thoughts?
Dr. Hommert. Very consistent with my colleagues. As I said
in my oral testimony, the treaty highlights the imperative of
what we're talking about here today in terms of moving forward
on strengthening the basis of the deterrent.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you all.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Dr. Miller, I missed, I think, your
response to Senator Nelson's question, that you agreed that it
would enhance our ability to monitor. Are you saying the New
START treaty would enhance the United States' ability to
monitor the actions of the Russians?
Dr. Miller. Yes. Our ability to monitor the actions of the
Russians is enhanced over not having the treaty. That was my
view.
Senator Sessions. Are you saying it's enhanced it over
current monitoring abilities?
Dr. Miller. Yes. Currently, of course, the original START
treaty is no longer in effect, we have no onsite inspection
rights, and the New START treaty would put those back into
place.
Senator Sessions. Some of them. Former Secretary of State
James Baker has raised questions and experts have, and it's
pretty clear that we will not have as good an ability under New
START as under the previous START to monitor the Russians. Do
you disagree with that?
Dr. Miller. That's a different question.
Senator Sessions. Right. Let's get this straight. The
impression here is being left that that's not very accurate, I
think.
Dr. Miller. Again, the question that I answered earlier was
over current, in which case we have no inspection rights. Is
this better? My answer to that was yes. There are differences
between the previous START treaty and the proposal under the
New START treaty. As I said in my testimony in answer to the
question, we did engage in the coordination of the NIE and did
concur in their key judgments.
Senator Sessions. I would just share my colleague, Senator
Inhofe's, concern about the out-years. When you talk about
something in this body dealing with years 6, 7, 8, that is like
fantasyland. That's through the looking glass. We have no
ability to count on what will happen in those years.
This committee voted, Dr. Anastasio, I think close to
sufficient funding on a RRW and other matters, but other
committees took it out and we eventually lost that. I do think
you've taken too many hits, all of you, in the last several
years, and it's not a very smart way to do it.
I was troubled particularly, Dr. Anastasio, in your
comments that you've been having to squeeze more on the science
and technology part of the budget. To me that's particularly
concerning. Indeed, the new spending that's projected in this
budget seemed to me to be on the construction of facilities and
buildings and not much earmarked for the science and
technology.
Do you think we've struck the right balance there, assuming
all this money actually were to be appropriated in the distant
future?
Dr. Anastasio. I certainly think that I agree with you,
sir, about the uncertainty of budgets 6 or 7 years from now. Of
course, you have much more experience in that than I. But that
is a concern to me. I have testified in the past, in 2008, that
I've been very concerned about the sustainability of the
program over the long term if we didn't fix this.
I think the budget in the fiscal year 2011 proposal is a
start to that fix, but as a good program manager you know it's
what's the lifetime of the program and the funding over that.
The money that's allocated to the new facilities and to the
stockpile is important because those are issues that need to be
addressed, but I do fear that there has been a history of
having an imbalance in the program. We've sacrificed the
science to the near-term deliverables, and we need to align our
expectations of what's really possible in a fiscal sense with
what needs to get done and make sure we do that in a balanced
way. Our appetite should be aligned with what's achievable.
But I'm very concerned that the out-year funds will be
there and then, as Dr. Miller said, we don't even have
baselines yet for the significant costs of these major efforts
about the life extensions or about the nuclear facilities. So
you would want to be able to expect that as those baselines are
adjusted to the realities that you have, then you'd like to be
able to adjust the budget to that as well.
Senator Sessions. Dr. Schwitters indicated that we may be
good for a decade or so with this maintenance of the current
stockpile. But if it were good for 15, 20 years more, don't we
today need to be thinking about when and how we're going to
need to replace what at some point appears to me would become
outmoded or at risk?
Dr. Anastasio. We certainly need to be able to today start
taking actions to refurbish the stockpile for the future.
Senator Sessions. The Nation needs to be very mature about
this and to develop a long-term, 20, 30, 40-year plan to go
forward, would you not agree, that is rational and makes sense?
Dr. Anastasio. Absolutely.
Senator Sessions. The only problem is that if the President
had his way, the three of you wouldn't have jobs because he
wants no nuclear weapons. It's his stated goal, and this makes
us all a bit nervous about what our future is.
I think it's clear with regard to the New START treaty that
this treaty will not be ratified unless we have confidence that
we have a plan in place to maintain and modernize and replace,
if needed, our nuclear weapons.
My time is up, but thank you, Mr. Chairman. That's my
concern.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Anastasio, my understanding is that the goal of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, which has been in effect for
many years, is the elimination of nuclear weapons. Is that
accurate?
Dr. Anastasio. I'm not an expert on the Nonproliferation
Treaty, sir, but I think it sets out a goal of a world that's
free of nuclear weapons, that's for sure.
Senator Reed. So this is not some current trendy, chic
thing that the President's talking about.
Dr. Anastasio. I will say that the administration has made
clear as well that on our path to a world without nuclear
weapons, if we could ever achieve that, that we must maintain a
safe, secure, and effective stockpile on that path. I must say
personally, I have a hard time imagining what the world--it
would be a very special world that's a world that's free of
nuclear weapons, now that we have figured out how to do that.
Senator Reed. Let me ask you. We've been talking a lot
about the out-years, but the Secretary of Defense just on June
17th announced a transfer of $4.6 billion to NNSA. The 2011
budget represents a 13.5 percent increase. Is this the first
significant increase in funding you've had in many years to the
NNSA enterprise?
Dr. Anastasio. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. So interesting to talk about the out-years,
but in fact this is the first administration that has made a
significant commitment of resources--the first in a long time--
to actually begin to address the issues with real dollars of
the nuclear enterprise; is that correct?
Dr. Anastasio. I believe that this NPR and the budget for
2011 proposal is a strong commitment on the part of the
administration.
Senator Reed. Dr. Miller?
Dr. Miller. Yes, sir. It is clearly a major step in the
right direction. The budget has been declining since about
2005. At the time the original stockpile stewardship program
was put in place in the early to mid-1990s, there of course was
a substantial increase at that time. However, as you have
noted, since 2005 there has been a steady decline, and this
represents a very important and very significant turnaround.
Senator Reed. Dr. Hommert?
Dr. Hommert. Yes, I agree that the budget represents a
significant change that we haven't seen recently. It also comes
accompanied with a commitment to managing the stockpile
forward, which is equally as important.
Senator Reed. Dr. Schwitters, your comment?
Dr. Schwitters. I really have nothing to add.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Let me ask each director and Dr. Schwitters if the New
START treaty is ratified, will it have any significant impact
on your proposed plans?
Dr. Anastasio. What it does is emphasize the importance of
the role that we play and the significance of the underpinning
of the stockpile and our confidence in it. I hope Congress
takes the actions that the administration has suggested.
Senator Reed. Dr. Miller?
Dr. Miller. It certainly does not inhibit the work that we
have to do and, because it is a package that emphasizes the
importance of maintaining the safety, security, and reliability
of the stockpile, it enhances that part which is our technical
responsibility.
Senator Reed. Dr. Hommert?
Dr. Hommert. I agree with my colleagues.
Senator Reed. Any comments, Dr. Schwitters?
Dr. Schwitters. No, sir.
Senator Reed. Let me just ask the opposite question. If
it's not ratified, what impact will it have on the enterprise?
Dr. Anastasio. For me then, that will put in question
whether we have the consensus strategy to go forward. If that's
not the path that the country's taking, what will be the path?
So I think it will lead to some uncertainty.
Senator Reed. Dr. Miller?
Dr. Miller. Yes, sir. I think the uncertainty is really the
issue. Again, I can't emphasize enough that having an agreed-
upon long-term vision for the future of the nuclear weapons
stockpile is very important to the stability, to engage the
workforce.
Senator Reed. Dr. Hommert?
Dr. Hommert. Clearly it doesn't change the technical
realities we're staring at in the stockpile. But there is the
question of the importance of a consistent national policy
going forward, and that I think would be what would come into
question.
Senator Reed. Dr. Schwitters?
Dr. Schwitters. If I could just say a little bit on this.
Of course, JASON studied the technical aspects of this. This is
not my responsibility, but we did identify, outside of our
narrow charge, these issues of the scientific and technical
manpower, their sustainability, and we also identified real
concerns about surveillance. So under any scenario, those are
high on our priority list that have to be maintained.
We were, of course, pleased with Secretary Chu's commitment
to this body on his views on this. That's all I care to say.
Senator Reed. Thank you.
Let me ask a final question. Sometimes we dwell, which we
should, on the problems that we have, particularly since we
have not tested a device, thankfully, for many, many years. If
you put yourself in the place of your counterparts in Russia or
in China, do they have the same problems in terms of
deteriorating skills, deteriorating systems, particularly
Russia since that's the focal point of the New START treaty?
Is their nuclear enterprise in the same sort of situation
as ours technically?
Dr. Anastasio. Sir, I believe that the Russians went
through a period of time some years ago of very strong
challenges on their budgets. They have recovered from that, is
my best insight. They are modernizing their stockpile and they
have a very active program and have hired many new people.
Senator Reed. Dr. Miller?
Dr. Miller. I would just add that from a technical point of
view they have the same kind of issues that we have. The nature
of the issues, the materials, are all very similar. They handle
it in a very different way than we do. Whereas we are looking
for major reinvestment in the production facilities, they have
a very excellent production capability that has been
functioning throughout this period. So their approach is
different than ours, but the technical issues that have to be
resolved are very similar.
Senator Reed. Dr. Hommert. The chairman has been very
gracious with my time, so if you could respond in writing,
that's fine.
Dr. Hommert. I agree with my colleagues.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
The vote has started. I think we probably have something
like 10 minutes left in the vote, plus the additional 5. So I'm
going to call next on Senator Thune. Senator Chambliss, I think
there will be enough time for your round if Senator Thune will
stick to the 6-minute rule. Then, if no one else shows up,
we'll be able to finish the open session and move to the closed
session.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you all very much for your service and for being here
today and for the insights that you provide on what is a very
important subject and something that many of us want to make
sure that we get right.
Dr. Anastasio, in your testimony, you stated that at LANL
the average age of career employees is now over 48 and that 32
percent of all career employees are expected to retire within
the next 5 years. In fact, General Kevin Chilton, the current
head of STRATCOM, said 2 years ago that the last nuclear design
engineer to participate in the development and testing of a new
nuclear weapon is scheduled to retire in the next 5 years.
Does this cause you some concern?
Dr. Anastasio. Yes, sir. It's very much in the issue of how
do we renew the really outstanding workforce that we have and
how do we give them the challenges that they need to develop
their full skill set.
Senator Thune. What are you doing under the current
limitations of experimenting and testing in order to preserve
the nuclear design expertise?
Dr. Anastasio. Part of what we do is to analyze the state
of the existing stockpile. That has been a large focus of our
program for the last 15 years. Unfortunately, that does not
challenge their creativity for design, and that's an element
that's been missing from the program.
Senator Thune. Can you describe the relationship between
the limitations placed on continuing to pursue scientific
advances and your ability to recruit younger individuals to
pursue this type of career?
Dr. Anastasio. I think one good example for us at LANL, of
course, is you need a window. LANL, appropriately, from its
history is a very isolated place in the country and we need a
way to attract people to want to come visit and engage with us.
We've had a major experimental facility there called the Los
Alamos Neutron Science Center (LANSCE). It's a proton
accelerator to study material properties. We're challenged to
keep that facility in the same state that it needs to be; and
the facilities that we have running, we have trouble doing all
the experiments, having adequate funding to maintain the
facility and to do all the experiments we'd like to do.
That's the mechanism to attract people there, and then to
sometimes induce them into coming into some of our classified
programs.
Senator Thune. What impact are some of these near-term
retirements going to have on the knowledge level required to
certify the reliability of nuclear weapons?
Dr. Miller. Senator, I think that retirements are obviously
something of concern. We have programs in place to transfer
that knowledge. Frequently, people who retire are willing to
continue to come back and mentor young people. So from my point
of view, the most important issue in responding to your
question is, do we have the financial ability to hire the young
people to accept the transfer of the new knowledge? We know how
to do that if we have active programs. Again the ability, as
specified in the NPR, as we do life extensions to examine the
full range of possibilities and engage the workforce, is a very
important subject. One of the very important side benefits of
having gone through the study phase of the RRW that we did is
it really engaged the creativity of the design community to
say, what could we do, what is possible.
So that full range of capability as expressed in the need
to bring forward options for the LEPs is very, very important
to me.
Dr. Hommert. Can I just add that this issue of sustaining
intellectual capability is a paramount concern for me. I think
we're at a critical juncture here where in order to attract
young engineering and science talent--these are individuals
that want to do real work--the stockpile demands that we do
real work, and we need to proceed, and that will bring the
talent we need to bridge this experienced to inexperienced
relationship.
Dr. Anastasio. Senator, could I add one more point which I
think is very important? For our scientists especially that get
involved, and engineers, at the lab, they get involved in these
classified programs, they're giving up their visibility into
the broad technical community because they're working on
classified issues. That's a big step for someone to make, that
we all made in our careers. The feeling at the laboratory that
we're working on something that's really important for the
country is a really important issue to be able to attract good
people. If there's not the feeling of commitment, a thing
that's been lacking in the last 15 years, that this is an
important activity for the national interest--and I think with
the policies that are being brought forward, if they can be
implemented, that would be a way to reassure the workforce that
this could be a significant career move for them to make and
help us attract the good people.
Senator Thune. Very quickly, Dr. Miller and Dr. Hommert,
the status with respect to age and retirement of your
workforce? Is it similar to what Dr. Anastasio described in his
testimony?
Dr. Miller. Yes, it's very similar.
Dr. Hommert. Yes, we have similar statistics as well.
Senator Thune. Thank you.
I will let Senator Chambliss go.
Chairman Levin. We appreciate that, and questions for the
record would be welcome.
Doctor--``Doctor Chambliss.'' Senator Chambliss.
[Laughter.]
Senator Chambliss. I can't even spell ``nuclear physics,''
Mr. Chairman. [Laughter.]
Gentlemen, I want to pick up on this issue of your
personnel, because I know that, Dr. Anastasio and Dr. Miller,
you have said that you've lost approximately 2,000 personnel
each since fiscal year 2006. Dr. Hommert, I assume you're down
somewhat. Is it comparable to that?
Dr. Hommert. About 800 out of the weapons program directly.
Senator Chambliss. Looking at you, you're like me; you're
grey-headed, what hair we have left. Dr. Hommert, I'm with you
there. But when you gentlemen came into this program it was on
the upswing you were challenged to develop systems based on
ideas that you could come up with. I'm sure it was an exciting
time for you and the colleagues that you had the opportunity to
work with.
Now, nuclear physicists coming out of Georgia Tech in my
State, if they go to work in a lab it's going to be working on
maintaining a system. It's not the excitement from the
standpoint of the day-to-day work, it appears to me. I think
you have a real challenge there. Not that you can't meet it,
but it looks to me like that's going to be very difficult to be
able to continue to draw folks into the field of science and
physics and challenge them in the work that they're going to be
doing in your labs.
Do the numbers in the budget that have been proposed allow
you to begin hiring folks back that you've had to let go?
Dr. Hommert. Let me take a crack here. Certainly for us the
fiscal year 2011 budget would demand that, for example, in the
main LEP line, we'll have to double the staffing where we are
today. That will attract individuals into the weapons program.
The nature of the work itself, where we have the opportunity to
bring new technology, is exciting and challenging to staff.
The last point I'd make is that at SNL we have a range of
other national security activities that we do which in a
technology space are very similar to what we have to pull on
for the weapons program. That all combined, even though we
still have to have that imperative of moving forward on the
LEP, does provide a basis of a strong intellectual capability.
So I'm confident that if all the pieces come together we can do
that.
Dr. Miller. Yes, sir, my answer is very similar. The
increase in the fiscal year 2011 budget is small for us, but it
is real. In addition, the prospect of working on the life
extension of the system after the B61, the W78, is very
important to us. It does exercise not quite all aspects of
weapons work, but it does exercise the creativity, the
intellectual curiosity, as well as, importantly, the
engineering discipline of actually turning your ideas into
something real.
So the program of work and the budget, I think, gives me
the capability to carry out the function as you described it.
Dr. Anastasio. I agree.
Senator Chambliss. We haven't had a test on any of our
systems since 1992. How much longer are we going to be able to
go without testing? Dr. Anastasio?
Dr. Anastasio. With the way this program is defined, with
the flexibility that we have, and if we're adequately funded
and appropriately funded through the life of this program, I
think we can continue down this path for quite an extended
period.
Senator Chambliss. Does anybody disagree with that?
Dr. Miller. No. What I would say is that as long as we have
the ability to continue to make progress on understanding the
underlying science and technology and the flexibility to manage
the stockpile appropriately, that gives us the ability to
continue with the program as it's currently laid out, that we
can do our job without having to resort to additional nuclear
tests.
Dr. Anastasio. Sir, be sure that we feel very strongly that
it's our obligation, if we ever doubt that that's the case,
that we will bring that forward to decisionmakers.
Senator Chambliss. When is the last time we manufactured a
nuclear warhead?
Dr. Miller. Let's see. The most recently completely from
scratch manufactured nuclear weapon would have been the W88,
which occurred in the late 1980s and early 1990s. We have
manufactured components through the LEPs for the W87, the B61,
and the W76. So we've remanufactured components, but not from
scratch, since the W88.
Senator Chambliss. Do we have the capability today to
manufacture one from scratch?
Dr. Miller. We do, but in limited numbers.
Senator Chambliss. We have two facilities: one at LANL and
one at Oak Ridge, that are planned for construction. What
additional capabilities will those two facilities give us?
Dr. Anastasio. For the one at LANL, the CMR replacement
facility, that will not give us new capability, but it will be
a smaller version of the capability that currently exists that
was opened in 1952. That's a very old building that does not
meet current safety and security standards, and this would be a
replacement for that facility that is right-sized for the
capability we need today. The capability it represents is to
give us the scientific understanding of the chemistry and
metallurgy of very complex materials like plutonium. So it
makes us understand the plutonium and assure the country that
the material in our weapons is behaving the way we can expect
and that we understand how that goes forward. Plutonium is
material that has only existed to our knowledge for 60-plus
years, so there's still plenty to learn about that material,
and this is the facility in which we do that.
Senator Chambliss. I appreciate your statement about the
fact that you don't yet have all the cost estimates on these
facilities, because frankly it's going to take about 10 years
to construct both those. I've seen the numbers, $4.5 to $5
billion each. That makes this budget issue critical. Your being
able to hire or continue to hire the right kind of people makes
this budget critical. We have to get some level of confidence
that you're going to have those funds, because obviously you
haven't had them. They have to be there in order for this
treaty to work.
I'll just close, Mr. Chairman, by saying that one of the
other things I'm concerned about in this treaty is the
inspections under New START. I assume it was not uncommon for
the Russians to be in your facilities on a fairly regular basis
under the previous treaty, as we were, at least on the outside
and occasionally on the inside, at places like Votkinsk. Now
we're going to depend on the Russians to tell us what they're
doing, just as you're going to be telling the Russians what
you're doing. I have all the confidence in the world you're
going to tell them the truth. I think there are still some
issues relative to the Russians.
When you have a total of 18 inspections a year under this
treaty or a total of 180 over 10 years, versus the over 600
that we did under the previous treaty, I think there are some
real inspections and trust issues that are going to have to be
resolved before we can get this treaty completed.
But gentlemen, thank you for the work you do. I have not
been to any of your labs, but I intend to, and I look forward
to visiting with you on site. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Chambliss.
We are now going to close our open session. We very much
appreciate the testimony of all of our witnesses. There will be
additional questions for the record. We will now move. Perhaps
15 minutes from now, if you could all get to room SVC-217, the
Capitol Visitor Center, we will have our closed session in room
SVC-217.
We will stand adjourned, with thanks.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Bingaman
replacement, reuse, and refurbishment
1. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Hommert, there seems to be a lot of debate
about refurbishment versus component replacement. Can you talk about
the differences in replacing a non-nuclear component outside the sealed
warhead versus a nuclear component inside the warhead?
Dr. Hommert. Non-nuclear components are periodically inspected, and
there are multiple reasons for replacement including issues identified
via the surveillance program, components with known limited lifetimes,
necessary modifications for interface with delivery systems and, in the
case of major life extension programs (LEP), to improve surety and to
replace obsolete technologies. The vast majority of non-nuclear
components are significantly more accessible than the nuclear
components.
2. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Schwitters, you mention three options for
the stockpile: refurbishment, reuse, and replacement. The refurbishment
option seems a little odd in proposing to use another warhead assembly
inside another nuclear weapon. Can you explain the issues in certifying
such an option compared to refurbishment or even replacement?
Dr. Schwitters. From its context, the question seems to be
concerned with the reuse option, which refers specifically to the use
of existing surplus pit and secondary components from other warhead
types. Because the key nuclear components have their pedigrees from
underground nuclear tests, the certification challenges for reuse hinge
on ensuring the physical conditions expected in the new configuration
of nuclear components are sufficiently close to those represented in
the underground tests of the component parts to maintain confidence in
the new weapon configuration without further underground tests.
In the refurbishment option, warhead components are replaced before
they degrade with components of nearly identical design or that meet
the same form, fit, and function. This option forms the basis of the
successful LEPs performed to date.
3. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Anastasio, on page 4 of your testimony you
state that your obligation is to ``examine all the relevant technical
options for a LEP, including refurbishment, reuse, and replacement and
bring them forward to the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) for a
decision.'' I take it then that you feel no constraint in looking at
any of these options?
Dr. Anastasio. I believe the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) strongly
endorses and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) reinforces that, on a
case-by-case basis, the full range of life extension options will be
considered. As I stated in my testimony, ``I recognize the sensitivity
of this topic but am convinced that . . . the laboratories [have
sufficient] flexibility to present policymakers with best technical
recommendations . . . [and] . . . do not feel overly constrained.''
This perspective reflects the view that the three national security
laboratory directors jointly presented earlier this year: ``the
consideration of the full range of life extension options
(refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from
different warheads, and replacement of nuclear components based on
previously tested designs), provides the necessary technical
flexibility to manage the nuclear stockpile into the future with an
acceptable level of risk.''
4. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Miller, do you support reusing the W-84
warhead, which is currently being stored and out of service, and if so,
in what way?
Dr. Miller. I support consideration of the W84 for an LEP utilizing
the reuse option. The laboratory directors have been tasked to ensure
that the full range of LEP approaches--including refurbishment, reuse,
and replacement of nuclear components--is studied on a case-by-case
basis for each system scheduled for an LEP. The W84 warhead has a
number of key attributes that make it a candidate for reuse for a
future air-carried system life extension. It is a well-tested design
with many modern safety and security features. A decision to reuse the
W84 or its components would be made based on technical assessments of
the ability of the W84 to meet critical stockpile goals (weapon system
safety, security, and effectiveness) and the results of surveillance of
the W84.
b61 program
5. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Hommert, on page 3 of your testimony under
Stockpile Surveillance you note a Surveillance Transformation Plan in
the fiscal year 2010 budget submission. Will this plan be implemented
in the B61 LEP?
Dr. Hommert. The basic tenets of surveillance transformation are an
approach that is tailored over the lifecycle of a warhead, and the
creation of a more anticipatory, predictive program based on
performance distributions, margins, trends, and uncertainties. We are
implementing this approach for the B61 LEP.
6. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Hommert, on page 4 of your testimony you
mention the timing and integrating the B61 to the F-35, which is an
entirely new design. It seems to me that the whole F-35 program is
still being worked out through developmental testing. Do you have
certainty in the requirements for integrating this nuclear weapon to
the F-35 at the present time?
Dr. Hommert. The Air Force requirements for the B61 LEP are still
under development and there is some technical risk associated with the
preliminary nature of our knowledge of the F-35 flight environments. We
have an initial set of requirements that we are using today, and we
have a schedule for finalizing the requirements going forward. We often
experience changes to some elements of the requirements, and we have a
rigorous requirements management process in place to deal with these
changes.
7. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Hommert, on page 4 of your testimony for
the B61 you mention that ``total cost estimates are subject to change
until the design definitions and requirements are finalized.'' How
close are you to getting a total cost and time estimate for Sandia's
portion of the B61?
Dr. Hommert. The 6.216.2A design definition and cost estimation
study will be completed at the end of fiscal year 2011.
8. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Hommert, on page 5 of your testimony you
mention the large staffing changes that are underway to support the B61
program. Where are the staff coming from and could they affect other
areas of work for Department of Defense (DOD) customers?
Dr. Hommert. We are committed to a smooth and orderly transition as
we ramp up for the B61 LEP, which is arguably the largest nuclear
weapons development program we have had in over 2 decades. Through a
strategic management decision earlier this year, we began staffing up
for this program, and the recently approved reprogramming for fiscal
year 2010 will align our fiscal year 2010 funding with our current
staffing levels. The additional growth required in the program next
year is large, and we will add the new staff in three ways: shifts
within our nuclear weapons program, selective conversion of staff from
our Work for Others (WFO) projects, and new hiring. We have an
aggressive and successful hiring program underway. Overall at SNL we
have hired over 600 people this fiscal year. We are devoting a
significant amount of executive leadership and management attention to
this, and we are confident that we can take on the B61 LEP without
putting our DOD and other WFO programs at risk.
9. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Schwitters, will JASON be involved in the
work scope of the B61 and the study on the possible merger to a single
warhead for both the Minuteman and Trident missiles, and do you see
merit in an external review by your group of these two programs?
Dr. Schwitters. JASON has not been asked to examine the scope of
the B61 LEP nor the possible merger to a single warhead for both the
Minuteman and Trident missiles. Requests to do so would normally come
from NNSA or DOD. This summer (2010), we were asked by DOD to examine
questions regarding those programs as part of a classified study on DOD
surety matters. I believe there would be merit in having JASON look
into the technical aspects and peer review approaches of both the B61
LEP and the possible development of a single warhead for both Minuteman
and Trident missiles.
commercial suppliers
10. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Hommert, on page 6 of your testimony you
mention the benefit of commercial off-the-shelf products. How do you
maintain an adequate long-term supplier base for them, especially when
they must be certified for nuclear weapons?
Dr. Hommert. It is a challenge to ensure that the Nation has a
sufficient, reliable long-term supplier base for all the components of
the nuclear weapons stockpile. While some of the components and devices
for nuclear weapons are based on the same underlying technologies of
commercial products, we often have unique performance requirements and
have to survive very harsh environments. Working closely with the non-
nuclear component production agencies within the NNSA complex, SNL uses
rigorous processes to continuously evaluate which components to acquire
commercially, and to certify these external suppliers. Some components
must be manufactured within the complex for both effectiveness and
surety purposes. The W76-1 arming, fuzing, and firing, for example,
includes a large number of commercially available microelectronic
devices, but 98 percent of the core functionality resides in the custom
application specific integrated circuit that were designed at SNL and
manufactured in the trusted foundry of our Microsystems and Engineering
Sciences Applications (MESA) Complex.
sandia workforce
11. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Hommert, on page 7 of your testimony you
discuss your workforce, its age and qualifications. It seems to me that
one of the distinctive features of Sandia is its ability to maintain a
diverse set of missions other than nuclear weapons, such as research
with industry or the Office of Science. Will that be endangered with
the large nuclear weapons workload that you expect?
Dr. Hommert. Please see the answer to question #8.
quantification of margins and uncertainties recommendations
12. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Schwitters, the National Academy of
Sciences (NAS) did a study on Quantification of Margins and
Uncertainties (QMU) and found that many of the tools used for nuclear
reactor design could be used effectively for our stockpile. Are you
aware of whether the labs have embraced the recommendations of this
report?
Dr. Schwitters. The weapons laboratories led the way in the
original establishment of QMU as a method for assessing confidence in
the nuclear weapons stockpile. The 2008 NAS study found that QMU is a
``sound and valuable framework'' that helps the national security
laboratories perform their responsibilities within the nuclear weapons
program. Among its many recommendations, the report suggested that some
concepts and capabilities previously developed in the area of
probabilistic risk assessment could be applied to QMU applications. The
laboratories appear to be following many of the recommendations of the
QMU report, with Sandia perhaps embracing them most fully. Some of the
report's recommendations have received less attention than others,
although it is important to note that some of the recommendations
basically ask the laboratories to address technical problems for which
the solutions are as yet unknown.
warhead consolidation
13. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Anastasio, Los Alamos designed the W78
Minuteman III warhead and the W88 Trident warhead, but I understand
from page 9 of Dr. Miller's testimony that Lawrence Livermore National
Laboratory (LLNL) is in the lead in the study to look at consolidating
these two warheads. Do you feel comfortable moving the technical
details of these warheads to another laboratory?
Dr. Anastasio. In April 2010, NNSA announced that it had assigned
the W78 LEP to LLNL. I am confident that Los Alamos National Laboratory
(LANL)-SNL can transfer the necessary technical information to support
a W78 life extension activity by LLNL-SNL. This transfer will be
further enabled as the W78 is one of the first system to be part of the
INWAP process of independent assessment by the other laboratories'
team.
At this point I am unaware of any decision by NNSA to consolidate
W78/W88 into a common warhead. Should NNSA move in that direction, both
laboratories will be asked to provide their best technical options for
sustaining the stockpile over the long term.
surveillance
14. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Anastasio, on page 2 of your testimony
you note that ``surveillance shows ever increasing signs of aging.''
You often say the sealed warhead is a miniature chemical reaction--how
well can you model this form of aging?
Dr. Anastasio. Over the past year we have witnessed improvements in
model fidelity. I remain concerned about the aging issues we have
identified and new aging issues that we may uncover in the future.
Modeling the impacts of aging phenomena is an important activity on
which many scientists and engineers are focused and many resources are
directed. The level of success always depends on the availability of
required data, the maturity of the associated models, the capability of
high performance computing and simulations, and the degree to which the
scientist or engineer understands the phenomenon.
1251 report
15. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Anastasio, on page 10 of your testimony
you state that ``I am concerned that in the administration's section
1251 report (on funding), much of the planned funding increase for
weapons activities do not come to fruition until the second half of the
10-year period.'' Can you please explain what you mean by that and its
impact?
Dr. Anastasio. My concern refers to the need for sustained
investments that carry across multiple administrations and Congresses.
Many of the science, technology, engineering, and infrastructure
investments are planned for the second half of the next decade. These
investments must be implemented within an uncertain and challenging
financial future facing the Nation.
Significant budgetary declines in nuclear weapons funding have been
seen many times when the Nation has faced difficult fiscal realities.
The President's fiscal year 2011 budget request is a positive first
step in the fiscal implementation of the roadmap to sustain the long-
term safety, security, and effectiveness of the stockpile. The roadmap
is a reasonable path to achieving these ends, and it must be fully
implemented.
stockpile stewardship and management plan
16. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Anastasio, do you think the SSMP
effectively takes care of refurbishing the Los Alamos Neutron Science
Center (LANSCE) over the next 10 years and if not, what does Congress
need to do?
Dr. Anastasio. During my testimony on 15 July 2010, I highlighted
the important roles that the LANSCE plays technically for the Stockpile
Stewardship Program (SSP) and in attracting new staff to pursue a
career at the laboratory, and the challenges LANL faces in identifying
adequate funding to maintain and operate the facility.
LANL has recently responded to a request by Under Secretaries
D'Agostino, Johnson, and Koonin asking for (among other things) a plan
regarding the full suite of issues that need to be addressed to sustain
operations of LANSCE through the decade. That plan proposes an increase
to the operating budget to a level that supports execution of the
essential maintenance that continues to allow the linear accelerator to
operate in the short term; invests in long-term capital replacements to
mitigate the major risks to continued operation of the linear
accelerator and beam transport systems; and invests in risk mitigation
for the rest of the facility to provide a more reliable capability.
The proposed plan has the support of the Department of Energy
(DOE), and LANL is working with the Under Secretaries to actualize it
within the SSMP.
single warhead merger
17. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Anastasio, how could the merger to a
single warhead for the Minuteman III and Trident missiles affect the
workload of the TA-55 plutonium facility and will the construction of
the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) facility
affect this?
Dr. Anastasio. In April 2010, NNSA announced that it had assigned
the W78 LEP to LLNL. At this point I am unaware of any decision by NNSA
to consolidate W78/W88 into a common warhead. Based on conversations
with LLNL, LANL is prepared to support the pit options under
consideration for the LEP.
If pit production is required for future LEPs, LANL has the
capability to support that mission with adequate investments to sustain
the TA-55 infrastructure. The TA-55 reinvestment project is a multi-
year effort that will ensure the continued safe and secure operations
of the Nation's only pit manufacturing facility for an additional 25
years. The construction and use of the CMRR facility is unaffected by
pit type and is essential to execute the entire plutonium mission. The
samples analyzed in the CMRR are independent of what type of pit is
being made in the plutonium facility (PF-4).
national ignition facility
18. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Miller, when do you expect the National
Ignition Facility (NIF) to become fully operational to support the
stockpile?
Dr. Miller. The NIF became operational in March 2009. The National
Ignition Campaign (NIC) is scheduled to be completed at the end of
2012. The NIC's goals are the development of a reliable and robust
ignition platform for experiments and transition of NIF to fully
operational international user facility. In 2009, stockpile stewards
began to utilize NIF as an experimental facility capable of creating
the temperatures and pressures necessary to study the physics of the
nuclear phase of weapons performance. At the present time, the NIC is
focused on achieving ignition and supporting non-ignition stockpile
stewardship experiments on NIF that are aligned with the SSP's
Predictive Capability Framework roadmap. As the NIC continues,
infrastructure such as diagnostics, cryogenics, and personnel and
environmental protection systems to support a wide range of types of
SSP experiments are being integrated into the facility. NIF is
scheduled to complete its transition from project completion to routine
facility operations in support of the NNSA's SSP by the end of fiscal
year 2012.
19. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Miller, how do you envision NIF and
Sandia's Z machine working together under the stockpile program?
Dr. Miller. NNSA laser (NIF and OMEGA) and pulsed power (Z-machine)
facilities are fundamentally different types of experimental platforms.
They are complementary and provide unique and important capabilities
for the SSP. Experiments at these facilities will support stockpile
assessment via validation of Advanced Simulation and Computing (ASC)
codes through the direct measurement of:
Material properties under extreme conditions of
temperature and pressure,
Radiation transport and complex hydrodynamics, and
Examination of the behavior of weapon components under
intense x-ray radiation.
NIF, and to a lesser extent OMEGA, provide the ability to focus
energy into a small volume and reach extremely high energy densities in
matter. The Z-machine can produce a comparable level of x-ray energy to
NIF, but NIF will be able to produce energy densities approximately 20
times those available at Z. Also, only NIF can be used to explore
applications of ignition, where the fusion process can be used to
create conditions approaching the temperatures and pressures in a
nuclear weapon. NIF and the Z-machine are viewed as stockpile
stewardship tools that complement rather than compete with each other,
and planned SSP experiments are designed to capitalize on strengths of
each facility.
exascale
20. Senator Bingaman. Dr. Miller, your testimony refers to advances
in computing to millions of trillions floating point operations per
second or Exascale--are you working with the DOE's Office of Science
computing program on this?
Dr. Miller. LLNL and other DOE laboratories are partnering with the
DOE Office of Science and the NNSA to advance computing from the
current PetaFlop platform (as exemplified by the 20 PetaFlop Sequoia
machine currently on schedule to be installed at LLNL in 2012) to the
Exascale regime. DOE has chartered a steering committee composed of
representatives from Argonne, Brookhaven, Lawrence Berkeley, Lawrence
Livermore, Los Alamos, Oak Ridge, Pacific Northwest, and Sandia
national laboratories (SNL) to provide advice on a proposed DOE
Exascale initiative.
Supercomputing is key to our nuclear weapons assessment and
certification mission. The majority of existing weapons types will
undergo life extension over the next two decades or so. Analysis of the
magnitude and quantity of the highly specialized and complex
simulations needed to support the full spectrum of LEP approaches
(refurbishment, reuse, and replacement) shows that Exascale computing
platforms are not only required but will need to be on-line for use in
the 2020 time frame if we are to meet programmatic milestones and
production timelines. Of particular importance is the ability to
numerically predict changes resulting from the inevitable and
continuous aging of materials in weapons produced during the Cold War
and the effects of these material changes on warhead performance. The
fact that we must perform very large numbers of these complex
simulations to rigorously quantify uncertainties further drives the
need for Exascale computing.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
nuclear posture review
21. Senator McCain. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, Dr. Hommert, and Dr.
Schwitters, a letter dated May 19, 2010, to Secretary Gates and
Secretary Chu from 10 former and well-respected lab directors cited
significant concern with the guidance set forth in the administration's
Nuclear Poster Review (NPR) to give ``strong preference to options for
refurbishment or reuse.'' The former lab directors state that such
guidance ``imposes unnecessary constraints on our engineers and
scientists'' and that based on their experience as former lab
directors, they believe this ``higher bar for certain life extension
options will stifle the creative and imaginative thinking that typifies
the excellent history of progress and development at the national
laboratories, and indeed will inhibit the NPR's goal of honing the
specialized skills needed to sustain the nuclear deterrent.''
In response to this letter from the former lab directors,
Secretaries Gates and Chu issued a response stating that supplemental
NPR guidance has made it clear that all LEP efforts should be pursued.
Has this message been clearly conveyed to you? If so, what was the
forum for doing so; was it a Presidential Directive?
Dr. Anastasio. In addition to the NPR itself, the Secretaries of
Energy and Defense response to the 10 former laboratory directors
letter dated May 19, 2010, regarding the ``2010 NPR Report and the
administration's strategy for stockpile sustainment, stated that: The
lab directors will . . . make sure that the full range of LEP
approaches, including refurbishment, reuse, and replacement of nuclear
components, are studied on a warhead case-by-case basis . . . [and]
will . . . provide findings associated with the full range of LEP
approaches and . . . make . . . recommendations based solely on their
best technical assessments of the ability of each LEP approach to meet
critical stockpile management goals.''
Dr. Miller. Yes. Senior administration officials have made it clear
to me that all LEP options should be studied. DOE Secretary Steven Chu,
in response to a question during the June 17, 2010, hearing of the
Senate Armed Services Committee, testified ``As was made clear in the
NPR, this administration is committed to studying all options available
for future LEPs, including reuse, refurbishment, and replacement on a
case-by-case basis.''
In fact, we have received subsequent reinforcement, through
meetings and conversations with key administration officials,
indicating that the NNSA laboratories have the flexibility,
responsibility, and authority to study the complete spectrum of
potential options, which includes replacement, for each future LEP in
order to provide the Nation's decisionmakers with our best technical
input upon which to base down-select decisions. NNSA's 1251 report
includes the following statement: The laboratory directors will ensure
that the full range of LEP approaches, including refurbishment, reuse,
and replacement of nuclear components, are studied for warheads on a
case-by-case basis.''
Dr. Hommert. SNL has had direct communication from the Secretary of
Energy and the NNSA concerning the response to this letter, but we have
not received a Presidential Directive. The response from Secretaries
Chu and Gates clearly states that ``the technical community is not
constrained in its exploration of technical options for warhead life
extension.'' It also assigns the laboratory directors with the
responsibility for making sure that ``the full range of LEP approaches,
including refurbishment, reuse, and replacement of nuclear components,
are studied on a warhead case-by-case basis.'' This is consistent with
the NNSA SSMP which refers to all three options: refurbishment, reuse,
and replacement; and the DOD 1251 document which specifically states
``the full range of LEP approaches will be considered.''
Dr. Schwitters. The message that all options for future LEPs should
be considered was made clear in the NPR itself, which states: ``The
United States will study options for ensuring the safety, security, and
reliability of nuclear warheads on a case-by-case basis, consistent
with the congressionally-mandated Stockpile Management Program. The
full range of LEP approaches will be considered: refurbishment of
existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from different warheads,
and replacement of nuclear components.'' We agree that all technical
options can and should continue to be explored.
When it comes to implementing a particular LEP, we believe the
preference assigned in the NPR to refurbishment and reuse is both
prudent and appropriate. In the absence of underground nuclear testing,
it is important to maintain strict discipline over any changes made to
the nuclear explosive packages (NEP) of stockpile systems to avoid
unintentionally undermining confidence. In the language of QMU, a
change designed to improve some performance margin M can actually have
a deleterious effect on confidence if the change increases the
uncertainty in performance U such that the net value of M/U is
diminished.
nnsa weapons program funding
22. Senator McCain. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, the
10-year plan for complex modernization attributes only $10 billion to
modernization efforts and the projected cost of CMRR and Uranium
Processing Facility (UPF) is roughly $7 billion, if not more. How
confident are you that the remaining $3 billion will be sufficient to
conduct three projected warhead life extensions while also bolstering
overall stewardship, surveillance, and dismantlement efforts?
Dr. Anastasio. Both the CMRR facility and the UPF are still being
planned, and cost baselines have not been finalized. We are working
closely with NNSA on this important project. To deliver CMRR
successfully we must have certainty in funding and consistency in
requirements throughout the project. In addition, cost baselines have
not been established for the projected warhead LEPs. At the same time,
there are many other essential facilities across the complex and at Los
Alamos that cannot be neglected because of our necessary focus on the
major nuclear facilities.
Many of the science, technology, engineering, and infrastructure
investments are planned for the second half of the next decade. These
investments must be implemented within an uncertain and challenging
financial future facing the Nation. I am also concerned about currently
unquantified costs associated with pensions and sustaining the rest of
the nuclear security enterprise, both of which are expected to increase
during the next 10 years.
Dr. Miller. In the out-years, the uncertainties associated with
baselines for the planned LEPs and construction of large facilities are
my primary source of concern. As discussed during testimony, without
detailed designs for the CMRR facility and the UPF and the
corresponding cost analysis, funding requirements will remain
uncertain. The laboratories and plants are working with the NNSA to
develop baselines for these projects, but the total costs are not yet
known. It is critically important to budget for adequate contingency in
large construction projects to ensure sufficient flexibility to
accommodate the detailed design issues that typically arise in
constructing these complex, one-of-a-kind facilities. It is equally
important to ensure that funding for these construction projects does
not erode available funding for the science and technology activities
that underpin the maintenance and assessment of the U.S. nuclear
deterrent.
The fiscal year 2011 budget increase proposed by the administration
is a positive first step toward revitalizing the nuclear weapons
complex necessary to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The nation's
nuclear strategy--with or without the planned force reductions--
requires a SSMP that is balanced, integrated, and sustained over time.
The level of investment, consistent with planned nuclear warhead
reductions, must grow over time to capitalize construction of essential
new facilities, sustain a robust science technology and engineering
core, manage the aging stockpile, support an increased level of LEP
work, and maintain a critically skilled workforce. Until the baselines
are completed, we will not have an accurate and reliable estimation of
the resources required. It is clear that sustained effort will be
necessary to ensure the appropriate balance within the program across
all of its requirements.
Dr. Hommert. It is true that the overall allocation of the
requested resources is strongly weighted toward construction of these
two key facilities. NNSA is strongly committed to the program
management discipline required to control the costs associated with
major construction projects. The $3 billion is in addition to the
baseline funding, and comes with a commensurate set of new
requirements, as you've noted in your question. While the exact funding
profiles required for the upcoming LEPs are not yet known precisely, we
are committed to working with NNSA to fund the highest priority
activities, to allow us to deliver on the LEPs, strengthen our
knowledge and confidence in the existing stockpile, and sustain and
advance our capabilities for the future.
23. Senator McCain. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, do
you believe a standing requirement, akin to the 1251 report, for DOE to
provide a 10-year top-line budget figure would be beneficial and
provide additional fiscal stability within the complex?
Dr. Anastasio. Yes. A disciplined, comprehensive, and coordinated
planning process could produce an annual long-term budget for the
nuclear security enterprise that would benefit DOE, NNSA, the nuclear
weapons laboratories, and the production plants. This product could be
one way of informing Congress so that a defensible investment strategy
could be sustained and stable funding could be established.
Dr. Miller. Yes. Annual updates that reflect evolving requirements,
progress on the baselines for the major efforts within the NNSA
enterprise, and arising issues in the stockpile would be beneficial for
the purposes of forecasting and planning. It is important to note that
the nature of NNSA's work requires program flexibility because
technical issues arise in the stockpile and requirements evolve. The
scope of work and budgets will need to be correspondingly adjusted.
Annual updates to the summary of the SSMP could provide a mechanism to
outline the program's funding requirements and projections. In
addition, I would recommend consideration of an annual assessment of
the health of the integrated enterprise be included as part of these
updates. Both would foster dialog to achieve a national consensus on
programmatic requirements and expectations for a sustained SSMP.
Dr. Hommert. The NNSA undertakes an annual budget process that
results in the President's budget request to Congress. This annual
process includes multi-year funding requirements. If Congress feels
that a longer-term funding profile is important as part of the annual
process, SNL would willingly support NNSA in developing longer future
budget estimates.
24. Senator McCain. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, I
understand that prior to the release of the fiscal year 2011 budget you
originally requested more than a billion dollar increase in the weapons
program account. Given the President's budget allocated a $624 million
increase, about two-thirds of your original request, I am interested in
learning more about what the administration chose not to fund.
Specifically, what does the difference between your original request
and the actual budget represent in terms of infrastructure, human
capital, and scope of work?
Dr. Anastasio. As I said previously in my testimony, `` . . . the
administration has developed a fiscal year 2011 budget that moves us in
the right direction. I view the NNSA's fiscal year 2011 budget request
as a positive first step and I urge its approval by Congress.''
Further, I believe that we need to be focused not on a single year's
budget, but rather on a long-term sustainable program that is both
balanced and flexible as new costing information comes available on the
nuclear facilities and on the planned LEPs.
Dr. Miller. The fiscal year 2011 budget increase proposed by the
administration is a positive first step toward revitalizing the nuclear
weapons complex necessary to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent and
reversing the recent trend of declining budgets. The budget increase
proposal was informed by a request developed a year ago by the NNSA
laboratory directors for a 3-year funding ramp increase to the NNSA
Weapons Activities account to create a balanced and robust program of
work across the three primary areas in the SSP. These include: (1) the
science and technology that underpins our understanding of an aging
stockpile and supports a reinvigorated surveillance program; (2) the
LEPs that are necessary to keep the systems safe, secure, and
effective; and (3) the modernization of the facilities and
infrastructure.
NNSA recognizes the importance of a balanced program of work
outlined by the laboratory directors, but chose to stretch the schedule
for meeting deliverables. While some aspects of the laboratory's
activities could proceed more rapidly if funding were available, this
situation is different than an ``unfunded requirement'' or true
shortfall.
The original laboratory director request contained additional
funding in the following areas (compared to the fiscal year 2011
President's budget request):
Surveillance. The increase in surveillance provided
for a robust surveillance program. This program included both
augmented data collection for the annual assessment process and
development of advanced techniques for monitoring the health of
the stockpile. NNSA is applying a risk-informed design process
to allocate fiscal year 2011 funding towards the highest
priority surveillance concerns. The President's budget request
does include a modest increase in funding for surveillance.
Readiness in Technical Base and Facilities (RTBF). The
laboratory director proposal recognized the need for a robust
facility infrastructure. The fiscal year 2011 budget request is
a positive first step, but continues to fall short in RTBF at
many sites across the complex. At LLNL, due to a $6 million
fiscal year 2011 RTBF shortfall, funding for high hazard and
nuclear facility compliance is marginal.
Science, technology, and engineering. The laboratory
directors requested additional funding in Science Campaigns,
ASC, and the Engineering Surety Campaign. This funding was
intended to underpin the long-term health of the deterrent and
provide a more rapid maturation of technologies that could be
used in future LEPs. As a specific example, the laboratory
director proposal recommended initiating a vigorous Exascale
Initiative in fiscal year 2011. Fiscal year 2011 funding
shortfalls are delaying work in these areas.
Finally, it should be noted that the proposed fiscal year 2011
increase provides for workforce stabilization, which is an encouraging
step toward workforce augmentation. At LLNL, the President's budget
request would allow us to fill key vacancies, reinvigorating the
critically skilled workforce underpinning the SSP.
Dr. Hommert. The Nuclear Security Enterprise Integration Council
(NSEIC) developed a number of ``uplift'' scenarios, ranging from a $400
million increase to a $1.8 billion increase. At each scenario level
there were different impacts to scope and schedule. The increase
allocated in the President's budget fell within our planning scenarios.
Specifically for the programs where there is a major effort at SNL, the
fiscal year 2011 budget adequately supports those programs. It will be
important to annually reassess budget requirements as technical
requirements and timelines become firm.
25. Senator McCain. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, as
a result of earmark pressures on coveted water projects, there is
concern that the appropriators are not going to be able to fully fund
the President's fiscal year 2011 budget request for the NNSA. Without a
bipartisan commitment to provide adequate and sustained resources, do
you believe we will be able to maintain the level of confidence
necessary to certify the stockpile without underground testing?
Dr. Anastasio. The NPR provides the necessary policy framework,
which can lead to a long overdue national consensus on nuclear policy
for the United States. The fiscal year 2011 request provides a positive
first step in providing the needed fiscal resources needed by the
nuclear enterprise to sustain the nuclear deterrent into the future.
Today, I judge that the stockpile is safe, secure, and effective. I
can make the judgment with confidence based on the investments made in
the SSP since the cessation of nuclear testing in 1992. As the
stockpile continues to age, we as a Nation must continue to invest in
the required experimental, computational, simulation, and modeling
tools needed by scientists and engineers to understand, diagnose, and
correct stockpile issues as they arise. I am cautiously optimistic that
we can address the challenges faced by the program with sustained
commitment from multiple administrations and Congresses with acceptable
levels of risk. As we go forward it will be critical that the program
is balanced, and that it maintains flexibility to meet changing
requirements.
Dr. Miller. Increased investment is required to revitalize the
complex, support the necessary planned LEPs, and sustain the science
and technology capabilities that underpin the annual assessment and
maintenance of the U.S. stockpile. Without sustained funding beginning
with the President's fiscal year 2011 budget request, I would be very
concerned about the future. The program cannot be sustained if the
declining funding trajectory of the past several years for the NNSA
continues. The laboratories' capabilities related to the assessment and
certification of the stockpile has been eroding; the rate of acquiring
key experimental data has been slowing and key capabilities in high
performance computing have not been advancing as rapidly as we prefer.
The Nation's deterrent requires annual support of a sustainable SSP by
successive administrations and Congresses in order to maintain an
effective national strategic deterrent.
Dr. Hommert. Throughout its history the nuclear weapons program has
had the support of Congress as a fundamental component of our national
security. Over the past 15 years, the stewardship program, which
provides the opportunity for all three laboratories to develop tools
that are essential to sustaining the stockpile in the absence of
nuclear testing, has received strong bipartisan support. It will be
essential to continue this as we now commit to an extensive and
necessary set of LEP activities. I cannot speak directly to the impact
of the congressional committee structure, only to the importance of
sustained bipartisan support for the deterrent.
26. Senator McCain. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, in
Dr. Anastasio's prepared remarks he stated that he fears ``that there
is already a gap emerging between expectations and fiscal realities''
and that he is ``concerned that in the administration's section 1251
report, much of the planned funding increase for weapons activities do
not come to fruition until the second half of the 10-year period.'' Can
you please elaborate and do you feel that some of that funding should
be shifted to the first half of the 10-year period?
Dr. Anastasio. My concern refers to the need for sustainable
investments that carry across multiple administrations and Congresses.
Many of the science, technology, engineering, and infrastructure
investments are planned for the second half of the next decade. These
investments must be implemented within an uncertain and challenging
financial future facing the Nation.
Significant budgetary declines in nuclear weapons funding have been
seen many times when the Nation has faced difficult fiscal realities.
The President's fiscal year 2011 budget request is a positive first
step in the fiscal implementation of the roadmap to sustain the long-
term safety, security, and effectiveness of the stockpile. While
shifting some funds to the first half would provide some near-term
relief it would reduce the out-year funding when the financial risks
are even greater. The roadmap is a reasonable path to achieving these
ends, and it must be fully implemented.
Dr. Miller. I do share Dr. Anastasio's concerns. Funding must be
appropriately allocated and sustained for several decades across the
various SSMP accounts in order to maintain a balanced program. The
three primary areas within the program are: (1) the science and
technology base that underpins our understanding of an aging stockpile,
which includes a reinvigorated surveillance program; (2) the LEPs to
keep the systems safe, secure, and effective; and (3) the modernization
of the enterprise's facilities and infrastructure. The baselines for
the LEPs and several large construction projects, namely the CMRR
facility and the Uranium Production Facility (UPF) are still maturing
and their total costs are not yet known.
NNSA's funding profile should reflect the workload of the complex
in any given year consistent with the stage and anticipated pace of the
various projects within the SSMP. Until these baselines are finalized,
it is difficult to assess the funding requirements of any given year.
Dr. Hommert. In some areas it would be preferable to have more of
the funding available earlier. However, the exact funding profile is
much less important than the imperative of a sustained national
commitment to fully fund the program over the coming two decades,
starting in fiscal year 2011. The immediate imperative of the B61 LEP
has received substantial near-term funding.
27. Senator McCain. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, in
Dr. Hommert's prepared remarks he stated that the future of SSMP
presents a number of challenges and that we must ``ensure that
resources are commensurate with the requirements and expectations.''
How well do you feel the fiscal year 2011 budget and projected out-
years funding address the challenges ahead?
Dr. Anastasio. The President's fiscal year 2011 budget request
represents a positive first step in the fiscal implementation of the
roadmap to sustain the long-term safety, security and effectiveness of
the stockpile. The budget plan for the out-years also moves in the
right direction to achieving the roadmap.
I want to emphasize the entire roadmap must be fully implemented,
including the science, technology, engineering, and infrastructure
investments planned in the second half of the decade. I am cautiously
optimistic that with sustained commitment from multiple administrations
and multiple Congresses that we can address the challenges faced by the
program with acceptable levels of risk. As we go forward it will be
critical that the program is balanced, and that it maintains
flexibility to meet changing requirements.
Dr. Miller. The budget increase for the NNSA in the President's
fiscal year 2011 proposed budget is a positive first step toward
revitalizing the nuclear weapons complex. The budget request seeks to
reverse recent downward funding trends and reflects the need for
increased investment to maintain sufficient capability to ensure the
viability of the U.S. stockpile. The proposed budget outlined in the
1251 report, which includes balanced investments in stockpile
maintenance, science and technology, and infrastructure
recapitalization, is required to sustain the nuclear deterrent.
There are two large facilities that must be built (the CMRR
facility and the UPF) and two LEPs that must be conducted over the
course of the next decade. The nature of NNSA's work is quite
challenging, particularly the construction of very complex, one-of-a-
kind facilities, which makes out-year budgeting challenging. Working
with NNSA, the complex has begun to develop baselines for the major
construction projects and the next two proposed LEPs. Out-year funding
requirements could present a significant challenge depending on the
full costs of the LEPs and major construction projects. For these types
of projects, it is very important to provide flexibility and
appropriate contingency that reflects the existence of many and
differing sources of uncertainty within each project. At this point in
time, it is difficult to say exactly what the right amount will be in
any given year or over the 10-year horizon because the baselines for
these complex facilities are still maturing. Certainly, fiscal year
2011 increase provides welcome relief from the constrained budgets and
eroding purchasing power of the last several years.
Dr. Hommert. We have confidence that the fiscal year 2011 budget,
if appropriated at the level of the President's budget request, is
sufficient to support the highest priority SNL activities for the
nuclear weapons program. Completion of the 6.216.2A study for the B61
LEP will allow us to better establish the required funding profile
beyond fiscal year 2011.
28. Senator McCain. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert,
does the budget's allocation of resources provide much, if any, room
for error?
Dr. Anastasio. I view the NNSA's fiscal year 2011 budget request as
a positive first step and I urge its approval by Congress. I am
cautiously optimistic that with sustained commitment from multiple
administrations and multiple Congresses that we can address the
challenges faced by the program with acceptable levels of risk.
Further, I believe that we need to be focused not on a single year's
budget, but rather on a long-term sustainable program that is both
balanced and flexible as new costing information comes available on the
nuclear facilities and on the planned LEPs.
Dr. Miller. In my opinion, there is no fat in the program of work
that has been planned and, in fact, significant risks exist; therefore,
there is no room for error. Indeed, even successful execution of the
proposed program of work within the budget requested is dependent on
achieving significant improvement in the overall efficiency of the
governance process. Over the last several years, we have eliminated
redundancies and implemented efficiency improvements in our efforts to
minimize, to the extent possible, the impact of the recent budget
declines we have experienced. We are as lean as a prudent level of risk
will allow. The fiscal year 2011 budget proposed by the administration
is a positive first step toward revitalizing the NNSA's national
security enterprise. The fiscal year 2011 budget request seeks to
reverse past funding trends and reflects the need for increased
investment to maintain sufficient capability to ensure the viability of
the U.S. stockpile. Working with the NNSA, the complex has begun to
develop baselines for the major construction projects and the next two
proposed LEPs. It is difficult to say exactly what the right amount
will be in any given year or over a 10-year horizon until the baselines
for these facilities and LEPs are firmly established. Out-year budgets
may have to be adjusted to support both the full costs of the LEPs and
major construction projects and costs of sustainable core science,
technology, and engineering capabilities. It will be very important to
provide the flexibility and contingency appropriate for these complex
large-scale, often one-of-a-kind, projects.
Dr. Hommert. The magnitude of the required work scope over the
coming decade is challenging, as we extend the lifetimes of key
warheads in the stockpile and invest in our infrastructure and
scientific capabilities. We must manage our resources very carefully,
and recognize that periodic reevaluation will be necessary.
29. Senator McCain. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, are
there any requirements currently unfunded within your facilities?
Dr. Anastasio. Although I am pleased with the proposed fiscal year
2011 budget, I remain concerned about the longer-term sustainability,
in particular on the accounts that fund facility operations, like RTBF.
The current fiscal year 2011 LANL RTBF budget target increases by 3
percent over the fiscal year 2010 budget authority, but is followed by
3 years of steady decline in the current Future Year Nuclear Security
Plan (FYNSP) targets. Increased demands on the RTBF budgets at LANL
have already begun to rise with a peak requirements case expected in
fiscal year 2012 during the current FYNSP and the next significant
increase expected in fiscal years 2016/2017 with the potential start-up
of the replacement Radiological Liquid Waste Treatment Facility. LANL
will work within the budget targets to develop a plan that meets all
nuclear safety, security, and compliance requirements first; all non-
nuclear safety, security, and compliance requirements second; and all
remaining warm standby activities within remaining budgets--which may
require halting programmatic work in facilities that cannot remain
appropriately operational within the funding constraints.
As I have stated in previous testimony, it is still important to
improve the balance within the program and I also remained concerned
about the issues between scope and fiscal realities. Much of the
existing physical infrastructure at LANL is old, 50 percent of the
buildings are greater than 40 years old. In addition, the scientific
equipment at the laboratory must continue to be refreshed as new
technology becomes available and we must be able to effectively use our
key scientific capabilities, such as Dual-Axis Radiographic
Hydrodynamic Test (DARHT), LANSCE, and NIF; and continue to advance
toward the ability to perform computing at the Exascale.
Dr. Miller. The President's fiscal year 2011 budget request is a
good start, helping to alleviate the downward pressure on the top line.
However within the President's fiscal year 2011 budget request, the
near-term budget pressure at LLNL continues to be most significant in
operations of facilities within the Readiness in Technical Base
Facilities (RTBF) account. RTBF is intended to provide required core
infrastructure support to the weapons laboratories and plants. The
President's fiscal year 2011 budget request included $80 million for
LLNL's RTBF operations; this is $6 million below the amount needed to
maintain stable funding necessary to meet our requirements.
At LLNL, the RTBF account essentially funds three major facilities
that support for NNSA programs (and some work for other U.S. Government
agencies): (1) Decontamination and Hazardous Waste Treatment Facility;
(2) Superblock plutonium facility; and (3) our high explosives
facilities at Site 300 which is interconnected with our High Explosives
Applications Facility. Adequate RTBF funding is necessary to comply
with safety standards for the operations of these facilities. LLNL is
in continual discussions with NNSA to address the $6 million shortfall
in RTBF. However, we remain concerned that we will be increasing the
risk of compliance issues with regard to these facilities without full
funding for LLNL's RTBF account and that our ability to respond to
emerging safety issues in nuclear and high hazard facilities will
erode.
LLNL's infrastructure will continue to underpin annual assessment
and stockpile certification for the foreseeable future.
Dr. Hommert. While the recently approved fiscal year 2010
reprogramming will alleviate much of the B61 LEP technology maturation
shortfall, further work is required with NNSA to address key facility
and infrastructure requirements. For SNL these include the second phase
of our Test Capabilities Revitalization project (TCR Phase 2) and
upgrades to Tonopah Test Range (TTR). TCR Phase 2 is urgently required
to ensure full support of the design and development activities for the
B61 LEP. We are working with NNSA to pursue funding for this project in
fiscal year 2011. Upgrades at TTR are required to support B61 LEP
development flight testing.
30. Senator McCain. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, do
you foresee any instances where resources above the administration's
request may be needed in fiscal year 2012 or beyond?
Dr. Anastasio. The laboratories will work closely with NNSA to
develop realistic financial plans that meet stockpile responsibilities,
sustain the necessary science, technology and engineering, and
construct, and maintain needed physical infrastructure. In particular,
restoring the required scientific and physical infrastructure is
essential. When coupled with pension challenges, this will take time
and sustained support from multiple administrations and Congresses. I
recognize the Nation faces fiscal challenges, and I will ensure
efficiency and accountability in executing the laboratory's
responsibilities.
Dr. Miller. There are several areas where additional resources may
be required. There are two large facilities that must be built, the UPF
and the CMRR facility, two LEPs that must be conducted over the next
decade; and the Nation must sustain the science and engineering
capabilities to support these LEPs and the annual assessment process.
Each area has its own unique challenges. The construction of very
complex, one-of-a-kind facilities makes out-year budgeting quite
uncertain. The NNSA and the complex have begun to develop baselines for
the major construction projects and the next two proposed LEPs. Future
budget requirements could present a significant challenge depending on
the full costs of the LEPs and major construction projects. For these
types of projects, it is very important to provide flexibility and
appropriate contingency that reflects the existence of many and
differing sources of uncertainty within each project. It is difficult
to say exactly what the right amount will be in any given year or over
a 10-year horizon until the baselines for these facilities and LEPs are
firmly established. The budget estimates will need to be evaluated
annually based on the evolving baselines of these projects. The science
and technology base upon which the program relies must also be nurtured
and sustained. In this regard, funding for an Exascale simulation
capability has yet to be identified.
Dr. Hommert. Over the next several years, SNL has a number of
funding issues that need to be addressed. These are small in comparison
with the overall nuclear weapons program budget, but still critically
important to our success. One of the larger funding requirements is the
recapitalization of obsolete tooling and equipment in our trusted
microelectronics fabrication facility. This will require an investment
of approximately $100 million over the next few years. Another example
is the need to strengthen our materials science capability, which has
degraded in recent years due to resource constraints. Materials science
is a critical capability over the entire nuclear weapons life cycle.
The adequacy of the budgets in fiscal year 2012 and beyond to support
LEPs other than the B61 will not be well-understood until the scopes
and schedules of these LEPs are better defined.
new start safeguards
31. Senator McCain. Dr. Anastasio, in your prepared remarks you
asserted that one way to assure the long-term stability of funding and
maintain focus across multiple administrations and Congresses would be
to establish safeguards similar to some used in past arms control
treaties. Could you specify more directly on what sort of safeguards
you believe should be included as conditions for START ratification?
Dr. Anastasio. Safeguards such as increased research and
development, improved monitoring and verification capabilities,
preparations to respond to noncompliance or the collapse of a treaty,
et cetera, have long been a feature of arms control agreements (e.g.,
SALT I and II, TTBT, and PNET) and, in my view, would be one mechanism
to consider for New START. Such safeguards would help ensure the long-
term sustainability of stockpile stewardship, infrastructure
modernization, and monitoring and verification programs on which the
laboratory's missions and U.S. security depend today and, even more so,
as numbers are reduced further.
With these considerations in mind, I believe it would be useful for
the administration and Congress to consider safeguards for the New
START treaty. Such safeguards would be designed to ensure a long-term
commitment to and continued funding of the broad range of activities
needed to sustain the stockpile; and to maintain and modernize
facilities and programs to ensure the continued application of human
scientific resources to those programs on which continued progress in
sustaining the nuclear deterrent depends.
Today, the assessment of the stockpile is reported in annual
assessment letters from the three laboratory directors and the
Commander of Strategic Command (STRATCOM). I would recommend that these
procedures be modified such that these reports and letters be sent
concurrently to both the President and relevant committees of Congress.
In addition, an annual unclassified letter from the three laboratory
directors and commander of STRATCOM to the President and Congress could
be required on the health and status of the stockpile, the NNSA
complex, and the program. Alternatively, Congress could hold an annual
open/closed hearing on these same subjects.
intellectual infrastructure
32. Senator McCain. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, the
impending intellectual brain-drain is a significant concern and
heightens the importance of recruiting the next generation of weapons
designers. Do you foresee any difficulty in recruiting new weapons
engineers in an environment driven by the recent NPR that discourages
work on new designs?
Dr. Anastasio. I remain concerned about developing the workforce
for the future and believe that this is one of my most important jobs
as the LANL Director. I am confident that the scope of work outlined in
the NPR is sufficiently challenging to help us attract and retain the
``best and brightest''. LANL has been successful in recruiting by
utilizing our strong post-doctoral fellowship programs and internal
graduate and undergraduate student programs. Our student programs at
the laboratory continue to bring excellent students into the laboratory
and provide a strong recruiting mechanism. Currently, the laboratory
has over 400 post-doctoral fellows and hosted over 1,300 students
during this summer. Additionally, the national laboratories are
utilizing DOE- and NNSA-funded programs like the Stockpile Stewardship
Graduate Fellowship Program and the Computational Science Graduate
Fellowship Programs to find and recruit the best and brightest.
The key to recruitment is sustaining the strong science funding
that is essential to carry out the full set of scientific research and
development. As I have argued before, many of the investments of
stewardship are coming to fruition, notably the DARHT Facility at LANL,
the NIF at LLNL, and the MESA facility at SNL. However, just as the
Nation needs to reap the benefits of these investments, the need to
recapitalize the infrastructure and the growing operational costs from
the ever-increasing safety, security, and environmental standards, make
it extremely difficult to maintain, use or enhance these stockpile
stewardship tools so necessary to preserve the deterrent, to further
other national security goals, and to ensure recruitment and retention
of the best scientists.
Dr. Miller. Maintaining intellectual capabilities and technical
competencies is a priority for the national laboratories. Success in
sustaining workforce excellence depends on the laboratories engaging in
a compelling national program with sufficient funding over the long
term. The program must provide opportunities for stimulating scientific
research and engineering advancements to attract, retain, and continue
to train the talent necessary to fulfill the challenging mission of
maintaining our nuclear deterrent. In addition, the laboratories must
be able to provide a competitive set of benefits and work-life
programs. I believe that if the funding increase is provided, we have a
compelling national program with opportunities for stimulating research
to exercise the talents of the laboratories, which will enable us to
maintain a skilled workforce.
A balanced program that promotes a compelling SSP with a sustained
science, technology, and engineering (ST&E) effort is needed to provide
the pipeline of skilled personnel to meet program demands and ensure
that our deterrent remains second to none in the future. The program
vision and objectives outlined in the NPR require vigorous ST&E. ST&E
activities must provide adequate opportunity to exercise skills in the
complete design-through-production cycle, which is essential training
for laboratory and production plant personnel. Senior administration
officials have made it clear that the NNSA laboratories have the
flexibility, responsibility, and authority to study the complete
spectrum of potential options, which includes replacement, for each
future LEP in order to provide the Nation's decisionmakers with our
best technical input upon which to base down-select decisions.
Consistent with this guidance, NNSA's 1251 report includes the
following statement:
``The laboratory directors will ensure that the full range of LEP
approaches, including refurbishment, reuse, and replacement of nuclear
components are studied for warheads on a case-by-case basis.''
LLNL welcomes NNSA's assignment responsibility of the W78 LEP to
this laboratory. This program of work is a vital element in maintaining
the competency and capability of LLNL's design and engineering cadre
through an integrated system design/engineering/manufacturing process.
The work will serve to attract highly trained and motivated workforce
needed to sustain nuclear deterrence.
Finally, I add that we are all aware of the challenges caused by
rising health-care costs and pension liabilities. As we move forward to
resolve these issues, it is important to keep in mind that they have a
significant influence on our ability to recruit and retain world-class
scientific, engineering, technical, and operational talent.
Dr. Hommert. NPR guidance on new designs applies primarily to the
NEP components. SNL's primary responsibilities are for non-nuclear
components whose underlying technologies evolve and change at a rapid
pace, mostly driven by commercial applications. As technologies change,
we are forced to new designs to avoid sunset technology issues. This
new design work offers challenges not seen in the commercial sector,
namely design for operation over long periods in extremely harsh
environments with near perfect reliability. Our data show that we
continue to successfully recruit the best and brightest technical
talent to the nuclear weapons program. The challenge going forward is
to motivate, train, and retain them. Key to success in this area is
clear evidence of an enduring national commitment to the U.S. nuclear
deterrent, and the concomitant programmatic stability. Also important
is challenging technical work and a work environment that includes
state-of-the-art facilities, design tools, and technologies.
b61 reprogramming
33. Senator McCain. Dr. Hommert, in your prepared remarks you
stated that the B61 LEP is a primary driver for the current state of
urgency across the weapons complex. DOE recently submitted a request to
reprogram $53 million of the NNSA's fiscal year 2010 appropriated
budget to support urgent funding for the B61 LEP study. How critical is
the timely approval of this reprogramming request?
Dr. Hommert. The reprogramming request was approved by the four
relevant congressional committees in August. The funds are essential to
complete the B61 LEP 6.2/6.2A and the technology maturation required
for the program.
34. Senator McCain. Dr. Hommert, what would the consequences of
denying such a request have on meeting the critical 2017 deadline?
Dr. Hommert. Please see the answer to question #33.
35. Senator McCain. Dr. Hommert, is the fiscal year 2011 and the
future years budget plan sufficient to support the fiscal year 2017
delivery of the B61 and to maintain the W76 schedule?
Dr. Hommert. The B61 LEP 6.2/6.2A study is underway and proceeding
thanks to fiscal year 2010 reprogramming granted by Congress. The
completion of this study in fiscal year 2011 will provide the
information needed to assess the adequacy of outyear funding levels.
The W76-1 is now in production, and so the funding needs are largest at
the plants going forward. My understanding is that the plants have
adequate resources to maintain the current schedule.
36. Senator McCain. Dr. Hommert, is there any likelihood of the B61
production slipping as a result of budget issues in fiscal years 2010-
2012?
Dr. Hommert. We are currently viewing the fiscal year 2017 first
production unit (FPU) date as a constraint on the program. Therefore,
any budget shortfalls would impact the scope of the LEP. We strongly
advocate the full scope program, and believe it would be ill-advised to
miss the opportunity to incorporate 21st century safety and security
features into the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile through this LEP.
jason study
37. Senator McCain. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, the
JASON Defense Advisory Panel study of the LEP released last November
has been interpreted to mean that there are no long-term reliability or
aging concerns that can't be fixed by relying on a simple refurbishment
approach. The NPR clearly concludes that refurbishment is only one of
three options that must be considered, including reuse and replacement.
Do you agree with that interpretation of the JASON study? If not,
please articulate your views in an unclassified response.
Dr. Anastasio. As I have stated in a letter to Representative
Michael Turner on January 25, 2010:
``The JASON report states that the lifetimes of today's nuclear
weapons could be extended for decades, with no anticipated loss of
confidence, by using approaches similar to those employed in LEPs to
date. I do not agree with this assertion.''
There are some materials and components in the current stockpile
that cannot be replicated in a refurbishment, and there may not be
suitable replacements that would allow sustained confidence in current
systems. Moreover, there are several technical issues that cannot be
addressed using a refurbishment-only approach, including the need to
improve the safety and security of warheads. More specifically, as I
stated in the letter to Representative Turner:
``There are several technical issues that cannot be addressed using
a refurbishment-only approach:
It is not possible to replace high explosive primaries
with insensitives high explosives primaries or implement
certain intrinsic surety features in today's stockpile using
refurbishment because of current system constraints.
Weapon aging, which can manifest itself in the form of
corrosion, microscopic and macroscopic defects, et cetera, can
lead to off-normal or feature-driven disruption to nuclear
performance and diminish the available performance margin in
low-margin weapons more rapidly than the weapons could be
cycled through a refurbishment. This risk can be managed by
preemptively increasing margins--but by amounts larger than
those available through refurbishment.
The JASON correctly recognizes that `Substantial
reductions in yield for various stockpile warheads, which may
be called for in the forthcoming NPR, also could not be
accomplished using refurbishment.' ''
Further, the JASON report states that some reuse and replacement
options require a more advanced understanding of weapons physics. While
this is an accurate statement, it also applies to refurbishment. It
does not mean that reuse and replacement options are precluded
technically. In fact, the classified JASON report supports reuse and
replacement options.
Dr. Miller. The JASON report says ``lifetimes of today's nuclear
warheads could be extended for decades. by using approaches similar to
those employed in LEPs to date.'' As was made clear in the NPR and DOE
Secretary Chu's recent testimony, this administration is committed to
studying all of the options available for future LEPs--including reuse,
refurbishment, and replacement--on a case-by-case basis. I agree with
the administration that we need to be able to study the full suite of
LEP options.
Studying the full suite of LEP options provides the additional
benefit of opening up the possibility of improving the safety,
security, manufacturability, maintainability, and performance margin of
the stockpile. Based on current and anticipated production capacity, it
will take more than a decade to complete any LEP for the stockpile--
independent of whether or not they include intrinsic safety and
security improvements. Recognizing this, we are investigating a variety
of options to improve safety and security of the stockpile warheads
that grows over time with technology advances. As opportunities present
themselves through planned LEPs, incorporation of advanced safety and
security features should be considered and put forward as one of the
case-by-case options developed in studying the full suite of options--
reuse, replacement, and refurbishment.
Dr. Hommert. In the JASON's study, the terms refurbish, reuse, and
replace were applied primarily to the nuclear explosive package (NEP),
and I defer to Dr. Anastasio and Dr. Miller in this regard. I would
like to point out, though, that even if NEP refurbishments can address
reliability and aging concerns, the refurbishment approach does limit
the options we have for improving the safety and security of the
stockpile. I therefore support the NPR guidance to consider all
options. For SNL, most of the non-nuclear components in the stockpile
today are based on obsolete technologies. Indeed, the most recently
developed nuclear warhead, the W88, was designed in the early 1980s
when cell phones weighed four pounds each. Massive investments by the
private sector have led to staggering improvements in the
miniaturization and functionality of microelectronics. These advances
offer real opportunities for safety and security improvements to our
nuclear weapons.
38. Senator McCain. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, an
area of significant concern involves the low rate at which we are
actually surveilling systems in the current stockpile. Is the
surveillance of weapons systems receiving the resources necessary to
proactively predict potential aging issues?
Dr. Anastasio. My congressional testimony highlights my concern
that we are not doing as much surveillance as we should be doing. I
have also documented my concerns in my annual assessment letters and
their supporting documentation. The fiscal year 2011 budget request
begins to address this concern. Sustained management focus and
additional funding will be required to redress this shortfall.
Surveillance involves two elements. The first is to understand the
current condition of the warheads/bombs with respect to the original
design intent. The second is to invest in the technical capabilities to
enable predictions of future conditions. The need to invest in
predictive technologies is driven by aging of the stockpile. Funding
for these elements comes from different sources, each of which competes
with other priorities.
Both elements grow in importance as the stockpile ages. Actual
surveillance work and the analysis of the data produced reveal the
condition of the stockpile and provide the inputs for evaluating future
conditions.
Dr. Miller. In recent years, the laboratory directors have
expressed increasing concern about their knowledge of the actual state
of the stockpile weapons in their annual assessment letters to the
Secretaries of Energy and Defense. The fiscal year 2011 budget request
is sufficient to prevent further atrophy of stockpile surveillance and
provides the surveillance enterprise a modest boost. The surveillance
enterprise is being scrutinized and the NNSA--together with the
laboratories and production facilities--is working hard to define a
right-sized forward-leaning surveillance program and the appropriate
level of funding for it.
Such a forward-looking surveillance enterprise would be designed to
meet the stockpile assessment requirements for small stockpile size. It
would build upon the two components of the NNSA surveillance
enterprise: Core Surveillance and Enhanced Surveillance. The primary
function of Core Surveillance is to gather data on the state of the
components and the materials in the stockpile. This is achieved through
destructive testing, where nuclear explosives packages are broken down
to their individual components and these are subsequently subjected to
a number of laboratory tests to determine their condition and ability
to fulfill their prescribed functions. Data derived from these tests
are examined for trends that might suggest changes that could limit the
lifetime of the component.
The primary function of Enhanced Surveillance is to develop
advanced surveillance techniques and aging models that will allow the
laboratories to project the future performance of the components and
materials in the NEP and, most importantly, to anticipate failures with
sufficient time to correct them given the accelerated aging
experiments, accumulated data from Core Surveillance, and knowledge
gained from long-term observation of similar materials in other NEPs in
the stockpile.
Dr. Hommert. Surveillance Transformation is fundamentally about
aligning our surveillance approach with the realities of a smaller,
older stockpile. While we have made progress in creating fundamental
predictive knowledge of important aging mechanisms, there is much more
to do and the pace of our progress toward the ultimate goal of
comprehensive understanding of the performance impacts has been less
than satisfying. We consistently raise this concern in our Annual
Assessment Reports (AAR). I am encouraged that the fiscal year 2011
budget identifies more resources for surveillance, however, I believe
it will be important that surveillance receive increasing priority
within the program going forward.
39. Senator McCain. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, do
such shortfalls raise concerns that you are not finding all the
problems?
Dr. Anastasio. Yes. Anomalous conditions in the stockpile and
discovered through surveillance generally can be grouped into three
categories: birth defects, deviations from design intent, and aging.
Recent modifications to the surveillance program of record and
investment strategy reflect the change in emphasis from detecting birth
defects to identification and assessment of aging phenomena. These
adjustments include a modest reduction in the number of units actually
surveilled combined with an increased number of new non-destructive
diagnostic capabilities. Even with these changes, however, it is
important to surveil the prescribed number of warheads/bombs with the
complete set of necessary diagnostics to develop confidence that the
actual condition of the stockpile is known and that the data are
adequate to predict future behavior.
Dr. Miller. Based on the results of our laboratory's most recent,
comprehensive annual assessment process, I have concluded that the U.S.
stockpile is safe, secure, and effective today. However, I continue to
be concerned about the longer term and the sufficiency of our
surveillance activities. The fiscal year 2011 uplift proposed by the
administration is a positive first step toward revitalizing the
national security enterprise, including surveillance. The fiscal year
2011 budget request seeks to reverse past funding trends and reflects
the need for increased investment to maintain sufficient capability to
ensure the viability of the U.S. stockpile. Within constrained budgets,
the NNSA is working hard to define a right-sized forward-leaning
surveillance program, encompassing both components of the surveillance
enterprise that can meet the stockpile assessment requirements for a
smaller stockpile size.
Additionally, I am encouraged by recent successes in developing and
deploying improved technology for surveillance. An example of a recent
success is the activation of the CoLOSSIS pit computed tomography
facility at Pantex, jointly developed by LLNL and Pantex. This facility
allows us to non-destructively examine weapon components in much more
detail than we have been able to achieve with previous radiographic
techniques. This facility has already returned interesting and
unexpected data on a stockpile weapons system. Additional funding,
however, is required to make full use of this and other tools.
Dr. Hommert. Our experience is that the more we look the more we
find, both current and potential future issues. In that regard, any
shortfalls are of concern. However, we have a strong cumulative
technical basis for our current assessments of the stockpile state of
health, and we will remain vigilant in our ongoing evaluations of the
stockpile.
40. Senator McCain. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, as
a result is it becoming more difficult to certify the weapons?
Dr. Anastasio. My annual assessment letters have repeatedly raised
concerns about surveillance shortcomings. As my testimony before the
committee points out ``we are not doing as much surveillance as we
should be doing.''
Up to now, certification has been maintained by increasing our
understanding of how the stockpile operates, examining impacts of
aging, performing life extensions of the W87 and W76, and by
determining that anomalies discovered in the stockpile do not affect
safety, reliability, or performance of the warhead/bomb with respect to
its military requirements. In some cases, certain stockpile management
activities or adjustments in requirements against capabilities were
required. In the future, these options may result in erosion of the
specified military characteristics, perhaps to values unacceptable to
DOD. Avoiding this will require increased scientific analysis and
insight, which drives the need to sustain a robust science,
engineering, and technology base in the nuclear security enterprise.
Maintaining this base requires national consensus for adequate and
sustained resources over the long term.
Dr. Miller. Based on the results of our laboratory's most recent,
comprehensive annual assessment process, I have concluded that the U.S.
stockpile is safe, secure, and effective today. However, the laboratory
directors have expressed increasing concern about their knowledge of
the actual state of the stockpile weapons in their annual assessment
letters to the Secretaries of Energy and Defense. Examples of the
sources of concern are the declining rate of acquiring key surveillance
data and the slow rate of developing enhanced surveillance
capabilities. As I said in my most recent assessment letter,
``reliability assessments should be withheld for systems without valid
flight/environmental tests or surveillance data within the previous 2
years.''
Prior to the fiscal year 2011 budget request, the overall funding
trajectory for nuclear weapons complex would have put the deterrent at
risk in the long term. The administration's fiscal year 2011 budget
proposal is a positive first step toward revitalizing the national
security enterprise, including surveillance. The budget request seeks
to reverse past funding trends and reflects the need for increased
investment to maintain sufficient capability to ensure the viability of
the U.S. stockpile. Within constrained budgets, the NNSA is working to
define a right-sized forward-leaning surveillance program, encompassing
both components of the surveillance enterprise that can meet the
stockpile assessment requirements for a smaller stockpile size.
Dr. Hommert. Certification is the approach we use during the
original fielding of a new warhead. Annual assessment is an ongoing
process of strengthening our knowledge and confidence in the state of
health of the stockpile over time. We have a robust, cumulative
technical basis for each of our warheads, and we continue to assess
them as being safe, secure, and reliable. From time to time we report a
temporary increase in the uncertainty associated with our assessments
due to testing shortfalls or other concerns.
41. Senator McCain. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, I
understand that the laboratories and plants have identified a shortfall
of approximately $400 million above the requested fiscal year 2011
budget request. What are these unfunded requirements?
Dr. Anastasio. The current fiscal year 2011 LANL RTBF budget target
increases by 3 percent over the fiscal year 2010 budget authority, but
is followed by 3 years of steady decline in the current FYNSP targets.
Increased demands on the RTBF budgets at LANL have already begun to
rise with a peak requirements case expected in fiscal year 2012 during
the current FYNSP and the next significant increase expected in fiscal
year 2016/2017 with the potential start-up of the replacement
Radiological Liquid Waste Treatment Facility. LANL will work within the
budget targets to develop a plan that meets all nuclear safety,
security, and compliance requirements first; all non-nuclear safety,
security, and compliance requirements second; and all remaining warm
standby activities within remaining budgets--which may require halting
programmatic work in facilities that cannot remain appropriately
operational within the funding constraints.
As I have stated in previous testimony, it is still important to
improve the balance within the program and I also remained concerned
about the issues between scope and fiscal realities. Much of the
existing physical infrastructure at LANL is old, 50 percent of the
buildings are greater than 40 years old. In addition, the scientific
equipment at the laboratory must continue to be refreshed as new
technology becomes available and we must be able to effectively use our
key scientific capabilities, such as DARHT, LANSCE, and NIF; and
continue to advance toward the ability to perform computing at the
Exascale.
Dr. Miller. The fiscal year 2011 budget increase proposed by the
administration is a positive first step toward reversing the recent
declining budget trends and revitalizing the nuclear weapons complex
necessary to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent. The budget increase
proposal was informed by a request developed a year ago by the NNSA
laboratory directors for a 3-year funding ramp increase to the NNSA
Weapons Activities account to create a balanced and robust program of
work across the three primary areas in the SSP. These include: (1) the
science and technology that underpins our understanding of an aging
stockpile and supports a reinvigorated surveillance program; (2) the
LEPs that are necessary to keep the systems safe, secure, and
effective; and (3) the modernization of the facilities and
infrastructure.
NNSA recognized the importance of a balanced program of work
outlined by the laboratory directors, but chose to stretch the schedule
for meeting deliverables. While some aspects of the laboratory's
activities could proceed more rapidly if funding were available, this
situation is different than an ``unfunded requirement'' or true
shortfall.
The original laboratory director request contained additional
funding in the following areas (compared to the fiscal year 2011
President's budget request):
Surveillance. The increase in surveillance provided
for a robust surveillance program. This program included both
augmented data collection for the annual assessment process and
development of advanced techniques for monitoring the health of
the stockpile. NNSA is applying a risk-informed design process
to allocate fiscal year 2011 funding the highest priority
surveillance concerns. The President's budget request does
include a modest increase in funding for surveillance.
RTBF. The laboratory director proposal recognized the
need for a robust facility infrastructure. The fiscal year 2011
budget request is a positive first step, but continues to fall
short in RTBF at many sites across the complex. At LLNL, due to
a $6 million fiscal year 2011 RTBF shortfall, funding for high
hazard and nuclear facility compliance is marginal.
Science, technology, and engineering. The laboratory
directors requested additional funding in Science Campaigns,
ASC, and the Engineering Surety Campaign. This funding was
intended to underpin the long-term health of the deterrent and
provide a more rapid maturation of technologies that could be
used in future LEPs. As a specific example, the laboratory
director proposal recommended initiating a vigorous Exascale
Initiative in fiscal year 2011. Fiscal year 2011 funding
shortfalls are delaying work in these areas.
Finally, it should be noted that the proposed fiscal year 2011
increase provides for workforce stabilization, which is an encouraging
step toward workforce augmentation. At LLNL, the President's budget
request would allow us to fill key vacancies, reinvigorating the
critically skilled workforce underpinning the SSP.
Dr. Hommert. The NSEIC developed a number of uplift scenarios,
ranging from a $400 million increase to a $1.8 billion increase. At
each scenario level there were different impacts to scope and schedule.
The increase allocated in the President's budget fell within our
planning scenarios. Specifically for the programs where there is a
major effort at SNL, the fiscal year 2011 budget adequately supports
those programs. It will be important to annually reassess budget
requirements as technical requirements and timelines become firm.
42. Senator McCain. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, why
are these unfunded requirements important?
Dr. Anastasio. The current fiscal year 2011 LANL RTBF budget target
increases by 3 percent over the fiscal year 2010 budget authority, but
is followed by 3 years of steady decline in the current FYNSP targets.
Increased demands on the RTBF budgets at LANL have already begun to
rise with a peak requirements case expected in fiscal year 2012 during
the current FYNSP and the next significant increase expected in fiscal
year 2016/2017 with the potential start-up of the replacement
Radiological Liquid Waste Treatment Facility. LANL will work within the
budget targets to develop a plan that meets all nuclear safety,
security, and compliance requirements first; all non-nuclear safety,
security, and compliance requirements second; and all remaining warm
standby activities within remaining budgets--which may require halting
programmatic work in facilities that cannot remain appropriately
operational within the funding constraints.
As I have stated in previous testimony, it is still important to
improve the balance within the program and I also remained concerned
about the issues between scope and fiscal realities. Much of the
existing physical infrastructure at LANL is old, 50 percent of the
buildings are greater than 40 years old. In addition, the scientific
equipment at the laboratory must continue to be refreshed as new
technology becomes available and we must be able to effectively use our
key scientific capabilities, such as DARHT, LANSCE, and NIF; and
continue to advance toward the ability to perform computing at the
Exascale.
Dr. Miller. Retaining confidence in the deterrent value of the U.S.
nuclear forces depends on a number of factors, including: confidence in
the warheads themselves; confidence in the ability of the
infrastructure to respond to issues that arise; and confidence in the
underlying ST&E and the talent of the workforce to use the ST&E to
accurately assess the health of the stockpile and manage arising
issues. When any of these elements are at risk, so is the deterrent
itself. The funding trend prior to fiscal year 2010 has put each of
these elements at risk. The fiscal year 2011 budget increase proposed
by the administration is a positive first step towards revitalizing the
nuclear weapons complex necessary to maintain the U.S. nuclear
deterrent. Recognizing the importance of a balanced program of work and
the importance of the originally defined scope of work, the NNSA has
chosen to stretch the schedule for meeting deliverables rather than
change balance or the scope of work. To meet the original scope of work
while relying on constrained budgets, NNSA applies a risk-informed
decision process to balance annual work scope and schedule. As is
always the case, while some aspects of the laboratory's activities
could proceed more rapidly if funding were available, this situation is
different than an unfunded requirement or true shortfall.
Dr. Hommert. At the funding level of the President's budget
request, SNL has at least three outstanding funding concerns; these are
small in comparison with the overall nuclear weapons program budget,
and we are working to resolve these items with NNSA. These include
renovation and modernization of some physical test facilities,
recapitalization of outdated tooling and equipment in our
microelectronics fabrication facility, and strengthening the material
science capabilities at SNL. These are all critically important to our
success in the upcoming design and development work for the LEPs.
43. Senator McCain. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert,
could a decision to defer work, some of which is directly related to
facility maintenance and repair, affect your ability to fulfill your
mission?
Dr. Anastasio. Yes. Deferring work, particularly facility
maintenance and repair, can affect the laboratory's ability to fulfill
mission. Every effort is made to understand mission needs and ensure
facility repair priorities are consistent with planned mission
activities. However, years of deferred maintenance and limited
operational dollars have resulted in areas of facility weakness. At Los
Alamos over 50 percent of the buildings are more than 40 years old.
Dr. Miller. Yes, deferring certain planned work, scientific
campaigns and/or facility maintenance and repair, could impact mission
deliverables. Delays could easily result in a domino effect across the
integrated complex. Accordingly, the work scope across the complex must
be carefully balanced.
For example, the RTBF program provides the infrastructure necessary
to maintain the deterrent. The fiscal year 2011 budget is a first
positive step, but continues to fall short in RTBF at many sites across
the complex. With respect to LLNL's infrastructure, stable funding is
required to maintain our nuclear facilities and high hazard facilities.
Their maintenance and safe operations are required to meet mission
deliverables. At LLNL, due to fiscal year 2011 RTBF constraints,
funding for high hazard and nuclear facility compliance is on the
tipping point. These facilities will continue to underpin the annual
assessment and stockpile certification process for the foreseeable
future, and they provide unique non-nuclear manufacturing capabilities.
It is important that out-year funding be provided to meet the critical
facility infrastructure requirements across the complex.
Dr. Hommert. There are a small number of essential facility
upgrades that must be accomplished in order for SNL to successfully
execute its design mission for the B61 LEP. If fully funded, the second
phase of our TCR Phase 2 will address the most urgent of these needs.
Deferral of TCR Phase 2 would result in a significant increase in risk
to the B61 LEP program. Upgrades at the TTR are required to support the
development flight test program for the B61 LEP. Replacement of aging
equipment and tooling in our MESA microelectronics fabrication facility
is also fundamentally important. Our ability to design and manufacture
the strategic radiation hardened microelectronics required for upcoming
reentry system LEPs depends on these upgrades.
44. Senator McCain. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, Dr. Hommert, and Dr.
Schwitters, according to the JASON Panel's assessment, the ``continued
success of the stockpile stewardship is threatened by lack of program
stability, placing any LEP strategy at risk.'' Has NNSA presented a
plan that alleviates these stability concerns?
Dr. Anastasio. The elements of the plan are sound but sustained
funding over 25+ years is necessary for implementation. The current
plans for the budget show proposed increases to the programs for much
of the next 10 years. The current proposed amount allows for the
national security laboratories to start the investments needed for
infrastructure improvements and sustaining the science necessary as the
stockpile size is reduced. This is a positive first step.
As I stated in my testimony, the majority of the budget increases
occur in the second half of the 10-year budget plan. Achieving an
enduring commitment is important to sustaining the nuclear stockpile
and to the ability to continue to certify the stockpile through the
science of the SSP. If the budget comes under fiscal pressure in the
out-years, science might again be squeezed out, which would raise
significant concerns about maintaining the credibility of the
deterrent. Sustained funding is needed to enable a safe, secure, and
effective deterrent underpinned by science and the facilities that
support it. I am concerned that fiscal pressure could create a major
problem for the national laboratories and the science that is critical
to the success of the program.
Dr. Miller. The proposed budget outlined in the 1251 report--
including investments in stockpile maintenance, science and technology,
and infrastructure--seeks to provide a reliable and stable funding
profile for the enterprise. The NNSA's SSMP defines the scope of work
for the out-years. Additionally, the laboratories and plants are
working with the NNSA to develop baselines for the two main facility
construction projects and the next LEPs. The required long-term
investments outlined in the 1251 report support sustaining the
confidence in our nuclear deterrent while reductions are made in the
overall U.S. stockpile size. These increased investments are not just
important, they are essential. NNSA's plans, which couple investments
with the work scope defined in the SSMP, and the ongoing base-lining
activity significantly help to alleviate concerns about program
stability.
Dr. Hommert. In my opinion, the combination of: (1) the policy
framework outlined in the NPR; (2) the high-level implementation plans
established by the NNSA fiscal year 2011 SSMP and DOD 1251 document;
and (3) the funding profile described in the administration's fiscal
year 2011 budget request document, forms a strong basis for
programmatic stability going forward.
Dr. Schwitters. I am not aware of any NNSA plan that alleviates
concerns regarding program stability raised in our 2009 LEP report.
45. Senator McCain. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, Dr. Hommert, and Dr.
Schwitters, are there any institutional issues within NNSA that impede
or threaten to impede stability?
Dr. Anastasio. At the national level, significant strides have been
made by the administration to provide a level of program stability. The
NPR and the President's fiscal year 2011 budget request form a core
around which a national consensus can be built. Congressional approval
of the fiscal year 2011 budget request will also assist. Within the
NNSA, the confirmations of Dr. Don Cook and Neille Miller provide much-
needed institutional stability. Dr. Cook's scientific background and
decades of experience in the weapons community provides the leadership
needed to sustain the program. His recent reorganization of the Defense
Programs Headquarters organization to focus on the scientific and
engineering challenges of sustaining the safety, security, and
effectiveness of the stockpile is a another step for program stability.
The Secretary and NNSA Administrator have recognized the need for
structural and organizational changes to ease the regulatory burdens
and thereby improve productivity at the laboratories, which we strongly
support.
Dr. Miller. It is vitally important that DOE revitalize the
Federally Funded Research and Development Center (FFRDC) model that
governs the relationship between DOE and the laboratories. The DOE
Secretary, the Deputy Secretary, and the Under Secretaries have made it
a high priority to improve the efficiency of the departmental processes
and mechanisms for governance. The NNSA is working with the
laboratories to identify institutional issues and address them. NNSA
Administrator and Under Secretary for Nuclear Security Tom D'Agostino
has established a trilaboratory advisory council to help map the future
and is actively pursuing reforms to laboratory governance to ensure
effective application of the laboratories' capabilities. In fact, the
DOE recently chartered the National Academy of Sciences to review
governance of the laboratories and we are looking forward to the
results of that review.
Additionally, NNSA is seeking to strengthen partnerships with other
agencies to better enable the application of NNSA in support of
critical broader national security missions. I fully support Under
Secretary D'Agostino's efforts to transform the NNSA Cold War nuclear
weapons complex to a 21st century national security enterprise.
Dr. Hommert. The detailed programmatic structure of the nuclear
weapons program, coupled with the high degree of congressional
direction to each element of the program, has made it increasingly
difficult to make even modest adjustments to the distribution of
funding within the overall program. Greater flexibility for NNSA to
manage and direct funding within the overall program would add
efficiency and help us address evolving priorities. We recognize that
methods of changing the funding distribution exist and are routinely
exercised particularly the supplemental appropriations and
reprogramming processes.
Dr. Schwitters. The question of program stability was raised in the
2009 JASON report as part of our general concern regarding professional
development and renewal of the technical manpower who provide the
expertise and capabilities in science, engineering, and production
absolutely essential to maintaining our Nation's nuclear deterrent. On
this issue, JASON is in agreement with the laboratory directors, both
current and past, that we face substantial challenges in recruiting and
retaining the key technical people needed today and in the future.
The question raised is important, but I don't believe the answer to
the larger issue of retention of technical staff can be found in
institutional issues within NNSA. Rather, I think a renewed sense of
purpose and trust between the labs, NNSA, Congress, and the greater
scientific community is in order.
46. Senator McCain. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, Dr. Hommert, and Dr.
Schwitters, do your annual assessments continue to find any aging
problems?
Dr. Anastasio. Yes. It comes as no surprise that warheads and
bombs, all of which are older than 20 years (some are 30+ years old)
continue to exhibit aging phenomena. These conditions are discussed in
the joint Los Alamos and Sandia AARs and my annual assessment letters.
Dr. Miller. Based on the results of our laboratory's most recent,
comprehensive annual assessment process, I concluded that the U.S.
stockpile is safe, secure, and effective today. Through our annual
assessments, we do continue to uncover changes in weapons due to aging
and birth defects, which we then analyze to understand what impact (if
any) they have on weapon effectiveness, safety, or security.
Dr. Hommert. As the nuclear weapons in our stockpile remain
deployed beyond their original design lifetimes, aging is an ongoing
concern. The specifics of our findings are outlined in the MRS.
Dr. Schwitters. JASON does not participate in the annual assessment
process. We were briefed extensively on results coming from annual
assessments which have shown effects of aging on weapon components as
described in our classified reports to NNSA.
47. Senator McCain. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, Dr. Hommert, and Dr.
Schwitters, are you finding any problems you did not predict?
Dr. Anastasio. Yes. Nuclear warheads and bombs are complex
assemblies with components that are radioactive, volatile, and
chemically active. When placed in a sealed volume for decades, some
unpredicted behaviors reveal themselves. It is essential that we have a
robust surveillance program to identify new issues and the science and
engineering to respond when discovered.
Dr. Miller. Yes, we continue to find changes in weapons that we did
not predict. The new technologies and tools developed through the SSP
have yielded tremendous insight into weapon anomalies we find,
including both birth defects and issues arising from material aging.
Dr. Hommert. We have not predicted every problem we have found in
the stockpile. The specifics of our findings are provided in the AARs.
Dr. Schwitters. JASON does not participate in the annual assessment
process. We were briefed extensively on results coming from annual
assessments which have shown unanticipated problems with some weapon
components usually associated with early design and manufacturing flaws
revealed during surveillance of sample warheads taken from the
stockpile.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
modernization
48. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, Dr, Hommert, and Dr.
Schwitters, I remain concerned over our modernization efforts in the
out-years. There is enough testimony and review to indicate a unanimous
concern over the serious disrepair and neglect of our nuclear weapons
stockpile and complex. I would like to reemphasize that we are the only
major nuclear power not modernizing its weapons and our weapons are an
average of 26 years old and most are 15 or more years beyond design
life, while other nuclear countries to include Russia continue to
modernize and replace their nuclear weapons. In general, all panel
members indicated that sufficient funding is required in the out-years
to meet delivery demands. Is the budget sufficient to support a fiscal
year 2017 delivery of the B61 (gravity bombs) and to maintain W76 LEP
schedules?
Dr. Anastasio. A B61 Phase 6.2/6.2A (Feasibility Study and Option
Down-Select/Design Definition and Cost Study) has just begun with the
very recent congressional approval, and is scheduled for completion at
the end of fiscal year 2011 after being delayed for over a year. This
study will produce a baseline design and cost estimate to support a
fiscal year 2017 FPU. In my judgment, due to the delay in starting,
accomplishing the correct scope for this life extension activity will
be difficult by fiscal year 2017.
The desired number of W76-1 warheads at the completion of the
production run has not been firmly fixed. Therefore, the adequacy of
funding for W76-1 production in the out-years cannot be fully assessed.
Dr. Miller. This is a question best directed to Dr. Anastasio,
LANL, and Dr. Hommert, SNL. LANL and SNL are the laboratories of record
responsible for the B61 LEP. I respectfully defer to them.
Dr. Hommert. The B61 LEP 6.2/6.2A study is underway and proceeding
thanks to fiscal year 2010 reprogramming granted by Congress. The
completion of this study in fiscal year 2011 will provide the
information needed to assess the adequacy of out-year funding levels.
The W76-1 is now in production, and so the funding needs are largest at
the plants going forward. My understanding is that the plants have
adequate resources to maintain the current schedule.
Dr. Schwitters. To be sure, there are concerns regarding the
present intellectual and physical infrastructure of the U.S. nuclear
weapons complex, but, as the series of recent JASON reports document,
science-based stockpile stewardship is succeeding in maintaining
confidence in our nuclear stockpile without underground nuclear testing
and in modernizing it to meet today's strategic requirements.
JASON examines technical aspects of our nuclear weapons efforts,
not year-to-year budgets. My impression, however, is that providing
stable funding and establishing shared priorities are important factors
for achieving program goals.
49. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, Dr. Hommert, and Dr.
Schwitters, what is the likelihood of the B61 production slipping due
to budget problems in fiscal years 2010-2012?
Dr. Anastasio. If B61 life extension funding for fiscal year 2011
is provided as requested, the Phase 6.2/6.2A (Feasibility Study and
Option Down-Select/Design Definition and Cost Study) can proceed.
Product Realization Teams, which include the laboratories and
production sites, will develop inputs regarding cost and schedule
necessary to finalize funding levels for production in fiscal years
2012-2017. In my judgment, accomplishing the correct scope for this
life extension activity will be difficult by fiscal year 2017.
Dr. Miller. This is a question best directed to Dr. Anastasio,
LANL, and Dr. Hommert, SNL. LANL and SNL are the laboratories of record
responsible for the B61 LEP. I respectfully defer to them.
Dr. Hommert. We are currently viewing the fiscal year 2017 FPU date
as a constraint on the program. Therefore, any budget shortfalls would
impact the scope of the LEP. We strongly advocate funding for the full
scope, and believe it would be ill-advised to miss the opportunity to
incorporate 21st century safety and security features into the U.S.
nuclear weapons stockpile through this LEP.
Dr. Schwitters. At present, determining the scope of the B61 LEP is
more important to establishing a realistic schedule for the B61 than
are current budget details.
50. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, Dr. Hommert, and Dr.
Schwitters, what risk is added if the B61 is delayed?
Dr. Anastasio. A delay to the B61 LEP will result in components
reaching the end of their design life and no longer meeting operational
requirements. In addition, this would delay enhancements in surety
while there is growing concern about nuclear terrorism.
Dr. Miller. LEPs are multi-year events of carefully sequenced work
within a balanced SSP. Delays will create ripple/domino effects
throughout the complex. Some technologies developed for the B61 LEP may
prove useful for the W78 LEP, which has been assigned to Livermore.
Delays in the B61 LEP could cause delays in other LEPs or raise the
cost of other LEPs if significant technology maturation is required.
As to the other specific programmatic and technical risks, this is
a question best directed to Dr. Anastasio, LANL, and Dr. Hommert, SNL.
LANL and SNL are the laboratories of record responsible for the B61
LEP.
Dr. Hommert. There are end-of-life issues associated with some SNL
components, and any delay will increase the risk of performance
impacts.
Dr. Schwitters. JASON has not studied this question.
51. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, Dr. Hommert, and Dr.
Schwitters, is there sufficient funding for the W78 and W80 LEPs?
Dr. Anastasio. The NWC has established the phase 6.X process to
provide a framework to conduct and manage refurbishment activities for
existing weapons. Phase 6.2A (Design Definition and Cost Study)
develops the cost estimates for the baseline design of the particular
life extension activity under consideration. A determination that there
is enough funding for the W78 and W80 life extension activities cannot
be made until accurate and complete funding profiles are developed from
the phase 6.2A study.
Dr. Miller. The fiscal year 2011 President's budget request
includes funding to initiate the study of life extension options for
the W78. The baseline has not yet been established for the W78 LEP, as
the study of the options has just begun. However, the 10-year plan does
anticipate funding for the W78 LEP.
There is no funding anticipated for a W80 LEP.
Dr. Hommert. The President's budget request includes a significant
funding increase for the W78 LEP over the FYNSP period, but the
required funding levels are not fully established. Our current
understanding is that there will be a joint W78 and W88 phase 6.1 study
starting in September 2010, with a potential phase 6.2/6.2A study
beginning in the 4th quarter of fiscal year 2011. An integrated
development approach to the W78 and W88 LEPs will allow us to maximize
the impact of our resources. The current schedule for the W80 LEP
places it beyond the FYNSP period. However, we are concerned about the
resources required to sustain the W80 in the meantime.
Dr. Schwitters. JASON has not studied this question.
national nuclear security administration budget
52. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, Dr. Hommert, and Dr.
Schwitters, section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Bill for
Fiscal Year 2010 requires that the submission of a New START agreement
to the Senate be accompanied by a plan to modernize the U.S. nuclear
deterrent. All panel members indicated that there is concern over an
emerging gap between expectations and fiscal realities, due to the
planned funding increase not coming available until the second half of
the 10-year period and the decline of the annual buying power. It is
important to reemphasize that the NSEIC proposal recommended a budget
of $7.34 billion in fiscal year 2011, $7.83 billion in fiscal year
2012, and $8.26 billion in fiscal year 2013 for weapons activities.
Most alarming, the NNSA and the administration did not follow the
advice of the NSEIC and submitted a request for $7.0 billion, $7.0
billion, and $7.1 billion over the 3 years ($340 million, $830 million,
and $1.16 billion less than recommended). Did the laboratories provide
their best estimates of the cost of requirements to the NSEIC?
Dr. Anastasio. Yes. The laboratories provided their best estimates
of the cost requirements to the NSEIC as part of a budget planning
process exercise. After analyzing the issues associated with the
President's fiscal year 2011 budget request, I believe the fiscal year
2011 budget it is a positive first step forward. Further, I believe
that we need to be focused not on a single year's budget, but rather on
a long-term sustainable program that is both balanced and flexible as
new costing information comes available on the nuclear facilities and
on the planned LEPs.
Dr. Miller. LLNL provided its best estimates of funding required
for a balanced SSMP.
The fiscal year 2011 budget increase proposed by the administration
is a positive first step toward revitalizing the nuclear weapons
complex necessary to maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent. Recognizing
the importance of a balanced program of work, the NNSA has chosen to
stretch the schedule for meeting deliverables rather than change
balance or the scope of work. As is always the case, while some aspects
of the laboratory's activities could proceed more rapidly if funding
were available, this situation is different than an unfunded
requirement or true shortfall.
The level of investment consistent with planned force reductions
must grow over time to capitalize construction of new facilities to
create an efficient production infrastructure, sustain a robust
science, technology, and engineering core, manage the aging stockpile,
support an increased level of LEP work, and maintain a critically
skilled workforce. LLNL continues to work with its partners in the NNSA
enterprise and NNSA leadership to support a sustainable and balanced
program.
Dr. Hommert. The NSEIC developed a number of uplift scenarios,
ranging from a $400 million increase to a $1.8 billion increase. At
each scenario level there were different impacts to scope and schedule.
The increase allocated in the President's budget fell within our
planning scenarios. Specifically for the programs where there is a
major effort at SNL, the fiscal year 2011 budget adequately supports
those programs. It will be important to annually reassess budget
requirements as technical requirements and timelines become firm.
Dr. Schwitters. JASON has not studied this question.
53. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, Dr. Hommert, and Dr.
Schwitters, if the complex received the full amount proposed by the
NSEIC, would it be able to properly execute that money?
Dr. Anastasio. Yes. I believe that the proposed budget planning
scenarios are executable.
Dr. Miller. Yes, if Congress provided the NNSA with the full
amount, I believe the complex could properly execute the associated
work scope.
Dr. Hommert. The President's budget request, if fully appropriated,
will result in an increase to SNL's weapons activities funding of
approximately 20 percent relative to fiscal year 2010 levels. This
additional funding is commensurate with the large body of work required
at SNL for the B61 LEP. Through a strategic management decision earlier
this year, we began staffing up for this program, and the recently
approved reprogramming for fiscal year 2010 will align our fiscal year
2010 funding with our current staffing levels, placing us in a good
position for the additional growth in fiscal year 2011. Further
increases in funding, as might evolve in discussions between the NNSA
and the DOD regarding additional requirements for a W88 Alt, and a
common warhead design program, will be evaluated for resource needs and
action will be taken to phase the work appropriately.
Dr. Schwitters. JASON has not studied this question.
54. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, Dr. Hommert, and Dr.
Schwitters, would increased funding in the first 3 years of the
proposed budget alleviate some of the risk and concerns about our
nuclear stockpile and future funding?
Dr. Anastasio. Yes, it would help alleviate some risks. In my view,
it is even more important to do everything possible to ensure adequate
long-term funding. Look first at the existing challenges and recognize
how difficult overcoming them in the next 10 years will be:
complete production of the W76-1;
complete planning and delivery of the first B61-12;
complete a study for the life extension of the W78;
maintain the science, technology, and engineering
base;
utilize existing stockpile stewardship facilities
(DARHT, LANSCE, NIF, Z, et cetera) to achieve their true
scientific potential;
design, build, and begin operation of two major multi-
billion dollar nuclear facilities (CMRR and UPF); and
sustain smaller, but still important, aging
facilities.
When I consider this daunting list, I am concerned about the
magnitude and scope of these activities and the fiscal commitments
needed to manage them concurrently. Moreover, even modest inflation and
other issues such as pensions may negatively impact the ability to
sustain the stockpile for the long-term.
Dr. Miller. The current uncertainties associated with developing
baselines for LEPs and construction of large facilities is the largest
source of concern with respect to future funding needs. Working with
the NNSA, the complex has begun to develop baselines for the major
construction projects and for the next two proposed LEPs. Since the
baselines are still maturing, total costs are not yet known. There is
work that could be accelerated with increased funding in the first 3
years of the proposed plan. As an example, the NNSA and DOE have yet to
identify the funding required for an Exascale simulation initiative. It
is vital that the program have sustained funding over a long period to
provide balance and stability, accomplish the scope of work necessary,
revitalize the complex, provide the scientific understanding and
assessments needed to execute this mission, and conduct the planned
LEPs. An immediate short-term infusion of funding will not be
sufficient.
Dr. Hommert. The critically important technology maturation
activities required to support the B61 LEP and future reentry system
LEPs would benefit from additional funding earlier in the program. It
would also be an advantage if we could complete some of the more urgent
facility and infrastructure upgrades in the near term. We are working
with NNSA to ensure the appropriate risk management approach given the
current funding profile.
Dr. Schwitters. JASON has not studied this question.
55. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, Dr. Hommert, and Dr.
Schwitters, would the labs be able to execute additional funding over
those years?
Dr. Anastasio. Yes. I believe that LANL would be able to execute
additional funding over those years.
Dr. Miller. Yes, additional resources could be absorbed and
effectively applied.
Dr. Hommert. Please see the answer to question 53.
Dr. Schwitters. JASON has not studied this question.
56. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, Dr. Hommert, and Dr.
Schwitters, should the 1251 report and budget request be updated each
year to reflect a current assessment of risks and technical and
strategic requirements?
Dr. Anastasio. A disciplined, comprehensive and coordinated
planning process could produce an annual long-term budget for the
nuclear security enterprise that would benefit DOE, NNSA, the nuclear
weapons laboratories, and the production plants. This product could be
one way of informing Congress so that a defensible investment strategy
could be sustained and stable funding could be established.
Dr. Miller. Yes. Annual updates that reflect evolving requirements,
progress on the baselines for the major efforts within the NNSA
enterprise, and arising issues in the stockpile would be beneficial for
the purposes of forecasting and planning. It is important to note that
the nature of NNSA's work requires program flexibility because issues
arise in the stockpile and requirements evolve. The scope of work and
budgets will need to be correspondingly adjusted. Annual updates to the
summary of the SSMP could provide a mechanism to outline the program's
funding requirements and projections. In addition, I would recommend
consideration of an annual assessment of the health of the integrated
enterprise be included as part of these updates. Both would the foster
dialog to achieve a national consensus on programmatic requirements and
expectations for a sustained SSMP.
Dr. Hommert. The administration's budget needs are updated annually
as part of preparation for a budget proposal to Congress. This process
in general looks at shorter timeframe than the 1251 document but still
more than a single year. If Congress needs a longer-term (say 10-year)
budget estimate, we would be willing to work within the framework of
NNSA to support that process.
Dr. Schwitters. JASON has not studied this question.
personnel and critical skills
57. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, Dr. Hommert, and Dr.
Schwitters, we discussed briefly concerns over the loss of human
capital. There has been substantial testimony over the last few years
that indicate our nuclear research and development capability is
dwindling, with a large amount of our experts due to retire in the next
few years. What is the impact of losing such a large percentage of
career employees?
Dr. Anastasio. It is true that the number of LANL technical staff
devoted to nuclear weapon research, development, and engineering has
declined in the past several years and that a significant number of
retirements are anticipated in the next several years. One of my most
important jobs as LANL director is to ensure that we, as an
institution, are developing the workforce of the future. In fiscal year
2010, I authorized selected divisions at LANL to implement a more
aggressive but selective hiring program. That process is underway. I
believe that the technical challenges and work scope outlined in the
NPR will be very helpful as we continue our recruitment efforts in the
years ahead. The projected growth in the weapons program funding over
the next several years will allow hiring to continue, and new staff
will begin their training before a large number of weapon experts
retire. Moreover, following retirement from LANL, a number of senior
staff return on either a part-time basis or as guest scientists to
mentor early-career staff.
Dr. Miller. LLNL implemented a strategic workforce reduction plan
to minimize the risks to the program; staffing reductions were a
necessary consequence of recent declining budgets and increased costs
during the past 5 years. While we have been successful in supporting
the needs of the current stockpile, numerous critical skill areas have
been reduced to only a handful of individuals, as evidenced in the
following examples:
LLNL's hydrotest execution capability was reduced from
two fully capable teams to one small team, and experimental
throughput has declined.
One of the major science initiatives, known as the
National Boost Initiative, has been delayed 3 years to date and
extended beyond its original planned completion date due to
lack of funding and available skilled staff to support this
initiative.
Additionally, warhead surveillance rates are lower,
there are numerous examples of underutilization of stockpile
stewardship facilities that have caused delays in key
scientific deliverables for assessing the stockpile, and LEPs
have been deferred.
LLNL is continuing to work very closely with the NNSA to manage
available resources in a prioritized, structured way to ensure our
national security mission requirements are met. The President's fiscal
year 2011 budget request seeks increased funding to reverse the
declining budget trends and provide stable and reliable funding levels
to maintain sufficient capability to ensure the viability of the U.S.
nuclear stockpile and the critically skilled workforce that underpins
it.
Dr. Hommert. We are concerned about the fact that many of our
experienced technical staff are over the age of 55. Their remaining
careers will not span the upcoming LEPs. This puts a huge premium going
forward on stable, multiyear, large-scale LEPs that provide
opportunities for our new technical staff to work closely with our
experienced designers on a full range of activities--from advanced
concept development to component design and qualification, and
ultimately to the production and fielding of nuclear weapon systems.
Our data show that we continue to successfully recruit the best and
brightest technical talent to the nuclear weapons program. The
challenge going forward is to motivate, train, and retain them. Key to
success in this area is clear evidence of an enduring, bipartisan
national commitment to the U.S. nuclear deterrent, and the concomitant
programmatic stability. Also important is challenging technical work
and a work environment that includes state-of-the-art facilities,
design tools, and technologies.
Dr. Schwitters. A major factor in the loss of human capital in the
nuclear weapons program was the sharp decline--approximately 30
percent--in science and technology development funding during fiscal
years 2005 to 2009 while the overall nuclear weapons budget remained
steady. The impacts are significant: opportunity costs of the weapons
science research not being performed, loss of mentoring of younger
scientists and engineers by experienced hands in the challenging
technical areas crucial to stockpile stewardship, and the strong
negative message sent to young scientists and engineers that weapons
science is somehow not important to our country. In today's world
without underground nuclear testing, confidence in the U.S. deterrent
ultimately rests on the quality of the science and scientists in our
weapons laboratories; the impact of losing a large percentage of career
employees reduces confidence in our nuclear weapons program.
58. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, Dr. Hommert, and Dr.
Schwitters, what is the incentive for younger engineers and scientists
to dedicate their lives to this critical field?
Dr. Anastasio. Many people choose to dedicate their careers to
nuclear weapons work out of a deep sense of duty to country and which
has substantial technical challenges. The ability to retain this
dedicated work force at LANL is based on several factors:
challenging and demanding work;
flexibility to pursue novel approaches to solving
those multifaceted security challenges;
state-of-the-art scientific, experimental, and
computational tools on which to carry out their
responsibilities;
modern infrastructure; and
a strong demonstration of executive and legislative
branch support for the work and commitment to the laboratory
staff for solving the Nation's security challenges.
Dr. Miller. The fundamental incentive for young scientists and
engineers to join this field is the opportunity to make a contribution
to national security through important, challenging scientific and
technical assignments. The SSMP provides a compelling opportunity to
use advanced experimental and computational capabilities in cutting-
edge research that leads to scientific discovery relevant to a number
of national priorities. The administration's and Congress's commitment
to a clear and long-term plan for managing the stockpile helps to
ensure that the scientists and engineers of tomorrow will be able to
engage in challenging cutting-edge research and development activities
required for maintaining U.S. security.
Additionally, the laboratories, with the support of Congress and
the administration, utilize funding provided through the Laboratory
Directed Research and Development (LDRD) program to provide young
scientists and engineers with opportunities to pursue innovative
research projects that are competitively peer-reviewed. LDRD is a vital
tool in the laboratories' recruiting and retention efforts.
One specific set of actions being undertaken by LLNL and SNL in
California is the creation of the Livermore Valley Open Campus (LVOC).
The LVOC will allow the two laboratories to enhance their research
programs in a way that leverages and facilitates ready access to the
expertise and facility investments already made by the NNSA while
providing a dynamic, modern, and exciting place to work for young
scientists and engineers. The LVOC will meet the laboratories' critical
needs to substantially increase our engagement with the private sector
and academic community to meet our mission objectives, stay at the
forefront of science and technology by engaging the broader academic
and industrial communities, and attract the best and brightest to
ensure the workforce of the future.
Dr. Hommert. For the most part, young scientists and engineers that
join SNL do so to serve the security interests of the Nation. Our
primary driver from the initiation of the institution is ``service in
the national interest.'' This is more than a slogan to us, it is in
fact the premise of all our work for both the nuclear weapons and work
for others national security programs. However, in order for these
staff to stay engaged, energized, and capable, we have to exercise
their expertise. We do that through the combination of work options
between the stockpile management activities (of which the B61 LEP is a
significant opportunity) and our other national security work. We also
energize these individuals through opportunities to work on and solve
high visibility and high impact problems in areas such as counter-
terrorism, energy security, support of the warfighter, and work to
address emerging cyber threats.
Dr. Schwitters. The incentives for young engineers and scientists
to dedicate their professional lives to our nuclear weapons program
include: (1) the opportunity to work on technical problems of great
importance to their country; (2) the opportunity to contribute
solutions to highly challenging technical problems that trace their
history to some of the greatest scientists and engineers of the past
century; (3) access to world-class computational and experimental tools
such as DAHRT and NIF; (4) participation in an outstanding technical
community; and (5) opportunities to apply expertise in other areas
important to our national security.
59. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, Dr. Hommert, and Dr.
Schwitters, is there a perception among new engineers and scientists
that joining Sandia is a dead-end job?
Dr. Anastasio. Many people choose to dedicate their careers to
nuclear weapons work at Los Alamos out of a deep sense of duty to
country. The nuclear weapons mission has always been the core mission
at LANL. For many decades, this core has been a powerful driver and
magnet for a broader range of related and reinforcing activities. These
areas naturally align with the laboratory's national security missions
and include energy research, climatology, bioscience research,
nanotechnology, and high performance computing. Talented and energetic
young people will always be attracted to an institution engaged in
cutting-edge physics, engineering, computational simulation, and
materials science. Sustaining these types of research and development
activities will be a key element in hiring the scientists, engineers,
and technologists needed to populate all of the laboratory's national
security programs.
A polling of LANL graduate students, post-doctoral personnel, and
early career staff has shown that most are impressed by the
opportunities for meaningful research and development that the
laboratory provides. However, there is a growing concern about the
national commitment and about the risk acceptance posture, compared to
major universities and corporations, that is making it difficult to
compete for the best and brightest.
Dr. Miller. SNL is a vital part of the NNSA enterprise and a
respected scientific institution with an impressive set of
accomplishments and an exciting future.
In fact, LLNL is working cooperatively with SNL in California to
develop the LVOC, which will help both laboratories to attract and
retain the best and brightest scientific and engineering talent. The
LVOC will allow the two laboratories to enhance their research programs
in a way that leverages and facilitates ready access to the expertise
and facility investments already made by NNSA while providing a
dynamic, modern, and exciting place to work for young scientists and
engineers. The LVOC will meet the laboratories' critical needs to
substantially increase our engagement with the private sector and
academic community to meet our mission objectives, stay at the
forefront of science and technology by engaging the broader academic
and industrial communities, and attract the best and brightest to
ensure the workforce of the future.
Dr. Hommert. SNL hiring data show that we continue to attract the
best and brightest technical talent from the Nation's top science and
engineering programs.
Dr. Schwitters. I am not aware of any such perception regarding
opportunities for new engineers and scientists at Sandia. Indeed, in
our investigations of work performed there, Sandia seems to have had
the most success in diversifying its mission to make it attractive to
younger technical people.
60. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, Dr. Hommert, and Dr.
Schwitters, what is the impact of not having one design engineer on
staff who participated in the development and testing of a new nuclear
weapon?
Dr. Anastasio. In 1989 the United States ended the production of
new nuclear weapons, 3 years later underground testing was halted. In
response to these changed circumstances, Congress and the
administration created the SSP ``to ensure the preservation of the core
intellectual and technical competencies of the United States in nuclear
weapons.'' That program has been a remarkable success thanks to the
significant investments made in experimental, computational,
simulation, and engineering capabilities and the mentoring by
development- and test-experienced engineers and scientists. These tools
have allowed us to gain a better understanding of weapons performance,
carry out several LEPs, and ultimately assess and certify the health of
the stockpile to the President of the United States. All this work has
allowed the laboratories to train and mentor the post-nuclear-testing
generation of scientists and engineers. Sustained investments and
challenging work scope at the labs must continue for the future to
develop the next generations.
Dr. Miller. The SSP has been extraordinarily successful in
developing the tool set required to maintain the stockpile in the
absence of testing and using those tools to train the next generation
of stockpile stewards. The program was specifically designed to
maintain the skills necessary in the absence of nuclear testing. The
SSP's above-ground experimental facilities, such as the NIF and DARHT
facility, not only provide data required for stewardship, but also
provide our weapons designers with opportunities to carry out complex,
integrated physics experiments that stress and hone designer judgment
as issues are investigated or potentially new phenomena are revealed.
Additionally judgment is developed through computational simulation.
Detailed simulations of weapons system performance continue to give new
insight into weapons physics, often times beyond that available during
the era of underground nuclear testing.
Of equal importance is providing adequate opportunity to exercise
skills in the complete design through production cycle, which is
essential for training of laboratory and production plant personnel.
For example, the NNSA's assignment of responsibility for the W78 LEP to
LLNL provides an essential path for maintaining the competency and
capability of its design and engineering cadre through the exercise of
an integrated system design/engineering/manufacturing program. Finally,
involvement in the annual assessment process provides a basis for
developing and exercising the judgment of new nuclear weapons staff in
dealing with difficult issues related to nuclear design and
engineering, in much the same way that the development of nuclear
weapons and underground testing did.
The NNSA and the laboratories have made a concerted effort to
mentor, train, and validate the skills of the next generation of the
Nation's stockpile stewards at a time when scientists and engineers are
available who were trained during the period of extensive weapon
development programs and nuclear testing. I am confident in the
capabilities of LLNL's workforce.
Dr. Hommert. SNL still has design engineers and scientists on roll
who participated in the development and testing of the most recently
fielded new warhead, the W88. We also have a large number of technical
staff who recently worked on the W76-1 LEP. Several Alts and
modifications, and limited life component exchange actions have
required non-nuclear component development and testing on an ongoing,
albeit limited, basis.
Dr. Schwitters. Nuclear weapons designers play crucial roles in the
stockpile stewardship program--they are the overall system integrators
who are responsible for understanding everything that is known about
the systems under their purview. The span of information includes
archived data from pertinent underground nuclear tests, data on
components as they were manufactured, results of non-nuclear
experiments including hydrodynamic tests and subcritical experiments,
experience gained from simulation codes describing the system, and data
obtained through surveillance of stockpile warheads.
Of course, advice and experience of veterans who originally
developed nuclear weapons and conducted the underground tests have been
most valuable in mentoring new generations of designers, but today's
questions, tools, methods, and knowledge base are quite different than
those of earlier times. The technical challenges facing today's
designers are still significant, however. This is good news, in my
opinion, because it provides strong incentives for good technical
people to work in our nuclear weapons program.
61. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, you stated that the current LEP
approach (refurbishment only) limits the range of safety and security
features that can be incorporated into certain weapons systems and that
all potential approaches--or, more likely, combinations of approaches--
need to be examined. Do you believe we should allow our labs to study
what is possible in nuclear design in order to maintain our current
expertise?
Dr. Miller. Yes. As noted in the NPR, the NNSA laboratories should
have the flexibility, responsibility, and authority to study the
complete spectrum of potential options, which includes refurbishment,
reuse, and replacement, for each future LEPs on a case-by-case basis in
order to provide the Nation's decisionmakers with our best technical
input upon which to base down-select decisions. NNSA's 1251 report
reinforces this responsibility and authority:
``The laboratory directors will ensure that the full range of LEP
approaches, including refurbishment, reuse, and replacement of nuclear
components, are studied for warheads on a case-by-case basis.''
There are a variety of safety and security features available and/
or proposed for the U.S. stockpile at this time. By exploring all three
approaches, as opportunities present themselves through planned LEPs,
incorporation of advanced safety and security features should be
considered and put forward as part of the case-by-case options
developed. Ultimately which safety and security options are
incorporated into the weapon system should be decided based upon a
number of factors, including military requirements, Service (Navy and/
or Air Force) needs, and consistency with NNSA's operational and
programmatic criteria, all while ensuring that the warhead is safe,
secure, and effective in all environments it might encounter. Studying
reuse, refurbishment, and replacement options for the stockpile and
applying them on a case-by-case basis coupled with a balanced SSMP with
sustained funding will preserve the skills required to maintain the
nuclear stockpile into the future with an acceptable level of risk.
62. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, when was the last time the United
States designed a new nuclear weapon?
Dr. Miller. The last time the United States completed a new nuclear
weapon design was when Los Alamos and Sandia developed the W88 warhead
before the cessation of nuclear testing. The W88 began production in
1988. While the W88 represented new system capabilities, the NEP was a
straightforward extension of previously developed and tested technical
capabilities. In that sense it did not represent any significantly new
technologies. The most recently evaluated truly new technologies were
associated with the Strategic Defense Initiative and were examined and
tested in the mid-1980s.
63. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, do we allow our engineers and
scientists to design new weapons?
Dr. Miller. We have not had a requirement to design a new nuclear
weapons system for several decades. Our efforts are focused on
extending the lifetimes of existing weapons systems through evaluation
of a spectrum of options, including refurbishment, reuse, and
replacement based on previously tested designs.
64. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, does the United States today have
the ability to design and produce a new nuclear weapon--people,
equipment, raw materials, and facilities?
Dr. Miller. Today, the United States does have the ability to
design and produce a newly manufactured weapon. Designing a truly new
weapon, one that represents new technologies in the NEP, today would
rely on the capabilities (human, tools, and facilities) developed in
the SSP. Verifying the performance of a truly new weapon--that includes
technologies never before tested in a nuclear event--would require the
resumption of underground testing. The capability to return to nuclear
testing to verify the performance of the truly new or newly
manufactured system, while not recently exercised, has been carefully
preserved in the weapons complex. If the new weapon were a simple
design extrapolation from the present stockpile, the present production
complex would be able to successfully build it, albeit at a slower pace
than the manufacturing rate during the Cold War. Producing more radical
designs could be more challenging for the production complex.
nuclear weapons research and production facilities
65. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Anastasio, you have strongly endorsed
investments in the UPF and CMR Replacement Nuclear Facility but have
stated there are many other essential facilities across the complex and
that Los Alamos requires investments. I understand that the
laboratories and plants have identified $400 million in needs above
$7.0 billion for fiscal year 2011. What are these unfunded requirements
and why are they important?
Dr. Anastasio. The current fiscal year 2011 LANL RTBF budget target
increases by 3 percent over the fiscal year 2010 budget authority, but
is followed by 3 years of steady decline in the current FYNSP targets.
Increased demands on the RTBF budgets at LANL have already begun to
rise with a peak requirements case expected in fiscal year 2012 during
the current FYNSP and the next significant increase expected in fiscal
year 2016/2017 with the potential start-up of the replacement
Radiological Liquid Waste Treatment Facility. LANL will work within the
budget targets to develop a plan that meets all nuclear safety,
security, and compliance requirements first; all non-nuclear safety,
security, and compliance requirements second; and all remaining warm
standby activities within remaining budgets--which may require halting
programmatic work in facilities that cannot remain appropriately
operational within the funding constraints.
As I have stated in previous testimony, it is still important to
improve the balance within the program and I also remained concerned
about the issues between scope and fiscal realities. At Los Alamos over
50 percent of the buildings are more than 40 years old.
66. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Anastasio, could the laboratories have
addressed these issues with additional fiscal year 2011 funds?
Dr. Anastasio. As I said previously in my testimony, `` . . . the
administration has developed a fiscal year 2011 budget that moves us in
the right direction. I view the NNSA's fiscal year 2011 budget request
as a positive first step and I urge its approval by Congress.''
Further, I believe that we need to be focused not just on a single
year's budget, but rather on a long-term sustainable program that is
both balanced and flexible as new costing information comes available
on the nuclear facilities and on the planned LEPs.
jason life extension program report
67. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Schwitters, the unclassified JASON LEP
Executive Summary, released September 9, 2009, has been widely
misconstrued in the press. The New York Times posted a headline of
``Panel sees no need for A-bomb upgrade''. While on the other hand, the
NNSA, in its press release on the report, cautioned, ``While we endorse
the recommendations and consider them well-aligned with NNSA's long-
term stockpile management strategy, certain findings in the
unclassified Executive Summary convey a different perspective on key
findings when viewed without the context of the full classified
report.'' The three national lab directors, in letters to Congress
received in March of this year, stated ``In the absence of the more
complete discussion provided in the classified report, the first two
findings understate . . . the challenges and risks . . . [and] also
understate the future risks that we must anticipate'' in sustaining the
U.S. nuclear stockpile. Did JASON identify aging and risks in the
stockpile that will require stockpile upgrades?
Dr. Schwitters. In the written remarks prepared for this hearing, I
describe the 2009 JASON report and its unclassified executive summary
released publicly by NNSA. The classified report details our
assessments of the certification challenges associated with LEP
strategies for all the systems in the enduring stockpile; the executive
summary provides verbatim the complete list of findings and
recommendations contained in the classified report. The full report
includes detailed discussions of aging effects. I hope I have made
clear in my testimony that JASON did not propose a refurbishment-only
strategy for future LEPs.
We were concerned that some of the commentary on our work implied
an inconsistency between the classified report and its unclassified
executive summary. We discussed these concerns with Administrator
D'Agostino in April 2010. Subsequently, NNSA forwarded to its staff and
laboratory leadership a statement that concludes: ``NNSA has reviewed
the JASON LEP report including the question of consistency between the
unclassified executive summary of the report and the full classified
version of the report JASON submitted to us. The two documents are
consistent. Both versions support NNSA's commitment to maintaining the
safety, security, and reliability of the Nation's nuclear weapons
stockpile under the terms of the NPR.''
My prepared remarks address the comments concerning the 2009 report
made by the laboratory directors in letters sent to Ranking Member
Turner of the House Subcommittee on Strategic Forces earlier this year.
68. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Schwitters, could issues arise in the
future due to aging or changes introduced in LEPs?
Dr. Schwitters. Yes, issues could arise in the future due to aging
or changes introduced by LEPs. A healthy stockpile surveillance program
provides a crucial window through which such issues can be observed as
they develop. JASON found that the current surveillance program is
inadequate and recommended a revised program to meet present and future
needs. The other principal tool for anticipating and preparing for
technical surprise in the stockpile is better understanding of the
science underlying nuclear weapons performance, including aging effects
in materials and the realms of validity of performance models and
simulations. Both surveillance and continuous improvement in
understanding of weapons science call for attention in the budget
process and setting of priorities by Congress, NNSA, and the
laboratories.
69. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Anastasio, Dr. Miller, and Dr. Hommert, can
the lab directors explain further how the report understates challenges
and risks in certifying the stockpile?
Dr. Anastasio. As I have stated in a letter to Representative
Michael Turner on January 25, 2010:
``The JASON report states that the lifetimes of today's
nuclear weapons could be extended for decades, with no
anticipated loss of confidence, by using approaches similar to
those employed in LEPs to date. I do not agree with this
assertion.''
There are some materials and components in the current stockpile
that cannot be replicated in a refurbishment, and there may not be
suitable replacements that would allow sustained confidence in current
systems. Moreover, there are several technical issues that cannot be
addressed using a refurbishment-only approach, including the need to
improve the safety and security of warheads. More specifically, as I
stated in the letter to Representative Turner:
``There are several technical issues that cannot be addressed using
a refurbishment-only approach:
It is not possible to replace HE primaries with IHE
primaries or implement certain intrinsic surety features in
today's stockpile using refurbishment because of current system
constraints.
Weapon aging, which can manifest itself in the form of
corrosion, microscopic and macroscopic defects, et cetera, can
lead to off-normal or feature-driven disruption to nuclear
performance and diminish the available performance margin in
low-margin weapons more rapidly than the weapons could be
cycled through a refurbishment. This risk can be managed by
preemptively increasing margins--but by amounts larger than
those available through refurbishment.
The JASON correctly recognizes that substantial
reductions in yield for various stockpile warheads, which may
be called for in the forthcoming NPR, also could not be
accomplished using refurbishment.
Further, the JASON report states that some reuse and replacement
options require a more advanced understanding of weapons physics. While
this is an accurate statement, it also applies to refurbishment. It
does not mean that reuse and replacement options are precluded
technically. In fact, the classified JASON report supports reuse and
replacement options.''
Dr. Miller. In the absence of the more complete discussion provided
in the classified report, the first two findings of the unclassified
JASON report understate the challenges and risks associated with
ensuring a safe and reliable nuclear force. These findings also
understate the future risks in sustaining the high-yield, low-margin
designs of the Cold War stockpile, in particular, the risks associated
with manufacturing difficulties, continued erosion of intellectual
capital, the impact of funding limitations, and the capability to
address potential future issues are all understated. While the
executive summary understates the risks and challenges, the full,
classified report does address some of the risks and therefore, in my
view, provides a more accurate description of the challenges facing the
SSP.
One of the sources of difficulty, in some cases, is the technical
challenge of recreating Cold War materials and/or production processes
(Fogbank is a recent noteworthy example). As discussed in the full
classified report, continuing to use approaches similar to those
employed in the LEPs to date would result in the need to reestablish
several other highly complex manufacturing processes that have been out
of use for decades. While it is theoretically possible to reestablish
these arcane processes, the time and cost to do so are daunting. This
challenge is compounded by the stress currently on the system resulting
from funding reductions over the past 5 years that have impacted our
science, engineering, and technology development efforts and resulted
in workforce reductions.
Another complication to consider is the fact that the accumulation
over time of small changes that are inherent in component aging,
material compatibility issues, and refurbishment of aging components,
take our warheads away from the designs whose safety and reliability
were certified in the era when nuclear tests were conducted. Recently
identified warhead problems (that were not identified when certain
warheads were first introduced into the stockpile) further complicate
certification. These factors introduce increased uncertainty in the
performance of existing warheads. Increased investment in the science,
engineering, and technical capabilities that underpin our ability to
maintain the U.S. nuclear deterrent is required.
Dr. Hommert. SNL has expressed concern that important differences
between nuclear and non-nuclear components were not fully considered in
the report. Therefore, we believe that certain findings and
recommendations are not necessarily extensible to the non-nuclear
components or the warhead system. In particular, the first finding of
the JASON'S report (JASON finds no evidence that accumulation of
changes incurred from aging and LEPs have increased risk to
certification of today's deployed nuclear warheads) is not applicable
to the non-nuclear components or the warhead system, and understates
the challenges we face today. Specifically, the accumulation of changes
in stockpile systems due to aging and changes to original design can be
a significant factor for non-nuclear components and does indeed affect
our confidence in these components and ultimately overall warhead
performance. Concerns about aging and technology obsolescence for non-
nuclear components are most effectively addressed with modern
technologies. These modern technologies would also enable SNL to
positively impact warhead safety and security. SNL can confidently
execute initial qualification and lifetime assessment of modem non-
nuclear components using our suite of engineering tools.
[Whereupon, at 11:26 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE NEW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 20, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:38 a.m. in room
SD-106, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Bill Nelson, E. Benjamin Nelson, Udall, Hagan, McCain, LeMieux,
Brown, and Collins.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member; and
Thomas K. McConnell, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
staff director; Christian D. Brose, professional staff member;
and Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Christine G. Lang, Hannah I.
Lloyd, Brian F. Sebold, and Breon N. Wells.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Griffin,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to
Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Ann
Premer, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Rob Soofer, assistant
to Senator Inhofe; Brian Walsh, assistant to Senator LeMieux;
Scott Schrage, assistant to Senator Brown; and Ryan Kaldahl and
Brandon Milhorn, assistants to Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody. I'd like to
welcome each of our witnesses this morning. We have with us
three very distinguished, dedicated public servants: Dr. James
Miller, the Principal Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy; Tom D'Agostino, the Administrator of the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA); and General Kevin
Chilton, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM).
It's good to see you all again.
With the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) which
was signed this last April, a nuclear verifiable arms control
treaty would be put back in place. Today we're going to focus
on how the New START treaty, if ratified, will be implemented
by the Department of Defense (DOD) and the NNSA.
There are many questions about how this treaty will be
implemented. These include the following: Does the reduced
force structure required by the new treaty meet the military
requirements to maintain nuclear deterrence for the United
States and for its allies? How will the force structure be
shaped? In other words, how will the requirements in the new
treaty for reductions in delivery systems and launchers be
implemented? Will implementation of the New START treaty
constrain DOD's programs and plans for missile defense? Can the
NNSA carry out its responsibility to maintain a smaller
stockpile of nuclear weapons under the New START treaty so that
these weapons can remain safe, secure, and reliable? Will the
ability of the directors of the national security labs to
propose any and all options they believe are warranted to
maintain the safety, security, and reliability of the nuclear
weapons be preserved?
Last week, we heard from the lab directors that they feel
that they are not limited in their ability to explore all
options. On the contrary, they said that they have the
flexibility and indeed it is their responsibility to propose
any option that they recommend.
The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) says that the full range
of life extension options should be studied, but that in
deciding which life extension options should move to the
engineering phase, the Nuclear Weapons Council (NWC) should
give preference for refurbishment or reuse. What does that
preference mean from an implementation perspective and will
this have any impact on the long-term ability to maintain
nuclear weapons safe, secure, and reliably, the reliability?
We heard from the Intelligence Community (IC) last week
that the New START and the old START have different approaches
to verification. Today we will hear from our witnesses as to
whether this treaty can be verified through the monitoring
activities of the IC utilizing the verification provisions of
the new treaty as well as national technical means.
Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank our
distinguished witnesses for their service and joining us today.
As I've stated before, I've been a supporter of previous
bipartisan efforts to reduce our nuclear weapons in step with
the Russian Government. Many of us have concerns about the New
START treaty's methods of verification, its constraints on
ballistic missile defense (BMD), and the accompanying plan for
modernization of both the nuclear stockpile and our nuclear
delivery vehicles. It's my hope that over the course of our
hearings Congress will receive both the assurances and the
funding commitments necessary to overcome these concerns.
Given this treaty's significant implications for our
national security and the multiple committees that have direct
oversight responsibilities, the Senate needs to move thoroughly
to consider this treaty and all of its critical components.
Obviously, we don't want to rush our deliberations to meet an
arbitrary deadline.
We have yet to receive critical documents necessary for
this committee and the full Senate to make an informed judgment
of this treaty. Specifically, the administration has yet to
provide the treaty's negotiating record, including the
negotiating history dealing with the ambiguity of the New START
treaty's preamble with respect to strategic defensive weapons
and the contradictory statements issued by the United States
and Russia on the meaning and legal force of that language.
This request for the treaty's negotiating history is not
unprecedented. The Senate has previously sought and received
access to the negotiating history for major arms control
treaties between the United States and the former Soviet Union,
such as the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and the 1987
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty. To enable the Senate
to fully fulfill its constitutional duty to provide advice and
consent on New START, the Obama administration should give the
Senate access to the negotiating records.
Last week the House appropriators chose to fund coveted
water project earmarks, but not to fully fund the President's
fiscal year 2011 request for modernization of the nuclear
weapons complex. There are already concerns about the adequacy
of the President's plan for meeting our full recapitalization
and modernization needs, and this lack of commitment by House
Democrats to at least meet the President's request is
troubling.
I look forward to hearing from all of our witnesses if
they're concerned by this cut and if they intend to recommend
that the President veto any funding bills that do not meet his
funding request for modernization of the weapons complex.
During this committee's hearings last week with the lab
directors, it was clear that some of these professionals have
significant concerns regarding the administration's decision to
discourage the replacement of warheads as an option for
extending the life of our nuclear stockpile. In fact, General
Chilton, I'm sure you weren't happy about the fact that I
quoted you and quote you again today when you said: ``We should
not constrain our engineers and scientists in developing
options on what it will take to achieve the objectives of the
stockpile management program and let them bring forward their
best recommendations for both the President and for Congress to
assess as to what is the best way forward.''
We've been told by the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of Energy that supplemental guidance for the NPR has
made it clear that all life extension efforts should be
pursued. However, it's not clear that such guidance has been
issued. It is essential for the President to state that his
administration should encourage and pursue all modernization
options achievable without testing or the establishment of a
new military characteristic.
These issues and others need to be resolved and clarified
before the Senate can in good faith and consistent with its
responsibilities make a considered judgment on this important
matter. Today's hearing is an additional opportunity to discuss
the implications of this new treaty and its supporting
documents, including the NPR, the 1251 report, the National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE), and the Stockpile Stewardship and
Management Plan (SSMP).
The treaty will also have implications on our nuclear force
structure. I look forward to hearing additional details on the
composition of our strategic forces from our witnesses this
morning.
I thank all of you again for your service and for appearing
here today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Dr. Miller.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES N. MILLER, Ph.D., PRINCIPAL DEPUTY
UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Dr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify today. It is a great pleasure to join my colleagues,
Tom D'Agostino and General Chilton, in discussing the New START
treaty. I'd like to summarize my prepared statement and ask
that it be entered into the record in its entirety.
Chairman Levin. It will be.
Dr. Miller. I'd like to make just six key points in
summary. First, the New START treaty will strengthen strategic
stability with Russia and reduce nuclear force levels. With
1,550 accountable nuclear warheads, the United States will be
able to sustain effective nuclear deterrence with an assured
devastating second strike capability. The administration plans
a robust triad of 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBM), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM),
and nuclear-capable heavy bombers. We plan to retain all 14
Ohio-class SSBNs and deploy no more than 240 Trident II SLBMs
at any one time. We also plan to retain up to 420 of the
current 450 Minuteman III ICBMs, each with a single warhead,
and we plan to retain up to 60 nuclear-capable B-2A and B-52H
heavy bombers, while converting remaining nuclear-capable B-1B
bombers and some B-52H bombers as well to a conventional-only
capability.
As noted in the section 1251 report to Congress, DOD plans
to spend well over $100 billion over the next decade to sustain
existing strategic delivery system capabilities and modernize
strategic systems for the future.
Second, on verification, the New START treaty's
verification provisions will increase our confidence in the
numbers and status of Russian nuclear forces. In fact, as
Secretary Gates has noted, one of the great contributions of
this treaty is its strong verification regime. The 18 annual
onsite inspections are a linchpin of the treaty's verification
framework. They will work synergistically with other elements
of the treaty, including the following: extensive data
exchanges on the characteristics and locations of ICBMs, SLBMs,
and nuclear-capable heavy bombers; unique identifiers
associated with each missile and heavy bomber; a requirement to
report any changes in the status of strategic systems through
timely notifications; and provisions for non-interference with
national technical means of verification.
Without the treaty and its verification measures, the
United States would have much less insight into Russian
strategic forces, thereby requiring our military to plan based
on worst-case assumptions. This would be an expensive and
potentially destabilizing approach that this Nation should not
accept.
Third point: U.S. force structure plans under the treaty
will further strengthen deterrence of Russian cheating or
breakout. Because the United States will retain a robust triad
of strategic forces, Russian cheating or breakout under the
treaty would have little effect on the assured second-strike
capabilities of U.S. nuclear forces. In particular, the
survivability and responsiveness of strategic submarines at sea
and alert heavy bombers would be unaffected by even large-scale
cheating.
In addition, the United States would be able to respond to
Russian cheating or breakout with the ability to upload large
numbers of additional nuclear warheads on both bombers and
strategic missiles. The United States will therefore be well-
postured under New START to deter any Russian attempt to gain
advantage by cheating or breakout.
This, of course, does not mean that Russian cheating or
breakout is likely or that it would be acceptable. If there
were any signs of Russian cheating or preparations to break out
from the treaty, the United States would first raise this
matter in the Bilateral Consultative Commission established
under the treaty and, if not resolved there, at higher levels,
and then would have other courses of action following that, if
necessary.
Fourth, the treaty does not constrain our ability to
develop and deploy non-nuclear prompt global strike
capabilities. DOD is currently conducting an indepth analysis
of non-nuclear prompt global strike. However, we have concluded
at this point that any deployment of conventionally armed ICBMs
or SLBMs with a traditional ballistic trajectory, which would
count under the New START treaty's limits, would be limited to
a niche capability which could easily be accounted for under
the treaty, while retaining our nuclear triad.
DOD is also exploring the potential of conventionally-armed
long-range missile systems that fly a non-ballistic trajectory,
for example so-called boost-glide systems. Such systems would
have the advantage that they could steer around other countries
to avoid overflight issues and they would have flight
trajectories distinguishable from an ICBM or SLBM. As we made
clear in the New START treaty negotiations, we would not
consider such non-nuclear systems, which do not otherwise meet
the definitions of the New START treaty as ICBMs or SLBMs, to
be new kinds of arms for purposes of the treaty.
The fifth point: The treaty does not in any way constrain
the ability of the United States to sustain our nuclear weapons
stockpile (NWS) and to rebuild the nuclear security enterprise
that supports it. This effort is a priority of the Secretary of
Defense. Both General Chilton and Administrator D'Agostino will
speak to this critical issue. I strongly endorse our efforts in
this area.
Sixth, the treaty does not constrain the ability of the
United States to develop and deploy effective BMDs, including
the ability to improve those defenses both qualitatively and
quantitatively, nor does it add any cost or inconvenience to
this effort. The treaty's preamble states that current
strategic defensive forces do not threaten to undermine the
effectiveness of the parties' strategic offensive arms. Given
that the United States currently has only 30 ground-based
interceptors (GBI) and Russia will likely deploy well over
1,000 ICBM and SLBM warheads under the treaty, U.S. missile
defenses could increase very significantly and the same will
remain true.
It is also important to note that the treaty's preamble is
not legally binding and therefore does not require or prohibit
either side from doing anything.
Article 5 of the treaty prohibits any future conversion of
ICBM silos or SLBM launchers to house or launch BMD
interceptors, or vice versa. Such a conversion would neither be
cost effective nor necessary. For example, converting 10 ICBM
silos to house GBIs would cost about $550 million, compared to
$360 million for building 10 new tailor-made GBI silos. The
placement of missile defense interceptors in converted SLBM
launchers would be operationally impractical and very
expensive. Therefore, the Article 5 limitation on launcher
conversion does not constrain U.S. plans, programs, or options.
Russia made a unilateral statement about missile defenses
in connection with the treaty. This statement is not part of
the treaty and is not legally binding. As I know the Senators
also know, the United States made a unilateral statement in
response that we will continue to improve our missile defense
capabilities to provide for effective defense of our Homeland
against limited missile attacks. We will also do so for our
deployed forces and our allies and partners against growing
regional threats.
As the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR), our
budgetary plans, the U.S. unilateral statement, and extensive
testimony by administration officials all make clear, the
United States will continue to expand and improve our missile
defenses.
In summary, the New START treaty promotes stability and
transparency in our strategic relationship with Russia. It is
effectively verifiable. It allows us to maintain and to
modernize a robust triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems
and, if desired, to deploy non-nuclear prompt global strike
capabilities. It does not affect our ability or intent to
revitalize our nuclear security enterprise, nor does it affect
our ability or intent to improve our ballistic missile defense
capabilities both qualitatively and quantitatively. In short,
the New START treaty will make the United States and our allies
and partners more secure.
Thank you, I look forward to answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. James N. Miller
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. It is a
pleasure to join General Kevin Chilton, Commander of U.S. Strategic
Command, and Tom D'Agostino, Administrator of the National Nuclear
Security Administration, in discussing the New Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START).
The New START treaty will strengthen strategic stability with
Russia at reduced nuclear force levels, improve transparency with key
data exchange and verification provisions, enable the United States to
retain and modernize a robust Triad of strategic delivery systems,
allow the freedom to alter our mix of strategic forces, and protect our
ability to develop and deploy non-nuclear prompt global strike and
missile defenses. In short, the New START treaty will make the United
States, and our allies and partners, more secure.
nuclear posture review and new start
An early priority of the year-long 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) was to develop U.S. positions for the New START negotiations,
including how many strategic delivery vehicles and deployed warheads
were needed to field an effective, credible, and flexible nuclear
deterrent for the duration of the treaty. The Secretary of Defense, the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General Chilton were all deeply involved in
the NPR, and in decisions on New START treaty limits.
The NPR's early, extensive, and continued attention to New START
resulted in guidance to negotiators that ensured the key limits agreed
to in the treaty would allow U.S. strategic nuclear forces to meet all
key strategic objectives for the United States. In particular:
The treaty's limit of 1,550 accountable warheads will
allow the United States to sustain effective nuclear
deterrence, including sufficient survivable nuclear forces for
an assured devastating second-strike capability.
The treaty's limits of 700 deployed intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs), and nuclear-capable heavy bombers will
support strategic stability by allowing the United States to
retain a robust Triad of strategic delivery systems--while
downloading all remaining Minuteman III ICBMs to a single
warhead.
The treaty's limit of 800 deployed and nondeployed
launchers of ICBMs, launchers of SLBMs, and nuclear-capable
heavy bombers will allow the retention of up to 100 ICBM and
SLBM launchers, and nuclear-capable bombers, in a nondeployed
status. When combined with the New START counting rule that a
launcher is deployed only when mated with a missile, and the
treaty's provisions on conversion of heavy bombers to a
conventional-only configuration, this will allow the United
States to minimize irreversible changes to nuclear force
structure.
By providing the freedom to mix U.S. strategic nuclear
forces as we see fit, the treaty will allow the United States
to rebalance its strategic forces as necessary to adapt to any
future technical and geopolitical challenges that could affect
a given leg of the Triad.
The treaty allows us to maintain our stockpile of
nondeployed warheads and an ``upload'' capacity for strategic
delivery systems, which provide a hedge against adverse
technical developments or a serious deterioration in the
international security environment. More broadly, the treaty
does not in any way constrain the ability of the United States
to sustain our nuclear weapons stockpile, and rebuild the
nuclear security enterprise that supports it.
The treaty's data exchange and verification provisions
will increase transparency and confidence in the numbers and
status of Russia's nuclear forces, without imposing significant
burdens on our ability to operate U.S. nuclear forces.
As I will discuss in more detail, the treaty does not
constrain our ability to develop and deploy non-nuclear prompt
global strike capabilities.
As I will also discuss in more detail, the treaty does
not constrain the ability of the United States to develop and
deploy effective ballistic missile defenses, including the
ability to improve these defenses both qualitatively and
quantitatively.
u.s. nuclear force structure under new start
The Department of Defense has developed a baseline nuclear force
structure for New START that fully supports U.S. security requirements
without requiring changes to current or planned basing arrangements.
Specifically, under baseline plans, the administration plans to field a
diversified force that meets New START limits by:
Retaining 14 Ohio-class SSBNs and deploying no more
than 240 Trident II D5 SLBMs at any time.
Retaining up to 420 deployed Minuteman III ICBMs, each
with a single warhead.
Retaining up to 60 nuclear-capable B-2A and B-52H
heavy bombers, while converting remaining nuclear-capable B-1B
and some B-52H heavy bombers to conventional-only capability.
This baseline force structure provides a basis for future planning.
The treaty affords the flexibility to make appropriate adjustments as
necessary.
The Department of Defense plans to sustain and modernize U.S.
strategic delivery capabilities, as outlined in detail in the
classified report submitted to Congress in response to section 1251 of
the National Defense Authorization Act of 2010. To this end, over the
next decade, the United States will invest well over $100 billion to
sustain existing strategic delivery systems capabilities and modernize
strategic systems.
The fiscal year 2011 budget request and future year program plans
reflect a decision to proceed with the SSBN(X) to replace the current
Ohio-class strategic submarines starting in the late 2020s, to sustain
Minuteman III ICBMs until 2030 as directed by Congress, and to sustain
dual-capable B-52H and B-2 bombers until at least 2035 and 2050
respectively. The DOD is currently conducting an Analysis of
Alternatives (AoA) for the next Air-Launched Cruise Missile, and will
initiate study of options for a follow-on ICBM in 2011-2012.
Finally, DOD is currently studying the appropriate long-term mix of
long-range strike capabilities, including heavy bombers as well as non-
nuclear prompt global strike systems, in follow-on analysis to the 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review and the NPR; the results of this ongoing
work will be reflected in the Department's fiscal year 2012 budget
submission.
non-nuclear prompt global strike
The deployment of a non-nuclear prompt global strike system would
provide the United States with a capability that we currently lack: the
ability to precisely strike a target anywhere on the earth in less than
1 hour using a non-nuclear warhead. At the same time, depending on
technical and operational details, such systems could raise a number of
challenges, including potential over-flight of other countries, and the
ability to distinguish the launch of non-nuclear as opposed to nuclear-
armed systems.
While our analysis of non-nuclear prompt global strike is still
underway, DOD has concluded that any deployment of conventionally-armed
ICBMs or SLBMs with a traditional ballistic trajectory, which would
count under the New START treaty's limits, should be limited to a niche
capability. For example, if the Conventional Trident Modification
program were deployed, it would involve 2 missiles for each of 12 to 14
submarines, and 24 deployed strategic delivery vehicles total and fewer
than a hundred accountable strategic warheads. This number of SDVs and
strategic warheads could easily be accounted for under the limit of 700
deployed SDVs and 1550 strategic warheads under the treaty, while still
retaining a robust nuclear Triad.
DOD is also exploring the potential of conventionally-armed, long-
range missile systems that fly a non-ballistic trajectory (e.g., boost-
glide systems). Such systems would have the advantage that they could
``steer around'' other countries to avoid over-flight and have flight
trajectories distinguishable from an ICBM or SLBM. As we made clear
during the New START treaty negotiations, we would not consider such
non-nuclear systems, which do not otherwise meet the definitions of the
New START treaty, to be ``new kinds of strategic offense arms'' for the
purposes of the treaty.
sustaining the nuclear weapons stockpile and infrastructure
In addition to sustaining U.S. delivery systems, maintaining an
adequate stockpile of safe, secure, and reliable nuclear warheads is a
core U.S. objective identified in the 2010 NPR, and this requires a
reinvigoration of our nuclear security enterprise. To this end, the
Department of Defense transferred $4.6 billion of its top-line to the
Department of Energy's National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
through fiscal year 2015. This transfer will assist in funding critical
nuclear weapons life extension programs and efforts to modernize the
nuclear weapons infrastructure. The initial applications of this
funding, along with an additional $1.1 billion being transferred for
naval nuclear reactors, are reflected in the Defense and Energy
Departments' fiscal year 2011 budget requests. The NNSA budget request
for weapons activities for fiscal year 2011 represents a 10 percent
increase over fiscal year 2010, and increased funding levels are
planned for the future, as reflected in the administration's recent
section 1251 report. The U.S. nuclear force posture under the New START
treaty will be strong, properly resourced, and supported by a
revitalized nuclear infrastructure.
verification
As Secretary Gates has testified, one of the greatest contributions
of this treaty is its strong verification regime. The treaty's
verification and data exchange provisions will increase transparency
and confidence in the numbers and status of Russian nuclear forces,
without imposing significant burdens on our ability to operate U.S.
nuclear forces.
Onsite inspections are a linchpin of the treaty's verification
framework. The treaty allows each Party to conduct up to 18 short-
notice onsite inspections each year, with up to 10 Type One inspections
conducted at operating bases for ICBMs, strategic nuclear-powered
ballistic missile submarines, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers, and up
to 8 Type Two inspections conducted at places such as storage sites,
test ranges, and conversion or elimination facilities where nondeployed
systems are located.
Onsite inspections work synergistically with other elements of the
treaty, including:
extensive periodic data exchanges on the
characteristics and locations of ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-
capable heavy bombers;
unique identifiers associated with each ICBM, SLBM,
and heavy bomber; and,
a requirement to report any changes in the status of
strategic systems through timely notifications.
By enabling the United States to directly observe Russia's
strategic nuclear forces and related facilities, onsite inspections
will help the United States verify that Russia is complying with the
provisions of the New START treaty.
Inspections will also provide a deterrent to cheating. Because the
treaty provides for up to 18 inspections per year at sites selected by
the inspecting party, each side knows that the other will have a
significant capability to uncover discrepancies between what is
reported and what is actually happening. If the United States has
concerns or encounters ambiguities during onsite inspections, we will
immediately raise these matters with the Russians in the Bilateral
Consultative Commission and seek prompt resolution. If necessary, we
will pursue them at higher political levels.
Without the treaty's verification measures, the United States would
have much less insight into Russian strategic forces, thereby requiring
our military to plan based on worst-case assumptions. This would be an
expensive and potentially destabilizing approach that this nation
should not accept.
The force structure plans of the United States, as outlined in the
Nuclear Posture Review and the section 1251 report to Congress,
reinforce the New START treaty's verification regime by minimizing the
value of any potential Russian cheating or breakout. Moreover, there is
no breakout scenario in which Russia would be able to employ even a
substantially expanded number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads to
undermine the second strike retaliatory deterrent capability of the
United States. Because the United States will retain a diverse Triad of
strategic forces, any Russian cheating under the treaty would have
little effect on the assured second-strike capabilities of U.S.
strategic forces. In particular, the survivability and response
capabilities of strategic submarines at sea and alert heavy bombers
would be unaffected by even large-scale cheating. Nor could Russia
achieve a sustained numerical advantage in deployed strategic warheads
through such a breakout because the United States will retain the
ability to ``upload'' large numbers of additional nuclear warheads on
both bombers and strategic missiles deployed under New START. Therefore
any breakout scenario would have, at most, limited military
significance. Notwithstanding this conclusion, should there be any
signs of Russian cheating or preparations to breakout from the treaty,
the United States would certainly raise this matter in the Bilateral
Consultative Commission, and if not resolved, at higher levels.
The New START treaty's verification provisions and a diverse and
survivable U.S. force posture combine to provide strong deterrence of
Russian cheating or breakout under the New START treaty. As the State
Department's recent report on the verifiability of the New START treaty
states, these factors contribute to a New START treaty that is
effectively verifiable.
ballistic missile defenses
As made clear in the report of the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense
Review, the ballistic missile threat to U.S. deployed military forces
and to our allies and partners is growing rapidly, with potential
implications for our ability to project power abroad, to prevent and
deter future conflicts, and to prevail should deterrence fail. One of
the most significant threats to the U.S. homeland is the continued
efforts of Iran and North Korea to develop nuclear weapons and long-
range ballistic missiles to deliver them. The protection of the United
States, our deployed forces, and our allies and partners from the
threat of ballistic missile attack is a critical national priority.
A core U.S. aim during the New START negotiations was to protect
the U.S. ability to deploy the most effective missile defenses
possible. U.S. negotiators achieved this objective. The New START
treaty does not constrain the United States from deploying the most
effective missile defenses possible, nor does it add any additional
cost or inconvenience. Rather, the treaty enables this President and
his successors to develop the missile defenses needed to defend the
Nation, our deployed forces abroad, and our allies and partners from
the threat of ballistic missile attack.
The New START treaty addresses missile defenses in two places: the
Preamble and Article V. First, the Preamble of the treaty states that
there is an interrelationship between strategic offensive and strategic
defensive arms, and that current strategic defensive forces do not
threaten to undermine the effectiveness of the Parties' strategic
offensive arms. Given that the United States has only 30 Ground Based
Interceptors and Russia will likely field well over 1,000 ICBM and SLBM
warheads under the treaty,
U.S. missile defenses can increase very significantly and the same
would remain true. It is also important to note that the treaty's
preambular statement is not legally binding, and therefore does not
require or prohibit either side from doing anything.
Second, Article V of the treaty prohibits any future conversion of
ICBM silos or SLBM launchers to house and launch BMD interceptors--or
vice versa. Such conversion would be neither cost-effective nor
necessary. For example, converting ten ICBM silos to house GBIs would
cost about $550 million, compared to $360 million for building 10 new
tailor-made GBI silos. The placement of midcourse missile defense
interceptors in converted SLBM launchers would be operationally
impractical and very expensive. Consequently, the Article V limitation
on launcher conversion does not constrain U.S. plans or programs.
In addition, Russia made a unilateral statement about missile
defense in connection with the treaty. This statement is not part of
the treaty and is not legally binding.
The United States also made a unilateral statement associated with
the New START treaty, which makes clear that our missile defense
systems are not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia,
and that we will continue to improve our missile defense capabilities
to provide for effective defense of our homeland against limited
missile attacks and of our deployed forces, allies, and partners
against growing regional threats. We have also explained that the
missile defense capabilities associated with the European Phased
Adaptive Approach will not affect the U.S.-Russian strategic balance,
and that we fully intend to proceed with that approach in the context
of the extensive missile defense program laid out in the 2010 Ballistic
Missile Defense Review. We continue to seek Russian cooperation on
missile defenses to improve both countries' ability to cope with the
growing threat.
As the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, our budgetary plans,
the U.S. unilateral statement, and extensive testimony by
administration officials all make clear, the United States will
continue to expand and improve missile defenses as necessary.
accountability of rail mobile icbms and their launchers
Before concluding, I would like to address an additional issue that
has arisen recently regarding the treaty. Some have asked whether a
Russian rail-mobile ICBM system, should Russia again deploy a system
such as its former rail-based SS-24, would be accountable under New
START. The answer is unequivocally yes. Such systems were not
specifically addressed in the treaty because, unlike the situation when
the previous START was being negotiated, neither party currently
deploys rail-mobile ICBMs. Nevertheless, the treaty's terms and
definitions cover all ICBMs and ICBM launchers, including possible
future rail-mobile systems. Therefore, in the event that Russia deploys
rail-mobile ICBMs in the future, the launchers and the ICBMs they carry
would be accountable under the New START treaty. Specific details about
the application of the above mentioned verification provisions would be
worked out in the treaty's Bilateral Consultative Commission.
conclusion
The New START treaty promotes stability and transparency in our
strategic relationship with the Russian Federation, and is effectively
verifiable. It allows us to maintain and modernize a robust Triad of
strategic delivery systems, and if desired, deploy non-nuclear prompt
global strike capabilities. The New START treaty does not affect our
ability to revitalize our nuclear security enterprise. Nor does it
affect our ability or intent to improve our ballistic missile defense
capabilities both qualitatively and quantitatively. For these reasons,
the Department of Defense fully supports this treaty.
Thank you. I look forward to answering your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Dr. Miller.
Mr. D'Agostino.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D'AGOSTINO, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. D'Agostino. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and
members of the committee, thank you for the opportunity to
testify on the New START treaty between the United States of
America and the Russian Federation. First of all, I'd like to
make clear that the New START treaty will not affect NNSA's
ability to maintain the safety, security, and effectiveness of
the Nation's NWS. No NNSA sites will be subject to inspections
and none of our operations will be subject to limitation. Our
plans for investment in and modernization of the nuclear
strategic enterprise are essential irrespective of whether or
not the New START treaty is ratified. Treaty implementation
will not affect our plans.
Ensuring the safety, security, and effectiveness of the NWS
is one of NNSA's primary missions. Maintaining the stockpile
without nuclear testing has been a national policy for nearly
20 years and we will continue to support that policy in the
future.
In addition to our maintenance, surveillance, and warhead
certification activities, important life extension milestones
include: completing the ongoing life extension for the W76
warhead, about the 2017 time frame; completing the full-scope
life extension study for the B61 bomb, with production
beginning about the 2017 time frame as the W76 is coming down;
and completing a study of life extension options for
maintaining the W78 ICBM warhead.
With respect to life extension options, the NPR is clear
that the full range of options will be considered for each
warhead life extension, to include replacement of nuclear
components. The report on New START treaty framework and
nuclear force structure plans, or what's known as the 1251
report, explains that, while the NPR expresses a preference for
refurbishment and reuse, the laboratory directors will be
expected to provide findings associated with the full range of
life extension approaches and they will make recommendations
based solely on their best technical assessment of the ability
of each life extension approach to meet critical stockpile
management goals. These are goals in weapons system safety,
weapons system security, and of course the effectiveness and
reliability.
The NPR also reinforced the need to maintain the most
survivable leg of the triad, a sea-based strategic deterrent.
Naval Reactors began reactor and propulsion plant design this
year for an Ohio-class replacement submarine. Reactor plant
components will be procured in 2017 and will support the Navy's
need for a reactor core that will last for more than a 40-year
life of submarine. Full funding for this program will be
required.
The NPR also concluded that we needed to recapitalize the
aging infrastructure and renew our human capital base. The SSMP
is a comprehensive 20-year plan to achieve this goal and to
modernize NNSA's nuclear security enterprise. Implementation of
this SSMP will allow us to strengthen our science, technology,
and engineering base, modernize the infrastructure, and
recruit, develop, and retain the next generation of nuclear
security professionals responsible for the stockpile
stewardship program as well as other nuclear security missions
that the Nation needs.
U.S. nuclear warhead reliability has always been held to
the highest standards. These standards for warhead reliability
will remain exacting and extremely high regardless of stockpile
size. But as the size of the stockpile decreases, our deterrent
will rely even more on the capabilities and the strong
capabilities-based infrastructure that can respond rapidly to
technical and geopolitical changes. This is not just
infrastructure in the form of buildings, but our people, the
infrastructure in the form of people and capability to be able
to respond in the future.
We've requested a substantial increase in funding in the
2011 to 2015 time period, and the President's budget request
for NNSA for the fiscal year during this period for what we
call the future year nuclear security program, is exactly
right. It reflects both what is necessary and executable. The
request includes an increase of $624 million next year and
scales up by an additional billion dollars by fiscal year 2015.
The plan calls for sustained investments at these higher levels
such that over the next decade the United States will have
invested nearly $80 billion in the SSMP and in modernizing the
infrastructure.
Sustained national-level commitment and support over the
next decade is essential for the entire nuclear security
enterprise. The United States relies on NNSA and the national
laboratories for the development of technologies, for treaty
verification, and for nonproliferation initiatives. Under New
START, U.S. inspectors will use equipment developed by our
national laboratories that was used for the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces and the START I treaties. Should new radiation
detection equipment be required, specialists from the nuclear
security enterprise will also play an essential role in
developing and evaluating this equipment.
The New START treaty, if ratified and entered into force,
commits the United States and the Russian Federation to further
reduce our deployed strategic nuclear weapons in a predictable,
transparent, and verifiable manner, increasing stability with
other countries and demonstrating in a concrete way the U.S.
and Russian commitment to our nonproliferation treaty
obligations. This I believe will provide positive momentum for
future U.S.-Russian collaboration and will provide further
credibility for maintaining a strong leadership role for the
United States in international nonproliferation initiatives.
Most importantly, the New START treaty accomplishes these
objectives without jeopardizing U.S. national security and
specifically will not jeopardize the ability of the United
States to maintain the safety, security, and effectiveness of
our NWS.
For these reasons, I urge this body to favorably consider
the New START treaty.
Thank you very much. I look forward to your questions, sir.
[The prepared statement of Mr. D'Agostino follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Thomas P. D'Agostino
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify on the treaty
between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on
Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms, known as ``New START.''
Last month, Secretary of Energy Chu testified before this committee
on the New START treaty. He described the treaty's impact on Department
of Energy (DOE) and National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA)
activities, and our ability to ensure the safety, security, and
effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile under the treaty. I
will reiterate the essential points made by Secretary Chu, and provide
further information on NNSA activities to maintain the stockpile in the
context of the New START treaty and the policies contained in the
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). Our strength rests on ensuring that our
nuclear weapons stockpile remains safe, secure, and effective for as
long as it is needed. Modernization and investment in our nuclear
infrastructure is essential to this objective, while allowing a reduced
role for nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. I will also
comment on NNSA's role in the development and evaluation of treaty
verification technology.
First and foremost, I want to make clear that the New START treaty
will not affect NNSA's ability to maintain the safety, security, and
effectiveness of the Nation's nuclear weapons stockpile. NNSA sites--to
include our production, testing, and national laboratory facilities--
will not be subject to inspection, and none of our operations will be
subject to limitation. Our plans for investment in and modernization of
the Nuclear Security Enterprise--the collection of NNSA laboratories,
production sites and experimental facilities that support our stockpile
stewardship program, our nuclear nonproliferation agenda, our naval
nuclear propulsion programs, and a host of other nuclear security
missions--are essential irrespective of whether or not New START is
ratified. Treaty implementation will not affect our plans. Warheads
removed from deployed delivery vehicles to meet New START limits will
continue to remain available to support maintenance and surveillance
activities. They may also be retained as inactive Reserve weapons,
available to support nuclear component reuse if needed as part of
future warhead life extension program (LEP) activities.
warhead life extension activities and the npr
Ensuring the safety, security and effectiveness of the Nation's
nuclear weapons stockpile is one of NNSA's primary missions.
Maintaining the weapons stockpile without nuclear testing has been
national policy for nearly 20 years, and we will continue to support
that policy in the future. In addition to our maintenance, surveillance
and warhead certification activities, important life extension
milestones include the following:
Completing by 2017 the ongoing LEP for the W76
warhead, which will extend its life for an additional 30 years;
Completing a full scope LEP study for the B61 bomb and
beginning production in 2017 to extend its service life,
enhance its safety and use control features, and ensure its
compatibility with modern aircraft; and
Completing, with the Nuclear Weapons Council, a study
of LEP options for maintaining the W78 ICBM warhead.
With respect to life extension options, while the NPR is clear that
the United States will give preference to nuclear component
refurbishment or reuse, it is equally clear that the full range of
options will be considered for each warhead LEP, to include replacement
of nuclear components. The report on the ``New START treaty Framework
and Nuclear Force Structure Plans,'' submitted to Congress in response
to section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2010, further explains that ``[w]hile the NPR expresses a policy
preference for refurbishment and reuse in decisions to proceed from
study to engineering development, the Laboratory Directors will be
expected to provide findings associated with the full range of LEP
approaches, and to make a set of recommendations based solely on their
best technical assessments of the ability of each LEP approach to meet
critical stockpile management goals (weapon system safety, security,
and effectiveness).''
The directors of Los Alamos, Lawrence Livermore, and Sandia
National Laboratories made their position on this approach clear in an
April 9, 2010, joint statement. They assessed that ``the approach
outlined in the NPR, which excludes further nuclear testing and
includes the consideration of the full range of life extension options
(refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from
different warheads and replacement of nuclear components based on
previously tested designs), provides the necessary technical
flexibility to manage the nuclear stockpile into the future with an
acceptable level of risk.''
The Nuclear Posture Review also reinforced the necessity to
maintain the capability of the most survivable leg of the triad with a
sea-based strategic deterrent. Naval Reactors began reactor and
propulsion plant design in fiscal year 2010 for the Ohio-class
replacement submarine to support the Navy's schedule. Reactor plant
components will be procured in 2017 to allow for the long manufacturing
spans and need for these components in submarine construction.
Research, development and design efforts are underway for the
development of reactor technologies to support the Navy's need for a
reactor core that will last for the more-than-40-year life of the
submarine. These efforts directly support recapitalizing the sea-based
leg of the triad within full compliance of the New START treaty.
priorities for nnsa's nuclear security enterprise
The NPR concluded that the NNSA needed to recapitalize the aging
infrastructure and renew our human capital base. The recently completed
Stockpile Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) is the comprehensive
resource plan to achieve this and to modernize NNSA's Nuclear Security
Enterprise to support the objectives detailed in the Nuclear Posture
Review. Implementation of the SSMP will allow us to accomplish the
following:
Strengthen the science, technology, and engineering
base, including the computational and experimental
capabilities, needed for conducting weapon system LEPs, weapons
surety, surveillance, and annual certification without nuclear
testing.
Modernize the infrastructure necessary to fulfill
stockpile stewardship requirements, including replacing
outdated facilities with modern, efficient, cost-effective and
properly-sized facilities. Key priorities are to:
Complete the design and begin building the
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Facility Replacement
Nuclear Facility at the Los Alamos National Laboratory
in order to complete construction by 2020, and ramp up
to full operations by 2022;
Increase pit manufacturing capacity and
capability at the Plutonium Facility at Los Alamos; and
Complete the design and begin building the
Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 National
Security Complex in order to complete construction by
2020, and ramp up to full operations by 2022.
Recruit, develop, and retain the next generation of
nuclear security professionals responsible for stockpile
stewardship. These individuals are today, and will be in the
future, our greatest asset. They face critical and persistent
scientific challenges as they implement our national policy to
consider all life extension options to maintain the nuclear
weapons stockpile without nuclear testing. I believe that these
challenges, combined with a national-level commitment to
transform NNSA from a nuclear weapons complex into a modern,
world-class 21st century Nuclear Security Enterprise will
provide the environment to attract and retain the best and
brightest scientists and engineers available. In addition,
defense initiatives beyond stockpile stewardship, such as
nuclear forensics and attribution, and treaty verification
activities, provide a broadened mission that will push the
envelope of nuclear technology and further challenge and
develop our nuclear security professionals.
maintaining warhead reliability
U.S. nuclear warhead reliability has always been held to the
highest standards--and these standards for warhead reliability will
remain exacting and extremely high, regardless of stockpile size. Over
the course of the past 20 years, the stockpile has been reduced from
over 21,000 warheads to approximately 5,100 at the end of fiscal year
2009 within the context of science-based stockpile stewardship and the
continuing moratorium on nuclear testing. During this time, the
national laboratories have assessed our weapon systems on an annual
basis and the Secretaries of Defense and Energy have annually certified
to the President the safety, security and reliability of our stockpile.
However, as the size of the stockpile continues to decrease, our
deterrent must rely even more on a strong capabilities-based
infrastructure that can respond rapidly to technical and geopolitical
challenges--and this is what we will achieve through the programs and
plans described in the SSMP. To ensure this infrastructure is in place
when we need it, sustained national-level support over the next decade
is essential.
Accordingly, we have included a substantial increase in funding in
the fiscal year 2011-2015 budget request, shaped by our requirements
and the ability of the Nuclear Security Enterprise to efficiently
``ramp up'' within the constraints of time, capacity and capability to
spend the increased funds. In this regard, the President's budget
request for the NNSA for the fiscal year 2011-2015 Future Years Nuclear
Security Program is exactly right--it reflects what is both necessary
and executable. The request includes an increase of $624 million in
fiscal year 2011, and scales to $1.64 billion in fiscal year 2015. The
administration's plan calls for sustained investments at these higher
levels such that over the next decade the United States will have
invested over $80 billion in modernizing the NNSA infrastructure. This
represents a nearly 30 percent increase over the next decade as
compared with the investments in these programs over the course of the
past decade. Again, however, sustained commitment and support over the
next decade is essential.
nnsa support to treaty verification
The United States relies on NNSA and the national laboratories for
the development, evaluation, and utilization of technologies for a
number of treaty verification and nonproliferation initiatives. Our
work in this area includes, for example: advanced safeguards technology
development to support the International Atomic Energy Agency;
equipment development for and monitoring of the conversion of highly
enriched uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium under the U.S.-Russia
HEU Purchase Agreement; and monitoring the extraction of spent fuel
rods at the Yongbyon reactor in North Korea and verifying that the
removed fuel rods were actually spent fuel. For strategic arms control
purposes, we leverage the expertise of our physicists and engineers to
develop advanced radiation detection equipment, as well as analyze the
impact of the use of this equipment on or near U.S. assets. With regard
to New START, U.S. inspectors will use equipment developed by the NNSA
National Laboratories to confirm that objects on deployed delivery
vehicles that are declared to be non-nuclear are, in fact, non-nuclear.
This equipment, which was originally developed for verification under
the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, was also used by U.S.
inspectors for verification under the 1991 START treaty. Should new
radiation detection equipment be required, specialists from throughout
the Nuclear Security Enterprise will play an essential role in the
development and evaluation process.
conclusion
The New START treaty, if ratified and entered into force, commits
the United States and Russian Federation to further reduce our deployed
strategic nuclear weapons in a transparent and verifiable manner,
thereby increasing stability between our countries, while demonstrating
in a concrete manner the U.S. and Russian commitment to our obligations
under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. This, I believe, will
provide positive momentum for future U.S.-Russian collaboration, and
will provide further credibility for maintaining a strong leadership
role for the United States in international nonproliferation
initiatives. Most importantly, the New START treaty accomplishes these
objectives without jeopardizing U.S. national security, and
specifically it will not jeopardize the ability of the United States to
maintain the safety, security and effectiveness of its nuclear weapons
stockpile. For these reasons, I urge this body to favorably consider
the New START treaty.
Thank you. I look forward to answering your questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Mr. D'Agostino.
General Chilton.
STATEMENT OF GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Chilton. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Senator McCain,
members of the committee. It's a pleasure to join you again
today. I'm also pleased to be here with Dr. Miller and Mr.
D'Agostino again, two great colleagues.
Mr. Chairman, I was fully consulted during the treaty
negotiation process and I support ratification of the New
START. Today I would like to briefly discuss three reasons why
our Nation will be safer and more secure with this treaty than
without it, and to highlight current challenges that must be
addressed to ensure the long-term safety, security, and
effectiveness of the U.S. strategic deterrent.
I ask that my entire statement be entered into the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be.
General Chilton. Thank you, Chairman.
Mr. Chairman, throughout the NPR process and New START
negotiations, STRATCOM's team played important analytical and
advisory roles. As the combatant command responsible for
strategic deterrence planning, advocating for related
capabilities, and executing operations at the President's
direction, no military organization has a greater interest in
the treaty's specifics than we do.
At the outset, our team analyzed the required nuclear
weapons and delivery vehicle force structure and posture
necessary to meet the current guidance. STRATCOM involvement
and support to both the NPR and New START was continuous,
providing options and engagement with the negotiating team
throughout the New START process. The breadth and depth of our
involvement gives me great confidence that the result does not
constrain America's ability to continue to deter potential
adversaries, assure our allies, and sustain strategic
stability.
I believe that there are three reasons why the New START
agreement represents a positive step forward. First, New START
limits the number of Russian ballistic missile warheads that
can target the United States, missiles that pose the most
prompt threat to our forces and our Nation.
Second, New START's flexible limits on deployed and
nondeployed delivery platforms retain sufficient flexibility in
managing our triad of deterrent forces to hedge against both
technical or geopolitical surprise.
Third, New START will reestablish a strategic nuclear arms
control verification regime that provides access to Russian
nuclear forces and a measure of predictability in Russian force
deployments over the life of the treaty.
I think it's equally important to remember what New START
will not do. Secretary Gates noted here last month: ``The
treaty will not constrain the United States from deploying the
most effective missile defense possible, nor impose additional
costs or barriers on those defenses.'' I wholeheartedly agree.
As the combatant command also responsible for synchronizing
global missile defense plans, operations, and advocacy, I can
say with confidence that this treaty does not constrain any
current or future missile defense plans.
In closing, let me say a word about the need to sustain a
safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. As Secretary
Gates has also noted in his prepared statement last month,
``America's nuclear arsenal remains a vital pillar of our
national security, deterring potential adversaries and
reassuring allies.''
Today the deterrent is indeed safe, secure, and effective.
But it is also in need. The NPR and administration plans
recognize needs in infrastructure, human capital, life
extensions, and delivery platform developments, and they
include support for improving our nuclear enterprise,
sustaining today's nuclear triad of delivery platforms, and
exploring future triad platforms.
In order to sustain the deterrent and implement the NPR, we
must commit to long-term investments that begin with several
increases outlined in the President's fiscal year 2011 budget.
They include: increased funding for NNSA for full-rate
production of the W76-1 warhead for our submarine leg of the
triad; full-scope nuclear and nonnuclear life extension of the
B61 bomb to sustain its strategic deterrence and extended
deterrence roles; and initiating studies to develop life
extension options for the W78 ICBM warhead. These investments
are not only important, they are essential independent from the
ratification of this arms control treaty.
I appreciate this committee's support for NNSA's investment
in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011.
This funding is very important and I'm grateful for this year's
support.
Thank you again for the opportunity to be here with you
today and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Chilton follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, USAF
introduction
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the committee, thank
you for the opportunity to meet with you today. U.S. Strategic Command
was closely consulted before and during negotiations on the New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and I look forward to
discussing the treaty with you today. I would like to note at the
outset how proud I am of the extraordinary work the Command performed
in support of these negotiations. We have an amazing team, and their
diligence, expertise, and tireless work continue to ensure our ability
to deliver global security for America.
new start
New START will enhance the security of the United States of
America, and I support its ratification. Our nation will be safer and
more secure with this treaty than without it. Let me briefly explain
why, from the perspective of the combatant commander responsible for
planning and executing strategic deterrence and nuclear operations.
First, New START limits the number of Russian ballistic missile
warheads that can target the United States, missiles that pose the most
prompt threat to our forces and our Nation. Regardless of whether
Russia would have kept its missile force levels within those limits
without a New START treaty, upon ratification they would now be
required to do so. The New START bomber counting rules are unlikely to
result in a reduction in Russian nuclear bomber forces, but these
platforms have much less potential to be destabilizing, and we will
retain the option to sustain equivalent capabilities.
Second, New START retains sufficient flexibility in managing our
deterrent forces to hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise.
To support the New START negotiation effort, U.S. Strategic Command
analyzed the required nuclear weapons and delivery vehicle force
structure and posture to meet current guidance. The options we provided
in this process focused on ensuring America's ability to continue to
deter potential adversaries, assure our allies, and sustain strategic
stability for as long as nuclear weapons exist. This rigorous approach,
rooted in deterrence strategy and assessment of potential adversary
capabilities, supports both the agreed-upon limits in New START and
recommendations in the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR). We will retain a
triad of strategic nuclear delivery systems, and if we have a technical
failure in one of our nuclear systems, we can rearrange our deployed
force posture and structure within the treaty limits to compensate.
Third, New START will reestablish a strategic nuclear arms control
verification regime that provides intrusive access to Russian nuclear
forces and a measure of predictability in Russian force deployments
over the life of the treaty. Such access and predictability contribute
to our ability to plan confidently our own force modernization efforts
and our hedging strategy. Without New START, we would rapidly lose some
of our insight into Russian strategic nuclear force developments and
activities, and our force modernization planning and hedging strategy
would be more complex and more costly. Without such a regime, we would
unfortunately be left to use worst-case analyses regarding our own
force requirements. Further, we would be required increasingly to focus
low density/high demand intelligence collection and analysis assets on
Russian nuclear forces.
deterrence capabilities
The nuclear enterprise remains, today and for the foreseeable
future, the foundation of U.S. deterrence strategy and defense posture.
The NPR recognizes this and makes a series of recommendations that I
strongly urge Congress to fully support. Specifically, the NPR
recommends moving forward with a number of nuclear enterprise
sustainment projects, including strengthening our nuclear command and
control structure; continuing development and deployment of our triad
of delivery systems; maintaining a safe, secure, and effective
stockpile; and revitalizing the National Nuclear Security
Administration's aging infrastructure. America's triad of diverse and
complementary delivery systems provides unique synergies that make our
deterrent highly credible and resilient in the face of a variety of
potential technological and geopolitical developments. The NPR endorses
DOD efforts to explore future triad systems, specifically to extend the
Minuteman III ICBM through 2030 and conduct studies now to inform
decisions on a follow-on ICBM; to replace the Ohio-class SSBN at end of
life for existing ships; and to study future long-range bomber
capabilities. It also supports moving forward with full-rate
refurbishment of the W76 warhead for our submarine leg of the triad;
study of full-scope life extension of the B61 bomb (including enhancing
safety, security, and use control) to sustain its strategic deterrence
and extended deterrence roles; and initiating studies to develop life
extension options for the W78 ICBM warhead, including the possibility
of also adapting the resulting warhead for sea launched ballistic
missiles and thereby reducing the number of warhead types.
Additionally, the NPR and the President's Budget recognize the need
to improve, sustain, and ensure all necessary elements of a safe,
secure, and effective deterrence enterprise, including weapons,
delivery systems, warning and communications capabilities, and their
supporting human capital and technological infrastructures, and to make
sustained investments to adequately preserve these capabilities for the
foreseeable future. These investments are required in order to
confidently reduce the overall U.S. stockpile while sustaining the
credibility of our nuclear stockpile, which is fundamental to effective
deterrence. Investments that revitalize NNSA's aging infrastructure and
intellectual capital strengthen our security with the facilities and
people needed to address technological surprises, geopolitical change,
and a range of cutting-edge national security challenges. In order to
sustain the deterrent and implement the NPR, we must commit to long-
term investments that begin with several increases outlined in the
President's fiscal year 2011 budget, most notably a 13 percent increase
in NNSA funding. These investments are not only important--they are
essential.
closing
Every day, U.S. Strategic Command remains focused on providing the
President and future presidents with the options and flexibility needed
for deterrence. Today, our deterrent is safe, secure, and effective;
our forces are trained and ready; and the Command is faithfully and
fully carrying out its mission each and every day. I am confident that
the combination of New START ratification, implementation of the NPR's
recommendations, and funding of associated investments will enable the
men and women of U.S. Strategic Command to continue delivering global
security for America today and in the future. Thank you again for the
opportunity to testify before this committee.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General Chilton.
Let's try a 7-minute first round.
I think you've all made reference to the flexibility of the
lab directors to look at all options in terms of whether it's
either refurbishment or whether it's reuse or whether it is
replacement of a warhead. My understanding is that if there's a
recommendation for replacement which the NWC makes, that that
would require authorization by Congress by law. Is that
correct, do you know, Dr. Miller?
Dr. Miller. Senator, Mr. Chairman, that is correct.
Approval by Congress would be required, including for the
funding of that effort.
Chairman Levin. So that the policy of the administration is
that there not be a replacement without specific approval of
the President, but there's also a requirement in law that
Congress authorize a replacement; is that correct?
Dr. Miller. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. I think you've all testified that those
requirements in no way limit the lab directors in terms of the
options that they can look at and any recommendations that they
make. As a matter of fact, they're specifically told they're to
look at all options for the life extension; is that correct?
Dr. Miller. That is correct.
Chairman Levin. Mr. D'Agostino, is that your understanding?
Mr. D'Agostino. Absolutely, sir. That's correct.
Chairman Levin. Now, on the silo conversion issue, I
believe that, Dr. Miller, you've indicated that neither side
can convert an ICBM or SLBM launcher for use as a missile
defense interceptor. I think, Dr. Miller, you indicated that it
would not be cost effective or operationally effective to do
so, that it would cost less to actually build new interceptors
rather than to convert those interceptors. Did I understand
your testimony correctly?
Dr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, we have deployed five GBIs in
former ICBM silos at Vandenberg Air Force Base. So we have good
experience with what the costs are, including the additional
costs of modifying the structure and security associated with
those silos. We now have extensive experience also in building
new silos for GBIs at Fort Greeley. So we have a good
understanding of what the costs would be for additional silos
for GBIs and, as I said, confidence that it would be about $550
million for 10.
Chairman Levin. For the silos?
Dr. Miller. To convert additional silos.
Chairman Levin. Okay.
Dr. Miller. About $360 million for 10 new silos. In
addition, the operating costs for converted old ICBM silos
would be higher.
Chairman Levin. In addition to the cost issue, that it
would make no sense from a cost perspective, is it also true
that if you have that kind of conversion that there's greater
chance for potential misunderstanding, miscalculation? In other
words, if you use silos of one type for another purpose, does
that not create a potential for miscalculation?
Dr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, with the five former ICBM silos
with GBIs at Vandenberg Air Force Base, we don't see that as a
problem. By the way, those were grandfathered into the treaty,
so those will continue to be allowed. Because those
interceptors are at a different location from the three main
ICBM fields that we have in the United States, there would be,
obviously, a concern about locating BMD interceptors at
locations very nearby our ICBM fields, and the concern would be
that there might be confusion between the launch of an
interceptor and the launch of an ICBM. Not confusion on our
part, but possible confusion by the Russians.
Chairman Levin. Now, for all those reasons, it is our
policy not to make those conversions; is that correct?
Dr. Miller. That is correct.
Chairman Levin. So the prohibition in the treaty against
conversion is a reflection of our policy. That's not just a
concession; that's our policy?
Dr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, it's a reflection of our policy
and of the cost assessments completed that we previously
discussed.
Chairman Levin. General Chilton, you've indicated in your
statement that the New START treaty will reestablish a
strategic nuclear arms control verification regime that
provides intrusive access to Russian nuclear forces. We don't
have any verification at the moment, is that correct?
General Chilton. That's correct, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Do the verification provisions in the new
treaty give you confidence to allow STRATCOM to have confidence
in planning for U.S. forces and modernization?
General Chilton. Mr. Chairman, it does. Without that, then
we would have to just go on intelligence estimates and not have
the insight that will be provided through the verification and
inspection process to allow us to assess what we need to be
doing more accurately with our forces.
Chairman Levin. In other words, the verification provisions
give you confidence that Russia cannot achieve a militarily
significant advantage undetected?
General Chilton. Yes, that's correct, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Now, you also said in your statement that
we would, without the verification provisions in the new
treaty, ``unfortunately, be left to use the worst case analysis
regarding our own force requirements.'' Let me see if I
understand that. Are you saying that if under the previous
verification provision with the number of warheads attributed
to missiles and bombers, instead of actual numbers of warheads
as in the new treaty, that we would have to retain a larger
number of deployed systems and warheads than we would otherwise
need?
General Chilton. The uncertainty would be in the counting
of the warheads, as you suggest, Mr. Chairman. With
uncertainty, without any verification or insight into what the
Russians were doing with their force structure and warhead
deployment that is allowed for with the verification protocols
of the treaty, then as the commander, without any knowledge, I
would assume worst case.
Chairman Levin. Which would be a larger number than you
might otherwise be needing?
General Chilton. Correct.
Chairman Levin. There's a cost to that maintenance of the
larger number?
General Chilton. That decision would have to be taken,
exactly what investments we might make for that uncertainty.
But having the verification would remove even that concern.
Chairman Levin. Does a larger number than needed result in
a larger cost?
General Chilton. Certainly. If we were to determine we
needed more warheads deployed and more warheads in the
inventory, that would be more expensive.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Miller, last month General Chilton stated that it was
not only important, but essential, that the President committed
to ensuring NNSA receive the full $624 million increase as
proposed in his fiscal year 2011 budget. Last week the House
Appropriations Energy Subcommittee marked up its spending bill
and didn't fully fund the President's request for the weapons
complex. Is that of concern to you?
Dr. Miller. Senator McCain, the administration continues to
support its request and will continue to do so as the process
moves forward. We believe that the $624 million increase that
you referenced is critical to moving forward with our nuclear
weapons modernization effort and our work on infrastructure.
Senator McCain. If it's that essential, if the cut remains
in the final appropriations bill, would you recommend a veto by
the President?
Dr. Miller. Senator McCain, at this point I think you've
asked me a question that, frankly, is perhaps above my pay
grade. What I would do is provide our best assessment of the
implications and specific consequences and do everything
possible to support continuing to get to the administration's
request on this funding level.
Senator McCain. General Chilton, do you agree with the
unclassified statement in the State Department verification
assessment that ``any cheating by the Russians would have
`little, if any effect'? ''
General Chilton. Senator McCain, I do agree with that.
Senator McCain. You do agree with it?
General Chilton. What I'm asked to do is preserve an
effective deterrent, and I believe we can. With our assured
response capabilities with our submarine force and with our
ICBM force, I believe that we're in a good position vis-a-vis
the Russians in this regard.
Senator McCain. What this brings to the casual observer's
mind, General, is if it doesn't have any consequences if they
do any cheating, what's the point in having a treaty?
General Chilton. There are consequences----
Senator McCain. If we don't care whether they cheat or not,
it has very little effect, why have a treaty?
General Chilton. Senator, I'm sorry. Let me restate that. I
do care if they cheat or not.
Senator McCain. If it has little effect? You just agreed it
has little, if any, effect.
General Chilton. Senator, let me correct myself then. On
our ability to deter the Russians with an assured response.
Senator McCain. So it would have little, if any, effect,
and we have a crisis and they own two or three times as many
nuclear weapons as we have. That doesn't have any effect?
General Chilton. Senator, I believe if they were to proceed
in a fashion as you described it, tripled or even doubled their
amount of weapons, I believe that would be detectable under the
verification regime, and in that case, they would have walked
away from the treaty. Hopefully, we would have had dialogue
with them before that to understand what they were doing and
why.
Senator McCain. But minor cheating, they wouldn't have
walked away from the treaty because that would have little
effect? There's no logic to your statements and to--if cheating
has very little, if any, effect, why we are--I always believed
in all the treaties that I've been involved in in the past 28
years, General, that cheating does matter, that it does have an
effect, and to say that it has little, if any, effect, then
we've been wasting a lot of time and money on negotiations.
General Chilton. Senator, I agree with you. It does have an
effect.
Senator McCain. So then you don't agree with the State
Department's statement?
General Chilton. In the narrow area of what my
responsibilities are, to assure the deterrent, an overwhelming
ability to respond, which is the baseline of the deterrent, in
that narrow area I think we're in good position with the
treaty. I also believe that we would be able to detect through
the verification protocols any cheating, significant cheating,
by the Russians.
Senator McCain. I take it that you've read the NIE?
General Chilton. I have, Senator.
Senator McCain. Dr. Miller, what continues to trouble a lot
of us is not the number of details, and they are very complex
and understandably so, but what bothers a great deal of us is,
I have two documents in front of me I think both you have seen.
One of them is the statement of the Russian Federation
concerning missile defense. The other one is the statement by
the United States of America concerning missile defense.
They're obviously at odds with each other, because the Russians
say that the treaty may be effective and viable only in
conditions where there is no qualitative or quantitative
buildup in the United States' missile defense system
capabilities.
Yet our statement was: ``The United States missile defense
system would be employed to defend the United States against
limited missile launches and defend its deployed forces. The
United States intends to continue improving and deploying its
missile defense system in order to defend itself against
limited attack.''
Now, the Russian statement doesn't say that the treaty
would be effective and viable only in conditions there's no
qualitative or quantitative buildup in the United States'
limited capability. There's a fundamental disagreement in both
signing statements to any objective observer.
So I still don't know how you reconcile those two
statements at some point that there isn't--if we continue to,
as is stated by the United States, improve and deploy our
missile defense systems in order to defend ourselves.
Maybe you can help us out here, doctor?
Dr. Miller. Senator McCain, let me first very briefly just
add on to General Chilton's response. His response focused
appropriately on the military aspects of any cheating. Because
we will have a diverse force structure under New START, with
highly survivable systems, and because we will retain the
ability to upload, from a military perspective we will be
postured well to first deter cheating, but then to minimize its
significance should it occur.
That said, any cheating by Russia on this treaty we would
consider to be significant politically because----
Senator McCain. I'm glad you would, because the State
Department doesn't seem to. But go ahead. Let's get back to
the----
Dr. Miller. So on the--I'll stop there. I'll say perhaps
more at another point on that issue.
Senator McCain. By the way, if you'd like to elaborate on
that response, I don't mean to cut you off. I'd be glad to have
additional comments for the record.
Dr. Miller. Thank you, sir.
Senator McCain. I hope I didn't short-circuit you there.
Dr. Miller. Thank you.
With respect to the Russian perspective on missile defense,
I believe it's been clear since about March 23, 1983, when
Ronald Reagan provided his so-called Star Wars speech, that the
Russians would like to constrain the U.S. activities in missile
defense.
Senator McCain. I'm sure you remember that that was the
Russian demand, which the President of the United States turned
down at Reykjavik. That's a matter of record, of historical
record, and a turning point in the Cold War.
He would not have agreed, in my view, to two conflicting
statements being the result of an agreement.
Dr. Miller. Senator McCain, our missile defenses are not
constrained by this treaty, with the exception of Article 5
that I talked about before and its prohibition on the
conversion from ICBM silos or SLBM launchers, or vice versa.
The ability of the United States to provide effective missile
defense for the Nation, for our forces overseas, and in
partnership with our allies is unaffected by this treaty. There
are no additional costs. There are no additional inhibitions on
our ability to do that.
I think it's worth just reading very briefly the second
part of the Russian statement on missile defense, understanding
that it is nonbinding and it's not a part of the treaty, but a
unilateral statement. The statement notes that the
extraordinary events referred to in the treaty that could
prompt Russian withdrawal would involve a buildup such that it
would give rise to a threat to the strategic nuclear force
potential of the Russian Federation.
That is their perspective. But as I noted before, when we
have 30 GBIs, we have a long way to go before we have any
capability that's close to affecting the strategic stability of
the balance when they will have over 1,000 warheads under the
New START.
President Medvedev was interviewed on April 9 on ABC, and
it's a long quote, but just the last sentence of it says: ``I
would not want to create the impression that any change would
be construed as grounds for suspending a treaty that we have
only just signed.''
[The information referred to follows:]
George Stephanopoulos. And we've seen now a landmark agreement
between the United States and Russia on nuclear weapons signed in
Prague. And it was a hard fought agreement, and the issue of missile
defence still seems to divide the United States and Russia. I just have
a very simple question: if the United States continues to develop
missile defence in Europe, will Russia withdraw from the START treaty?
Dmitry Medvedev. I will try to explain how I view the situation
today.
We spent quite some time and effort explaining to our American
partners the link between strategic offensive weapons and missile
defence. This issue concerns the configuration of nuclear forces, or,
more precisely, the differences in configuration of nuclear forces in
Russia and the USA. It also concerns our plans and those of our
American partners.
The complex negotiations that took place resulted in the wording
that has been included in the treaty's preamble. This wording reflects
a well-known legal principle. As far as the specifics go, this wording
states the link between strategic offensive weapons and missile defence
systems.
It also states that the obligations forming the basis for the
treaty's signature are deemed to have been formulated and approved by
the parties to the treaty. If these obligations change this could be
seen as jeopardising the treaty as a whole. This does not mean that if
the USA starts developing missile defence the treaty would
automatically be invalidated, but it does create an additional argument
that binds us and that makes it possible for us to raise the question
of whether quantitative change to missile defence systems would affect
the fundamental circumstances underlying the treaty. If we see that
developments do indeed represent a fundamental change in the
circumstances, we would have to raise this issue with our American
partners.
But ``I would not want to create the impression that any change
would be construed as grounds for suspending a treaty that we have only
just signed.'' [Emphasis added.] Moreover, we agreed--I discussed this
with President Obama, and our respective administrations discussed it--
that we should cooperate on building a global missile defence system.
But if events develop in such a way as to ultimately change the
fundamental situation Russia would be able to raise this issue with the
USA. This is the sense of the interpretation and the verbal statement
made yesterday.
George Stephanopoulos. So, if Russia feels this system, if it's
built up, is a threat, then you withdraw. That's the qualitative
change.
Dmitry Medvedev. Then we could raise the issue of suspending the
treaty, but I hope that this will not happen and that we will work on
these matters, work on enhancing our forces and work on missile defence
in consultation with each other, and in some areas, it would be good to
work together.
Dr. Miller. I have the sense that there could be continued
statements in this regard. We are unsurprised that the Russians
have desired to constrain our missile defenses. We continue to
encourage them to cooperate on missile defenses to deal with
the common threats that we face, and we will continue both to
qualitatively and quantitatively improve our missile defenses
and to seek their cooperation to move forward together to deal
effectively with this threat.
Senator McCain. My time has expired. I thank you, Mr.
Chairman. I'm reminded of a Groucho Marx line: ``You can
believe him or your own eyes.'' I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I
thank the witnesses.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman. I was looking to
the ceiling to see whether Groucho's duck was going to come
down.
I thank Dr. Miller, Mr. D'Agostino, and General Chilton for
returning. You have become recidivists before this committee,
to our benefit, and we appreciate your service and your
testimony.
I would guess that I'm in the same position as most, if not
all, members of the Senate, which is that I hope to be able to
vote to ratify the New START treaty, but for me, and I think
for a lot of members of the Senate, there are two lines of
questions that we need to have answered to give us that level
of comfort.
The first has to do with the health, if I can put it that
way, of our nuclear stockpile. That is, that as we reduce the
number of deployed nuclear warheads, obviously we want to have
a satisfactory level of confidence, to put it as simplistically
as I can, that they work. The second is verification. Senator
McCain has touched on both of these.
This series of hearings that Chairman Levin and Senator
McCain have been conducting have been in a sense a refresher
course, at least for me, on this whole subject area. One of the
things that I've come to understand again--and I focus this to
you, Mr. D'Agostino--is that nuclear weapons age, and as they
age they become less effective; is that correct?
Mr. D'Agostino. As they age, aging effects can make them
less effective. Really it depends on the specifics of the
material itself, and that's why we go through a very in-depth
annual process of taking apart nuclear weapons, looking inside,
noting any anomalies, and taking it from there. It's part of
our stockpile stewardship program.
Senator Lieberman. Right. Am I right, as someone said
before the committee, that today the average age of our
American NWS is greater than it's been, ever been before? Does
that sound right?
Mr. D'Agostino. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Lieberman. So this is why we're focused on making
sure that--and the fact is, and this is not a partisan fact--
both parties are part of this--that we have put the nuclear
weapons program of the United States, NNSA which you direct,
under budgetary pressure over the last years. It's why so many
of us as part of our consideration of the New START treaty are
focused on making sure that we increase our investment in our
nuclear stockpile to make sure that it works.
Senator McCain talked about the cut that the House Energy
and Water Subcommittee made. This is significant to me and a
lot of others, and I hope in the process that Congress will at
least fund to the level that the administration has requested
for fiscal year 2011. Obviously, it's very hard to bind a
future Congress, but we certainly can bind the administration
and ourselves for this coming year.
I do have a question to ask, just to try to stretch our
capacity to bind here a bit. The fiscal year 2012 number in the
future years nuclear security program is $7 billion, which is
essentially a no-growth figure. It's exactly what the
administration has requested for fiscal year 2011. Considering
inflation, that means that there will be in fact a drop in
fiscal year 2012 in funding for the nuclear program.
Why is that, Mr. D'Agostino? Why should we accept that as
an adequate figure?
Mr. D'Agostino. I'll talk to the specifics of the question,
but I'd like to add a little bit with respect to the overall
budget picture. In essence, we have a very significant increase
from fiscal year 2010 to fiscal year 2011. That reflects the
ability to execute the program and shows a commitment on the
part of ourselves and the United States that this is important
to maintain.
The fiscal year 2012 numbers, 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016,
and particularly fiscal years 2013, 2014, 2015, and 2016,
increase dramatically.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Mr. D'Agostino. What we say in our 1251 report and in our
3113 report, which is the 20-year look ahead, is that there is
an expectation for some numbers to change as we get the project
baselines well understood for the large budget drivers in that
particular program, specifically the B61 life extension, as
General Chilton referenced earlier, specifically the uranium
processing facility and the chemistry and metallurgy
replacement facility.
The report clearly states that as baselines are
established--and what we're going to spend is a lot of time in
the first 2 years getting those baselines down and then locking
in those numbers into the out years--we do believe--the
important thing for us and for me particularly as the program
manager and someone who's been involved with this program for
over a decade and a half, is the demonstrated ability to
execute those funds well and in the areas they need to go. It
was my assessment that this approach, the layout that we have
in our 5-year plan, is the right approach that we have put
together. It's not just mine. The Secretary was involved.
Senator Lieberman. I hear you, and I'd say that there are a
group of us in both parties who probably would like to continue
this discussion with you in the hope that--fiscal year 2012 is
the next year, obviously. We can't quite control it
legislatively, but we can reach toward it, and to see if we can
bring some of that money that you have in your future plan
forward to fiscal year 2012. But we'll talk more about that.
I want to get to one question on verification. The New
START treaty does cut back in some significant ways, I think,
from the verification mechanisms in START I. The one that
concerns me most is with regard to telemetry. Parties are
obligated under START I to exchange telemetry tapes,
interpretive data, and acceleration profiles for every missile
test flight, with the emphasis on ``every.'' Under the New
START treaty, the international exchange required--is required
on at most five tests per year, and each country can determine
which five they'll agree to exchange telemetry.
Russia is expected to test between 10 and 12 ICBMs per year
and will likely therefore, we assume, because of its general
concern about transparency in its strategic program, share with
us data only on its older systems. So I think we make the--I
understand the difference. We make it harder for our
Intelligence Community to gauge exactly what the Russians are
developing. I understand that may be different from exact
verification here, but my bottom line here is that we're losing
a capacity in the proposed New START treaty, verification
capacity, that we had in START I, and I wanted to ask Dr.
Miller or General Chilton both why we agreed to this and
whether you're concerned about it.
Dr. Miller. Senator Lieberman, the START treaty had a
couple of provisions for which telemetry was important for
verifying. The first was that it limited throw weight, and so
when a missile was tested and its warhead was tested the
telemetry, the information coming out from that test, was
important to understand the throw weight of that missile, how
much it could carry.
Senator Lieberman. So they actually gave us tapes, if you
will, from inside the missile?
Dr. Miller. There were provisions for exchange of tapes and
for open broadcast as well, and typically both of those would
occur, and for non-encryption of those tapes and broadcasts.
The second provision in the previous START, for which
telemetry was relevant, was that it had an attribution rule for
warheads for each missile. So the SS-18 was counted as 10
warheads under START. If we then saw the Russians testing with
11 warheads, that would be a violation of the treaty, and the
telemetry broadcasts and tapes associated with those tests were
therefore directly relevant to the verification of START.
The New START treaty doesn't have limitations on throw
weight and uses a different rule for accounting for warheads.
It actually counts the warheads on each missile and delivery
system--I'm sorry, on each missile, ICBM and SLBM--so that we
don't have that attribution rule. Therefore telemetry does not
play a role in verifying the provisions of the New START treaty
as it did in the previous START.
Now, we were able to negotiate an exchange of telemetry, as
you noted, for up to five exchanges per year, irrespective of
the fact that it was not needed for verification of the treaty.
Senator Lieberman. My time is up. General Chilton, I'd like
to hear from you as this goes on. I'm concerned about this. I
understand what you're saying about verification requirements,
but it seems like an odd compromise to make. If the telemetry
is not required for verification of the Russians' compliance
with the treaty, then why even have five?
But to me it was quite valuable to us--and this gets into
your area, General Chilton--in terms of assessing the capacity
of the Russian missiles, which is important for our national
security. So I'm puzzled why we didn't either fight for the
same unlimited access to telemetry that was in START I or, if
it didn't matter, then why even have five, because they'll give
us data on their oldest missiles and it won't help us very
much.
Dr. Miller. Could I answer very briefly?
Senator Lieberman. Yes.
Dr. Miller. Senator, we think telemetry is a useful
provision for improving transparency and for helping us
understand each other's systems, and that we would intend to
work to build on the provisions in the New START treaty to try
to get the most useful exchanges possible.
Senator Lieberman. My time's up. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Senator
Lieberman.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, Dr. Miller, Mr. D'Agostino, and General Chilton,
for your service and for being here today. I want to speak with
you first about tactical nuclear weapons and why they're not
addressed in the treaty, as I understand it. In May, Henry
Kissinger testified in front of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee that the large Russian stockpile of tactical nuclear
weapons, unmatched by a comparable American deployment, could
threaten the ability to undertake extended deterrence.
According to the Congressional Strategic Posture Commission
(CSPC), Russia has 3,800 tactical nuclear weapons, with a 10 to
1 advantage over us, and some are concerned that if you factor
in those tactical weapons, this New START treaty will put us in
a position where they have more total nuclear weapons.
So the question I have to start off with is, why were
tacticals not contemplated and addressed in the treaty?
Dr. Miller. Senator, when this administration came in there
was a recognition that START was going to expire on December 5
of last year and that therefore we would be without any
verification provisions or limitations at that time. Consistent
with the recommendations of the CSPC, the Perry-Schlesinger
Commission, the administration therefore made a decision to
work with Russia to try to achieve a New START treaty as soon
as reasonably possible. Didn't make it, obviously, by December
5, but came in several months later, so that we would have
those verification provisions and data exchanges and other
elements of the treaty in place, again consistent with the
recommendations of the CSPC.
We also noted in the NPR that this was intended to be the
next step, not the last step, and that we have suggested
follow-on negotiations after ratification and entry into force,
if that is provided by the Senate and the Duma, that would look
at both tactical and strategic and both deployed and
nondeployed nuclear weapons.
We continue to intend to pursue that path today.
Senator LeMieux. General Chilton, do you want to address
this?
General Chilton. Sir, there's not much I can add with
regard to why we went, negotiated, and sat down and talked
about this. It was a strategic arms reduction treaty, so it was
focused on strategic weapons. I think maybe the only thing I
would add is that the imbalance in the tactical area puts an
exclamation point on why we have to continue to pay attention
to the assurance aspect of our force structure, because our
allies look at the tactical nuclear weapons through a different
set of lenses than we would with regard to how they may
threaten their nations.
Senator LeMieux. It occurs to me that the tactical in a lot
of ways is more disconcerting than the strategic, just because
it's harder to monitor where they are, they're portable, and
they can be employed in ways that would be very disconcerting
to our allies, as well as to us. Strategic, we think about the
ICBM, and that's obviously something we have to keep track of.
But in a world where we're concerned about nuclear
proliferation, about rogue terrorist countries getting nuclear
weapons, the fact that they're moveable seems to be something--
I know the President has articulated that he's concerned about
that.
Do you anticipate that we're going to be entering into
another round of treaty negotiations soon? Is there anything
planned to discuss tactical?
Dr. Miller. Senator, first, we have encouraged and continue
to encourage Russia to move its tactical nuclear weapons back
into the interior of the country and to further improve the
security of the storage of those weapons. They've made
significant progress since the end of the Cold War, but we
believe there's important progress yet to be made.
The President has asked us to consider what the next round
of negotiations should address and, as I said, has given
direction that it should include tactical as well as strategic
and deployed and nondeployed.
In terms of aggregate numbers, just to give only the
unclassified, obviously, in this setting, we have 5,113 nuclear
weapons in the stockpile--that was declassified just a couple
of months ago--and in addition to that have several thousand
nuclear weapons awaiting dismantlement. I can't, in this open
setting, speak to the number of Russian weapons.
But when people think about the U.S. nuclear arsenal, I
think it's important to understand that there's more than the
1,550 that are referenced in the limits of the New START
treaty.
Senator LeMieux. Do we believe that in entering into this
agreement that Russia is already at the levels that the treaty
requires, or are they going to have to make reductions?
Dr. Miller. I'd defer the details to a classified setting.
Our estimate is that, in terms of warheads and delivery
systems, they are moving or have moved into the range of the
treaty.
Senator LeMieux. I'm a newcomer to this process, but in
trying to evaluate whether I would support this it's a big
concern to me that we're not dealing with tacticals. It's a big
concern to me that they probably are already at the levels that
we were asking for, so we're not gaining a concession. It
really comes down to verification, and that's obviously
important, and being able to have an open process with them to
know what they're doing with their weapons.
But then we get to the point that was very articulately
made by Senator Lieberman, is that the verification component
seems to be weaker than in the previous START treaty. So you
wonder what we're gaining in this agreement. Then there's the
issues that Senator McCain raised about the missile defense
system.
Let me pose this question to you. Are you aware that the
Russians are developing new weapon delivery systems to overcome
any missile defense system that we would employ?
Dr. Miller. Senator, I would prefer to answer that question
in a classified setting.
Senator LeMieux. In terms of our triad, the comment was
made earlier by Mr. D'Agostino that we are working on a follow-
on to the submarine system and a new class of submarines. What
about the rest of the triad, the ICBMs, the B-52s, the nuclear-
launched cruise missiles? Are there plans in place to update
our triad? I understand that there are expiration dates on the
longevity of those aspects of the triad. They're not right on
our doorstep, but they're coming quick. Do we have plans in
place for the next phase of those weapons systems?
General Chilton. Senator, I'll take that one. The work is
underway on the studies required for the Ohio-class Trident
submarine replacement. With regard to the Minuteman III,
Congress has directed that we sustain that until 2030, and I
believe adequate investments are in place for the issues that
we're aware of today, and as they continue their studies, the
Air Force will be able to do that and, in fact, will extend the
Minuteman III.
Along those lines, though, in a couple of years we'll be
lead time away from thinking about what would be the follow-on
to the land-based deterrent. So they'll begin an analyses of
alternatives (AOA) here and begin the initial studies for
follow-on to the land-based deterrent appropriately here in the
near-term.
Then of course, as you are aware, the long-range strike
question as to what would be the follow-on to the bomber is
being discussed in the Department right now and is an issue
that the Air Force is taking on in this cycle.
Lastly, with regard to the air-launched cruise missile, we
believe with modest investments in both the platform and the
weapon that can be easily extended until 2030, which I think is
appropriate to do, and then allow us to begin studies in about
the 2015 time period to see what would be the follow-on
replacement to that.
So all of these are in play now and they're absolutely
important.
Senator LeMieux. Thank you, General.
My time is up. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator LeMieux.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen. Mr. D'Agostino, the inspection
schedule and the verification are essential to the treaty, as
it was with START I. But I think it's important to note that,
as I understand it, in START I there were 70 sites in 4
different countries that had to be monitored, versus 35 sites
and just Russia. So from the degree of the simplicity of
streamlining, the challenge is not as--I'll let you
characterize it. How does that change, the inspection schedule?
Dr. Miller. Senator Reed, you're exactly correct. Under
START I there were 70 sites in 4 different countries, including
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, in addition to Russia. The
Russians have declared 35 sites under the New START treaty. We
have 18 inspections, 18 onsite inspections, allowed under the
New START per year. There were 28 allowed under START I, so
proportionately, in fact, we're doing somewhat better.
In addition, some of the so-called Type One inspections
that we have under the New START treaty, of which there are 10
of the 18 Type Ones, those have an additional element that you
can debate how to score it, but it provides something more than
just a 1.0 in terms of when you conduct that inspection being
able to do an additional look for nondeployed items as well.
Senator Reed. So in effect, at first blush when you see 28
and then you see 10 plus 18, there might be the impression that
we're missing something. But you do have to factor in the fact
that we're looking at half the sites we did in START I.
Dr. Miller. That's correct, sir.
Senator Reed. One of the issues, General Chilton, here is
that if we fail to ratify the New START treaty, what will it do
to the whole issue of predictability, stability, transparency,
things that at least we have with START I, which is not legally
in effect, but out there as a format? Can you comment on that?
General Chilton. Senator, today we have no verification or
inspection rights with Russia because START I has expired. So
what we're balancing is zero inspections in the future or the
promises of the treaty before you for consideration.
But I would also add, it's just not the insights you would
no longer have, but the constraints of the treaty actually do
constrain Russia with regard to deployed launchers and deployed
strategic weapons, and that's an important element as well.
Without that, they are unconstrained.
Senator Reed. So your judgment from your perspective is
that relationship of the treaty would enhance stability and
transparency into their operations?
General Chilton. The term ``stability'' I always hesitate
on because I think of strategic stability with regard to the
force structure. But I think it would certainly do both of what
you describe, Senator, and that is why I support ratification.
Senator Reed. Thank you, General.
My colleague, Senator LeMieux, brought up the issue of
tactical weapons. I thought it was interesting, the comments
that Senator Lugar made in an op-ed he wrote that--and I'll
quote them and see if you would associate yourself: ``In fact,
most of Russia's tactical nuclear weapons either have very
short ranges, are used for homeland defense, are devoted to the
Chinese border, or are in storage. An agreement with Russia
that reduced, accounted for, and improved security around
tactical nuclear arsenals is in the interest of both nations,
but these weapons do not compromise our strategic deterrent.''
Is that accurate, General Chilton?
General Chilton. Senator, clearly the most proximate threat
to us are the ICBM and SLBM weapons because they can and are
able to target U.S. Homeland and deliver a devastating effect
on this country. So we appropriately focused in those areas in
this particular treaty for strategic reasons.
Tactical nuclear weapons, the comments that you just read
are valid with regard to their ranges, et cetera. But in
reality, weapons can be put on platforms and moved at
intercontinental ranges, but they don't provide the proximate
threat that the ICBMs and SLBMs do. From a broader perspective,
as we look toward reduction of total weapons you do have to
take in follow-on negotiations. I strongly support that we look
at the entire inventory of Russia in future discussions with
them, because there are nuclear weapons and they do affect our
allies in the region and that's important to us.
Senator Reed. My sense--and I'll ask you for your sense,
General--is that if this treaty is not ratified, the prospects
of serious follow-on discussions about nuclear reductions are
probably close to zero. Is that your sense?
General Chilton. Senator, I couldn't speculate on that. I
don't have an assessment on that.
Senator Reed. Dr. Miller, can you speculate on that?
Dr. Miller. Thank you for that opportunity, Senator Reed. I
agree with your assessment.
Senator Reed. Finally, Mr. D'Agostino. We here are looking
very carefully at our nuclear enterprise, the laboratories and
everything else. We all understand that there are budget
issues, modernization issues, attracting the scientific talent
that we need in a much different environment than 30 or 40
years ago. But I think we sometimes have a tendency to think
that the other folks, the Russians, have this superb, highly
polished and running at max efficiency institutional endeavor.
Can you comment on, particularly since we both, mercifully,
abstained from testing for decades now, what their
establishment looks like?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, I'll do so, and of course keep it
unclassified.
Senator Reed. Yes, sir.
Mr. D'Agostino. The Russian approach is a bit different
than ours. The Russian approach is focused more on the
production side, just keep building and keep taking things
apart. So there's a fair amount of exercising of the
infrastructure. Our approach has been to focus on deep
understanding of what's happening inside the warheads
themselves, using experiments, simulation, and tieing all these
things together.
They're just two different approaches. That's not to say
the Russians are not doing the science base. They are. That's
not to say we aren't doing some production work. We are.
They're just two different approaches to address the item.
With respect to the United States, though, I think what
I've observed in this program over many years is that the thing
that is so important to running a program like this, of this
size and complexity, is some uncertainty about what the future
is, what the country really wants. What's been great about what
we've seen particularly over the last 2 years or so is a
gathering of ideas and a certain consensus that's developing, a
bipartisan consensus, if you will, that says it's important to
have certainty in this program and it's important that the
workforce understand that the Nation really cares about this
program, because these are smart people that can get jobs
elsewhere.
So from my standpoint, and it'll maybe go to answer one of
the questions you asked General Chilton, the relationship of
START is another piece of that certainty and predictability.
It's the view that the workforce sees that there's a general
consensus on the need to maintain the stockpile, the need to
support science, and the need to modernize the infrastructure.
The relationship of this treaty is another nail into that,
locking in the national consensus on this approach. It provides
the stability for the workforce, they know the country cares
about it. It allows the program managers to adequately plan so
that we'll know what size stockpile we're taking care of. It
allows us to drive some efficiencies in our program, and that's
what we've shown in our 1251 report and our 3113 report, sir.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, gentlemen.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Brown.
Senator Brown. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Miller, Senator LeMieux and others have commented about
the tactical nuclear weapons. In START I they were punted to
the next treaty. In START II, which wasn't ratified, they were
punted once again. Moscow, the same thing. Now we're in this
potential treaty signing and it seems that it will be punted
again.
Now, I'm having difficulty, and I am, like Senator LeMieux,
one of the new guys, but I've been in the military for 30
years. I do understand tactics and a lot of that good training
I received from the people of the United States. I'm trying to
get my hands around the trust issue and the strategic versus
tactical, ICBMs, just seeing how it affects us. Yes, I agree
the long-range weapons obviously affect us, but we have troops
throughout the world that can be dramatically affected by our
failure to address the strategic--the tactical nuclear weapons
as well.
I'm just wondering whether we're missing an opportunity, if
we're just trying to get a victory here, political victory,
versus actually getting a solid treaty that we can rely on. Any
thoughts on that?
Dr. Miller. Senator Brown, the tactical nuclear weapons are
a concern of this administration. We have, as I think Senator
Reed noted, emphasized the importance of their security, and
the President has made it clear that we should look to future
arms control negotiations where we aim to reduce those along
with all other types of nuclear weapons.
The reason for focusing first on strategic nuclear weapons
was not because of the lack of importance of tactical nuclear
weapons, but because the START was expiring and with it the
verification provisions and limits under the treaty that we
believe are essential to reducing uncertainty associated with
Russian strategic forces, also provide a basis for follow-on
negotiations. I think it will be extraordinarily difficult to
take that next step if we don't first have START ratified and
enter into force.
This administration will continue to work on the security
issues and continue to encourage Russia to move the weapons
back and to improve their security. But at the same time, those
follow-on negotiations will be much more likely to proceed if
we have a basis in a New START treaty.
Senator Brown. Mr. Chairman, we've had other hearings and
we've actually had private opportunities to speak to up the
food chain a little bit. So a lot of my questions have been
asked and a lot of them are sensitive in nature. But I keep
going back to why don't we try to go and renegotiate or
incorporate a lot of these issues.
That issue for me is one of the more important issues. I
understand we need to do this before we do that, but it's been
START I, START II, Moscow. At what point do we stop beating
around the bush and actually get serious and say, if we don't
have this we're going to do that. Because there's just
something gnawing at me that I have to get my hands around.
I've been trying to do the appropriate research and speak to
the appropriate people.
The trust element for me is something that I don't really
see here, evidenced by your conversation with Senator McCain.
What if they don't do it? What are the ramifications? What is
the enforcement? What do we do? Do we say, ``oh, you're bad!''?
Where are the teeth?
Am I missing something?
Dr. Miller. Senator Brown, if your question is about what
if the Russians agree, that they ratify New START and that we
ratify, and then they either cheat or break out, at a small
level, where we're having the debate over whether an activity
such as the type of reentry vehicle covers that are used in
inspections is appropriate or not, we first would take it to
the Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) and have that
conversation, if necessary, then elevate it to more senior
political levels.
If you're talking about significant changes in their
posture that we judge to be cheating or breakout, we would have
a range of options, starting with the political, but including
steps to increase the alert levels of our strategic forces, if
appropriate, and to increase the capabilities by uploading
additional warheads on our missiles and bombers.
So we would have that response, and we believe that that
capacity to respond in that way will contribute to giving them
disincentives or, put differently, deterring Russia from
cheating should any future leader have that inclination.
Senator Brown. That's helpful.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Brown.
Senator Hagan's next.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen, for being here today and discussing
this very important issue with us.
Senator Lieberman asked a question concerning the aging of
the stockpiles of nuclear weapons. My question is one step
further and talking about the recruitment and the retention of
the nuclear scientists and engineers that will be overseeing
that. Last month during our committee's hearing, Secretary of
Energy Steven Chu indicated that he was concerned about the
ability to recruit and retain the best and the brightest
nuclear scientists and engineers for the stockpile stewardship
and life extension program.
He emphasized that a primary obstacle is the perceived lack
of financial stability and importance in this program. He
underscored that nuclear scientists and engineers need to
believe that the U.S. Government cares about the nuclear life
extension.
Compounding our recruitment problems is the fact that a
significant portion of our nuclear scientists and engineers in
our national laboratories will be eligible for retirement in
the next 5 years, and without an infusion of younger talent
before those retirement dates we are at risk to lose the
invaluable institutional knowledge with regards to addressing
the challenges in maintaining our nuclear stockpile. This is a
concern to me because stewardship is becoming technically more
challenging as our weapons continue to age beyond their
intended lifetimes.
Two questions, primarily to you, Mr. D'Agostino, are: Do
the national laboratories have a recruiting strategy and set of
agreed-upon goals and objectives to recruit new talent? What
kind of university partnerships do the national laboratories
have in order to bring in a stream of new talent? Additionally,
how do the national labs envision sustaining this recruitment
of personnel with specialized technical skill sets and, more
importantly, institutionalizing the mentoring with the older
employees to retain the decades-long institutional memory?
Mr. D'Agostino. Thank you very much, Senator, for the
questions. Secretary Chu is exactly right. When he came into
this position over a year ago, I had an opportunity to describe
the program to him as I carried forward from my previous role
in the previous administration. He took a look just at the
budget and then he ended up talking to the lab directors
personally. When you look at the science budget, he saw over a
period of time, a dramatic decrease in that, and that clearly
was affecting the morale at the laboratories themselves.
Just as important as the morale, though, was this lack of
consensus that we as a Nation had an understanding of where we
were going with these nuclear programs. What we have right now
is that understanding. Now, that understanding has actually
motivated the workforce recently. They understand that it's
important, that the Nation cares about wanting to maintain the
stockpile.
So the laboratories as a result of that--in fact,
previously we did have a recruiting strategy. We've updated
that strategy because of this infusion and the request for
additional resources. This strategy is based on a very
systematic assessment of the critical skills that are needed to
maintain the stockpile and do all of the other nuclear security
work that we have.
Particularly in radio-analytic chemistry, that's a skill
that we need to maintain to do nuclear forensics work. It's the
skills associated with being able to design radiation detection
devices, and not only that, but the skills associated with
running large experiments, not underground tests but large
experiments, and using the computers to pull these things
together.
We have joint programs with a set of universities, a wide
set of universities around the country. We have a program
called the Academic Strategic Alliances program, which has
strategically aligned our laboratories and universities. This
provides the laboratories a foot in the door to that
recruiting, that talent pool that's out there.
Finally, as our senior scientists retire, we take those in
many cases and sign them for a mentoring role, to come back and
to follow through, because they have clearances typically, and
obviously they're experienced, and they typically are wanting
to engage in work the country cares about. So we have a
mentoring role.
The last critical piece to all of this is what I would call
real work. It's important for our scientists and engineers and
production technicians at the nuclear security enterprise to do
real work, work on the stockpile itself. The three main pieces
that General Chilton referred to, which are working on
finishing the W76 life extension; working on the B61 life
extension, to include the nuclear and the non-nuclear
components; and starting to think about concepts for the W78
warhead, which we know is aging, all that is real work. They're
frankly quite energized about that. That last piece is very
important, and that's what we've laid out in our 10-year plan
and in our 1251 report.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
During this committee's June 17th hearing on the New START
treaty, Secretary Clinton indicated that it appears as though
the Russians have postponed the sale of the S-300 long-range
surface-to-air missile system to Iran. During the hearing
Secretary Clinton and Secretary Gates indicated that Russia did
not deliver the system because of improved U.S.-Russian
relationship building.
Some experts indicate that not ratifying the New START
treaty would send a negative signal to Russia that may cause
them to not support U.S. objectives with respect to dealing
with the Iranian nuclear program or implementing the new round
of U.N. sanctions against Iran.
Dr. Miller, what strategic impacts will ratifying the
treaty have on U.S.-Russian talks with respect to Iran's
ambiguous nuclear program, and how would not ratifying the
treaty affect our cooperation with Russia in dealing with the
Iranian nuclear program or implementing the new round of U.N.
sanctions?
Dr. Miller. Senator, you're right that Russia postponed the
delivery of the S-300 to Iran and we hope that that
postponement continues indefinitely. The state of the U.S.-
Russian relationship is obviously an important element in
thinking about what the future is, not just of that issue of
the S-300, but also, as you suggest, of our ability to convince
Iran to give up its efforts to move forward with its nuclear
programs.
The improvement in U.S.-Russian relations is difficult to
quantify, but it is real. Our ability to work together on the
issues associated with Iran, the Russian response also with
respect to working to denuclearize North Korea and continued
efforts there in response to the Cheonan sinking, are some of
the signs that we see that this is having--that we're headed in
a productive direction. It does not mean we won't have our
differences. It does not mean we may not even face setbacks.
But it's clear that the New START treaty has been a very
important part of moving the relationship forward.
Senator Hagan. Thank you. My time has expired.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Hagan.
Senator Collins.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Miller, I want to follow up with you on the discussion
that you had with Senator Lieberman about telemetry. You stated
that the second reason telemetry was important under the
original START was to ensure that ICBMs were not armed with a
number of warheads in excess of the number of warheads
attributed to each ICBM under the START counting rules. The
original START counting rules, as I understand them, attributed
to each ICBM the maximum number of warheads that it was
believed to be able to carry. If telemetry can be used to
verify the actual number of warheads, as you seem to be saying
in response to Senator Lieberman, why wouldn't that information
under the counting rules of the New START treaty, which counts
the number of deployed warheads missile by missile, be even
more important?
It's obviously more difficult for us to verify the number
of warheads if we're trying to count missile by missile than if
we're assuming the maximum and can use telemetry to verify that
or to see if there is a way to carry additional warheads. So it
seems to me that your answer to Senator Lieberman doesn't add
up, because it seems to me that it's more important that we
have telemetry in order to verify the number of warheads under
the new counting rules. So explain this to me?
Dr. Miller. Senator Collins, under the previous START you
are correct that for ICBMs and SLBMs there was an attribution
rule. We wanted it to be as close as possible to the maximum,
but in fact believe that, for example, the SS-18 could have
carried more than 10 warheads should Russia have so decided. If
we had seen them testing with 11 or 12 or 13, that would have
been an indication of a violation of the treaty under START.
Now, in the New START treaty each side would have the
freedom to mix, in other words to have the number of warheads
on a given delivery system that they decide and they declare.
That number would be subject to onsite verification. So as an
example, if we saw the Russians testing an SS-18 missile with
five or six or seven or eight, we would then expect that they
declared some with that number. But the real issue would be
what do they have--not what do they test, but what have they
deployed. The telemetry doesn't provide any insight into what's
deployed. For that we need the combination of declarations,
national technical means, and then reinforced critically by
onsite inspections where we go and actually look under the hood
and see what the numbers are.
Senator Collins. But the number of onsite inspections is
also limited under New START and is less extensive than under
the old START. It worries me because it seems that you're
limiting the number of onsite inspections, you're allowing the
Russians to choose the site, we're no longer going to be
monitoring 24 hours a day what's coming out. Instead, there's
this notice provision. Plus we're limiting telemetry.
Doesn't the combination of that make verification--and
we've changed the counting rules. So it worries me that the
combination of those factors--more limited onsite inspections,
more limited telemetry, and a change in the counting rules--
makes it more difficult for us to verify compliance.
Dr. Miller. Senator, let me respond to each of those as
succinctly as I can. First, with respect to the numbers of
inspections, the New START treaty has 18, the old START had 28.
The New START treaty has to deal with 35 facilities, the old
START had to deal with 70. That means that on a proportional
basis the New START treaty is by number of facilities, greater
proportionally.
Second, with respect to onsite inspections, the inspecting
side chooses the site and gives advance notice, relatively
short notice as well. When they get to the site for their
inspection, they then will have an opportunity to select which
system to focus on and therefore which, for example, missile to
pull the cover off and to look at the number of reentry
vehicles. So that anything that didn't look right with respect
to previous data declarations, that we gathered from our
national technical means, or that looked like it wasn't correct
in the database, which is constantly updated, we would then be
able to go test with an onsite inspection where the inspecting
party chooses the timing and which systems are inspected.
Senator Collins. Let me switch to a different issue that
has been brought up several times by my colleagues, and that is
the impact of New START on our ability to pursue advances in
missile defense. Former Under Secretary of State Ambassador
John Bolton has written that the President has essentially
given Russia a de facto veto over U.S. missile defense plans,
and he says as a result advances in missile defense are now
effectively impossible if this START is entered into and
remains in force.
Do you believe that the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to
missile defense in Europe represents a qualitative or
quantitative improvement in our missile defense systems?
Dr. Miller. Yes, Senator, I do believe the PAA in Europe
and the application of that approach in other regions will
constitute a qualitative and a quantitative improvement of our
missile defenses, and we have briefed the Russians on the PAA.
I've done so several times, including the first time the day
that the announcement was made I briefed Ambassador Kislyak,
the Russian ambassador to the United States.
We have made it clear that each of the phases will involve
improved capabilities and that going through phase 4 of the PAA
for Europe, we will have additional numbers of interceptors
with increasing capabilities deployed.
Senator Collins. I agree with your assessment that it
represents both a quantitative and qualitative improvement, but
then I have a difficult time reconciling the Russians'
assertion that they would withdraw from the treaty if we
increase either the quantity or the quality of our missile
defense. It seems inconsistent to me.
Dr. Miller. Senator, they understand both the capabilities
of the system and the fact that it will not pose a threat to
the strategic capabilities of the Russian Federation. The
deployments in Europe are not going to have the ability to
intercept ICBMs launched from Russia aimed at the United States
and Russia understands that.
At the same time, it is very clear that we are committed
not only to the improvements of our system for the PAA in
Europe and elsewhere around the globe; we've also made very
clear that we are committed to improving our capabilities for
Homeland defense. We currently have 30 GBIs and we will improve
their capability as necessary to deal with the threat to which
they're aimed, which is the North Korean and Iranian challenge.
The Secretary of Defense, as you also know, approved moving
forward with eight additional silos at Fort Greeley so that in
the event we see the threat grow faster than expected, we would
have the ability to add additional capability.
The Russian statement is nonbinding. It's not a part of the
treaty. It concludes by noting that the issue is any set of
capabilities that would give rise to a threat to the strategic
nuclear force potential of the Russian Federation. We don't
believe that that is going to occur, but irrespective of that,
we have made clear in every possible way, through public
statements, testimony, our budget, our BMDR, and indeed
discussions, diplomatic discussions with the Russians, that we
would intend to continue to improve our missile defenses to
deal with the threats that we face.
Senator Collins. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
We ought to, if it's all right with Senator Collins, put
both the unilateral statements in the record at this time.
Senator Collins. Yes, thank you.
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Chairman Levin. Thank you very much.
Senator Ben Nelson.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Thank you, gentlemen. General Chilton, at the NPR hearing
this last April you stated you fully support--and I think you
did as well today again--the New START treaty and its
associated reduction to our nuclear force. You stated that you
were fully involved. Could you describe your role and your
responsibilities that are involved in maintaining a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear deterrent?
General Chilton. Senator, thank you. My role is in a couple
areas. One, I'm an advocate, so, based on the guidance given to
me by the President and the Secretary of Defense, we at the
command assess what is militarily required to meet that
guidance. It falls into three fundamental areas. One includes
the weapons themselves. So I come and support Mr. D'Agostino's
programs and work closely with them to make sure that the
requirements are understood for our needs for the weapons, but
also his requirements are understood and advocated for to
support those.
Second would be along the line of delivery systems that are
required to support the strategy and the guidance. We do that
through DOD in supporting the three legs of the triad.
There is another element of that as well that probably
doesn't get as much visibility, and that is the nuclear command
and control portion, which is also fundamentally essential to
the deterrent. So you need all three of those parts and our job
is not only to advocate for them, but as they are fielded to
ensure their readiness to be able to respond to any direction
we might get from the President of the United States.
Senator Ben Nelson. In your opinion, would the new treaty
adversely impact your ability to carry out your duties?
General Chilton. No, sir, it would not.
Senator Ben Nelson. What are the ramifications of not
putting a treaty into place?
General Chilton. Senator, two that would give me concern.
First, we would lose the transparency provided by the
verification and inspection protocols that are in the treaty,
which have lapsed since START I ended in December of last year.
I think that's very important.
Second, there would be no constraints placed upon the
Russian Federation as to the number of strategic delivery
vehicles or warheads they could deploy. I think that's
important to the United States, that there be limits there,
limits that we would also be bound by, obviously.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
Dr. Miller, what level of verification do we have at the
moment? I assume the answer is zero.
Dr. Miller. Senator Nelson, today we would rely solely on
national technical means.
Senator Ben Nelson. That's not justification for entering
into a treaty that is inadequate. We understand that. But one
of the questions I would have is, you mentioned the ability to
look under the hood to see what the other side is doing. Does
this potentially, this treaty, give us the ability to look
under at least the same number of hoods that we looked under
during the initial START?
Dr. Miller. Senator, proportionally the answer is yes,
proportionally, because we're allowed 18 inspections per year,
there were 28 in START, but, as we talked about before, there
are half as many facilities under New START as there were at
the entry into force of the START treaty.
With the combination of onsite inspections, with the other
verification provisions, including non-interference with
national technical means, but also data exchange, notification
requirements, the maintenance of an up-to-date database of the
disposition of all Russian forces, and unique identifiers,
which are an important extension from START, all contribute to
giving us an effective verification regime.
Senator Ben Nelson. Dr. Miller, I think it would be fair to
categorize your comments about tactical versus strategic review
as a two-step process: step one being this New START treaty;
step two being starting the process of looking at tactical
warheads. Now, there's a suggestion that somehow, since we
didn't do steps one and two together in the New START treaty,
that there's something that's defective about what we've done.
What were the reasons that you didn't have the two-step
process in START I? Or is it criticism that is being leveled
today against the New START treaty a criticism that could have
been just as easily leveled against the first START?
Dr. Miller. Senator, in principle that could have been. Let
me just say that if we don't move forward with the New START
treaty relationship and entry into force, it will be much more
challenging to try to move forward to something beyond it. In
fact, it's difficult to see how we would do so, how we would
then move forward with an effort to reduce strategic and
tactical in both deployed and nondeployed.
This administration and previous administrations have paid
attention to the potential dangers associated with tactical
nuclear weapons. The Nunn-Lugar effort for cooperative threat
reduction has made good progress there in terms of improving
security. We believe we have a long way to go. We would intend
to do that, to continue to press on improving security for
tactical nuclear weapons in parallel with negotiations on
reducing tactical nuclear weapons. We understand that, given
the relative numbers at this point, that the New START treaty
is, while it's essential for establishing the verification
regime and a basis for further negotiations, that from this
point forward it will make sense to broaden the aperture and
deal with all nuclear weapons.
Senator Ben Nelson. It was a matter of prioritization with
the first START treaty, just as it is a matter of
prioritization with this treaty. But second, because they
weren't both accomplished in the first START treaty, strategic
and tactical, it has now become a two-step process to
accomplish it at this point in time.
Are you satisfied that we've made every effort, that every
effort that we're making now to enter into new discussions
about tactical--are those discussions ongoing at the present
time, recognizing you have to get the first one done before you
do a second one? But are discussions under way right now?
Dr. Miller. Senator Nelson, we have made clear this
administration's interest in those further discussions with the
Russian Federation, and also understand that the prospect for
those discussions going forward prior to START ratification and
entry into force are minimal. It really will need to be, as you
said, sir, a two-step process. We are engaged in our own
analysis and planning at this point. We've indicated an
interest, but we have not gotten at this point a positive
response from the Russian Federation and, frankly, would not
expect to until we're on the other side of New START
ratification discussion.
Senator Ben Nelson. If the New START treaty is not
ratified, what are the opportunities to go back and now start
and try to talk about the tactical weapons in another treaty?
Dr. Miller. Senator, that scenario----
Senator Ben Nelson. I know I'm asking you to speculate.
Dr. Miller. I would speculate that that would make things
much more difficult.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you very much.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. More difficult meaning less likely we would
succeed in negotiating such reductions?
Dr. Miller. Yes, sir, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Nelson.
These unilateral statements that we've referred to are
similar, are they not, to unilateral statements which were made
for the first START in June 1991, when then the Soviet
negotiator in his unilateral statement said: ``This treaty may
be effective and viable only under conditions of compliance
with the Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty''? Is that correct?
Dr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, they are analogous in that regard
and----
Chairman Levin. Our response to that statement was:
``Unilateral statements that a future hypothetical U.S.
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty could create such conditions are
without legal or military foundation.'' That was our unilateral
response, is that correct?
Dr. Miller. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. I'll make these part of the record.
Why, when answering questions about the unilateral
statements and saying they're not legally binding, don't you
refer to the almost perfect example of what happened in 1991
when the Soviets said something was going to happen if
something else happened and, by the way, something else did
happen, we withdrew from the ABM Treaty, and there was no
effect on the implementation of START I? Why isn't that in your
answer?
Dr. Miller. Senator, thank you for that recommendation.
Chairman Levin. I'm just curious. Am I missing something?
It seems to me that, hey, we've been there, done that, it's
proven to have no effect whatsoever.
Dr. Miller. Senator, I believe we put that on the record at
some points over the last couple of months. But we also want to
note that it is, in fact, the case that unilateral statements
are just that.
Chairman Levin. No, I know it has been made part of the
record in other hearings, but it's not always part of the
answer. It seems to me that's the most effective answer. If
it's proved its ineffective, nonbinding impact before when we
pulled out of a treaty and the Russians, the Soviets, then in
1991 said what would happen if we did, it seems to me that's
proof positive that this is not binding now. If it wasn't
binding in 1991, these kind of unilateral statements aren't
binding now.
I would think that's the clearest answer to me. But in any
event, I would urge you to include that in your answers. We
will make it part of the record at this time these two
unilateral statements before START I.
[The information referred to follows:]
Statements on the Relationship of Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START) and Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Read at a Meeting Between U.S.
Ambassador Brooks and Deputy Foreign Minister Obukhov on June 13, 1991.
statement by the soviet side at the u.s.-soviet negotiations on nuclear
and space arms concerning the interrelationship between reductions in
strategic offensive arms and compliance with the treaty between the
united states and the union of soviet socialist republics on the
limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems
In connection with the treaty Between the United States of America
and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, the Soviet side states the
following:
This treaty may be effective and viable only under conditions of
compliance with the treaty between the United States and the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems, as signed on May 26, 1972.
The extraordinary events referred to in Article XV \1\ of this
treaty also include events related to withdrawal by one of the Parties
from the treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, or
related to its material breach.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ As written, understood to mean ``Article XVII''. Two Treaty
Articles were included after the statement was made, but before the
treaty was signed.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
statement by the u.s. side at the u.s.-soviet negotiations on nuclear
and space arms
While the United States cannot circumscribe the Soviet right to
withdraw from the START treaty if the Soviet Union believes its supreme
interests are jeopardized, the full exercise by the United States of
its legal rights under the ABM Treaty, as we have discussed with the
Soviet Union in the past, would not constitute a basis for such
withdrawal. The United States will be signing the START treaty and
submitting it to the U.S. Senate for advice and consent to ratification
with this view. In addition, the provisions for withdrawal from the
START based on supreme national interests clearly envision that such
withdrawal could only be justified by extraordinary events that have
jeopardized a Party's supreme interest. Soviet statements that a
future, hypothetical U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty could create
such conditions are without legal or military foundation. The ABM
Treaty, as signed on May 26, 1972, has already been substantially
amended and clarified by subsequent agreements between the Parties.
Moreover, current and future negotiations, to which the Soviet Union
committed in the June 1990 Summit Joint Statement, could lead to
significant additional changes in the ABM Treaty, or its replacement.
Changes in the ABM Treaty agreed to by the Parties would not be a basis
for questioning the effectiveness or viability of the treaty on the
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.
Chairman Levin. On the question that you were asked,
General, about detecting cheating and what the effect would be
from a military perspective if there were cheating, there's an
unclassified portion of a classified Department of State
verification report dated July 12, 2010, and the first one that
I'm going to make part of the record, the first unclassified
paragraph relative to this subject--and I want to ask you
whether you concurred in each of these paragraphs: ``Deterrence
of cheating is a key part of assessment of verifiability and is
strongest when the probability of detecting significant
violations is high, the benefits to cheating are low, and the
potential costs are high. We assess that this is the case for
Russian cheating under the New START treaty.''
Is that familiar to you, that paragraph?
General Chilton. It is, and I agree with that, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Now, the next unclassified paragraph on
that page is the following: ``Given the terms of the New START
treaty, the potential benefits to be derived by Russia from
cheating or breakout from the treaty would appear to be
questionable. Because the United States will retain a diverse
triad of strategic forces, including single-warhead ICBMs,
nuclear-capable heavy bombers, and a significant fraction of
total deployed warheads on strategic submarines, any Russian
cheating under the treaty would have little, if any, effect on
the assured second strike capabilities of U.S. strategic
forces. In particular, the survivability and response
capabilities of strategic submarines and heavy bombers would be
unaffected by even large-scale cheating.''
Are you familiar with that paragraph?
General Chilton. I am, Senator, and I agree with it.
Chairman Levin. You agree with that.
Next unclassified paragraph: ``The costs and risks of
Russian cheating or breakout, on the other hand, would likely
be very significant. In addition to the financial and
international political costs of such an action, any Russian
leader considering cheating or breakout from the New START
treaty would have to consider that the United States will
retain the ability to upload large numbers of additional
nuclear warheads on both bombers and missiles under the New
START, which would provide the ability for a timely and very
significant U.S. response.''
Are you familiar with that one?
General Chilton. I am, Senator.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree with that?
General Chilton. I do, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Finally on this page: ``The combination of
improved U.S. understanding of Russian strategic forces
resulting from the implementation of the START, U.S. National
Technical Means Capabilities, the New START treaty's
verification provisions and a favorable posture for deterring
cheating or breakout results in a New START treaty that is
effectively verifiable.''
Do you agree with that? Are you familiar with that?
General Chilton. I'm not sure I'm familiar with that
precise quote, Mr. Chairman. But, hearing it, I do agree with
it.
Chairman Levin. Now, on the question of the telemetry
Senator Lieberman asked a question about, if we agreed to
obtain the telemetry or exchange telemetry on five launches per
year, as I understand or remember the language, if telemetry is
not important why did we negotiate for five? I don't think the
answer was very persuasive on that. I didn't understand it and
I think in terms of the time, I think if you would, it would be
better to give us an answer for the record, Dr. Miller.
There is an apparent inconsistency. We get less telemetry,
but we don't need it. Then, as Senator Lieberman points out, if
we don't need it why did we negotiate for five? I think that
the answer needs to be amplified because it was either not
particularly clear or wasn't particularly persuasive, or maybe
there is no persuasive answer. But if there is one, we would
appreciate your giving it a go on the record if you would. Will
you do that?
Dr. Miller. Yes, Mr. Chairman.
[The information referred to follows:]
The previous START treaty had more extensive provisions related to
telemetry than New START because it contained limits, prohibitions, and
obligations that required the analysis of telemetric information to
ensure that a Party was complying with the treaty. The New START
provisions relating to telemetry reflect the fact that there are no
specific obligations, prohibitions, or limitations in the new treaty
that require the analysis of telemetric information in order to verify
a Party's compliance with the treaty. For instance, the treaty does not
limit the development of new types of missiles, so there is no
requirement to determine the technical characteristics of new missiles
such as their launch weight or throw-weight in order to distinguish
them from existing types.
Although telemetry is not needed to verify compliance with the
provisions of New START, to promote transparency and predictability, we
negotiated for the exchange of telemetric information on an agreed
equal number of launches of intercontinental ballistic missiles and
submarine launched ballistic missiles, up to five annually, with the
testing party deciding the launches on which it will exchange
information. The specifics of the annual telemetry exchanges will be
worked out in the treaty's implementation body, the Bilateral
Consultative Commission.
Chairman Levin. Now, on the negotiating record, there's
apparently a history on getting negotiating records, which we
also are going to need for the record. This is a matter for the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, but apparently I think it
was during the INF Treaty, there was some back and forth
between the State Department on whether or not in the future
the negotiating record itself would be made available. I think
for the record we better get hold of that history, because it
would seem, just off the top of my head, why not? Why don't we
get the negotiating record? Apparently there's some history as
to why not and why there's been refusal before.
There's apparently been precedent for doing it, for giving
Congress or the Senate the negotiating record. As Senator
McCain said, apparently in 1972 we got the record, and I think
he said in 1987 we got the record. But then there was some
resistance to getting future negotiating records and some, if
not an understanding, clear delineation as to the reasons why
the State Department was not in the future going to do it,
which applied to subsequent treaties after 1987, I believe.
Even though you're not the State Department, we would need
you to get for us either the State Department position on this
or the administration position on why don't we get this
negotiating record.
Dr. Miller. Senator, let me just say that that request is
pending and the administration will have a response and we will
provide something for the record on the history. You are
correct that the chilling effect, the concern about the
chilling effect, is a key consideration.
Chairman Levin. On negotiations?
Dr. Miller. On future negotiations.
Chairman Levin. I don't think we made that request. I think
that came from Senate Foreign Relations Committee, is that
correct? But if you could just make sure that we get a copy of
that.
Dr. Miller. Yes, sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
When President Obama transmitted the New START treaty to the
Senate, the transmittal package included a detailed, article-by-article
analysis of the treaty. This analysis is nearly 200 pages long and
provides information on every provision of the treaty, protocol, and
annexes, including information regarding the U.S. interpretation of the
treaty. These materials were prepared in close coordination with the
treaty negotiators and provide a detailed explanation ofU.S. rights and
obligations under the New START treaty.
Since treaty submission, the negotiation and senior Administration
officials have been widely available to answer questions on the treaty
and the negotiations. Administration witnesses have testified at nine
hearings before three Senate committees--Foreign Relations, Armed
Services, and Intelligence. A final hearing is scheduled for July 29
with the two leading members of the negotiating team. Administration
representatives, including members of the negotiating team, have also
conducted numerous briefings for Senators and staff.
The Intelligence Community recently submitted a National
Intelligence Estimate for the New START treaty; it addresses the
challenges of monitoring Russian compliance with the Treaty's
obligations. Additionally, the State Department has submitted a report,
pursuant to section 306 of the Arms Control and Disarmament Act, on the
verifiability of the treaty.
Finally, the executive branch has answered over 500 questions for
the record regarding the Treaty. Like the other components of the
ratification process, these questions for the record touch on all
aspects of the New START treaty.
In sum, the administration has provided a vast amount of
information regarding the New START treaty to the committee. We have
made every effort to provide the committee with a full understanding of
every right and obligation the United States would undertake as a party
to the Treaty, were it to enter into force. Indeed, my colleagues from
the Intelligence Community, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense
Department, the negotiating team, and I repeatedly testified about the
executive branch's consistent understanding of the treaty's terms.
We are committed to answering all of the Senate's questions. If,
however, the Administration were to provide the committee with access
to the negotiating record as requested, the Administration would be
contributing to a precedent that--as noted by Senator Kerry, Chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, when this issue was raised
in his committee--would damage the treaty-making process and erode our
constitutional allocation of responsibility.
The longstanding practice in consideration of treaties is that the
Senate does not request, and the executive does not provide, the
negotiating record. That was the case throughout the 110th Congress,
when some 90 treaties were approved by the Senate. That was also the
case in the Senate's consideration of other major arms control and
security treaties in the past two decades, including the Moscow Treaty
in 2002 and 2003, the START I and START II Treaties in the 1990s, and
the three instances in the past 12 years when the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization was expanded. This practice of reviewing treaties without
access to the negotiating record has consistently occurred during both
Democratic and Republican majorities in the Senate, and Democratic and
Republican administrations.
Chairman Levin. I'll just ask one additional question
before I call on Senator Nelson, if he will yield for another
minute even though his turn has arrived. This has to do with
that cut in the budget that the House committee, I believe, the
Appropriations Committee, made in your budget, Mr. D'Agostino,
the Energy and Water Appropriations Subcommittee.
They reduced the budget by, I believe, $99 million and they
offset it in part by using $80 million in prior year balances.
First of all, does NNSA have $80 million available in prior
year balances? Second, what is the amount of the budget? Third,
what is the amount of the increase in the budget over last
year? Can you get us those three numbers for the record? If you
have them on the top of your head, or give them for the record?
Mr. D'Agostino. I'd be glad to do either one, sir. Just
very quickly, and we'll take it for the record as well. The
details are important. I haven't yet seen the details of that.
We do have some prior year balances. The key on prior year
balances--and this is where resources were authorized and
appropriated, but because the project wasn't fully ready
they're being held until the project is ready. There are a few
projects. I don't know if they add up to $80 million, and
that's why we need to see the details.
Chairman Levin. All right.
Mr. D'Agostino. I'll take the rest of it for the record,
sir.
[The information referred to follows:]
The National Nuclear Security Administration has approximately $40
million associated with the Radioactive Liquid Waste Treatment Facility
construction project in prior year funds within its weapons activities
account, for which plans have been made to redeploy to another high
priority project. All other prior year balances are for goods and
services on order, and would have workload impacts if reduced. The
request for weapons activities in fiscal year 2011 is $7,008,835.
Weapons activities increased $624 million from the fiscal year 2010
appropriation to the fiscal year 2011 request.
Chairman Levin. Do you know the total size of your budget
request?
Mr. D'Agostino. Oh, yes, sir. It's over $7 billion, and so
therefore this $99 million number that keeps floating around at
this point is a fairly small percentage. But at this point we
did scrub pretty hard to come up with this number. I support
the President's budget. We'll need to look at the details on
that.
Chairman Levin. I expect that you would and should, as a
matter of fact. I just want to get the proportion as to what
that cut is. What was the dollar increase over last year?
Mr. D'Agostino. $624 million, sir, in this particular
account.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Gentlemen, thank you for your service. In the NPR, a whole
bunch of warheads in the queue for dismantlement, and that
number will increase under the START reductions. What are the
most significant challenges to managing this drawdown?
Mr. D'Agostino. I'll take that. The difficult challenge
associated with dismantling warheads is in many cases we're
talking about warhead systems--I'll call them systems--that
have been together for many years, in many cases multiple
decades. So what we have to deal with is making sure that we
have the safety rules down, clearly understood, so that these
warheads can be taken apart safely.
We've done a lot of work at the laboratories and the Pantex
plant to get the rules, the procedures, and the tooling and the
training all together at the same time so that we can take
apart these warheads. Our current commitment on the size of the
dismantlement queue that we have right now is to get that work
done by the year 2022, which is a significant amount of work.
We recognize that we'll be adding potentially more over the
next few years to that queue and we're going to try to hold
that date and look for efficiencies. In fact, there are some
significant efficiencies because the Pantex plant tends to do
better than we had originally expected to getting all that
dismantlement work done.
Senator Bill Nelson. So you feel reasonably confident that
you have the facilities and the skills in order to handle this
reduction?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir, I do feel confident. I would be
remiss if I didn't mention an event that happened not too long
ago, frankly, that we're working on right now. There was a
significant amount of rain in the State of Texas. We had some
fairly significant flooding at our Pantex plant. We're
currently in the process of assessing what it will take to
recover from that flooding event, and we'll be notifying the
appropriate committee staff as we get that information together
and work with DOD.
So our goal, of course, is to not have it impact the work
that DOD needs. But we're in the middle of that assessment,
sir.
Senator Bill Nelson. General Chilton, as you de-MIRV the
launchers where they're carrying only one warhead, how does
this START enhance the stability of the nuclear balance?
General Chilton. Senator, first there's an advantage of de-
MIRVing the Minuteman system because we can then disperse those
warheads, which are limited under the treaty, to other, more
survivable platforms, for example, yet at the same time a
potential adversary would, if they were thinking about a
preemptive strike, have to expend a large number of warheads to
address the Minuteman threat, which would still stay in large
single-warhead numbers.
Strategic stability, when we talk about that, it's having a
posture on both sides that in the worst crisis case, the
highest levels of tension, that neither side would be tempted
to conduct a first strike as their least best option. So de-
MIRVing, if you have 10 warheads in the extreme or even 100
warheads in the extreme on one missile, then you could envision
that an opportunity--well, maybe if I strike and eliminate 100
with just 2, that's to my great advantage for a disarming
strike.
At the other extreme, if there's just one there, there's
more stability. There's less temptation in time of crisis to
attempt a first strike, a disarming strike of the adversary.
So this provides, by de-MIRVing, we make it still a very
difficult target to attack and one that doesn't make sense to
attack.
Senator Bill Nelson. You've described the stability. Then
as you go about doing this, what are the challenges in bringing
about this change from several warheads down to one?
Mr. D'Agostino. Senator, we're well-practiced at this in
our missile fields and I don't see any difficulty in this. It
would just be a matter of the work that we would need to
accomplish over a scheduled time period. But our crews are
trained and able to both conduct uploads and downloads of the
configuration of our warheads in the fields today.
Senator Bill Nelson. Mr. Secretary, tell me about how long
do you think it's going to take to implement this drawdown?
Dr. Miller. Senator Nelson, the treaty would have a 7-year
implementation period following entry into force, and our
intention would be to undertake those reductions spread out
over that period.
Senator Bill Nelson. It's a 10-year treaty and in 7 years
you're going to be doing the drawdown?
Dr. Miller. Technically, it doesn't require that much time.
But we would expect to spread the work out over a substantial
part of that period, and we are currently developing the
detailed plans associated with each leg of the triad, the
changes that we would be looking for.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do you see any problem in implementing
that?
Dr. Miller. Sir, there's no expected problem in
implementing the treaty within the 7 years. If decided, it
could be done in less time.
Senator Bill Nelson. Do we think the Russians will do
likewise over 7 years?
Dr. Miller. Sir, I don't have an assessment of that. We
believe they'll be able to reach it within the 7-year period
certainly. We don't have an assessment of what their plans are
in terms of timing.
Senator Bill Nelson. But they have to, under the terms of
the treaty, accomplish it by year 7?
Dr. Miller. Within 7 years after entry into force of the
treaty, they would need to meet their limits.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
I have no further questions. Thank you very, very much for
your testimony.
The hearing is adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Daniel K. Akaka
start verification components
1. Senator Akaka. Dr. Miller, what steps do you plan to take to
assure the American people that the parties are in compliance with the
terms of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)?
Dr. Miller. Throughout the duration of the New START treaty, the
United States will make full use of the treaty's verification
provisions--onsite inspections, notifications, and data exchange
provisions as well as all available U.S. intelligence means--to include
national technical means--in order to monitor Russian compliance with
the terms of the treaty. Congress and the American people will be kept
informed of any potential issues regarding Russian compliance with the
terms of the treaty through the annual arms control compliance report
titled ``Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control,
Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and Commitments,'' which
is prepared and transmitted by the Department of State (DOS) with
coordination from the Department of Defense (DOD), the Department of
Energy (DOE), and the Intelligence Community (IC).
2. Senator Akaka. Dr. Miller, what is your level of confidence in
the verification process?
Dr. Miller. As Secretary Gates has testified, one of the greatest
contributions of this treaty is its strong verification regime. I have
confidence that the treaty's verification provisions, in particular its
onsite inspections, notifications, and data exchange provisions, will
increase transparency and confidence in the numbers and status of
Russian nuclear forces, without imposing significant burdens on our
ability to operate U.S. nuclear forces.
3. Senator Akaka. Dr. Miller, what are some of the details of
verification that will ensure compliance?
Dr. Miller. Onsite inspections are a linchpin of the treaty's
verification framework. The treaty allows each party to conduct up to
18 short-notice onsite inspections each year, with up to 10 Type One
inspections conducted at operating bases for intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBM), strategic nuclear-powered ballistic missile
submarines, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers, and up to 8 Type Two
inspections conducted at other declared facilities such as storage
sites, test ranges, and conversion or elimination facilities where
nondeployed systems are located.
Onsite inspections work synergistically with existing National
Technical Means of verification as well as other elements of the
treaty, including:
Extensive periodic data exchanges on the technical
characteristics, locations, and dispositions of ICBMs,
submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and nuclear-
capable heavy bombers;
Unique identifiers associated with each ballistic
missile and heavy bomber; and
A requirement to report any changes in the status of
strategic systems through timely notifications.
By enabling the United States to observe Russia's strategic nuclear
forces and related facilities directly, onsite inspections will help
the United States verify that Russia is complying with the provisions
of the New START treaty. Inspections will also provide a deterrent to
cheating. Because the treaty provides for up to 18 inspections per year
at declared sites selected by the inspecting party, each side knows
that the other will have a significant capability to uncover
discrepancies between reported data and what is actually fact. If the
United States has concerns or encounters ambiguities during onsite
inspections, it will be able to raise these matters with Russia in the
Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC), which will meet at least twice
each year, and pursue these matters at higher levels, if necessary.
start and the missile defense agency
4. Senator Akaka. Dr. Miller, upon ratification, the proposed
treaty could affect many areas within our national security
establishment in regards to weapons testing and operations. Would this
treaty in any way limit the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) from carrying
out future operations and testing? If so, how?
Dr. Miller. No. The New START treaty does not contain any
constraints on the testing, development, or deployment of current or
planned U.S. missile defense programs. This includes the Phased
Adaptive Approach (PAA) in Europe, the Ground-based Midcourse Defense
system, and any planned future missile defenses. The only limits on
missile defense in the New START treaty are the provisions in Article
V, Paragraph 3, that prohibit the placement of missile defense
interceptors in converted ICBM or SLBM launchers and vice versa.
However, as Lieutenant General O'Reilly, Director of the MDA, has
testified such conversion would be neither cost-effective nor
necessary. For example, converting 10 ICBM silos to house ground-based
interceptors (GBI) would cost about $550 million, compared to $360
million for building 10 new silos. The placement of midcourse missile
defense interceptors in converted SLBM launchers would be operationally
impractical and very expensive. Consequently, the Article V limitation
on launcher conversion does not constrain U.S. plans or programs.
Under New START we will have greater flexibility in conducting
testing with regard to launch locations, telemetry collection and
processing, and other aspects of test execution. The favorable changes
to the restrictions on target missiles under the New START treaty will
allow MDA to use more efficient test architectures and realistic
intercept geometries.
conventional prompt global strike capability
5. Senator Akaka. Dr. Miller, a DOS factsheet dated April 8, 2010,
asserted that the New START does not contain any constraints on the
current or planned U.S. conventional prompt global strike (CPGS)
capability. However, the factsheet also states that ``long-range
conventional ballistic missiles would count under the treaty's limit of
700 delivery vehicles, and their conventional warheads would count
against the limit of 1,550 warheads, because the treaty does not make a
distinction between missiles that are armed with conventional weapons
and those that are armed with nuclear weapons.'' From your perspective,
does the New START limit the current or planned U.S. CPGS capability?
Please explain.
Dr. Miller. No. The New START treaty protects the U.S. ability to
develop and deploy a CPGS capability. Should the United States deploy
conventional warheads on treaty-accountable ICBMs or SLBMs, they would
count toward the treaty's aggregate deployed warhead limit of 1,550,
just as conventional warheads would not have been distinguished from
nuclear warheads in terms of accountability under the START treaty.
However, the treaty's limit of 700 deployed delivery vehicles combined
with the associated ceiling of 1,550 deployed warheads would
accommodate any plans the United States might pursue during the life of
this treaty to deploy conventional warheads on ballistic missiles.
Moreover, the treaty does not prohibit the development, testing, or
deployment of potential future long-range weapons systems for CPGS that
are currently under development. We would not consider such non-nuclear
systems that do not otherwise meet the definitions of the New START
treaty to be accountable as ``new kinds of strategic offensive arms''
for the purposes of the treaty. A study of long-range strike options,
including those that would provide CPGS capabilities, is currently
underway in DOD and will be completed in time to inform the fiscal year
2012 President's budget.
recruitment of nuclear security professionals
6. Senator Akaka. Mr. D'Agostino, in your opening statement you
declared that one of the priorities for the National Nuclear Security
Administration's (NNSA) Nuclear Security Enterprise is to recruit,
develop, and retain the next generation of nuclear security
professionals responsible for stockpile stewardship. The state of
science, technology, engineering, and math (STEM) education in the
United States has been subject to some critical assessments in recent
years. For example, a 2007 Department of Labor report noted that trends
in K-12 and higher education science and math preparation, coupled with
demographic and labor supply trends, point to a serious challenge: our
Nation needs to increase the supply and quality of ``knowledge
workers'' whose specialized skills enable them to work productively
within the STEM industries and occupations.
How does NNSA plan to fulfill its priority of recruiting,
developing, and retaining the next generation of nuclear security
professionals given the expected shortages of students and workers with
technical backgrounds?
Mr. D'Agostino. Our nuclear security professionals are today, and
will be in the future, our greatest asset. They face critical and
persistent scientific challenges as they implement our national policy
to consider all life extension options to maintain the nuclear weapons
stockpile without nuclear testing. I believe that these challenges,
combined with a national-level commitment to transform the NNSA nuclear
weapons complex into a modern, world-class 21st century Nuclear
Security Enterprise that affords unique opportunities for postdoctoral
students and summer interns, will provide the environment to attract
and retain the best and brightest scientists and engineers available.
In addition, defense initiatives beyond stockpile stewardship, such as
nuclear forensics and attribution, nonproliferation, and treaty
verification activities, provide a broadened mission that will push the
envelope of nuclear technology and further challenge and develop our
nuclear security professionals.
The management and operations (M&O) contractors at our laboratories
and plants will continue to offer opportunities to exercise unique and
essential skills in stable programs of national importance to preserve
their viability. Developing the next generation of nuclear security
professionals is a high priority at all of our sites. The laboratories
and plants are making significant human capital investments in order to
recruit, retain, and exercise critical skills. However, we must
continue to modernize and operate world-class facilities to attract the
best students and workers with technical backgrounds to maintain a
second-to-none nuclear weapon science, technology, and engineering
capability.
In addition to our active efforts to provide unique and challenging
opportunities for the nuclear professionals in our laboratories and
plants, we are also recruiting, developing, and retaining a Federal
workforce to complement the M&O contractor workforce. As an example,
one of the NNSA actions to ensure a technical and competent Federal
workforce includes the Future Leaders Program. The objective of the
Future Leaders Program is to develop competent professionals to
ultimately manage programs and projects within our sites.
u.s. deterrence under new start
7. Senator Akaka. General Chilton, the proposed START between the
United States and Russia lowers the limits on strategic nuclear
warheads and the means to deliver them. It effectively reduces the
level of warheads each nation possesses to its lowest level in more
than 50 years. Will the United States possess an adequate deterrent in
light of the proposed reductions contained in the New START?
General Chilton. Yes. Under the New START treaty, based on U.S.
Strategic Command (STRATCOM) analysis, I assess that the triad of
diverse and complementary delivery systems will provide sufficient
capabilities to make our deterrent credible and effective.
As the combatant command responsible for executing strategic
deterrence operations, planning for nuclear operations, and advocating
for nuclear capabilities, we at STRATCOM are keenly aware of how force
structure changes can affect deterrence, assurance, and overall
strategic stability. Under the New START treaty, the United States will
retain the military flexibility necessary to ensure each of these for
the period of the treaty.
In support of the New START treaty negotiation effort, STRATCOM
analyzed the required nuclear weapons and delivery vehicle force
structure and posture to meet current guidance and provided options for
consideration by DOD.
This rigorous appraisal, rooted in both deterrence strategy and
assessment of potential adversary capabilities, validated both the
agreed-upon reductions in the New START treaty and recommendations in
the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR).
telemetry and new start
8. Senator Akaka. General Chilton, there are some differences
between the old START which expired in December 2009 and the new START.
For example, the new START does not contain restrictions on the
location and number of basing areas of land-mobile ICBM systems of
various classes. Will the new START change the verification proviqsions
from the previous START with regard to telemetry and monitoring of
mobile ICBMs? If so, how will it change and will this be a positive
change for the United States, the Russian Federation, or both?
General Chilton. The START treaty had obligations, prohibitions,
and limitations that required analysis of telemetric information in
order to verify a party was complying with the provisions of the
treaty. The START treaty therefore required the exchange of telemetry
on all ballistic missile launches. However, in New START, there are no
specific obligations, prohibitions, or limitations that require
telemetric information to verify compliance. To promote transparency
and predictability, New START allows for the exchange of telemetry on a
mutual basis on up to five ballistic missile launches per year,
selected by the testing party.
The START treaty, negotiated when both Russia and the United States
were planning to deploy mobile ICBMs, imposed limits on mobile ICBM
deployment areas as a way of monitoring their movements. The New START
treaty contains no limits on the size of the deployment area for mobile
ICBMs. Provisions of New START--including the information in the
comprehensive database on the association of all mobile ICBMs and
mobile ICBM launchers with a particular operating base, storage area,
or other treaty-accountable facility--require notifications when mobile
ICBMs and mobile ICBM launchers change deployed/nondeployed status or
are moved to other facilities. The presence of unique identifiers on
all ICBMs, in combination with these factors, will further facilitate
our ability to monitor the status of Russian mobile ICBMs. I believe
these changes will be of benefit to both parties by preserving
transparency and predictability.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
nnsa modernization
9. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller, Mr. D'Agostino, and General Chilton,
as I stated in my opening remarks, the House Appropriations Energy and
Water Subcommittee marked up its fiscal year 2011 spending bill and did
not fully fund the President's fiscal year 2011 request for the weapons
complex. Given the criticality of funding to modernize the weapons
complex--which just last month General Chilton stated was not only
important but ``essential''--is the President committed to ensuring
that NNSA receive the full $624 million increase as proposed in his
fiscal year 2011 budget? If so, will you recommend that the President
veto any appropriation that does not meet his full request for the
nuclear weapons complex?
Dr. Miller. As the 2010 NPR report and the fiscal year 2011 budget
request make clear, the President is fully committed to the
modernization of the nuclear weapons complex. The administration
remains fully committed to full funding for the NNSA in fiscal year
2011 and future years.
Mr. D'Agostino. The President is committed to ensuring the NNSA
receives the full $624 million increase in funding for weapons
activities as reflected in his budget proposal for fiscal year 2011.
The President's fiscal year 2011 budget proposal initiates a multi-year
investment plan with substantial budget increases to extend the life of
the stockpile, redress shortfalls for stockpile surveillance activities
and stockpile certification through investments in the science,
technology, and engineering base, and maintain and modernize the
supporting infrastructure.
I would not support an appropriation that did not allow the United
States to ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S.
nuclear weapons deterrent, and if asked by the President for my
recommendation on this matter, I would advise him accordingly.
General Chilton. Funding the modernization of the Nation's weapons
complex is critical and the President's fiscal year 2011 budget is the
essential first step for doing so. As a combatant commander, I strongly
support the full fiscal year 2011 appropriation. The fiscal year 2011
President's budget request resulted from close coordination between
DOD, DOE, and the administration and represents an important first step
in recapitalizing our infrastructure to more effectively sustain our
stockpile and manage risk. Long-term strategic system sustainment and
infrastructure improvements will require the administration and
Congress to work together to fully fund NNSA requirements.
10. Senator McCain. Mr. D'Agostino, in his prepared remarks for our
hearing last week, Dr. Michael Anastasio, Director of Los Alamos
National Laboratory, stated that he ``fear[s] that there is already a
gap emerging between expectations and fiscal realities'' and that he is
``concerned that in the administration's section 1251 report, much of
the planned funding increase for weapons activities do not come to
fruition until the second half of the 10-year period.'' Why do you
suspect Dr. Anastasio believes that some of the funding outlined in the
1251 report should be shifted to the first half of the 10-year period?
Mr. D'Agostino. I cannot speculate with regard to Dr. Anastasio's
statement. The funding plan identified in the report titled ``The New
START treaty Framework and Nuclear Force Structure Plans,'' submitted
to Congress pursuant to section 1251 of the National Defense
Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010 (the 1251 report), builds from
analysis completed for the fiscal years 2011-2015 Future Years Nuclear
Security Program (FYNSP), which was shaped by the NNSA's assessment of
the ability of the Nuclear Security Enterprise to efficiently ramp-up
within the constraints of time, capacity, and capability to spend
increased funds to redress mission shortfalls.
As part of the budget development process, I invited the
Integration Council to offer its insights and analysis, unfettered by
any ceiling or constraint. Program managers were tasked with a
different assignment that focused on executability. My leadership team
and I then worked through all the competing priorities to offer a
budget proposal to Secretary Chu that balanced needs and priorities
against the ability to execute a spending profile, which the Office of
Management and Budget and the President supported. The resulting budget
request is more conservative in the first 2 years of the FYNSP, based
on this approach. But an equally important consideration is that we
will not have a validated baseline for four major projects called for
by the NPR and the President. These are the B61 and W78 life extension
programs (LEP) and the two material processing facilities: the
Chemistry and Metallurgy Research Replacement (CMRR) Nuclear Facility
and the Uranium Processing Facility (UPF). These baselines may drive a
different out-year view of requirements. The funding requirements
identified to date represent the most complete view of needs until
these projects reach validation.
force structure under new start
11. Senator McCain. General Chilton, the 1251 report outlined a
``baseline nuclear force structure'' which specifies retaining up to
420 deployed ICBMs, a cut of at least 30 silos; up to 60 nuclear-
capable bombers, a reduction of 34; and all of the current 14 ballistic
missile submarines (SSBN), with no more than 240 SLBMs deployed at any
time. Given the provided ranges account for 720 delivery vehicles, 20
above the deployed limit under the New START, when does DOD intend to
provide the Senate with its final force structure?
General Chilton. Let me begin by stating the force structure
construct as reported in the section 1251 report is sufficient to meet
the Nation's strategic deterrence mission. Furthermore, the New START
treaty provides flexibility to manage the force drawdown while
maintaining an effective and safe strategic deterrent. DOD is working
to determine force structure concepts of operations and provide
recommendations that meet national strategic requirements and New START
treaty central limits, which we do not have to meet until 7 years after
the treaty's entry into force. STRATCOM is engaged with Office of the
Secretary of Defense, the military departments, and interagency
partners to develop implementation plans that will address guidance
received and sustain operational flexibility.
12. Senator McCain. General Chilton, have you yet estimated how the
Russians will configure their strategic forces under the New START?
General Chilton. This topic is addressed in the National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) on monitoring the New START treaty, which
was provided to the Senate on June 30, 2010.
13. Senator McCain. General Chilton, have you also conducted a net
assessment to determine if the United States can carry out its
deterrence mission under a likely mixed Russian strategic and tactical
nuclear weapons force structure? If so, please provide details.
General Chilton. The New START treaty's lower strategic force
levels are based on force analyses conducted during the NPR. Among
other things, these analyses considered:
The ability to meet current policy guidance;
Deterrence and extended deterrence;
Assurance of friends and allies;
The need to hedge against possible technical and
geopolitical developments through changes in U.S. force posture
and structure both within and outside treaty limits; and
The nuclear arsenals of other declared nuclear weapon
states, as well as the nuclear programs of proliferant states.
The conclusion of the NPR analyses was that stable deterrence could
be maintained at lower strategic force levels, including those
eventually agreed to in the New START treaty.
Regarding tactical nuclear weapons, the vast majority of tactical
nuclear weapons do not directly influence the strategic nuclear balance
between the United States and Russia because of their limited range and
different roles. Although numerical asymmetry in tactical nuclear
weapons exists, when considered within the context of our total
capability, and given the force levels as structured in the New START
treaty, we assess that our strategic deterrent will be effective in the
future.
Further, within the regional context, in order to support extended
deterrence and power projection, the United States possesses many
diverse capabilities, including strategic and tactical nuclear weapons,
superior conventional forces, ballistic missile defenses, and advanced
technologies. We also benefit from significant allied nuclear and
conventional capabilities. As President Obama stated in Prague last
year, we are committed to maintaining a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear arsenal to deter any adversary and guarantee that defense to
our allies.
start and missile defense
14. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller, irrespective of threats from the
Russians to withdraw from the treaty, is this administration committed
to funding, developing, and deploying all elements of the PAA for
missile defense in Europe as well as implementing the strategy as
portrayed in the Ballistic Missile Defense Review (BMDR)?
Dr. Miller. Yes. As outlined during the announcement of the PAA to
missile defense in Europe last September and in the 2010 Report of the
BMDR, while further advances in technology or future changes in the
threat could modify the details or timing of later phases, we plan to
deploy all four phases of the PAA in Europe, including Phase Four.
dual-capable f-35
15. Senator McCain. General Chilton, the development of the dual-
capable, nuclear and conventional, variant of the F-35 to replace aging
dual-capable F-16s is a primary driver for the B-61's 2017 deadline.
How critical is the timely delivery of the dual-capable F-35 to the
extended deterrence mission?
General Chilton. Let me begin by clarifying that the B-61 LEP is
not dependent on either F-16 Service Life Extension or F-35
development. The B-61 LEP is required to replace aging components in
the strategic and tactical variants of that weapon. Additionally, the
B-61 LEP will ensure the weapon is compatible with both aircraft. The
NPR makes a clear commitment to retain the capability to forward-deploy
U.S. nuclear weapons on tactical fighter-bombers and proceed with a
full scope life extension for the B-61. Both are key components of a
broader strategy to accomplish U.S. non-proliferation and deterrence
goals.
16. Senator McCain. General Chilton, how confident are you that it
will be available as scheduled in 2017?
General Chilton. Based on the recent F-35 program restructure and
Nunn-McCurdy breach, a new program baseline is currently in work and
those results will help inform the Air Force regarding any possible
effects on the Dual Capable Aircraft timeline. Whatever the effects on
the Dual Capable Aircraft timeline, I support the maintenance of the
Dual Capable Aircraft mission until the F-35 is fully capable of
performing it.
prompt global strike
17. Senator McCain. General Chilton, while the treaty does not
prohibit the development and deployment of long-range conventional
strike capabilities, it does stipulate that conventional warheads
placed on ICBMs or SLBMs will be counted under the overall strategic
nuclear warhead ceiling. How will this tradeoff affect the development
and the deployment of our future prompt global strike (PGS) capability?
General Chilton. NPR analysis concluded that New START treaty
strategic delivery vehicle and strategic warhead limits allowed
retention of a margin above the minimum required nuclear force
structure for the possible addition of non-nuclear PGS capabilities
(conventionally-armed ICBMs or SLBMs) that would be accountable under
the treaty. Additional decisions will be required to determine the U.S.
force structure composition under the limit of 700 deployed ICBMs,
SLBMs, and heavy bombers under the New START treaty. The final
decisions will be made during the 7 years of implementation before the
limit takes effect. During that period, DOD will continue
modernization, sustainment, and operation of U.S. nuclear forces.
Whether deployment of PGS would require additional adjustment in
the number of U.S. deployed ICBMs and SLBMs will be a function of the
type of PGS system developed and deployed, because some PGS systems
under consideration for deployment would not count against the New
START limits. Given this uncertainty, it is premature to speculate on
where possible reductions of other strategic systems may come from, or
whether further reductions will even be necessary. The number of such
conventionally-armed delivery vehicles and the warheads they carry
would be very small when measured against the overall levels of
strategic delivery systems and strategic warheads. Should we decide to
deploy them, counting this small number of conventional strategic
systems and their warheads toward the treaty limits will not prevent
the United States from maintaining a robust, fully adequate nuclear
deterrent.
b-61 reprogramming
18. Senator McCain. Mr. D'Agostino, DOE recently submitted a
request to reprogram $53 million of the NNSA fiscal year 2010
appropriated budget to support urgent funding for the B-61 LEP study.
How critical is the timely approval of this reprogramming request?
Mr. D'Agostino. The reprogramming is essential for the NNSA to
complete the design definition and cost study in 2011 and meet DOD's
first production unit requirement of 2017. The funds provide critical
resources to ramp up design agency and production technical staff and
continue maturation of technologies, including enhanced surety
concepts.
19. Senator McCain. Mr. D'Agostino, what would the consequences of
denying such a request have on meeting the critical 2017 deadline?
Mr. D'Agostino. The NNSA was pleased to receive approval for the
reprogramming. The program is committed to meet the challenging
schedule of a fiscal year 2017 first production unit.
20. Senator McCain. Mr. D'Agostino, is the fiscal year 2011 and the
future years budget plan sufficient to support the fiscal year 2017
delivery of the B-61 and to maintain the W-76 schedule?
Mr. D'Agostino. The budget for fiscal year 2011 is sufficient for
the B61. The fiscal year 2011 budget request of $252 million provides
the needed funds to complete the design definition and cost study and
develop technologies in fiscal year 2011 to support the fiscal year
2017 first production unit. The Phase 6.2A cost study will develop
budget quality estimates for fiscal year 2012 and beyond. The NNSA will
document these in the Weapon Data Cost Report. Current estimates in the
fiscal years 2011-2015 FYNSP are based on analysis of previous LEPs and
will be updated, as needed, once the B61 study is completed and Phase
6.3 is authorized.
The W76 budget is sufficient to meet the planned production rate.
If implementation of the NPR changes the planned annual production
requirement, NNSA will rebaseline the program and update the budget
request.
21. Senator McCain. Mr. D'Agostino, is there any likelihood of the
B-61 production slipping as a result of budget issues in fiscal years
2010-2012?
Mr. D'Agostino. The risks to the fiscal year 2017 schedule for the
first production unit (FPU) will be determined as part of the B61
study. FPU risks are dependent on the detailed schedules associated
with development and production engineering and will be affected by the
down-selection of technologies, including decisions to implement
enhanced surety technologies.
verifying the warhead limit
22. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller and General Chilton, under the
treaty, any missile can carry any number of warheads, as long as the
total does not exceed 1,550, but it's unclear as to how we will verify
this number. Warhead loadings are unobservable with national technical
means and the treaty's onsite inspection measure simply tells us how
many warheads a missile has at a particular base. If, for example, we
learn during one of these inspections that a missile the Russians said
was loaded with 3 warheads is now loaded with 6, how does that help us
find out if the Russians exceeded the overall 1,550 limit?
Dr. Miller. [Deleted.]
General Chilton. The New START treaty's annual quota of 10 Type One
inspections will allow the United States to confirm the accuracy of
declared data on the numbers of warheads emplaced on designated,
deployed ICBMs and SLBMs. As part of a multi-faceted verification
regime which includes comprehensive data exchanges, notifications,
unique identifiers, and non-interference with National Technical Means,
these onsite inspections will help to confirm compliance with the
Article II central limit of 1,550 warheads on deployed ICBMs, deployed
SLBMs, and nuclear warheads counted for deployed heavy bombers.
A classified answer will be provided separately. Additional
information on this issue is also contained in the July 30, 2010 letter
to you from Secretary Gates and the New START NIE on monitoring the New
START treaty, published on June 30, 2010.
23. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller and General Chilton, is there any
scenario that could lead the United States to conclude unequivocally
from these inspections that the Russians are in violation of the
treaty's 1,550 limit?
Dr. Miller and General Chilton. Although monitoring all reentry
vehicles emplaced on deployed ICBMS and SLBMs will be difficult under
the New START treaty, most large-scale breakout scenarios would likely
involve activity that could be observable over time. In assessing
Russian compliance with the New START treaty, the United States would
use not only onsite inspections, but also data exchanges,
notifications, and national technical means of verification.
Information on this issue at the classified level is contained in
the July 30, 2010 letter to you from Secretary Gates, and in the New
START treaty NIE, published on June 30, 2010.
24. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller and General Chilton, what tactics or
excuses can the Russians use to keep our inspectors away from missiles
whose warheads they do not want us to see?
Dr. Miller and General Chilton. [Deleted.]
______
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
delivery system modernization
25. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, press reports indicate that
the administration will invest $100 billion over the next decade in
nuclear delivery systems. About $30 billion of this total will go
toward development and acquisition of a new strategic submarine. Of the
remaining $70 billion, STRATCOM estimates that the cost of maintaining
our current nuclear forces is approximately $56 billion over this
period.
This leaves roughly $14 billion for:
Next generation bomber
Follow-on ICBM
Follow-on nuclear air-launched cruise missile (ALCM)
Conventional PGS capability
In fact, the 1251 modernization report does not even make a
commitment to go forward with these delivery systems. Is $100 billion a
sufficient investment in our nuclear delivery systems over the next
decade?
General Chilton. The section 1251 report, ``New START Framework and
Nuclear Force Structure Plans,'' provided to Congress, which is the
basis for the estimate of $100 billion costs over 10 years for delivery
systems, included costs for which there are currently programs of
record. As stated in the one-page, unclassified summary of the section
1251 report, the administration intends to invest well over $100
billion in modernizing strategic delivery systems. DOD is currently
conducting an analysis of alternatives (AoA) for a possible follow-on
ALCM, and is assessing future heavy bomber requirements in a study of
long-range strike capabilities that will be completed in fall 2010. In
addition, the Air Force is initiating a study of future ICBM concepts
and requirements. As these studies are completed, and subsequent
decisions taken, the estimate for costs of strategic delivery systems
in the next decade will likely change.
26. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, what assurances can you
provide that the administration is committed to modernizing the above
programs?
General Chilton. The President's budget provides funding to address
our Nation's most critical needs to update and modernize our deterrent
and global strike capabilities. It represents a 10 percent increase in
fiscal year 2011 over fiscal year 2010. As for STRATCOM, our intent is
to continue to advocate for the necessary capabilities to support
strategic deterrence. It is clear that a long-term commitment,
reflected in consecutive budget submissions and sustained congressional
support, will be required.
27. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, why aren't they addressed in
the 1251 report?
General Chilton. The estimates in the section 1251 report include
programs planned for fiscal years 2011-2015, and the administration's
current best estimate of fiscal years 2016-2020 costs. As some programs
are yet to be fully defined, such as the Minuteman III ICBM follow-on,
the ALCM follow-on, and the follow-on bomber, their costs across the
entire period are not included because they are not yet known. As
specific decisions are made regarding these systems, the necessary
funding will be requested in future DOD budget requests.
tactical nuclear weapons
28. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, the Strategic Posture
Commission Report indicates a disparity of 3,800 Russian tactical
nuclear weapons versus less than 500 for the United States. What are
your thoughts on how the United States will engage Russia on its
overwhelming number of tactical nuclear weapons?
General Chilton. The vast majority of tactical nuclear weapons do
not directly influence the strategic nuclear balance between the United
States and Russia because of their limited range and different roles.
Although numerical asymmetry in tactical nuclear weapons exists, when
considered within the context of our total capability, and given the
force levels as structured in the New START treaty, we assess that our
strategic deterrent will be effective in the future. The force
structure we will retain under the New START treaty will preserve our
capability to upload our strategic nuclear delivery systems if
necessary. Further, within the regional context, in order to support
extended deterrence and power projection, the United States possesses
many diverse capabilities including strategic and tactical nuclear
weapons, superior conventional forces, ballistic missile defenses and
other advanced capabilities. We also benefit from significant allied
nuclear and conventional capabilities.
The Perry-Schlesinger Congressional Strategic Posture Commission
recommended deferring negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons until
after a treaty successor agreement to the START treaty had been
concluded. Additionally, pursuant to the 2010 NPR, and as the President
reiterated at the signing of the New START treaty, the United States
intends to engage Russia regarding broader reductions in strategic and
tactical nuclear armaments, including nondeployed weapons. The number
and role of tactical nuclear weapons in the Russian nuclear arsenal
warrant addressing them in future discussions.
29. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, what impact will this disparity
have on allied views of the U.S. nuclear umbrella?
Dr. Miller. Because of their limited range and different roles,
tactical nuclear weapons do not directly influence the strategic
balance between the United States and Russia. Furthermore, within the
regional context, the United States relies on additional capabilities
to support extended deterrence and power projection, including
conventional force capabilities, ballistic missile defenses, allied
capabilities, advanced technologies, and modernization and maintenance
of existing forces, to name a few. As President Obama stated in Prague
last year, we are committed to maintaining a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear arsenal to deter any adversary and guarantee that
defense to our allies. During the NPR consultations, our NATO allies
were engaged on the issue of extended deterrence and were assured of
our continued commitment to their defense. Allies have welcomed the
outcome of the NPR, as well as the signing of the New START treaty.
30. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, what leverage do we have to address
this disparity in the future, and why didn't we make this an objective
for this agreement?
Dr. Miller. A more ambitious treaty--one that addressed tactical
nuclear weapons or additional nuclear weapons states--would have taken
much longer to complete, adding significantly to the time before a
successor agreement, including verification measures, could enter into
force following START's expiration in December 2009. Following
ratification and entry into force of the New START treaty, we intend to
pursue further negotiations with Russia on measures to reduce both
strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, including nondeployed nuclear
weapons.
Leverage for future negotiations will come from several directions.
The Russians are concerned with the totality of the U.S. nuclear
stockpile, particularly the upload capability of our strategic
ballistic missiles, as well as U.S. tactical nuclear weapons forward-
deployed in NATO countries. Also, Article VI of the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) stipulates that nuclear weapons states
are to work toward achieving nuclear disarmament. The Russians want to
be seen favorably as working toward this goal. President Medvedev has
expressed interest in further discussions on measures to further reduce
both nations' nuclear arsenals. As stated in the April 2010 NPR and by
the President at the signing of the New START treaty in Prague, we
intend to raise strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, including
nondeployed nuclear weapons, in those discussions.
31. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, what would the United States use to
negotiate another arms control agreement with Russia to get them to
agree to reduce their thousands and thousands of tactical nuclear
weapons?
Dr. Miller. The New START treaty sets the stage for further
negotiations with Russia on measures to reduce both strategic and
tactical nuclear weapons, including nondeployed nuclear weapons.
President Medvedev has expressed interest in further discussions on
measures to further reduce both nations' nuclear arsenals. We intend to
raise strategic and tactical nuclear weapons, including nondeployed
nuclear weapons, in those discussions.
While it is premature at this stage to discuss what our negotiating
strategy might be, leverage for future negotiations will come from
several directions. The Russians are concerned with the totality of the
U.S. nuclear stockpile, particularly the upload capability of our
strategic ballistic missiles, as well as U.S. tactical nuclear weapons
forward-deployed in NATO countries. Also, Article VI of the NPT
stipulates that nuclear weapons states are to work toward achieving
nuclear disarmament. The Russians want to be seen as favorably working
towards this goal.
nuclear warhead levels
32. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, during his nomination hearing
on July 9, 2009, General Cartwright expressed the view that he ``would
be very concerned'' if we got below 800 deployed delivery vehicles. The
New START establishes a level of 700 deployed strategic delivery
vehicles. Are you concerned that this number is 100 below General
Cartwright's comfort level?
General Chilton. No, I am not concerned. The decision to agree to a
limit of 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles resulted from an
updated assessment of U.S. force deployment options in the light of
different counting rules under New START. General Cartwright's
statement was made in the context of the previous START treaty's
counting rules; subsequently, New START provisions were agreed. These
include an agreement not to count nondeployed ICBMs and SLBMs as part
of the central limit on delivery vehicles, not to count converted
individual SLBM launchers on strategic submarines, and not to count
bombers that have been converted to conventional-only missions. Because
of these provisions, under the 700 limit of the New START treaty, the
United States will be able to retain all 14 SSBNs, while reducing the
number of deployed SLBM launchers by 96 (from 336 to 240). In addition,
the United States will convert a subset of the B-52H bombers to a
conventional-only role, so that they are no longer accountable under
the treaty.
In sum, the treaty's limits of 700 deployed strategic delivery
vehicles will support strategic stability by allowing the United States
to retain a robust triad of strategic delivery systems.
33. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, are you concerned that at
lower levels the military will not be able to carry out its deterrence
missions?
General Chilton. No. I am confident that the military will maintain
a reliable and effective deterrent.
The New START treaty's lower strategic force levels are based on
force analyses conducted during the NPR. Among other things, these
analyses considered:
The ability to meet current policy guidance;
Deterrence and extended deterrence;
Assurance of friends and allies;
The need to hedge against both technical and
geopolitical developments; and
The nuclear arsenals of other declared nuclear weapon
states, as well as the nuclear programs of proliferant states.
The conclusion of the NPR analyses was that stable deterrence could
be maintained at lower strategic force levels.
Throughout the NPR process and during New START treaty
negotiations, STRATCOM played important analytical and advisory roles.
As the combatant command responsible for strategic deterrence planning,
advocating for related capabilities, and executing operations at the
President's direction, no other military organization has the necessary
analytical skills and expertise to advise the Secretary of Defense
fully on these matters. Our team analyzed nuclear weapons and delivery
vehicle force structure options and postures necessary to meet the
current guidance. STRATCOM's involvement in and support to the NPR was
both thorough and continuous.
The breadth and depth of our analysis, evaluations, and involvement
in the treaty-making process give me confidence that the result will
not constrain the ability of the United States to continue to deter
potential adversaries, assure our allies, and sustain strategic
stability.
34. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, are you concerned about the
survivability of U.S. forces at lower levels--certainly, the
implications of cheating become more profound?
General Chilton. No.
Russia would not be able to undermine the strategic balance between
the United States and Russia because a portion of the U.S. ballistic
missile submarine force is always at sea at any given time, and capable
of launching Trident II SLBMs. These highly survivable submarines and
the weapons they carry provide survivable, credible assurance of the
abilities of the United States to execute a response to an attack on
the U.S. or our interests.
Further, when considering the utility of a hypothetical breakout
and potentially disarming first strike, Russia will be able to have
significant confidence that the United States has retained a highly
responsive force of up to 420 single warhead Minuteman III ICBMs
deployed in hardened silos. Russian consideration of such a strike
would always have to factor in the ability of the U.S. President to
decide to launch those ICBMs while under attack, a decision that would
enable a large portion of the ICBM force to deliver their warheads to
Russian targets. Our analysis has clearly demonstrated that additional
Russian warheads, even significantly above the treaty limits, would do
nothing to threaten the survivability of U.S. ballistic missile
submarines at sea or bombers when on alert. Nor would they guarantee
the destruction of all U.S. land-based ICBMs.
In summary, additional Russian warheads above the New START limits
would have little to no effect on the U.S. assured and survivable
second-strike capabilities that underwrite our strategic deterrence
posture.
35. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, are you concerned that other
countries may view lower U.S. force levels as an opportunity to gain
parity with the United States in nuclear capability?
General Chilton. No.
The only nation that could potentially compete with the United
States or Russia in nuclear weapons is the People's Republic of China.
The New START limits will permit the United States to maintain forces
well above China's. Chinese spokesmen have stated that China does not
seek to attain numerical parity with Russia or the United States, and
its nuclear arsenal remains much smaller than U.S. and Russian
arsenals. As a declared nuclear weapon state under the NPT, China's
restraint in its nuclear modernization is important to nuclear
disarmament and global nonproliferation efforts. We look to China to be
more transparent about its strategic programs and to show restraint in
them.
36. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, are you concerned that at
lower levels of U.S. forces, our allies may come to doubt the
credibility of U.S. nuclear security guarantees--especially if the
Russians maintain large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons?
General Chilton. The New START treaty's lower strategic force
levels are based on force analyses conducted during the NPR. Among
other things, these analyses considered:
The ability to meet current policy guidance;
Deterrence and extended deterrence;
Assurance of friends and allies;
The need to hedge against both technical and
geopolitical developments; and
The nuclear arsenals of other declared nuclear weapon
states, as well as the nuclear programs of proliferant states.
The conclusion of the NPR analyses was that stable deterrence could
be maintained at lower strategic force levels.
As part of the NPR consultations, our NATO allies were engaged on
the issue of extended deterrence and were assured of our continued
commitment to their defense. U.S. allies have welcomed the outcome of
the NPR, as well as the signing of the New START treaty. In fact, their
response to the New START treaty has been overwhelmingly positive. NATO
Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen himself welcomed the agreement
as an important contribution to arms control and an inspiration for
further progress.
modernization funding
37. Senator Inhofe. Mr. D'Agostino, in your written testimony you
state that the President's fiscal year 2011 budget request is ``exactly
right.'' The administration has requested a $10 billion increase over
10 years for modernization. Yet the CMRR Nuclear Facility in New Mexico
and the UPF in Tennessee nuclear material facilities will likely cost
more than $7 billion by the time they are complete. This leaves $3
billion to conduct three warhead overhauls and restore stockpile
stewardship and stockpile surveillance. Is this amount really
sufficient?
Mr. D'Agostino. The funding identified in the President's budget
request for the NNSA fiscal years 2011-2015 FYNSP represents my and the
administration's assessment of what is required over the next decade.
This includes significant funding increases, which start at $624
million in fiscal year 2011 and increase to $1.64 billion in fiscal
year 2015, and sustained investments at these higher levels such that
over the next decade the United States will have invested $80 billion
in the Nuclear Security Enterprise. This will support required
maintenance and surveillance activities, investments in science,
technology, and engineering, modernization of physical infrastructure,
and essential investment in human capital. It will also support
specific critical activities, including: design and initial
construction of the CMRR Nuclear Facility; design and initial
construction of the UPF; creation of a sustainable plutonium pit
manufacturing capacity at the PF-4 facility; completion of the LEP for
the W76 warhead and the B61 bomb; and beginning LEP studies to explore
the path forward for the W78 ICBM and the W88 SLBM systems.
But an equally important consideration is that we do not have a
validated baseline for four major projects called for by the NPR and
the President: the B61 and W78 LEPs, the CMRR Nuclear Facility, and the
UPF. These baselines may drive a different out-year view of
requirements. The funding requirements identified to date represent the
most complete view of needs until these projects reach validation. Out-
year requirements will be adjusted if necessary as baselines for these
activities are validated.
38. Senator Inhofe. Mr. D'Agostino, since 70 percent of these funds
will not show up until 2016, what near-term risk do you foresee in this
budget plan?
Mr. D'Agostino. The funding increases identified in the President's
budget request for the NNSA fiscal years 2011-2015 FYNSP, which start
at $624 million in fiscal year 2011, ramp up to $1.64 billion in fiscal
year 2015, and then continue at the higher levels in the out-years,
will support required maintenance and surveillance activities,
investments in science, technology, and engineering, modernization of
physical infrastructure, and essential investment in human capital. The
progressive funding profile supports all identified programmatic
requirements and represents a manageable and executable investment in
NNSA's national security mission.
39. Senator Inhofe. Mr. D'Agostino, you also state that one of your
priorities is to ``strengthen the science, technology, and engineering
base,'' yet most of these funds are clearly for facility improvements.
Additionally, during the hearing with the lab directors last week, the
committee heard that 37 percent of the experienced technical staff in
the weapons system and component design at the Sandia lab are over the
age of 55. This concerns me. How are we going to retain this expert
workforce?
Mr. D'Agostino. This is an important issue that the NNSA will
continue to monitor. We are adding additional investments into our
science, technology, and engineering base. The NNSA will ensure the
right skill mix is maintained for the future within the Federal and
contractor workforce to accomplish its mission by attracting and
retaining the top national talent and expertise to provide key nuclear
weapon scientific understanding. Actions that NNSA is taking include
promoting cross-training of critical skills and knowledge management/
transfer for mission critical skills. I believe that challenging work,
combined with a national-level commitment to transform the NNSA nuclear
weapons complex into a modern, world-class 21st century Nuclear
Security Enterprise, will provide the environment to attract and retain
the best and brightest scientists and engineers available. This
national-level commitment was made evident by the administration's NPR
and the fiscal year 2011 budget request for the NNSA. In addition,
defense initiatives beyond stockpile stewardship, such as nuclear
forensics and attribution, and treaty verification activities, provide
a broadened mission that will push the envelope of nuclear technology
and further challenge and develop our nuclear security professionals.
40. Senator Inhofe. Mr. D'Agostino, can critical nuclear weapons
design skills, including plutonium pit design and production, be
preserved solely through reuse or refurbishment as the administration's
NPR policy suggests?
Mr. D'Agostino. The United States has made the decision not to
design and produce new warheads; however, we will preserve our critical
nuclear weapon design skills. The capabilities needed to design a new
warhead include knowledgeable designers, along with a responsive,
capable research and development and manufacturing infrastructure.
These are the same capabilities and skill sets utilized when completing
weapon life extensions. Instead of honing and demonstrating these
skills through an ongoing program to design, develop, and test new
nuclear weapon designs, such as was done during the Cold War, the NNSA
is strengthening our science, technology, and engineering capabilities
to sustain these core skills.
41. Senator Inhofe. Mr. D'Agostino, do you have confidence that in
25 years from now, we will understand every skill required to
manufacture a new nuclear warhead, if the Nation requires one?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes. The United States has made the decision not to
design and produce new warheads; however, we will preserve our critical
nuclear weapon design skills. The capabilities needed to design a new
warhead include knowledgeable designers, along with a responsive,
capable research and development and manufacturing infrastructure.
These are the same capabilities and skill sets utilized when completing
weapon life extensions. The investments of this administration provide
the necessary skill sets and infrastructure that will ensure that
future technical competencies and capabilities are in place to support
nuclear deterrence.
verification regime
42. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, you state in your prepared
testimony that ``New START will reestablish a strategic nuclear arms
control verification regime that provides intrusive access to Russian
nuclear forces and a measure of predictability in Russian force
deployments over the life of the treaty.'' However, the New START
verification regime is clearly less stringent than that found in the
expired START I. For example, there are fewer onsite inspections, a
weakening of telemetry exchange provisions, and no longer any
continuous monitoring of missile production facilities. Is the
verification in the treaty adequate to give us the same understanding
of new Russian systems as we have of current Russia systems thanks to
START I?
General Chilton. The New START treaty verification regime is
designed to verify each party's compliance with the provisions of the
treaty just as the START treaty's verification regime was designed to
verify compliance with that treaty's provisions. Because the New START
treaty's provisions differ from those of the START treaty, the New
START treaty requires a different set of verification measures. The
number of inspections permitted in the START treaty and the New START
treaty is not a simple ``apples to apples'' comparison. For example,
although the New START treaty allows fewer inspections, its Type One
inspections at ICBM and SSBN bases combine the key attributes of the
START treaty's reentry vehicle onsite inspections and data update
inspections. Additionally, the number of facilities for which Russia
provided site diagrams and which will therefore be inspectable under
the New START treaty (35) is significantly lower than the number
confiscatable facilities in the former Soviet Union when the START
treaty entered into force (70). This is due to the fact that Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine no longer have strategic offensive arms and
therefore are not parties to the New START treaty, as well as that
Russia now has fewer facilities where strategic offensive arms are
located than it had when START entered into force.
According to the document titled ``New START Treaty--The
Determination Pertaining to Verification,'' dated July 12, 2010,
prepared in accordance with Section 306 of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Act, the administration concluded that the combination of
improved U.S. understanding of Russian strategic forces resulting from
the implementation of the START treaty, U.S. NTM capabilities, the New
START treaty's verification provisions, and a favorable posture for
deterring cheating or breakout, results in a New START treaty that is
effectively verifiable. Finally, the New START treaty's verification
regime will provide far more insight into Russian strategic nuclear
forces than having no onsite inspection access at all, which is
currently the case.
With regard to telemetry exchange provisions, the START treaty had
obligations, prohibitions, and limitations that required analysis of
telemetric information in order to verify a party was complying with
the provisions of the treaty. The START treaty therefore required the
exchange of telemetry on all ballistic missile launches. However in New
START, there are no specific obligations, prohibitions, or limitations
that require telemetric information to verify compliance. To promote
transparency and predictability, New START allows for the exchange of
telemetry on up to five ballistic missile launches per year.
43. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, how important is it that we
get telemetry of new Russian missile tests in order to understand the
capabilities of those systems?
General Chilton. Please see the NIE on Monitoring the New START
Treaty, which was provided to the Senate on June 30, 2010.
44. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, don't we need better
verification at lower force levels than we needed at higher force
levels?
General Chilton. Regardless of the specific force levels, the key
criterion in evaluating whether the New START treaty is effectively
verifiable is whether the United States would be able to detect, and
respond to, any attempt by the Russian Federation to move beyond the
limits of the treaty in a way that has military significance, before
such an attempt became a threat to U.S. national security. The military
significance of a cheating scenario depends upon its impact on the
military capability of the parties and its impact on strategic
stability. The key to strategic stability is that each side possesses
strategic nuclear forces able to execute a devastating second strike
under any war initiation scenario.
After conducting a thorough analysis, we have concluded that Russia
will not be able to achieve militarily significant advantage by
cheating or breakout under New START, principally because of the
inherent survivability of the planned U.S. strategic force structure-
specifically, our Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, a number of
which are at sea at any given time.
Further, when considering the utility of a breakout and potentially
disarming first strike, Russia will know with certainty that the United
States has retained a highly responsive force of up to 420 single
warhead Minuteman III ICBMs deployed in hardened silos. Russian
consideration of such a strike would always have to factor in the
ability of the U.S. President to decide to launch those ICBMs while
under Russian attack, a decision that would enable a large portion of
the ICBM force to deliver their warheads to Russian targets. The
Russian President would almost certainly understand that no matter how
many warheads Russia launches in an attempt to destroy the U.S. ICBMs,
the United States would possess the ability to negate the effectiveness
of a first strike by launching before the Russian warheads reached the
ICBMs in their silos.
Therefore, additional Russian warheads above the New START limits
would have little to no effect on the U.S. assured second-strike
capabilities that underwrite our strategic deterrence posture.
However, if Russia were to attempt to gain political advantage by
cheating or breakout, the United States would be able to rapidly
respond by increasing the alert levels of SSBNs and bombers, and by
uploading warheads on SSBNs and ICBMs. This would offset any
conceivable political benefits the Russians may believe they would gain
through temporary numerical advantage.
45. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, do you agree with the
statement that any cheating by the Russians will have little, if any,
impact on our second-strike capability?
General Chilton. Yes. Russia will not be able to achieve militarily
significant advantage by cheating or breakout under New START, due to
the inherent survivability of the planned U.S. strategic force
structure.
To undermine the strategic balance, Russia would need to develop
the means to prevent U.S. Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, a
number of which are at sea at any given time, from being able to
deliver their Trident II SLBMs. These highly survivable submarines and
the weapons they carry guarantee the ability of the United States to
execute a response with hundreds of nuclear warheads. Further, when
considering the utility of a breakout and potentially disarming first
strike, Russia will know with certainty that the United States has
retained a highly responsive force of up to 420 single warhead
Minuteman III ICBMs deployed in hardened silos. Russian consideration
of such a strike would always have to factor in the ability of the U.S.
President to decide to launch those ICBMs while under Russian attack, a
decision that would enable a large portion of the ICBM force to deliver
their warheads to Russian targets. The Russian President would almost
certainly understand that no matter how many warheads Russia launches
in an attempt to destroy the U.S. ICBMs, the United States would
possess the ability to negate the effectiveness of such a strike by
launching before the Russian warheads reached the ICBMs in their silos.
Therefore, additional Russian warheads above the New START limits
would have little to no effect on the U.S. assured second-strike
capabilities that underwrite our strategic deterrence posture.
However, if Russia were to attempt to gain political advantage by
cheating or breakout, the United States will be able to rapidly respond
by increasing the alert levels of both SSBNs and bombers, and by
uploading warheads on SSBNs and ICBMs. This would offset any
conceivable political benefits the Russians may believe they would gain
through temporary numerical advantage.
46. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, doesn't detecting cheating,
i.e. strong verification, become more important at the lower levels
imposed by the New START?
General Chilton. Regardless of the specific force levels, the key
criterion in evaluating whether the New START treaty is effectively
verifiable is whether the United States would be able to detect, and
respond to, any attempt by the Russian Federation to move beyond the
limits of the treaty in a way that has military significance, before
such an attempt became a threat to U.S. national security. The military
significance of a cheating scenario depends upon its impact on the
military capability of the parties and its impact on strategic
stability. The key to strategic stability is that each side possesses
strategic nuclear forces able to execute a devastating second strike
under any war initiation scenario.
After conducting a thorough analysis, we have concluded that Russia
will not be able to achieve militarily significant advantage by
cheating or breakout under New START, primarily because of the inherent
survivability of the planned U.S. strategic force structure--
specifically, our Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, a number of
which are at sea at any given time.
Further, when considering the utility of a breakout and potentially
disarming first strike, Russia will know with certainty that the United
States has retained a highly responsive force of up to 420 single
warhead Minuteman III ICBMs deployed in hardened silos. Russian
consideration of such a strike would always have to factor in the
ability of the U.S. President to decide to launch those ICBMs while
under Russian attack, a decision that would enable a large portion of
the ICBM force to deliver their warheads to Russian targets. The
Russian President would almost certainly understand that no matter how
many warheads Russia launches in an attempt to destroy the U.S. ICBMs,
the United States would possess the ability to negate the effectiveness
of a first strike by launching before the Russian warheads reached the
ICBMs in their silos.
Therefore, additional Russian warheads above the New START limits
would have little to no effect on the U.S. assured second-strike
capabilities that underwrite our strategic deterrence posture.
However, if Russia were to attempt to gain political advantage by
cheating or breakout, the United States will be able to rapidly respond
by increasing the alert levels of SSBNs and bombers, and by uploading
warheads on SSBNs and ICBMs. This would offset any conceivable
political benefits the Russians may believe they would gain through
temporary numerical advantage.
47. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, you state in your prepared
testimony that ``New START will reestablish a strategic nuclear arms
control regime that provides intrusive access to Russian nuclear forces
and a measure of predictability in Russian force deployments over the
life of the treaty.'' However, the New START verification regime is
clearly less stringent than that found in the expired START I. For
example, there are fewer onsite inspections, a weakening of telemetry
exchange provisions, and no longer any continuous monitoring of missile
production facilities. The administration says on the one hand that the
treaty is verifiable, but on the other hand it says that cheating is
irrelevant. Do you agree cheating is irrelevant?
General Chilton. I do not think Russian cheating on New START would
be irrelevant.
The document titled ``New START Treaty--The Determination
Pertaining to Verification'' dated 12 July 2010, prepared by the State
Department in accordance with Section 306 of the Arms Control and
Disarmament Act, states: ``Russian cheating under the treaty would have
little, if any, effect on the assured second-strike capabilities of
U.S. strategic forces. In particular, the survivability and response
capabilities of strategic submarines and heavy bombers would be
unaffected by even large-scale cheating.''
I agree with that statement. Russia will not be able to achieve a
militarily significant advantage by cheating or breakout under New
START, due to the inherent survivability of the planned U.S. strategic
force structure. I would add to the State Department's quote above that
while our ICBM force is potentially vulnerable to a Russian
counterforce strike, no Russian leadership could confidently assume
that the President would not launch ICBMs before attacking Russian
warheads would arrive.
If Russia were to attempt to gain political advantage by cheating
or breakout, the United States will be able to rapidly respond by
increasing the alert levels of SSBNs and bombers, and by uploading
warheads on SSBNs and ICBMs. This would offset any conceivable
political benefits the Russians may believe they would gain through
temporary numerical advantage.
48. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, if it doesn't matter if Russia
cheats, why do we need the treaty?
General Chilton. I don't think that it doesn't matter if the
Russians cheat. Any cheating would be taken very seriously and could
well become a politically significant issue that could lead to changes
in U.S. military posture.
As I articulated in my prepared statement, I believe that there are
three reasons why the New START agreement represents a positive step
forward. First, New START limits the number of Russian ballistic
missile warheads that can target the United States--missiles that pose
the most prompt threat to our forces and our Nation. Second, New
START's flexible limits on deployed and nondeployed delivery platforms
retain sufficient flexibility in managing our triad of deterrent forces
to hedge against both technical and geopolitical surprise. Third, New
START will reestablish a strategic nuclear arms control verification
regime that provides access to Russian nuclear forces and a measure of
predictability in Russian force deployments over the life of the
treaty.
49. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, did you agree with the
findings of the NIE?
General Chilton. The NIE on Monitoring the New START treaty
presents the IC's assessment of its ability to monitor the treaty based
on treaty verification measures and available current and projected
intelligence collection and analytic resources. I have no reason to
doubt this assessment.
50. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, do you believe this new
verification regime is sufficient to detect large-scale cheating by the
Russians over the life of the treaty?
General Chilton. Yes. Please see the classified NIE on Monitoring
the New START Treaty, published on June 30, 2010.
51. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, what do you consider to be
militarily significant cheating? In other words, how many additional
ballistic missiles and/or warheads would the Russians have to secretly
deploy to concern you: 100? 500? 1,000?
General Chilton. The military significance of a cheating or
breakout scenario depends upon its effect on the military capability of
the parties and, in particular, its effect on strategic stability. The
key to strategic stability is that each side possesses strategic
nuclear forces capable of executing a devastating second strike under
any war initiation scenario and the existence of rough parity between
the parties in strategic offensive arms. Stability in the strategic
nuclear relationship between the United States and Russian Federation
depends, therefore, upon the assured capability of each side to deliver
a sufficient number of nuclear warheads to inflict unacceptable damage
on the other side, even with an opponent attempting a disarming first
strike. Consequently, the only Russian breakout or cheating scenario
that could undermine the basic framework of mutual deterrence that
exists between the United States and Russia, is a scenario that enabled
Russia to deny the United States the assured ability to respond against
a substantial number of highly valued Russian targets following a
Russian attempt at a disarming first strike.
Our analysis has clearly demonstrated that additional Russian
warheads, even significantly above the treaty limits, would do nothing
to threaten the survivability of U.S. ballistic missile submarines at
sea or bombers when on alert. Nor would they guarantee the destruction
of all U.S. land-based ICBMs.
Therefore, Russia would not be able to achieve a militarily
significant advantage by cheating or breakout under the New START
treaty, due to the inherent survivability of the planned U.S. strategic
force structure--specifically, our SSBNs. Additional Russian warheads
above the New START treaty limits would have little to no effect on the
U.S. assured second-strike capabilities that underwrite stable
deterrence. Moreover, the United States would be capable of uploading
additional warheads on all three legs of the strategic triad in order
to restore parity in the strategic nuclear balance.
Regarding the second question, any secret Russian deployments of
any ballistic missiles or warheads in violation of New START treaty
provisions would concern me due to the political significance of
deliberate Russian cheating.
52. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, you note in your prepared
statement that when STRATCOM analyzed the required nuclear weapons and
delivery vehicle force structure, it took into account ``an assessment
of potential adversary capabilities.'' This suggests you support New
START force levels of 1,550 warheads on 700 delivery vehicles based on
a current projection of smaller Russian forces. What if the
geopolitical situation changes and the Russians cheat?
General Chilton. The New START treaty's central limits preserve the
ability of the United States to respond to geopolitical changes in a
timely and effective manner. If Russia were to attempt to gain
political advantage by cheating or breakout, the United States could
respond in several ways. Specifically:
The United States could substantially upload the
ballistic missile submarine leg of the triad with hundreds of
additional warheads, and/or send additional submarines to sea
on a routine, day-to-day basis.
The United States could also choose to return a
portion of its heavy bomber force to an alert posture. In this
posture, such heavy bombers would be capable of launch and safe
escape from their airbases within minutes of receiving a
tactical warning of an imminent Russian strike, thereby
improving their survivability. These bombers could then
contribute substantially to any U.S. nuclear response.
The United States could also upload additional ICBM
warheads on a portion of its deployed Minuteman III force, and
could choose to redeploy a limited number of additional ICBMs
and warheads in nondeployed silo launchers.
53. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, would your assessment
concerning the adequacy of U.S. nuclear forces change if the Russians
increased significantly their nuclear forces?
General Chilton. No. A number of factors were considered in
STRATCOM's analysis for the New START treaty and the NPR, including but
not limited to: employment guidance, deterrence, extended deterrence,
assurance of friends and allies, and--most pertinent to this question--
the ability to hedge against technical and geopolitical developments
based on the nuclear infrastructure.
Russia would not be able to achieve a militarily significant
advantage by cheating or breakout under the New START treaty, due to
the inherent survivability of the planned U.S. strategic force
structure--specifically, our SSBNs. Additional Russian warheads above
the New START limits would have little to no effect on the U.S. assured
second-strike capabilities that underwrite stable deterrence.
If Russia were to attempt to gain a political advantage by cheating
or breakout, the United States could respond in several ways:
The United States could substantially upload the
ballistic missile submarine leg of the triad with hundreds of
additional warheads and/or send additional submarines to sea.
The United States could also choose to return a
portion of its heavy bomber force to an alert posture. In this
posture, such heavy bombers would be capable of launch and safe
escape from their airbases within minutes after receiving
tactical warning of an imminent Russian strike, thereby
improving their survivability. These bombers could then
contribute substantially to any U.S. nuclear response.
The United States could also upload additional ICBM
warheads on a portion of its deployed Minuteman III force, and
could choose to redeploy a limited number of additional ICBMs
and warheads in nondeployed silo launchers.
54. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, what's the likelihood that we
would detect this in a timely manner?
General Chilton. Please see the NIE on Monitoring the New START
Treaty, published on June 30, 2010.
55. Senator Inhofe. General Chilton, does the verification regime
in New START permit early detection?
General Chilton. Please see the NIE on Monitoring the New START
Treaty, which was published on June 30, 2010.
multiple independent reentry vehicle
56. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller and General Chilton, you suggest it
is stabilizing for the United States to deploy only single reentry
vehicle ICBMs. Is Russia similarly deMIRVing their missiles? If not, is
that not destabilizing too?
Dr. Miller and General Chilton. Russia will determine the
composition and structure of its force posture based on its own
analyses. However, we do not anticipate that Russia will deMIRV its
ICBM force. It is important to note that MIRVed mobile ICBMs differ
from fixed, silo-based MIRVed ICBMs, because the former, when deployed
in the field, are more survivable and thus do not present a stark use
or lose as ICBMs can.
Should Russia continue employing MIRVed ICBMs in its force posture,
it will not be destabilizing because of the inherent capabilities of
the triad of systems that we deploy, and the posture in which we
maintain and operate them. The United States maintains a sizable
portion of its SSBNs at sea and its ICBM forces on alert.
For more information on Russian strategic forces, please see the
NIE on Monitoring the New START Treaty, published on June 30, 2010.
57. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller and General Chilton, wasn't START II
intended to deMIRV all land-based missiles?
Dr. Miller and General Chilton. Yes. However, the START II treaty
never entered into force.
conventionally-armed ballistic missiles
58. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller and General Chilton, if, during the
duration of the treaty, the United States deploys a conventionally-
armed ballistic missile (whether on submarine, surface ship, or bomber)
that is capable of boost glide and ballistic flight (in excess of 50
percent of its trajectory), would that be counted by the treaty limits
for strategic delivery vehicles?
Dr. Miller and General Chilton. A submarine-launched ballistic
missile (SLBM) with a range of more than 600 km that has a ballistic
trajectory over most of its flight path would meet the definition of an
SLBM under the treaty, and thus would be subject to the provisions of
the New START treaty. A submarine-launched boost-glide missile that
does not have a ballistic trajectory over most of its flight path would
not meet the definition of an SLBM under the treaty, although it would
be subject to the treaty if it used a first stage of an SLBM. In
addition, the treaty does not limit missiles launched from surface
ships or aircraft, unless such a missile is an existing type of ICBM or
SLBM. If such systems were developed and deployed by the United States
as conventional arms, the Russian Federation might seek to characterize
these missiles as a new kind of strategic offensive arm subject to the
New START treaty. However, U.S. negotiators made clear during the New
START treaty negotiations that we would not consider future, strategic-
range non-nuclear systems that do not otherwise meet the definitions of
this treaty, to be new kinds of strategic offensive arms for purposes
of the treaty.
59. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller and General Chilton, would there be
grounds for any discussion of such systems in the BCC?
Dr. Miller and General Chilton. The New START treaty, as was the
case in the START treaty, makes no distinction between nuclear or
conventionally armed missiles that meet the definitions of ICBMs or
SLBMs, or between nuclear and conventional warheads on such missiles.
Conventionally armed ICBMs or SLBMs based on existing types of ICBMs
and SLBMs listed under the New START treaty or new types of ICBMs and
SLBMs are allowed and will be counted against the limits on strategic
delivery vehicles and warheads under the treaty.
Thus, the existence of such systems and their deployment should not
lead to discussions within the BCC. Nevertheless, as expressed in Part
Six of the Protocol to the New START treaty, the parties may use the
BCC to resolve questions relating to compliance with the obligations
assumed by the parties, and, in that context, discussions related to
those systems might ensue, as they could for any other kind of
strategic delivery vehicle.
If the Russian Federation were to seek to characterize future non-
nuclear boost-glide systems, or ship-based missiles, as a new kind of
strategic offensive arm, it could raise this issue in the BCC. However,
the United States made clear during the New START treaty negotiations
that we would not consider future, strategic range, non-nuclear systems
that do not otherwise meet the definitions of the treaty to be new
kinds of strategic offensive arms for purposes of the treaty.
60. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller and General Chilton, would it matter
if the missile only had a 1,000-mile range?
Dr. Miller and General Chilton. Ground-launched ballistic missiles
with a range of 1,000 miles are prohibited by the Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. A 1,000-mile range SLBM would be subject
to the New START treaty if it met the treaty definition of a ballistic
missile, meaning that it flew a ballistic trajectory over most of its
flight path. A 1,000-mile range conventionally-armed surface ship-
launched or air-launched ballistic missile would not meet the
definition of an ICBM or SLBM and therefore would not be subject to the
treaty as an existing kind of strategic offensive arm, although either
party could raise the issue of whether it were a new kind of strategic
offensive arm. U.S. negotiators made clear during the New START treaty
negotiations that the United States would not consider future,
strategic-range non-nuclear systems, which do not otherwise meet the
definitions of systems limited by the New START treaty, to be new kinds
of strategic offense arms for the purposes of the treaty.
61. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller and General Chilton, what if it had
a 21-inch or 36- to 40-inch diameter?
Dr. Miller and General Chilton. The dimensions of a ballistic
missile do not determine whether it is subject to the treaty. The only
issue which could turn on missile dimensions is whether the missile was
an existing type of ICBM and SLBM. In this case, none of the dimensions
mentioned in the question would result in a missile being classified as
an existing type of ICBM or SLBM. The accountability of small ballistic
missiles under the New START treaty would depend upon their range,
flight profile, and launch mode.
62. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller and General Chilton, would it make
any difference if it were launched from a vertical launching system
tube?
Dr. Miller and General Chilton. Whether a missile is launched from
a vertical or horizontal tube is immaterial. A missile is accountable
under the treaty if it meets the definition of items that are limited
and, in the context of a deployed launcher, is launched from a type of
launcher that is constrained by the treaty. The precise configuration
of the launcher does not matter as long as the launcher meets the
treaty definition of an ICBM or SLBM launcher.
verification provisions
63. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, is the verification in the treaty
adequate to give us the same understanding of new Russian systems as we
have of current Russian systems thanks to START I?
Dr. Miller. As Secretary Gates has testified, one of the greatest
contributions of this treaty is its strong verification regime, which
will increase transparency and confidence in the numbers and status of
Russian nuclear forces, without imposing significant burdens on our
ability to operate U.S. nuclear forces. Like START, the New START
verification regime includes: short notice, onsite inspections to
confirm data; a comprehensive, updated database; notifications
pertaining to the movements between facilities and changes in the
status of strategic offensive arms; use of unique identifiers;
provisions against interference with national technical means; and the
establishment of a BCC. Further, building on over 15 years of
experience with inspections under the previous START treaty, the New
START inspection procedures were designed to include provisions
addressing issues which arose during implementation of START's complex
inspection and verification provisions.
Please see the NIE on Monitoring the New START Treaty for
additional information and analysis.
64. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, how important is it we get
telemetry of new Russian missile tests in order to understand the
capabilities of those systems?
Dr. Miller. There are no obligations, prohibitions, or limitations
in the New START treaty that require the analysis of telemetric
information in order to verify a party's compliance with the treaty.
Nevertheless, the United States and Russia agreed to exchange
telemetric information on an equal number of launches (up to five) of
ICBMs and SLBMs each year, with the testing party deciding the launches
for which it will exchange information, to promote transparency and
predictability. The value of such exchanges will depend on the specific
launches for which telemetric information is exchanged.
For more discussion about the purpose served by telemetry for
intelligence collection, please see the classified NIE on the IC's
ability to monitor the New START treaty.
65. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, how valuable, from an intelligence
collection perspective, is the telemetry information that we will
supply to the Russians?
Dr. Miller. Since there are no specific obligations, prohibitions,
or limitations in the New START treaty that would require the analysis
of telemetric information in order to verify a party's compliance with
the treaty, the role of telemetry under the New START treaty is to
promote transparency and predictability. The parties have agreed to
allow for the exchange of telemetric information on an agreed equal
number (up to five annually) of launches of ICBMs and SLBMs, with the
testing party deciding the launches on which it will exchange
information. For the missiles on which telemetry is exchanged,
telemetry can provide information on technical characteristics of new
or modified missiles such as their launch weight or throw-weight.
Consequently, while the telemetry on the launches of existing types of
ICBMs and SLBMs provided to the Russians under New START may be useful
to them in assessing the reliability and performance of the Minuteman
III ICBM and Trident II/D5 SLBM, it is unlikely to provide any
particularly valuable new information on these systems.
66. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, would U.S. security be enhanced by
not transmitting and encrypting that information?
Dr. Miller. The alternative to broadcasting telemetry would be to
record the telemetric data within a capsule onboard the front section
of the missile and then recover the ejected capsule following
completion of the launch. The United States would prefer not to employ
this technically difficult and costly encapsulation approach, and sees
benefits in terms of transparency and predictability in the exchange of
some telemetric information. Under New START, the parties will agree on
the number of launches--up to five each year--for which telemetry is
provided to the other party. With the exception of these launches, the
United States will have the right to encrypt the telemetry on all other
launches. Even for launches for which the unencrypted telemetry is
provided, this openness will not apply to telemetry regarding the
operation of reentry vehicles or other objects installed on the missile
for the purpose of being delivered into the upper atmosphere or space,
which could be encrypted if there were a reason to do so.
67. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, do the same answers apply for
potential U.S. follow-on systems?
Dr. Miller. Yes.
68. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, if the Russians adopt a policy of
denying the U.S. telemetry on their new systems deployed during the
duration of the New START treaty, would we adopt the same policy? If
not, why not?
Dr. Miller. The United States does not currently plan to develop a
new ICBM or SLBM during the coming decade. Hence, no such decision will
be needed.
69. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, the DOS verification assessment
takes a rather narrow approach to determining the potential effects of
Russian cheating under the treaty when it states that such cheating
would have ``little or any effect on the assured second-strike
capabilities of U.S. strategic forces.'' What other potential strategic
or political consequences could result from various levels of Russian
cheating?
Dr. Miller. Russia will not be able to achieve militarily
significant cheating under the New START treaty due to both the
treaty's verification regime and the inherent survivability and
flexibility of planned U.S. force structure. If Russia were to attempt
to gain political advantage by substantially expanding the number of
warheads deployed on its strategic nuclear forces above the treaty's
warhead limit, the United States will be able to respond rapidly by
increasing the alert levels of SSBNs and bombers, and by uploading
additional warheads on ICBMs, SLBMs, and bombers. Therefore, the
survivable and flexible U.S. strategic posture planned under the New
START treaty will help deter any future Russian leaders from cheating
or breakout from the treaty, should they ever have such an inclination.
This does not mean that Russian compliance with the New START
treaty is unimportant. The United States expects Russia to comply fully
with the treaty, and the United States will use all elements of the
verification regime--along with all available intelligence means--to
ensure that this is the case. Any Russian cheating could affect the
sustainability of the New START treaty, the viability of future arms
control agreements, and the ability of the United States and Russia to
work together on other issues. Should there be any signs of Russian
cheating or preparations to breakout from the treaty, the executive
branch would immediately raise this matter through diplomatic channels,
and if not resolved, raise it immediately to higher levels. The Senate
would also be kept informed of such actions.
70. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, did the Russians use shrouds on
their ballistic missiles that limited our ability to confirm the number
of warheads on a given missile under START I?
Dr. Miller. In some cases, oversized Russian reentry vehicle covers
and their method of emplacement hampered U.S. inspectors from
ascertaining that the front section of the ICBMs and SLBMs being
inspected contained no more reentry vehicles than the number of
warheads attributed to a missile of that type under the START treaty.
Following discussions and the implementation of new procedures worked
out at the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission, many of these
reentry vehicle cover-related issues were resolved during the life of
the START treaty.
71. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, if they continue this practice
under the new treaty, is that more or less significant given that under
this treaty we are supposed to actually count warheads?
Dr. Miller. All potential compliance issues regarding reentry
vehicle (RV) covers were considered to be significant under the START
treaty and will continue to be viewed as significant under the New
START treaty. The New START treaty, like the START treaty, establishes
the inspected party's right to cover RVs and other equipment with
individual covers, but with the caveat that such covers must not hamper
inspectors in accurately confirming that the number of RVs emplaced on
a front section matches the declaration for that missile (or for START,
that the number of RVs emplaced does not exceed the attributed number
for that type of missile). These provisions are intended to ensure that
covers are not used in such a manner that would obscure the actual
number of reentry vehicles on a front section. Under the New START
treaty, the verification task is to determine the actual number of
reentry vehicles emplaced on a missile selected for inspection, whereas
under the START treaty the verification task was to confirm that there
were no more than the attributed number of reentry vehicles for a given
missile type.
Please see the NIE, published on June 30, 2010, on Monitoring the
New START Treaty for additional information on this topic.
72. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, according to open source reporting,
the Russians are deploying a new 5,000 km nuclear-capable cruise
missile on a new class of submarines. Is that a tactical or strategic
nuclear weapon?
Dr. Miller. Long-range, nuclear-armed, submarine-launched cruise
missiles traditionally have been regarded as non-strategic/tactical
rather than strategic weapons and have not been limited or reduced
under any of the U.S.-Russia strategic arms reduction and limitation
treaties.
73. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, don't we need better verification
at lower levels than we needed at higher force levels?
Dr. Miller. Effective verification measures have been and will be
needed regardless of the level of the limits in the strategic arms
limitation and reduction treaty. The START treaty's verification regime
was tailored to the specific obligations of the START treaty, while the
New START treaty verification provisions are tailored to the specific
obligations of the new treaty. The New START treaty's verification
regime was designed to be effective while reducing the implementation
costs and the disruption to operations at U.S. and Russian military
facilities subject to the treaty.
74. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, both sides will have significant
upload capability under this treaty. Have you considered whether in a
crisis, the sides might get into a competitive uploading dynamic and
might that not be destabilizing?
Dr. Miller. Any Russian uploading that resulted in breaking the
treaty's limit on warheads on deployed strategic delivery vehicles,
while not having military significance due to the inherent
survivability of U.S. forces and particularly at-sea SSBNs, would be of
significant political concern. If the United States decided to upload
its missiles in response, we could do so in a manner that minimized the
vulnerability of U.S. forces, for example by uploading one SSBN at a
time, and/or by placing bombers on strip alert to increase the number
of second-strike weapons for the United States. Both the United States
and Russia could load heavy bombers with nuclear armaments during a
much shorter period of time than required for uploading ICBMs and
SLBMs; furthermore, such loading is legal and would not affect the
number of warheads counted under the New START warhead limit. The
loading out of heavy bombers on one or both sides and the placement of
these bombers on strip alert would certainly be noteworthy and a
powerful signal of increased force readiness during a major crisis.
Given the fact that relatively slow flying bombers (when compared to
ballistic missiles) are not well-suited to play a central role in a
would-be disarming first strike, uploading of these systems would, in
my view, not be destabilizing.
75. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, is the United States assured of
timely and accurate warning if the Russians were to move quickly to
attempt large scale breakout of the treaty in a crisis?
Dr. Miller. On the IC's monitoring confidences regarding detection
and thus the warning of any large-scale Russian breakout from the New
START treaty, see the NIE.
However, should there be any signs of Russian cheating or
preparations to breakout from the treaty, the executive branch would
immediately raise this matter through diplomatic channels, and if not
resolved, raise it immediately to higher levels. We would also keep the
Senate informed.
76. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, the DOS verification assessment
suggests that this is a moot question because our nuclear deterrent
would not be affected even by large scale Russian cheating. Do you
agree? If so, then does this not raise the fundamental question of
whether this treaty has any real value?
Dr. Miller. The assessment of the Secretary of Defense, the
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, the Joint Chiefs, and the Commander,
STRATCOM is that Russia will not be able to achieve militarily
significant cheating or breakout under New START, due to both the New
START verification regime and the inherent survivability and
flexibility of the planned U.S. strategic force structure. This is
consistent with the DOS verification assessment.
The United States, however, would take any signs of Russian
cheating or breakout from the treaty very seriously. Should there be
any signs of Russian cheating or preparations to breakout, the
executive branch would immediately raise this matter through diplomatic
channels, and if not resolved, raise it immediately to higher levels.
We would also keep the Senate informed.
None of this lessens the value of this treaty to U.S. security. As
the Secretary of Defense and many other senior leaders from across the
administration have said, the United States is better off with this
treaty than without it. Without the treaty's verification measures, the
United States would have much less insight into Russian strategic
forces, thereby requiring our military to plan based on worst-case
assumptions. This would be an expensive and potentially destabilizing
approach that this nation should not accept.
77. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, has NNSA fully committed to support
full production of the W76-1 life extension warheads to meet all DOD
requirements? If not, when do you expect that to occur?
Dr. Miller. NNSA has fully committed to complete the planned W76-1
LEP in order to meet DOD requirements. However, the recent flood at the
Pantex production facility may affect the schedule. NNSA's ability to
meet those commitments will also be directly dependent upon full
funding of the President's fiscal year 2011 budget request and
continuing support of this program during the full production period.
78. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, has there been a negotiation of
those requirements based upon a perceived inability of NNSA to obtain
full and adequate funding?
Dr. Miller. No. DOD requirements for the W76-1 are based on the
needs to meet the requirements of the commander of STRATCOM. The
President's fiscal year 2011 NNSA budget request is adequate to support
W76-1 production requirements.
79. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, what is the status of the force
structure and the resultant Nuclear Weapon Stockpile Plan (NWSP)?
Dr. Miller. DOD outlined the baseline force structure under New
START in the section 1251 report to Congress ``New START Framework and
Nuclear Force Structure Plans.'' As stated in that report, the United
States retains the right to modify our force structure as appropriate
under the treaty. The NWSP is in development as a part of the Nuclear
Weapons Stockpile Memorandum to the President and the Requirements
Planning Document that is due to be voted on by the Nuclear Weapons
Council (NWC) soon. Once approved by the NWC, the package will be
forwarded to the President for his approval.
80. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, if the U.S. deploys conventional
prompt strike assets that are not accountable per the treaty (e.g.
boost glide), is the United States prohibited from utilizing that
technology for nuclear delivery?
Dr. Miller. No. If a strategic-range hypersonic boost glide system
were developed for nuclear warhead delivery, it could be viewed as a
new kind of strategic offensive arm that would be subject to the
provisions of the New START treaty. As such, it would be subject to
discussion and possible agreement in the BCC that it be made subject to
the treaty.
81. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, if Russia develops a nuclear boost
glide system, could U.S. conventional forces then be accountable?
Dr. Miller. A nuclear-armed hypersonic boost glide system, despite
the fact that it did not meet the definition of an ICBM or SLBM under
the New START treaty could be subject to the treaty, as a new kind of
strategic offensive arm, irrespective of which party develops it. This
matter would be discussed within the BCC. As stated previously and
during negotiations with Russia, the United States would not consider
any future, strategic range non-nuclear systems that do not otherwise
meet the definitions of this treaty to be new kinds of strategic
offensive arms for purposes of the treaty.
82. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, you say that one option to respond
to Russian cheating is that we could quickly upload our own delivery
systems. How quickly could we do that? Please respond with a minimum
and maximum possible time period for upload for each nuclear delivery
system the United States will deploy during the life of the treaty.
Dr. Miller. At the unclassified level, I can say that upload time
for various systems would be days, months, or a few years. Upload time
could be affected by weather, safety, and security considerations and
the need to sustain a survivable deterrent capability while uploading
operations were underway. A classified answer will be provided
separately.
[Deleted.]
83. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, will the United States maintain
enough nondeployed warheads (and ALCMs and associated warheads) during
the life of the treaty to fully upload (to maximum capacity) each U.S.
delivery system?
Dr. Miller. As stated in the Report of the 2010 NPR, the United
States will retain the ability to upload some nuclear warheads as a
technical hedge against any future problems or as a result of a
fundamental deterioration of the security environment. The United
States does not need to maintain enough nondeployed warheads to fully
upload every single U.S. delivery system in order to effectively hedge
against technical or geopolitical surprise, but will retain a
substantial upload capacity.
84. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, can the United States upload
without the Russians realizing we were uploading?
Dr. Miller. [Deleted.]
85. Senator Inhofe. Dr. Miller, please specify the minimum and
maximum possible time periods during which deployments outside of that
permissible by the treaty could be conclusively determined to be
cheating at the following cheating levels:
Tens of warheads on submarines
Tens of warheads on bombers
Tens of warheads on ballistic missiles (mobile and
stationary)
Hundreds of warheads on submarines
Hundreds of warheads on bombers
Hundreds of warheads on ballistic missiles (mobile and
stationary)
Dr. Miller. Please see the classified NIE on the IC's ability to
monitor the New START treaty.
nnsa budget comparisons
86. Senator Inhofe. Mr. D'Agostino, why is the fiscal year 2012
NNSA budget flat when compared to fiscal year 2011 (negative if you
consider inflation)?
Mr. D'Agostino. The President's fiscal year 2011 budget request
includes an increase of more than 10 percent for NNSA's weapons
activities. This reflects an unprecedented commitment to modernizing
our nuclear security infrastructure, revitalizing the science and
technology at its core, and restoring the human capital required to
accomplish our mission. In addition, the President has offered a plan
for the next 10 years that includes $80 billion in critical
investments, up from roughly $60 billion over the previous decade.
These figures represent our understanding at the time the fiscal year
2011 budget request was submitted to Congress of what is required to
implement the NPR and maintain the safety, security, and effectiveness
of our nuclear stockpile without a resumption of underground nuclear
testing. As each month passes, our understanding matures as to what is
required to execute the NPR requirements. Because the NPR was completed
after the release of the fiscal year 2011 budget request, these
evolving insights into execution requirements will inform and have an
impact on the fiscal year 2012 request and the associated FYNSP.
87. Senator Inhofe. Mr. D'Agostino, why is the fiscal year 2013
budget essentially flat when compared to fiscal year 2011?
Mr. D'Agostino. The FYNSP included in the President's fiscal year
2011 budget request represents our understanding at the time the fiscal
year 2011 budget request was submitted to Congress of what is required
to implement the NPR and maintain the safety, security, and
effectiveness of our nuclear stockpile without a resumption of
underground nuclear testing. It includes an annual increase of more
than 10 percent for NNSA's weapons activities. In addition, the
President has outlined his plan to invest $80 billion over the next
decade to modernize our nuclear security infrastructure, up from
roughly $60 billion over the previous decade. This reflects an
unprecedented commitment to modernizing our nuclear security
infrastructure, revitalizing the science and technology at its core,
and restoring the human capital required to accomplish our mission. As
each month passes, our understanding matures as to what is required to
execute the NPR requirements. Because the NPR was completed after the
release of the fiscal year 2011 budget request, these evolving insights
into execution requirements will inform and have an impact on the
fiscal year 2012 and fiscal year 2013 request and the associated FYNSP.
88. Senator Inhofe. Mr. D'Agostino, were these budget estimates
placeholders that you intend to adjust upwards prior to the next budget
request (fiscal year 2012), reflecting a continued commitment to
improving the science and technology research necessary to sustain our
current stockpile until infrastructure improvements are reached?
Mr. D'Agostino. The funding requirements identified to date
represent the most complete view of our needs at the time the fiscal
year 2011 budget request was submitted to Congress. It includes a
significant increase in the science, technology, and engineering that
underpin our nuclear deterrent. As each month passes, our understanding
matures as to what is required to execute the NPR requirements. Because
the NPR was completed after the release of the fiscal year 2011 budget
request, these evolving insights into execution requirements will
inform and have an impact on the fiscal year 2012 request and the
associated FYNSP.
stockpile stewardship management program
89. Senator Inhofe. Mr. D'Agostino, is the plan outlined in the
1251 report and the Stockpile Stewardship Management Program (SSMP)
sufficient to produce the number of W76-1 life extension warheads
needed to meet DOD requirements?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes.
90. Senator Inhofe. Mr. D'Agostino, what is the status of the NWSP?
Mr. D'Agostino. The fiscal years 2011-2017 NWSP, due to the
President by September 30, 2010, is currently in the second stage of
coordination in the NWC. The final stage requests the signatures of the
Secretaries of Defense and Energy prior to release of the document to
the National Security Council. The most current NWSP is one signed by
the President in 2008 covering stockpile numbers for fiscal years 2009-
2014 and is commonly referred to as National Security Presidential
Directive 68. The Departments of Defense and Energy collaboratively
decided to forego sending the NWSP originally due to the President in
September 2009 in anticipation of changes that would be made as part of
the NPR and the New START treaty. The draft NWSP now with the NWC will
be consistent with the stockpile numbers contained in the SSMP and the
section 1251 report.
91. Senator Inhofe. Mr. D'Agostino, does that plan align with the
1251 report and the SSMP?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes. The draft NWSP now with the NWC will be
consistent with the stockpile numbers contained in the SSMP and the
section 1251 report.
92. Senator Inhofe. Mr. D'Agostino, will disconnects between the
NWSP and the SSMP be resolved through an increased budget request
starting in fiscal year 2012?
Mr. D'Agostino. The NWSP and the SSMP were informed by the
requirements that were developed in the NPR and are therefore in
alignment. The NNSA will continue to provide the President with
executable resource requirements that will support the President's
vision as he develops his future budget requests for Congress.
93. Senator Inhofe. Mr. D'Agostino, would you please provide a
detailed site-by-site breakdown on Readiness in the Technical Base and
Facilities (RTBF) (operations and facilities construction and
maintenance) for the period fiscal year 2008 to fiscal year 2018?
Mr. D'Agostino. A detailed RTBF operations and maintenance and
construction breakdown by site is provided in the attached table for
fiscal years 2008 through 2015. A site-by-site breakdown has not yet
been determined for fiscal years 2016 through 2018.
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
94. Senator Inhofe. Mr. D'Agostino, the fiscal year 2011
President's budget was prepared well in advance of the NPR, the 1251
plan report, and the SSMP. In fact, the budgeting process for fiscal
year 2011 was initiated long before a national commitment to
modernizing our nuclear weapons infrastructure was certain. And it is
apparent, after listening to the testimony of the national laboratory
directors last week, that there are uncertainties in the budget plan,
especially beyond fiscal year 2011. Dr. Anastasio expressed concerns
over pension requirements, for example. Other issues likely exist
across the complex. Are you aware of these issues, and do you agree
that there is a risk to execution of infrastructure modernization and
operations accounts as a result of these issues?
Mr. D'Agostino. Although the budgeting process did start before the
NPR was completed, NNSA's fiscal year 2011 budget request was guided by
analysis undertaken in the early stages of the NPR process. It also
reflects a then-emerging bipartisan national consensus on the need to
modernize our nuclear security infrastructure, revitalize the science
and technology at its core, and restore the critical human capital
required to support our mission. This emerging consensus was most
significantly reflected in the final report of the bipartisan
Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the United States
(also known as the Perry-Schlesinger Commission), many of whose
conclusions were both incorporated into the NPR and accounted for in
the fiscal year 2011 President's budget request. As each month passes,
our understanding matures as to what is required to execute the NPR
requirements. These evolving insights into execution requirements will
inform and have an impact on the fiscal year 2012 request and the
associated FYNSP.
Relative to managing risk, I would not support a budget that did
not ensure the safety, security, and effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear
weapons deterrent. If the President's request for fiscal year 2011 and
the FYNSP is approved, the Nation will end a multi-year downward
funding trajectory and moderate significantly the risks that have had
to be absorbed as a consequence. In this regard, the President's
commitments to maintaining a strong deterrent, coupled with a major
reinvestment strategy, represent a significant turning point for the
Nuclear Security Enterprise and will put it on a well-defined path.
95. Senator Inhofe. Mr. D'Agostino, at a minimum, would you agree
that the near-term budget in the SSMP and the 1251 plan has risks that
could be addressed through additional funding?
Mr. D'Agostino. The fiscal years 2011-2015 FYNSP was shaped by the
NNSA's assessment of the ability of the Nuclear Security Enterprise to
efficiently ramp-up within the constraints of time, capacity, and
capability to spend increased funds to redress mission shortfalls. It
reflects what is required and what is executable. The funding
requirements identified to date represent the most complete view of our
needs. When major efforts called for by the NPR and the President
mature further, and validated baseline cost estimates become available,
we will revisit our long-term projections.
96. Senator Inhofe. Mr. D'Agostino, do you believe that the 1251
plan is flexible? In other words, does NNSA have the latitude to
prepare an fiscal year 2012 budget that exceeds that shown in the 1251
plan and the SSMP, to accommodate these future problems we are hearing
about?
Mr. D'Agostino. We continuously evaluate our requirements and needs
for resources. The fiscal year 2011 President's budget represents our
best current estimate of what funding is required for the next decade
to accomplish the requirements of the NPR and support the stockpile
described in the section 1251 report. We have already acknowledged the
potential for these budget figures to change due to the lack of
approved baselines for a number of major facilities such as the UPF and
the CMRR Nuclear Facility, and for several LEPs, such as the B61 and
W78. As our planning for these and other activities proceeds and our
estimates for their costs mature, modifications of the numbers found in
the section 1251 report may be necessary.
science vs. near-term deliverables
97. Senator Inhofe. Mr. D'Agostino, Los Alamos Director Michael
Anastasio testified last week that, ``there has been a history of
having an imbalance in the program and that we've sacrificed the
science to the near-term deliverables.'' Do you concur that this has
happened in the past?
Mr. D'Agostino. Certainly, there have been periods of time in the
past when certain aspects of the Nuclear Security Enterprise have not
been fully funded as a result of difficult decisions that had to be
made to balance near-term needs with long-term imperatives.
Nevertheless, we have been successful to this point in sustaining a
safe, secure, and effective deterrent. Now, with a new consensus on the
future of the stockpile and the Nuclear Security Enterprise that
underpins it, as outlined in the NPR, the fiscal years 2011-2015 FYNSP,
submitted as part of the President's budget, provides a newly balanced
approach that sustains the stockpile, preserves the enabling science,
technology, and engineering foundations, and modernizes the necessary
infrastructure as envisioned by the President.
98. Senator Inhofe. Mr. D'Agostino, how is this addressed in future
budgets?
Mr. D'Agostino. The President's fiscal year 2011 budget proposal
initiates a multi-year investment plan with substantial budget
increases to extend the life of the stockpile, redress shortfalls for
stockpile surveillance activities and stockpile certification through
investments in the science, technology, and engineering base, and
maintain and modernize the supporting infrastructure. The fiscal years
2011-2015 budget request is necessary and executable based on the
requirements and the ability of the Nuclear Security Enterprise to ramp
up efficiently within the constraints of time, capacity, and capability
to spend increased funds.
99. Senator Inhofe. Mr. D'Agostino, do you agree with Director
Anastasio's follow-up statement about the uncertainty of life extension
and facility construction costs, ``And so you would want to be able to
expect that, as those baselines are adjusted to the realities that you
have, then you'd like to be able to adjust the budget to that, as
well''?
Mr. D'Agostino. Any long-term plan needs to remain flexible as new
information and data become available and circumstances change. I
believe that our fiscal year 2011 SSMP reflects what is required today
and what is executable. As some of our major endeavors outlined in this
plan become better defined, and their baseline cost estimates are fully
validated, we will revisit our projections. Funding requirements
identified to date represent the most complete view of needs until
these projects reach validation stages. Future budget requests may need
to be adjusted from what we envision today.
100. Senator Inhofe. Mr. D'Agostino, are you prepared to adjust the
fiscal year 2012 budget to fully reflect the requirements articulated
in the 1251 plan, the SSMP, and other emerging issues in the complex?
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, if needed to address any unanticipated
requirements. The funding requirements identified to date represent the
most complete view of needs until we have validated the requirements
for B61 and W78 LEPs and the two material processing facilities: the
CMRR Nuclear Facility and the UPF. Validated baselines may drive a
different out-year view of requirements.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Thune
section 1251 report
101. Senator Thune. Dr. Miller, when you were before this committee
in April testifying about the NPR, you stated to me that the 1251
report would provide a specific force structure concerning the triad of
nuclear delivery vehicles. However, as I told Secretary Gates when he
was here last month, the 1251 report provides a very troubling lack of
specificity concerning force structure. Specifically, the
administration's factsheet on the section 1251 report explains that the
U.S. nuclear force structure under this treaty could comprise up to 420
ICBMs, 240 SLBMs, and 60 bombers. Since deployments at the maximum
level of all three legs of the triad under that explanation add up to
720 delivery vehicles, it is mathematically impossible for the United
States to make such a deployment and be in compliance with the treaty's
limit of 700 deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Clearly,
significant additional decisions need to be made with respect to U.S.
force structure under this treaty. Therefore, as I told Secretary Gates
last month, I would be very reluctant to cast a vote in favor of this
treaty without being fully briefed in more precise detail to my
satisfaction about the plans for our nuclear delivery vehicle force
structure. Where will the reduction of 20 vehicles come from in order
to get to 700 total deployed delivery vehicles required by this treaty?
Dr. Miller. The reduction of 20 strategic delivery vehicles that
you mention will come from ICBMs and/or bombers. The New START treaty
allows each side 7 years to reach its treaty-compliant force structure,
and to modify it over the life of the treaty. Additional decisions are
required to meet the 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicle limit of
New START. The final decisions will be made during the 7 years of
implementation as the Services study modernization, sustainment, and
operation of the nuclear forces.
102. Senator Thune. Dr. Miller, will the administration provide a
classified briefing to concerned Members on the specific planned force
structure for deployed nuclear delivery vehicles?
Dr. Miller. Yes. This classified briefing to Members on the planned
U.S. strategic force structure under New START was provided on July 29,
2010.
103. Senator Thune. Dr. Miller, my understanding is that an ICBM-
based PGS platform would be counted against the 700 deployed delivery
vehicles. If we decide to develop that system, which of the three legs
of the triad would be further reduced to accommodate it?
Dr. Miller. No decision regarding a PGS system has been taken and
cannot be taken before other decisions are made about what type of
conventional long-range strike capabilities are useful and available
during the period that the New START treaty is in force. A variety of
PGS systems are being assessed within the Long-Range Strike Study that
is to be completed this fall. The New START treaty provides flexibility
to each party to determine its own strategic force structure. As
stipulated in the report submitted with the New START treaty pursuant
to section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2010, the United States will pursue a future force structure under
the New START treaty that will preserve adequate flexibility, including
possible accountable CPGS systems currently under study by DOD. In
addition, NPR analysis concluded that New START treaty delivery vehicle
and strategic warhead limits allowed retention of a margin above the
minimum required nuclear force structure for the possible addition of
non-nuclear prompt-global strike capabilities (conventionally-armed
ICBMs or SLBMs) that would be accountable under the treaty.
If the United States decides to develop a PGS system that would be
accountable under New START, the Joint Chiefs and the Secretary of
Defense agree that it should involve small numbers of strategic
delivery vehicles. Under the baseline plan summarized in the section
1251 report, ``New START Framework and Nuclear Force Structure Plans,''
to Congress, the United States will retain 240 deployed SLBMs, up to 60
heavy bombers, and up to 420 deployed ICBMs under New START. Given the
7-year implementation period of the treaty, and each side's freedom to
select its desired force structure and change it over time, decisions
about changes involving small numbers of the 700 permitted deployed
strategic delivery vehicles should be made after such a decision to
deploy these systems.
104. Senator Thune. Dr. Miller, what is your estimate of how the
Russians will configure their strategic forces under New START?
Dr. Miller. This topic is addressed in the NIE on Monitoring the
New START Treaty, which was provided to the Senate on June 30, 2010.
105. Senator Thune. Dr. Miller, what impact, if any, should that
have on the way the President has decided to configure ours?
Dr. Miller. The United States will continue to configure and
posture its forces to maintain the overall force's combined qualities
of survivability, responsiveness, flexibility, and effectiveness for
both large-scale and limited contingencies. We do not anticipate
significant alterations as being necessary due to any Russian changes,
because U.S. forces have been developed and deployed to minimize their
sensitivity to changes in other nations' force postures.
funding for nuclear force structure modernization
106. Senator Thune. Dr. Miller, your prepared statement indicates
the administration will invest $100 billion over the next decade in
nuclear delivery systems. About $30 billion of this total will go
toward development and acquisition of a new strategic submarine.
According to estimates by STRATCOM, the cost of maintaining our current
dedicated nuclear forces is approximately $5.6 billion per year or $56
billion over the decade. This leaves roughly $14 billion of the $100
billion the administration intends to invest--even less if you factor
in inflation. This $14 billion is not nearly sufficient to develop and
acquire a next generation bomber, a follow-on ICBM, a follow-on ALCM,
and develop a CPGS capability. In light of these figures, and the fact
that you have yet to make additional modernization decisions, why do
you believe $100 billion is a sufficient investment in our delivery
systems over the next decade?
Dr. Miller. The estimated investment of well over $100 billion for
strategic delivery vehicles over the next decade, provided in the
section 1251 report, represents a best-estimate of costs associated
with deployed systems and programs underway and planned. This estimate
does not include all of the costs associated with potential future
modernization programs. DOD is currently studying long-range strike
options, including future bomber requirements and PGS systems, and is
also initiating an AoA for a follow-on, nuclear-capable ALCM. Studies
regarding a possible follow-on ICBM will be initiated in 2011-2012.
Therefore, costs associated with any future program decisions on these
systems would be additive to the estimate of well over $100 billion in
the section 1251 report.
107. Senator Thune. Dr. Miller, why didn't you make a decision to
pursue these programs in the 1251 report?
Dr. Miller. As stated in the one-page unclassified summary of the
1251 report, the administration intends to invest well over $100
billion in modernizing strategic delivery systems. Alternatives for a
follow-on bomber are being developed in the ongoing Long Range Strike
Study for consideration with the President's fiscal year 2012 budget.
An AoA on the follow-on nuclear-armed ALCM is currently underway.
Although a decision on any follow-on ICBM is not needed for several
years, studies to inform that decision will begin in fiscal years 2011
and 2012. The studies and development programs for these systems will
consider a range of possible options, with the objective of defining a
cost-effective approach that supports continued reductions in U.S.
nuclear weapons while promoting stable deterrence.
108. Senator Thune. Dr. Miller, is there a chance the
administration could decide against a new bomber, ALCM, or follow-on
ICBM?
Dr. Miller. While I will not speculate regarding future decisions,
the Department and the administration support a strong triad under the
New START treaty, and we are committed to making necessary investments
for both delivery systems and the nuclear weapons complex. It is worth
noting that the investments needed to sustain the U.S. nuclear arsenal
and nuclear weapons complex under New START and beyond will be the work
of multiple administrations and congresses.
109. Senator Thune. Dr. Miller, how do we know the administration
will pursue these programs?
Dr. Miller. The NPR, the section 1251 report, ``New START Framework
and Nuclear Force Structure Plans,'' to Congress, and our budget
requests clearly outline the commitment of the executive branch to
sustain an effective nuclear deterrent for the long-term and New START
preserves our ability to do so. Today's Minuteman III ICBMs will be
sustained until 2030 as directed by Congress, nuclear-capable B-52Hs
can be sustained to the 2030s, and B-2As to the 2040s. Analysis of any
follow-on ICBM will start in fiscal year 2011. There is time to do this
analysis, and given both the resources and military capabilities
involved, an imperative to make well-informed decisions at the
appropriate time.
DOD plans to invest well over $100 billion over the next decade to
sustain existing strategic delivery systems capabilities and modernize
strategic systems. The fiscal year 2011 budget request and future year
program plans reflect a decision to proceed with the SSBN(X) to replace
the current Ohio-class strategic submarines starting in the late 2020s,
to sustain Minuteman III ICBMs until 2030 as directed by Congress, and
to sustain dual-capable B-52H and B-2 bombers until at least 2035 and
2040, respectively. The DOD is currently conducting an AoA for the next
ALCM, and will initiate study of options for a follow-on ICBM in 2011-
2012.
Finally, DOD is currently studying the appropriate long-term mix of
long-range strike capabilities, including alternatives for a follow-on
heavy bomber as well as non-nuclear PGS systems, in follow-on analysis
to the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review and the NPR; the results of this
ongoing work will be reflected in the Department's fiscal year 2012
budget submission.
nuclear bomber force
110. Senator Thune. Dr. Miller and General Chilton, according to
the most recent briefs I have seen, DOD expects the current nuclear
bomber force to remain in service through 2040. Thirty more years is a
long time for a bomber that was built 50 years ago. Proponents of this
plan say they can last that long with upgrades. However, physically
remaining in service is significantly different than remaining
survivable in a future high threat combat scenario. Since the NPR
recognizes the need for a triad, what is your plan to replace the aging
nuclear bomber force so that the nuclear triad stays survivable in the
future?
Dr. Miller. As outlined in the NPR, the Department will maintain a
nuclear triad under New START. Accordingly, the Air Force will retain
the B-52 in its inventory through 2035 and beyond to continue to meet
both nuclear and conventional mission requirements and is investing
approximately $14.3 billion for fiscal year 2010 through fiscal year
2020 to modernize and sustain the B-52. In addition, DOD will invest
approximately $12.5 billion for fiscal year 2011 through fiscal year
2020 to sustain and modernize the B-2 bomber. These enhancements will
help sustain its survivability and improve mission effectiveness.
Further, the Air Force is commencing an AoA on the long-range standoff
cruise missile while DOD completes its study on long-range strike
systems that includes consideration of alternatives for a future bomber
in time to inform the fiscal year 2012 President's budget.
General Chilton. I agree that the capabilities of the triad need to
be sustained and recapitalized. To that end, STRATCOM is supporting the
DOD's studies to identify the investments necessary for long range
strike. The Long Range Strike Front End Assessment will help identify
the investments necessary to field the family of systems necessary to
retain effective deterrent and strike capabilities for the future. In
addition, STRATCOM is actively supporting the Long-Range Stand-Off AoA
to provide for the replacement of the current ALCM. The current plan to
develop the next generation cruise missile along with the sustainment
of the current ALCM, and warhead to the year 2030 will allow for a
smooth transition in the mid-2020's timeframe. Finally, with the
expected retirement of the B-52 in the 2040 timeframe, the decision for
its recapitalization will need to be addressed in the early to mid
2020s.
delivery vehicle thresholds
111. Senator Thune. Dr. Miller and General Chilton, during
testimony before this committee last July, General Cartwright expressed
the view that he would be very concerned about the viability of the
triad if we got below 800 deployed delivery vehicles. The New START
establishes a level of 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles. I note
that General Cartwright stated this concern after the NPR team had
already conducted detailed analysis in the Spring of 2009 to determine
negotiating positions in the New START on an appropriate limit on
strategic delivery vehicles. Why are you not concerned, given that this
number is 100 below General Cartwright's comfort level?
Dr. Miller and General Chilton. The decision to agree to a limit of
700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles did not result from a change
in the security environment, but from an updated assessment of U.S.
force deployment options in the light of progress achieved in the
negotiations. The testimony you refer to in your question was delivered
before the definitional difference between deployed and nondeployed
ICBM and SLBM launchers had been agreed, and before the sides had
agreed to the conversion of individual SLBM launchers on strategic
submarines. Thus, the 800 deployed delivery vehicles figure referred to
in the testimony would, for example, have included U.S. strategic
delivery systems that will now count as nondeployed (e.g., two SSBNs in
overhaul). Once these provisions were agreed, it became clear that we
could sustain a strong triad and meet deterrence and hedging
requirements within a limit of 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and
deployed (nuclear-capable) heavy bombers. The U.S. senior military
leadership has stated its support for this result.
112. Senator Thune. Dr. Miller and General Chilton, if the former
commander of STRATCOM was concerned about reducing our delivery
vehicles below 800 at a time that was well after the NPR analysis was
completed, shouldn't we be concerned as well?
Dr. Miller and General Chilton. No, because the decision to agree
to a limit of 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles did not result
from a change in the security environment, but from an updated
assessment of U.S. force deployment options in the light of continued
progress in the negotiations. The testimony you refer to in your
question was delivered before the definitional difference between
deployed and nondeployed ICBM and SLBM launchers had been agreed and
before the sides had agreed to the conversion of individual SLBM
launchers on strategic submarines. Thus, the 800 deployed delivery
vehicles figure referred to in the testimony would, for example, have
included U.S. strategic delivery systems that will now count as
nondeployed (e.g., two SSBNs in overhaul). Once these provisions were
agreed, it became clear that we could sustain a strong triad and meet
deterrence and hedging requirements within a limit of 700 deployed
ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and deployed (nuclear-capable) heavy bombers.
The U.S. senior military leadership has stated its support for this
result.
113. Senator Thune. Dr. Miller and General Chilton, what were the
assumptions going into the negotiations that drove our level of
acceptance to reduce these numbers?
Dr. Miller. General Cartwright, as well as the rest of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and both of us support the
New START treaty including the limit of 700 on deployed strategic
delivery vehicles. The New START limit will allow the United States to
retain all 14 current SSBNs, while reducing the number of accountable
SLBM launchers by 96 relative to the previous START treaty's counting
rules (from 336 to 240). The United States will be able to do this by
taking advantage of the treaty's provisions by converting or
eliminating 56 SLBM launchers and not deploying SLBMs in an additional
40 launchers. In addition, the United States will convert a subset of
the B-52H bombers to a conventional-only role, so that they are no
longer accountable under the treaty. By taking advantage of these
treaty provisions, the United States will have to eliminate or keep in
a nondeployed status only 30 to 50 ICBM launchers of the 450 Minuteman
III active silos today. In sum, the decision to agree to a limit of 700
deployed strategic delivery vehicles resulted from an updated
assessment of U.S. force deployment options in the light of different
counting rules under New START.
General Chilton. The NPR conducted a detailed analysis of potential
reductions in strategic weapons, including delivery vehicles, which
would allow the U.S. to sustain stable deterrence at lower force
levels. This analysis assumed negotiated limits with Russia. The
analyses took into account the nuclear arsenals of other declared
nuclear weapon states, as well as the nuclear programs of proliferant
states. The conclusion from the NPR analyses was that stable deterrence
could be maintained and current planning guidance met at lower
strategic delivery vehicle levels. These results formed the basis for
U.S. negotiations with Russia.
conflicting messages to the air force
114. Senator Thune. Dr. Miller and General Chilton, in an effort to
build up the nuclear enterprise, the Air Force recently accomplished an
extensive restructuring which included, among other things, adding a
new Global Strike Command, adding an additional B-52 nuclear capable
bomber squadron, and multiple changes to procedures and testing. This
was all part of a tremendous and ongoing effort to reinvigorate the
nuclear enterprise. However, by ratifying this treaty it would seem we
are providing conflicting guidance to our nuclear force and telling
them we want to draw down and scale back the nuclear mission. For
example, this treaty would specifically reverse the direction the Air
Force was just given to build up the B-52 nuclear capability by cutting
the number of nuclear capable B-52s. Are you at all worried about
undercutting the Air Force's improved emphasis on the nuclear mission
after the problems the Air Force had with the nuclear mission a few
years ago?
Dr. Miller and General Chilton. No. The conclusion of the New START
treaty in no way reduces the emphasis we will place on the Air Force
nuclear enterprise. As reported in the section 1251 report, under New
START we plan to maintain up to 60 deployed nuclear capable heavy
bombers as well as additional nondeployed heavy bombers. New START will
not require us to reduce the number of bomber-delivered nuclear weapons
in the U.S. inventory. The NPR recognized that first, this capability
provides a rapid and effective hedge against technical challenges with
another leg of the triad, as well as geopolitical uncertainties; and
second, nuclear capable bombers are important to extended deterrence of
potential attacks on U.S. allies and partners. Unlike ICBMs and SLBMs,
nuclear capable heavy bombers can be visibly forward deployed, thereby
signaling U.S. resolve and commitment in crisis.
DOD plans to spend more than $4 billion over the next 5 years to
support upgrades to the B-2 stealth bomber. These enhancements will
help sustain survivability and improve mission effectiveness. In regard
to the B-52 bomber, the Air Force will conduct an assessment of
alternatives to inform decisions in fiscal year 2012 about whether and
if so how to replace the current ALCM, which will reach the end of its
service life later in the next decade. The future of the heavy bomber
leg will be considered in the ongoing study on long range strike, which
will be completed in time to inform the fiscal year 2012 President's
budget.
missile defense
115. Senator Thune. Dr. Miller, the New START is supposed to be
about strategic offensive nuclear arms. Yet, taken together, the
treaty's preamble and Russia's unilateral statement on the subject
strongly suggest Russia will threaten to withdraw from the treaty
should the United States expand its current missile defense
capabilities. Moreover, Article V of the treaty places binding
limitations on U.S. missile defenses, the first since the United States
lawfully withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) treaty. What
are your views of including language in the Senate Resolution of
Ratification confirming the administration's characterization of the
treaty that there are no constraints in the treaty (other than Article
V) on the development or deployment of U.S. missile defenses?
Dr. Miller. As I and other administration officials have testified,
the prohibition on the conversion of missile defense interceptors to
offensive launchers set forth in Article V will have no operational
impact on U.S. missile defense efforts. As Lieutenant General O'Reilly
has testified, the MDA has never had any plans to convert additional
ICBM silos to missile defense interceptor launchers. Doing so would be
much more expensive than building smaller GBI silos from scratch.
Moreover, as Lieutenant General O'Reilly has also stated, newly-built
GBI silos are easier both to protect and maintain.
Executive branch officials have also testified that, aside from
Article V(3), the treaty contains no restraints on the development or
deployment of U.S. missile defenses.
The administration is engaged in discussions with the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations about the resolution of advice and
consent that will be presented to the committee for its consideration.
116. Senator Thune. Dr. Miller, does the New START establish a new
precedent for limiting missile defenses despite our withdrawal from the
ABM treaty? Why or why not?
Dr. Miller. No. The New START treaty does not constrain the United
States from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible, nor
does it add any additional cost or inconvenience to the implementation
of U.S. missile defense plans. In addition, the treaty does not contain
any constraints on the testing or development of current or planned
U.S. missile defense programs. The only constraints on missile defense
in the New START treaty are the prohibitions in Article V on the
placement of missile defense interceptors in converted ICBM or
converted SLBM launchers and vice versa. However, this constraint has
no effect on current or planned U.S. missile defense programs given the
higher costs of such a conversion option vice simply constructing new
missile defense interceptor launchers and the operational challenges
associated with such placements.
For these reasons, the New START treaty does not establish any new
precedent for limiting missile defenses.
[Whereupon, at 11:44 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
INDEPENDENT ANALYSES OF THE NEW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION TREATY
----------
TUESDAY, JULY 27, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:34 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Reed, Hagan,
Goodwin, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, Chambliss, Thune, Brown, and
Collins.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; and Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Christian D. Brose,
professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff
member; and David M. Morriss, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Jennifer R. Knowles, Christine G.
Lang, and Hannah I. Lloyd.
Committee members' assistants present: Carolyn A. Chuhta,
assistant to Senator Reed; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator
Hagan; Anthony J. Lazarski and Rob Soofer, assistants to
Senator Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to
Senator Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator
Chambliss; Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Scott
Clendaniel, assistant to Senator Brown; and Ryan Kaldahl,
assistant to Senator Collins.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
Over the course of the last month or so, the Senate Armed
Services Committee has held three hearings and one briefing on
various aspects of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty
(START), including how it will be implemented by the U.S.
military, how it will be monitored and verified, and how the
nuclear weapons complex will be utilized to maintain a smaller
stockpile. We will have what will probably be our final hearing
this Thursday, with Assistant Secretary of State Rose
Gottemoeller, the chief negotiator of the New START treaty, and
Dr. Edward Warner, the Secretary of Defense's representative to
the New START treaty talks.
The previous hearings, as well as the hearing this
Thursday, have all been held with various representatives of
the executive branch, to better understand the New START
treaty, and how the New START treaty will be implemented--tasks
which the executive branch will be carrying out.
Today we welcome a panel of nongovernmental witnesses. We
look forward to hearing their independent views on the New
START treaty. While none of our witnesses this morning are
currently serving in the executive branch, each of them has
extensive previous experience, either with or in the executive
branch. They represent different views of the New START treaty.
We welcome that, and we welcome each of our distinguished
witnesses this morning.
Dr. John Foster has had a long and distinguished career in
science and industry. He helped establish the Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory in 1952, and was director of the
laboratory from 1961 to 1965. From 1965 to 1973, he was the
Director of Defense Research and Engineering at the Department
of Defense (DOD). He retired as Vice President of Science and
Technology at TRW, Inc. in 1988, and served on TRW's board of
directors until 1994. Dr. Foster has served on a variety of DOD
advisory boards and was the Chairman of the Defense Science
Board from 1990 to 1993. He was a member of the Strategic
Posture Commission and is currently a member of the advisory
board for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency.
Frank Miller retired in 2005 with over 30 years of
government experience, including 22 of those years at DOD. He
served on the National Security Council (NSC) staff as a
Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for
Defense Policy and Arms Control under President George W. Bush.
Mr. Miller was also the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary
for Strategy in Threat Reduction, twice served as Acting
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security
Policy, and worked on both the START I and START II treaties.
Mr. Miller serves on the advisory group for the U.S. Strategic
Command (STRATCOM), and is senior associate at the Center for
Strategic and International Studies.
Ambassador Steven Pifer spent 26 years with the Department
of State and has extensive experience in Russia and the states
of the former Soviet Union. He is a former Ambassador to
Ukraine, served as the Special Assistant to the President and
Senior Director for Russia, Ukraine, and Eurasia on the NSC
staff, under President Clinton, was a Special Assistant to
Ambassador Paul Nietze, and worked on the Intermediate-Range
Missile Treaty negotiations. Ambassador Pifer is currently a
Senior Fellow and Director of the Arms Control Initiative at
the Brookings Institution.
Dr. Keith Payne is head of the Graduate Department of
Defense in Strategic Studies at Missouri State University,
Washington Campus, and President and CEO of the National
Institute of Public Policy. From 2002 to 2003, he served as the
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Forces Policy. Dr.
Payne has served on a number of advisory boards, and is
currently a member of the policy panel of the advisory group
for the STRATCOM, and was also a member of the Strategic
Posture Commission. He has written extensively on defense and
foreign policy issues, including proliferation, arms control,
and missile defense.
Before we begin, I'd like to welcome Senator Carte Goodwin.
He is the newest member of the committee. It's a pleasure to
have you here, to continue a long tradition--a three-decades-
old tradition of representing the people of the State of West
Virginia on the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Senator Byrd sat right here for many, many decades. We miss
him, but we welcome you and welcome you very warmly. You will
find that this committee strives to approach these issues on a
bipartisan basis, and I know that you're going to fit right in
with that spirit. Welcome.
Chairman Levin. Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I also welcome our new colleague from the State of West
Virginia. I want to thank our distinguished witnesses for their
service to our Nation, and joining us today.
To date, our hearings on the New START treaty have
exclusively been the views of administration officials. Today's
hearing will feature the views of independent expert witnesses
who can provide a different perspective on the New START
treaty, and the national security implications of this
agreement and its supporting documents.
Many of us have concerns about the New START's methods of
verification, its constraints on ballistic missile defense
(BMD), and the accompanying plan for modernization of both the
nuclear stockpile and our nuclear delivery vehicles. This
hearing offers a chance to consider these concerns in a
different light.
Last year, the Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture
Commission alerted Congress to the dire need for modernizing
the nuclear weapons complex. At that time, the Commission
stated that while the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA) has a reasonable plan, they lack the necessary funding
to implement it properly. The administration's 10-year
modernization plan that accompanied the New START treaty, also
referred to as the 1251 Report, was expected to address these
funding concerns. However, many are questioning whether the
President's plan is adequate to meet our full recapitalization
and modernization needs.
I was particularly concerned by the testimony this
committee received from the director of the Los Alamos National
Laboratory regarding his ``fear that there's already a gap
emerging between expectations and fiscal realities,'' and his
concern that ``much of the administration's planned funding
increase for weapons activities do not come to fruition until
the second half of the 10-year period.'' I'll be interested in
hearing from our witnesses today if they feel the
administration's 10-year plan for modernization commits the
necessary resources in the appropriate timeframe to
reconstitute the weapons complex.
Another significant concern raised in the Strategic Posture
Review involved the ability to attract and retain a new
generation of scientists and engineers to sustain the safety,
security, and reliability of the nuclear weapons stockpile.
During the committee's hearings on the Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR), and more recently, during our hearing with the lab
directors, concerns were raised about the administration's
decisions to discourage the replacement of warheads as an
option for life-extension programs.
Dr. Foster, you, along with nine other former lab
directors, sent a letter to the Secretary of Defense and the
Secretary of Energy stating that you believe this more limited
approach to life extension programs constitutes a, ``higher bar
that will stifle the creative and imaginative thinking that
typifies the excellent history of progress and development at
the national laboratories.'' I look forward to hearing more
about whether curtailing the replacement of warheads could
result in an impending brain drain from our nuclear complex,
while harming the prospects for recruiting new talent and the
ability to design, manufacture, field, and evaluate nuclear
weapons in our overall deterrence posture.
Many of us also remain concerned about the New START
treaty's references to missile defense. While some have argued
that New START will not constrain us from developing and
deploying effective missile defenses, facts are stubborn
things. In the New START text, not just the preamble, but
article 5 of the treaty itself, includes a clear, legally
binding limitation on our missile defense options. While this
limitation may not be a meaningful one, it is a limitation.
Such limitations could fuel Russia's clear desire to establish
unfounded linkages between offensive and defensive weapons,
while diverting attention away from negotiating reductions to
the large Russian stockpile of tactical nuclear weapons.
The significant imbalance in tactical nuclear weapons has a
far greater strategic destabilizing impact than defensive
systems, like missile defense. Though the administration
apparently relented to Russian pressures to acknowledge an
interrelationship between strategic offensive and defensive
weapons, it ignored the far more significant
interrelationship--that between strategic and nonstrategic
offensive weapons. Russia has a 10-to-1 advantage over the
United States in tactical nuclear weapons.
Dr. Payne, you have stated publicly that quote, ``The great
locus of concern about Russian nuclear weapons lies in its
large arsenal of tactical nuclear weapons.'' I look forward to
hearing more about the significant and destabilizing danger
that this imbalance in tactical weapons could pose, and what
steps the United States must take, in the near future, to
address this threat.
Our consideration of the New START treaty is a serious
responsibility, and I thank all of you for joining us today to
help add to our understanding of it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
Senator Nunn, who's the former chairman of this committee,
and well known to all of us who had the opportunity to serve
with him, has submitted a statement, and we will make that part
of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
Prepared Statement by Former Senator Sam Nunn
I want to thank both the distinguished chairman and ranking member
of the Senate Armed Services Committee, Senator Carl Levin and Senator
John McCain, for the opportunity to present my views on the New START
agreement to the committee. I have always believed the national
security of the United States--in particular as it relates to questions
surrounding nuclear weapons and arms control--is by definition a
nonpartisan issue, and should be approached that way by the executive
and legislative branches of our government. The two of you are setting
an example in this regard, and I commend your leadership in scheduling
hearings on the New START agreement with a distinguished group of
administration officials, former officials, and experts, and for your
thorough and expeditious review of the New START agreement.
As this committee knows, the potential use of nuclear weapons is
one of the gravest dangers the world faces. Working with former
Secretaries of State George Shultz and Henry Kissinger and former
Secretary of Defense Bill Perry, the four of us have called for U.S.
leadership to help build a solid consensus for reversing reliance on
nuclear weapons globally as a vital contribution to preventing their
proliferation into potentially dangerous hands, and ultimately ending
them as a threat to the world. One important step involves the renewal
of nuclear arms talks and cooperation between the United States and
Russia and the conclusion of the New START treaty.
In considering this treaty, the bottom line for me is this: the
nuclear threat has fundamentally changed since the end of the Cold War.
The threat of nuclear terrorism is now urgent, fueled by the spread of
nuclear weapons, materials, and technology around the world. While this
is a global issue, there are two countries--the United States and
Russia--whose cooperation is absolutely essential in order to
successfully deal with a wide range of security issues, including
current nuclear threats. Specifically, cooperation is essential for:
1. Securing nuclear materials and preventing catastrophic
terrorism
2. Energy security
3. Euro-Atlantic security
4. Stemming the spread of nuclear weapons to North Korea and Iran
5. Addressing deep instability in Afghanistan and conflict in the
Middle East
6. Preventing conflict in Central Asia, and
7. A more stable and safer non-nuclear Korean peninsula.
In each of these cases, cooperation between the United States and
Russia is not just important, it is vital. With New START, our odds of
establishing a more cooperative relationship with Russia go up, and the
odds of a nuclear weapon being used go down.
It is also essential to note that with the expiration of the 1991
START Treaty last December, there is no longer any agreement in place
for monitoring strategic nuclear forces on both sides. The New START
treaty's provisions for data exchange and on-site inspection of
strategic nuclear forces will provide unique and valuable information
on Russian nuclear capabilities that we will not have if we do not
ratify this treaty. This information remains vitally important to the
security of the United States and will increase transparency and
confidence on both sides, thus enhancing predictability and stability.
I know some have expressed concerns that the New START treaty might
undermine America's missile defense program. They cite the preamble
recognizing the interrelationship between strategic offensive and
defensive arms; or the treaty's prohibition on converting or using
existing strategic launchers for placement of missile defense
interceptors; or Russian assertions of a right to withdraw from the
treaty. Informed by my own review of the treaty text and the detailed
testimony presented on this topic before the Senate, I am reassured
that New START is not a threat or a barrier to America's missile
defenses, and I see little value in encouraging the Russians to think
otherwise.
Another issue of concern to this committee and the Senate is the
question of maintaining the safety, security, and reliability of our
own nuclear weapons. In my view, nothing in the New START agreement
would in any way inhibit the ability of the United States to make the
necessary investments in our nuclear weapons infrastructure and the
three national nuclear weapons laboratories. Indeed, we must proceed on
both fronts: reducing nuclear dangers by maintaining our deterrence,
and reducing nuclear dangers through arms control. The New START
agreement is consistent with this framework.
New START has been forcefully advocated by Secretary of State
Hillary Clinton, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, and the Joint
Chiefs of Staff. In addition to Secretaries Shultz, Perry, and
Kissinger, the treaty has been endorsed by former Secretary of State
James Baker, former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, and former
National Security Advisors Brent Scowcroft and Steve Hadley, who served
under Presidents George H.W. Bush and George W. Bush, respectively.
I urge the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification of
New START as early as is feasible. I also urge the two governments to
begin planning now for even more substantial reductions in the future
involving all nuclear weapons, strategic and tactical, deployed and
non-deployed.
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, and members of the committee, I know
how important the Senate's role is in treaty ratification, and I also
recognize the imperative of strong committee leadership. I am grateful
for the opportunity to present my views to the committee and the
Senate.
Chairman Levin. We will call on our witnesses. I think we
will call on you in alphabetical order. I don't have any more
logical way to do it. So we will start with Dr. Foster, then
Mr. Miller, Dr. Payne, and Ambassador Pifer.
Dr. Foster.
STATEMENT OF DR. JOHN S. FOSTER, JR., INDEPENDENT CONSULTANT
Dr. Foster. Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished
members of the Senate. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate
the invitation to appear before the committee to discuss New
START treaty.
Since you have been provided a copy of my prepared
testimony, Mr. Chairman, I propose to take just 4 or 5 minutes
to highlight my views and suggestions.
Chairman Levin. That would be fine. All the statements will
be made part of the record, in full.
Dr. Foster. President Obama has reenergized U.S. policy to
work toward a nuclear-free world. Recognizing that the
achievement of that situation will likely take many decades,
the President has required the maintenance of our nuclear
deterrent for the foreseeable future. If we are able to
accomplish that, it will be a most welcome turning point from
the general course that we have been on for the last two
decades.
The administration has made its case to support
ratification of New START, and numerous concerns have been
raised. They range from failure of the Soviet Union and Russia
to comply with past treaties, to concerns about
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) on trains, ships,
and aircraft, the omission of tactical nuclear weapons, linkage
of strategic offense and defensive systems, provisions for
verification, et cetera. To reach a judgment on ratification of
New START requires that the Senate examine the pros and cons of
each concern. That's the purpose of these hearings.
Of those concerns, I single out just one: verification. I
find it to be inadequate for the next 10 years, in part,
because New START's provisions are significantly less demanding
than START I, and if the Russian economy supports the programs
they plan to deploy from their new triad, we will not have in
place the monitoring capability that may be necessary.
For example, we no longer have the monitoring station at
the Volkinsk plant that was assembling the missiles, and that
we don't have the degree of missile telemetry that was
permitted under START I. Then there's the reduction in site
visits. These limitations could become serious over the next 10
years.
I realize there are now fewer facilities, 24-hour notice on
a new missile to emerge from the plant, and we can count
warheads on deployed missiles, and so on. But, there are no
limitations on new missile characteristics, and more telemetry
would be very important if, for example, we need to defend our
ICBMs.
Next, the limitations on deployed delivery vehicles to 700
and warheads to 1,550. Secretary Gates and General Chilton have
testified that nuclear deterrence can still be maintained,
subject to Russian compliance and no requirements for force
increases. Things could change a lot over the next 10 years. I
urge that we not only maintain the current strategic force and
its infrastructure, but complete current studies of possible
future systems and initiate hedge programs so that we can be in
a position to produce a modern triad, as the service lives of
current systems run out.
The committee has heard from the three laboratory directors
regarding the recent decline in congressional support for
NNSA's nuclear warhead programs and supporting infrastructure,
particularly in the last 5 years. Stockpile surveillance is
behind schedule, laboratory experiments, tests, and personnel
have been reduced. Important new facilities planned for Los
Alamos in New Mexico and Oak Ridge in Tennessee, but there is
concern that the costs of the multibillion-dollar facilities
could increase substantially over the estimates submitted in
the fiscal year 2011 through 2015 budgets. Should that occur,
it could again force reductions in warhead surveillance, delays
in life extension programs, reduction in lab experiments and
personnel.
To reduce the likelihood of that happening, I have
suggested that the nuclear weapons council consider initiating
a thorough scrub of the necessary capabilities and construction
costs to ensure that safety, security, programmatic risks and
costs are effectively managed.
Certification: Congress has directed that each year the
laboratory directors, Commander of STRATCOM, and the
Secretaries of Defense and Energy submit letters to the
President certifying as to the safety and reliability of the
nuclear deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing. However,
in the past few years, the directors have expressed increasing
concern in their ability to certify the stockpile, in part,
because the reduced funding of the Stockpile Stewardship
Program has reduced the information needed to perform that
certification.
I have urged the laboratory directors to assess the minimum
conditions under which they would have the knowledge necessary
to consider certifiability of the stockpile.
Safeguards: Congress, in approving and ratifying past
agreements and treaties have established safeguards which
helped us to meet our commitments. In considering New START, I
urge the Senate to again specify safeguards which provide for
an annual, independent assessment of DOD's nuclear delivery
programs, NNSA's warhead programs, and the sufficiency of both
supporting infrastructures.
Mr. Chairman, thank you very much.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Foster follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. John S. Foster, Jr.
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and other members of the
committee, I am honored to be invited to present a very brief summary
of my views on several aspects of the New Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START) treaty and then attempt to answer any questions you may
have.
nuclear deterrence
As the committee knows well, the purpose of our strategic nuclear
deterrent is to deter the use of nuclear weapons against the United
States and our allies, and large scale war, and not to fight a nuclear
war. But, to be effective it needs to insure that no potential nuclear
adversary could believe that they could gain more than they would lose
by an attributable attack on the United States or on those supported by
our extended deterrent. The existence of dynamic military delivery and
nuclear warhead infrastructures is also an important deterrent.
The administration has made its' case to support ratification of
New START and concerns have been raised regarding such issues as MIRV'd
payloads, missiles on ships, aircraft and trains, the omission of
Russian tactical nuclear weapons, linkage of Russian offensive missiles
to our missile defense, also the counting of our possible Conventional
Prompt Global Strike, visibility of changes negotiated by the Bilateral
Consultative Commission, provisions for verifications, etc. These
concerns raise important issues for U.S. security. During the next few
months the Senate will have an opportunity to carefully examine these
concerns and the administration's responses prior to providing its
advice and consent. At this time I'll just make a brief comment on the
verification provisions.
verification
The importance and value of verification increases as the
negotiated number of weapons decreases. New START verification, in my
judgment, is inadequate to give us the depth of knowledge that we will
need, given Russian military doctrine and modernization programs. I
assume we all believe in the necessity to ``Trust but Verify''.
Unfortunately, past compliance by the Soviet Union/Russia and our
inability or unwillingness to force compliance does not provide a firm
foundation for this treaty. Second, the provisions in New START are
significantly less demanding than START I. The provision for visits (up
to 18 per year) is substantially less than we found necessary under
START I. Third, a monitoring station at the Russian assembly plant at
Volkinsk is no longer permitted and missile telemetry, which we have
found very useful, is greatly reduced. These limitations could become
serious over the next 10 years if the Russian economy and priority to
strategic nuclear systems ramp up their modernization program. I
understand that currently there are fewer facilities, that we can
expect 24-hour notice of an identified missile leaving the assembly
plant and that we can count the number of warheads on each deployed
missile. But there are no limitations on new missile characteristics
and more telemetry would be very important if we chose, for example, to
defend our intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs).
Given this situation, and based on our perception of Russia's
intentions, I believe that more visibility is needed. We need to be
alert to the fact that intentions can change much more rapidly than
capabilities. Hence, I urge that we continue to explore verification
approaches.
New START would limit U.S. and Russian deployed delivery vehicles
to 700 and nuclear warheads to 1,550. For our current situation General
Chilton and Secretary Gates have testified that with those numbers and
some specific assumptions regarding our future needs, nuclear
deterrence can still be maintained. But things do change. In the future
even smaller numbers could possibly still be effective or larger
numbers of offensive launchers and or defenses might be needed. Our
nuclear enterprise must be resilient to such potential changes. For
example, we should maintain a Triad because we depend on the special
and different characteristics of each leg to provide retaliatory
capability that is credible to the attacker. The heavy bombers provide
for communication of intent and resolve and when generated are
survivable. ICBMs provide responsive command and control and ballistic
missile submarines, survivability. It is important to understand that
the need for a Triad is not dependent on numbers. But if the numbers of
delivery vehicles were to change, then the strategy and its associated
targeting would have to change.
a nuclear turning point?
President Obama's commitment to maintain nuclear deterrence for the
foreseeable future, the Department of Defense's (DOD) NPR, and the
fiscal year 2011-2015 budgets all mark a possible turning point in
plans from the 20-year decline of our strategic nuclear deterrent, its
maintenance, and supporting infrastructure.
The venerable B-52 and aging B-2 heavy bombers are to
receive upgraded communications, flight systems, radar and
structural improvements. Funds are also included to define a
follow-on heavy bomber. The Air Force also plans to study the
need to develop an advanced, reliable strategic nuclear cruise
missile for heavy bombers to replace the aging ALCM.
The Minuteman III ICBM's are to be upgraded and
maintained until 2030. Planning is also underway for a follow-
on ICBM.
The service life of the Navy's submarine leg of the
Triad and its ballistic missiles are planned to be upgraded and
extended to 2042. To provide a replacement of the Trident
submarine, the Navy is designing a new submarine and follow-on
missiles.
Preliminary estimates of costs for future strategic systems
have led Secretary Gates to request the services to find ways
to substantially reduce their costs. One attractive opportunity
to reduce missile costs would be for the Air Force and Navy to
agree on common missile/warhead interfaces, common booster
missile production facilities and depot level support
capabilities.
But for the trend in our nuclear deterrent to turn around will
require that Congress support the DOD strategic program requests. We
also need to recognize that the nuclear weapons complex is an essential
component of DOD's capability. History tells us that it will require an
extraordinary sustained commitment to the long-term needs to maintain
the strategic deterrent. While we see an encouraging focus now, it will
take continuing attention on the part of Congress and successive
administrations to keep it on track. Beyond maintaining our current
aging deterrent we need to not only complete the current studies but to
start programs that will position us to deploy modern replacement
systems when needed. I suggest that the Senate request a policy
commitment from the administration to replace our aging force structure
with modern systems.
turning point for nuclear warheads
The fiscal year 2011-2015 budgets would provide increased support
for warhead life extension programs, warhead surveillance and mandatory
fixes and also to boost computing, science, engineering and laboratory
experiments. In implementing the life extension programs it is
important that the laboratories are free to pursue approaches that, in
their judgment, best provide for safety and reliability. In addition,
budgets are estimated for new facilities, in particular CMRR at Los
Alamos for research on plutonium and UPF, a uranium parts manufacturing
plant at Oakridge in Tennessee. The committee should understand that at
present we do not yet have good cost estimates for the new facilities,
each of which are expected to cost billions of dollars. There is
general concern that their costs will exceed the preliminary estimates
and that may force major reductions in other NNSA nuclear weapons
activities to include warhead surveillance, the life extensions and
science programs. Such a development would turn us back into the
situation we have faced for the last 5 years. I have suggested that the
Nuclear Weapons Council initiate a thorough scrub of the necessary
capabilities and construction costs for the new facilities to insure
that safety, security, programmatic risks and costs are effectively
managed.
certification
Congress has directed that each year the Laboratory Directors,
Commander STRATCOM, and the Secretaries of Defense and Energy submit
letters to the President certifying as to the safety, security and
reliability of the nuclear deterrent in the absence of nuclear testing.
However, in prior years, the Laboratory Directors have expressed
increasing concerns because of both the cumulative changes to the
warheads from their life extensions and reductions in warhead
surveillance and reduced funding of the Stockpile Stewardship Program
which has reduced the information they need to perform the annual
assessments as to certifiability of the safety, security and
reliability of the stockpile. One can hope the lesson of the last 5
years will be learned and the necessary surveillance, lab
experimentation etc., will be increased and sustained for the
foreseeable future. I have urged the laboratory Directors to assess the
minimum conditions under which they would have the knowledge necessary
to consider the certifiability of the stockpile without nuclear
testing, eg., surveillance, SFI's, hydro-experiments, training on new
nuclear device designs through to prototypes, etc.
Whether or not we really are at a turning point regarding the
maintenance and modernization of our strategic nuclear deterrent,
extended deterrent and infrastructure depends on whether or not we
initiate and adequately fund programs recommended by recent studies and
reports.
safeguards
Prior to approving/ratifying past agreements and treaties; the
atmospheric and threshold test bans, START I and the Moscow Agreement,
Congress established, for different objectives, the activities
necessary to meet the Nation's commitments. The existence of those
safeguards proved to be an important factor in ensuring that subsequent
administrations and Congress provided the flexibility and resilience to
respond to our uncertain future. I urge that in considering New START
the Senate to again specify appropriate safeguards including an annual
independent assessment of DOD's nuclear delivery programs and NNSA's
warhead programs, also including sufficiency of the aerospace
industrial aircraft, submarine and missile infrastructure and the
nuclear warhead laboratories and that infrastructure to support our
nuclear deterrent into the future.
Thank you, I would welcome any questions the committee members may
have.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Dr. Foster.
Mr. Miller.
STATEMENT OF FRANKLIN C. MILLER, INDEPENDENT CONSULTANT
Mr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the
committee, it's an honor to appear before you, with my
colleagues, this morning.
Since experience has taught me that the principal value of
a panel such as this is our responses to your questions and our
interaction with each other, my opening remarks will be quite
brief.
Let me say, at the outset, that I support this New START
treaty. It is, as Harold Brown once said of another treaty,
``modest but useful.'' Based on my long involvement in U.S.
nuclear deterrence policy and target planning, I am confident
that the United States can safely provide for our national
security, and that of our allies, at the launcher and warhead
limits that the New START treaty prescribes.
The New START treaty reopens channels of communication and
means of inspection and verification which were closed when the
START treaty expired in December of last year. Transparency
increases predictability. Predictability enhances stability.
The New START treaty by itself, however, will not provide
increased strategic stability. It is vitally important, in this
regard, that the administration and Congress support a
modernized and effective U.S. nuclear deterrent. This means
that adequate funding must be provided, where necessary and
appropriate, to modernize both delivery systems and warheads,
including the Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear weapons
complex, which the committee has discussed in previous
hearings.
The New START treaty permits modernization by both sides.
Each side is equally advantaged or disadvantaged. But we, the
United States, will only be disadvantaged by what we,
ourselves, choose not to do with respect to modernization. The
strategic triad which underwrites our national security is
aging. It is the product of the Reagan administration's
recapitalization of the Kennedy administration's Strategic
Modernization Program. The United States must begin promptly to
begin work on proceeding with the replacement for the Ohio-
class submarine. The administration needs to provide Congress a
more concrete plan which sets forth its plans for the
sustainment of the Minuteman force and for the bomber force.
We also must pay attention to the defense industrial base
which supports our strategic deterrent, especially the solid
rocket motor production facilities. It is also my view that
additional funds need to be provided to enhance both the
technical and the human side of that part of our intelligence
community which will monitor Russia's compliance with the New
START treaty.
Finally, let me say that I believe this New START treaty is
the last nuclear arms treaty which can safely ignore Russia's
short-range nuclear systems. While properly not a subject for
this treaty, which stands on its own merits, I believe the
administration must begin to press the Russian Government to
reduce, significantly, its vastly oversized arsenal of short-
range nuclear weapons. I believe, and have written elsewhere,
that I do not think this needs to await the opening of a new
round of negotiations on strategic arms cuts, whenever that
might occur. I believe the United States needs to turn
international attention to the bloated and grossly unnecessary
size of the Russian short-range nuclear arsenal.
The administration and the international community should
press the Russian Government to provide transparency into the
size and composition of its short-range nuclear stockpile, and
should call for major near-term reductions in it.
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, this concludes my opening
remarks, and I look forward to the committee's questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. Miller.
Dr. Payne.
STATEMENT OF DR. KEITH B. PAYNE, PROFESSOR AND HEAD, GRADUATE
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC STUDIES, MISSOURI STATE
UNIVERSITY (WASHINGTON CAMPUS)
Dr. Payne. Thank you Chairman Levin, Senator McCain,
distinguished members, it's an honor to appear before the
committee to discuss the New START treaty this morning.
I would like to begin by observing that reductions in the
number and diversity of U.S. forces can matter greatly, because
the credibility of our forces to deter enemies and assure
allies is dependent on their flexibility to provide a spectrum
of deterrent options and their resilience to adjust in a timely
way to changes in the threat environment.
The need for flexibility and multiple strategic options is
particularly important today because the contemporary threat
environment can shift rapidly and surprisingly. The 2009 report
by the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission emphasizes this
U.S. requirement. Understanding the requirement for flexibility
and resilience, I believe, is the necessary starting point for
any review of the New START treaty. Our force numbers may move
lower, but we must be careful to advance the flexibility and
resilience that helps make them credible.
The material question regarding verification, and the New
START treaty in general, is whether it is compatible with the
quantity, diversity, flexibility, and resilience essential for
the credibility of our forces. The New START treaty raises some
concerns in this regard. For example, a recent Obama
administration report on verification apparently emphasizes
that any Russian cheating, and I quote, ``would have little
effect on the assured second-strike capabilities of U.S.
strategic forces.'' This claim suggests that an assured
devastating second-strike capability is adequate for U.S.
strategic forces, and, therefore, any Russian cheating would
have no serious effect on our ability to deter or assure.
Yet, every Republican and Democratic administration since
the 1960s has concluded that an assured-destruction second-
strike capability alone is an inadequate measure for our
forces, because it includes little or none of the flexibility
and resilience so important for credible deterrence and
assurance.
Under the New START treaty, would the combination of U.S.
force reductions and Russian deployments, with or without
Russian cheating, threaten the necessary flexibility and
resilience of our forces? The New START treaty would limit U.S.
strategic flexibility and resilience, to some extent, because
it requires sizable reductions in the number of U.S. strategic
nuclear launchers and limits some types of strategic
conventional forces for Prompt Global Strike.
Senior U.S. military leaders have noted, in open testimony,
that the New START treaty would indeed allow sufficient U.S.
strategic force flexibility. This important conclusion
reportedly follows from analyses that included these three key
assumptions: one, that U.S. planning guidance for strategic
forces would remain the same; two, that there would be no
requests for an increase in forces; and three, that Russia
would be compliant with the New START treaty. If one or all of
these starting optimistic assumptions do not hold, as is
plausible, would the New START treaty allow sufficient U.S.
flexibility and resilience to adjust, as necessary, for
credible deterrence? This is a fundamental question regarding
the New START treaty.
The traditional U.S. triad of bombers, ICBMs, and sea-based
missiles, now buttressed by missile defense and the potential
for new conventional Prompt Global Strike, can help provide the
flexibility and resilience to adjust to a multitude of
different threats and circumstances. At this point, however,
there is no apparent administration commitment to advance
conventional Prompt Global Strike deployment, to replacing the
aging ICBM and bomber legs of our triad, or to a new air-
launched cruise missile. That fosters concern that force
reductions may come at the expense of the longstanding
requirements for force diversity and flexibility, and take
refuge in old assured-destruction thinking.
If our numbers are to decline further, we must take care to
ensure sufficient flexibility and resilience, whether through
traditional means or innovations, and for conditions that are
less optimistic than those assumed in administration analysis.
How much confidence can we have that the administration will
take the necessary strategic modernization steps, given the
clear statement that its highest nuclear priority now is
nonproliferation and movement towards a nuclear-free world, its
commitment to further negotiated reductions, and its
presumption against any new nuclear warheads? A solid U.S.
commitment to bomber and cruise missile modernization,
Minuteman III replacement or life extension with enhanced
survivability measures, and missile defenses of all ranges
could help provide this confidence.
Concern about the New START treaty's reductions of U.S.
force flexibility and resilience, however modest or
significant, also might be eased if the treaty's ceilings on
Russian forces actually would reduce the threats we might face.
But, according to numerous Russian open sources, the New START
treaty's ceilings are of little real consequence for Russia.
Russia's aged cold war strategic launchers already have been
reduced below the New START treaty's ceilings, and will decline
further without the treaty. The New START treaty has common
ceilings, but appears to require unilateral U.S. reductions.
In addition, the New START treaty's loopholes would allow
Russia to deploy far beyond the New START treaty's strategic
nuclear warhead ceiling within the terms of the New START
treaty, if Russia finds the financial resources to do so. This
may be significant over time, because Russia's highest defense
procurement priority is the modernization of its strategic
nuclear forces.
The troubling irony is that aging forces, and Russia's
production and financial problems are now causing reductions in
Russia's force numbers without the New START treaty, and the
treaty would not prevent Russia from deploying future forces
well beyond the New START treaty's specified ceilings.
In sum, flexibility and resilience are key contributors to
the credibility of our forces. The most important New START
treaty question is whether U.S. forces will retain sufficient
flexibility and resilience to be credible in conditions that
are less optimistic than those assumed by the administration in
its analysis. An important consideration in this regard is that
the New START treaty's ceilings appear not to require real
Russian launcher reductions in the near term, and its loopholes
would allow the renewal of Russian strategic capabilities over
time.
There are some steps that might help to mitigate the
potential risks posed by the New START treaty. They involve
U.S. commitments, demonstrated by policy direction and robust
program budget for advanced conventional Prompt Global Strike,
missile defense, and innovative replacements for our aging
triad.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Payne follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Keith B. Payne
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members, thank you
for the invitation to appear before the committee to discuss New START;
it is an honor to do so.
I would like to begin by observing that reductions in the number
and diversity of U.S. forces can matter greatly because the credibility
of our forces is dependent on their flexibility to provide a spectrum
of deterrent options and their resilience to adjust in a timely way to
changes in the threat environment. This flexibility and resilience, in
turn is determined to a great extent by the number and diversity of our
strategic forces.
An ``assured destruction''-type deterrent lacking this flexibility
and resilience is likely to be incredible against many of the limited,
yet severe threats we and our allies may face. U.S. officials knew this
full well during the Cold War; virtually all major nuclear policy
documents since the 1960s emphasized the need for flexibility and
multiple strategic force options.\1\ That need is particularly
important today because the contemporary threat environment can shift
rapidly and surprisingly. In one crisis we may need one set of
strategic capabilities to deter credibly, in a different crisis, a
different set of strategic capabilities may be necessary; assuring
allies credibly may necessitate still different types of strategic
forces; and when an attack cannot be deterred, an altogether different
set of forces may be necessary to defend.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ See Richard Nixon, National Security Council, National Security
Decision Memorandum-242, Policy for Planning the Employment of Nuclear
Weapons, January 17, 1974 (Top Secret, declassified February 20, 1998).
See also, Jimmy Carter, Presidential Directive/NSC-59, The White House,
July 25, 1980 (Top Secret, Partially declassified August 20, 1996);
Harold Brown, Department of Defense Annual Report Fiscal Year 1982
(Washington, DC: USGPO, 1981), p. 40.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
If we want a credible deterrent across a spectrum of severe
threats, including for example, nuclear and biological threats to our
allies, our forces must have the quantity and diversity necessary to be
flexible and resilient. The 2009 report by the bipartisan Strategic
Posture Commission, America's Strategic Posture, emphasizes this
contemporary U.S. requirement given the fluid threat environment.\2\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\2\ The Final Report of the Congressional Commission on the
Strategic Posture of the United States, America's Strategic Posture
(Washington, DC: USIP, 2009), pp. 23, 24-26.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Understanding this requirement is the necessary starting point for
any review of New START. The material question regarding verification
and New START in general is whether the treaty is compatible with the
flexibility and resilience essential to the credibility of U.S. forces
over the long term--not simply whether we could retain an ``assured
second-strike'' capability. Under New START, would the combination of
U.S. force reductions and Russian force deployments (with or without
Russian cheating) threaten the necessary flexibility and resilience of
our forces? We must not allow enthusiasm for quantitative nuclear
reductions to degrade the flexibility and resilience of our forces and
return U.S. to old discarded standards of ``assured destruction.'' Our
ability to deter and assure credibly would be undermined. Instead, as
our force numbers move lower, we must be careful to advance the force
flexibility and resilience that helps make them credible.
My conclusion is that New START raises some concerns in this
regard.
For example, a recent administration report on verification
apparently emphasizes that ``any'' Russian cheating ``would have little
effect on the assured second-strike capabilities of U.S. strategic
forces . . . '' \3\ This claim suggests that an ``assured devastating
second-strike capability'' is adequate for U.S. strategic forces, and
therefore ``any'' Russian cheating could have no serious effect on our
ability to deter or assure.\4\ Yet, as noted, every Republican and
Democratic administration since the 1960s has concluded that an
``assured destruction'' capability alone is inadequate because it
requires little or none of the flexibility and resilience so important
for credible deterrence and assurance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\3\ Unclassified potions of the report quoted by Chairman Carl
Levin, Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing on the New Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (START) Implementation, July 20, 2010, CQ
Congressional Transcript.
\4\ ``Assured devastating second-strike capability'' is the
descriptor used by Dr. James Miller in, Senate Armed Services
Committee, Hearing on the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
Implementation, July 20, 2010, CQ Congressional Transcript.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The treaty would limit U.S. strategic force flexibility and
resilience because it requires sizeable reductions in the number of
U.S. strategic nuclear launchers, and would limit some types of
strategic conventional forces for prompt global strike (PGS).
Administration officials have said, ``The treaty does not constrain our
ability to develop and deploy non-nuclear prompt global strike
capabilities.'' \5\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\5\ Dr. James Miller, Ibid. See also, Department of State, Bureau
of Verification, Compliance, and Implementation, Fact Sheet, April 8,
2010, at http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/139899.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
In fact, New START would restrict deployment of U.S. conventional
PGS options based on existing ICBMs or sea-based ballistic missiles.
These would be limited under New START's ceiling of 700 deployed
launchers.\6\ We would have to reduce our strategic nuclear force
launchers below 700 on a 1:1 basis for each of these conventional PGS
systems deployed. The treaty would thus limit our flexibility and
resilience in this area. In general, a 1:1 replacement of nuclear
forces by conventional forces has understandably and specifically been
rejected for deterrence purposes by senior U.S. military leaders.\7\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ Under New START the number of deployed U.S. strategic launchers
will have to be reduced from today's reported level of 880 launchers to
a ceiling of 700 deployed launchers. Amy Woolf, The New START Treaty:
Central Limits and Key Provisions, Congressional Research Service 7-
5700 (June 18, 2010), p. 19.
\7\ General Kevin Chilton, Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing
to Receive Testimony on the Nuclear Posture Review, April 22, 2010, pp.
24-25.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Administration officials have said, nevertheless, that so limiting
these conventional PGS options is acceptable assuming there is a need
for only a small number of such systems.\8\ Unfortunately, there can be
no certainty behind that assumption given the many different and now-
unknown threats that will arise in New START's 10-15 year timeframe.
Perhaps the option of deploying many such conventional PGS systems will
be critical for deterrence, assurance or defense. Under New START we
would be mightily constrained from doing so because of the treaty's
limits and its required 1:1 trade-off with our nuclear forces.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\8\ Woolf, The New START Treaty: Central Limits and Key Provisions,
pp. 17-18; also, Miller, Senate Armed Services Committee, Hearing to
Receive Testimony on the Nuclear Posture Review, April 22, 2010, p. 24.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
This problem might be mitigated with Senate guidance that there be
no further negotiated restrictions on advanced U.S. non-nuclear PGS
systems and a requirement for a firm commitment to the development and
deployment, as soon as technically and operationally sound, of
conventional PGS capabilities that are not limited by treaty.
In addition, New START's force limits do not allow ``more
[capability] than is needed'' for deterrence under current planning.\9\
Leaving little or no such margin may be risky when force flexibility
and diversity is necessary to deter and assure across a range of
threats.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\9\ General Kevin Chilton, Senate Foreign Relations Committee,
Hearing, The New START Treaty: Views From the Pentagon, June 16, 2010,
Federal News Service.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Senior U.S. military leaders have noted in open testimony that New
START would indeed allow sufficient U.S. strategic force
flexibility.\10\ The analysis behind this important conclusion
reportedly was predicated on three key assumptions: (1) U.S. planning
guidance for strategic forces would remain the same; (2) there would be
no requests for an increase in forces; and (3) Russia would be
compliant with New START.\11\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\10\ General Kevin Chilton, Senate Armed Services Committee,
Hearing to Receive Testimony on the Nuclear Posture Review, April, 22,
p. 14.
\11\ General Kevin Chilton, Ibid, pp. 8, 13; and, House Armed
Service Committee, Hearing, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy and Force
Structure, April 15, 2010, p. 11.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Would the treaty allow sufficient U.S. flexibility and resilience
to adjust as necessary for credible deterrence and assurance if one or
all of those starting optimistic assumptions do not hold, as is
plausible?
For example, what if Russia again decides to violate its treaty
commitments? What if relations with China and Russia return to a crisis
pitch, and they express more severe nuclear threats to our allies or to
us? What if Iranian deployment of nuclear weapons and missiles throws
the entire Middle East into an unprecedented security crisis? What if
the apparent nuclear nexus of Burma, Iran, North Korea and Syria poses
unprecedented threats to our allies or our forces abroad? \12\ U.S.
planning and force requirements might have to change with any and all
of these unwanted developments that could arise during New START's
tenure. What new quantitative or qualitative strategic force
requirements might arise as a result for credible deterrence, assurance
or defense, and would New START preserve the necessary U.S. force
flexibility and resilience to meet those requirements? These are
fundamental questions regarding the treaty and international security.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\12\ See the discussion in, ``Article Sees Serious Implications for
India From Burma's Purported Nuclear Plans,'' The Tribune Online,
(Chandigarth), July 17, 2010, SAP20100717534024.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
More simply, will the United States, at least, develop and deploy
the diverse strategic force structure that remains possible under the
treaty and could help preserve U.S. force flexibility and resilience?
The traditional U.S. triad of bombers, ICBMs, and sea-based missiles--
now buttressed by missile defenses and the potential for new non-
nuclear PGS capabilities--can be extremely valuable in this regard
because the diversity of offensive and defensive options helps provide
the flexibility and resilience to adjust to a multitude of different
threats and circumstances.
Fortunately, the Obama administration has expressed its intention
to support the triad, missile defense deployment, and conventional PGS.
At this point, however, there is no apparent, concrete administration
commitment to advanced conventional PGS deployment or to replacing the
aging ICBM and bomber legs of the triad, including the air-launched
cruise missile. This fosters concern that enthusiasm for force
reductions may come at the expense of the longstanding requirements for
force diversity, flexibility, and resilience, and take refuge in old
``assured destruction'' thinking. If our numbers are to decline
further, we must take care to ensure continued flexibility and
resilience--whether through traditional means or innovations.
Bombers have great inherent flexibility and resilience, and the
weapons counting rules for bombers under New START are extremely
permissive. But these counting rules will be advantageous for U.S. only
if we modernize our bomber force. While Russia has decided to build a
new strategic bomber and apparently has a new long-range air-launched
nuclear cruise missile near deployment,\13\ the Obama administration
plans to cut U.S. nuclear-capable bombers by more than one-third under
New START and has made no apparent commitment to replace the venerable
B-52 or to a new air-launched cruise missile.\14\ Similarly, the
administration has announced that it will reduce the number of U.S.
ICBM launchers by at least 30 under New START,\15\ while Russia is
deploying new MIRVed mobile ICBMs, and has decided for a new heavy
MIRVED ICBM as is now permitted under New START.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\13\ See ``Moscow Upgrades Strategic Bomber Fleet,'' Air &
Cosmos,(Paris) January 8, 2010, pp. 34-35, EUP201001081; ``Russian
Military Pundits Consider Recent Missile Launches, Prospects,'' Mayak
Radio, (Moscow) August 8, 2001, CEP20070811950032.
\14\ White House Fact Sheet on the ``1251 report,'' May 13, 2010,
available at www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/
New%20START%20section%201251%20fact%20sheet.pdf.
\15\ Ibid.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Over time, this New START-inspired combination of U.S. ICBM
launcher reductions and permitted Russian MIRVed heavy ICBMs could
again challenge the survivability of the U.S. ICBM and bomber legs of
the triad--a situation long-recognized as highly ``destabilizing.'' If
their survivability is at risk, so will be much of the triad's
flexibility and the credibility of U.S. forces to deter, assure and
defend.
Hard decisions will need to be made during the life of this treaty
if we are to advance flexible offensive and defensive capabilities and
a resilient force structure. How much confidence can we have that the
administration will take the necessary strategic modernization steps
given its highest nuclear priority of non-proliferation and movement
toward a nuclear free world, its commitment to further negotiations,
and its presumption against any new nuclear warheads? \16\ Credible
assurances and the necessary strategic modernization budgets tied to
New START would be helpful in this regard. A solid U.S. commitment to
bomber and cruise missile modernization, Minuteman III replacement or
life extension with enhanced survivability measures, and missile
defenses of all ranges could help provide this confidence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\16\ Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, April
2010, p. vi; and, Testimony of Dr. James Miller, House Armed Service
Committee, Hearing, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy and Force Structure,
April 15, 2010, pp. 38, 41.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Concern about New START's reduction of U.S. force flexibility and
resilience--however modest or significant--also might be eased if the
treaty's ceilings on Russian forces actually would reduce the threats
we might face. But, according to numerous Russian open sources, New
START's ceilings are of little real consequence for Russia because
Russia's aged Cold War strategic launchers already have been reduced
below New START's ceilings, and will decline further with or without
the treaty--and Russia's comprehensive post-Cold War nuclear
modernization programs are moving forward slowly at this point. Aleksey
Arbatov, the former Deputy Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee,
notes, ``The new treaty is an agreement on reducing the American and
not the Russian [strategic nuclear forces]. In fact, the latter will be
reduced in any case because of the mass removal from the order of
battle of obsolete arms and the one-at-a-time introduction of new
systems.''\17\ Prior to the New START negotiations, Russian open
sources already projected that by 2012 Russian strategic nuclear forces
could have as few as 406 launchers and fewer than 1,500 warheads--well
below New START ceilings using its counting rules.\18\ The point was
made most succinctly by Dr. Sergei Rogov, Director of the USA and
Canada Institute in Moscow: ``We will not have to reduce anything
prematurely. In effect, the ceilings established by the new START
Treaty do not force the United States to reduce currently available
strategic offensive forces . . . Only the United States will have to
conduct reductions . . . '' \19\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\17\ ``Russia: Arbatov Critique of Khramchikhin Article on Poor
State of RF Air Defense,'' Nezavisimoye Obozreniye Online, March 5,
2010, CEP20100305358011.
\18\ See, ``Russia: Strategic Missile Troops Chief, Aide Cited on
25 December RS-24 Test Launch,'' NEWSru.com, December 25, 2007,
CEP20071227358002.
\19\ Sergei Rogov, ``Attempt Number 6: the Balance of Achievements
and Concessions. Only the United States Will Have to Reduce Its
Strategic Forces,'' Nezavisimoe Voennoe Obozrenie, April 9, 2010, (In
Russian), available at: http://nvo.ng.ru/concepts/2010-04-09/1--
snv.html.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
New START's common ceilings essentially appear to require
unilateral reductions by the United States. Russian officials and
analysts have long celebrated this situation, while some U.S. officials
and treaty proponents have acknowledged it only recently.\20\ In this
context, it is difficult to take seriously the notion that the treaty's
supposed reductions for Russia justify its prospective limitations on
U.S. flexibility and resilience.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\20\ See for example, Woolf, The New START Treaty: Central Limits
and Key Provisions, p. 20.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Even though Russia's forces are declining dramatically with or
without New START, does not the treaty provide solid barriers against
the re-emergence of Russian strategic forces? Unfortunately, no. New
START neither requires real Russian reductions nor does it provide hard
limits on a renewed build up of Russian strategic nuclear forces. This
is a troubling irony.
How can it be so? New START contains sufficient loopholes and
permissive counting rules to allow Russia to deploy far beyond the
treaty's 1,550 strategic nuclear warheads ceiling within the terms of
the treaty if Russia finds the financial resources to do so. In fact,
according to a report by the official news agency of the Russian
Federation, RIA Novosti, Russia could deploy 2,100 strategic nuclear
weapons under the treaty--well above the putative 1,550 warhead
ceiling.\21\ There are avenues that would allow Russia to deploy many
more than 2,100 warheads under the treaty. This may be significant over
time because Russia's highest defense procurement priority is the
modernization of its strategic nuclear forces.\22\ According to Russian
open sources, Russia has a new strategic air-launched nuclear cruise
missile near deployment, is MIRVing its new mobile ICBMs (the RS-24),
and has committed to deploy at least one new strategic bomber, a new
5000 km-range submarine-launched cruise missile, and a new heavy ICBM.
There also has been interest expressed in the Russian press for a new
rail-mobile ICBM and a new air-launched ICBM--neither of which,
according to some open Russian commentary, would necessarily have to be
counted under the treaty's force ceilings.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\21\ Ilya Kramnuk, ``New START Treaty based on Mutual Russian-U.S.
Concessions,'' RIA Novosti, April 22, 2010, at http://en.rian.ru/
analysis/20100409/158499862.html.
\22\ As stated by the First Deputy Defense Minister, Col-Gen.
Vladimir Popovkin in, Pavel Felgenhauer, ``Russia Seeks to Impose New
ABM Treaty on the U.S. by Developing BMD,'' July 16, 2010, at
georgiandaily.com.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The bottom line is that aging forces and Russia's production and
financial problems are causing reductions in Russia's force numbers
precipitously--with or without New START. But, if and when Russia has
the necessary financial and production capacity, New START will not
prevent Russia from deploying new forces well beyond New START's
specified ceilings.
In sum, force numbers and diversity do matter because flexibility
and resilience are key contributors to the credibility of our forces.
This was true in the past and is even more so now. New START's limits,
including on some U.S. conventional PGS options, will require U.S.
force reductions and constrain U.S. strategic force flexibility and
diversity. The most important question in this regard is whether U.S.
forces in the future will retain sufficient flexibility and resilience
to be credible in conditions that are less optimistic than those
assumed by the administration in its New START analyses. An important
consideration in this regard is that the treaty's ceilings appear not
to require real Russian nuclear force reductions in the near-term, and
its loopholes and extreme permissiveness would not prevent the renewal
of Russian strategic capabilities over time. A treaty that could reduce
U.S. flexibility and resilience but not require real Russian cuts nor
preclude a future Russian strategic renewal merits close Senate
scrutiny.
There are some steps that might help to mitigate these risks posed
by New START. They involve U.S. commitments, demonstrated by policy
guidance and robust program budgets for advanced conventional PGS,
missile defense, and innovative replacements for our aging ICBMs,
bombers and air-launched missiles--modernization programs permitted
under the treaty.
new start and missile defense
Many others have commented on New START's connections to missile
defense. So, I will only summarize my own conclusions here. Senior
administration officials have said about missile defense that, ``There
are no constraints of any kind in the New START Treaty,'' \23\ and,
``The treaty does nothing to constrain missile defenses . . . there is
no limit or constraint on what the United States can do with its
missile defense systems.'' \24\ Such administration statements simply
are false. New START includes limitations on U.S. missile defense
options. Judgments may differ regarding the significance of these
limitations, but there should be no further denials that New START
includes them.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\23\ Secretary Ellen Tauscher, House Armed Service Committee,
Hearing, U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy and Force Structure, April 15,
2010, p. 19.
\24\ Secretary Ellen Tauscher, Press Briefing, ``New START Treaty
and the Obama administration's Nonproliferation Agenda,'' March 29,
2010, available at, www.state.gov/t/us/139205.htm.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
U.S. missile defense options may need to be protected, particularly
given Russia's long-standing goal to veto U.S. missile defense and the
administration's apparent commitment to further negotiations. Toward
this end, the Senate could direct the President to make more clear to
Russia than now is reflected in the pertinent U.S. Unilateral Statement
that the United States recognizes no treaty limits on missile defense
beyond those in Article 5, paragraph 3, and that the United States will
not agree to any further negotiated limits of any kind on U.S. missile
defense options. In addition, New START establishes the Bilateral
Consultative Commission (BCC) and gives it broad authority to ``agree
upon such additional measures as may be necessary to improve the
viability and effectiveness of the Treaty.'' \25\ Missile defense is
part of the subject matter of the treaty and its protocol, and the BCC
is authorized specifically to discuss the unique distinguishing
features of missile defense launchers and interceptors and make
``viability and effectiveness'' changes in the treaty. These could be
done in secret and without Senate advice and consent.\26\ Such
institutions are not supposed to make substantive changes in the terms
of treaties. But, START I's Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission
(JCIC) served with a more limited scope, and appears to have made
significant changes in START's terms without Senate advice and consent.
This past precedent is not comforting in this regard.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\25\ New START Treaty, Protocol, Part 6, Section 1, paragraph b.
\26\ New START Treaty, Article XV, paragraph 2; New START Treaty,
Protocol, Part 6, Section 5.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The Senate might find it particularly valuable to insist on
continuous and complete visibility into the ongoing workings of the
BCC. This could be particularly helpful to ensure that no new limits on
missile defense emerge, without Senate advice and consent, from the
BCC's potentially secret proceedings.
Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Dr. Payne.
Ambassador Pifer.
STATEMENT OF AMBASSADOR STEVEN PIFER, SENIOR FELLOW, FOREIGN
POLICY CENTER ON THE UNITED STATES AND EUROPE, AND DIRECTOR,
ARMS CONTROL INITIATIVE, THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION
Ambassador Pifer. Thank you. Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain,
distinguished members of the committee, thank you for the
opportunity to appear today to discuss the New Strategic Arms
Reductions Treaty, or the New START treaty.
With your permission, I'll submit a written statement for
the record, but I would like to summarize the five ways that I
believe the New START treaty will strengthen U.S. national
security.
First, the New START treaty will limit the number of
Russian strategic nuclear warheads that could target the United
States. While political relations between Washington and Moscow
have changed dramatically since the Cold War, reducing and
limiting the strategic nuclear potential on the Russian side
nevertheless will make the United States safer and more secure.
Some question the need for treaty-based limits, given that
the Russian strategic missile force has been shrinking. Moscow,
thus far, has made a policy choice to allow that shrinkage, but
it should not be assumed that Russia would continue to reduce
its nuclear forces in the absence of the New START treaty. The
Russians could decide to build more strategic missiles and
deploy an arsenal well in excess of the New START treaty
warhead ceiling of 1,550.
Second, the New START treaty's verification measures will
provide significant information regarding Russian strategic
systems that we will not have without the treaty. Due to the
expiration of the START I treaty in December of last year,
there's currently no system of onsite inspections or data
exchanges to augment our understanding of Russia's strategic
nuclear forces. Absent the New START treaty's extensive
verification provisions, the United States will steadily lose
clarity on the status of Russia's strategic nuclear arsenal.
The New START treaty's data exchange, for example, would
require that the Russians provide the number of warheads on
each deployed ICBM and submarine-launched ballistic missile
(SLBM). Its inspection regime will allow U.S. inspectors to
choose individual missiles and check the number of warheads.
U.S. national technical means of verification cannot, on their
own, provide this kind of information.
Third, U.S. strategic nuclear forces, under the New START
treaty, will provide a strong deterrent to protect the United
States and extend deterrence to our allies. The planned triad
will be survivable, robust, and agile. Here I would associate
myself with remarks by both Mr. Miller and Dr. Foster on the
importance of the executive branch and Congress working
together to ensure that we have a modern nuclear weapons
complex, and the appropriate steps to modernize our strategic
forces.
Fourth, the New START treaty will strengthen the U.S. hand
in pressing to constrain the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
This will not affect the cases of North Korea or Iran. But U.S.
implementation of the New START treaty could help raise the
proliferation bar, including by strengthening our ability to
secure the help of third countries in pressing future nuclear
aspirants not to proceed.
Fifth, the New START treaty contributes to improved U.S.-
Russian relations. The Obama administration is finding, like
the administrations of President Reagan, President George H.W.
Bush, and President Clinton before it, that progress on arms
control has a positive impact on the broader relationship. For
example, Moscow does not see eye to eye with us on the issue of
Iran. But, Russian adoption of a tougher stance towards Tehran,
over the past 10 months, coincided with progress in, and
conclusion of, the New START treaty. Certainly, difficult
issues remain between Washington and Moscow, but the
relationship is, by any measure, better than it was 2 years
ago.
A number of concerns have been raised about the New START
treaty, such as the possible impact on missile defense, the
bomber-weapon-counting rule, and the verification regime. I
believe these concerns lack a substantive basis, or have good
responses. The New START treaty does not, for example, affect
in a meaningful way our ability to deploy missile defenses to
protect the United States and our allies. I address these
points in detail in my prepared statement.
All this does not mean that the New START treaty is ideal.
It would have been preferable to have a bomber-weapon-counting
rule that reflected less of a discount, and to retain the START
I telemetry provisions. But, an agreement necessarily reflects
compromises that take into account the position of the other
side. These points do not outweigh the compelling arguments in
favor of the New START treaty.
A failure to ratify the New START treaty, moreover, would
have substantial costs for the United States. Lack of the New
START treaty's verification regime would deny us valuable
insights into Russian strategic forces and unpredictability
would grow. The U.S. effort to curb nuclear proliferation would
suffer, and a failure to ratify would deal a major blow to
U.S.-Russia relations, resulting in less cooperation from
Moscow on problems such as Iran.
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee, I
believe that a substantive assessment of the New START treaty
demonstrates that the treaty is in the U.S. national interest.
It merits the Senate providing consent to ratification.
Thank you for your attention, and I look forward to
answering your questions.
[The prepared statement of Ambassador Pifer follows:]
Prepared Statement by Ambassador Steven Pifer
Introduction
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to appear today to testify on
the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) and why I believe
its ratification and entry-into-force are in the national interest of
the United States.
New START will strengthen U.S. national security in several ways.
The treaty will:
limit Russian strategic nuclear forces in a verifiable
manner;
provide greater transparency regarding Russian
strategic systems, allowing us to make better-informed
decisions regarding our own strategic forces;
permit the United States to maintain a robust nuclear
deterrent capable of protecting the United States and our
allies;
strengthen the U.S. position in the international
community in seeking to curb the proliferation of nuclear
weapons; and
contribute to a more positive U.S.-Russia
relationship.
At the same time, the treaty does not affect our ability to develop
and deploy missile defenses to protect the United States and our
allies.
The arguments in favor of ratification of New START are compelling.
The United States will be better off with the treaty than without it. A
number of concerns have been raised about the treaty since Presidents
Obama and Medvedev signed it on April 8. When those issues are
examined, they do not make a case for withholding consent to
ratification. Moreover, a failure to ratify the treaty would have
significant costs for the United States.
why new start is in the u.s. national interest
There are five principal reasons why New START strengthens U.S.
national security.
First, New START will limit the number of Russian strategic nuclear
warheads that could strike the United States. New START's limits of
1,550 warheads and 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles constitute
significant reductions compared to the limits in the 1991 START I
Treaty: 6,000 warheads and 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles.\1\ New START represents a more modest reduction compared to
the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), which limited
each side to no more than 1,700-2,200 strategic nuclear warheads by
2012.\2\ New START, however, includes agreed counting rules, while SORT
had none; it is not clear that the sides shared the same view of how to
count warheads under SORT.
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\1\ Due to differences in counting rules between START I and New
START, these limits are not exactly comparable.
\2\ SORT did not limit strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. As SORT
had no counting rules or verification measures, it provided no way for
the sides to verify the number of warheads deployed by the other.
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Given the changes in political relations between Washington and
Moscow since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet
Union, it is difficult to conceive of circumstances in which there
would be a nuclear exchange between the United States and Russia.
Nevertheless, reducing the strategic nuclear potential on the Russian
side and reestablishing an effective verification regime will make the
United States safer and more secure.
Some question the need for treaty-based limits on strategic nuclear
forces given that the Russian strategic missile force has been
shrinking. This results from the aging of their current
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and ballistic missile
submarines, and their relatively modest procurement rate of new ICBMs,
which is reportedly less than 10 per year. Moscow thus far has made a
policy choice to allow that shrinkage. It should not be assumed that
Russia would choose to continue to reduce its nuclear forces in the
absence of New START. The Russians could, if they felt it necessary,
change their policy and build more strategic ballistic missiles and
continue to deploy an arsenal of deployed strategic warheads well in
excess of the New START ceiling of 1,550 warheads. While Russia's
economic situation is not as strong as it was prior to the global
financial crisis, recovering energy prices ensure a steady stream of
revenue to the Russian Government that could be used to fund expanded
production of new missiles.
Second, New START's verification and transparency measures will
provide significant information regarding Russian strategic systems
that we will not have without the treaty. With the expiration of START
I and its verification regime on December 5, 2009, there is currently
no system of on-site inspections or data exchanges to augment our
understanding of Russia's strategic nuclear forces. Absent the new
treaty's extensive verification provisions, the United States will have
to rely solely on national technical means of verification and will
steadily lose clarity on the status of Russia's strategic nuclear
arsenal.
New START's data exchange, for example, will require that the
Russians provide the location of every one of their deployed and non-
deployed ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) as
well as the number of warheads on each of their deployed missiles. The
inspection regime will allow U.S. inspectors to choose individual
Russian ICBMs and SLBMs and check the number of warheads on those
missiles, to be sure that they conform to the number in the Russian
data declaration. U.S. national technical means of verification, such
as imagery satellites, are by all accounts very capable, but they
cannot on their own provide information such as the number of warheads
on individual Russian strategic ballistic missiles.
The aggregate of New START's verification provisions--exchanges,
data updates, unique identifiers, notifications and inspections--will
have a synergistic effect. For example, notifications of changes in
data, of the exit of solid-fueled ICBMs or SLBMs from a production
facility, or of movement of ICBMs to a test range will allow us to cue
our national technical means and use them more effectively to monitor
Russian forces.
The treaty's verification regime will provide the United States a
far better picture of the development of Russian strategic forces over
the next 10 years than we would have with just national technical means
alone. Greater predictability about Russian strategic forces bolsters
strategic stability. It will allow the U.S. military to avoid having to
make worse-case assumptions; it instead will be able to make better-
informed and smarter decisions about how to equip and operate U.S.
strategic nuclear forces. While not required for monitoring New START's
limits, the treaty's telemetry provisions will provide transparency
regarding the performance of Russian strategic ballistic missiles.
Third, while New START will reduce U.S. strategic nuclear forces,
they will continue to provide a strong and effective deterrent. The
Department of Defense has said that, under New START, it will maintain
the strategic triad. It intends to deploy a force of up to 420 single-
warhead Minuteman III ICBMs, up to 60 B-2 and B-52 heavy bombers
equipped for nuclear armaments, and 240 Trident D-5 SLBMs.\3\ The force
will be survivable, robust, and agile--able to deter attack on the
United States and extend deterrence to U.S. allies.
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\3\ As New START limits the United States to no more than 700
deployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments
and the Department of Defense plans to deploy 240 SLBMs, the United
States will be able to deploy a total of no more than 460 ICBMs and
heavy bombers. This could be 400 Minuteman III ICBMs and 60 heavy
bombers, or 420 Minuteman III ICBMs and 40 heavy bombers, or some
combination in between.
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Compared to the current force structure, U.S. strategic forces
following implementation of the New START reductions would present a
potential attacker with the challenge of striking almost the same
number of targets, less 30-50 ICBM silos. Today and for the foreseeable
future, only Russia is capable of even contemplating such a strike.
U.S.-Russian relations have changed dramatically since the Cold War, so
such a strike is barely conceivable. Nevertheless, were the Russians to
consider an attack, they would face significant and daunting
challenges.
New START will have limited Russian strategic nuclear forces. Since
each U.S. Minuteman III will carry only one warhead, and conservative
attack scenarios normally postulate using two warheads against each
ICBM silo, a Russian first strike attempting to disarm the United
States would require that the Russians use well over half of their
permitted weapons to destroy about one-fourth of permitted U.S.
strategic warheads in fixed ICBM silos. This is hardly a good exchange
ratio.
Assuming that the U.S. Navy keeps one-half of its Trident ballistic
missile submarines not in long-term maintenance at sea--a conservative
assumption \4\--even if all ICBMs, bombers and submarines in port were
destroyed, the United States would still retain some 540 nuclear
warheads at sea under the New START limits.\5\ That force would give
the president a range of response options. Moreover, this assumes a
``bolt from the blue,'' a surprise attack in which the United States
has not generated its forces. In a crisis, the U.S. Navy would have the
option of deploying more Trident submarines at sea, which would
increase the number of surviving warheads, while the U.S. Air Force
could place heavy bombers on alert, thereby increasing their survival
prospects. The ability of a large portion of U.S. strategic nuclear
forces to survive an attack would be a significant factor dissuading
and deterring a potential aggressor from striking in the first place.
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\4\ According to the U.S. Navy Fact File, ``The Ohio class design
allows the submarines to operate for 15 or more years between major
overhauls. On average, the submarines spend 77 days at sea followed by
35 days in-port for maintenance. Each SSBN [ballistic missile
submarine] has two crews, Blue and Gold, which alternate manning the
submarines while on patrol. This maximizes the SSBN's strategic
availability while maintaining the crew's training readiness and morale
at high levels.'' This suggests that closer to two-thirds of the
submarines are at sea at any particular time. Of the 14 Trident
ballistic missile submarines, 2 usually are in long-term maintenance,
leaving 12 for normal operations. A two-thirds deployment rate would
mean eight at sea.
\5\ The Department of Defense plans for the strategic triad under
New START suggest the 240 deployed Trident D-5 SLBMs will carry a total
of 1,090 warheads. Thus, half of the Trident submarines at sea would
mean some 540 warheads at sea. If 8 submarines were at sea, that would
mean some 720 warheads.
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Fourth, ratification and entry-into-force of New START will
strengthen the U.S. hand in pressing to constrain the proliferation of
nuclear weapons. This will not reverse North Korea's decision to
acquire a nuclear capability or persuade Iran to halt its nuclear
efforts; the United States and the international community will have to
pursue other means to achieve those goals. But U.S. ratification and
implementation of New START could help raise the bar to prevent other
countries from proceeding down the path to acquiring nuclear weapons,
including by strengthening our ability to secure the help of third
countries in pressing future nuclear aspirants not to proceed.
The United States and Russia together have some 95 percent of the
world's nuclear weapons; if we are not reducing those arsenals, what
does that do to our credibility in asking other countries to forgo
nuclear programs? If New START is rejected or its entry-into-force
substantially delayed, U.S. non-proliferation efforts would suffer. The
ability of the United States to press other states to endorse,
implement and help to enforce additional counter-proliferation and non-
proliferation initiatives--such as universal adherence to the IAEA
additional protocol--would, in all likelihood, be severely weakened.
Fifth, New START contributes to improved U.S.-Russian relations.
Relations between Washington and Moscow in 2008 fell to their lowest
point since the collapse of the USSR in 1991. The relationship has
improved substantially since then, and New START has been a major
driver of that improvement. While the Russians do not regard the treaty
as ideal, they recognize that Washington took account of some of their
key views.
A primary Russian concern regarding a successor to START I was that
it contain limits on strategic delivery vehicles. In 2008, the Bush
administration proposed to replace START I with a follow-on agreement
that would have limited deployed strategic nuclear warheads but not
strategic delivery vehicles. This was unacceptable to the Russians.
They believed that, with no limits on strategic delivery vehicles and
no limits on non-deployed strategic nuclear warheads, the United States
would have a major breakout capability, that is, the ability to quickly
deploy strategic warheads beyond the limits in a follow-on agreement.
The Russians thus appreciated the readiness of the Obama
administration to return to the traditional approach to constraining
strategic offensive forces and limit strategic delivery vehicles as
well as strategic warheads. That facilitated conclusion of New START
and also demonstrated Washington's broader willingness to take into
account Russian concerns. The Obama administration is finding, like the
administrations of President Reagan, President George H.W. Bush, and
President Clinton before it, that progress on arms control can have a
positive impact on the overall relationship.
The Russians now permit overflights by U.S. military aircraft to
move personnel and lethal military equipment to support U.S. and NATO
operations in Afghanistan. This, plus Moscow's allowance of land
transit of other materiel through Russia, has helped diversify supply
routes to Afghanistan. On another priority issue for Washington, Moscow
has over the past 10 months adopted a tougher stance toward Iran's
nuclear ambitions, delaying delivery of the S-300 surface-to-air
missile system and supporting a June U.N. Security Council resolution
imposing new sanctions on Iran, including an embargo on most types of
arms. The latter point is notable in that Russia has long viewed Iran
as a market for conventional weapons sales.
This does not mean that Moscow sees eye-to-eye with us on Iran;
indeed, the Russians have a different set of interests with Tehran and
view the prospect of an Iranian nuclear weapon with a lesser sense of
urgency than does Washington. The Russians have, however, over the past
10 months adopted a tougher position toward Tehran than in the past.
That coincided with progress on and conclusion of New START.
All is not going well in U.S.-Russian relations. There are serious
grounds for concern over political freedom within Russia. In addition,
Washington and Moscow continue to differ sharply on questions regarding
the post-Soviet space, such as Georgia and the breakaway regions of
South Ossetia and Abkhazia. But the overall relationship is by any
measure in better shape than it was 2 years ago, and New START has made
an important contribution to that. Rejection or substantial delay of
New START entry-into-force would damage the broader relationship and
make it more difficult to secure Russian support on issues of concern
to Washington, such as Iran.
responding to concerns about new start
In the time since New START's signature, a number of concerns have
arisen about the treaty, its terms and its impact on U.S. security.
When examined, those concerns have no substantive basis or are over-
stated relative to the benefits of the treaty.
First, some worry that New START will limit missile defense and/or
weaken the American commitment to missile defense. The New START treaty
does not constrain the planned U.S. missile defense program and has
only one limit on missile defense. That limit prevents the United
States from doing something it would not in any case want to do.
The treaty's preamble recognizes ``the existence of the
interrelationship between strategic offensive arms and strategic
defensive arms.'' This reflects a strategic reality that has been
acknowledged for more than 40 years: if one side deploys a strategic
missile defense system, that could have an impact on the other side's
strategic offensive forces. The preamble also notes ``current strategic
defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of the
strategic offensive arms of the Parties.'' That statement reflects the
current strategic reality. This preambular language does not constrain
missile defense.
The single limit in the treaty on missile defense appears in
Article V, paragraph 3. It says ``each Party shall not convert and
shall not use ICBM launchers and SLBM launchers for placement of
missile defense interceptors therein.'' This would prevent the United
States from converting existing ICBM silos to hold ground-based
interceptor missiles. However, as senior Department of Defense
officials have testified, the cost of converting one ICBM silo to house
a ground-based interceptor missile would be $20 million more than
building a new interceptor silo from scratch. No one has offered a
plausible reason or scenario for putting missile defense interceptors
on ballistic missile submarines. A limit that prevents the United
States from doing something that the United States would not do in any
event is a limit that the United States should be able to live with.
Others have expressed concern about the unilateral statement issued
by the Russians on April 8, which says in part that New START ``may be
effective and viable only in conditions where there is no qualitative
or quantitative build-up in the missile defense system capabilities of
the United States. Consequently, the extraordinary events referred to
in Article XIV of the Treaty also include a build-up in the missile
defense capabilities of the United States of America such that it would
give rise to a threat to the strategic nuclear force potential of the
Russian Federation.'' This statement merits several observations.
First, as a unilateral statement rather than as a part of the
treaty, this statement has no legal bearing. It should be read merely
as a statement of Russian concern.
Second, Russia has the right under the treaty--as does the United
States--to withdraw on 3 months notice for any reason that it
determines endangers its supreme interests. Such withdrawal clauses
have been an integral part of every U.S.-Soviet or U.S.-Russian
strategic nuclear arms agreement. Indeed, the United States invoked the
withdrawal clause in December 2001 when it notified Russia of its
intent to withdraw from the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty.
Third, President Medvedev explained the unilateral statement in
some detail in an April 9 interview. He said ``that formula says there
is an interconnection between strategic offensive arms and missile
defense. But it's mentioned there also about circumstances which were
the basis [for signature] of that treaty agreed upon by both parties.
So, if those circumstances will change, then you would have, we would
consider it as the reason to jeopardize the whole agreement. That
doesn't mean that because of that rule, if the American side starts to
build up the missile [defense] system, that the treaty would
automatically lose its power. . . . I would like to make sure there is
no impression that any change would be a reason to abandon a signed
agreement.'' \6\ The point is that the Russians would not be concerned
by any U.S. missile defense developments but by missile developments
that would endanger their strategic offensive forces. In those
circumstances, they have the option of withdrawing from the treaty. Why
is this considered a remarkable point? Were Russian missile defense
developments to threaten the U.S. strategic deterrent, Washington
presumably would want the option to withdraw from the treaty.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\6\ ``Transcript: George Stephanopoulos Interviews Russian
President Dmitry Medvedev,'' April 9, 2009, http//abcnews.go.com/
print?id=10348116.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Fourth, Moscow expressed concern about potential U.S. missile
defense developments in 1991 and made a similar unilateral statement in
conjunction with its signature of the START I Treaty. In fact, the
Russians did not withdraw from START I, even after the United States
withdrew from the ABM Treaty in 2002 and began deploying ground-based
interceptors whose deployment would have been barred by the ABM Treaty.
Moscow may hope to use the threat of withdrawal to persuade the United
States to scale back its missile defense plans, but that tactic has not
worked in the past.
Fifth, the Russians signed New START after President Obama made
clear that he would not agree to limit the U.S. ability to defend
against a ballistic missile attack from North Korea or Iran. They did
so presumably because they concluded that the constraints on strategic
offensive forces are in their interest and that U.S. missile defense
plans--particularly the Phased Adaptive Approach based on the Standard
SM-3 interceptor--will not endanger their strategic offensive forces
over the 10-year life of the treaty.
Second, some express concern that conventional warheads on ICBMs
and SLBMs will count under New START's limit of 1,550 strategic
warheads. At present, the United States deploys only nuclear warheads
on its strategic ballistic missiles. The Russians are concerned that,
given the increased accuracy of U.S. strategic systems, conventional
warheads could destroy strategic targets that previously would be
targeted with nuclear weapons. The Russians therefore sought a ban on
conventional warheads on ICBMs and SLBMs but fell off that when the
United States agreed to count any conventional warheads on strategic
ballistic missiles under the warhead limit.
The United States has considered a program--Prompt Global Strike--
to put conventional warheads on ICBMs or SLBMs. Were that program to go
forward, those conventional warheads would count under the terms of New
START. However, the number of conventional warheads on strategic
ballistic missiles would likely be small. The Obama administration has
characterized this as a niche capability. The Bush administration
considered removing the nuclear warheads from two Trident D-5 SLBMs on
each Trident ballistic missile submarine and replacing those with
conventional warheads. That plan, which did not go forward, would have
meant less than 30 conventional warheads on the total SLBM force, a
tiny fraction of the 1,550 warheads permitted under New START. An ICBM
or SLBM is an awfully expensive way to deliver a conventional warhead
to a target. It is difficult to conceive of plausible scenarios where
other, more cost-effective means--such as bomber-delivered weapons or
Trident submarines converted to carry conventional sea-launched cruise
missiles--would not suffice and provide lower-cost strike options.
Third, some criticize New START for counting heavy bombers as
carrying only one warhead each, when they can carry many more. New
START treats warheads on ballistic missiles and heavy bombers
differently. It counts the actual number of warheads on ICBMs and
SLBMs; thus, if either side were to choose to deploy only ICBMs and
SLBMs, it would face a hard limit of 1,550 warheads. The rule
attributing one weapon to each heavy bomber equipped for nuclear
armaments is more an accounting mechanism rather than a hard limit.
Depending on how many weapons the sides plan to place on bombers, the
total number of ballistic missile warheads and bomber weapons could
exceed 1,550.
The negotiators explained this rule by noting that, in contrast to
ICBMs and SLBMs, neither U.S. nor Russian bombers are normally
maintained with any nuclear weapons on board. They thus decided to
attribute one weapon to each deployed heavy bomber.
Securing preferential treatment for bombers has been a central goal
of U.S. arms control policy for 40 years. The rationale for
differentiation between bombers and ballistic missiles is that bombers,
due to their long flight times (as much as 8-10 hours as opposed to 15-
30 minutes for strategic ballistic missiles), cannot be used in a
surprise attack. The Reagan administration's original START proposal in
1982 contained no limits on bombers. When it was concluded in 1991,
START I had counting rules that discounted the number of weapons
attributed to bombers under the 6,000 warhead limit.\7\
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\7\ Under START I, each U.S. bomber equipped to carry long-range
air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) counted as ten under the 6,000
warhead limit, even though U.S. bombers could carry more. The B-52H,
for example, could carry up to 20 ALCMs. Russian bombers equipped to
carry long-range ALCMs counted as eight under the 6.000 warhead limit;
they could carry more than eight but not as many as U.S. bombers. U.S.
and Russian bombers not equipped to carry long-range ALCMs counted as
one under the 6,000 warhead limit, even though they could carry many
more. U.S. B-52 bombers, for example, could carry 12-14 nuclear bombs
and short-range attack missiles and still count as only one warhead
under START I.
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It would have been preferable had New START included a counting
rule that provided less of a discount for bomber weapons. However, this
rule benefits Russia and the United States equally. The United States
historically has given greater weight to the bomber leg of its triad
than did the Soviet Union or Russia, and deploys twice as many bombers
as does Russia, though many U.S. bombers have been converted to
conventional-only roles.
Fourth, some worry that New START does not define a rail-mobile
ICBM launcher, thereby creating a loophole for future exploitation by
the Russians. It is correct that the treaty's definitions do not
specifically define a ``rail-mobile ICBM launcher.'' U.S. negotiators
did not pursue this because the Russians retired their rail-mobile
ICBMs prior to the beginning of the New START negotiations. The plant
which manufactured those SS-24 ICBMs is located in Dnipropetrovsk, in
what today is independent Ukraine.
Part One of the New START Protocol defines an ICBM launcher as ``a
device intended or used to contain, prepare for launch, and launch an
ICBM.'' This would capture under New START's limits any rail-mobile
ICBM that the Russians might choose to deploy in the future. It is
difficult, moreover, to give credence to the notion that a U.S.
administration would sit back while the Russians deployed rail-mobile
ICBMs and claimed that they somehow were exempt from the limits of New
START.
Fifth, some express concern that New START has less in the way of
verification than did START I. As Presidents Obama and Medvedev agreed
in July 2009, one goal for New START was, where possible, to streamline
and simplify verification measures. This reflected a desire on the part
of the militaries on both sides to make verification measures less
costly and less intrusive on operational practices. It also reflected
the fact that, over 15 years of implementing the START I verification
regime, the sides gained considerable expertise, including on how to
make verification simpler and more efficient.
In some cases, New START's limits did not require the kinds of
verification provisions that START I did. This was the case with
telemetry, the information that a missile broadcasts during a flight
test to report on its performance. START I required that the sides
broadcast virtually all telemetry unencrypted and that, following a
test, the testing side provide the other with a copy of the telemetry
that it recorded. START I needed access to this telemetry for three
reasons: (1) to monitor START I's limit on ballistic missile throw-
weight; (2) to monitor START I's limit on new types of strategic
ballistic missiles; and (3) to monitor the number of warhead releases
or simulated releases during a ballistic missile test to ensure that
the total number of releases did not exceed the number of warheads
attributed to that type of ballistic missile.
New START does not have limits on throw-weight, on new types of
ballistic missiles, or on the total number of warheads attributed to a
particular missile type. As for monitoring the number of warheads, New
START uses inspections to confirm the actual number of warheads on
individual ICBMs and SLBMs. New START thus does not need telemetry for
purposes of verifying its limits. It would have been preferable for
transparency purposes were New START to retain START I's telemetry
provisions, so that we would have access to all telemetry from Russian
ballistic missile tests. The Russians, however, were not prepared to
agree to this. The result is a more limited transparency provision that
provides for exchanging telemetry on five missile tests per year.
More broadly, however, asking whether New START has more or less in
the way of verification measures than START I is using the wrong metric
for judging New START's verification regime, just as it would be
incorrect to compare New START to the SORT Treaty, which had no
verification measures. The verification system of START I was designed
to monitor compliance with a different treaty, with a different (and
more complex) set of limits, in a different political context. For
example, START I applied inspections to 70 facilities, many never
previously seen by U.S. personnel on the ground. There are now only 35
facilities subject to inspection, many quite familiar to U.S.
inspectors from past visits.
The verifiability of New START should be judged by whether its
monitoring and verification measures are appropriate for its limits
such that the United States will have high confidence that it could
detect a militarily significant violation in a timely manner, that is,
in time for the United States to respond before its security is
jeopardized. The answer to this question is ``yes.'' The treaty is
effectively verifiable, as General Chilton, Commander of U.S. Strategic
Command, stated last week.
Sixth, some criticize New START for not limiting tactical nuclear
weapons, where Russia has a significant numerical advantage. It is
correct that New START does not limit tactical nuclear weapons. Had the
administration tried to limit those weapons in this agreement, it could
have taken much longer to negotiate, when the urgency was to secure a
new strategic arms agreement given the looming expiration of START I in
December 2009. The negotiators would likely still be at it.
The Obama administration has stated that it will address tactical
nuclear weapons in the next round of negotiations. This is important.
With New START's limits, we will be at the point where it is difficult
to countenance further strategic arms cuts without addressing limits on
tactical nuclear weapons. A failure to ratify New START, however, would
damage the broader U.S.-Russian relationship and would not make
securing Russian agreement to reductions in tactical nuclear weapons
any easier. Under those circumstances, it is uncertain how quickly the
Russians would even agree to return to the negotiating table. Once they
did return, the new negotiation would prove far more difficult as the
Russians revisited concessions from New START and made new demands.
Finally, as Senator Lugar noted in a July 8 statement, ``most of
Russia's tactical nuclear weapons either have very short ranges, are
used for homeland air defense, are devoted to the Chinese border, or
are in storage.'' The countries most exposed to Russia's tactical
nuclear arsenal--NATO allies in Europe--support New START.
Seventh, some argue that further reductions in the U.S. strategic
arsenal would be risky without a plan to maintain a robust U.S. nuclear
deterrent. In fact, the administration requested $7 billion in the
fiscal year 2011 budget for the National Nuclear Security
Administration's (NNSA) weapons activities, a 10 percent increase
compared to the previous year. The administration has stated that it
intends to spend $80 billion over 10 years for NNSA weapons activities
and the nuclear weapons complex, as well as $100 billion over 10 years
to maintain and modernize strategic delivery systems.
When the concerns about New START are examined, they lack
substantive basis or are over-stated relative to the benefits of the
treaty. None of these concerns should offer grounds for the Senate to
withhold its consent to ratification, particularly when bearing in mind
the benefits that the treaty offers and the substantial costs to the
United States of a failure to ratify.
possible russian cheating
There has been some discussion before this committee regarding the
possibility of Russian cheating. No cheating on an arms control
agreement should be politically acceptable. However, one can draw a
distinction between cheating that will have little impact on the
strategic balance and cheating that is militarily significant. While
one would want a monitoring and verification regime capable of
detecting any cheating, the focus should be on a monitoring and
verification regime that can detect militarily significant treaty
violations in a timely manner, that is, in time for a U.S. response
before its security interests are jeopardized. This is the standard of
``effective verification'' against which arms control treaties have
historically been evaluated.
Under the New START treaty, the United States should be able to
detect militarily significant cheating. That plus possible U.S.
response options should dissuade the Russians from considering cheating
in the first place.
For example, could the Russians cheat by deploying extra warheads
on ICBMs or SLBMs? Perhaps, but they would run a significantly greater
risk of being caught than in the past. START I provided for 10
inspections per year to ensure that the number of warheads on an ICBM
or SLBM did not exceed the number attributed to that type of ICBM or
SLBM. The sides concluded that ten inspections created a sufficient
risk of being caught so that neither would cheat. New START also
provides for ten warhead inspections per year, but the number of
inspectable ICBMs and SLBMs will be dramatically reduced compared to
the number in START I. That raises the likelihood that cheating would
be discovered.\8\
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\8\ The 10 START I warhead inspections were conducted when the
treaty allowed each side to deploy 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery
vehicles and the Russians deployed fewer than 100 heavy bombers; thus
the ``universe'' of inspectable Russian ICBMs and SLBMs could be in the
neighborhood of 1,500. New START permits 10 inspections per year to
confirm the number of warheads on individual ICBMs or SLBMs, but the
``universe'' of inspectable ICBMs and SLBMs will be far less than under
START I--no more than 700 deployed ICBMs and SLBMs, if one were to make
the unlikely assumption that the Russians deploy no heavy bombers and
sustain a force of 700 deployed strategic missiles. One can infer from
the July 2009 Russian proposal for the limit on strategic delivery
vehicles--500--that Moscow plans to deploy fewer than 700 ICBMs and
SLBMs. Some estimates by non-governmental analysts project a Russian
deployed strategic delivery vehicle force under New START as low as
400. This would narrow the ``universe'' of inspectable ballistic
missiles even further, again raising the odds of discovery of cheating.
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Given that the Russians will likely have significant headroom under
the 700 limit on deployed ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers equipped for
nuclear armaments, it is hard to see that they would perceive an
advantage to trying to build undeclared ballistic missiles. The United
States, moreover, would likely detect the production of more than a
small number of undeclared ballistic missiles.
Finally, when considering whether to cheat, the Russians would face
a major disincentive in the form of the possible U.S. response. As
described by the Department of Defense, the United States will have to
eliminate or convert about 130 deployed strategic delivery vehicles
under New START but will reach the warhead limit of 1,550 largely by
``downloading''--removing warheads from deployed missiles. The Russians
understand that those missiles could be ``uploaded,'' that is, the
downloaded warheads could be returned to deployed missiles. New START
will leave the United States with a significant upload capability.
Under the plans announced by the Department of Defense, the U.S. Navy
will have up to 1,090 warheads on its 240 deployed Trident D-5 SLBMs.
Two hundred and forty Trident D-5s are capable of carrying 1,920
warheads, so those SLBMs would have an upload capacity of 830 SLBM
warheads. As for the ICBM force, the planned 400-420 Minuteman III
ICBMs will each carry single warheads, but each is capable of carrying
three warheads, meaning an upload capacity of 800-840 ICBM warheads.
When considering any cheating scenario, the Russians would have to bear
in mind that the United States could respond in a matter of months by
uploading more than 1,600 warheads, doubling the number allowed by New
START. That should provide a significant disincentive to cheating.
conclusion
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, members of the committee, there are
compelling reasons for the Senate to give its consent to ratification
of the New START treaty. That agreement serves the U.S. national
interest: it will limit the number of strategic warheads that could
target the United States, provide greater transparency regarding
Russian strategic forces, allow the United States to maintain a robust
deterrent, strengthen the U.S. hand in pressing to constrain
proliferation, and contribute to a more positive U.S.-Russia
relationship.
While one might wish for different provisions in some parts of the
treaty--for example, a lower discount in the bomber weapon counting
rule or greater access to telemetry--a treaty inevitably reflects
compromises that take account of the other side's position. These
points do not come close to outweighing the gains that will accrue to
U.S. security from the treaty's entry-into-force. Moreover, a failure
to ratify would carry substantial costs for the United States. Lack of
New START's verification regime would deny us valuable insights into
Russian strategic systems, and unpredictability would grow. The U.S.
effort to curb nuclear proliferation would suffer. A failure to ratify
would deal a major blow to U.S.-Russian relations, resulting in less
cooperation from Moscow on problems such as Iran.
New START is in the U.S. national interest. The Senate should
provide its consent to ratification. Finally, I would reiterate that,
with the expiration of START I in December, the United States no longer
receives the data on Russian strategic offensive forces provided by
START I's verification regime. Early ratification and entry-into-force
of New START will close this gap and restore a situation in which the
United States has access to important information regarding Russian
strategic forces.
Thank you for your attention.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Ambassador.
Let's try 8 minutes, for our first round of questioning.
The New START treaty, in its preamble, recognizes that
there is an interrelationship between strategic offensive arms
and strategic defensive arms, and there's also an
interrelationship that will become more important as strategic
nuclear arms are reduced. That's not in the text, but it's in
the preamble.
First of all, I guess, Dr. Payne, do you agree there are
such interrelationships?
Dr. Payne. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Why?
Dr. Payne. There are a number of interrelationships between
offense and defense. For example, it seems to me that defense
actually facilitates the reduction of offensive forces, because
it eases the potential verification problems. In other cases,
the deployment of defense might encourage offensive force
production by a state that wants to overcome that defense. So,
there are a number of potential linkages between offense and
defense, and it seems to me that preamble acknowledges that.
Chairman Levin. The Congressional Commission on the
Strategic Posture of the United States on which, I think, both
you, Dr. Payne and Dr. Foster, served, where Bill Perry and
James Schlesinger were the chair and the vice chair, recognized
the relationship between the strategic offensive and defensive
forces. It also said the following: ``For more than a decade,
the development of U.S. BMDs has been guided by the principles
of protecting against limited strikes, while, two, taking into
account the legitimate concerns of Russia and China about
strategic stability.'' This Commission said that, ``these
remain sound guiding principles that defense is sufficient to
sow doubts in Moscow or Beijing about the viability of their
deterrence and could lead them to take actions that increase
the threats to the United States, its allies, and friends.''
Then, one of the recommendations of the commission was that
while the missile threats posed by potential regional
aggressors are countered, the United States should ensure that
its actions do not lead Russia or China to take actions that
increase the threat to the United States, its allies, and
friends. Could you expand on that a bit, Dr. Payne?
Dr. Payne. I think what the commission was getting at was
fairly clear in the words. The basic point is that U.S. missile
defense, at this point, is intended to provide active
protection against limited threats, such as those posed by
rogue states. But that there, at least at this point, is not an
intention to deploy missile defenses that might, for example,
bring into question Russia's strategic capability.
Chairman Levin. You've raised article 5's paragraph 3 of
the treaty, which prohibits converting ICBM or SLBM launchers
to be launchers of missile defense interceptors and vice versa.
I believe this is the only provision in the treaty that has a
constraint related to missile defense options. But, it
prohibits something the United States does not want to do, does
not plan to do, does not make economic sense, and which, if it
were not prohibited, could cause a dangerous and destabilizing
miscalculation.
There's not been enough discussion of that last point,
which is that this provision will avoid confusion and
miscalculation. Both sides would be bound by the provision;
it's not binding just on us. It prohibits, as I said, silo
conversions that would be risky and, in other ways, unneeded
and not planned. If either side could use silos for either
nuclear missiles or missile defense interceptors, the other
side would not know, with certainty, what is in a silo and
whether a nuclear missile is being launched from a missile
defense silo or vice versa.
Let me start with you, Ambassador Pifer. Would you agree
that it is in our interest to avoid that confusion and
miscalculation?
Ambassador Pifer. I agree that would be a risk that if you
put a missile defense interceptor in a silo in an ICBM field,
if you had to launch that interceptor, the Russians would see
the launch and might not understand that it was an interceptor,
as opposed to an ICBM. Particularly, if that interceptor was
heading in the direction, for example, of intercepting an
Iranian missile, where it might be heading towards Russia, that
could cause additional concerns about miscalculation.
Chairman Levin. Would you agree that while this is
technically a limitation, it is a limitation that is binding on
both sides, and is it a desirable limitation? Do you agree with
that?
Ambassador Pifer. Sir, based on the testimony by General
Riley, when he said it would cost him about $20 million per
silo to convert an ICBM silo, as opposed to building a new
silo, it seems to me that, yes, this is a constraint on missile
defense. But, a constraint that prevents us from doing
something that we would not do is probably a restraint that we
could live with.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Mr. Miller, let me ask you a
question. You said that tactical nuclear weapons are properly
not part of the the New START treaty. I think all of you
commented on the disproportionate number of tactical nuclear
weapons in the Russian inventory, compared to ours. But, why,
then, is it not part of the the New START treaty?
Mr. Miller. Senator Levin, I believe that the New START
treaty is focused on the strategic forces of both sides. The
long-range forces that essentially could threaten each other.
The tactical forces are clearly a political and a military
threat to our allies. But, we have failed, for decades, to get
our hands around that threat. My view is that this has to be
handled in a separate treaty between the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) and Russia, a view subscribed to by former
Secretary General of NATO, Lord George Robertson and Dr. Kori
Schake. I believe that has to deal with, but in a different
fora.
Chairman Levin. Ambassador, there's a number of critics who
have pointed to a Russian unilateral statement on missile
defense as an indication that Russia would withdraw from the
New START treaty, if the United States pursues additional
missile defenses. They've also suggested that the threat, or
implied threat, might dissuade the United States from pursuing
missile defenses, for fear of Russian withdrawal. However, is
it not true that in the START I treaty, there was a similar
unilateral statement by the then-Soviet government that the
START treaty would only be effective and viable as long as the
Antiballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty remained in force? Is it not
also true that the United States eventually withdrew from the
ABM Treaty, but that the Russian Government did not withdraw
from the START treaty? So, would you, to put the third question
all in one, agree that the Russian unilateral statement is not
part of the treaty, is not binding on either side, it does not
prevent the United States from pursuing future missile
defenses?
Ambassador Pifer. Senator, I would agree with that. The
Russians did make a similar statement, in the context of the
1991 START I treaty, and did not withdraw from START I, even
when the United States, in 2002, withdrew from the ABM Treaty.
I would also note that the day after the Russians made
their unilateral statement, President Medvedev made a comment
on this. He said that the Russians would not withdraw because
of any American missile defense deployments. He said it would
be missile defense deployments that would threaten the Russian
strategic nuclear deterrent. Frankly, I do not find that an
unremarkable statement, or, I don't find that a remarkable
statement. I would assume that, if, in 7 years from now, the
Russians had a missile defense capability that threatened our
deterrent, we also would want the right to withdraw from the
treaty. But, this is a unilateral statement. It is not legally
binding.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Thank you all.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. How does a defensive missile system
threaten deterrence, Ambassador Pifer? You obviously have an
exact opposite view of what missile defense does. Missile
defense doesn't harm anybody's deterrence, it harms the ability
of countries for first strike. I mean, you just made an
Orwellian statement that, somehow, missile defense harms
people's first-strike deterrent. It's amazing to me. Do you
want to clarify your response you just gave to Senator Levin?
Ambassador Pifer. Yes, Senator. I think when you look at
the question of missile defense, I look at it in the context of
strategic stability. I think the Russian concern here is that a
combination of an American first strike, which I do not think
is at all likely, but an American first strike, and then the
surviving Russian forces having to deal with an American
missile defense, would call into question the ability of their
nuclear deterrent. I think that's a fairly straightforward
concern.
The Russians, when they look at the phased-adapted approach
that we've adopted for the Standard Missile-3 (SM-3), I don't
believe are concerned about the first three phases. But, when
you look at what the Russians say, they say they are concerned
about phase four, at the point where the SM might begin to have
the capabilities against an ICBM system.
Senator McCain. Well, I say, with great respect, you've
just outlined what's wrong with the left's view of missile
defense. I view missile defense as a way of inhibiting a first-
strike motivation by the part of the Russians or anybody else,
because it would prevent them from achieving their objective.
Somehow, to view missile defense as a destabilizing factor, to
me, frankly, is just, and I hate to use the word Orwellian, but
it's in contravention to everything that Ronald Reagan stood
for, everything that we have believed in. Defensive systems
would inhibit and make uncertain the threat of a first strike
against the United States of America, which is, of course, our
greatest concern.
Dr. Payne, what do you have to say about this view that,
somehow, development of missile defense systems is
destabilizing?
Dr. Payne. Senator, I believe, on balance, that missile
defense is much more likely to be stabilizing of the strategic
relationship. As you pointed out, I think it's absolutely
correct that missile defense can help ensure that no first-
strike capabilities are going to provide a theory that any
military planner is going to find useful. So, missile defense,
by degrading the potential for a first strike being successful,
should help stabilize the strategic relationship.
Senator McCain. The whole purpose of a first strike is to
destroy the enemy, because you know what's going to happen in
response. So, the more likely that is to succeed, the more
unlikely it is for our adversaries to try it. So, therefore, it
seems to me, a robust missile defense system would be, as we
have found out from Russian behavior in the past, has obviously
been a deterrence for doing so.
This is really one of the fundamental differences we have
in the New START treaty, because where the State Department
says, ``any Russian cheating under the New START treaty would
have little effect, if any, on the assured second-strike
capabilities of U.S. strategic forces.'' Dr. Foster, do you
have a view on this fundamental argument here?
Dr. Foster. Senator McCain, it seems to me that missile
defense provides for survivability of our offensive deterrent.
It provides for survivability of a retaliatory strike, just as
preparing the heavy bombers to depart, if there is an
emergency, so that there will be a surviving second-strike
capability.
Senator McCain. Dr. Payne, does cheating matter? Do you
agree that any Russian cheating would have little, if any,
effect?
Dr. Payne. Senator, the standard that one uses to determine
whether cheating would have any effect or not, seems to me to
be the most important question. If you care about the
flexibility and resilience of U.S. strategic forces, so that
they can provide a credible deterrent, then, it seems to me,
one has to worry about whether potential cheating can do that.
I don't know whether Russian cheating under the New START
treaty could threaten the flexibility and resilience of U.S.
forces. That's a calculation that I can't make. But, it is
certainly a question that we should address, not just whether
cheating would threaten an assured second-strike capability,
that's not the standard of adequacy for U.S. forces, it's
whether cheating might threaten the resilience and flexibility
of our retaliatory options.
Senator McCain. It also brings into question whether there
should be a treaty or not, if cheating doesn't matter. If
cheating doesn't matter, then what's the point of a treaty, Dr.
Foster?
Dr. Foster. Senator McCain, I don't understand why we go to
the trouble of negotiating with a potential adversary with the
understanding that the adversary is going to cheat.
Senator McCain. I'd just like to raise this issue of the
conflicting signing statements. Ambassador Pifer pointed out
that President Medvedev made a statement and other Russian
leaders have made statements exactly to the contrary. It seems
to me that that issue should be resolved, in its entirety,
before we should move forward with ratification. I didn't hear
President Medvedev repudiate the signing statement. He didn't
tell anybody of his negotiators to remove that signing
statement. His foreign minister and other leading Russian
officials have made the opposite statement, leaving a period of
great ambiguity. With great respect, that signing statement,
and relating it to START I and the ABM Treaty, I'm not sure is
a parallel that is really operative.
Dr. Payne.
Dr. Payne. My concern, Senator, is in particular with the
known history, as we might understand it, of Russian cheating.
If we were engaged with a country that didn't have such a
history, perhaps the concern about verification could be
lowered. I'm reminded, for example, of the former Assistant
Secretary of State who worked verification issues. She said
that the level of Russian cheating has been intentional and
widespread. She worked on the verification issues from 2005 to
2009, and she said, ``in that history, you will find continued
intentional Russian cheating.''
So, in a sense, the level of verification that is the
standard of adequacy depends on the party you're engaged with
and, also, the standard of excellence that you subscribe to. In
our engagement with Russia, it seems to me that we need to
recognize that we are engaged with a party that has a history
of, according to these U.S. officials who've looked at this
issue, intentional cheating.
Senator McCain. I thank you, Mr. Chairman. I thank the
witnesses.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Goodwin.
Senator Goodwin. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I also would like
to thank you and Senator McCain for your kind words of welcome
and introduction. It certainly means a great deal to me to be
here today, and I want to thank you for your time. It is an
immense honor to represent the people of West Virginia in the
Senate, and to have a chance to play a role serving on this
esteemed committee where Senator Byrd dedicated so much of his
time and energy. I know Senator Byrd had immense respect for
this body, for this committee, and for his colleagues. I just
wanted to take a moment to thank you all.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator Goodwin. With that in mind, obviously I take very
seriously the responsibility of considering the New START
treaty, and want to thank the members of today's panel for
their time. I look forward to ongoing comprehensive debate on
this very extremely important matter in the days and weeks to
come.
First question, I would direct to Mr. Miller. Talk a little
bit about the provisions in the treaty, setting forth the
signatory's ability to, in fact, objectively measure and verify
compliance and be able to track cheating, as we've discussed.
Mr. Miller. Senator, I believe that the New START treaty
provides a series of onsite inspections and rules which, in
combination, and I stress that, in combination with our own
intelligence capabilities, allows us to have an adequate basis
of determining whether or not the Russians are abiding by the
rules in this treaty--not some other treaty, but in this
treaty.
Cheating by the Russian Government, in this respect, would
clearly represent a very significant political decision, and
would be a great moment internationally. I think that the
ability of the United States to be flexible and resilient as my
colleague Dr. Payne has talked about, depends on this
committee, on the Senate, and on the House, because the
flexibility and resilience is resident in our forces, in our
intelligence capabilities, not whether the Russians cheat or
not.
If we continue to fund our intelligence capabilities and do
the treaty's monitoring steps, which we are permitted under the
treaty, we'll increase our knowledge about what the Russians
are doing. If we adequately fund our forces, we will continue
to have the flexibility and resilience which I believe we have
today, which will provide a secure basis should the Russians
cheat or not, we have the capability to upload warheads on our
Minuteman and Trident forces. If we cannot cause them to stop
their cheating, we should get out of the New START treaty. But,
that's quite down the road.
Senator Goodwin. Let me follow up on your last point. If
you could, talk a little bit about the flexibility embodied in
the New START treaty that would permit us to withdraw or, in
any event, act in our own national security interest if
conditions would arise that would render provisions of the
treaty in conflict with those interests.
Mr. Miller. All treaties have a supreme national interest
clause which allows a country to withdraw, should its supreme
national interest be threatened by its continued participation
in the treaty. This is a standard in arms control, as other
treaties.
Senator Goodwin. Thank you.
Ambassador, you referred earlier to how the failure to
ratify this treaty could perhaps inhibit U.S. efforts to curb
proliferation around the globe. Talk a little bit more about
that for me.
Ambassador Pifer. Yes, Senator. As I said, I don't think it
would apply in the case of North Korea and Iran, but I'm
thinking about the next state that wants to go down the nuclear
path. It seems to me that if the United States and Russia,
which, between the two of them, control 95 percent of the
world's nuclear weapons, are not working towards reduction, it
is going to greatly undermine our diplomatic credibility in
pressing other countries not to go down the nuclear route, but,
more importantly, in enlisting the help of third countries to
press those countries to avoid that. So, it's a matter of, are
we setting the sort of nonproliferation example that will be
useful to motivate pressure against countries that might choose
to follow the examples of Iran and North Korea? I think if the
United States now backs away from the New START treaty and
says, we are not prepared to consider these sorts of
reductions, our credibility on that question will be
substantially undercut.
Senator Goodwin. Dr. Foster, do you agree with that?
Dr. Foster. Yes. Sorry. Senator, yes, I agree. One has to
look at both sides of this. It seems to me that, on the one
hand, Russia has suffered economic decline. Their future growth
in the nuclear weapons business will be paced, in part, by
their economic recovery. On the other hand, looking at the U.S.
side, whether or not we can maintain a nuclear deterrent
depends on our commitment and our willingness to support that
commitment. It seems to me, they're the two major uncertainties
that drive the future.
Senator Goodwin. All right. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Goodwin.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Yes. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
having this hearing.
I observed a long time ago when we were talking about the
Law of the Sea Treaty, this is not a partisan statement,
because that particular treaty--was pushed hardest by President
Bush, I remember so well someone coming in from the Bush
administration. I asked a simple question, that they're going
to give up jurisdiction of over 70 percent of the surface, does
that include the air above the surface? They didn't have an
answer for it.
I think that we get into these treaties and everyone's for
them. In the case of the Law of the Sea Treaty, that passed the
Foreign Relations Committee 17 to 4. If it hadn't been for the
fact that we just demanded to have hearings in this committee,
as well as the Environment and Public Works Committee, that
treaty probably would have sailed through. Of course, it hasn't
yet.
Now, even when Thursday's behind us, we will have had some,
I can't remember the exact number of the hearings but, some 30
witnesses. Of the 30 witnesses, the only 2 that have been
opposed to this treaty are Dr. Payne and Dr. Foster, who are
here at this one. So, it's kind of 28 to 2, I think that's a
little bit uneven. But, nonetheless, I did make the request
that we have some of the distinguished witnesses that were
opposed to the New START treaty here, and I appreciate the fact
that we did.
Now, Dr. Payne, let me ask you a question. I'm looking at
this kind of simplistically. Russia is already down below the
number of launchers that would be required under the New START
treaty, as well as the warheads. Now, there is an article in
the Washington Times, and I would just read one paragraph out
of it. They're talking about Yuri Savenko the first deputy
chairman of the Duma Defense Committee. He said, ``Whether the
Americans want it or not, they, after adopting the New START
treaty, will give us a breathing space that we can use to
reform and modernize the country's nuclear missile potential.
So, if the''--he goes on to say--``So, if the Russian nuclear
arsenal is getting smaller, anyway, but its leaders believe
locking us into a reduction gives them time to improve it, why
would the White House make the New START treaty centerpiece of
the arms control strategy?'' In other words, what we're
requiring them to do, they're already doing. That really is
unilaterally what we would have to do. Am I missing something
here?
Dr. Payne. No, Senator Inhofe, I think you've put your
finger on an important point. That is, one of the ironies of
the New START treaty is, it appears not to require real
reductions on the part of the Russians, or I should say,
reductions that they aren't already making. At the same time,
it would not prohibit a renewal of Russian capabilities well
beyond the ceilings. As I said in my opening remarks, there are
a number of loopholes in the New START treaty that would allow
either party to go well beyond the numbers that are present in
the limitations in the ceilings, in other words, 1,550
warheads, for example--very easy to go well beyond that ceiling
if the Russian Federation has the financial and the production
wherewithal to do that.
So, in short, the irony of the New START treaty is, it
doesn't require real Russian reductions in the near term. In
the far term, it's not going to prohibit Russian renewal of its
strategic capabilities, if Russia decides to do that.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, and that's essentially what the
article said, and it seems very obvious to me.
On verification, Ambassador Pifer, you had talked about how
you felt it had very strong verification. On the other hand,
Dr. Foster, your first statement that you made was that you
questioned the verification capabilities. When I look at it
just numerically, the New START treaty has only, tell me if I'm
wrong on this, 18 inspections a year, or that would be 180 over
a 10-year period. During the START I, we conducted on the order
of 600 inspections during the 15 years of START I. Tell me, is
there not a relationship between the number of inspections and
the verification credentials of a treaty? I'll start with you,
and then ask Dr. Foster to respond.
Ambassador Pifer. Thank you, Senator. First, a couple of
points on the START I verification regime. The 600 inspections,
of course, included baseline inspections that were allowed when
you went in and took a look at each site to establish your
initial database which, since we've had 15 years of inspections
continuing under START I, are not needed in the New START
treaty.
In terms of numbers of inspection, on an annual basis,
START I allowed the sides to conduct 28 inspections per year,
whereas the New START treaty allows 18 per year. There are two
points, though, I think that you need to factor in when
considering that. First of all, in the case of START I, where
you had 28 inspections a year, that was conducted against 70
sites. For the New START treaty, it will be 18 inspections a
year, conducted against 35 sites. So, the universe is reduced
by half.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. I don't want to use too much time
here, real quickly.
Ambassador Pifer. The second point, very quickly, is for
some of your type 1 inspections, 10 of the 18 inspections in
the New START treaty are type 1, you actually do two things
that you used to require two separate inspections, under START
I. So, 18 is actually, maybe, more like 23, 24, in terms of
START I.
Senator Inhofe. All right. Dr. Foster, do you agree with
that?
Dr. Foster. Senator, yes I agree that there are fewer
places to look, now that there's no longer a Soviet Union, but
we just have Russia to be concerned with. So, that's the first
point.
The other one has to do, however, with the fact that when
you do inspections, you somehow have to have the concern that
you may not find what you're looking for. Recall the situation
we faced in Iraq. We knew that from the last time we were there
that there were activities associated with nuclear weapons.
When we went back the second time, with 1,000 or so folks
looking, we didn't find any evidence. Where did it go? Look, it
is so easy, in a large nation, to hide this stuff. It seems to
me that we really should look skeptically at the matter of
verification.
Senator Inhofe. Yes, I appreciate that. I think I was
probably more upset than most people were when the
administration took down the ground-based site in Poland, with
what our intelligence tells us the threat is out there. We've
talked a lot during this hearing about the missile defense
requirement. I can only say that I think it was Serge Lavrov
who made the statement, ``The treaty can operate and be viable
only if the United States of America refrains from developing
its missile defense capabilities quantitatively and
qualitatively.'' To me, that's such a specific statement. Dr.
Payne, is there any doubt in your mind, in terms of their
wanting to use this to preclude us from pursuing improving our
missile defense system?
Dr. Payne. No, Senator. There's no doubt in my mind that
that's what they would like to do. The question will be, how
vulnerable will we be to that kind of pressure. I think, for
example, back to where the ABM Treaty's restrictions on
strategic missile defense caused us to have a less robust
theater missile defense capability than we otherwise would have
had, for fear of violating the restrictions on strategic
missile defense. We can look into the past, where there was no
restriction on theater missile defense in the ABM Treaty, but
we indeed made our theater defenses less capable than they
otherwise could be, because we wanted to be very careful not to
violate the spirit or the letter of the treaty. My concern is
that the Lavrov statement and the other Russian statements that
lay this out could have the same effect on U.S. decisionmaking.
Senator Inhofe. Okay. My time has expired, but I'd like
just to ask, just for a real quick answer on, why wouldn't the
tactical weapons be a part of the New START treaty? Dr. Payne,
it would seem to me that that is something that should have had
a lot of significance in this negotiation.
Dr. Payne. I think the real answer to that question, sir,
is, they could not be part of this treaty because the Russians
did not want to engage in negotiations on their tactical
nuclear weapons. I think they'll be very wary about ever
engaging in serious negotiations on their tactical nuclear
weapons.
Senator Inhofe. Since they have a 10-to-1 quantitative
advantage.
Dr. Payne. Because they are so valuable in the Russian
military doctrine.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Miller, at this point, what are the legal enforceable
verification restrictions against the Russians?
Mr. Miller. The legally enforceable verification
restrictions, Senator, are that the Russians will inform us on
how many warheads a particular missile is loaded with.
Senator Reed. At this point. Where are we today?
Mr. Miller. At this point, none.
Senator Reed. None?
Mr. Miller. None.
Senator Reed. So, we have no verification.
Mr. Miller. No, sir.
Senator Reed. No. What are the limits on Russian offensive
and defensive missile systems, at this point?
Mr. Miller. At this point, the Treaty of Moscow applies, so
that the Russians would be in, what is it, 12 years? So, it'd
be about 2014, the Russians would have to have between 1,700
and 2,200 strategic nuclear warheads under one set of counting
rules. A different set of counting rules applies to the New
START treaty. Essentially, the warhead numbers will be about
the same. But, at a point in time, 12 years from 2002, when the
Moscow Treaty was signed, the Russians have to be at 1,700 to
2,200 and nuclear warheads, full stop. For a brief moment in
time. There are no limits on defensive systems.
Senator Reed. I would assume, the Moscow Treaty that we're
talking about would impose a verification regime which has
lapsed, would also more effectively and more immediately reduce
limits on the Russian missile systems. Is that correct?
Mr. Miller. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. That's one reason, I presume, that you
support the New START treaty?
Mr. Miller. Yes, sir, it is. It is the verification. It is
the fact that the Russians may not be building up their systems
now, but this will set a cap in the future, and it will
particularly set a cap on their ballistic missile systems,
which has always been a cause of concern to U.S. national
security planners.
Senator Reed. Why would the Russians enter into the New
START treaty with a verification regime, since none exists
today, if their intention is to cheat?
Mr. Miller. That's a more difficult question, Senator. I
think that the Russians intend, at this point, to comply with
the New START treaty. Future Russian Governments may play
around the edges. There is a long history of the Russians doing
that. That's why President Reagan said ``trust but verify.'' We
will be verifying.
Senator Reed. Thank you. With respect to the issue of the
relationship between defensive systems and offensive systems,
if the Russians, today, were able to deploy an effective
national missile defense system, what would be your
recommendation--with respect to the number of warheads that we
should have, offensively? Would it go up, or would it remain
the same?
Mr. Miller. If the Russians were, today, able to deploy an
effective defense of Russia, our warhead requirements to
maintain a deterrent would rise astronomically, as would our
investment on penetration-aid technologies, and on a huge
modernization of the bomber force.
Senator Reed. Would that likely prompt a response by the
Russians?
Mr. Miller. Yes, sir. You would be back into the nuclear
arms race of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s.
Senator Reed. Isn't that the definition of nuclear
instability?
Mr. Miller. Yes, sir.
Senator Reed. Dr. Payne, do you agree?
Dr. Payne. There are multiple definitions of stability.
There's what's called ``arms race stability.'' There's also
``deterrence stability.'' In my comments earlier, where I
indicated that I don't believe that missile defense is
destabilizing, I was referring to deterrence stability, which
is what I thought was the nature of the question.
Senator Reed. No, I think you were referring to the United
States deploying a missile system. But, if the Russians
deployed a missile system, would you recommend that we maintain
our current number of warheads?
Dr. Payne. If the Russians were to deploy missile defense,
it would depend on the capabilities of those systems, as to
whether the United States would respond with more ICBMs, SLBMs,
or bombers. It may well make a lot of sense to avoid the
ballistic missile threat if the Russian missile defense system
is very effective, and move more towards bombers.
Senator Reed. That would require new bombers with nuclear
capabilities, correct? I'm not talking about one specific
system, you would recommend that we be able to effectively
deliver many more warheads than we have today.
Dr. Payne. No, not necessarily, sir. It may well be that if
the Russians have an effective missile defense system, there
wouldn't be any point in deploying more ballistic missiles
because their system would be effective, so we could decide if
we want to maintain deterrence based on retaliatory threats and
move into greater emphasis on bombers, or we might decide we
want to essentially mimic what the Russians are doing, in this
case, have effective defenses of our own. Both sides would
decide to have a relationship based on effective defenses.
Senator Reed. Another way to look at this, if we deploy a
very effective missile defense, the Russians might decide to
use bomber forces or increased bomber forces, which effectively
could negate our defense. Is that your point?
Dr. Payne. They could do that, sure.
Senator Reed. Which means in many respects it's very
difficult to achieve, by defense alone, a stable nuclear
posture. Would you agree with that?
Dr. Payne. No, I wouldn't, sir.
Senator Reed. Okay. I'm just a little bit confused. You
posit that we can, with an effective missile defense, stabilize
the system. But the Russians will always have a counter to our
missile defense, either through conventional hypersonic weapons
or through increased bombers. Is that correct?
Dr. Payne. Not necessarily so, sir. For example, Senator
McCain said earlier that missile defense could help reduce the
vulnerability of retaliatory forces. It's not clear to me, at
all, that the Russians could have a response to missile defense
for our retaliatory forces, that would be effective.
The issues aren't black and white. They're not clear cut.
There are all kinds of nuances and permutations. The bottom
line is, if we choose to maintain our relationship with Russia
based on a retaliatory nuclear deterrent, obviously if they try
and defend against that, we'll want to maintain the nuclear
retaliatory deterrent. Perhaps it will be with bombers, rather
than ICBMs, if they have an effective missile defense.
On the other hand, if both sides were able to deploy
effective defenses, we could move towards what President Reagan
was looking for in the past, and that is a relationship that is
not based on mutual retaliatory threats, but on defensive
capabilities on each side.
Senator Reed. A purely defensive position.
Ambassador Pifer, what's your view on these issues?
Ambassador Pifer. There was a very broad look at missile
defense back in the 1980s, and I think that we found the
capabilities, to provide that kind of defense that would
protect the United States against a large-scale Soviet or
Russian missile attack, was beyond the technological
capabilities and beyond the budget realities. Every
administration, actually, since President Reagan has talked
more about a more focused missile defense system, looking at
threats such as North Korea and Iran.
I guess I would disagree with Dr. Payne on the question of
crisis stability. It does seem to me that if one side has a
missile defense system, in a crisis, that will affect the other
side's calculations as to whether or not to strike first or
not.
For an example, and I think this is an extremely low
probability event today, if you had a situation where there was
an American missile defense that might blunt some of the
Russian ballistic missile attack. The Russians have to
calculate, if they are smarter to go first and launch first,
against the United States, or run the risk of absorbing an
American first strike. Then they have to launch their
retaliatory forces, which would be significantly degraded,
against an American missile defense. I do worry that missile
defenses, in some configurations, in terms of the U.S.-Russia
relationship, can be destabilizing in a crisis.
Senator Reed. Dr. Foster, my time is expired, but if you
could answer quickly.
Dr. Foster. Yes, Senator Reed. Let me just make a point
that is relevant to the points that have been made before.
First, what counts here is the offensive capabilities, the
numbers, and the effectiveness of penetrating capabilities.
Second, the effectiveness of the defenses, whether they are
very large or small, compared with the offense. Currently, the
U.S. has a large offense. The Russians have a small defense.
The rogue nations have a small offense, and we can have a
rather advanced, and as large as we want, defense. So, it
depends a little on asymmetries on both sides.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much, Dr. Foster.
Thank you, gentlemen.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. I appreciate the
fine discussion and good panel.
The New START treaty has been promoted as central to our
nuclear policy and our national security, but I'm uneasy about
it. I have several fundamental concerns. First, the
administration has been far too anxious, in my view, to sign
and get the New START treaty done. There are political
benefits, I don't mean domestic political, perhaps that's a
part of it, but that somehow, politically, signing the New
START treaty is going to make the world more willing to
eliminate nuclear weapons and put us on that path. I don't
think that's a sound policy. But it's been part of the
anxiousness, I believe, that has been affecting these
negotiations, and has made our negotiating position weaker than
otherwise would have been the case, and less beneficial to our
security, in my opinion.
I think the negotiations were further weakened by the
clearly stated goal of this administration of moving toward a
nuclear-free world, which is unrealistic. More than that, it's
dangerous and confusing to our allies and in some ways,
destabilizing. This could even, in my view, cause other nations
to see an opportunity to become a nuclear world power, and
cause proliferation, rather than restraining nuclear weapons,
around the world.
Second, Russia, to my view, is not the most important
threat to America right now. It is the largest threat, of
course, by far. I think our security is most directly affected
by Iran and North Korea, and we're doing very little about
that. I think more of our focus should be on that, and other
nations, too, that may have nuclear weapons that do not have
the history of stability that the Russians and, prior to them,
Soviets have shown in dealing with nuclear weapons. I think it
could have the perverse effect of encouraging other nations to
pursue the dream of being a nuclear competitor to the United
States, rather than the other ones.
Finally, on modernization, I'm not confident about the
plans on modernization. I'll ask some questions about that. I
do believe there are limitations on missile defense. As Mr.
Pifer noted, the phased adaptive approach eventually will
result in phase IV, the SM-3 Block 2B, and they're going to
object to that. Are they going to walk out of the treaty as a
result of that? We've already foregone the two-stage missile
defense system that we had planned for Central Europe. I guess
it's some sort of good faith sweetener to these negotiations. I
see no other good reason for it. Now, we've put this process
off for another 5 years, before we get this SM-3 system up and
developed. It wasn't even on the drawing board a few months
ago. I'd say, it makes me nervous about what kind of commitment
we have to missile defense.
The Russians are still irritable that we walked out of the
ABM Treaty for very sound reasons. I don't think they'd
hesitate to walk out of the New START treaty if they felt that
we were going to proceed with even a limited missile defense
system. I do agree, Ambassador Pifer, that we've never, at
least in recent decades or two, we've not advanced the idea of
a comprehensive missile defense system. But a limited one that
could protect us from, perhaps, an accidental launch, or a
rogue nation attack.
I do believe that we should have already begun very serious
negotiations over tactical nuclear weapons which were not part
of the New START treaty, because the Russians refused to talk
about it, and we acquiesced.
This is my concern, I think this administration has a
progressive, leftist aversion to national missile defense and
to nuclear deterence. They don't like it, emotionally and
otherwise. That vision, I think, is affecting policy, and it
causes me to be uneasy.
One of the things we are dealing with is delivery systems.
Dr. Miller's press reports indicate that the administration
will invest $100 billion over the next 10 years in nuclear
delivery systems. About $30 billion of this will go toward the
development of a new strategic submarine. Of the remaining $70
billion, STRATCOM estimates the cost of just maintaining the
current nuclear forces is approximately $56 billion. So, that
would leave, if their estimates are not low, with just $14
billion for the triad, or what would follow on from that, the
next-generation bomber, the follow-on ICBM, nuclear air-
launched cruise missile, or Prompt Global Strike capability,
conventional matter. Do you think that, if these facts are
accurate, the $14 billion would be sufficient to move us toward
a modernized delivery system?
Mr. Miller. Senator Sessions, I can't do the math off the
top of my head. I would like the administration to provide some
concrete plans that we could judge whether or not the
modernization that they intend is, in fact, adequate. I think
that we basically need to see that for the Minuteman force. We
need to understand what they intend to do with the bomber force
and the air-launch cruise missile. I appreciate there's
planning underway by the Navy for the follow-on to the Ohio-
class submarine. To the best of my knowledge, there is not a
full program up here in front of Congress to proceed ahead with
that. I don't think they've gone through milestone A yet. I
would like to see more progress by the administration in
defining what they are going to do to modernize our strategic
forces, which we're going to have to do whether we have the New
START treaty in place or not. I'd also like to see progress,
sir, on Prompt Global Strike, I would like to see something
deployed sooner, rather than later. Research and development is
terrific, but it doesn't provide an operational capability in
the field. I'd like to see a program there.
Senator Sessions. Well, it was a very painful thing to me,
when we debated the Prompt Global Strike, and President Bush
proposed that, and Congress did not fund it. I do believe it
was a mistake. I think it could really help our security and
not cause the problems some suggested. But, we ask, as part of
the last defense bill, as supported in, I think, section 1251
which call on DOD to set forth a 10-year plan on modernization
of the triad and delivery systems. But we've gotten nothing
back on anything other, I guess, than the submarine
advancement. You would agree that we have to be serious about
what we're going to do, make decisions, and then examine the
budget to make sure there's sufficient funds to fund that?
Mr. Miller. Yes, sir.
Senator Sessions. My time is up, Mr. Chairman. Thank you.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you for
holding this hearing, and I want to thank all of you for your
testimony today.
The relations between Russia and the United States have
evolved beyond what they were during the Cold War. Within this
strategic context, and in the face of our aging nuclear
stockpile, strategic arms reduction is in the best interest of
both nations.
Ambassador Pifer, are there any specific provisions within
the New START treaty that you feel make the United States less
secure than we would be in the absence of this treaty?
Ambassador Pifer. Senator, there are certain points in the
New START treaty that, in an ideal treaty, would be different.
For example, I would prefer not to have seen such a discount on
the bomber-weapon counting rule. It would have been preferable
to have START I verification measures with regards to
telemetry, so that we had full access to telemetry. But, a
negotiation is a negotiation, and, sometimes, you don't get
everything that you want. Although there may be things that I
would like to see in the New START treaty, those points do not
outweigh what, I think, is the overall compelling interest that
the United States has in ratification and entry into force of
the New START treaty.
Senator Hagan. Some of the critics of the New START treaty
have based their reservations on the fact that the New START
treaty does not limit the tactical nuclear weapons. I know
we've talked about that this morning. However, the Obama
administration has made it clear that negotiating with the
Russians on tactical nuclear weapons requires ratification of
this treaty. Mr. Miller, I was wondering, as someone that's
played a significant role in previous strategic arms reduction
negotiations, how important is it, in ratifying the New START
treaty, to facilitate discussion on tactical nuclear weapons?
Mr. Miller. Senator, the connection is that if we don't
ratify the New START treaty, we're back to the drawing boards
on some sort of approach to strategic arms, and the tacticals
are still going to get left behind. I do not see the New START
treaty, in the future, that will lump the large Russian
tactical stockpile in with the smaller strategic stockpiles on
both sides.
I believe that the Russian Government needs to be called to
account in front of every international forum, because it has a
bloated, obscenely large tactical nuclear stockpile, which
makes no military sense. What we have to do, in terms of
reassuring our allies, is to ensure that, as the administration
put forward in the NPR, that the Joint Strike Fighter has a
nuclear role that we can deploy to Europe, and that the B-61
bomb that is deployed in Europe is modernized. We need to have
that to reassure our allies. We need to keep embarrassing the
Russians and pushing the Russians to reduce that stockpile
which is really of no military significance in deterring us or
our allies, as long as we modernize. But, it has political
significance that they use to intimidate their near neighbors.
It's that which we need to avoid.
Senator Hagan. Dr. Foster, any comments on the tactical
nuclear weapons?
Dr. Foster. Senator Hagan, yes, I think that tactical
nuclear weapons are an integral part of a strategic security.
Let me give you my reasoning. The tactical nuclear weapons in
Russia, along with their nuclear doctrine, their declaratory
statements, and the tailoring of a nuclear capability to attack
their neighbors, threaten NATO, threaten U.S. military and
civilian people there. Also, their tactical nuclear weapons
aboard attack submarines with cruise missile capability armed
with nuclear warheads off our coasts threaten both the east
coast and the west coast. So, those are strategic threats, even
though we call them tactical.
I agree with Mr. Miller that upgrading the life extension
of the B-61 is critical. We may actually have to consider
increasing the numbers of such deployments. Thank you.
Senator Hagan. I think it was when Secretary Clinton was
testifying she made the comment that we need to go ahead and
ratify the New START treaty in order to continue negotiating
with Russia on their tactical nuclear weapons.
Mr. Miller, the New START treaty does not prevent the
United States or Russia from developing new strategic nuclear
weapon capabilities. Do you anticipate the Russians developing
new strategic nuclear weapon capabilities in the near future?
Mr. Miller. Yes, I do.
Senator Hagan. Any other comments from the other panel
members? Dr. Payne.
Dr. Payne. The Russian Federation, right now, has a
comprehensive strategic nuclear modernization program. The head
of their defense acquisition program has said that this is the
highest priority for Russian defense acquisition. The question
right now is, how much money can Russia put to that program.
That, I believe, is the bounding factor for them.
Ambassador Pifer. Senator, I would agree that for Russia,
maintaining strategic nuclear parity with the United States, is
a central factor and they will devote resources to ensure that.
That's where I see the value in the New START treaty, we would
then have a limit, in terms of how many Russian warheads could
be deployed that could strike the United States.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
When START I expired, in December 2009, the respective
verification and the compliance regimes expired with it. The
Moscow Treaty, which is scheduled to remain in effect through
the end of 2012, has no verification regime and relied upon
those from the expired START I protocols. Ambassador Pifer, in
absence of the New START treaty being ratified, what strategic
arms verification procedures would be in existence between
Russia and the United States? What impact will that have on
ensuring compliance with the Moscow Treaty?
Ambassador Pifer. Well, Senator, as you stated, we no
longer have the START I verification regime. The 2002 Moscow
Treaty has no counting rules and no verification measures. So,
right now, the only way that we have to monitor Russian
strategic nuclear forces are national technical means of
verification. We don't have the sorts of provisions that were
in START I and that are in the New START treaty, for data
exchange, inspections, and notifications.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Hagan.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Thank you all very
much for providing your insights and responding to some of the
questions that many of us have on this very important subject.
If I might, Mr. Miller and Mr. Payne, the 1251 Report
provides a very troubling lack of specificity concerning force
structure. Specifically, the administration's factsheet on the
Section 1251 Report explains that the U.S. nuclear force
structure, under the New START treaty could comprise up to 420
ICBMs, 240 SLBMs, and 60 bombers. Since deployment at the
maximum level of all 3 legs of the triad, under that
explanation, add up to 720 delivery vehicles, it is
mathematically impossible for the United States to make such a
deployment and be in compliance with the New START treaty's
limit of 700 deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.
Clearly, additional reduction decisions are going to have to be
made, with respect to the U.S. force structure under the
treaty. Therefore, as I told Secretary Gates last month, I
would be reluctant to cast a vote in favor of this treaty
without being fully briefed in more precise detail, to my
satisfaction, at least, about the plans for our nuclear
delivery vehicle force structure. So far, I've only been told
that decisions will be made at some point in the distant
future, and will be based on Russia's force structure. So, I
guess I would ask, in your opinion, how do you think Russia
will establish their force structure? Based on that, where do
you foresee the additional reductions coming from in order to
get to the 700 total deployed delivery vehicles that are
limited to by the New START treaty?
Dr. Payne. Senator Thune, did you mean, how will the
Russians, we believe, structure their forces under that? Or,
how will the United States likely do that?
Senator Thune. Kind of both. Because, what I've been told
is that our decision will be made somewhat based on the
Russian's force structure and how might they compose their
arsenal? Then how might we, I guess, respond to that?
Dr. Payne. Okay. Yes, sir. The outlines of what the
Russian's comprehensive modernization program might be there.
The details, obviously, we don't know at this point. But, it
appears that the Russians are going to move towards heavily
MIRVed ICBMs, MIRVed SLBMs, and a new strategic bomber.
On the ICBM side, the Russians have already committed to
the deployment of a new heavy ICBM which, presumably, will be
able to carry a considerable number of MIRVed warheads. They've
committed to the deployment of at least one new strategic
bomber, and they have near-deployment, according to open
sources, of a new air-launched nuclear cruise missile, the KH-
102.
Since we put that all together, what you see is the
Russians moving towards a lower number of launchers, probably
considerably lower than the START I limits. But, of those
launchers, the ICBMs and SLBMs will be heavily MIRVed. The
bombers, because the New START treaty bomber-counting rule only
counts one warhead and one bomber as one unit each, the
Russians will be able to maximize the number of weapons on
their new strategic bomber. What that might look like is an
open question, now. They might go to 16 air-launched cruise
missiles. Maybe they'd go to 20 air-launched cruise missiles. I
don't know. But, what you see with that kind of force structure
are numbers well in excess of the ceiling of 1,550, but within
the bounds--within the terms of the New START treaty.
Senator Thune. Right.
Mr. Miller. Senator, I would say that we are not going to
base our force structure on what the Russians are going to do.
For a long time, we have avoided heavily MIRVed systems, and I
think we have done so wisely. I think the Russians are foolish
to invest in that, but that's their decision.
I think we will continue to have the heart of the deterrent
based in the Trident force and in the Minuteman force, the
Minuteman force being single-warhead systems. But, the
administration does owe the Senate, Congress, an answer as to
how many of each, and in what. The plan, as I understand it,
for the follow-on to Trident, is to have 12 submarines, which
is a number that I believe is barely adequate, but adequate.
But, as you pointed out, with the arithmetic of that 720,
up to 60 bombers--well, we only have about 19 B-2s, at last
count. That means a decision needs to be made as to what's
going to keep the B-52s viable. Otherwise, the other 40 bombers
fall away without any kind of a viable delivery platform in a
new air-launched cruise missile, or a modified air-launch
cruise missile.
So, as I said in my opening remarks, I really believe that
the heart of this lies in our own modernization. Those
decisions are between Congress and the administration.
Regardless of the New START treaty, we have to do something to
recapitalize the existing strategic forces.
Senator Thune. Well, it's a bit of a precarious situation
for Senators who are being--we're being asked to provide advice
and consent before obtaining a commitment on some of these
follow-on delivery systems. What if the systems weren't
replaced? How would this impact security, under the New START
treaty?
I want to come back, just briefly, to the bomber issue
because, according to the most recent briefs that I've seen,
DOD expects the nuclear bomber force to remain in service
through 2040. As you mentioned, 30 more years is a long time
for a bomber that was built 50 years ago. Now, the proponents
of the plan say they can last that long with upgrades. But,
physically remaining in service is significantly different than
remaining survivable in a future high-threat combat scenario.
The NPR recognizes the need for a triad. Since the New START
treaty is only for a 10-year period, how do you think the
treaty will affect any plans to build a replacement bomber?
Mr. Miller. I don't think that it will. I think we are free
to do, under the New START treaty limits, what we choose to do.
You're right that the B-52 airframe can be kept viable. The
question is, what is the delivery system that it's carrying?
The air-launch cruise missile was first deployed in 1980s. It
is not as stealthy a system any more. We relied, at that time,
on mass and what we euphemistically called defense suppression
which meant ballistic warheads taking out key air defense
sites. We need to have some sense from the administration as to
what they plan to do, or what they propose to Congress to do to
keep the B-52 force viable, if that is indeed the
administration's intention.
Dr. Payne. Senator Thune, may I add to that? I associate
myself with my friend Frank Miller's comments. I've only seen
the unclassified version of the 1251 Report. But, what's most
disturbing about it is what's not there. What we don't see is a
modernization program for the ICBM, bomber, or a new air-
launched cruise missile that would make it effective. What we
don't see is a commitment to the deployment of conventional
Prompt Global Strike. These are problems. Again, I agree with
my friend Frank Miller that, if the United States would make a
commitment to these modernization programs, at least for me, it
would help mitigate some of the concerns I have about the New
START treaty.
Senator Thune. My understanding, too, is that the ICBM-
based Prompt Global Strike platform would be counted against
the 700 deployed-delivery vehicles. If we decide to develop
that system, which, in your opinion, of the three legs of the
triad, would be or should be further reduced to accommodate it?
Dr. Payne. I'm sorry, Senator, I'd rather not try and
choose among them. But, what I would note is, because Prompt
Global Strike is based on an ICBM, or an SLBM, would count,
under the 700 ceiling. Those numbers that Frank Miller
mentioned earlier would have to go down below 700. The Prompt
Global Strike would have to come at the expense of a bomber,
SLBM, or ICBM.
Mr. Miller. Could I just say, having been involved in the
past, as has Dr. Payne, on the Prompt Global Strike, I think
the numbers that we're talking about, in terms of Prompt Global
Strike systems are quite small, on the order of tens of
systems, certainly not hundreds. I do not think that taking
about 40 nuclear warheads off and replacing them with
conventional Prompt Global Strike systems will, in any way,
undercut our deterrent. I don't think that has been talked
about, as an issue. I don't think it's a treaty issue, as long
as the administration commits to actually fielding a Prompt
Global Strike system.
Senator Thune. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
To all or our witnesses, thanks for your testimony today.
This issue gets more complex the more we learn about it.
Certainly all of you help bring forth the type of information
that we're going to have to have to be able to think through
this.
Dr. Payne, Mr. Miller, thank you for your generous time
that you spent with my staff and me. I appreciate it. We look
forward to continuing the dialogue with all of you as we move
forward.
Let me go back to this tactical issue, again, because I
have been very disturbed about that from day one. I want to
make sure that I understand what all four of you have basically
said here. In your opinion, there is no way that the Russians
are going to negotiate, as a part of the New START treaty, the
issue of tactical nuclear weapons. Am I correct? That bothers
me to no end. Tell me what I'm missing here and why I can take
comfort in the fact that they don't want to negotiate tactical
weapons as a part of this? Dr. Payne?
Dr. Payne. Sir, to be honest, I don't believe you can take
any comfort in the fact that they don't want to negotiate on
this issue. It strikes me that one of the enormous challenges
that will confront us over the next decade, is how to try and
get a handle on their tactical nuclear weapons when they do not
want us to get a handle on them.
Senator Chambliss. Mr. Miller?
Mr. Miller. Senator, I don't think there's a single magic
treaty that's going to solve all of our issues with the Russian
nuclear forces. I think we're going to have to take it, as we
have in the past, one step at a time. We have not, for three
administrations back to President Reagan, felt the need to
match the Russians, in terms of tactical nuclear forces. We
have felt the need to have a viable deterrent to offset that,
knowing that if they started to use tactical nuclear weapons,
the whole conflict would escalate to the strategic level
quickly.
I view those weapons as a political threat. I view them as
a threat because the weapons could be stolen or diverted to
terrorists. I think we need to continue to press to get our
arms around them. But, I think throwing the New START treaty
away because we haven't gotten our hands on the tacticals is
not the way to approach this. I think we have to go after the
tacticals separately.
Senator Chambliss. Okay. Ambassador Pifer?
Ambassador Pifer. Senator, I would concur with Mr. Miller.
It seems to me that if we did not ratify the New START treaty,
we would then be back to square one. It would not make it
easier to persuade the Russians to put tactical nuclear weapons
into the negotiation. We would likely face the possibility that
they would reopen some of the compromises that were reached in
the New START treaty, and advance new demands of their own. It
would not make it easier to get our hands around the tactical
question.
Dr. Foster. Senator, going back to the earlier part of your
question a reason that the Russians have taken a strategic
position with regard to the United States is perhaps to reduce
our influence and presence in Europe.
Senator Chambliss. Going back to what Senator Thune was
talking about, with respect to our nuclear triad and where
we've been and how we go forward. It looks to me like, with the
dependence on the B-52, the service life of that aircraft is
going to be basically reaching an end in the next 2 or 3
decades, if it lasts that long. That airplane is at least 60
years old now, or older. We're going to reach a point where the
B-52s have no mission here. Do you think the 1251 modernization
plan adequately addresses this issue of where we go, with
respect to a bomber? How important is that, with respect to the
underlying strategic plan that the United States has been
working under for decades now?
Dr. Payne. The 1251 Plan, as we've seen it publicly,
indicates no commitment to bomber modernization, to a follow-on
to the venerable B-52. At least as importantly, it indicates no
commitment to a new air-launch cruise missile that would allow
that platform to remain effective. That absence is one of the
problems with the plan that we've seen.
Mr. Miller. I agree with Dr. Payne. It's very difficult for
all of you to fully consider the New START treaty without
understanding the administration's modernization plans. It's
seems to me that they go hand in hand.
Dr. Payne. I might add, Senator, that that's in the context
of the Russians having made a commitment to the modernization
of the strategic bomber force and to a new air-launch cruise
missile.
Senator Chambliss. Yes. Ambassador Pifer and Dr. Foster----
Chairman Levin. Senator Chambliss, could I interrupt you
just for 1 minute, because I think Senator Thune may have to
leave. I just wanted to give him some information on the
subject that he was asking. Would you just yield to me for 1
minute on that?
Senator Chambliss. Sure.
Chairman Levin. We have tried to schedule a time for DOD to
come up and brief us on force structure. They've asked us,
actually, to do that. We've had a briefing from Secretary
Gates, in June, on what their baseline force structure is. But,
in terms of your request, they are happy to come up. We're just
trying to schedule a time. It may have to be Thursday
afternoon. But, we'll keep in touch with you, because of your
special interest in that subject.
Thanks for the interruption.
Senator Chambliss. Sure. Ambassador Pifer and Dr. Foster, a
major concern for me has been this issue of modernization and,
in particular, the commitment not just of this administration
but a commitment of Congress to put the dollars in place to
make sure that we have the capability to modernize. What are
your thoughts on the administration's budget, with respect to
the next several years, and our ability to continue down the
road of an adequate modernization plan? We've already seen that
the House has taken several hundred million dollars out of that
proposed budget. What would be the impact of not keeping the
proposed budget at the level that the administration has set?
Ambassador Pifer. Well, Senator, in order, this is actually
regardless of whether we have the New START treaty or not, for
the foreseeable future, it is going to be important for the
United States to have a survivable, effective, robust strategic
nuclear deterrent. That's going to require that this
administration, and successive administrations working very
closely with Congress, assure that the resources are there to
modernize the strategic deterrent.
Senator Chambliss. Do you think this administration's
proposed budget does that?
Ambassador Pifer. The proposed budget, as it's been
described so far, puts us on a start in that direction. But,
this is going to have to be continuous work between the
administration and Congress to make sure that those plans are
adequately funded, so that we can maintain the strategic
deterrent.
Senator Chambliss. Dr. Foster, any additional comment?
Dr. Foster. Yes, Senator. It seems to me that, regarding
the first part of your earlier question, the B-52 has indeed
lasted a long time, and it will be possible for the
administration to maintain that bomber for a decade or two, no
question. However, that bomber cannot penetrate. As a matter of
some urgency, we need to develop an advanced cruise missile
that can be reliable. Now, it also has to be advanced because
it must penetrate. That's a technological challenge.
Next, when it comes to committing to do these things, there
is the budget deficit issue. In the face of that, President
Obama has committed to maintain the strategic deterrent for the
foreseeable future. It may be that, because of the nature of
our democracy, we really will not do what we should do, and
face a crisis, and then do it.
Senator Chambliss. My time is expired. But again, I
appreciate your testimony this morning. While we all understand
that we have no treaty now, we have no verification plans in
place, this is a long-term treaty. It's unbelievable to me that
we'd be discussing a treaty and, at the same time, discussing
how likely it is that the other party to it is going to cheat,
and how much they're going to cheat, and they have a history of
doing this. There are a lot of reasons why this is going to
have to take a lot of deliberation. Certainly we need a treaty
of some sort with the Russians. Hopefully we can get ourselves
satisfied on this one. But, a bad treaty would be worse, in my
opinion, than no treaty at all. Again, we're going to be
counting on you folks to continue to give to us the type of
information we need to help develop, in our minds, exactly the
way forward. I thank you very much for being here this morning.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Dr. Payne, I made reference, in my questions to the report
of the Congressional Commission on the Strategic Posture of the
United States, on which you served. One of the statements that
they made in their report, relative to missile defense, was the
following ``For more than a decade, the development of U.S. BMD
has been guided by the principles of protecting against limited
strikes while,'' this goes to a matter that you were talking to
Senator Reed about. These are the key words, ``taking into
account the legitimate concerns of Russia and China about
strategic stability. These remain sound guiding principles.''
Then this sentence, ``Defenses sufficient to sow doubts in
Moscow or Beijing about the viability of their deterrents could
lead them to take actions that increase the threats to the
United States and its allies and friends.''
Now, when Dr. Perry and Dr. Schlesinger were here, they
told us that the Commission's report, other than a section on
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, was a consensus document.
Did you concur on that paragraph that I just read? You did?
Dr. Payne. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. It's important that, I wish our colleagues
were all here to hear that, is an important statement. It adds
an element to the discussion that you had previously.
The only other question that I have is for you, Dr. Payne,
I think all the other witnesses were asked whether or not the
rejection of the New START treaty would make it more likely
that the Russians would engage in agreed-to limits on tactical
weapons. I don't know that you were asked that question.
Dr. Payne. I'm sorry, sir. Could you repeat the question?
Chairman Levin. Yes. I'm not sure Dr. Foster was asked
either, as a matter of fact. The other witnesses were asked
specifically, just a few minutes ago, if the New START treaty
were rejected, whether that would make it more likely that the
Russians would negotiate a limit on the tactical weapons? Would
the rejection of the New START treaty make it more likely?
Dr. Payne. I think it would likely be inconsequential in
that regard.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Dr. Foster, I don't know if you were
asked.
Dr. Foster. I agree with that position, Senator.
Chairman Levin. You agree with the one that----
Dr. Foster. I would agree that if the United States were to
reject the New START treaty, it would make it more difficult to
address, with Russia, the matter of tactical nuclear weapons.
Chairman Levin. Okay.
Thank you all. It's been very, very helpful. We greatly
appreciate your service to our country and to your being here
this morning. Thanks.
We'll stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
russian tactical nuclear weapons
1. Senator McCain. Dr. Foster and Dr. Payne, in his written
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Former
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger stated: ``as strategic arsenals are
reduced, the distinction between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons
is bound to erode. The large Russian stockpile of tactical nuclear
weapons, unmatched by a comparable American deployment, could threaten
the ability to undertake extended deterrence. This challenge is
particularly urgent given the possible extension of guarantees in
response to Iran's nuclear weapons program and other programs that may
flow from it.'' Do you agree with Dr. Kissinger's assessment?
Dr. Foster. I agree with Dr. Kissinger's statement. And statements
by the Russian leadership indicate the importance of tactical nuclear
weapons in Russian military strategy. The new Russian military
doctrine, their tailored tactical nuclear capabilities and threats of
nuclear attack against their neighbors and NATO has already caused some
allies to express concerns. Urgent attention is required to maintain
the U.S. extended deterrent.
Dr. Payne. No. The Russian 10:1 numeric advantage in tactical
nuclear weapons already threatens the credibility of the U.S. extended
deterrence. That asymmetry will worsen as the United States withdraws
TLAM-N weapons. This threat to U.S. extended deterrence credibility is
not a future concern, it is here and now. Several allies have been
explicit about their concerns in this regard.
2. Senator McCain. Dr. Foster and Dr. Payne, do you believe there
is a significant interrelationship between strategic and tactical
offensive weapons?
Dr. Foster. There is a significant interrelationship between
strategic and tactical offensive weapons. Our so-called tactical
nuclear weapons in Europe provide a strategic deterrent to Russia's
tactical nuclear weapons that are a strategic threat to NATO. In the
same way, Russia's tactical nuclear attack submarines armed with
nuclear cruise missiles, when off our east and west coasts, pose a
strategic threat to the United States.
Dr. Payne. Yes. In fact, the divide between tactical nuclear
weapons and strategic nuclear weapons is largely artificial and a
legacy of Cold War arms control practice. Shorter-range nuclear weapons
(e.g., those that can be deployed on ships or aircraft) certainly
represent a strategic threat to our allies and even possibly to the
United States. In the past U.S. officials appear to have believed that
a large, diverse U.S. strategic nuclear force structure could help
compensate for deterrence purposes for the Russian numeric advantage in
tactical weapons. That U.S. deterrence strategy will be undermined if
we further reduce U.S. strategic forces to sustain strategic parity
with Russia at considerably lower strategic force numbers while Russia
maintains or increases its enormous advantage in tactical nuclear
weapons. Several key allies have expressed concern about this
development and, to date, the United States appears to have no
alternative approach to maintaining credible extended deterrence and
assurance in the context of the great Russian advantage in tactical
nuclear weapons.
3. Senator McCain. Dr. Foster and Dr. Payne, do you agree that the
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) should have at the very
minimum established the framework for addressing tactical nuclear
weapons?
Dr. Foster. I agree that New START should have included a framework
for addressing tactical nuclear weapons. I suspect that our U.S.
negotiators were aware of the value of establishing a framework for
future negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons, however it's clear
from Russian statements that consideration of tactical nuclear weapons
was not to be a part of the negotiations for New START.
Dr. Payne. Yes. The United States should have attempted to use the
considerable negotiating leverage it had in the New START negotiations
to gain some agreement with Russia on tactical nuclear weapons. If
agreement with Russia is possible on tactical nuclear weapons, this was
the time to secure it. The United States is unlikely to have a
comparable level of leverage in the future and Russia sees
significantly increasing value in its tactical nuclear weapons;
negotiating any serious (as opposed to a fig leaf) limits on those
Russian weapons now will be more difficult, perhaps impossible. The
administration's argument that the New START agreement was supposed to
be about strategic nuclear weapons and therefore tactical nuclear
weapons rightly were excluded is contradicted by the fact that other
categories of forces were indeed included: the United States accepted
some limitations on U.S. missile defense and on U.S. conventional
strategic forces in this agreement. The bottom line in this regard is
that the United States did not use its negotiating leverage to gain any
concessions at the tactical nuclear level where Russia holds
considerable advantage and appears to have gained very little in return
for U.S. concessions at the strategic level where Russian capabilities
in the near-to-mid term are declining with or without a treaty.
4. Senator McCain. Dr. Foster and Dr. Payne, what leverage do we
have to compel Russia to discuss reductions of its tactical arsenal in
the future if we were to ratify the New START treaty?
Dr. Foster. Russia's several thousand tactical nuclear weapons are
the deterrent to their perceptions of threats of a larger conventional
military capabilities of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
and China. So it's not simply a NATO/Russia concern, it's also a
Russia/China concern, in that case over territory and energy resources.
Having offered concessions, we have very little leverage left to compel
or persuade Moscow to significantly reduce its tactical nuclear
arsenal. Perhaps early U.S./China and Russia/China discussions to limit
china's nuclear deployments and to reduce Russia's could help.
Dr. Payne. Little, and much less than before the negotiation of the
New START treaty. In the Russian open press, Russian writers have
described at length Russia's main negotiating goals and observe happily
that Russian negotiators achieved all of those goals in the New START
treaty with one exception: Russia was able to place considerable
potential political limits on U.S. missile defense via the language in
the preamble and Russia's own unilateral statement on missile defense,
but it was not able to place many strict technical limits on U.S.
missile defense. With this exception, the Russians appear to have
gotten what they wanted. The Russian 10:1 numeric advantage in tactical
nuclear weapons does not provide much or any direct negotiating
leverage for the United States with regard to future negotiations on
tactical nuclear weapons. Consequently, under current conditions, there
appears to be very little potential ``trade space'' for the United
States with regard to future negotiated reductions in Russian tactical
nuclear weapons unless, perhaps, if the United States is willing to
agree to Russia's desired restrictions on U.S. missile defense options,
U.S. conventional capabilities, and U.S. space-based capabilities. In
addition, again according to the Russian open press, there is no
enthusiasm in Russia for another round of negotiations; since the
signing of the New START treaty, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov has
underscored this by placing conditions on future negotiations that make
any new agreements highly improbable.
verification
5. Senator McCain. Dr. Foster and Dr. Payne, during our hearing
last week, I asked Jim Miller and General Chilton if they were
concerned with an unclassified excerpt of a recent State Department
report stating that ``any Russian cheating under the treaty would have
little effect, if any, on the assured second-strike capabilities of
U.S. strategic forces.'' Both General Chilton and Dr. Miller said they
agreed with the finding. Does cheating matter?
Dr. Foster. I think cheating can matter. The verification
provisions in New START were the result of negotiations which limited
the objectives of each side to guard against cheating. We do not know
what the Russians might do that would matter and that we would not
detect in time to react. I am not aware of any formal Red Team effort
to identify and document Russian evasive actions that could
significantly affect U.S. nuclear deterrence. So, to say that Russian
cheating would have little effect is a judgment reached after some
consideration of evasion, capabilities of U.S intelligence and the
effectiveness of the verification provisions. Cheating could change the
situation and then as General Chilton indicated, we would need to
change force levels and be capable of an adequate response.
Dr. Payne. Cheating matters greatly whether or not it is deemed
``militarily significant'' by the State Department. Cheating at any
level is significant because it reveals the character of Russia's
commitment to the arms control process and the integrity of any
agreement. If Russia is willing to cheat, why should we expect Russia
to cheat only on matters of modest significance? In the past, the
Soviet Union and Russia have cheated on matters large and small. To
presume that because Russia has signed a treaty it is therefore
committed to implementing its terms properly is counter to history
since at least the 1930s. This is why tight verification provisions are
essential when dealing with a country like Russia that has a track
record of cheating. The New START treaty eliminated many such
provisions that existed in the previous START treaty.
The apparent State Department conclusion that potential Russian
cheating would have little effect on U.S. assured second strike
capabilities and therefore can be viewed with some equanimity should
itself be viewed with alarm, not as reassuring. The belief that assured
destruction is the U.S. standard of adequacy for deterrence reflects a
common but mistaken understanding of U.S. policy from the 1960s. For
more than five decades the standard of adequacy for U.S. forces for
deterrence and assurance purposes has mandated more force flexibility,
survivability and resilience than is required by a simple assured
second strike capability alone. The inadequacy of that standard alone
for credible deterrence and assurance has been recognized by Democratic
and Republican administrations alike. The State Department's apparent
resurrection of that long-rejected Cold War standard now in connection
with New START is troubling because it suggests that an inadequate
standard has been used to judge the verification provisions of New
START.
6. Senator McCain. Dr. Foster and Dr. Payne, do you agree that any
Russian cheating would have little, if any, affect?
Dr. Foster. Any cheating by Russia could have little, if any
effect, or cheating could have serious consequences. It depends on what
they chose to do when we learned of it and how prepared we were to
minimize the consequences.
Dr. Payne. No. Russian cheating could have significant political
and strategic implications if the assumptions about the scope and
timing of possible Russian cheating used in consideration of this
question are less than optimistic.
7. Senator McCain. Dr. Foster and Dr. Payne, what would happen if
the United States could not detect in a timely manner the Russian
deployment of 1,000 or 2,000 additional warheads?
Dr. Foster. It depends on Russia's strategic intent and future
capabilities. If their intent were to develop a credible first strike
capability, with an additional 1,000 or 2,000 warheads and other
offensive and defensive capabilities and, the failure on our part to
maintain our deterrent, that kind of situation could lead them to
threaten an attack or at least coerce us to comply with their demands.
For that reason we must have a dedicated focus on what they and others
could be and are doing and maintaining capable and responsive U.S.
forces.
Dr. Payne. Depending on the types of the warheads and delivery
systems and the state of U.S. forces, such a level of cheating could
significantly reduce the survivability of U.S. intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), bombers, and ballistic missile submarine
(SSBN) not on patrol, and thus degrade the necessary flexibility and
resilience of U.S. deterrence forces. This could undercut the
credibility of U.S. deterrence strategies and increase the
vulnerability of the United States and allies to attack or coercion.
The modernization of U.S. strategic forces could help to reduce the
vulnerability of U.S. deterrence strategies to cheating, but to date
the administration has not committed to any comprehensive modernization
program.
8. Senator McCain. Dr. Foster and Dr. Payne, does the fact of no
consequences undercut the need for and validity of the New START?
Dr. Foster. Yes. The assertion of no consequences invites evasion
and weakens our grounds for compliance.
Dr. Payne. The claim of ``no consequence'' is not a ``fact''. And,
if it were true, there could be no corresponding claim that the treaty
and its verification measures are of great importance. If no level of
cheating can be of consequence, then the verification provisions of the
treaty and the treaty itself cannot be of great importance.
9. Senator McCain. Dr. Foster, in your prepared remarks you state
that you believe the New START verification regime is ``inadequate to
give us the depth of knowledge that we will need, given Russian
military doctrine and modernization programs.'' Please elaborate on
your concerns regarding Russian modernization and why you feel this
treaty abandons the ``Trust but Verify'' approach?
Dr. Foster. Given the track record of Soviet/Russian evasions of
past treaties does justify much ``trust'' in treaty negotiations. The
verification provisions of New START are inadequate because Russian
leadership has given highest priority to the development of a
modernized strategic nuclear deterrent and it's supporting
infrastructure. They have announced their commitment to a new bomber,
new mobile and silo based and mirved ICBMs and a new SSBN with new
mirved missiles. The limited inspections, denial of the previous
assembly plant's monitoring facility and now more limited telemetry on
missile firings do not provide the knowledge we need for verification
of Russian compliance with New START over the next 10 years.
national nuclear security administration modernization
10. Senator McCain. Dr. Foster, in his prepared remarks for our
hearing last week, Dr. Michael Anastasio, Director of Los Alamos
National Laboratory stated that he ``fear[s] that there is already a
gap emerging between expectations and fiscal realities'' and that he is
``concerned that in the administration's section 1251 report, much of
the planned funding increase for weapons activities do not come to
fruition until the second half of the 10-year period.'' Do you share
Dr. Anastasio's concerns? If not, why?
Dr. Foster. I share Dr. Anastasio's concerns regarding the
inadequacy of the funding identified in the administrations section
1251 report. Three aspects cause my concern.
First, the requirements for the facilities were set
and the designs laid out before the economic decline and call
for procedures, level of risk acceptance and capabilities,
while nice to have, may no longer be considered appropriate. A
thorough Department of Defense (DOD)/Department of Energy (DOE)
scrub of the level of risk acceptance and required, as opposed
to desired, capabilities is called for.
Second, the DOE track record of escalating
construction costs on some past facilities requires that
special attention be given to details of the contract and
management of costs, both at NNSA and on-site, with clear
descriptions of responsibilities, authorities and
accountabilities of the assigned individuals.
Third, if the appropriated budgets for these
facilities are inadequate the concern is that funding will come
from reductions in the warhead surveillance, and science and
technology programs, as has occurred in the last 5 years.
11. Senator McCain. Dr. Foster, should some of the funding outlined
in the 1251 report be shifted to the first half of the 10-year period?
Dr. Foster. That may be important to reduce near-term risk but it
would make the out-year budget situation even worse. I think that now
is the time to face up to the realities. More funding will be needed in
the first few years and even more funds will be needed in the second
half of the 10-year period.
weapons complex intellectual infrastructure
12. Senator McCain. Dr. Foster, as I stated in my opening remarks,
you along with nine other former lab directors sent a letter to the
Secretary of Defense and the Secretary of Energy stating that you
believe the administration's Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) will have a
negative impact on the ability of the nuclear weapons complex to
recruit and retain the best and brightest talent. In your letter you
state that this ``higher bar'' for certain life extension programs
(LEPs) will ``stifle the creative and imaginative thinking that
typifies the excellent history of progress and development at the
national laboratories.'' Please elaborate on the concerns you and the
other former lab directors raised in your letter.
Dr. Foster. This elaboration on the concerns expressed in the
letter reflect my views and may not represent those of other ex-
directors. I think it is important to understand the situation the
laboratories are facing regarding their ability to attract the best and
brightest to a career in nuclear weapons.
Weapons work is performed in secure areas requiring
security clearances and unclassified research and publication
is not easily accommodated.
The constantly increasing controls and procedures
imposed to assure safety, security and compliance led the 1999
Commission chaired by Adm. Chiles (Ret) to conclude that
``worker feelings range from anger to resigned despair''.\1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ 1999 Report of the Commission on Maintaining United States
Nuclear Weapons Expertise. The 2008 DSB Task Force report ``Nuclear
Deterrence Skills'', also chaired by Adm. Chiles, found ``no change''
regarding ``expanded personnel flexibility''.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
The laboratories have not been permitted to perform
underground tests for 18 years, not designed, developed and
deployed nuclear warheads for about 20 years. And President
Obama has launched a priority initiative to take concrete steps
to nuclear zero. And now, in performing refurbishment of the
aging warheads, if their preferred nuclear approach were to use
a different previously tested but not stockpiled nuclear
component, that approach would require review and approval by
the Secretary of Energy and the President. Such a review would
likely involve still more involvement and reviews by outside
scientists and engineers judging the technical risks of the
directors' approach compared to other approaches. As a
consequence, the laboratories are likely to avoid proposing the
approach that would lead to still more reviews.
In my view the preference of the administration to avoid
different nuclear components on technical grounds does further
stifle the creative and imaginative thinking of the nuclear
design laboratories.
verification: potential for strategic instability
13. Senator McCain. Dr. Foster and Dr. Payne, it appears that both
Russia and the United States will have the capability to upload large
numbers of warheads in fairly short order. This raises the prospect
that if a crisis occurred and tensions were running high, each side
might take measures to prepare to upload warheads. Actually uploading
the warheads in excess of the treaty's limits would be a violation, but
making preparations to do so would be legal. If in a crisis, the
Russians suddenly revealed that they had twice the number of warheads
that were limited by the treaty, would you view that as a dangerous
situation?
Dr. Foster. Yes, if the crisis situation, such as described, were
to develop that caused the Russians to up-load twice the number of
deployed warheads allowed under New START, it would indeed be a
dangerous situation for at least three reasons.
The nature of the crisis apparently compelled Russia
to increase its' strategic military posture and capability.
Although each nation has a large number of non-
deployed warheads, a two-fold increase in deployed capability
implies that the Russians may have made available more delivery
capability for those warheads than we had assumed.
It would raise questions of intent. Had they been
planning to achieve strategic superiority? And we would need to
know the status of Russian tactical nuclear units off our
coasts and near our allies.
Yes, it would be a ``dangerous situation''.
Dr. Payne. The actual situation is somewhat worse than described in
the question. The treaty itself allows the possibility of Russian
deployment of several thousand weapons beyond the treaty's ceiling of
1,550 deployed warheads within the terms of the treaty. Russia would
not have to violate the treaty to have several thousand deployed
warheads, possibly including long-range nuclear weapons not covered by
the treaty such as long-range sea-launched cruise missiles.
Nevertheless, the uploading scenario described in the question would be
particularly dangerous given the hostile political context and intent
assumed in the scenario. In addition, the level of ``breakout''
described could undermine the survivability of U.S. ICBMs, bombers and
SSBN not on patrol, and thus undercut the flexibility and resilience of
U.S. deterrence forces. This could reduce the credibility of U.S.
deterrence strategies at precisely the time when their credibility
would be crucial.
14. Senator McCain. Dr. Foster and Dr. Payne, how important would
it be for the United States to have timely and accurate warning that
the Russians were preparing for, or had actually achieved, a rapid and
large breakout of the treaty's warhead limits?
Dr. Foster. Obviously it would be very important. The information
from Russian civilian and military leadership provides adequate
evidence to support on the one hand an expectation that Russia will
seek peaceful compromises with its' neighbors, NATO and the United
States. On the other hand, it also supports concerns that Russia will
seek to regain dominant influence over the former states of the Soviet
Union and that the United States is its enemy. In our efforts to
maintain the National security of the United States and its allies, it
is important that we make every effort to have timely and accurate
information on potential military capabilities, including those
associated with breakout.
Dr. Payne. It could be critical to help prevent a Russian
``breakout'' that could degrade the credibility of U.S. deterrence and
assurance strategies in a crisis. Accurate warning of such a
development could be crucial to the survivability, flexibility and
resilience of U.S. forces necessary for credible U.S. deterrence
strategies.
15. Senator McCain. Dr. Foster and Dr. Payne, the Russians are
known for their secrecy, denial, and deception in operating their
strategic forces. Is there a potential danger that, again in a crisis,
the United States could misinterpret some Russian strategic activities
as breakout? If so, could that result in a series of other escalatory
moves?
Dr. Foster. In a crisis there is a concern that both sides can
misinterpret the information and initiate actions that can lead to a
series of reinforcing escalatory moves by both sides.
Dr. Payne. The incentives for escalation in a breakout scenario are
likely to be greater in the context of relatively low force levels. Any
actual or seeming Russian breakout as described above could trigger an
escalation process leading to war, particularly if it took place in the
context of low force levels and an acute political-military crisis such
as the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis or the 1973 Yom Kippur War. The
outbreak of World War I had some of these characteristics.
prompt global strike
16. Senator McCain. Mr. Miller, Dr. Foster, and Dr. Payne, while
the New START treaty does not prohibit the development and deployment
of long-range conventional strike capabilities, it does stipulate that
conventional warheads placed on ICBMs or submarine-launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs) will be counted under the overall strategic nuclear
warhead ceiling. Do you feel we should be concerned that this treaty
may impede the development and deployment of our future prompt global
strike capability?
Mr. Miller. No. I do not believe the Treaty impedes the development
and deployment of our future prompt global strike capability. What has
impeded that development and deployment has been the inability of
Congress to authorize and appropriate funds for such a program. The
United States could have a highly affordable and effective prompt
global strike system based on the Trident II/D-5 missile deployed in
little over 2 years if only Congress would fund it.
Dr. Foster. Yes, it may. I think that in the future, the need for a
prompt global strike capability and the associated number of missiles
required will increase. But I don't see that our need for such a
capability to require the United States to reduce the strategic nuclear
deterrent. For the next 10 years a New START treaty could trump the
deployment of a Prompt Global Strike capability. We need to also
consider prompt precision strike capabilities that do not use Triad
assets and perhaps some are deployed offshore.
Dr. Payne. New START does limit the deployment of some conventional
prompt global strike (CPGS) options by requiring the United States to
reduce its nuclear forces on a 1:1 basis for each ICBM or SLBM-based
CPGS missile. Senior U.S. military leaders have said that in general
conventional forces should not be considered substitutes for nuclear
weapons on a 1:1 basis or even on a 10:1 basis. Nevertheless, New
START's 700 deployed launcher ceiling would require a 1:1 reduction of
nuclear force launchers under that ceiling for each such CPGS launcher
deployed. This is a concern because it constrains the numbers of what
appears to be the quickest deployable CPGS options and because the
United States appears not to have gained any Russian concession in
return for limiting CPGS options in this fashion. Over the course of
the treaty (10-15 years), the United States may have a requirement for
many such CPGS systems, but the treaty essentially precludes the United
States from deploying that capability beyond very small numbers.
17. Senator McCain. Mr. Miller, Dr. Foster, and Dr. Payne, how
could this tradeoff affect the development and deployment of our future
prompt global strike capability?
Mr. Miller. The projected number of required prompt global strike
systems is quite small. The trade-off with nuclear systems under the
treaty should not, therefore, impose any constraints on or delay to the
fielding of a prompt global strike system. As I indicated in my answer
to question 16, the United States could field such a system in about 2
years time if Congress would only fund it.
Dr. Foster. General Cartwright, Commander STRATCOM, and more
recently as Vice-Chairman of the JCS, has supported the development of
a Prompt Global Strike capability. The DOD requested the budgets for
Navy and Air Force proposed programs in 2006. Congress did not support
the requests but did authorize funds for research and technology
development.
The DOD continues to state the need for a PGS capability. New START
would require a trade-off of PGS missiles against Nuclear ICBMs and
SLBMs. Near term, trading off a few tens of the 1,550 nuclear missiles
for an initial PGS capability may be acceptable numerically. My concern
is that we fail to emphasize that strategic nuclear deterrence and the
capability to provide a prompt and very local destruction of a fleeting
target opportunity are two very different and unrelated national needs.
The needed numbers in each case will change independent of the other.
Any consideration of trade-off should not affect the development and
deployment of PGS.
Dr. Payne. This trade off denies the United States the option of
any large number of what may be the most near-term and least costly
CPGS options. This situation created by New START is likely to reduce
the potential for sustainable support for the development and
deployment of these options in favor of more distant and more expensive
CPGS options not limited by New START.
department of defense modernization
18. Senator McCain. Mr. Miller, Dr. Foster, and Dr. Payne, the NPR
set forth a broad vision that must not be viewed outside of the realm
of affordability. The cost alone for modernizing both the nuclear
weapons complex and the triad are substantial, and as we move to reduce
the size of our nuclear stockpile, this modernization effort becomes
all the more important. Factoring in the cost of missile defense and
prompt global strike--both essential and critical, but also costly,
programs--the overall budget outlook seems to suggest steady the need
for increases for the foreseeable future. What is the near-term and
long-term affordability of implementing the NPR?
Mr. Miller. I believe the answer to this question must await the
publication by the Department of Defense of its plan to modernize the
ICBM and bomber legs of the Triad.
Dr. Foster. It is important that the administration's near-term
focus has been on persuading Congress to fund the turn-around of the
National nuclear enterprise and the maintenance of the nuclear
strategic deterrent and studies on modernization of the Triad to
maintain nuclear deterrence for the foreseeable future. A near term
priority focus is necessary to learn of and understand the possible
objectives, strategies, plans and programs of China which could require
major changes in U.S. objectives, strategies, force structures and
possibly a heavy long term financial burden.
Dr. Payne. The $10 billion per year over 10 years apparently
identified by the Obama administration for modernization of the U.S.
strategic nuclear force structure is likely to be far short of what
will be necessary for the maintenance of existing systems and even the
most basic, essential modernization steps.
19. Senator McCain. Mr. Miller, Dr. Foster, and Dr. Payne, how
important is it to replace our bomber, ICBM, and air-launched cruise
missiles?
Mr. Miller. I believe it is critically important that the United
States maintain a modern and effective ICBM force. I await with
interest DoD's plan to do so. The issue of the bomber leg is more
complicated. There is a critical need to maintain a force of
penetrating bombers because those systems perform missions which ICBMs
and SLBMs cannot. The need to maintain the B-52/air-launched cruise
missile element of the bomber force is more complicated.
Dr. Foster. There seems to be a consensus on the need to replace
the venerable B-52 strategic bomber, air launched cruise missiles,
ICBM, Trident submarine and its missile by 2030-40. Studies are
currently underway to determine the appropriate characteristics.
My sense is that we need to think about the possible surprises and
asymmetric capabilities of adversary strategic offensive and defensive
systems that could be deployed 20 to 30 years from now. It is important
to maintain the unique characteristics of the present triad's,
signaling intent, responsive command control and survivability of a
credible deterrent, especially with reduced numbers. Future threat
systems should be expected to provide precision targeting of fixed and
moving targets, advanced ASW and improved ballistic missile and air
defenses. It is important that the current studies focus on potential
future adversary capabilities in determining the kind of capabilities
we should develop to provide for a viable, survivable future U.S.
nuclear deterrent. My concern is on the need to move beyond the study
phase and develop modern replacements. This would also help the urgent
need to sustain critical skills and technologies and production
capabilities in our defense industrial base.
Dr. Payne. If these legs of the triad are not modernized, beginning
with an ICBM life-extension program and a modern air-launched cruise
missile program, U.S. strategic forces are likely to lose much of their
flexibility and resilience which will undermine the credibility of U.S.
deterrence and assurance strategies. This consequence of delayed or
aborted modernization must be understood. In addition, delay could have
a profoundly negative effect on our already fragile industrial base to
support strategic capabilities.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Jeff Sessions
future nuclear weapons reductions
20. Senator Sessions. Mr. Miller and Dr. Payne, according to the
2010 NPR, ``The President has directed follow-on analysis to the NPR .
. . to set goals for future U.S.-Russia reductions in nuclear weapons
below New START levels.'' Would additional reductions in U.S. ICBMs,
SLBMs, and heavy bombers, and their associated warheads/bombs, below
those contained in the New START treaty be desirable?
Mr. Miller. I have never believed that reducing nuclear weapons to
meet specific numerical goals makes sense. If arms reduction is to be
of value, it must strengthen strategic stability. The acid test for any
reductions proposed below the levels of New START should be examined
and evaluated only in that light.
Dr. Payne. Further limits could be reasonable and desirable under
certain conditions. For example, further nuclear reductions could be
reasonable if the threats to which U.S. strategies of nuclear
deterrence and assurance apply (e.g., nuclear, biological and chemical
threats) manifestly decline, and appear unlikely to arise again. Or,
further nuclear reductions could be reasonable if an international
organization is established that can be relied upon to monitor
globally, enforce international standards (e.g., strict controls on all
WMD), prevent international conflict, and thereby provide security for
the United States, allies and other countries. Even under these
conditions, any further U.S. nuclear reductions should avoid further
limits on U.S. missile defense and CPGS, and should include deep
reductions and limitations respectively on Russian tactical nuclear
forces and Chinese forces. The prospects are highly questionable for
serious limits or even serious transparency measures (as opposed to fig
leaves) on Russian tactical nuclear weapons and other possible WMD, and
on Chinese nuclear forces and other possible WMD.
21. Senator Sessions. Mr. Miller and Dr. Payne, what are the key
considerations to take into account when contemplating lower U.S.
nuclear force levels?
Mr. Miller. The key considerations in contemplating any additional
reductions in U.S. strategic nuclear force levels are as follows:
Can we maintain an adequate safe, secure, reliable and
credible deterrent at the proposed level?
Can we reassure our allies that we can continue to
provide a ``nuclear umbrella'' over them at the proposed level?
Does the proposed reduction increase or decrease
strategic stability?
Dr. Payne. First is the fundamental need to maintain the
credibility, flexibility, and resilience of U.S. forces for deterrence
purposes. This becomes increasingly difficult as force numbers decline
and these characteristics become even more important for U.S. forces at
lower numbers. Another consideration is the need to assure allies and
friends regarding the credibility, effectiveness, and reliability of
the U.S. extended security commitments. Nuclear weapons are a critical
element to that assurance goal for key allies, including, for example,
Japan and South Korea.
22. Senator Sessions. Mr. Miller and Dr. Payne, are you concerned
that at lower levels the military will not be able to carry out its
deterrence missions?
Mr. Miller. This question cannot be answered until the outlines of
any proposed additional reduction are put forward.
Dr. Payne. U.S. deterrence missions are larger than military
missions. Deterrence is a national mission dependent on all elements of
U.S. power, including nuclear weapons. The military is the steward of
these weapons that are intended to support national missions such as
the deterrence of threats and the assurance of allies. Yes, I am
concerned that at lower force levels U.S. nuclear forces will lack the
flexibility, resilience, and survivability necessary to support U.S.
national deterrence and assurance missions. Only comprehensive U.S.
nuclear modernization programs specifically intended to maximize these
characteristics at low U.S. force levels, would be likely to address
this potential problem.
23. Senator Sessions. Mr. Miller and Dr. Payne, are you concerned
about the survivability of U.S. forces at lower levels?
Mr. Miller. The lower the level of U.S. strategic forces, the more
the issue of survivability comes into play. If U.S. forces are to be
reduced in the future, the United States must resist the budgetary
temptation to reduce the number of SSBNs. As I understand it, the
administration's plan for SSBN-X is that it will have 16 rather than 24
tubes: this is a step in the right direction. Similarly, the
administration's plan, as I understand it, is to ``neuter'' in a
verifiable manner launch tubes on the existing Ohio SSBNs rather than
cut the number of SSBNs in the force; this, again, is a strategically
wise move.
Dr. Payne. Yes. The problem is that New START reduces the number of
U.S. launchers significantly, but places no limits on Russia's MIRVed
ICBM payloads and only very porous limits on the number of deployed
warheads. This combination is ripe for increasing the vulnerability of
U.S. strategic forces unless the United States simultaneously
undertakes a modernization program designed to preserve force
survivability at low launcher numbers. That was not a requirement with
the existing legacy Cold War-era systems and would be a new design
requirement.
24. Senator Sessions. Mr. Miller and Dr. Payne, doesn't detecting
cheating, i.e. strong verification, become more important at the lower
levels imposed by New START?
Mr. Miller. Yes.
Dr. Payne. Yes. At New START's lower force levels cheating could
threaten the survivability, flexibility, and resilience of U.S.
forces--particularly if those forces are not modernized specifically to
preserve those characteristics at low force levels. The
administration's apparent claim that Russian cheating could not be of
strategic significance because it could not threaten a U.S. ``assured
second strike capability'' is a non-sequitur because the standard of
adequacy for U.S. forces for deterrence and assurance purposes is not
simply an assured second strike capability. U.S. force survivability,
flexibility, and resilience are important force characteristics for
credible deterrence and assurance, and those characteristics could be
jeopardized by cheating, by a rapid ``break-out'' from the treaty, or
simply by the covert exploitation of the treaty's many loopholes.
25. Senator Sessions. Mr. Miller and Dr. Payne, are you concerned
that other countries may view lower U.S. force levels as an opportunity
to gain parity with the United States in nuclear capability?
Mr. Miller. I do not believe that if the New START treaty is
ratified, and the United States moves to the 700/1,550 limits that any
third country would view this is an opportunity to gain parity.
Dr. Payne. Yes. The potential for U.S. reductions to serve as an
inducement for greater Chinese nuclear efforts is a reasonable concern
under two plausible conditions: if the United States does not modernize
its nuclear forces as is possible under New START, and/or if, as the
administration emphasizes, New START is only the first step in a
transition to deeper reductions that could be such an inducement for
China. Russian open sources express precisely this concern vis-a-vis
China. It should be noted that China is likely to continue the
expansion and modernization of its nuclear forces with or without New
START. In addition, the loopholes in New START's ceilings on launchers
and warheads give the United States the option of retaining several
thousand nuclear warheads under the terms of the treaty-a level that
would be unlikely to induce greater-than-normal Chinese nuclear
efforts.
26. Senator Sessions. Mr. Miller and Dr. Payne, are you concerned
that at lower levels of U.S. forces, our allies may come to doubt the
credibility of U.S. nuclear security guarantees--especially if the
Russians maintain large numbers of tactical nuclear weapons?
Mr. Miller. I do not believe that our allies and friends will have
any reason to doubt the credibility of U.S. nuclear security guarantees
at the 700/1,550 New START limits. I do believe, however, that Russia's
stockpile of short-range nuclear weapons vastly exceeds any reasonable
political or military requirements and that Russia should be convinced
to carry out dramatic reductions of those weapons. My views on this are
captured in the article I co-authored in February 2010 with former NATO
Secretary General Lord Robertson and Dr. Kori Schake ``Germany Opens
Pandora's Box.''.
Dr. Payne. Yes. This is a serious concern as evidenced by numerous
allied comments along precisely these lines. Allied doubts about the
credibility of U.S. security commitments could undermine alliance
relations and encourage nuclear proliferation among some allies and
friends. Again, dedicated U.S. nuclear force modernization and the
development and deployment of other strategic force programs, including
missile defense and advanced conventional strategic forces, could help
to ameliorate this problem.
nuclear weapons complex budget
27. Senator Sessions. Dr. Foster, the administration's budget plan
for NNSA stockpile and infrastructure costs is rather flat in fiscal
years 2012 and 2013. According to the 1251 report, ``the plan to `ramp
up' investment over time reflects the reality that the complex is
constrained in its ability to rapidly absorb new funding.'' Do you
agree with the administration's assessment that the nuclear weapons
complex cannot absorb funding increases over the next few years?
Dr. Foster. I do not agree with that assessment. It is my
understanding that more funds are needed than are in the fiscal year
2010-2013 budgets for such programs as the backlogged surveillance
programs, the delayed actions to correct SFI's, the delayed initiation
of the B-61 Life Extension work, initiation of dual revalidation,
conduct of more laboratory experiments and tests on DHART, NIF, Z-
Machine NTS, etc. Efforts were made to reduce the funds requested by
the labs and plants but I do not know details of a process that found
that the complex cannot absorb funding increases over the fiscal year
2011-2013 budgets.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John Thune
nuclear delivery vehicles
28. Senator Thune. Mr. Miller and Dr. Payne, press reports indicate
the administration will invest $100 billion over the next decade in
nuclear delivery systems. About $30 billion of this total will go
toward development and acquisition of a new strategic submarine.
According to estimates by U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), the cost
of maintaining our current dedicated nuclear forces is approximately
$5.6 billion per year or $56 billion over the decade. This leaves
roughly $14 billion of the $100 billion the administration intends to
invest--even less if you factor in inflation. This $14 billion is not
nearly sufficient to develop and acquire a next generation bomber, a
follow-on ICBM, a follow-on air launched cruise missile, and develop a
CPGS capability. In light of these figures, do you think that $100
billion is a sufficient investment in our delivery systems over the
next decade? If so, why?
Mr. Miller. I do not have the necessary detailed visibility into
the DOD budget to provide an answer to this.
Dr. Payne. Given these numbers, there is no doubt that the amount
identified is far short of that required to modernize U.S. strategic
forces as necessary to support credible strategies for deterrence and
assurance.
29. Senator Thune. Mr. Miller and Dr. Payne, with the aging of the
ICBM and with current bombers becoming less and less survivable, how is
$14 billion enough to replace two thirds of our triad?
Mr. Miller. I do not have the necessary detailed visibility into
the DOD budget to provide an answer to this.
Dr. Payne. $14 billion over a 10-year period would be insufficient
to modernize each leg of the triad. In the very near-term,
modernization would require, at a minimum, a life-extension program for
the Minuteman ICBM and the development and deployment of a new air-
launched cruise missile for the bomber force. It should be noted in
this regard that the 2009 report of the bipartisan Congressional
Strategic Posture Commission included unanimous agreement that the
United States should maintain the strategic triad.
30. Senator Thune. Mr. Miller and Dr. Payne, during testimony
before this committee last July, General Cartwright expressed the view
that he would be very concerned about the viability of the triad if we
got below 800 deployed delivery vehicles. The New START treaty
establishes a level of 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles. I note
that General Cartwright stated this concern after the NPR team had
already conducted detailed analysis in the spring of 2009 to determine
negotiating positions in the New START treaty on an appropriate limit
on strategic delivery vehicles. Why should we not be concerned, given
that this number is 100 below General Cartwright's comfort level?
Mr. Miller. As one who has spent many years directing on U.S.
nuclear deterrence policy, my own view is that the force structure the
United States is able to field a credible, survivable, and robust
deterrent under the 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles limit. I
do not believe General Cartwright and I disagree on this. My
understanding is that General Cartwright believes that the Treaty is in
the security interests of the United States.
Dr. Payne. New START's reduction of U.S. deployed strategic
launchers to 700 launchers is the treaty's most significant force
limitation. Achieving a strict limitation on U.S. launchers was,
according to the Russian press, the priority goal for Russian
negotiators. The number of Russian deployed launchers already is below
700, and according to numerous open Russian press reports, with or
without New START the number of accountable deployed Russian launchers
will continue to decline and will remain below 700 for the foreseeable
future. Consequently, New START's launcher limit essentially is of
consequence only for the United States. In addition, to the extent that
the United States deploys conventional PGS based on ICBMs or SLBMs, the
number of launchers available for U.S. strategic nuclear forces will be
reduced on a 1:1 basis. So, in reality, the number of deployed nuclear
launchers possible under New START will be below 700 with the
deployment of such conventional PGS.
We should be concerned about this ceiling on U.S. launchers because
the number of available launchers is one of the primary factors
determining the flexibility, survivability, and resilience of U.S.
strategic forces, and thus their credibility for deterrence and
assurance. I concur with General Cartwright's apparent initial view
that the United States should not agree to the reduction of launchers
available for U.S. deployed strategic nuclear forces below 800. And,
that number should not be reduced further by the U.S. deployment of
conventional PGS. A ceiling of 800 actual deployed strategic nuclear
launchers would allow room for a reasonable level of flexibility and
resilience in the deployment of the U.S. triad. Why the United States
accepted an actual number for deployed nuclear launchers well below 800
(and below 700 if counting possible U.S. PGS deployment) when the
Russian number of launchers already was headed down far below 800 with
or without New START appears to be inexplicable. This situation is
particularly troubling in the absence of any apparent administration
commitment to comprehensive modernization of the triad.
31. Senator Thune. Mr. Miller and Dr. Payne, if the former
Commander of STRATCOM is concerned about reducing our delivery vehicles
below 800, shouldn't we be concerned as well?
Mr. Miller. Please see my answer to question 30.
Dr. Payne. Yes. That concern could be ameliorated to the extent
that the administration commits to a comprehensive strategic nuclear
modernization program designed to maximize strategic force flexibility,
survivability, and resilience at low force numbers. Modernization would
also help sustain important industrial capabilities in the United
States.
32. Senator Thune. Mr. Miller and Dr. Payne, what do you believe
were the assumptions going into the START negotiations that drove our
level of acceptance to reduce to these numbers?
Mr. Miller. Negotiated outcomes are a complex result of many
factors. I would direct your question to the administration since I did
not participate in the negotiations of advise the negotiating team.
Dr. Payne. In open testimony, senior military leaders have
identified assumptions behind the analysis that apparently allowed the
acceptance of New START numbers:
1. Russia would comply with New START limits;
2. there would be no requirement for an increase in U.S. forces;
and,
3. U.S. planning guidance would remain the same.
These are extremely optimistic assumptions. For example, the
assumption that Russia will comply with treaty obligations is not
supported by past Russian or earlier Soviet behavior.
1251 report and force structure reductions
33. Senator Thune. Mr. Miller and Dr. Payne, the 1251 report
provides a very troubling lack of specificity concerning force
structure. Specifically, the administration's fact sheet on the section
1251 report explains that the U.S. nuclear force structure under the
New START could comprise up to 420 ICBMs, 240 SLBMs, and 60 bombers.
Since deployments at the maximum level of all three legs of the triad
under that explanation add up to 720 delivery vehicles, it is
mathematically impossible for the United States to make such a
deployment and be in compliance with the treaty's limit of 700 deployed
strategic nuclear delivery vehicles. Clearly, additional reduction
decisions need to be made with respect to U.S. force structure under
this treaty.
In your expert opinion, how do you think Russia will establish
their force structure and based on that, where do you foresee the
additional reductions will come from in order to get to the 700 total
deployed delivery vehicles that we are limited to by this treaty?
Mr. Miller. I believe that the Russian strategic force under New
START will be ICBM-heavy, with many of those ICBMs MIRVed. The Russians
are seeking to produce as much force for as little spending as
possible. Our own forces, however, need to be structured to meet our
requirements, not anyone else's. Those requirements include
survivability, credibility, and robustness. I believe the answer to the
question as to where the postulated reduction of 20 deployed delivery
vehicles will occur is that they will be taken from either the ICBM leg
or the bomber leg. This depends, in turn, on the administration's
decisions on the future of the B-52/ALCM element of the bomber leg of
the Triad.
Dr. Payne. Based on my reading of open Russian analyses of Russian
forces, I expect that for the next decade Russia will have no more than
500 accountable deployed strategic launchers--at least 200 below the
New START ceiling. Russian numbers could improve if energy prices
increase greatly and provide Russia with windfall resources to boost
spending on strategic forces (Russian military leaders have stated
openly that strategic nuclear force modernization is Russia's highest
defense priority). At relatively low launcher numbers, Russia will take
advantage of New START's lack of restrictions on MIRVing and MIRVed
payloads, and will slowly introduce new, heavily MIRVed ICBMs and SLBMs
into its arsenal. Russia also is likely to take advantage of New
START's permissive warhead counting rule for bomber weapons. As a
result, I expect Russia to have 2000 or more actual strategic warheads
under the Treaty on fewer than 500 accountable launchers. If Russia
cheats and has the necessary resources, the number of warheads could be
much higher.
34. Senator Thune. Mr. Miller and Dr. Payne, with the New START's
limitations going into effect within 7 years, at what point do we need
to begin making the changes necessary to comply with this treaty?
Mr. Miller. I no longer am sufficiently familiar with the specific
timelines involved and so I cannot provide a useful answer to this
question.
Dr. Payne. We probably would need to begin within 3-4 years,
although the administration could begin the reductions more quickly if
it chose to do so.
35. Senator Thune. Mr. Miller and Dr. Payne, will we know what the
Russia force structure will be by that point, in your judgment?
Mr. Miller. No.
Dr. Payne. We can anticipate some features of the Russian force
structure 7 years out based wholly on open Russian sources-with the
understanding that some variation is inevitable. The Russian force
structure will likely be characterized by a relatively low number of
accountable ICBM, SLBM and strategic bombers (i.e., strategic
launchers) because during this period Russia will continue deactivating
its old Cold War strategic launchers more rapidly than it replaces them
with new systems. Consequently, the number of Russian strategic
launchers accountable under New START will continue to decline well
below the New START ceiling with or without the treaty. The number of
Russian deployed strategic launchers in this timeframe will probably be
fewer than 500 accountable launchers (again, based on Russian open
sources), including new ICBMs and SLBMs that are MIRVed. In addition,
according to open Russian sources, Russian forces are likely to include
new long-range air-launched cruise missiles (which would be accountable
under New START as a single weapon per bomber regardless of how many
might be deployed on each bomber), and also a new long-range sea-
launched cruise missile that probably will not be accountable under New
START. Given New START's counting rules, the actual number of deployed
Russian warheads could be well above the treaty's 1,550 ceiling under
the terms of the treaty.
36. Senator Thune. Mr. Miller and Dr. Payne, how important is it to
replace our bomber, ICBM, and air-launched cruise missile force?
Mr. Miller. As I indicated in my response to question 19: ``I
believe it is critically important that the United States maintain a
modern and effective ICBM force. I await with interest DOD's plan to do
so. The issue of the bomber leg is more complicated. There is a
critical need to maintain a force of penetrating bombers because those
systems perform missions which ICBMs and SLBMs cannot. The need to
maintain the B-52/air-launched cruise missile element of the bomber
force is more complicated.''
Dr. Payne. It is critical for credible deterrence and assurance
purposes. This is true with or without the treaty. With the treaty and
any further nuclear reductions, however, it will be essential to
modernize the smaller arsenal to maximize its survivability,
flexibility, and resilience at low force numbers. The earliest need is
for a Minuteman LEP and the development of a new air-launched cruise
missile. The existing cruise missile is approximately 25 years old and
a modern replacement must be a priority.
37. Senator Thune. Mr. Miller and Dr. Payne, Senators are in a
precarious situation, being asked to provide advice and consent before
obtaining a commitment to follow-on delivery systems. What if these
systems were not to be replaced? How would this impact U.S. security
under New START?
Mr. Miller. I believe it is critically important to our security
and that of our allies that the United States maintain a deterrent
based on a modernized Triad of SLBMs/SSBNs, ICBMs, and bombers.
Dr. Payne. In the absence of a much more benign international
threat environment, if these systems are not replaced the capacity of
U.S. forces to support critical national deterrence and assurance goals
will erode; the continued lack of modernization would eventually create
a very dangerous context for the United States and allies. It would
increase the probability of attacks on the United States and allies,
undermine key U.S. alliances, and lead to greater incentives for
nuclear proliferation.
survivability of the bomber force
38. Senator Thune. Mr. Miller and Dr. Payne, according to the most
recent briefs I have seen, DOD expects the current nuclear bomber force
to remain in service through 2040. Thirty more years is a long time for
a bomber that was built 50 years ago. Proponents of this plan say they
can last that long with upgrades. However, physically remaining in
service is significantly different than remaining survivable in a
future high threat combat scenario. Since the NPR recognizes the need
for a triad, and since the treaty is only for a 10-year period, how do
you think this treaty will affect any plans to build a replacement
bomber?
Mr. Miller. The treaty should not--and does not--affect our plans
to build a replacement bomber. That decision should be made on the
basis of the contribution of such a replacement bomber to the viability
and credibility of our deterrent.
Dr. Payne. This treaty should encourage the development and
deployment of a new strategic bomber given the inherent flexibility
offered by bombers and the precedent the treaty sets for extremely
permissive counting rules for bomber weapons. Whether the
administration will take advantage of this element of New START remains
an open question. Russia already has announced its plans to build at
least one new strategic bomber. The modernization of the U.S. air-
launched cruise missile probably is as important as are modernization
plans for a new bomber itself. In a heavy air defense environment, a
new long-range air-launched cruise missile will contribute to the
continuing credibility of strategic bombers. Consequently,
modernization of the bomber leg of the triad needs to be seen in terms
of bomber and cruise missile modernization.
39. Senator Thune. Mr. Miller and Dr. Payne, my understanding is
that an ICBM-based prompt global strike platform would be counted
against the 700 deployed delivery vehicles. If we decide to develop
that system, which of the three legs of the triad, in your opinion,
should be or would be further reduced to accommodate it?
Mr. Miller. My understanding is that the number of prompt global
strike systems needed to meet U.S. national security requirements is
fairly small. I favor an SLBM-based system. The administration is also
looking at an ICBM-like option. In either case, deploying a small
number of prompt global strike systems should be compensated for under
the treaty by retiring an equivalent number of ``like'' systems, that
is, SLBMs in the event of a sea-based deployment or ICBMs in the event
of a land-based deployment.
Dr. Payne. Developing and deploying CPGS weapons on ballistic
missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs) would be the most timely option for fielding
such a capability. However, given the treaty's limits on CPGS, my
recommendation would be to pursue a CPGS system that is not accountable
under New START and to keep the number of treaty-accountable CPGS low,
i.e., no more than 25-35. Each leg of the triad could be reduced by
some fraction of that number. The goal of this approach would be to do
the least damage possible to the integrity of the triad as a whole.
conflicting messages to the nuclear force
40. Senator Thune. Mr. Miller, Dr. Foster, and Dr. Payne, in an
effort to build up the nuclear enterprise, the Air Force recently
accomplished an extensive restructuring which included, among other
things, adding a new Global Strike Command, adding an additional B-52
nuclear capable bomber squadron, and multiple changes to procedures and
testing. This was all part of a tremendous and ongoing effort to
reinvigorate the nuclear enterprise. However, by ratifying the New
START it would seem we are providing conflicting guidance to our
nuclear forces and telling them we want to draw down and scale back the
nuclear mission. For example, the New START would specifically reverse
the directions the Air Force was just given to build up the B-52
nuclear capability by cutting the number of nuclear capable B-52s.
Are you at all worried that the reduction in force structure that
the New START establishes, will undercut the Air Force's improved
emphasis on the nuclear mission, especially now that the Air Force has
made great strides toward fixing the problems it had a few years ago?
Mr. Miller. I am not worried. I believe the question sets up a
false premise. Air Force nuclear units exist to serve national
requirements; the reverse is not true.
As a member of the Secretary of Defense Task Force on DOD Nuclear
Weapons Management (``the Schlesinger Task Force''), I was in the
forefront of calling for increased Air Force attention to its nuclear
role. I strongly believe the Air Force has made great improvements in
its nuclear force management and that Air Force personnel involved in
the nuclear mission area understand the critical importance of their
jobs. Whatever Air Force nuclear force structure emerges from the
administration's plans and Congress' approval of those plans, airmen
will continue to serve in nuclear roles in the ICBM force and in the
bomber force. They will be expected by their leadership to perform to
the highest professional standards.
Dr. Foster. The Air Force's refocused effort to maintain a nuclear
deterrent for the foreseeable future is very important. It will require
a couple of decades just to rebuild the career paths and capabilities
in all aspects of nuclear deterrence. The numbers of delivery vehicles
and warheads must change in response to the needs of national security.
I am not particularly worried by the changes that would be required
by New START because I believe the current DOD and Air Force leadership
are fully committed and will sustain the recovery near term. Longer
term, it will be important to guard against budget pressures and other
national priorities that could again degrade nuclear deterrence. The
Air Force will need, of course, the support of Congress in order to be
successful.
Dr. Payne. Yes. The potential negative political effect of New
START on the needed revitalization and modernization of U.S. strategic
programs, including missile defense, is a great concern. Arms control
agreements in the past have had a powerfully negative political effect
on subsequent U.S. programs not technically limited by treaty. This
tendency in the U.S. political system may now be stronger because this
administration has emphasized that New START is a transitional
agreement toward further reductions and the ultimate goal of nuclear
zero, and that movement in this direction is this administration's top
nuclear policy goal. The actual prospects for another strategic force
agreement and nuclear zero are limited and infinitesimal respectively.
Nevertheless, given the administration's stated top priority goals in
this regard, the necessary revitalization and modernization programs
will be seen by many as inconsistent with the priority direction of
U.S. policy. It will be difficult to maintain this internal
inconsistency in the likely context of defense budget austerity.
41. Senator Thune. Mr. Miller, Dr. Foster, and Dr. Payne, how will
these reductions affect our long-term recruiting and retention efforts
at our labs?
Mr. Miller. The national requirement to maintain safe, secure and
reliable nuclear weapons will exist irrespective of any arms reduction
agreement. If Congress fully funds the administration's request to
modernize the DOE nuclear weapons complex I believe recruiting and
retention will meet the nation's needs.
Dr. Foster. The reductions that would be required specifically by
New START will not directly affect the work scope required at the
Laboratories; their work scope is principally determined by the need to
refurbish the currently deployed systems and not by the number of
warheads. However, the reduction in the numbers of weapons coupled with
the President's goal of a ``nuclear zero'' could affect the long-term
recruiting and retention efforts of the laboratories' nuclear warhead
programs by creating the perception that maintaining the health of the
nuclear weapons program is not a national priority. The New START
treaty could stimulate the laboratories ability to attract new
personnel and enlarge programs to support the monitoring, inspections
and the provision of associated capabilities.
Dr. Payne. I would like to defer to Dr. Foster on all questions
regarding recruitment, careers, retirement and expertise at the
National laboratories. Dr. Foster has unparalleled experience and
knowledge regarding these questions.
recruitment and retirement issues within the labs
42. Senator Thune. Dr. Foster and Dr. Payne, 2 weeks ago, Dr.
Anastasio, Director of the Los Alamos Lab, stated in his testimony that
the average age of career lab employees is now over 48 years old and
that 32 percent of all career employees are expected to retire within
the next 5 years. In addition, General Kevin Chilton, the current head
of STRATCOM, said 2 years ago that ``the last nuclear design engineer
to participate in the development and testing of a new nuclear weapon
is scheduled to retire in the next 5 years.'' Does this cause you some
concern? Why or why not?
Dr. Foster. Yes. I am concerned about the lack of programs at the
design laboratories to provide engineering/production design-related
challenges and experience to the next generation of warhead designers
and engineers. The nuclear laboratory directors have been increasingly
concerned over the last 20 years because college graduates have become
less attracted to a career in nuclear weapons. A more immediate concern
relates to General Chilton's observation that few scientists and
engineers remain who have had nuclear warhead design, engineering,
production and nuclear test experience. To properly train those that
have not had that experience would require that they, in integrated
teams, design, engineer, prototype and flight test one or two different
kinds of warheads in the immediate future. But Congress has rejected
such activity often because it could lead to a ``new'' warhead, a new
military capability which some asserted could provide an additional
reason for non-nuclear nations to proliferate. While the United States
is the only nuclear nation with such self-imposed restrictions, it has
prevented the United States from providing the best opportunity to
train and develop competence and proficiency in the teams responsible
for maintaining our nuclear warheads.
Dr. Payne. I would like to defer to Dr. Foster on all questions
regarding recruitment, careers, retirement and expertise at the
national laboratories. Dr. Foster has unparalleled experience and
knowledge regarding these questions.
43. Senator Thune. Dr. Foster and Dr. Payne, what are we doing
under the current limitations of experimenting and testing in order to
preserve nuclear design expertise?
Dr. Foster. Current design, engineering production and testing and
experimentation on the newly built facililties has been limited,
particularly in the last 5 years by congressional restrictions on
design-related programs and successive reductions in weapons funds
available to the laboratory and plants. The Future Years Defense
Program (FYDP) 2011-16 budgets, particularly if appropriations are
increased would make major changes in the whole nuclear enterprise.
The best remaining opportunity to train the laboratory and plant
teams of scientists, engineers and plant personnel is to undertake
aggressive and competitive revalidations of the warheads that are
overdue for Life Extensions.
Dr. Payne. I would like to defer to Dr. Foster on all questions
regarding recruitment, careers, retirement and expertise at the
national laboratories. Dr. Foster has unparalleled experience and
knowledge regarding these questions.
44. Senator Thune. Dr. Foster and Dr. Payne, can you describe the
relationship between the limitations placed on continuing to pursue
scientific advances and our ability to recruit younger individuals to
pursue this type of career?
Dr. Foster. The ability to recruit younger individuals to pursue a
career particularly in nuclear warheads is limited by their perception
from the following situation:
Nuclear testing has not been permitted for 18 years.
The recent U.S. policy goal to take concrete steps to
a global nuclear zero
The nuclear weapons inventory and associated funds
have generally been reduced over the last 20 years.
Creative challenges, such as developing new types of
nuclear designs have been blocked by Congress.
Funding limitations have restricted the number of
experiments that can be performed on the newly constructed and
existing facilities.
Currently, there is a priority focus on security
safety, procedures and oversight. This is important work, but
may not be attractive to the best young talent. Nevertheless
younger people would be attracted to work at the Laboratories
if the unique facilities in computers, DHART, MESA, the Z-
Machine and the more creative opportunities in ``Work'' for
others are available to them.
Dr. Payne. I would like to defer to Dr. Foster on all questions
regarding recruitment, careers, retirement and expertise at the
National laboratories. Dr. Foster has unparalleled experience and
knowledge regarding these questions.
45. Senator Thune. Dr. Foster and Dr. Payne, what impact will these
near-term retirements have on the knowledge level required to certify
the reliability of nuclear weapons?
Dr. Foster. Near term the performing teams will not be receiving
the training and experience they need before the more experienced
leaders retire. The backlog of warhead surveillance does not provide
confidence that we have a thorough current understanding of some of the
potential failure modes and unacceptable aging of components. Even the
Significant Findings Investigations mandatory corrections are behind
schedule. Recent funding restrictions have reduced laboratory
experiments and tests and delayed the introduction of plant equipment
to improve inspections and efficiency.
These are the kinds of things that limit the knowledge that
laboratory directors need to assess and certify the stockpile.
Dr. Payne. I would like to defer to Dr. Foster on all questions
regarding recruitment, careers, retirement and expertise at the
National laboratories. Dr. Foster has unparalleled experience and
knowledge regarding these questions.
certification process
46. Senator Thune. Dr. Foster, all nuclear weapons are certified to
meet a standard of weapon reliability. According to DOE, this is
defined as ``the probability of achieving the specified yield, at the
target, across the stockpile-to-target sequence of environments,
throughout the weapon's lifetime, assuming proper inputs.'' According
to the Government Accountability Office, this is done at our National
laboratories using a methodology that combines both the margins and
uncertainties and statistical data to predict the reliability of our
weapons. Can you describe the challenges and risks associated with the
current process to certify the reliability of our nuclear stockpile
since we aren't testing anymore?
Dr. Foster. Since we aren't performing nuclear testing, we are
running risks. Based on our experience and current knowledge we can
judge that the stockpile is safe and reliable. But we don't know that
it is because we can't prove it through a full-scale integrated test.
The best we can do is to follow the methodology referred to by the
Government Accountability Office. All of the nuclear laboratories are
now using the quantification of margins and uncertainties and that
process has led to important research, findings and increased
confidence. In the absence of nuclear testing--which demonstrated that
nuclear warheads would or would not function properly--the new
challenge is to demonstrate the absence of all problems which could
cause warheads to not operate properly and why. This is a very
difficult challenge.
Two areas, in my view, need more focus and priority. The first is a
major effort to use the few remaining leaders who have experienced the
design, engineering, production nuclear and flight testing to train
those who have not had that experience. The best available opportunity
is to accelerate the overdue LEPs. The planned Stockpile Stewardship
Program would require, for each LEP, a competitive revalidation process
to be used in extending stockpile lives. Additional funds will be
needed to permit acceleration of that process.
The second area is to provide more statistical data to provide
information on the condition of each warhead type and components in the
stockpile as well as those in storage. During the last 5 years
reductions in available funding has reduced the number of programmed
warhead surveillance operations, reduced the effort on ``mandatory''
fixes, reduced laboratory experiments and tests, etc. As a result, the
laboratory directors lack the statistical information and knowledge
they planned to have in order to assess the reliability and safety of
the stockpile
The 2011-2016 FYDP will help to reverse recent trends, but there is
serious concern that more funds are necessary.
47. Senator Thune. Dr. Foster, how will the risk levels or the
process change with reduced overall numbers of weapons, the emphasis on
used or refurbished parts and the increasingly distant amount of time
since our last test?
Dr. Foster. We know that without nuclear testing we are already
running some risks. For more than 50 years the Stockpile Surveillance
Program has found potential failure modes, more than 90 percent were
due to non-nuclear components, and mandatory fixes were performed. But
during the last 5 years of reduced funding the warhead surveillance
program has been curtailed as have other parts of the Stockpile
Surveillance Program which has increased the risks. When we had
thousands of nuclear warheads and tens of different types, such risks
may have been judged acceptable but as the number of deployed warheads
and types are reduced, the risks grow. For that reason, it is very
important to adequately fund warhead inspections and laboratory testing
of component development and production articles.
The use of used and refurbished non-nuclear parts is acceptable
provided we have performed statistically significant tests-to-failure
determined quantitative margins of uncertainty and have a more rigorous
inspection process. If we do not have enough used parts for adequate
tests, the additional risks may not be acceptable.
The risks associated with increasingly distant time since the last
warhead test of each type is a complex matter. But, in my view, the
dominante factor is the dedication and training of the scientists,
engineers and production personnel to develop competence and
proficiency in maintaining the nuclear stockpile. Recent studies have
found that the situation must be improved, and it can be.
48. Senator Thune. Dr. Foster, does using refurbished or reusable
parts affect, in any way, your calculations on reliability of the
warhead and service life estimates?
Dr. Foster. The use of refurbished or reuseable nuclear parts could
change estimates of the reliability and service life. The option to use
nuclear components from other warheads of the same type after careful
inspection is, to me, acceptable. The option to use a nuclear component
or assembly based on previously tested designs but not stockpiled has
not yet been subjected to a competitive review by the nuclear design
labs. If, after a competitive laboratory review of all options the
nuclear replacement option were chosen, I feel that on technical
grounds that option should be accepted.
49. Senator Thune. Dr. Foster, wouldn't there be increased risk in
their reliability if using used parts?
Dr. Foster. Because there could be increased risks in using used
nuclear parts, the laboratories make every effort to understand and
minimize those risks. Of course, it is the risks that they don't know
about, if any, that are not addressed and are always a lingering
concern. The best we can do is to incentivize competitive teams to
discover such risks and be given the commitment to support efforts to
run such discoveries to ground.
[Whereupon, at 11:33 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
CONTINUE TO RECEIVE TESTIMONY ON THE NEW STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTION
TREATY
----------
THURSDAY, JULY 29, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:36 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Udall, Hagan, Bingaman, McCain, Inhofe, Sessions, Chambliss,
and Thune.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; and Richard W. Fieldhouse, professional staff member.
Minority staff members present: Christian D. Brose,
professional staff member; Daniel A. Lerner, professional staff
member; and David M. Morriss, minority counsel.
Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard, Hannah I. Lloyd,
and Brian F. Sebold.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Griffin,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn Chuhta, assistant to
Senator Reed; Nick Ikeda, assistant to Senator Akaka; Roger
Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan; Jonathan Epstein, assistant
to Senator Bingaman; Anthony Lazarski, assistant to Senator
Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator
Sessions; Clyde Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss; and
Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
Today, we are continuing the Armed Services Committee
hearings on the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START).
Our witnesses this morning are Rose Gottemoeller, Assistant
Secretary of State for Verification, Compliance, and
Implementation, and the lead negotiator on the New START
treaty, and Dr. Edward Warner, the Secretary of Defense's
representative to the New START treaty talks.
We will also, as I mentioned at our hearing on Tuesday, be
having a classified briefing on the U.S. strategic force
structure options today at 3 p.m.
Ms. Gottemoeller, it is a pleasure to have you back before
the committee. Several times over the course of the
negotiations on the New START treaty, you provided the
committee and other Senators with detailed progress reports on
the negotiations. Those were very helpful. We thank you for
doing those.
Dr. Warner, it is good to see you again as well. I note
that you often accompanied Ms. Gottemoeller when she gave us
those progress reports, and we are grateful to both of you for
your service in this very demanding work that you were engaged
in and are engaged in.
The committee has now heard from witnesses discussing the
scope of the treaty and how it will be implemented, with
representatives from the executive branch including Secretary
of State Clinton; Secretary of Defense Gates; Secretary of
Energy Chu; and Admiral Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs.
We have also heard from a panel of independent analysts who
shared their views and opinions on the New START treaty.
As a result of these discussions, I think there are a
number of areas of interest or concern that have been
identified, and among them are the following: whether the
treaty has any negative effect on missile defense programs, the
adequacy of telemetry and verification, adequacy of onsite
inspections, what would make it more likely that we could get
Russia to begin negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons--
ratification or rejection of the treaty; what would be more
helpful in terms of getting Russia, again, to do something that
I guess many administrations have supported, which is an
agreement on tactical nuclear weapons?
Another issue which has been raised is the question of
possible cheating. In that question, the subquestions, what is
the ability to detect possible cheating, its effect if it
occurs, and what remedies are there if it takes place? Those
are issues which we have explored with other witnesses, but
these witnesses may have some thoughts on that.
Also, the adequacy of modernization of the nuclear complex
and the force structure, which, again, are issues which have
been raised, and perhaps these witnesses are not the right
witnesses for those issues, but we have raised those with a
number of our other panelists.
Ms. Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, we look forward to a good
discussion. I turn this over to Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank our witnesses for their service and for joining us
today.
We have with us today, as the chairman said, the leaders of
our negotiating team for the New START treaty. We thank them
for the many hours they spent in negotiating this treaty with
the Russian government.
Thus far, this committee has received testimony from many
administration officials and, most recently, from a panel of
outside experts. Nonetheless, some serious questions still
remain about this treaty, specifically on the New START
treaty's methods of verification, its potential constraints on
our ballistic missile defense, and the accompanying plan for
modernization of both the nuclear stockpile and our nuclear
delivery vehicles.
I believe that before this committee will be in a position
to provide its views, a number of significant issues require
clarification from the administration. Aside from the hundreds
of questions for the record that remain unanswered, we have yet
to receive critical documents necessary for this committee and
the full Senate to make an informed judgment of this treaty.
Today is an important opportunity to discuss these concerns
directly with the men and women who negotiated this treaty with
Russian officials. It is an opportunity to try to learn why the
administration chose to limit this treaty only to strategic
nuclear arms reductions, despite the fact that Russia's
tactical nuclear weapons outnumber the U.S. arsenal by a factor
of 10 to 1 and despite the fact that there was no binding
requirement to limit the negotiations to strategic weapons
after the administration chose not to renew the original START
treaty.
Did we receive any benefits from the Russians in return for
this U.S. concession, or any assurances that Russia will commit
to reduce its tactical nuclear arms in future?
This hearing is also an opportunity to try to learn why our
negotiators agreed to a significantly weaker verification
regime than that of the original START treaty it is to replace.
So weak, in fact, that the potential for cheating is
significant, though the Department of State (DOS) has tried to
downplay this fact, stating in a recent report that Russian
cheating would have little effect on the assured second-strike
capabilities of U.S. strategic forces. If that is true, it
seems to call into question the utility of the treaty itself
and the ability to make serious nuclear arms reductions.
Finally, this hearing is a chance to hear our negotiators'
explanation for New START's puzzling and troubling references
to missile defense. We originally were told that there would be
no references to missile defense in the treaty and no linkage
drawn between offensive and defensive weapons. Then we were
told there would be such a reference, but only in the preamble,
which, of course, is not legally binding.
However, in the final treaty text--not just in the
preamble, but Article V of the treaty itself--there is a clear,
legally binding limitation on our missile defense options.
While this limitation may not be a meaningful one, it is a
limitation.
We must ask why did the administration agree to this
language after saying they would do no such thing? Why hand the
Russian Government the opportunity they so desire to draw
unfounded linkages between offensive and defensive weapons, as
Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has done, saying the
``linkage to missile defense is clearly spelled out in the
accord and is legally binding.''
We look forward to gaining greater clarity on all of these
questions, and others, directly from our negotiators. Still,
many of us feel strongly that Congress should be able to
complement discussions like this today with our own review of
the facts. That is why we are insisting on an opportunity to
review the negotiating record for ourselves, specifically,
those parts dealing with the ambiguous references to missile
defense and the contradictory unilateral statements issued by
the United States and Russia on the meaning and legal force of
that language.
As I have noted before, this request is not unprecedented.
The Senate has previously sought and received access to the
negotiating history for arms control treaties between the
United States and the Soviet Union, such as the 1972 Anti-
Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and the 1987 Intermediate-Range
Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. This information and the further
insights we hope to gain today are critical as the Senate moves
to consider and vote on the ratification of this treaty.
I thank each of the witnesses again for your service and
for appearing here today.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Secretary Gottemoeller?
STATEMENT OF HON. ROSE E. GOTTEMOELLER, ASSISTANT SECRETARY,
BUREAU OF VERIFICATION, COMPLIANCE, AND IMPLEMENTATION,
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
Ms. Gottemoeller. Thank you very much, Chairman Levin,
Senator McCain, and members of this committee.
I am honored to be here today to provide you my perspective
as the chief negotiator of the New START treaty. I am also
pleased to be joined by my colleague, Dr. Ted Warner, who
served on the delegation as Secretary Gates's representative
and as one of my deputies. We share a strong belief that the
New START treaty will make our country more secure, and we urge
the Senate to provide its advice and consent to ratification.
At the conclusion of my remarks, I will be pleased to
respond to your questions. Many questions already are on the
table, thanks to the opening remarks, Mr. Chairman and Mr.
McCain. But with your permission, I would like to present an
abbreviated version of my remarks this morning and submit my
full statement for the record.
Chairman Levin. It will be made part of the record.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Thank you, sir.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Ms. Gottemoeller. A little over a year ago, the
administration set out to negotiate the New START treaty, with
the goal of replacing the expiring START treaty with a new
agreement for each party to reduce and limit its strategic
offensive arms. I want to underscore that the focus of these
negotiations from the beginning to the end was on strategic
offensive arms.
The New START treaty will enhance U.S. national security by
stabilizing the strategic balance between the U.S. and the
Russian Federation at lower levels of nuclear forces. The New
START treaty preserves the United States' right to determine
our own force structure, giving us the flexibility to deploy
and maintain our strategic nuclear forces in a way that best
serves U.S. national security interests.
As long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will
maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter any
adversary and protect our allies. To those who may have
concerns regarding alleged backroom deals during the treaty
negotiations, let me state unequivocally today on the record
before this committee, as I have stated before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, that there were no--and I repeat--
no secret deals made in connection with the New START treaty,
not on missile defense nor on any other issue.
Regarding the recently released 2010 Compliance Report, I
want to point out that Russia was in compliance with START's
central limits during the treaty's life span. Moreover, the
majority of compliance issues raised under START were
satisfactorily resolved. Most reflected differing
interpretations on how to implement START's complex inspection
and verification regime.
Let me speak briefly about verification of the treaty.
Verification and the DOS's recent verifiability assessment
addressed the large questions related to whether the United
States could detect, in a timely manner, if Russia were
preparing to move beyond the limits of the treaty or were
cheating in a significant way on the treaty well before such an
attempt became a threat to U.S. national security.
In addition, the verification regime should and will enable
the United States to detect other activities inconsistent with
the treaty that, while they may not present an immediate risk
to U.S. national security, could, if they went undetected, lead
to a situation in which the U.S. national security would be at
risk.
Last week, the Commander of U.S. Strategic Command
(STRATCOM), General Chilton, testified before this committee
that he agreed with this assessment, stating that the ``New
START treaty retains sufficient flexibility in managing our
deterrent forces to hedge against technical or geopolitical
surprise.'' Dr. Miller, the former Principal Deputy Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy, who also testified last week,
agreed, adding that, under New START, the United States is
``postured well to first deter cheating, but then to minimize
the significance should it occur.''
These assessments are based on the ability under the New
START treaty of the United States to retain a diverse triad of
strategic forces and, in particular, the fact that the
survivability and response capabilities of strategic submarines
and heavy bombers would be unaffected even by large-scale
cheating.
I want to emphasize as a comment at this moment that in the
Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and in our nuclear policy overall,
the maintenance of a diverse triad, a diverse and resilient
triad, is important. We really emphasize the necessity of both
prompt capabilities as well as second-strike or response
capabilities.
The obligations and prohibitions of the New START treaty
are different from those in START, reflecting lessons learned
from 15 years of implementing the START treaty. The differences
also reflect the spirit of the Moscow Treaty by permitting each
party the flexibility to determine for itself the configuration
of its strategic forces at reduced levels of delivery vehicles
and deployed warheads as established in this treaty.
Like START, the New START treaty contains extensive
verification provisions that promote strategic stability by
ensuring transparency and predictability--I want to reemphasize
the word ``predictability''--regarding U.S. and Russian
strategic forces and confidence that the Russian Federation
does not exceed the treaty's limits throughout its 10-year
term.
During the negotiation of the New START treaty, negotiators
on both sides drew on the lessons learned from START
implementation. Both sides benefited from having experienced
START treaty inspectors and also the operators of our strategic
weapons systems serving on their respective delegations.
We learned much during the 15 years in which the START
treaty verification regime was implemented, and the United
States and Russia sought to take advantage of that knowledge in
formulating the verification regime for the new treaty, seeking
to maintain elements which proved useful, to include new
measures where necessary, improve on measures that had been an
unnecessary drag on our strategic force operations, and
eliminating those that were not essential for verifying the
obligations of the New START treaty.
Mr. Chairman, as Secretary Clinton stated in her testimony
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and in a similar
statement made to this committee, ``The choice before us is
between this treaty and no treaty governing our nuclear
security relationship with Russia, between this treaty and no
agreed verification mechanism on Russia's strategic nuclear
forces.''
Mr. Chairman, in sum, I believe that the New START treaty
is in the national security interests of the United States, is
the right treaty for today and the coming years, and will
restore the transparency and predictability that START provided
while it was in force. The combination of improved U.S.
understanding of Russian strategic forces resulting from the
implementation of the START treaty over the past 15 years, U.S.
National Technical Means (NTM) of verification, the New START
treaty's verification provisions, and a favorable posture
deterring cheating or breakout, results in a New START treaty
that is effectively verifiable.
Thank you, and I will be happy to respond to your
questions.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Gottemoeller follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Rose Gottemoeller
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, and members of the committee, I
want to thank you for this opportunity to appear before you. I am
honored to be here to provide my perspective as chief negotiator of the
treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation
on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic
Offensive Arms, also known as the New START treaty. I'm also pleased to
be joined by Dr. Ted Warner, who served on the delegation as Secretary
Gates' representative and as one of my deputies. We share a strong
belief that the New START treaty will make our country more secure, and
we urge the Senate to provide its advice and consent to ratification.
At the conclusion of my remarks, I will be pleased to respond to your
questions.
I believe there is every reason for the Senate to provide its
advice and consent to ratification of the New START treaty. The treaty
is a continuation of the international arms control and
nonproliferation framework that the United States has worked hard to
foster and strengthen for the last 50 years. It will provide ongoing
transparency and predictability regarding the world's two largest
nuclear arsenals, while preserving our ability to maintain the strong
nuclear deterrent. Indeed, this treaty imposes no constraint on U.S.
efforts to modernize its nuclear enterprise or develop and deploy the
most effective missile defenses possible to protect U.S. national
security and the security of our allies and friends.
A little over a year ago, the administration set out to negotiate
the New START treaty with the goal of replacing the expiring START
treaty with a new agreement for each Party to reduce and limit its
strategic offensive arms. I want to underscore that the focus of these
negotiations from beginning to end was strategic offensive arms. We
were also determined to move beyond Cold War mentalities and chart a
fresh beginning in our relations with Russia. The 2010 Nuclear Posture
Review concluded that the United States could sustain a stable
deterrent with significantly fewer deployed warheads and strategic
delivery vehicles than permitted under earlier arms control agreements.
It further recognized that we need to cooperate with Russia as our
partner to meet these threats and other global challenges.
The New START treaty represents a significant step forward in
building a stable, cooperative relationship with Russia. But this
treaty is not just about Washington and Moscow. It advances the
security of the entire world. By demonstrating that we are living up to
our obligations under Article VI of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT), we enhance our credibility to convince other governments to help
strengthen the international nonproliferation regime and confront
proliferators.
The New START treaty will enhance U.S. national security by
stabilizing the strategic balance between the United States and the
Russian Federation at lower levels of nuclear forces. The New START
treaty preserves the United States' right to determine our own force
structure, giving us the flexibility to deploy and maintain our
strategic nuclear forces in a way that best serves U.S. national
security interests. As long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States
will maintain a safe, secure, and effective arsenal to deter any
adversary and protect our allies.
To those who may have concerns regarding alleged backroom deals
during the treaty negotiations, let me state unequivocally today on the
record before this committee, as I have done previously before the
Foreign Relations Committee, that there were no/no secret deals made in
connection with the New START treaty; not on missile defense or any
other issue. Everything we agreed to is in the treaty documents
transmitted to the Senate on May 13. I also want to make clear that
Article XV of the treaty authorizes the Bilateral Consultative
Commission to make changes in the Protocol without resorting to the
treaty amendment procedures only where such changes do not affect
substantive rights or obligations under the treaty. A similar provision
was contained in, and successfully implemented under, the START treaty.
Regarding the recently released 2010 Compliance Report, I want to
point out that Russia was in compliance with START's central limits
during the treaty's life span. Moreover, the majority of compliance
issues raised under START were satisfactorily resolved. Most reflected
differing interpretations on how to implement START's complex
inspection and verification provisions.
Let me speak briefly about verification of the treaty. Verification
and the State Department's recent verifiability assessment address the
larger questions related to whether the United States could detect, in
a timely manner, if Russia was preparing to move beyond the limits of
the treaty, or were cheating in a significant way on the treaty well
before such an attempt became a threat to U.S. national security. In
addition, the verification regime will enable the United States to
detect other activities inconsistent with the treaty that, while they
may not present an immediate risk to U.S. national security, could, if
undetected, lead to a situation in which U.S. national security would
be at risk. Last week, General Chilton testified before this committee
that he agreed with this assessment, stating that the ``New START
retains sufficient flexibility in managing our deterrent forces to
hedge against technical or geopolitical surprise.'' Dr. Miller also
agreed, adding that, under New START, the United States is ``postured
well to first deter cheating, but then to minimize the significance
should it occur.'' These assessments are based on the ability under the
New START treaty of the United States to retain a diverse triad of
strategic forces, and in particular the fact that the survivability and
response capabilities of strategic submarines and heavy bombers would
be unaffected even by large-scale cheating.
It is important that the Department of State's verifiability
assessment not be confused with Intelligence Community monitoring
confidences. The Intelligence Community's monitoring efforts provide
evidence, along with other inputs such as legal interpretations,
information gathered from other sources, and compliance analysis, which
contribute to the verification process.
New START's verification measures are designed to ensure that each
Party is able to verify the other's compliance with the central limits
in the treaty, including:
No more than 700 deployed intercontinental ballistic
missiles (ICBMs), deployed submarine launched ballistic
missiles (SLBMs), and deployed heavy bombers;
No more than 1,550 warheads emplaced on deployed ICBMs
and deployed SLBMs and counted for deployed heavy bombers; and
No more than 800 deployed and nondeployed ICBM
launchers, deployed and nondeployed SLBM launchers, and
deployed and nondeployed heavy bombers.
The obligations and prohibitions of the New START treaty are
different from those in START, reflecting lessons learned from 15 years
of implementing the START treaty. The differences also reflect the
spirit of the Moscow Treaty, by permitting each Party the flexibility
to determine for itself the configuration of its strategic forces at
the reduced levels of delivery vehicles and deployed warheads
established in this treaty. Like START, the New START treaty contains
extensive verification provisions that promotes strategic stability by
ensuring transparency and predictability regarding U.S. and Russian
strategic nuclear forces and confidence that the Russian Federation
does not exceed the treaty's limits throughout its 10-year term.
The START treaty's verification regime was tailored to the specific
obligations of the START treaty, while the New START verification
provisions are tailored to the specific obligations of the new treaty.
The treaty's verification regime was designed to be effective while at
the same time reducing the implementation costs and the disruption to
operations at U.S. and Russian military facilities subject to the
treaty as compared with the original START treaty. The regime is based
on an extensive set of data exchanges and timely notifications
regarding all strategic offensive arms and facilities covered by the
treaty, two types of onsite inspections, exhibitions, locational
restrictions, and additional transparency measures, including the use
of unique identifiers on each ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber. Although
telemetry from missile flight tests is not required to verify the
provisions of the New START treaty, the treaty includes provisions
regarding the exchange of some telemetric information as a means of
enhancing transparency and predictability.
Deterrence of cheating is a key part of the assessment of
verifiability, and is strongest when the probability of detecting
significant violations is high, the benefits to cheating are low, and
the potential costs are high. We assess that this is the case for
Russia cheating under the New START treaty.
During the negotiation of the New START treaty, negotiators on both
sides drew on the lessons learned from START implementation. Both sides
benefited from having experienced START treaty inspectors serving on
their respective delegations. Much was learned over the 15 years in
which the START treaty verification regime was implemented, and the
United States and Russia sought to take advantage of that knowledge in
formulating the verification regime for the new treaty--seeking to
maintain elements which proved useful, to include new measures where
necessary, improve those measures that were an unnecessary drag on our
strategic forces, and eliminate those that were not essential for
verifying the obligations of the New START treaty.
Mr. Chairman, as Secretary Clinton stated in her testimony to the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and in a similar statement made to
this committee: ``The choice before us is between this treaty and no
treaty governing our nuclear-security relationship with Russia, between
this treaty and no agreed verification mechanism on Russia's strategic
nuclear forces, between this treaty and no legal obligation for Russia
to maintain its strategic nuclear forces below an agreed level. We
cannot turn a blind eye to Russian nuclear force developments, which
would be a step in the wrong direction from our burgeoning relationship
with Russia.'' Secretary Gates noted that the treaty ``has the
unanimous support of America's military leadership;'' Admiral Mullen
said that the ``conclusion and implementation of the New START treaty
is the right thing for us to do;'' General Chilton reminded us that,
``Without New START, we would rapidly lose some of our insight into
Russian strategic nuclear force developments and activities, and our
force modernization planning and hedging strategy would be more complex
and more costly'' and Secretary Chu testified that ``the New START
treaty will serve the interests of the United States without
jeopardizing our ability to sustain the safety, security and
effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear weapons stockpile.'' The entire
administration is united behind this treaty.
Mr. Chairman, in sum, I believe that the New START treaty is in the
national security interests of the United States, is the right treaty
for today and the coming years, and will restore the transparency and
predictability that START provided while it was in force. The
combination of improved U.S. understanding of Russian strategic forces
resulting from the implementation of the START treaty, U.S. NTM
capabilities, the New START treaty's verification provisions, and a
favorable posture deterring cheating or breakout, results in a New
START treaty that is effectively verifiable.
Thank you and I will be happy to respond to any questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Secretary Gottemoeller.
Dr. Warner?
STATEMENT OF HON. EDWARD L. WARNER III, Ph.D., SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE REPRESENTATIVE TO POST-START NEGOTIATIONS, DEPARTMENT
OF DEFENSE
Dr. Warner. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, other
members of the committee.
It, too, is an honor for me and a privilege to have an
opportunity to speak with you today about the New START treaty.
I served as a representative of the Secretary of Defense on
the treaty negotiating team and was involved in the effort from
the beginning, April 2009, through the signing of the treaty
almost a year later. The leadership of the Department of
Defense (DOD) stands firmly behind the treaty. It will
strengthen strategic stability, enable the United States to
modernize its triad of strategic delivery vehicles, and protect
our flexibility to deploy effective missile defenses and
conventional prompt global strike capabilities.
I would like today to focus my remarks on the national
defense-related aspects of the treaty and on the inspections
framework for the treaty, which I was responsible for
negotiating on the U.S. side. Regarding the national defense
aspects of the treaty, I would like to make four points.
First, the United States sought to conclude a treaty that
would limit U.S. and Russian strategic offensive arms while
preserving strategic stability in a manner that provides
predictability and transparency and is supported by an
effective verification system.
While pursuing stabilizing reductions in strategic or
offensive forces, we protected our ability to field a flexible,
effective strategic triad and enabled modernization of our
strategic delivery systems and the nuclear weapons and the
nuclear weapons complex that supports them. We agreed to
ceilings on strategic warheads that were lower than those in
the Moscow Treaty, but sufficient to meet the needs of the
Nation as established by the NPR.
Second, the administration plans to maintain all three legs
of the triad and to field strategic nuclear forces within the
central limits of the treaty that will include up to 420
deployed Minuteman III intercontinental ballistic missiles
(ICBMs) with a single warhead; 240 deployed Trident II D-5
submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) on the 12
operational, a total of 14 Ohio-class submarines; and up to 60
deployed B-2A and B-52H heavy bombers equipped for nuclear
armaments.
Over the next decade, DOD plans to invest over $100 billion
in sustaining and modernizing our strategic nuclear delivery
systems, and the Department of Energy (DOE) plans to invest $80
billion in sustaining and modernizing the nuclear weapons
stockpile and the nuclear weapons complex.
Third, we protected our ability to develop and deploy the
most effective missile defenses possible. Under the treaty, the
United States is free to pursue its current and planned
ballistic missile defense programs, as well as any other
courses of action we might choose to pursue.
The one limitation within the treaty on missile defense is
the ban on conversion of ICBM or SLBM launchers for the use as
missile defense interceptor launchers, or vice versa. As
previously discussed by Dr. Miller when he appeared before you
last week, such a conversion does not make sense on strategic
or cost grounds.
Fourth, we protected the U.S. ability to develop and deploy
conventional prompt global strike systems, agreeing to a so-
called ``permit and count'' regime whereby conventionally armed
ICBMs or SLBMs would be permitted but counted against the
strategic delivery vehicle and strategic warhead ceilings.
Turning to issues of verification, achieving an effective
verification framework was another key U.S. and DOD objective
in the negotiations. As the U.S. Chairman of the Inspections
Working Group during the negotiation of the treaty, I met more
than 90 times with my Russian counterpart to hammer out an
effective tailored inspections framework for the treaty. In
this effort, I was aided by a cadre of veteran START inspectors
who brought many years of combined experience to the
negotiating table.
We crafted an inspections framework that continues the
appropriate verification and transparency functions provided
for under START, while streamlining the overall process and
reducing unnecessary burdens. The treaty provides that each
party may conduct up to 18 short-notice, onsite inspections
each year.
These inspections are divided into two groups. Type I
inspections will be conducted at the operating bases for ICBMs,
SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers and will include
inspections of both deployed and nondeployed systems. Type II
inspections are focused on nondeployed strategic systems, as
well as formerly declared facilities, and confirming the
results of the elimination or conversion of strategic offensive
systems. These inspections will be conducted at places such as
storage sites, test ranges, formerly declared facilities, and
conversion or elimination facilities.
Each side is allowed to conduct up to 10 Type I inspections
and up to 8 Type II inspections annually. Type I inspections
combine many of the aspects associated with two different types
of inspections--the reentry vehicle onsite inspection and the
data update inspection--that were conducted separately under
START, thus requiring fewer inspections annually at operating
bases while achieving many of the results of the previous START
inspection regime with a smaller number of annual inspections.
That means less disruption to our operating forces on an annual
basis.
These inspection activities contribute to the verification
of the treaty's provisions by confirming that the declared data
is accurate, that weapon systems have been converted or
eliminated, and that formerly declared facilities are not used
for purposes inconsistent with the treaty.
Inspections will also help deter cheating. Since the 18
short-notice, onsite inspections each year will be conducted at
sites selected by the inspecting party, each side knows that
the other will have a significant capability to uncover any
discrepancies between what is reported and what is actually
happening.
If the United States encounters ambiguities or evidence of
what appears to be cheating, we will immediately raise these
matters in the Bilateral Consultative Commission, the body set
up to oversee implementation of the New START treaty. Or, if
necessary, we will raise them at higher political levels,
seeking prompt resolution.
The use of unique identifiers on each ICBM, SLBM, and heavy
bomber, timely notifications each time a treaty-accountable
system changes status, the regularly updated comprehensive
database that provides information on all treaty-accountable
systems and facilities, and the use of NTM of verification will
all complement inspections in providing for a robust treaty
verification regime.
In summary, the New START treaty will promote stability,
transparency, and predictability in the U.S.-Russian strategic
relationship and is effectively verifiable. It will allow us to
field a strong triad of strategic delivery systems and, if
desired, to deploy conventional prompt global strike
capabilities.
It will not affect our ability to improve our missile
defenses qualitatively and quantitatively to defend the
Homeland against limited missile attacks and to protect our
deployed forces, allies, and partners from growing regional
missile threats.
Thank you for the opportunity to discuss this matter with
you today. I very much look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Warner follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. Edward L. Warner III
Chairman Levin, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the
committee:
Thank you for the opportunity to speak today regarding the New
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START). I served as the Representative
of the Secretary of Defense on the New START treaty negotiating team
and was involved in the effort from the beginning of our discussions
with the Russians in late April 2009 through to the signing of the
treaty almost a year later.
The leadership of the Department of Defense (DOD) stands firmly
behind this treaty. The agreement will strengthen strategic stability,
enable the United States to modernize its Triad of strategic delivery
systems, and protect our flexibility to develop and deploy effective
missile defenses and conventional prompt global strike capabilities.
Because of this, the treaty has the support of the U.S. defense
leadership--including the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Chiefs, and the Commander of the
U.S. Strategic Command, the command responsible for the U.S. strategic
nuclear deterrent.
In light of my role in the negotiation of New START treaty, I would
like to focus my remarks today on the national defense-related aspects
of the agreement and on the inspections framework for the treaty, which
I was responsible for negotiating on the U.S. side.
As the Representative of the Secretary of Defense for the talks, I
had a particular responsibility to ensure that the national defense
interests of the United States, as viewed by the leadership in DOD,
were properly incorporated into our negotiating positions and in any
provisions that were agreed for inclusion in the treaty and its
supporting documents. I am confident that we did so. Throughout the
negotiations, my colleague representing the Joint Staff and I were in
close contact with DOD leadership, and we did not agree to the
inclusion of any provisions without securing their approval. Indeed,
the final treaty, Protocol, and supporting annexes very much reflect
the input of senior DOD leaders to an effective government-wide
process, including the personal involvement of the Secretary of Defense
and Admiral Mullen, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, at key
junctures in the negotiation of the treaty.
Let me address some of the key national defense-related issues in
the treaty and how the U.S. side handled them.
First, the United States sought to conclude a treaty that would
limit U.S. and Russian strategic offensive arms while preserving
strategic stability in a manner that provides predictability and is
supported by an effective verification system.
While pursuing stabilizing reductions in strategic offensive
forces, the U.S. negotiators sought to protect our ability to field a
flexible, effective strategic Triad composed of intercontinental
ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs), and nuclear-capable heavy bombers, and to enable modernization
of our strategic delivery systems and the nuclear weapons they carry.
The U.S. negotiators also sought agreement on ceilings on strategic
warheads that were lower than those in the Moscow Treaty, but
sufficient to meet the needs of the Nation as established by the
Nuclear Posture Review.
We achieved these objectives. The New START treaty will entail
stabilizing limits on deployed strategic nuclear forces and nondeployed
ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers, as well as
associated verification measures. We agreed to these limits based on
analysis conducted in the Nuclear Posture Review prior to and during
the course of the negotiations, which determined that the ceilings
would be sufficient to allow us to meet U.S. strategic deterrence
requirements and to maintain the Triad of delivery systems. The
agreement of the DOD leadership to the limits was also conditional upon
Russian agreement to allow removal of converted B-1Bs, cruise missile
submarines (SSGNs), and any future conventional-only B-52Hs from
accountability under the New START treaty. We achieved agreement on
these points as well.
Second, the treaty affords us the freedom to deploy, maintain, and
modernize our forces as we determine appropriate in a manner consistent
with the central limits of the treaty. As outlined in the report to
Congress issued in compliance with Section 1251 of the National Defense
Authorization Act, 2010, the administration plans to maintain and
modernize all three legs of the Triad. By the time that the treaty
reductions go into effect, 7 years after entry into force, the
Department intends to field strategic nuclear forces within the central
limits of the treaty that include: up to 420 deployed Minuteman III
ICBMs; 240 deployed Trident II D5 SLBMs; and up to 60 deployed B-2A and
B-52H heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments. Over the next
decade, DOD plans to invest over $100 billion in sustaining and
modernizing our strategic nuclear delivery systems, and the Department
of Energy plans to invest $80 billion in sustaining and modernizing the
nuclear weapons stockpile and the nuclear weapons complex.
Third, protecting our ability to develop and deploy the most
effective missile defenses possible was one of the most important U.S.
objectives during the treaty negotiations, and we clearly did so. Under
the treaty, the United States is free to pursue its current and planned
ballistic missile defense programs, as well as any other courses of
action we might choose to pursue. The one limitation is the ban on
conversion of ICBM or SLBM launchers for use as missile defense
interceptor launchers, or vice versa. As previously explained, such a
conversion does not make sense on strategic or cost grounds, and is not
part of our plans for future missile defense programs. Nothing in this
treaty or in the Russian unilateral statement concerning U.S. missile
defenses, which is not a part of the treaty and not legally binding,
will constrain us from developing and deploying the most effective
missile defenses possible, nor will the treaty impose additional costs
or burdens on these efforts.
Fourth, the administration was also intent on protecting the U.S.
ability to develop and deploy conventional prompt global strike
systems. We therefore agreed to a ``permit and count'' regime whereby
conventionally-armed ICBMs or SLBMs would be permitted but counted
against the strategic delivery vehicle and strategic warhead ceilings.
In addition, the United States stated during the negotiations that it
would not consider future, strategic range non-nuclear systems that do
not meet the definitions of this treaty to be ``new kinds of strategic
offensive arms'' for purposes of the treaty. We are confident that this
arrangement accommodates our defense requirements regarding the
possible development and deployment of conventional prompt global
strike capabilities for the lifetime of the treaty.
Achieving an effective verification framework was another key U.S.
and DOD objective in the negotiations. Let me therefore turn now to my
role as the U.S. Chairman of the Inspections Working Group during the
negotiation of the treaty. In this capacity, I led the U.S. side in
negotiating the inspections framework that will form a central pillar
of the treaty's verification regime. During the course of the
negotiations, we met more than 90 times with our Russian counterparts
to hammer out an effective, tailored inspections framework for the
treaty. In this effort, I was aided by a cadre of veteran inspectors
who brought many years of combined experience in implementing
inspections under the START and Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces
Treaties to the development of our negotiating positions and to the
negotiating table.
The inspections framework that we negotiated with Russia is an
essential part of the treaty's overall verification regime. Our
objectives were to craft an inspection framework that continues the
appropriate verification and transparency functions provided for under
START, while streamlining the overall process and reducing unnecessary
burdens, in line with the July 2009 Joint Understanding signed by
Presidents Obama and Medvedev. We achieved these objectives.
The treaty provides that each Party may conduct up to 18 short-
notice, onsite inspections each year. These inspections are divided
into two groups. Type One inspections will be conducted at the
operating bases for ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable heavy bombers and
will include inspections of both deployed and nondeployed systems. Type
Two inspections are focused on nondeployed strategic systems, as well
as formerly declared facilities, and confirming the results of the
elimination or conversion of strategic offensive systems. These
inspections will be conducted at places such as storage sites, test
ranges, formerly declared facilities, and conversion or elimination
facilities. Each side is allowed to conduct up to 10 Type One
inspections and up to eight Type Two inspections annually. Type One
inspections combine many of the aspects associated with two different
types of inspections that were conducted separately under START, thus
requiring fewer inspections annually at the operating bases while
achieving many of the results of the previous START inspection regime
with a smaller number of annual inspections.
These inspection activities contribute to the verification of the
treaty's provisions by confirming: the accuracy of declared data on the
numbers of deployed and nondeployed ICBMs, SLBMs, and nuclear-capable
heavy bombers and of the warheads located on or counted for them; that
weapon systems have been converted or eliminated; and that formerly
declared facilities are not being used for purposes inconsistent with
the treaty.
Inspections will also help deter cheating. Since the 18 short
notice, onsite inspections each year will be conducted at sites
selected by the inspecting party, each side knows the other will have a
significant capability to uncover discrepancies between what is
reported and what is actually happening. If the United States
encounters ambiguities or evidence of what appears to be cheating, we
will immediately raise the matters in the Bilateral Consultative
Commission or, if necessary, at higher political levels, seeking prompt
resolution. The use of unique identifiers on each ICBM, SLBM, and heavy
bomber, timely notifications each time a treaty accountable system
changes status, the regularly updated comprehensive database, and the
use of national technical means will complement inspections in
providing for a robust treaty verification regime.
In conclusion, the New START treaty will promote stability,
transparency, and predictability in the U.S.-Russian strategic
relationship and is effectively verifiable. It will allow us to field a
strong Triad of strategic delivery systems, and, if desired, to deploy
conventional prompt global strike systems. It will not affect our
ability to improve our missile defenses qualitatively and
quantitatively to defend the homeland against limited missile attacks
and to protect our deployed forces, allies, and partners from growing
regional missile threats.
Thank you for the opportunity to testify on New START. I would be
happy to answer any questions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Dr. Warner.
Let us have a 7-minute first round, if that is all right?
Let me start with you, Secretary Gottemoeller. Some critics
have asserted that the START I treaty should have been extended
in lieu of a new treaty. Did the Bush administration desire to
extend the START I treaty before it expired, or did they prefer
to begin negotiations on a new treaty?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, it is my understanding that during
the Bush administration, President Bush and then-President
Putin agreed at the Sochi summit in April 2008 that they would
proceed with negotiating a new legally binding treaty. It was
my understanding that we had already mutually informed each
other that we would not be extending the START treaty before
the end of 2008.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
DOS recently completed and provided to Congress a report on
treaty compliance since 2005. Now, the unclassified version of
the report says that with respect to Russia and the START I
treaty, that ``notwithstanding the overall success of START
implementation, a number of longstanding compliance issues
remained unresolved when the treaty expired on December 5,
2009.''
Now, was it DOS's determination that Russia or the Soviet
Union--I guess Russia at that point--was not in compliance, or
is it the statement of DOS that the issues were just
unresolved?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, that is a very important question.
In fact, the view of DOS and its report in the compliance
report is that all the signatories to the START treaty,
including not only Russia, but also Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and
Belarus, in addition to the United States, were in compliance
with the central limits of the START treaty. The START treaty
was well implemented, and its implementation was a success is
our view.
Compliance issues did arise in the implementation of the
START treaty over its 15-year history. It was a very
complicated treaty, 700 pages in length. For that reason, there
were differences in interpretation at times, questions that
needed to be resolved. That is why we used the Joint Compliance
and Inspection Commission to resolve very many compliance
issues.
At the time START went out of force, not all of those
questions had a chance to be resolved. It is my understanding
that most of them were minor technical issues.
Chairman Levin. Then is it more accurate to say that the
issues were unresolved or that there was noncompliance? Had we
determined noncompliance, or did this report find otherwise?
Ms. Gottemoeller. No, sir. The issues were simply not
resolved.
Chairman Levin. All right. On the Biological Weapons
Convention (BWC), is it the conclusion that Russia is not in
compliance with obligations, or as the unclassified DOS
compliance report indicates, is it a matter that ``remains
unclear?''
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, it is a matter that remains unclear.
I will note that the compliance report, when it focuses on the
period since the demise of the Soviet Union, takes note of the
fact that with regard to both the BWC and the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC), the Russian Federation has been working very
closely with the international bodies that are responsible for
those conventions, and its activities at this time appear to be
in compliance with those obligations.
The concerns that have arisen are related to the past. They
are related to the Soviet period. President Yeltsin made some
statements in 1992 about the Russian compliance or, rather, the
existence of a Russian offensive BW program. There was a
statement made at the time that some information would be
provided about that program. That information has never been
received. It is a question about past activities, dating from
the Soviet era that is of concern with regard to the BWC.
Chairman Levin. Were DOD, the Intelligence Community (IC),
and DOE fully involved in treaty negotiations, and did they
concur in the outcome?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Absolutely, sir. From beginning to end,
this was a thorough-going interagency process. We had an
excellent interagency team in Geneva working on the
negotiations, and the backstopping team, back here in
Washington, was entirely interagency in its character. I will
say also that we received enormous support from agency
principals, as well as from the President himself.
Chairman Levin. Do they concur in the outcome and support
the treaty?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes. Absolutely, sir.
Chairman Levin. Does the IC assess that Russia is likely to
comply with its obligations under the New START treaty?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. On this issue of silo conversion, there has
been a number of comments about the fact that there is in
Article V, Paragraph 3 of the treaty a prohibition on the
conversion of ICBM silos and SLBM launchers to be launchers of
missile defense interceptors, and vice versa. You made
reference to that in your opening statement as well.
You also indicated in your opening statement that from our
perspective it makes no sense on a strategic basis, but also on
cost grounds, for that conversion to take place. Could I ask
you, if conversion were allowed, would that also introduce an
element of ambiguity as to whether or not a silo was a silo for
offensive or defensive purposes and that that ambiguity, at
least as I see it, would be something which would not
contribute to security and stability?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Mr. Chairman, I am sure Dr. Warner might
like to comment on this.
Chairman Levin. Let me ask Dr. Warner then about that.
Dr. Warner. Yes, sir. Your final point, I think there would
be a real strategic stability concern about intermixing
ballistic missile defense interceptors and ICBM and active ICBM
silos. The issue there isn't so much just a distinguishability.
It is that, were there a crisis, were there a missile defense
interceptor fired against a, for instance, North Korean or
Iranian ICBM fired at the United States, it would come out of
this ICBM field and could be misinterpreted by Russia as a
launch of an ICBM.
Therefore, it would introduce, and it is a consideration
about the colocation of defense interceptors and offensive
missiles, a potentially destabilizing event that I think is one
of the factors that argues against moving in that direction.
Chairman Levin. Just to conclude, the reference in the
treaty itself to missile defense is limited to that one
reference, and it is a reference that we agreed to?
Dr. Warner. The two references under the treaty?
Chairman Levin. No, I said in the treaty itself. Not the
preamble. I will come to that in a minute.
Dr. Warner. Okay. The preamble is also part of the treaty.
Chairman Levin. Okay.
Dr. Warner. But in the articles of the treaty, the only
references to missile defense is Article V, Paragraph 3, which
is the provision we just talked about.
Chairman Levin. We thought that was in our interest?
Dr. Warner. We clearly thought that was in our interest.
Chairman Levin. There is reference in the preamble, which,
as you point out, is part of the treaty?
Dr. Warner. There is reference in the preamble to the
interrelationship between offense and defense.
Chairman Levin. A similar relationship reference was made,
as I remember, in START I. Is that correct? In the preamble. In
terms of ABM, there was a reference to the ABM Treaty.
Ms. Gottemoeller. The reference was to the ABM Treaty in
the preamble to START I, but the relationship is very much the
same between START I and its unilateral statements and the New
START treaty and its unilateral statements.
Mr. Chairman, may I just comment for 1 second?
Chairman Levin. Could you make it brief because my time is
up?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Paragraph 5, Article III also, in our
view, is very much and the focus on it is a conversion issue
because the Russians were very concerned during START about
this conversion. They considered it actually a compliance
problem on our side.
We wanted to ensure that the missile defense interceptors
at Vandenberg Air Force Base that had been converted from silo
launchers of ICBMs, that they were absolutely grandfathered
under this treaty and that no further compliance questions
would arise in the New START treaty.
Chairman Levin. Thank you.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses. Madam Secretary, the media says that
there are reports that the U.S. negotiators actually told the
Russians that the United States had no intention of putting
strategic missile defenses in Europe. In your opening
statement, you said that was not correct. Is that true?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, we were very, very strict in our
Geneva negotiations to keep separate the matter of strategic
defensive forces and strategic offensive forces. We simply did
not discuss this matter of missile defenses in Europe.
Senator McCain. So the answer is no?
Ms. Gottemoeller. No.
Senator McCain. Then is it agreeable to you that this
committee and the Senate have the ability to carefully review
the negotiating record so that the record can be set straight?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, as far as the negotiating record is
concerned that there have been some very rare instances in
which the parts of the negotiating record have been reviewed
from time to time. The point you raised about the ABM Treaty
earlier was actually several years after the ABM Treaty was
ratified and entered into force.
Some questions were raised concerning the interpretation of
the ABM Treaty, and at that time, the Senate, in some limited
circumstances, was allowed to look at some of those documents,
but it was not part of the ratification process for the ABM
Treaty. As far as we can find out, there were no documents
shared at the time that the START treaty was ratified.
Now, in the case of the INF Treaty and following on the
reinterpretation debate over the ABM Treaty, there were some
very limited opportunities presented to review documents. At
the time, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee commented in
its report out on the INF Treaty about this extraordinarily
rare circumstance and also was very firm in underscoring that
this should not be a precedent for further treaties coming
before the Senate on account of the chilling effect that it
would have on U.S. diplomacy. As the chief negotiator of this
treaty, I do agree with that point of view.
Senator McCain. So you would object to this committee and
members of the Senate from reviewing the full review of the
negotiating record.
Now there was an unclassified version of the DOS treaty
compliance report that Senator Levin just asked you about, and
the unclassified report says that compliance issues from the
last START treaty remained unresolved. It also concludes the
U.S. Government does not believe Russia is in compliance with
the CWC because it has not declared all its stockpiles nor
agree it destroyed those it acknowledged, despite a 1997 plan
to do so, and that Russia may not be in compliance with the
international convention banning biological weapons.
You just told Senator Levin that that was all prior to the
fall of the Soviet Union issues. It certainly can't be, as far
as the 1997 plan to do so. There is nowhere in the unclassified
version that says that all of this took place before the fall
of the Soviet Union. In fact, it said they remain unresolved
and they remain not in compliance with the 1997 plan to do so.
It seems to me what you just told Senator Levin is at
variance with DOS. One of you has an obviously different
interpretation of the facts.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Thank you very much, sir, for bringing up
that point. It is a very good one to remind us all of. The
Russian Federation has been working hard to destroy its CW
stocks.
Senator McCain. I would just ask, do you believe that they
are still not in compliance, along with this report or not?
Ms. Gottemoeller. I think, if I may, sir? I think that they
have been working very hard to destroy their stock.
Senator McCain. My time is very limited. I would like to
have an answer. Do you believe that they are in compliance or
not in compliance and unresolved, as the DOS report says?
Ms. Gottemoeller. I am convinced that they are working to
resolve compliance, any compliance concerns by trying to reduce
their stocks, as required by the convention.
Senator McCain. They are working, in 2010, on complying
with treaties that were concluded many, many years ago.
Did the Russians tell you, in the course of the
negotiations, that they were going to have a signing statement
that basically said that any qualitative or quantitative
buildup in the missile defense system capabilities of the
United States of America would affect the viability and the
Russian commitment to the treaty?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, sir. They told us that.
Senator McCain. They told you that?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes,
Senator McCain. What did you say?
Ms. Gottemoeller. This was a unilateral statement of
Russian policy, not legally binding on us in any way. We
essentially told them that if they were to make a unilateral
statement of that kind, we would make our own unilateral
statement, stating our own policy views on this question.
Senator McCain. Does cheating matter?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Absolutely, sir.
Senator McCain. Do you agree that any Russian cheating
under the treaty would have little effect, if any, on the
assured second-strike capabilities of the U.S. strategic
forces?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, if the Russians intended to cheat so
as to undermine this treaty, it would be an enormously serious
matter for the United States of America. It would be taken up
in diplomatic channels and, if serious enough, at the highest
political level. So cheating is a very serious matter.
Senator McCain. In his statement before the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, Henry Kissinger said:
``As strategic arsenals are reduced, the distinction
between tactical and strategic nuclear weapons is bound
to erode. The large Russian stockpile of tactical
nuclear weapons, unmatched by a comparable American
deployment, could threaten the ability to undertake
extended deterrence. This challenge is particularly
urgent, given the possible extension of guarantees in
response to Iran's nuclear weapons program and other
programs that may flow from it.''
Do you agree with Dr. Kissinger's assessment?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, sir. I think that it is extremely
important to bear in mind that we must also focus on
nonstrategic or tactical nuclear weapons.
Senator McCain. In summary, I think most observers agree
that the verification requirements of this treaty are less
stringent than START I. We now have a report from DOS that the
compliance issues from the last START treaty remain unresolved
and that the CWC has not been adhered to, and they may not be
in compliance with international convention banning biological
weapons.
It obviously is a matter of concern to us that the
verification procedures for this treaty are less stringent than
the ones for the last, which they clearly are not, despite your
statements about all of it happening before the fall of the
Soviet Union--that is not my interpretation of this report--is
a matter of significant concern to this committee.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator McCain.
Senator Reed.
Senator Reed. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Warner, then Secretary Gottemoeller, we have had 15
years of experience with the START I Treaty. From that
experience, what lessons did we apply in developing the
verification regime?
Dr. Warner. Senator, we used that experience in many ways
in developing the regime. One, we screened what kinds of
inspections we needed to carry out, and we identified what
things we need, how those inspections needed to be carried out,
and they informed the manner in which we wrote the protocol and
the inspection activities annex.
So, for instance, as I talked of these Type I inspections
at operating bases, under START, we had two different types of
inspections coming to operating bases that made them doubly
vulnerable, and each installation was, for instance, vulnerable
up to two times under both types of inspections.
This time, we combined those inspections at operating
bases. This is a good example. Therefore, they will be somewhat
longer when they come, and they will look at both the deployed
and nondeployed elements, including the warhead inspection, the
reentry vehicle inspection at an ICBM or SLBM base. But they
will at most come twice a year to any one installation.
Senator Reed. When you say installation, these are U.S.
installations?
Dr. Warner. Yes. The same rule applies to both. It means
when you come to an ICBM base, SLBM base, or heavy bomber base,
you have the opportunity to do multiple elements, what were
separated in START. This has been important on the numbers
game, if you will, in comparing the two.
Under START, you were allowed to do up to 28 annual
inspections of 3 different types. Under the New START, we will
be able to do 18. But within those 18, there is this double-
duty business at the operating bases. So, the effective number
is more like 23 or 24. Then, on top of that, the number of
installations to be inspected under START was 70. The number of
installations subject to inspection under New START is 35.
We have inspection numbers that are in the 20s in an
effective comparison, but half the number of installations.
That really means this argument that we have a much weaker
inspection regime, I think, is very questionable.
Senator Reed. Let me follow up with two questions. One is
that not only the lessons learned, but also the individuals who
were participating in this negotiation were veterans of 15
years of experience of looking at Soviet and Russian systems
and, frankly, being on the other end of having the Russians
look at our systems. It is their experience that was
significant in your input?
Dr. Warner. It was absolutely indispensible.
Senator Reed. The other aspect here, too, is that some of
our concerns are actually protecting our installations and our
systems from unwanted intrusion. I think the impression often
is that this is simply the interests of the Russians of
obscuring what they are doing. It is both sides of the street
have the similar interest. Is that correct?
Dr. Warner. We both have the interest in, on one hand,
allowing people to inspect and verify the relevant data, the
critical data on numbers of systems, numbers of reentry
vehicles mounted, et cetera. On the other hand, we have every
interest, as they do, in protecting our national security
secrets, if you will.
Senator Reed. That interest is held by everyone, but I
would think particularly by the uniformed officers in the Air
Force and the other strategic systems, who would like to have
some of their operations not transparent?
Dr. Warner. We were in very close consultation. Number one,
we had representation on the team of people from the Services,
from the Joint Staff, as well as other parts of the
interagency. We were in close contact. Any of the key issues
that we were negotiating and going toward agreement had to be,
in fact, vetted through the so-called backstopping process.
We were very cautious. We had to strike that balance,
enough visibility to have good verification, but also
protecting U.S. national security.
Senator Reed. Secretary Gottemoeller, any comments?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, sir. I did want to underscore that a
very important consideration was disruption to the operational
tempo (OPTEMPO) of the strategic forces, and it was a
consideration for the negotiators, I think, on both sides of
the table because we had found in the 15-year implementation of
START that quite oftentimes facilities would get closed down by
repeated inspection activities. So, OPTEMPO for the strategic
forces was an important consideration.
Senator Reed. Let me pose a question again to both of you
that arises consistently, and that is if the failure to ratify
this New START would create a situation in which there are no
essential limits that are enforceable. That is somewhat
rhetorical. You can correct me.
Also it would tend to, I think, set back any further
effective negotiations with the Russians on any other major
weapons systems. Is that a fair judgment, or alternatively, how
would you describe the situation if the treaty is not ratified?
Secretary Gottemoeller?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, Senator. The Moscow Treaty does
remain in force at this time, with its limits on 1,700 to 2,200
warheads. A very interesting artifact of the Moscow Treaty,
however, is that it is in the course of being implemented, but
there are no sublimits or scheduled limitations and reductions
that have to take place.
Those limitations and reductions must be achieved by the
time the treaty goes out of force in 2012, midnight, the last
day of December 2012. Those limitations will be in force
essentially on a momentary basis.
We are in the process of moving in that direction. I
believe both countries will actually achieve those reductions
without much trouble.
Senator Reed. Can I ask one question about the Moscow
Treaty? There is speculation that the limits could be reached,
but moments after the bell tolls at midnight, they could, in
fact, restore, and we could restore launchers or warheads to
exceed the limits. Is that true?
Ms. Gottemoeller. As a legal matter, that would be
possible. In realistic terms, it is not possible because, of
course, these are big, complicated systems. It takes time to
deploy them.
There are two other points I would like to make about the
situation we are in at the moment, and the first one is, of
course, that we no longer have the predictability of a
verification and inspection regime related to the START treaty.
The Moscow Treaty was basically built on the foundation of the
START treaty.
The important line in the Moscow Treaty was a provision
that stated that the START treaty remains in force according to
its terms, which meant that START would continue, its
verification regime would continue, and it would underpin the
Moscow Treaty.
Now, with START out of force, there are simply no
verification measures, and our predictability regarding the
Russian strategic forces and, ultimately, our confidence level
in what is going on there will go down.
Senator Reed. Thank you very much.
My time has expired. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Reed.
Senator Inhofe.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Let me just say, I am probably not going to take all my
time, but I have been concerned about the process, and I am not
blaming anyone. Certainly, it is not a partisan concern that I
have. I look at how significant this is, and this is our 17th
hearing and the 30th witness. Some have appeared more than one
time.
I appreciate this, Mr. Chairman. The hearing that we had 2
days ago, we had two witnesses that were opposed to the treaty.
That is 2 witnesses out of 30 witnesses in this period of time
were opposed to it. I am reminiscent of what we went through at
that time--it was the Bush administration's fault, in my eyes--
in the Law of the Sea Treaty.
I didn't like it. I sat through these hearings. I am on
both the Senate Armed Services Committee and the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee. They had all the hearings, and everyone
thought this was the greatest thing in the world. The Democrats
and the Republicans agreed. I remember it passed out in 2007 of
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The vote was, I think,
17 to 4. It was pretty near unanimous.
Yet, they had gone through the same thing. They hadn't had
any of the witnesses opposed to it. At that time, I was also
the ranking member or, actually, the chairman--we were a
majority at that time--of the Senate Environment and Public
Works Committee, which had jurisdiction over that issue, as
well as this committee.
We had hearings. We had hearings here, and we had hearings
in that committee. We had a lot of people come in to shed new
light on it. This went all the way back, this treaty, to the
Reagan days, as this one does, too. So many people came forth
that we ended up just completely reversing that thing.
Just my only concern is to have both sides heard, and those
who are opposed to it, we have a lot of very smart people that
have been opposed to it. The concerns that I have haven't
really been addressed that much. You folks are doing a great
job, and I think this is probably the most informed of the
administration that I have heard.
But still there are a lot of things that need to be
discussed on this thing. Senator McCain talked about the quote,
his concern with the missile defense connection here with
Sergey Lavrov. There is another quote by him that I want to
quote, and that is from April 8. You all are very familiar with
this quote:
``The treaty can operate and be viable only if the
United States of America refrains from its development
of its missile defense capabilities quantitatively and
qualitatively.''
I was very much disturbed back when we shut down our
intentions in both Poland and the Czech Republic. I think when
our own intelligence shows us the capability that Iran is going
to have by perhaps as early as 2015. I am concerned about what
we are going to have in place at that time to take care of some
of the problems to defend this Nation and my 20 kids and
grandkids. I have been very much concerned about that, and so I
do have a lot of questions.
What I would like to do, instead of getting responses to
questions now, is in addition to the questions that Senator
McCain had in his opening statement and in his questions, I
would like to add other questions in the areas of
modernization, such as is $100 billion a sufficient investment
in our nuclear delivery systems over the next decade? What
assurances can you provide that the administration is committed
to modernizing the above programs? Why aren't they addressing
this in the 1251 report? What is our triad going to look like
in the future?
Under verification, is the verification of the treaty
adequate to give us the same understanding of the new Russian
systems as we have of current Russian systems, thanks to START
I? How important is it that we get telemetry of the new Russian
missile tests in order to understand the capabilities of the
systems?
The administration says on one hand that the treaty is
verifiable, but on the other hand, it says that cheating is
irrelevant. You have talked a little bit about that. Do you
agree cheating is irrelevant? And you have already answered
that question. If it doesn't matter if Russia cheats, then why
do we need the treaty?
Other issues, in missile defense, we have talked a little
bit about that. But I would like to know when will the United
States be able to deploy an SM-3 IIB, if that is under the new
Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) system, as well as when will we
be able to support the Phase 1 in terms of the radar, the early
warning radar system? Where will it be deployed? When will it
be deployed? Which are the candidate countries?
In areas of tactical weapons, that is one thing we really
haven't heard anything why. I am not as smart as you guys and
the other people who are involved in this thing. So I don't
understand why in the world we weren't concerned and addressed
the tactical weapon thing in the original treaty.
What I am going to do, Mr. Chairman, is ask that all these
questions in the list that we are providing be answered. But
the only one I would like to have you address right now is the
tactical weapons.
Being outnumbered or outflanked by 10 to 1--it is very
disturbing to me. This would be something that would more
directly affect or enhance the capability of, in my opinion, a
terrorist. Maybe you could just use the remainder of my time
talking a little bit about tactical weapons, if you would,
please?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, Senator Inhofe, with pleasure.
Actually, with regard to tactical nuclear weapons, it was
very clear from the outset, and as the Obama administration was
coming into office, the Strategic Posture Commission, other
eminent commissions were looking at this question. Indeed, the
agreement was among a number of eminent experts and the
incoming administration that we must tackle the problem of
tactical nuclear weapons.
The conclusion was, first, we needed to replace the START
treaty. The START treaty was going out of force in December
2009, and we needed to move with dispatch to negotiate a
follow-on treaty to START that would provide the transition
from START to the next stage of arms reductions. But there was
always a very, very clear commitment to going after tactical
nuclear weapons, nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
President Obama in April, when he signed the New START
treaty, said very clearly we are now ready to move on to
nonstrategic, as well as nondeployed nuclear weapons in the
next stage of reductions. I am pleased that in the context of
these negotiations, President Medvedev as well has agreed that
we must continue with further negotiations in the future and
further reductions. We have the opportunity to work with our
Russian colleagues on this.
There is one important factor that affected the
decisionmaking in this regard, and that is that the NATO
countries, our NATO allies in this year are involved in a
review of their strategic concept. As they review their
strategic concept, they are tackling the very important issue
of what to do about nonstrategic nuclear weapons, tactical
nukes inside the NATO alliance. We really felt it was very
important that we not in any way--in any way--undermine that
important process of the NATO strategic review, which, of
course, we take part in as a member of the NATO alliance.
In many ways, we did not want to rush ahead of NATO and
NATO decisions in our own plans for negotiating further
reductions.
Senator Inhofe. Madam Secretary, I appreciate that.
My time has expired. But for the record, I would like to
have you go into a little more depth as to why then the
tactical weapons weren't a part of this. I understand what you
are saying, but I think we need to elaborate on that.
[The information referred to follows:]
A more ambitious treaty that addressed nonstrategic/tactical
nuclear weapons would have taken much longer to complete, adding
significantly to the time before a successor agreement, including
verification measures, could enter into force following the START
treaty's expiration in December 2009. This fact, combined with the need
to consult closely with our allies before addressing nonstrategic/
tactical nuclear weapons, did not support broadening the scope of the
New START treaty. This approach was consistent with the bipartisan
Perry-Schlesinger Congressional Strategic Posture Commission's
recommendation to ``pursue a step-by-step approach,'' and to make the
first step ``modest and straightforward.'' The Commission recommended
deferring negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons until after a START
successor agreement had been concluded.
At their London Summit on April 1, 2009, President Obama and
President Medvedev committed to ``achieving a nuclear-free world, while
recognizing that this long-term goal will require a new emphasis on
arms control. . . .'' President Medvedev expressed interest in future
discussions on measures to further reduce both nations' nuclear
arsenals when he and President Obama signed the New START treaty in
Prague on April 8, 2010. As President Obama made clear on that
occasion, we intend to raise strategic and nonstrategic/tactical
nuclear weapons, including nondeployed nuclear weapons, in those
discussions.
Senator Inhofe. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Inhofe.
The administration does have a significant number of
questions, which we have asked. The answers are not yet due. It
is a large number. But we will, of course, expect that the
answers will be filed by the time they are due. If not, if you
could make sure that you come to us, let us know that you can't
meet a deadline and seek an understanding relative to that.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. It is our
expectation we will answer them in the time accorded to us.
Chairman Levin. All right. Then, Senator Inhofe may have
additional questions, which he referred to, and any of those
questions we would give you a reasonable time to answer, if
they are in addition to the ones already submitted. That would
be true for all the members of the committee that if there are
additional questions for the record, we will get them to you.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Certainly, sir.
Chairman Levin. Senator Chambliss.
Senator Chambliss. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Let me thank both of the witnesses, both for not just being
here today, but for the work you did on this. It is easy to
look back from our standpoint and be critical. But having been
in your shoes and negotiated over the years in law practice, I
understand how difficult your job was.
The way I understand this, though, I am puzzled by the
numbers. We knew, obviously, during the course of the
negotiation that the number of Russian weapons were in decline.
They have been in decline over several years, and actually, the
maximum number allowed under the treaty is not even present in
the Russian inventory now. We obviously knew that. So the
Russians have an opportunity to build up their inventory while
we are required to go down with our inventory.
That part of the negotiation bothers me, to some extent.
But the numbers part of it, or the fuzzy numbers part of it,
bothers me even more is the Russians could line up 15 long-
range bombers on a runway and load them up with 6 bombs each
that would contain nuclear warheads, and that would be 90 bombs
that would be in those 15 long-range bombers. Yet, under the
rules of this treaty, that only counts as 15 bombs or 15
warheads.
Why would we agree to something like that? Why wouldn't it
be a one-for-one deal on both sides with respect to those kinds
of counting?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Senator Chambliss, those are excellent
questions. First of all, neither the Russian Federation nor the
United States has for many years, on a day-in/day-out basis,
loaded nuclear weapons on their bombers. They are, of course,
retained as part of our nuclear arsenal, if needed. But on a
day-in/day-out basis, they are not on so-called ``strip
alert,'' ready to fly out.
There are many reasons for that, but the primary one is
that we are not in the kind of crisis era of the Cold War.
There is a view that, in fact, the bombers can be in that role.
In our case, we are really placing an emphasis more and more on
conventional missions for our long-range bombers.
I think in our own Armed Forces, in our Air Force, there is
a very firm view that we did not want to have to over count our
bombers if we have more bombers than the Russian Federation
does. I am going to allow my colleague to speak to this in a
moment. But if we had to count more bombs on the bombers, that
would really up the numbers in the central limits for warheads
inside the treaty as far as we are concerned. We would end up
paying a price for it.
That was one of the critical issues. We wanted to find a
counting rule for the bombers that would continue to express
that they have a nuclear mission, but that on a day-in/day-out
basis, they really don't carry nuclear bombs.
We do have some security in this regard because we have a
right during onsite inspections to go and check and look inside
the bombers. We even have a right to take radiation detection
equipment and check out what is inside the bombers. If we find
that the Russians are starting to put nuclear bombs back on
their bombers, we are going to find out about it.
Senator Chambliss. Dr. Warner, any comment? Let me just
preface before your comments that I appreciate your comments,
Secretary Gottemoeller. But the fact is that we know that we
have loaded nuclear weapons on our bombers. It happened 2 years
ago. It may have been by accident, but it does happen.
Second, the Russians have a long-range plan for the
production of additional bombers that I know, Dr. Warner, you
are very well aware of, and we have no similar plan. That is
one reason this particularly concerns me.
Excuse me, Dr. Warner, go ahead.
Dr. Warner. No problem, sir.
To summarize or to spin off of the point that was made by
Secretary Gottemoeller, if we counted by the rule of what is
operationally deployed, what is on, then the number would have
been zero. We elected to use a representational number of one,
which, as you say, does not actually adequately express the
real capability of the bombers on both sides. Having said that,
because these bombers are not on alert, that was a better
solution than zero.
The other point that has been made is that bombers are slow
fliers relative to ballistic missiles, and in the arcane
analysis of strategic stability, of the threat that one can
pose to one another, bombers are less destabilizing. They do
not have the promise of delivering a first strike within
minutes, within 10 minutes, which is the possibility of both
the ballistic missile characteristics of the ICBMs and SLBMs.
Under the START treaty, bombers were also under counted.
They were under-counted in a somewhat different way. It
depended whether they had air-launched cruise missiles or
bombs, but there has been a tradition of counting them in this
manner.
I agree with you that the 1,550 doesn't really represent
the total capability of either side by a few hundred weapons.
But in our view, it represented an effective practice for doing
this that is similar to the de facto arrangements that are
present in the Moscow Treaty, and it is very similar to what
was done under START.
Senator Chambliss. There is reference in the treaty with
regard to mobile launchers. But there is no reference to rail
launchers. Yet, we have seen reports in the press and reports
coming out of Russia that rail-launched mechanisms are under
consideration by the Russians.
Was there a reason that rail mobile launchers were not
included?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, sir. The very direct reason is that,
at the present time, neither the United States nor the Russian
Federation deploys rail mobile ICBMs. I will underscore that
should the Russians begin to develop and deploy rail mobile
ICBMs, they would be captured by the central limits of this
treaty. They would be captured by the definition of launchers.
In that case, we would go to the Russians in the Bilateral
Consultative Commission and say, ``all right, you are deploying
a new system. We have to work out the special inspection and
verification measures that will be required for this new
system.'' There may be some other changes that would have to be
made, but all of those measures that would relate to a newly
deployed rail mobile missile we would be able to work out.
Dr. Warner. The definition of an ICBM launcher really says
anything that can hold or launch an ICBM will count as a
launcher. The fact that we didn't specify rail or road,
anything that meets that definition would be counted and
captured as a launcher. The definition of an ICBM, in terms of
the distance of the type of missile, we will also capture.
While there were rail mobile launchers in the Soviet
period, and they lasted until about 2005, there are none today.
There may be talk of future ones. We will see. But we gave a
definition of the ICBM launcher and ICBM that would absolutely
capture them. They would count. Arrangements for the specific
questions of new bases that might be involved would be
undertaken in the normal way if either side adds systems to its
strategic arsenal.
Senator Chambliss. Very quickly, if this treaty is
ratified, and 2 years from today, President Obama decides he
wants to nullify the treaty, can he simply write a letter to
President Medvedev, or whoever it may be, and say we are no
longer going to comply with the treaty?
Ms. Gottemoeller. If that were the case, sir, the President
would make a determination that the treaty is no longer in our
national security interests, and the procedures would be
followed.
To be quite honest with you, I don't know exactly what the
procedures would be. But this is only to say that as in other
arms control treaties back through time and a large number of
national security treaties in general, there is a withdrawal
clause that if the U.S. President and the United States decide
that a treaty is no longer in our interest, in our national
security interest, there is an opportunity to withdraw.
Senator Chambliss. Thank you very much.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Chambliss.
Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, thank you for being
with us today. I want to get at the rationale behind the New
START limit of 700 delivery vehicles. I want to preface that by
saying that a year ago, we had General Cartwright, who is the
Vice Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and a former head of
STRATCOM, before our committee. He testified in front of this
committee that he would be ``very concerned about endangering
the triad if the number of strategic delivery vehicles dropped
below the 800 number.''
Yet, the New START treaty limits the number of delivery
vehicles to 700. I guess I would be interested in knowing, if
you could walk me through, what occurred during the
negotiations on this particular issue of delivery vehicles.
What will the negotiating transcript reflect with regard to the
discussion of delivery vehicles?
Because at the outset, we were talking about a range of 500
to 1,100, and how do we end up at the 700 number?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Senator, I am going to let my colleague
speak to this question mostly, but I did want to make an
introductory remark, which is that, quite rightly, you point to
the joint understanding of July 8, 2009, that President Obama
and President Medvedev signed in Moscow. The Russians proposed
500. We had proposed 1,100.
This was the Russian attempt to constrain our delivery
vehicles and constrain our ability to upload. They were trying
to drive our numbers down very low for delivery vehicles, and
the negotiation that ensued, I think, really represented a very
solid move away.
I will tell you, quite honestly, as the negotiator, I was
surprised that the Russians didn't try harder to go after
upload capability on the U.S. side. As a matter of fact, that
was one of the early goals that they stated very, very clearly,
from their expert community. It was a surprise to me. But we
ended up, I think, in a very good place.
Ted?
Dr. Warner. Let me directly address the issue of the 800 to
700. As the negotiations unfolded in the summer and into the
early fall, one of the key issues was the definition of a
deployed versus a nondeployed system. The fact that we then
adopted a definition that a deployed missile is only when the
missile is located in its launcher--in the SSBN tube, in the
SLBM tube, in the strategic submarine, in the silo launcher, or
on a mobile ICBM launcher--why did that make a difference?
Over the next decade, we are going to have two of our
strategic submarines in this lengthy midlife overhaul, which is
coming at the middle of their 40-plus years of service in order
to restore their nuclear power plant and do other work. When
they are in this overhaul for well over nearly 2 years, they do
not have missiles associated with them. Therefore, those
submarines do not count. Under START, they used to count even
in this shape. Under this new treaty, they do not count when
there are no missiles in the launchers.
A second issue that we worked out with the Russians was the
ability to reduce the number of launch tubes on a given
submarine. Today, the Trident has 24 launch tubes. We have
plans, as indicated in the 1251 report, to take out four of
those tubes, to disable them for use in launching strategic
missiles.
Therefore, we can still have the same number of submarines
at sea. We can spread the number of warheads we want to carry
per boat among the other 20 missiles, but we have 4 less
launchers on each.
When you combine that ability to not count the 2 that are
in extended overhaul and you are able to take 4 tubes out of 14
submarines, that alone adds up to 96 less tubes. Those 96 less
as deployed systems were not being taken into consideration by
General Cartwright when he was citing the 800 number.
In addition, we have the opportunity to take the Minuteman
missiles out of their launchers, to maintain the launcher in a
caretaker status, if we choose to, and to maintain the missile
and, if circumstances make it necessary, to put them back in.
There is flexibility in the ICBM force as well on this deployed
and nondeployed.
Finally, we also show in our 1251 report that we intend to
convert to conventional-only capability some share of the B-
52Hs, which has not yet been determined. It is part of that
mathematics of coming to the 700.
Now there is a third limit we haven't mentioned. There is
the limit of 1,550 warheads, 700 deployed strategic delivery
vehicles--not really launchers, but delivery vehicles. Finally,
there is the 800 limit, which means that it is the deployed and
nondeployed ICBM and SLBM launchers and bombers.
That provides a constraint on how many nondeployed systems
you can have, but the things I just indicated--the individual
elimination or conversion of tubes on submarines, the two
submarines in deep overhaul, even with the test assets and so
forth, we have the flexibility to live with the 700 deployed
systems and nevertheless meet our needs and be able to have a
strong, resilient triad.
Senator Thune. Without making the distinction between
deployed and nondeployed, did you have, going into the
negotiations, though, a bottom-line, redline number of deployed
delivery vehicles? Was 800 that number?
Dr. Warner. Under the NPR, there had been a number of
studies done, beginning in mid-spring, as the NPR got underway,
which were looking at the requirements to meet the national
guidance and many other requirements. They helped inform our
negotiating position.
There was never a set number that it would be, and to my
knowledge, there was never an individual number, ``no lower
than.'' But I think once we came to understand the flexibility
provided in the deployed and nondeployed, then we could take
the very concrete rules of the game, if you will, do the
analysis and see, could we sustain a triad? Could we sustain a
triad with enough warheads spread amongst it that it would meet
our requirements not only against Russia, but against all other
things that we wish to use our central strategic deterrent
force for?
There was a steady, in a sense, a rolling responsive
analysis done as the different rules became available.
Ultimately, it was agreed by the Joint Chiefs, by the
Secretary, and within the interagency all the way to the
President, that under these conditions, this would meet the
requirements.
Senator Thune. Were you and the administration prepared to
go below 700?
Dr. Warner. I can't speak to that. It is above my pay
grade. We went to 700, and that is where we ended up.
Senator Thune. My understanding is the Russians aren't
going to have to cut their number of delivery vehicles because
they are already well below 700. Since they don't have to make
cuts in the number of delivery vehicles, what concessions did
we obtain from the Russians in exchange for us reducing our
delivery vehicles below that number?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, from the outset, it was clear that
the Russians were suffering a mass obsolescence of their older
ICBMs, the SS-18s and the SS-19s. We went into the negotiations
knowing that this was what the circumstance was. We needed to
have what we needed out of the negotiations, which, as Ted has
gone through very well, was 700 deployed delivery vehicles and
800 deployed and nondeployed launchers. That is great
flexibility for maintaining our strategic nuclear triad.
As far as the Russians are concerned, they are going to be
required to stay under the central limits of this treaty,
particularly with regard to the 1,550 warheads. That central
limit will be very important, I think, in maintaining an equal
balance and strategic stability between the two sides.
If I may mention also the deployed and nondeployed launcher
limit will affect them because they have a lot of decrepit
launch systems, submarines and so forth, that they are going to
have to put some money into destroying. It is, I think,
important to underscore that the Russians will have to do some
eliminations under this treaty as well.
Senator Thune. The 1251 report explains that the U.S.
nuclear force structure under the treaty could comprise 420
ICBMs, 240 submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and 60
bombers. Now the deployments at the maximum level of all 3 legs
of the triad under that explanation add up to 720 delivery
vehicles.
So it is mathematically impossible for the United States to
make such a deployment and be in compliance with the treaty's
limit of 700 deployed strategic nuclear delivery vehicles.
Clearly, there would have to be some additional reduction
decisions made. There is also, since it covers prompt global
strike, that platform, my assumption is there is going to have
to be and there are going to be decisions made down the road.
I guess my question would be which of the 3 legs of the
triad do you envision we would have to reduce in order to
accommodate getting from today, because if we are talking about
720 and the number of the hard limit is 700, you have some
ground we would have to give up there, as well as counting
prompt global strike under the number. How would you see us
accommodating this?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Senator, this also is a question for my
colleague from the Pentagon, but I did want to make one point.
That is that this treaty has a 7-year reduction period, 10-year
life of the treaty overall. In order to implement these
reductions, we have a 7-year period. We don't have to hit 700
any time soon.
Dr. Warner. The deliberations were among the Chiefs with
the Commander of STRATCOM, General Chilton, and ultimately in
discussions with the Secretary and the Deputy Secretary. The
baseline planning structure that was laid out in 1251 is the
one that you cited.
It does have an addition problem in the sense that it has a
couple of ``up tos,'' the up to 420 in the ICBM launchers for
the single RV Minuteman, the up to 60 heavy bombers, and the
240 launchers on the submarines. It was just thought that at
this time with the 7-year reduction--those are very close. The
main center of gravity of how to get there is really
established within those numbers. The swing area is between 20
on the ICBMS and that of the bombers.
The decision was made at this time not to need to make that
commitment yet because of the 7 years. It will be examined over
time. It provided us with flexibility. I want to emphasize that
the lion's share of what is going to be in that strategic force
is provided in that baseline.
Senator Thune. But what I heard you just say, however, is
that you would see that reduction being dealt with between
ICBMs and bombers?
Dr. Warner. At this point, with this set of decisionmakers,
that is certainly where they were.
Senator Thune. I see my time has expired. Thank you, Mr.
Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Thune.
Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I appreciate the opportunity to be with you, and I remain
of the view that we have been too anxious to obtain this
treaty, which is not the most important thing we need to be
doing at this time to deal with the proliferation of nuclear
weapons. We have serious problems in a lot of different areas
that need rigorous attention.
I just noticed in today's Washington Times a report that
two intelligence officials and other U.S. officials with access
to intelligence reports said information compiled over the past
7 months showed agents from several foreign governments,
including Brazil, Burma, Iran, Nigeria, North Korea, Sudan, and
Syria, pursued members of the Abdul Khan network that
distributed nuclear weapons.
Now the essence of that story, as far as I am concerned, is
that a lot of countries are still seeking nuclear weapons, and
this is the kind of proliferation that is dangerous. I worry
about it. I don't feel like we have this right. I don't feel
like the Russian strategic weapons level is that important
since they probably are going to reduce their strategic weapons
anyway, and we achieve nothing with regard to the tactical
weapons that they have and in which they have a 10-to-1
advantage. I am just raising questions about this, and I am
concerned about it.
With regard to missile defense, I am uneasy about that. The
protestations from the administration notwithstanding, in
response to a question for the record from Senator Wicker to
Secretary Clinton from the May 18th hearing in the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, Secretary Clinton seemed to
deviate from a prior administration statement on the planned
deployment of Phase 4 of the PAA to missile defense in Europe.
In her response, Secretary Clinton referred to that
deployment as being possible, not the program of record plan
that had been presented to Congress and is specified in the
Ballistic Missile Defense Review of 2010. The statement, in
effect, says including the possible deployment of SM-3 Block
IIB under Phase 4 to defend the ICBM threat from the Middle
East.
Do we have a firm commitment from this administration to
move forward to actually deploy SM-3 Block IIB in Europe to
defend against possible missile threats from the Middle East,
or is it now a possible activity sometime in the distant
future?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Senator, I think the emphasis in that
response was on the adaptive nature, the so-called PAA. It has
been the policy of the administration to keep a close eye on
the actual threats that are emerging and to adapt the
deployments according to the threats as they are emerging
against our friends and allies in Europe. I believe that that
was the intent of that question and no other.
Ted, do you wish to add anything on this?
Dr. Warner. I would have to look for the exact wording. I
have not been in the middle of PAA. It does have the four
phases. The fourth phase is associated with the Standard
Missile-3 Block IIB. On this question of whether it is an
ironclad commitment that they go at this time or that is what
the phase looks like is going to depend on how things evolve. I
would have to check the NPR, sir.
Senator Sessions. Let me tell you what concerns me. We have
deployed a missile system in Alaska and several in California
that could defend us potentially against most of the world and
particularly the Pacific, North Korea-type launch, a limited
launch against the United States.
The plans were to take that three-stage missile, develop it
into a two-stage missile and be able to deploy it in 2015, 2016
in Central Europe that could provide an additional protection
against missile launches from Iran and perhaps a rogue launch
from Russia. Well, this has been abandoned.
What the technology has proven, it is simpler to have a
two-stage than a three-stage, and out of the blue, it has come
forward that there is going to be a plan to develop a new SM-3
Block IIB that could be deployed in Europe, that could be
effective against an Iranian missile launch that would come
over Europe to get to the United States. It is very good place
throughout that region to deploy it. It is not even on the
drawing board. It is 2020, after the time intelligence experts
tell us it could be deployed.
So not having fallen off the turnip truck last week, I am
of the view that this signals a decision not to deploy what was
virtually ready to begin to be deployed, to put it off in the
future, and I am not at all surprised that Secretary Clinton
would say it is possibly now to be deployed and no longer our
plan to deploy it.
Why shouldn't we conclude in Congress that as part of your
negotiations with Russia, who have consistently objected to the
deployment of these kind of missiles, why shouldn't we conclude
that you have, indeed, conceded an important commitment of the
United States to deploy a system in Europe? Why shouldn't we
conclude that?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Senator Sessions, you will have to
forgive me. I am not an expert on the details of our missile
defense plans and programs, as I was really focused on these
START negotiations. We will certainly get answers for you for
the questions that you raise.
I did want to emphasize, though, the statement of policy
that the United States made. It is our unilateral statement
made on April 7, 2010.
It says:
``The United States missile defense systems are not
intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia.
The United States missile defense systems would be
employed to defend the United States against limited
missile launches and to defend its deployed forces,
allies, and partners against regional threats. The
United States intends to continue improving and
deploying its missile defense systems in order to
defend itself against limited attack and as part of our
collaborative approach to strengthening stability in
key regions.''
As far as our negotiations were concerned, we were very,
very clear with the Russian Federation that that is our policy,
and that is not only for the Russian Federation, but for other
audiences, that is a statement of our policy.
Senator Sessions. But the Russians have made clear that
they don't accept any qualitative or quantitative improvements
in our missile defense system, and they have the right to
withdraw from the treaty for really any reason they choose.
They have made clear they will not accept that. It appears to
me we will be in a situation, if we actually go forward with a
system in Europe, that the Russians will threaten to get out of
the treaty because we do not have an agreement on this with the
Russians.
The Russians are saying no, and we are saying we don't give
up the right to go forward. They have a right to get out of the
treaty, and I think it is going to be very much a threatening
situation that they will suggest that this treaty, they will
move out of the treaty if we have even a limited system.
Which really is bizarre since it has no threat to Russia
and the massive number of weapon systems they have. A limited
system that could protect us from a rogue state or an
accidental launch is not a threat to Russian strategic nuclear
weapons.
Dr. Warner. Senator, if I could?
Senator Sessions. Yes.
Dr. Warner. I want to build exactly on the point you made.
In the Russian unilateral statement, they do make the statement
about they are unhappy with potential qualitative or
quantitative increase in our missile defenses.
Senator Sessions. They have been objecting for years over
that.
Dr. Warner. That is what Secretary Gates said. They have
not been an enthusiast for our missile defense for many years.
But they go on, in the last sentence, they say, ``Consequently,
the extraordinary events referred to in Article XIV of the
treaty,'' this is the potential withdrawal, ``also include a
buildup in the missile defense capabilities of the United
States of America such that it would give rise to a threat to
the strategic nuclear force potential of the Russian
Federation.'' That will not be the case of the PAA.
Senator Sessions. It wouldn't be the case with the two-
stage system we were talking about putting in Europe either.
Dr. Warner. I understand. I understand.
Senator Sessions. They objected to that.
Dr. Warner. I am saying they can object all they want, but
the only point they made here about potential withdrawal is if
we build missile defenses that threaten the strategic nuclear
potential. That is not the case. You made the case yourself
very clearly and very correctly, sir. That is the small, the 30
or so interceptors we currently have for the defense of the
Homeland and the system that we are building in Europe, if we
go ahead with all four phases.
I think the possibility here is largely, does the Iranian
threat emerge? If the Iranian threat emerges, I believe we are
committed to move forward all the way through Phase 4. So the
only possibility issue is were we to succeed in getting the
Iranians not to pose an intercontinental nuclear threat to us.
But in any case, I think you have made the point very
clearly, sir, that the Russians are concerned about something
undercutting their strategic nuclear forces. Our missile
defense activities will not do that. Neither our system in
Alaska, nor our system in California, nor the PAA in Europe
will pose it. General O'Reilly has talked with the Russians and
briefed the Russians to make clear to them the nature of our
future capability through all four phases will meet our needs
vis-a-vis Iran, will not threaten Russian strategic nuclear
forces.
Senator Sessions. I hope that is true. I will just say that
we went from a situation in which we were able to deploy a
system in 2016, when the intelligence agencies tell us we need
it, to a fourth phase of a plan that possibly could result in
the deployment of a system in 2020.
Forgive me if it makes me uneasy. It appears to me this is
the way you kill a program. You put it off indefinitely into
the future and take it off reality and put it in unreality in
the vapors somewhere in the future, and that is my concern.
I thank all of you for your hard work. I know this is not
an easy thing. I don't criticize you for working on this and
trying to bring us a treaty that we can support. But I am
uneasy about it.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Sessions.
Senator Hagan.
Senator Hagan. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the witnesses for testifying, too, and also for
your hard work on this very, very important issue.
Ratifying the New START provides the United States with an
opportunity to negotiate with Russia on tactical nuclear
weapons, as well as enhance U.S.-Russian military and
diplomatic ties. We will not obtain cooperation with Russia on
tactical nuclear weapons without ratifying the New START.
During yesterday's hearing, subject matter experts not tied
to the administration indicated that tactical nuclear weapons
are valuable to the Russian military doctrine. The witnesses
also indicated that Russian tactical nuclear weapons are also
strategic threats. Additionally, Russia uses its numerical
advantage in tactical nuclear weapons to forcefully coerce its
neighbors to adopting policies that favor Russian interests.
My question is if the Senate ratifies New START, what type
of Russian cooperation do you believe we can expect to receive
regarding limitations on tactical nuclear weapons and
preventing proliferation?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Thank you, Senator.
The preamble to the treaty makes note of our aspiration
once we have completed the process of negotiating New START and
ratifying it, bringing it into force, that we will move on to
further stages of negotiations. President Medvedev has made
statements about this in his speech in Helsinki, and he also
agreed with President Obama last April a year ago--that is, in
2009--when they were in London together, that there would be
further stages of negotiations following completion of the New
START treaty.
We are currently thinking ahead and planning. As President
Obama stated very clearly in Prague just this last April, when
we signed the treaty, he stated very clearly that we will move
on in the next stage of negotiations to tackle tactical nuclear
weapons and also nondeployed nuclear weapons.
These are very clearly our tasks laid out ahead, and I want
to get on with it.
Dr. Warner. The only thing I would add, it will be a tough
negotiation. People have talked about the reality of the
symmetry in numbers between these two and the relative
dependence. That doesn't mean, and I don't think there will be
any zero answer on tactical nuclear weapons. In other words,
the Russians will want to sustain a tactical nuclear arsenal.
I do believe there is an opportunity to negotiate
reductions and limitations in this area, and the only road to
getting on that path at this point is to ratify and enter into
force with this treaty. That will give us, I think, an impetus
to begin what will be a difficult negotiation.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
It is important to discuss nuclear arms control with the
Russians within the context of the evolving U.S.-Russian
relations and geopolitical realities. New START ensures a
degree of predictability in the bilateral relationship that can
be used as an important mechanism to facilitate cooperation on
our mutual interest, regional interest. New START does not
prevent the United States or Russia from developing new
strategic nuclear weapons capabilities.
Yesterday, our committee received testimony from a variety
of experts, once again not tied to the administration.
Witnesses emphasized the Russians placed enormous significance
in maintaining strategic nuclear parity with us. The witnesses
anticipated that the Russians would likely build more strategic
nuclear capabilities. If anyone fears that Russia is poised to
launch a buildup of nuclear weapons, would it not be wiser to
restrain them with this particular treaty?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Ma'am, it is absolutely the case that
both countries have the opportunity to modernize under this
treaty. That is the very first paragraph of Article V. We both
have the opportunity to modernize. I think that is important.
The other key point about this treaty, and you mentioned
the word yourself, ``predictability.'' You mentioned
predictability in U.S.-Russian relations overall, but within
our strategic nuclear relationship, the predictability that is
provided by this treaty helps us to understand not only what
decisions the Russians are making about modernization, where
they are heading, what kinds of programs they are developing
and beginning to deploy, but also helps us to understand what
is going on with the day-to-day operations of their forces.
That is what is so very important about the verification
and inspection regime. I do agree that predictability, it is
inherent in this treaty if it is ratified and enters into
force.
Dr. Warner. I might just add one point. I have been a
student of first, Soviet, and then, Russian, military affairs
for too many years to count. I think we still have a hangover
of the impression we had about the Russian military and the
Russian strategic nuclear forces of the late 1990s. At that
time, given the great difficulties that Russia was
encountering, it was really true that this obsolescence of the
old systems, the block obsolescence was just marching at them.
The forces were coming down.
The Russia of 2010, while it was affected by the global
financial problem, is still quite different. They have the
options to invest and even to have larger forces were they to
choose to do so.
I think it is very important--it is a fact that because of
the different composition of our forces--we are deMIRVing our
ICBMs and taking off the multiple warheads. They continue to
have multiple warheads in silos and also a new system that has
just become operational for the first time, a multiple warhead
mobile system.
Because of the difference in structure, they have a smaller
number of delivery vehicles than we do. But they are really in
the position--and I think the IC has commented on this--that if
they wished to go to higher levels, something they really
couldn't contemplate, I think, a decade ago, they can
contemplate now.
Even though they are below the limits right now, it is
useful to ensure they stay no higher than those limits that are
mutually agreeable that both sides can ensure their security
with.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Ratifying New START will underscore our commitment and
emphasis toward nonproliferation, and ratifying the treaty will
assist us in garnering international consensus regarding
nuclear weapons proliferation challenges from rogue states,
such as Iran and North Korea. It will also send a positive
message in achieving consensus with other countries on nuclear
issues.
Will ratifying New START assist the United States in
encouraging the non-nuclear states to sign and abide by the
Nonproliferation Treaty?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Ma'am, already with the negotiation and
signature of New START, we have been seeing some beneficial
effects in this regard. As you may recall, back in May, after
the treaty was signed in April, we were working very hard to
achieve a sixth resolution in the U.N. Security Council in
order to send a strong message to Iran that their behavior with
regard to their nuclear program is unacceptable to the
international community.
I understand that the diplomacy with regard to achieving
that resolution was very much strongly conducted by the United
States of America, and the cooperation we were able to achieve
with the Russian Federation, with China, with other members of
the U.N. Security Council, the influence of our having just
signed the START treaty was very evident.
I think there has already been a beneficial effect. I
believe if we ratify this treaty and it is brought into force
that the momentum of that process will ensure other successes
in our fight against the proliferation of nuclear weapons and
other weapons of mass destruction.
Senator Hagan. Dr. Warner?
Dr. Warner. The other incident that happened was the review
conference on the Nonproliferation Treaty. We have a
responsibility within that treaty. We, the super powers, the
Russians and the United States--the old term, ``the super
powers''--we had a commitment to make progress in reducing our
nuclear capabilities, our nuclear forces, as we also ask others
to forego having nuclear weapons.
Now that doesn't guarantee anything, but I think we did get
a result in that review conference held at the U.N. in May. I
think we got a very favorable resonance there as well from
having recently, just a month before, signed this treaty.
Senator Hagan. Do you hear any discussions with these
countries as we debate this treaty?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes. I just wanted to mention that two
other major conventions have been discussed this morning, and
that is the review conference for the CWC and the BWC. Both of
those major conventions will have review conferences over the
next 2, 3 years.
I think the kind of leadership we have been able to show by
negotiating signing and, we hope, ratifying and bringing into
force the New START treaty will, I think, really boost our
opportunities for success, for making really positive progress
on some of the problems that the compliance report of DOS has
raised.
The Russian Federation has, indeed, had difficulties
achieving all of the necessary reductions in its chemical
weapons stockpile. I must say, Senator, that the United States
is having difficulties as well. We have to work together on
ensuring that the proper reductions are taken according to the
CWC.
It is the kind of cooperative environment that was created
by the START negotiations that will help us not only in our
work with Russia, but with other countries under these major
regimes. I really do think that it provides us the momentum we
need for leadership across this arena in both arms control and
in nonproliferation.
Senator Hagan. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Hagan.
On the CWC compliance issue, you said parenthetically that
we weren't able to comply with its requirements either. As a
matter of fact, we had to seek and obtain an extension of the
deadline from 2007 to 2012. Is that correct?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. That was a one-time extension?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes.
Chairman Levin. If we can't make the destruction
requirements by 2012, then what? Then we won't be in
compliance, but there is no provision for an extension. Then
what?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, we hope to and plan to work very
closely again with the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons, the implementing body of the CWC, and with
the other countries who are concerned with this matter,
including the Russian Federation, to come to some
accommodation.
Chairman Levin. Now the reference, I believe, was made by
Senator Thune to a statement of General Cartwright relative to
the minimum number of delivery vehicles that he would be
comfortable with. I understand, I believe here that Mr.
Elliott, who is Admiral Mullen's representative to the talks,
is with us here this morning. I don't want to ask him to
comment on it here because my colleagues aren't here for that
purpose, and it wouldn't be fair for me to do that, I don't
think.
But it is appropriate for me to say that there will be a
question for the record for General Cartwright about that
comment. We would appreciate, Mr. Elliott, your identifying
that in the answer to a question for the record, what that
comment was and whether there is a change in his position or
exactly what his position is relative to it. It was a comment
that was made, apparently.
Now, on the statement as to whether or not DOS has
concluded that the Russians are not in compliance or whether or
not there remain questions or uncertainty or lack of clarity
about Russian compliance with the CWC, I am going to ask you,
Secretary Gottemoeller, also for the record to go into that
issue into a little more detail.
Senator McCain made reference to a language here that I
can't find, but I assume it is in this report finding that the
Russians are not in compliance. That is different from
uncertainty about compliance or lack of clarity about
compliance. Somewhere in there, those words ``not in
compliance'' appear that were quoted by Senator McCain. Can you
comment for the record on that finding and what the
significance is of that relative to our consideration of the
New START treaty?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, sir. I would be glad to do so. I
welcome the opportunity to look closely at the language myself.
I don't know it by heart.
[The information referred to follows:]
The July 2010 Compliance Report states that the United States is
unable to ascertain whether Russia's CWC declaration is complete as it
relates to CW production facilities, CW development facilities, and CW
stockpiles, and whether Russia is complying with the CWC-established
criteria for destruction and verification of its CW. For further
information about the U.S. conclusions regarding Russia's compliance
with the CWC, please see the classified version of the July 2010
Compliance Report.
We believe the New START treaty should be evaluated on its merits,
and that it will make a vital contribution to maintaining stability and
transparency in our strategic nuclear relationship with Russia.
We note that under the START and INF treaties, the Russian
Federation did not attempt to increase its forces beyond treaty limits;
we have no reason to expect Russia will do so under New START.
Chairman Levin. Okay. On the tactical nuclear weapons, they
were not covered by START I. Is that correct?
Ms. Gottemoeller. That is correct, sir.
Chairman Levin. I think it is in everybody's interest that
those negotiations begin and that we try to reach an agreement
on tactical nuclear weapons with the Russians. I think many
presidents have said the same thing, and I think this president
has said the same thing. But they have not yet been included in
a treaty, and my question is would rejection of the New START
treaty make it more or less likely that we would begin
discussions with the Russians on limitations of tactical
nuclear weapons?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, I have testified before the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee that I believe it would be unlikely
that we could begin negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons if
we are not to ratify and bring this treaty into force.
Chairman Levin. Would it be less likely?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Unlikely.
Chairman Levin. Does that mean less likely than would be
the case otherwise?
Ms. Gottemoeller. It is also less likely.
Chairman Levin. Now, on the Votkinsk missile facility,
apparently there is not going to be a continuation of
inspections at Votkinsk. Is that accurate, Dr. Warner?
Dr. Warner. At Votkinsk, we had the permanent, what was
called, perimeter and portal monitoring system. This was the
final production plant for the mobile missiles that they were
producing. For all 15 years of the START treaty, we had the
right and we did have people there at Votkinsk 24/7/365, and
they had an opportunity to man the key rail line going in and
out of this final assembly plant and to verify the exit from
that final assembly plant of mobile ICBMs.
The Russians had a reciprocal right to do a plant in Utah
that would produce the Peacekeeper because the Peacekeeper by
the time of the signing of the treaty was identified as a
potentially mobile missile. In the end, the Russians never
implemented their right on the Peacekeeper at that plant in
Utah, though they had implemented their right to do an
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) missile production
plant throughout the life of the INF Treaty.
Chairman Levin. Therefore?
Dr. Warner. That provision--no, no, I am sorry.
Chairman Levin. Back to Votkinsk, if you would?
Dr. Warner. On Votkinsk, the provision to have that portal
monitoring is not part of this treaty.
Chairman Levin. Why not?
Dr. Warner. Instead, we have the opportunity to have a
notification 48 hours in advance of the exit of any solid-
fueled ICBM or SLBM from a production facility, including
Votkinsk, and that same provision applies to the United States
for any solid-fueled ICBM or SLBM. That will provide us the
information that a new system is entering the inventory. There
will also be a notification when that missile goes to its first
place, its first destination, to a test area, to a storage
facility, to an operating base.
Chairman Levin. From the point of view of DOD, that is an
adequate or more than adequate protection for whatever
potential breakout or potential manufacture that the Russians
may pursue?
Dr. Warner. We believe that that, in combination with the
notifications, the unique identifiers now are applied to all
missiles, ICBMs, SLBMs, as well as to heavy bombers. In the
context of all the other components, notifications, and so
forth, we believe that is adequate to have effective
verification.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Mr. Chairman, may I just add one word on
this point?
Chairman Levin. Yes, please.
Ms. Gottemoeller. I think it is important to note that the
decision to depart the Votkinsk permanent presence continuous
monitoring site as START goes out or went out of force on
December 4, 2009, that decision was made in 2008. The agreement
for an orderly departure from Votkinsk was completed before the
end of 2008.
Chairman Levin. That was determined before the new
administration took over?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Correct.
Chairman Levin. I just have one more question.
Ms. Gottemoeller. That doesn't mean that we didn't try to
push back against it, but the Russian Federation----
Chairman Levin. That was not part of the negotiations. That
was a previously decided?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, we did try to--how shall I put it?
We did try to work the issue with the Russians, nevertheless.
But they believed that they had an agreement already on this
matter.
Chairman Levin. I see. I will just ask one more question if
you are ready to go.
The question has been raised about the European missile
defense. My question here is does this treaty limit the PAA or
a European missile defense in any way?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Absolutely not, sir.
Chairman Levin. I know there are differences over whether
or not that switch of systems to the PAA was the right one.
NATO has approved it, and I think it is clearly a much stronger
defensive system for us, but whether or not people agree to
that or not, it seems that is a separate issue from this
treaty. That shift is not prohibited by the treaty. It is not
covered by the treaty. It is not limited by the treaty.
I think that what is being pulled in here is not a matter
which is really relevant to our consideration of the treaty. It
is a relevant question, and people can argue it. But I don't
see how it is relevant to the consideration of this treaty.
Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Welcome, Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. I apologize
that I wasn't able to get here at the outset of the hearing
because I am very interested in the subject. I just had a
meeting I couldn't skip out of.
Let me first thank you for the extraordinary effort that
you both made in achieving the treaty. I think this may be the
seventh hearing the Senate Armed Services Committee has held on
it, and what is clear, I think, I'm sure clear to you is in any
treaty, a treaty is a compromise. You have goals, but you are
negotiating with another party. You can't always achieve
everything you want, presumably, unless there is a real
imbalance in the parties negotiating.
That is true here, too. I think we have to try to, as we go
forward, though members of the committee--I, myself, have some
questions--balance out what we gain from the treaty, what the
world gains, but what we gain particularly and what, if any,
risks are being taken. I just have a couple of questions in
that regard. I don't want to hold you a lot longer.
This first is based on my staff's report about an exchange
you had with Senator Sessions before I was here. So if I am
mistaken, it is totally my staff's fault. [Laughter.]
Senators never make mistakes. Mistakes are only made by
staff.
Chairman Levin. Hear, hear. [Laughter.]
Senator Lieberman. I understand that you had a discussion
with Senator Sessions with regard to the PAA for missile
defense that the Obama administration has adopted, and though I
think there may have been some unease at the beginning when it
was first adopted, I think, generally speaking, around here
there is support for that approach now.
I believe what I have heard is that you left the impression
that the completion of the four stages of the PAA, including
the deployment of the SM-3 Block IIB, was contingent on the
development of Iranian ballistic missile capacity. I think that
the administration has been clear, from the moment the
President first announced the PAA, that deploying all four
stages is not in any sense contingent or optional, but
mandatory and a necessity, as it were.
That is certainly how I viewed it. Of course, this
committee has had testimony from the previous head of the
Defense Intelligence Agency that as early as 2015, with outside
help, presumably from somebody like North Korea or somebody
else, that Iran could have ICBM capacity that could reach the
United States.
I don't know if you want to clarify this one for the record
or you want to say anything more at this point. But if, in
fact, your testimony is that the completion of the PAA,
including SM-3 Block IIB, is conditional, that is different
than I understood before.
Dr. Warner. I was the party who wandered into that
assertion, Senator. I probably would have been safer staying
with the first assertion, saying I need to get back and check
on the specific wording.
Make no mistake, my responsibilities in my current position
and over these last few months, this last year or so, have not
included being in the middle of this issue.
Senator Lieberman. Okay.
Dr. Warner. The issue was the use of the word ``possible''
deployment of the force. We will check into the specific
wording and get back to you. But the PAA, it was my personal
understanding, is linked to and it was focused on regional
threats because those are the threats that are coming first,
and that is why Phases 1 and 2 were of that character. Phase 3
was to cope with threats that were deeper into Europe, and
Phase 4 would finally address those that would go very deep
into Europe and all the way to the United States.
I made, perhaps erroneously, the statement that I believe
the only adaptive part of this if that threat fails to
materialize, then I said that might be the possible reason why
we would not move to Phase 4. You say you understand we are
committed to all the way to Phase 4. Let me simply check on
that.
[The information referred to follows:]
As outlined during the announcement of the Phased Adaptive Approach
(PAA) in Europe last September and in the Report of the 2010 Ballistic
Missile Defense Review, while further advances in technology or future
changes in the threat could modify the details or timing of later
phases, we plan to deploy all four phases of the PAA in Europe,
including Phase 4. This last phase will include an upgrade to the
Standard Missile-3, the Block IIB, which will provide capability
against a potential intercontinental ballistic missile launched from
the Middle East against the United States. As the President has stated,
this approach will ``provide stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of
American forces and America's allies.''
Senator Lieberman. Okay.
Dr. Warner. That was the root of this set of judgments or
assessments.
Senator Lieberman. Good. I appreciate that. If you will let
us know for the record, that would be helpful.
I think there are two general categories of concern that
people have. Most people I talk to, Members in the Senate,
would like to get to a point to vote to advise and consent to
the New START treaty. I certainly would.
The two categories of concern are about the modernization
program for our nuclear weapons stockpile since the number of
deployed warheads will go down, and we have had a lot of
testimony that was on that, and I think a lot of work is going
on on that. The second set of concerns is about verification,
and some of this is based on classified NIE on this question,
some of it just on open testimony. Obviously, I will ask about
that.
This really goes to--actually, we were in a classified
briefing, and we started to ask this question to some of the
folks from the IC, and they said, ``no, that is not our
responsibility. You should talk to the people who negotiated
the treaty. There are certain reductions in our verification
capacities under the proposed New START treaty from what they
were under START.''
Perhaps if you could, Secretary Gottemoeller, I would ask
you to begin just to respond to those concerns and indicate
what the process was by which they were agreed on and why you
think that they don't represent unacceptable risk for the
United States?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Senator Lieberman, the verification
regime in the New START treaty is different from that in the
START treaty. It does respond very much to the central limits
and obligations in this treaty. There are differences among the
various verification measures.
But I would argue that in some cases we actually improved
and adjusted verification measures. For example, in one case,
we found that our inspectors, when they were flying into the
point of entry to begin an onsite inspection, they weren't
having enough time to recover from their travel, and it was
becoming a safety concern. We made some changes, extended some
time periods, so that they could get a night's rest.
Those kinds of changes we made were, and I want to make
this point very clearly, on the basis of the 15 years of
implementing the START treaty. We had experienced inspectors
come along on our delegations, and we had experienced operators
of the strategic nuclear forces who knew the nuclear weapons
systems inside and out. In some cases, they said we are wasting
time on inspections with this, that, or the other procedures.
We need to focus in on what is really important.
They really, really worked hard to make sure that we were
making the New START treaty verification regime more efficient
and effective, as well as helping to address what had become a
problem under the START treaty. That is that some of the
inspection measures became drags on the operational tempo of
our strategic forces.
This was clearly laid out as an instruction in our July
joint understanding that President Obama and President Medvedev
signed. There was a clear instruction in there: look for ways
to make all these measures more efficient and effective and
less expensive to implement.
So the result, I think, is an excellent one and really does
serve the needs of this treaty, that is, response to the need
to monitor and verify its central obligations.
Senator Lieberman. Mr. Chairman, my time is up. With your
permission, I would ask one more question.
Chairman Levin. Please.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks. I have had particular concern
about the reduction and what is required under the treaty for
telemetry exchanges because of the extra information they give
us to verify the capacity of the ballistic missiles.
Incidentally, I gather that we were both obliged to exchange
telemetry information on all of our tests for missiles under
START, and as far as we know, the Russians complied with that
quite completely.
This is now limited in the New START treaty to five
telemetry exchanges, to exchange telemetry information for five
missile tests at the choice of the country testing. In
testimony before our committee last week--I believe it was last
week--General Chilton said that the treaty does provide for
less transparency than we would prefer into Russian missile
programs.
There is a difference here, I understand, that the
telemetry is not really necessary to verify compliance with the
New START treaty, but we are losing in the reduction of the
number of telemetry exchanges transparency into the Russian
missile programs. I wanted you to talk, Madam Secretary, if you
would, about why we accepted that reduction.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Sir, it points to the comment I made a
moment ago. That is for the verification of this treaty,
telemetry is not required. In particular, we took a new
approach to counting under this treaty, to more precisely count
the number of reentry vehicles on ICBMs and SLBMs.
I think this helps us quite a bit, by the way, because we
don't end up over counting the D-5, which the use of
attribution rules under START meant that we were continuing to
count the D-5 up at eight reentry vehicles per missile where we
had started to download it over time, five, six, whatever
number of reentry vehicles on each missile. We ended
up with a situation where the D-5 under START was being
over counted, so to say.
In this treaty, we went to a different approach to
counting. As a result, we did not need to determine attribution
for each missile. To determine an attribution rule, we would
check to see how many reentry vehicles were being released from
each missile type during tests, and then we would determine the
attribution rule. If it were tested with 10, we would count it
with 10 under START.
We have, I think, a better, more precise counting rule
under this treaty. As a result of that, the need to have
telemetry to actually verify the measures of the treaty went
away.
I have to say that I wanted to make two comments about
this. First of all, it is not strictly true to say that under
START we had to exchange telemetry on all missile tests because
we had the opportunity to request an exception, to say we don't
want to exchange telemetry for this particular test. Forgive
me, I don't remember off the top of my head, but it was five or
seven, some number like that. We could get that amount to give
you a more precise view of that.
We always had the right to request not to exchange
telemetry under START. In this new treaty, we looked at what
the concepts of this new treaty were in terms of our overall
relationships with the Russians, and we said we need to develop
further transparency.
By the way, this is an approach that the previous
administration took with regard to the Moscow Treaty, always
that we would have transparency, additional transparency
developing. In this treaty, the Russians came in and proposed
an actual treaty article, Article VIII, that speaks to the need
to develop additional voluntary transparency measures on top of
the verification regime. The telemetry measures under this new
treaty are very much in that spirit.
My personal view is, given the experience we had in the
negotiations that the Russians became more enthusiastic about
this exchange over the course of the negotiations, I think that
it will turn out to be quite beneficial in transparency terms,
give us important insights into the Russian missile force
developments over the life of the treaty. But, of course, that
means we will have to bring the treaty into force.
Senator Lieberman. Yes, so I take it the Russians asked for
a reduction in the number of exchanges of telemetry information
on missile tests?
Ms. Gottemoeller. We actually went into this treaty
negotiation pretty much with a proposal as to how to proceed,
and then we worked out, over the course of time, what the
overall numbers would be. So it is up to five, as you noted,
launches of ICBMs or SLBMs.
Senator Lieberman. Okay. I take it from the end of your
last answer, you are saying that you think that there is an
opportunity to negotiate with the Russians post New START
treaty the kinds of exchanges of telemetry and other
information regarding ICBMs that we are discussing now?
Ms. Gottemoeller. The telemetry provisions in the treaty
call for, actually, an annual review.
Senator Lieberman. Yes.
Ms. Gottemoeller. We would get together and have an
opportunity every year to review where we are, how it is
working. Is it going well, not going so well? What can we do to
improve it? Again, that is another reason why I look very
positively on the telemetry exchange under this treaty.
I think we could make it responsive over the 10-year life
of the treaty to our needs. Of course, the Russians will be
trying to do the same thing, but I look upon it as very
beneficial from that perspective and potentially very positive
transparency regime.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks. I have taken more than enough
time. I thank you for your patience, Mr. Chairman.
I thank the two witnesses.
Chairman Levin. Not at all. I also have a few more
questions. First, I want to comment on what Senator Lieberman
said relative to the Phase 4 of the so-called PAA. I agree with
him as to his comment that it is our understanding part of the
plan to proceed to that. It is not stated to be conditional on
anything. I think he is correct.
I am glad that, Dr. Warner, you will check on that and
correct the record if you need to or give a statement for the
record because that is my understanding is the same as Senator
Lieberman.
Second, Madam Secretary, I asked you before to give us for
the record where Russian compliance, questions about Russian
compliance remain unresolved or unclear or where we have
concluded that they are in a state of noncompliance. If you
could give us a chart, it may not be able to be total because,
I think, there are so many requirements for compliance, but you
could give us types of compliance requirements where we believe
that there is lack of clarity as to whether they are in
compliance, lack of resolution, which I think is a different
issue--apparently, a DOS report uses those terms in a different
way--and also where we have reached a judgment that Russians
have not complied.
Okay, those are three categories. There may be more
categories. If so, give us a fourth or a fifth category. But we
have to clarify that issue because of the report.
[The information referred to follows:]
The following is a list of the bilateral or multilateral arms
control treaties involving Russia and the United States where there are
compliance issues concerning either Russia or the United States.
1. Treaties for which the United States has unresolved compliance
issues regarding Russia (the United States has raised compliance issues
with Russia in each case)
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)--prior to the
treaty's expiration
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)
Treaty on Open Skies
2. Treaties for which Russia has raised compliance issues
concerning the United States
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BWC)
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC)
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)--prior to the
treaty's expiration
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE)
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty
3. Treaties for which the United States is uncertain about
Russia's compliance
Please see the classified response to QFR #1 provided
separately
4. Treaties for which the United States has concluded that Russia
is not in compliance with certain of its obligations \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For details, please see ``Adherence to and Compliance with Arms
Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and
Commitments,'' U.S. Department of State, July 2010 (known as the
Compliance Report). With regard to the START treaty, the Compliance
Report (p. 8) states ``Notwithstanding the overall success of START
implementation, a number of longstanding compliance issues that were
raised in the START treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commissions (JCIC) remained unresolved when the treaty expired on
December 5, 2009. Throughout the term of the treaty, the Parties worked
through diplomatic channels and in the JCIC to ensure smooth
implementation of the treaty and effective resolution of compliance
issues and questions.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Same as #1 above
Chairman Levin. On the telemetry issue, and I am glad
Senator Lieberman raised that issue, as I understand, the
telemetry point is that we no longer use telemetry to verify
this treaty to begin with. But that to the extent we get
telemetry and exchange it, it could be useful in terms of
providing additional transparency into the Russian program.
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, sir.
Chairman Levin. Is that a summation of it?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes.
Chairman Levin. Okay. There are other ways of providing
transparency as well, but this is a plus, but not necessary for
compliance determinations?
Ms. Gottemoeller. Yes, sir. That is correct.
Chairman Levin. Okay. Do you have anything more?
Senator Lieberman. No.
Chairman Levin. Okay. We thank you both, and it is very
useful to have these hearings. There will be additional
questions, I am sure, for the record. Please give us answers
promptly.
There is a letter I have been requested to put into the
record in support of the treaty signed by former commanders of
STRATCOM. It is signed by seven former commanders of STRATCOM
and will be made part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Chairman Levin. We will stand adjourned with our thanks.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Carl Levin
arms control treaty compliance issues
1. Senator Levin. Secretary Gottemoeller, please provide a table or
list of the bilateral or multilateral arms control treaties involving
Russia and the United States where there are compliance issues
concerning either Russia or the United States, indicating whether the
United States or Russia have raised compliance issues concerning the
other, whether there is uncertainty about compliance, whether there are
unresolved compliance issues, or whether the United States has
concluded that Russia is not in compliance with its obligations.
Secretary Gottemoeller. The following is a list of the bilateral or
multilateral arms control treaties involving Russia and the United
States where there are compliance issues concerning either Russia or
the United States.
1. Treaties for which the United States has unresolved compliance
issues regarding Russia (the United States has raised compliance issues
with Russia in each case)
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
Chemical Weapons Convention
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty--prior to the
treaty's expiration
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
Treaty on Open Skies
2. Treaties for which Russia has raised compliance issues
concerning the United States
Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention
Chemical Weapons Convention
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty--prior to the
treaty's expiration
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
3. Treaties for which the United States is uncertain about
Russia's compliance
Please see the classified response provided
separately
4. Treaties for which the United States has concluded that Russia
is not in compliance with certain of its obligations \1\
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ For details, please see ``Adherence to and Compliance with Arms
Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements and
Commitments,'' U.S. Department of State, July 2010 (known as the
Compliance Report). With regard to the START treaty, the Compliance
Report (p. 8) states ``Notwithstanding the overall success of START
implementation, a number of longstanding compliance issues that were
raised in the START treaty's Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commissions (JCIC) remained unresolved when the treaty expired on
December 5, 2009. Throughout the term of the treaty, the Parties worked
through diplomatic channels and in the JCIC to ensure smooth
implementation of the treaty and effective resolution of compliance
issues and questions.''
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Same as #1 above.
2. Senator Levin. Secretary Gottemoeller, during the hearing on
July 29, 2010, Senator McCain asked a question about whether the U.S.
Government has concluded that Russia is not in compliance with the
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The July 2010 unclassified
Department of State (DOS) compliance report states that the United
States is ``unable to ascertain whether Russia's CWC declaration is
complete as it relates to CW production facilities, CW development
facilities, and CW stockpiles, and whether Russia is complying with the
CWC-established criteria for destruction and verification of its CW.''
Has the U.S. Government concluded that Russia is not in compliance with
the CWC or, as the report states, that it is unable to ascertain
Russia's compliance?
Secretary Gottemoeller. The July 2010 Compliance Report states that
the United States is unable to ascertain whether Russia's CWC
declaration is complete as it relates to CW production facilities, CW
development facilities, and CW stockpiles, and whether Russia is
complying with the CWC-established criteria for destruction and
verification of its CW. For further information about the U.S.
conclusions regarding Russia's compliance with the CWC, please see the
classified version of the July 2010 Compliance Report.
phased adaptive approach to missile defense
3. Senator Levin. Dr. Warner, during the hearing, there was a
question about whether Phase 4 of the Phased Adaptive Approach (PAA) to
missile defense in Europe was conditional or not. Is it correct that
the plan for the PAA to missile defense in Europe includes all four
phases, including the development and deployment of the Standard
Missile-3 Block II interceptor in Phase 4, and that Phase 4 is not
conditional? Please consult with Secretary Gates in preparing your
answer, so that the Senate Armed Services Committee knows his view as
well.
Dr. Warner. As outlined during the announcement of the PAA in
Europe last September and in the Report of the 2010 Ballistic Missile
Defense Review, while further advances in technology or future changes
in the threat could modify the details or timing of later phases, we
plan to deploy all four phases of the PAA in Europe, including Phase 4.
This last phase will include an upgrade to the SM-3, the Block IIB,
which will provide additional capability against a potential
intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) launched from the Middle East
against the United States. As the President has stated, this approach
will ``provide stronger, smarter, and swifter defenses of American
forces and America's allies.''
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
site inspections
4. Senator Burris. Secretary Gottemoeller, in the New Strategic
Arms Reduction Treaty (START) there will be an annual quota of 18
inspections, instead of 28 as under the START I, and only 35 sites are
eligible for inspection instead of the 70 sites under the START I. Can
you describe why these reductions are in our best interest?
Secretary Gottemoeller. The New START treaty verification
provisions are tailored to verify the requirements of the New START
treaty, which are different from the START treaty requirements.
The New START treaty provides for an annual quota of up to 18 short
notice, onsite inspections to aid in verifying Russian compliance with
its treaty obligations. These inspections will provide U.S. inspectors
with 18 opportunities per year to select from among declared Russian
strategic forces facilities to verify the accuracy of Russian data
declarations and to deter cheating. Although the new treaty provides
for fewer inspections than the annual quota of 28 permitted under the
original START treaty, the number of facilities for which Russia
provided site diagrams and which will therefore be inspectable under
the New START treaty (35) is also significantly lower than the number
of inspectable facilities in the former Soviet Union when the START
treaty entered into force (70). As explained in the response to QFR #5
below, this is due to the fact that Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine
are not Parties to New START, as well as that Russia now has fewer
facilities where strategic offensive arms are located than it had when
START entered into force.
The New START treaty annual inspection quota includes 10 Type 1
inspections of deployed and nondeployed strategic offensive arms, which
will be conducted at operating bases for ICBMs, ballistic missile
submarines (SSBNs), and nuclear-capable heavy bombers. Type 1
inspections combine many of the aspects associated with two different
types of inspections that were conducted separately under the START
treaty; specifically, reentry vehicle onsite inspections and data
update inspections. Thus, fewer inspections annually at the operating
bases will achieve many of the results of the previous START treaty
inspection regime. The quota also includes eight Type Two inspections
focused on nondeployed, converted, or eliminated strategic systems,
which will be conducted at facilities such as storage sites, test
ranges, and conversion or elimination facilities, as well as formerly
declared facilities.
The administration assessed the number of Type One and Type Two
inspections needed annually to meet U.S. inspection objectives as the
nature of these inspection types emerged during the New START
negotiations. These assessments ultimately concluded that an annual
quota of 18 such inspections would be adequate to meet U.S. inspection
needs.
5. Senator Burris. Secretary Gottemoeller, why are the other 35
sites, previously inspected under START I, now off limits?
Secretary Gottemoeller. At the time of entry into force of the
START treaty, there were 70 inspectable facilities in Belarus,
Kazakhstan, Russia, and Ukraine. Of those 70 facilities, 55 facilities
were located on the territory of what is now the Russian Federation,
and 15 facilities were located in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine.
All of the strategic offensive arms associated with the 15
facilities located in Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine were removed,
thereby ``eliminating'' those facilities for purposes of the START
treaty. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine no longer deploy any strategic
offensive arms, and so they are not signatories of the New START
treaty.
During the implementation of the START treaty, Russia eliminated 12
facilities by removing the strategic offensive arms from those
facilities in accordance with START treaty provisions.
The remaining eight facilities in Russia that were inspectable
under the START treaty and for which Russia has not provided site
diagrams under the New START treaty are either facilities that remain
inspectable because they have been consolidated with another
inspectable facility, or facilities that no longer have existing types
of strategic offensive arms located at them.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
treaty negotiating record
6. Senator McCain. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner,
consistent with past practice on arms control treaties, including the
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty and START I treaties,
when does the administration intend to provide the Senate with the
negotiating record of the treaty, including all elements of the record
dealing with missile defenses, tactical nuclear weapons, and limiting
prompt global strike?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. So far as we are aware,
Senators were not provided full access to the negotiating record during
Senate consideration of the START treaty. Nor was the negotiating
record provided to the Senate during its consideration of the ABM
Treaty. Rather, information from the negotiating record was provided to
the Senate in relation to a controversial interpretation of the ABM
Treaty more than a decade after the Senate had provided its approval
and the treaty had entered into force.
As the Senate Foreign Relations Committee noted in its report on
the treaty between the United States and the U.S.S.R. on the
Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles (INF
Treaty), ``a systematic expectation of Senate perusal of every key
treaty's `negotiating record' could be expected to inhibit candor
during future negotiations and induce posturing on the part of U.S.
negotiators and their counterparts during sensitive discussions.'' The
Committee Report further noted that regularly providing the negotiating
record would ultimately ``weaken the treaty-making process'' and
``damage American diplomacy.''
Of course, Senators being asked to provide advice and consent to
ratification of a treaty should have a full understanding of what
obligations would be undertaken by the United States upon ratification
of that treaty. Thus, when a President transmits a treaty to the Senate
it is accompanied by a detailed article-by-article analysis of the
treaty. The analysis of the New START treaty transmitted to the Senate
by the President on May 13, 2010, is nearly 200 pages long and provides
information on every provision of the treaty, protocol, and annexes.
This analysis includes relevant information drawn from the negotiating
record. The treaty text and these materials provide a comprehensive
picture of U.S. obligations under the treaty.
In addition, as you were informed in a letter dated August 10,
2010, the administration has made available to the Senate a classified
summary of discussions in the New START treaty negotiations on the
issue of missile defense.
Should you have any outstanding questions, we are committed to
providing answers in detailed briefings, including in a classified
session, if needed.
russian tactical nuclear weapons
7. Senator McCain. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, some
people argue that we must ratify this treaty if we ever want to engage
with the Russians on reducing tactical nuclear weapons. What assurances
do we have from the Russians that they are willing to negotiate
reductions in tactical nuclear weapons?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. At their London Summit on
April 1, 2009, President Obama and President Medvedev committed to
``achieving a nuclear-free world, while recognizing that this long-term
goal will require a new emphasis on arms control . . . '' President
Medvedev expressed interest in future discussions on measures to
further reduce both nations' nuclear arsenals when he and President
Obama signed the New START treaty in Prague on April 8, 2010. As
President Obama made clear on that occasion, we intend to raise
strategic and nonstrategic/tactical nuclear weapons, including
nondeployed nuclear weapons, in those discussions.
missile defense
8. Senator McCain. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, in her
prepared remarks before the Atlantic Council in April 2010, Under
Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher stated that ``our Russian friends
needed some assurances as it negotiated deeper reductions in the
absence of an Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The United States
made a unilateral statement to clarify that our missile defense systems
are not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia.'' Why was
it necessary to provide such assurances to Russia?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. A number of public
statements made by Russian leaders about the treaty have shown that
they considered such assurances necessary in the context of reaching
agreement on the treaty. Under Secretary Tauscher's statement to the
Atlantic Council referred to the U.S. unilateral statement, which was
based on standing U.S. policy as articulated in the 2010 Ballistic
Missile Defense Review that ``while the GMD system would be employed to
defend the United States against limited missile launches from any
source, it does not have the capacity to cope with large scale Russian
or Chinese missile attacks, and is not intended to affect the strategic
balance with those countries.''
The United States has made clear that U.S. missile defense efforts
are not directed against Russia. As Secretary Gates stated in his May
18 testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
``Under the last administration, as well as under this one,
it has been U.S. policy not to build a missile defense that
would render useless Russia's nuclear capabilities. It has been
a missile defense intended to protect against rogue nations
such as North Korea and Iran, or countries that have very
limited capabilities. The systems that we have, the systems
that originated and have been funded in the Bush
administration, as well as in this administration, are not
focused on trying to render useless Russia's nuclear
capability. That, in our view, as in theirs, would be
enormously destabilizing, not to mention unbelievably
expensive.''
Russia has expressed concerns that U.S. ballistic missile defense
(BMD) capabilities could eventually be a threat to Russia's nuclear
deterrent; the United States, therefore, sought to convey to Russia the
underlying approach outlined by Secretary Gates. To this end, we have
provided, and will continue to provide, policy and technical
explanations regarding why U.S. BMD capabilities such as the European-
based PAA do not and cannot pose a threat to Russian strategic
deterrent forces.
9. Senator McCain. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, did you
receive assurances from Russia that they will not object to the full
deployment of all four phases of the PAA in Europe?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. No. The PAA was not a topic
of the New START negotiations. U.S. negotiators did not seek such
assurances, but the United States has provided, and will continue to
provide, technical explanations regarding why U.S. BMD capabilities
such as those to be deployed throughout all four phases of the
European-based PAA will not pose a threat to Russian strategic
deterrent forces. In addition, the United States made clear in its
unilateral statement that it intends to continue improving and
deploying missile defense systems.
10. Senator McCain. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, did you
receive assurances that the Russians will not object to the potential
need to increase the number of ground-based interceptors (GBI) in
California and Alaska if the threat from North Korea or Iran
materializes sooner than expected?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. No. This issue was not a
topic of the New START treaty negotiations. U.S. negotiators did not
seek such assurances, but the United States made clear in its
unilateral statement that it intends to continue improving and
deploying missile defense systems in order to defend the U.S. Homeland
against limited attack.
11. Senator McCain. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, if we
offered assurances on missile defense, why didn't we demand similar
assurances on tactical nuclear weapons?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. The U.S. assurances on
missile defense have been a reiteration of standing U.S. policy as
articulated in the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, and
explanations of the capabilities of current and planned U.S. missile
defense systems. Tactical nuclear weapons were beyond the scope of the
New START treaty negotiations. A more ambitious treaty that addressed
tactical nuclear weapons would have taken much longer to complete,
adding significantly to the time before a successor agreement,
including verification measures, could enter into force following the
START treaty's expiration in December 2009.
Deferring negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons until after a
START successor agreement had been concluded was also the
recommendation of the Perry-Schlesinger Congressional Strategic Posture
Commission, which advised pursuing ``a step-by-step approach,'' and
making the first step ``modest and straightforward.'' President
Medvedev has expressed interest in future discussions on measures to
further reduce both nations' nuclear arsenals. We intend to raise
strategic and tactical weapons, including nondeployed nuclear weapons,
in those discussions.
12. Senator McCain. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner,
irrespective of threats from the Russians to withdraw from the treaty,
is this administration committed to funding, developing, and deploying
all elements of the PAA for missile defense in Europe, as well as
implementing the strategy as portrayed in the Ballistic Missile Defense
Review?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. Yes. As outlined during the
announcement of the PAA in Europe last September and in the Report of
the 2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review, while further advances in
technology or future changes in the threat could modify the details or
timing of later phases, we plan to deploy all four phases of the PAA in
Europe, including Phase 4.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator James M. Inhofe
negotiation strategy
13. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller, you stated the
following in your opening statement: ``I want to underscore that the
focus of these negotiations from beginning to end was strategic
offensive arms. We were also determined to move beyond Cold War
mentalities and chart a fresh beginning in our relations with Russia.''
If the focus was on strategic arms, why did you agree to include
language associated with conventional prompt global strike and missile
defense in the preamble and the treaty itself?
Secretary Gottemoeller. The preamble language referred to in the
New START treaty is simply a statement of fact acknowledging the
interrelationship of strategic offensive and defensive arms and the
potential impact of conventionally-armed ICBMs and submarine launched
ballistic missiles (SLBMs) on strategic stability. The preamble also
affirms that currently deployed strategic defensive arms do not
undermine the viability and effectiveness of either Party's strategic
offensive arms. This preambular statement was negotiated and agreed
between the Parties in accordance with the Joint Understanding signed
by President Obama and President Medvedev on July 6, 2009. As stated in
the article-by-article analysis of the treaty, this statement is part
of the shared view of the Parties of the importance of predictability
and strategic stability.
Regarding the treaty's ban in Article V, paragraph 3, on the
conversion of ICBM or SLBM launchers to missile defense interceptor
launchers and vice versa, this ban does not constrain the United States
from deploying the most effective missile defenses possible, nor does
it add any additional cost or inconvenience to the implementation of
U.S. missile defense plans. The Article also ``grandfathers'' the five
former ICBM test silos at Vandenberg Air Force Base, which were
converted for GBIs several years ago.
The United States protected the right to develop and deploy a
conventional prompt global strike capability, should we decide to
pursue such a capability under New START. Just as in the START treaty,
conventional warheads deployed on ICBMs or SLBMs would count toward the
aggregate warhead limit of 1,550 under the New START treaty. As
envisaged by our military planners, the number of such conventionally-
armed delivery vehicles and the warheads they carry would be very small
when measured against the overall levels of strategic delivery systems
and strategic warheads. Should we decide to deploy them, counting this
small number of conventional strategic systems and their warheads
toward the treaty limits will not prevent the United States from
maintaining a robust, fully adequate nuclear deterrent.
14. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller, perhaps it was a
strategic error to focus too narrowly on strategic arms and ignore
Russia's superiority in tactical nuclear weapons. Why didn't you press
harder to include tactical nuclear weapons in the New START?
Secretary Gottemoeller. A more ambitious treaty that addressed
nonstrategic/tactical nuclear weapons would have taken much longer to
complete, adding significantly to the time before a successor
agreement, including verification measures, could enter into force
following the START treaty's expiration in December 2009. Because of
their limited range and very different roles from those played by
strategic nuclear forces, the vast majority of nonstrategic/tactical
nuclear weapons do not directly influence the strategic nuclear balance
between the United States and Russia. This fact, combined with the need
to consult closely with our allies before addressing nonstrategic/
tactical nuclear weapons, did not support broadening the scope of the
New START treaty. This approach was consistent with the bipartisan
Perry-Schlesinger Congressional Strategic Posture Commission's
recommendation to ``pursue a step-by-step approach,'' and to make the
first step ``modest and straightforward.'' The Commission recommended
deferring negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons until after a START
successor agreement had been concluded.
At their London Summit on April 1, 2009, President Obama and
President Medvedev committed to ``achieving a nuclear-free world, while
recognizing that this long-term goal will require a new emphasis on
arms control ...'' President Medvedev expressed interest in future
discussions on measures to further reduce both nations' nuclear
arsenals when he and President Obama signed the New START treaty in
Prague on April 8, 2010. As President Obama made clear on that
occasion, we intend to raise strategic and nonstrategic/tactical
nuclear weapons, including nondeployed nuclear weapons, in those
discussions.
15. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller, you suggest you wanted
to move beyond ``Cold War mentalities,'' yet what could be more
suggestive of this mentality than a Cold War-style arms control
agreement? Both Russia and the United States were moving to lower
levels of strategic nuclear arms; we should have focused, instead, on
dealing with the problems of nuclear proliferation, which would have
been a better strategy for moving beyond Cold War mentalities. How does
this treaty further nuclear nonproliferation?
Secretary Gottemoeller. U.S. leadership in reducing its nuclear
arsenal is essential to our efforts to bolster the nonproliferation
regime and reduce global nuclear dangers. The New START treaty
positions the United States to continue its international leadership
role in advancing the goals of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty
(NPT) regime. The conclusion of the New START treaty with Russia
strengthened the U.S. position during the NPT Review Conference in May
2010, and helped aid our efforts to conclude a consensus final
document, which did not occur at the previous Review Conference in
2005. The new treaty set the stage for engaging other nuclear powers in
fulfilling the goals of the NPT, and expanding opportunities for
enhancing strategic stability.
Enhanced cooperation between the United States and Russia in the
nuclear arena will contribute to the positive international environment
needed to reinforce programs to secure and safeguard nuclear material
stockpiles worldwide, and to strengthen the NPT. More generally,
improved U.S.-Russian relations will help in achieving critical U.S.
foreign policy objectives related to U.S. security, including efforts
to address the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea.
strategic balance
16. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, why have
you said the treaty will enhance U.S. security by stabilizing the
strategic balance? Please address what is wrong with the current
strategic balance.
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. The New START treaty is
needed in order to provide a critical framework for the strategic
relationship between the United States and Russia. Without a successor
agreement to the START treaty, transparency and strategic stability in
the U.S.-Russian relationship would erode over time due to the absence
of agreed treaty limits on strategic delivery vehicles, launchers, and
strategic warheads, as well as the lack of a comprehensive verification
regime. While the Moscow Treaty could, in principle, be extended to
retain its aggregate limits on each side's strategic nuclear warheads,
there would be no associated verification or transparency measures. In
the absence of the New START treaty, the probability would increase
that suspicion and misunderstanding would reemerge in the U.S.-Russian
relationship.
The New START treaty's verification provisions will enhance
predictability and stability by providing a window into Russia's
strategic nuclear forces, thereby helping to mitigate the risks of
surprises, mistrust, and miscalculations that can result from excessive
secrecy or decisions based on worst-case projections of Russian
strategic nuclear forces in the absence of the insights provided by the
combination of the comprehensive, steadily updated database, a series
of mandatory notifications, and up to 18 short-notice, onsite
inspections that will be conducted each year.
17. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, by
reducing strategic nuclear weapons, you exacerbate the disparity
between Russia and the United States in tactical nuclear weapons. How
do you know you are increasing strategic stability when the Russians
now can deploy more tactical nuclear warheads than the United States is
permitted to deploy strategic nuclear warheads under the new treaty?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. The treaty's limitations on
Russia's nuclear forces are obviously an important factor in assessing
the desirability of the treaty's limits. The New START treaty will
enhance U.S. national security by stabilizing the strategic balance
between the United States and the Russian Federation at lower levels of
nuclear forces. Even so, the force structure the United States will
retain under the New START treaty limits will preserve our capability
to upload our strategic nuclear delivery systems in response to any
attempt by Russia to leverage its tactical nuclear weapons to gain
advantage. U.S. strategic forces will continue to underwrite deterrence
for the United States, our allies, and our partners.
Because of their limited range and very different roles from those
played by strategic nuclear forces, the vast majority of nonstrategic/
tactical nuclear weapons do not directly influence the strategic
balance between the United States and Russia. Furthermore, in order to
support extended deterrence and power projection, the United States
possesses many diverse capabilities, including strategic and tactical
nuclear weapons, superior conventional forces, ballistic missile
defenses and other advanced capabilities. We also benefit from
significant allied nuclear and conventional capabilities.
bilateral consultative commission
18. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller, how do we know what
will be considered a ``substantive right or obligation'' and therefore
require a treaty amendment to change the treaty protocol, as described
in Article XV of the treaty?
Secretary Gottemoeller. The use of treaty-based commissions to
agree on limited technical changes to improve or clarify implementation
of treaty provisions is a well-established practice in arms control
treaties. The New START treaty authorizes the Parties to use the
Bilateral Consultative Commission (BCC) to reach agreement on changes
in the Protocol to the treaty, including its annexes, that do not
affect substantive rights or obligations. The START treaty's JCIC and
the Intermediate and Shorter Range Nuclear Forces Treaty's Special
Verification Commission were assigned similar responsibilities by those
treaties, and our practice under the BCC would be informed by those
important precedents in determining what will be considered a
``substantive right or obligation'' that would require a treaty
amendment. Examples of agreements reached within the framework of the
START treaty's JCIC included:
Setting the maximum weight of equipment and supplies
that may be brought into Russia or the U.S. by monitors (3,000
kg);
Providing that the inspecting Party shall repack cargo
if unpacked and inspected at a point of entry;
Establishing new procedures for additional
confirmation of the dimensions of first stages of SLBMs; and
Establishing procedures for notification of changes to
flight routes for inspection flights.
The executive branch intends to consult with the Senate in those
cases in which there could be a question as to whether a proposed
change in the Protocol would affect substantive rights or obligations
under the treaty.
19. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller, the authority to act in
secrecy and outside the treaty amendment process with the BCC is
troubling. Who gets to decide what issues are discussed in the BCC?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Any agreements reached in the BCC, or any
other recorded results of its work, are presumed not to be
confidential, unless otherwise agreed by the BCC. Further, just as was
true under the INF Treaty's Special Verification Commission (SVC) and
the START treaty's JCIC, where U.S. administrations sought to keep the
Senate informed following each SVC and JCIC session, we will keep the
Senate informed on BCC sessions.
The rules governing the BCC provide that each Party must notify the
other Party, prior to the beginning of a session, of any questions to
be raised at a meeting. This is the same as the practice in the SVC and
the JCIC.
cheating
20. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, if
``even large-scale cheating'' by Russia doesn't impact U.S. deterrence,
then why do we need this treaty?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. Large-scale Russian
cheating--indeed any Russian cheating--would be of extremely serious
concern to the United States and could have very significant negative
repercussions for the U.S.-Russia relationship. However, an expansion
of the Russian strategic nuclear arsenal--beyond the New START limits
of 1,550 warheads--achieved by cheating or breakout would not undermine
the basic second strike capability of the United States, which is the
foundation of our strategic deterrent. This is the case because the
survivability and response capabilities of U.S. strategic submarines at
sea and alert heavy bombers would be unaffected by even large-scale
Russian cheating or breakout. Russia could not achieve a sustained
numerical advantage in deployed strategic warheads through such
cheating or breakout because the United States retains the ability to
``upload'' large numbers of additional nuclear warheads on both
strategic missiles and bombers deployed under the New START treaty.
However, should there be indications of Russian cheating or
preparations to break out from the treaty, the executive branch would
view the situation as very serious and would immediately raise this
matter through diplomatic channels, and if not resolved, raise it
immediately to higher levels. We would also keep the Senate informed.
The New START treaty will provide stability and predictability
between the world's two leading nuclear powers. The United States and
Russia will be able to maintain strategic stability at lower,
verifiable strategic force levels, while also gaining insight regarding
the size and character of each other's strategic nuclear forces through
the treaty's extensive verification regime. This would not be possible
without the New START treaty. The treaty builds confidence, maintains
predictability about the strategic forces of the two parties, dampens
the incentives for worst case assessments that encourage arms racing,
helps strengthen political and military relations between the two
countries, and reinforces America's leadership in international
nonproliferation efforts, distinct from our ability to maintain a
survivable, effective second strike force as the basis of our strategic
deterrent even when faced with large-scale cheating.
21. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller, why not escape the
``Cold War mentality'' as you say, by simply issuing unilateral
commitments to reduce our respective forces rather than through a
treaty?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Both during the Cold War and since its end,
the United States and Russia have agreed to mutual, legally binding,
verifiable limits on their strategic nuclear arsenals in order to
prevent an arms race, increase transparency, and mitigate mistrust and
surprises. These agreements build trust and promote stability in the
relationship between the world's two largest nuclear powers. Unilateral
reductions would not provide the same level of predictability and
stability because there would be no obligation to make or maintain
them. Furthermore, there would be no verification regime associated
with them.
Likewise, the Moscow Treaty does not contain a verification regime
or any measures to provide confidence, transparency, and
predictability. Although the Moscow Treaty could, in principle, be
extended to retain its aggregate limits on each side's strategic
nuclear warheads, there still would be no associated verification or
transparency measures. The New START treaty is needed in order to
provide a critical framework for the strategic nuclear relationship
between the United States and Russia.
The New START treaty's verification provisions provide visibility
into Russia's strategic nuclear forces, helping to mitigate the risks
of surprises, mistrust, and miscalculations that can result from
excessive secrecy or decisions based on worst-case projections of
Russian strategic nuclear forces and their capabilities. The treaty
will give us a window into Russia's strategic forces, facilities, and
operations. The degree of transparency provided by the New START treaty
verification regime, which includes providing for the presence of each
other's inspectors at military facilities and the exchange of
confidential strategic forces data, would be difficult, if not
impossible, to achieve under nonbinding unilateral commitments to
reduce our respective forces.
22. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, in a
crisis, surely large-scale cheating would matter. If the Russians were
to double or triple their strategic forces, they could threaten to
destroy all but a few of our nuclear submarines out at sea, and then,
with the remainder of their now extensive arsenal, threaten further
retaliation if the United States dared to respond. In other words, they
would be able to deter our deterrent. How does the treaty prevent this?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. In signing the New START
treaty, Russia has made a binding commitment to keep its forces within
the treaty limits. Without a treaty, we would have significantly less
predictability regarding Russia's strategic force plans for the next 10
years. No treaty by itself could prevent the Russians from cheating or
establishing a breakout capability to increase their strategic forces
beyond treaty limits. We note that under the START and INF treaties,
the Russians did not attempt to increase their forces beyond treaty
limits; we have no reason to expect they will do so under New START.
That said, if Russia were to choose to violate the treaty's limits,
it would not be able to achieve militarily significant advantage by
cheating or breakout under New START, due to the inherent survivability
of the planned U.S. strategic force structure; particularly our SSBNs
(for which alert rates could be raised), and also alert bombers. Russia
would also have to consider that the United States may choose to launch
ICBMs under attack rather than ``ride out'' an attack. Additional
Russian warheads above the New START limits would have little or no
effect on the U.S. assured second-strike capabilities that underwrite
stable deterrence.
The administration has concluded that the United States would be
able to detect and respond to any attempt by the Russian Federation to
move beyond the limits of the treaty in a militarily significant way,
well before such an attempt would become a threat to our national
security. In order to restore numerical parity in the balance of
deployed strategic nuclear warheads and visibly strengthen its assured
second strike capability, the United States could respond to Russian
cheating in a variety of ways depending upon the international security
situation, to include:
The United States could substantially upload the
ballistic missile submarine leg of the triad with hundreds of
additional warheads and/or send additional strategic submarines
to sea on day-to-day alert status.
The United States could also choose to return a
portion of its heavy bomber force to a day-to-day alert
posture. In this posture, such heavy bombers--loaded with
nuclear armaments--would be capable of takeoff and safe escape
from their airbases within minutes after receiving tactical
warning of an imminent Russian strike, thus improving their
survivability. These bombers could then contribute
substantially to any U.S. nuclear response.
The United States could also upload additional ICBM
warheads on a portion of its deployed Minuteman III force and
could choose to redeploy a limited number of additional ICBMs
and warheads in nondeployed silo launchers.
23. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, a
significantly superior Russian nuclear arsenal could cast doubt on U.S.
nuclear security guarantees. Wouldn't you agree there are political
implications of cheating?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. We agree absolutely that
cheating would have political implications. Any cheating could affect
the sustainability of the New START treaty, the viability of future
arms control agreements, and the ability of the United States and
Russia to work together on other issues. Should there be indications of
Russian cheating or breakout from the treaty, the executive branch
would promptly raise this matter through diplomatic channels and/or the
BCC, and if not resolved, raise it to higher levels. We would also keep
the Senate informed.
24. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller, you pose a false choice
by claiming ``the choice before us is between this treaty and no treaty
governing our nuclear-security relationship with Russia, between this
treaty and no agreed verification mechanism on Russia's strategic
nuclear forces, between this treaty and no legal obligation for Russia
to maintain its strategic nuclear forces below an agreed level.'' We
did not have to accept this treaty. We could have held out for a better
treaty that included tactical nuclear weapons, stronger verification
provisions, and no constraints on missile defense and conventional
prompt global strike. Why should we ratify this treaty rather than
waiting for a better treaty?
Secretary Gottemoeller. The New START treaty is the treaty that the
U.S. and Russian presidents reached agreement on and signed in 2010. It
does not constrain the United States from deploying the most effective
missile defense possible, nor will it constrain our ability to develop
and deploy long-range conventional strike capabilities, including
prompt global strike systems.
The administration's judgment is that the New START treaty is
effectively verifiable. We have concluded that the United States would
be able to detect, and respond to, any attempt by the Russian
Federation to move beyond the limits of the treaty in a militarily
significant way, well before such an attempt could become a threat to
our national security.
We did not make limiting nonstrategic/tactical nuclear weapons an
objective for this treaty because from the outset the New START treaty
was intended to replace the START treaty, which was about strategic
offensive forces. The desire to minimize the time before a successor
agreement, including verification measures, could enter into force
following the START treaty's expiration in December 2009, combined with
the need to consult closely with our allies before addressing
reductions or limitations on nonstrategic/tactical nuclear weapons, did
not support broadening the scope of the New START treaty to address
those weapons. Deferring negotiations on nonstrategic/tactical nuclear
weapons until after a successor agreement to the START treaty had been
concluded was also the recommendation of the Perry-Schlesinger
Congressional Strategic Posture Commission.
Delays in ratifying the New START treaty would hurt U.S. national
security by denying U.S. policymakers valuable information and insights
into the strategic forces of the world's other major nuclear power. It
is important to maintain a stable strategic relationship with Russia
through the New START treaty as we pursue further reductions, including
reductions in nonstrategic/tactical nuclear weapons.
25. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller, you say you want to
change the Cold War mentality, yet Secretary Clinton suggests we need a
``treaty governing our nuclear-security relationship with Russia.'' Why
do we need a codified nuclear-security relationship with Russia if you
intend to change the Cold War mentality?
Secretary Gottemoeller. Please see the response to your question
for the record #21.
modernization
26. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, the
Perry-Schlesinger Commission was unanimously alarmed by the serious
disrepair and neglect of our nuclear weapons stockpile and complex.
Secretary Gates warned in October 2009, ``there is absolutely no way we
can maintain a credible deterrent and reduce the number of weapons in
our stockpile without either resorting to testing our stockpile or
pursuing a modernization program.'' We are the only major nuclear power
not modernizing its weapons and our weapons are an average of 26 years
old and most are 15 or more years beyond design life. Meanwhile, other
nuclear countries, including Russia, continue to modernize and replace
their nuclear weapons.
When you do the math and break out the $100 billion promised over
the next decade for modernization, we have some substantial shortfalls.
Approximately $30 billion of this total will go toward development and
acquisition of a new strategic submarine while $56 billion is required
to just maintain our current dedicated nuclear forces, leaving roughly
$14 billion--less if you factor in inflation--to develop and acquire: a
next generation bomber, a follow-on ICBM, a follow-on nuclear air-
launched cruise missile (ALCM), and develop a conventional prompt
global strike capability. We cannot get there from here.
This situation has been substantiated by our experts. Our national
lab directors, when they were in front of the Senate Armed Services
Committee on July 15, 2010, stressed the need for substantial increases
above the fiscal year 2011 budget proposal and sustained out-year
commitment. While they acknowledged that the $624 million increase in
funding for the weapons complex in the fiscal year 2011 request is a
good first step, the directors were clear that the 10-year funding
program promised by the administration may not be adequate. Are you
aware if the administration is adequately funding our nuclear
infrastructure as part of this treaty to continue with robust enough
modernization programs to ensure we maintain a qualitative technology
and capabilities gap over our peers?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. The President has pledged
that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will maintain
a safe, secure, and effective arsenal. The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review
(NPR) reflects the high priority placed by the administration on the
modernization of the nuclear weapons infrastructure and the sustainment
of the science, technology, and engineering base required to support
this goal. The President's budget proposes a substantial increase in
funding for extending the life of our nuclear weapons, rebuilding of
science, technology, and engineering capabilities, assuring that
surveillance informs the stockpile assessment and certification
responsibilities, and modernization of the nuclear weapons
infrastructure. For fiscal year 2011, we requested, and the President
supported, the funding we considered necessary and executable. The
Section 1251 report was prepared jointly by the Department of Defense
(DOD) and the Department of Energy (DOE) in response to direction in
the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010.
This report sets out a 10-year budget plan that, in addition to the
over $100 billion that the DOD will be spending over the next 10 years
for strategic delivery systems, calls for the DOE to spend $80 billion
for the National Nuclear Security Administration's (NNSA) nuclear
weapons stockpile and critical infrastructure enhancements.
The President's fiscal years 2011-2015 budget plan calls for a
``ramp-up'' in funding in order to transform the nuclear weapons
complex into a modern, efficient, capabilities-based nuclear security
enterprise. This will involve an increase over the previous budget plan
of $624 million in fiscal year 2011 ramping up to an increase of $1.64
billion in fiscal year 2015, an overall increase totaling $5.68 billion
over the fiscal years 2011-2015 period.
We plan to use fiscal years 2011 and 2012 to establish validated
baselines for four major NNSA projects called for in the NPR and by the
President. These are the B61 and W78 life extension programs and the
construction of two new material processing facilities: the Chemistry
and Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility and the Uranium
Processing Facility. While the funding requirements identified to date
represent the most complete view of our needs, these four baselines may
drive a different out-year view of requirements. Finally, as each month
passes, our understanding matures as to what is required to execute the
NPR requirements. Since the NPR was completed after the release of the
fiscal year 2011 budget request, these evolving insights into execution
requirements will inform and have an impact on the fiscal year 2012
request and NNSA's associated Future Year Nuclear Security Plan.
In summary, our out-year budgets are projections, based on the NPR
results and our best current estimates for the longer-term funding
requirement. While funding in future budget years, or target completion
schedules, may require adjustment, the administration has proposed full
and adequate funding and is committed to maintaining a safe, secure,
and effective nuclear arsenal.
27. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, how did
out-year funding plans factor into the treaty negotiations,
limitations, and goals?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. The out-year funding numbers
take into account the decisions that were made as part of the NPR. The
New START treaty limits are consistent with decisions made during the
NPR, including the requirement to modernize strategic delivery
capabilities, which is not constrained by the treaty.
The fiscal year 2011 budget request and future year program plans
reflect a decision to proceed with the SSBN(X) to replace the current
Ohio-class strategic submarines starting in the late 2020s, to sustain
Minuteman III ICBMs until 2030 as directed by Congress, and to sustain
dual-capable B-52H and B-2 bombers until at least 2035 and 2040,
respectively. The DOD is currently conducting an Analysis of
Alternatives (AoA) for the next ACLM, and will initiate study of
options for a follow-on ICBM in 2011-2012.
Finally, DOD is currently studying the appropriate long-term mix of
long-range strike capabilities, including heavy bombers as well as non-
nuclear prompt global strike systems, in follow-on analysis to the 2010
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the NPR; the results of this
ongoing work will be reflected in the Department's fiscal year 2012
budget submission.
28. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, what
decisions have been made or will be made to replace or modernize our
aging systems based on ratification of this treaty?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. DOD plans to sustain and
modernize U.S. strategic delivery capabilities, as discussed in detail
in the classified report submitted to Congress in response to section
1251 of the NDAA of 2010. To this end, over the next decade, the United
States will invest well over $100 billion to sustain existing strategic
delivery systems capabilities and modernize strategic systems.
The fiscal year 2011 budget request and future year program plans
reflect a decision to proceed with the SSBN(X) to replace the current
Ohio-class strategic submarines starting in the late 2020s, to sustain
Minuteman III ICBMs until 2030 as directed by Congress, and to sustain
dual-capable B-52H and B-2 bombers until at least 2035 and 2040,
respectively. The DOD is currently conducting an AoA for the next ACLM,
and will initiate a study of options for a follow-on ICBM in 2011-2012.
Finally, DOD is currently studying the appropriate long-term mix of
long-range strike capabilities, including heavy bombers as well as non-
nuclear prompt global strike systems, in follow-on analysis to the 2010
QDR and the NPR; the results of this ongoing work will be reflected in
the Department's fiscal year 2012 budget submission.
force structure
29. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, during
closed briefings on New START, the Senate Armed Services Committee has
been provided background, in some detail, on Russian force structure
and capabilities and U.S. force structure and capabilities. I
understand that this treaty is all being assessed in the context of
assumptions on future strategic threats and capabilities, which are not
necessarily 100 percent accurate and can create pitfalls. Therefore, it
is imperative that we take into full consideration the 2010 NPR which
concluded that ``large disparities in nuclear capabilities could raise
concerns on both sides and among U.S. allies and partners, and may not
be conducive to maintaining a stable, long-term relationship,
especially as nuclear forces are significantly reduced.'' I remain
concerned that we will ratify this treaty without having the full
appreciation of its impacts 7 years down the road. What will the U.S.
nuclear force structure look like under New START?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. DOD has developed a baseline
nuclear force structure for the New START treaty that fully supports
U.S. security requirements without requiring changes to current or
planned basing arrangements. Specifically, under baseline plans, the
administration plans to field a diversified force that meets New START
treaty limits by:
Retaining 14 Ohio-class SSBNs and deploying no more
than 240 Trident II D5 SLBMs in 12 SSBNs at any time;
Retaining up to 420 deployed Minuteman III ICBMs, each
with a single warhead; and
Retaining up to 60 nuclear-capable B-2A and B-52H
heavy bombers, while converting the remaining nuclear-capable
B-1B and some B-52H heavy bombers to conventional-only
capability.
This baseline force structure provides a basis for future planning.
The treaty affords the flexibility to make appropriate adjustments as
necessary.
30. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, how does
our force rank against likely Russian force structure, including
cheating scenarios, under New START?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. Under New START, there is
likely to be rough equivalence in U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear
forces, with both sides retaining a strategic triad of ICBMs, SLBMs
carried on nuclear-powered strategic submarines, and heavy bombers,
although there will be differences in the details of the two force
structures. Should the Russians substantially expand the number of
deployed strategic delivery vehicles and/or deployed warheads by
cheating or breakout, the United States could respond in a variety of
ways depending upon the international security situation, to include:
The United States could substantially upload the
ballistic missile submarine leg of the triad with hundreds of
additional warheads and/or send additional strategic submarines
to sea on day-to-day alert status.
The United States could also choose to return a
portion of its heavy bomber force to a day-to-day alert
posture. In this posture, such heavy bombers--loaded with
nuclear armaments--would be capable of take-off and safe escape
from their airbases within minutes after receiving tactical
warning of an imminent Russian strike, thus improving their
survivability. These bombers could then contribute
substantially to any U.S. nuclear response.
The United States could also upload additional ICBM
warheads on a portion of its deployed Minuteman III force and
could choose to redeploy a limited number of additional ICBMs
and warheads in nondeployed silo launchers.
Please see the classified National Intelligence Estimate on
monitoring the New START treaty for additional information relevant to
this question.
31. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, is
cheating harder to detect under New START than START I?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. [Deleted.]
32. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, what
decisions have been made to develop new systems to replace the current
bombers, ICBMs, SLBMs, and ALCMs that will reach the end of their
service lives in the 2030 to 2040 period?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. DOD plans to sustain and
modernize U.S. strategic delivery capabilities, as outlined in detail
in the classified report submitted to Congress in response to section
1251 of the NDAA of 2010. To this end, over the next decade, the United
States will invest well over $100 billion to sustain existing strategic
delivery systems capabilities and modernize strategic systems.
The fiscal year 2011 budget request and future year program plans
reflect a decision to proceed with the SSBN(X) to replace the current
Ohio-class strategic submarines starting in the late 2020s, to sustain
Minuteman III ICBMs until 2030 as directed by Congress, and to sustain
dual-capable B-52H and B-2 bombers until at least 2035 and 2040,
respectively. The DOD is currently conducting an AoA for the next ACLM,
and will initiate study of options for a follow-on ICBM in 2011-2012.
Finally, DOD is currently studying the appropriate long-term mix of
long-range strike capabilities, including heavy bombers as well as non-
nuclear prompt global strike systems, in follow-on analysis to the 2010
QDR and the NPR; the results of this ongoing work will be reflected in
the Department's fiscal year 2012 budget submission.
33. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, what are
the impacts of unilaterally reducing the nuclear payload on each
Minuteman III ICBM from three warheads down to a single warhead, while
Russia has not made any corresponding statement and will actually be
increasing their reliance on multiple independent reentry vehicles?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. De-MIRVing the silo-based
Minuteman III ICBM force enhances the strategic stability of the
nuclear balance by reducing the incentives of a would-be attacking side
to strike first against these high-value, fixed targets. The U.S. de-
MIRVing of ICBMs is being done unilaterally because it enhances
stability, irrespective of Russia's strategic force structure.
Limiting MIRVed ICBMs was not an objective in the New START treaty
negotiations, which focused on extending the overarching arms control
and verification architecture and permitted each Party to define its
own strategic nuclear force structure and composition. While Russia
continues to possess MIRVed, silo-based ICBMs, the Russian force's age
and smaller size led the United States to determine that it was less
important to prioritize discouraging the deployment of such systems.
This is consistent with the approach taken under the Moscow Treaty.
When the ratification process for the Moscow Treaty was underway in
2002, Secretary of State Colin Powell testified that, since neither the
United States nor Russia has any incentive to launch nuclear weapons at
each other, we no longer view the Russian deployment of MIRVed ICBMs as
destabilizing to our strategic relationship.
Instead, the New START treaty grants both parties the right to
determine for themselves the composition of their own strategic forces,
reflecting the assessment that both sides will continue to emphasize
survivable systems--including, but not limited to, MIRVed strategic
missiles located on SSBNs on the U.S. side and on both SSBNs and road-
mobile ICBMs on the Russian side--which, when deployed at sea or in the
field, do not raise the destabilizing ``use or lose'' concerns posed by
heavy MIRVed, silo-based ICBMs.
gaps in the treaty
34. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, why does
this treaty not specifically address rail-based launchers?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. The New START treaty defines
an ICBM launcher as a ``device intended or used to contain, prepare for
launch, and launch an ICBM.'' This is a broad definition intended to
cover all ICBM launchers, including rail-mobile launchers if they were
to be deployed again in the future. Rail-mobile ICBMs and their
launchers are not specifically addressed in the New START treaty
because neither the United States nor Russia currently deploys ICBMs in
that mode. Russia eliminated its rail-mobile SS-24 ICBM system under
the START treaty. The New START treaty's terms and definitions cover
all ICBMs and ICBM launchers, including a rail-mobile system should
either Party decide to develop and deploy such a system.
A rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs would meet the treaty's definition
of an ICBM launcher. Such a rail-mobile launcher would therefore be
accountable under the treaty's limits.
Because neither Party has rail-mobile ICBM launchers, the previous
definition of a rail-mobile launcher of ICBMs in the START treaty (``an
erector-launcher mechanism for launching ICBMs and the railcar or
flatcar on which it is mounted'') was not carried forward into the New
START treaty.
If a Party chose to develop and deploy rail-mobile ICBMs, such
missiles and their launchers would be subject to the treaty and its
limitations. Specific details about the application of verification
provisions would be worked out in the BCC.
35. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, what
would it take to ensure the New START addresses all current and future
launchers and delivery systems?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. The New START treaty already
provides that all current and future strategic systems that meet the
New START definitions for ICBMs and SLBMs, ICBM launchers and SLBM
launchers, and heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments will be
subject to the treaty during its lifetime. For other types of delivery
systems, Article V of the New START treaty states that when a Party
believes that a new kind of strategic offensive arm is emerging, that
Party has the right to raise the question for consideration in the BCC.
The BCC has the authority to resolve issues related to the
applicability of the provisions of the treaty to a new kind of
strategic offensive arm--if both Parties agree that the system is, in
fact, a new kind. However, U.S. negotiators made clear during the New
START treaty negotiations that we would not consider future, strategic-
range non-nuclear systems that do not otherwise meet the definitions of
systems limited under the New START treaty to be ``new kinds of
strategic offensive arms'' for the purposes of the treaty.
36. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, the
Perry-Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission report notes: ``The
combination of new warhead designs, the estimated production capability
for new nuclear warheads, and precision delivery systems such as the
Iskander short-range tactical ballistic missile, open up new
possibilities for Russian efforts to threaten to use nuclear weapons to
influence regional conflicts.'' Moreover, in March 2003, then-Senator
Biden stated, ``After entry into force of the Moscow Treaty, getting a
handle on Russian tactical nuclear weapons must be a top arms control
and nonproliferation objective of the United States Government.'' Why
does this treaty not address tactical nuclear weapons, even though
tactical nuclear weapons remain one of the most significant threats to
our national security?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. We did not make limiting
tactical nuclear weapons an objective for this agreement because from
the outset the New START treaty was intended to replace the START
treaty, which was about strategic offensive forces. The Joint
Understanding signed by President Obama and President Medvedev on July
6, 2009, directed that the United States and Russia conclude a new
legally binding agreement to replace the START treaty ``at an early
date.'' A more ambitious treaty that addressed nonstrategic/tactical
nuclear weapons would have taken much longer to complete, adding
significantly to the time before a successor agreement, including
verification measures, could enter into force following the START
treaty's expiration in December 2009. The desire to minimize the time
before a successor agreement, including verification measures, could
enter into force following the START treaty's expiration, combined with
the need to consult closely with our allies before addressing possible
limitations on and reductions in nonstrategic/tactical nuclear weapons,
did not support broadening the scope of the New START treaty to address
tactical nuclear weapons. Deferring negotiations on nonstrategic/
tactical nuclear weapons until after a successor agreement to the START
treaty had been concluded was also the recommendation of the Perry-
Schlesinger Congressional Strategic Posture Commission. Moreover,
because of their limited range and very different roles from those
played by strategic nuclear forces, the vast majority of nonstrategic/
tactical nuclear weapons do not directly influence the strategic
nuclear balance between the United States and Russia.
missile defense
37. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, the
implications of this treaty on missile defense have yet to be clarified
completely. Please explain how and why this treaty involves missile
defense.
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. The New START treaty does
not constrain the United States from deploying the most effective
missile defenses possible, nor does it add any additional cost or
inconvenience to the implementation of U.S. missile defense plans. The
New START treaty does not contain any constraints on the testing,
development, or deployment of current or planned U.S. missile defense
programs.
The preamble of the treaty contains a statement of fact
acknowledging the interrelationship of strategic offensive and
strategic defensive arms, which was also contained in the U.S.-Russian
Joint Understanding of July 6, 2009, and recognizes that this
relationship will become more important as strategic offensive arms are
reduced. The preamble also affirms that currently deployed strategic
defensive arms do not undermine the viability and effectiveness of
either Party's strategic offensive arms. These statements create no
constraints regarding future U.S. BMD programs.
Paragraph 3 of Article V of the treaty prohibits the conversion of
ICBM or SLBM launchers to missile defense launchers, as well as the
conversion of missile defense launchers to launch ICBMs or SLBMs.
Article V also ``grandfathers'' the five former ICBM silos at
Vandenberg Air Force Base that were converted for GBIs several years
ago.
The United States agreed to this provision in the treaty because it
resolves a longstanding ambiguity that arose during implementation of
the START treaty. Specifically, it ensures that our five former ICBM
test silo launchers at Vandenberg that now are used for missile defense
interceptors will not be a continuing subject of dispute with Russia
and will not count against the New START treaty's limits on nondeployed
ICBM launchers.
This provision will have no operational impact on U.S. missile
defense efforts. As Lieutenant General O'Reilly, Director of the
Missile Defense Agency, has testified, the United States has no plans
to convert additional ICBM silos to missile defense interceptor
launchers. Doing so would be more expensive than building smaller,
tailor-made GBI silos from scratch. Moreover, as Lieutenant General
O'Reilly has also stated, newly built GBI silos are easier both to
protect and maintain.
With regard to the conversion of SLBM launchers into missile
defense interceptor launchers, as Lieutenant General O'Reilly stated in
his testimony, the Missile Defense Agency had examined earlier the
concept of launching missile defense interceptors from submarines and
found it operationally unattractive and an extremely expensive option.
He added that the United States already has a very good and
significantly growing capability for sea-based missile defense on
Aegis-capable surface ships, which are not constrained by the New START
treaty.
On April 7, 2010, just prior to the signing of the New START
treaty, both the United States and the Russian Federation made
unilateral statements concerning ballistic missile defense. These
statements are not an integral part of the treaty. Russia asserted in
its unilateral statement that any build-up in U.S. missile defenses
that would ``give rise to a threat to the strategic nuclear force
potential of the Russian Federation'' would justify Russia's withdrawal
from the treaty. This statement is not legally binding and does not
constrain U.S. missile defense programs. In fact, either side has the
right to withdraw, under the terms of the treaty itself, if it decides
that extraordinary events related to the subject matter of the treaty
have jeopardized its supreme interests. Such withdrawal clauses are
common in arms control treaties.
The Russian unilateral statement in no way changes the legal rights
or obligations of the Parties under the treaty. Further, the U.S.
unilateral statement in response makes clear that the United States
intends to continue to improve and deploy the most effective missile
defense capabilities possible, in order to defend the U.S. Homeland
from limited ballistic missile attacks and to defend U.S. deployed
forces, our allies, and partners from growing regional ballistic
missile threats.
As the U.S. unilateral statement, the 2010 Ballistic Missile
Defense Review Report, and our budgetary plans all make clear, the
United States will continue to improve our missile defenses, as needed
to defend the U.S. Homeland, our deployed forces, and our allies and
partners. Nothing in the New START treaty limits our ability to do
this.
38. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, when
taken together, the treaty preamble, Russian unilateral statement, and
pronouncements by senior Russian officials suggest the Russians believe
there is a linkage between certain U.S. missile defense activities and
their adherence to the treaty. No one in the administration has been
able to explain why. The unilateral statement issued by the Russians on
missile defense, released the same day as the full agreed-upon treaty
text in Prague on April 8, 2010, states that the treaty ``can operate
and be viable only if the United States of America refrains from
developing its missile defense capabilities quantitatively or
qualitatively.'' Russia's Foreign Minister, Sergei Lavrov, stated: ``We
have not yet agreed on this [missile defense] issue and we are trying
to clarify how the agreements reached by the two presidents . . .
correlate with the actions taken unilaterally by Washington,'' and
added that the ``Obama administration had not coordinated its missile
defense plans with Russia.'' Please explain in detail what the
collection of Russian statements and actions mean for the future of
missile defense under this treaty.
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. The United States will
continue its missile defense programs and policies, as outlined in the
2010 Ballistic Missile Defense Review Report. The treaty preamble and
Russia's unilateral statement have not changed our course, as laid out
in the review, nor will they.
Russia's unilateral statement merely reflects Russia's current
position that the ``extraordinary events'' that could justify Russia's
withdrawal from the treaty include a build-up in U.S. missile defense
system capabilities that would threaten the Russian strategic nuclear
force potential. We have continuously assured Russia, however, that the
U.S. BMD system is neither designed nor intended to threaten the
strategic balance with Russia.
President Medvedev explained the Russian view regarding ``a
qualitative or quantitative build-up in the missile defense system
capabilities of the United States'' during a television interview in
April 2010 in which he said: ``That does not mean that if the United
States starts developing missile defense the treaty would automatically
be invalidated, but it does create an additional argument that binds us
and that makes it possible for us to raise the question of whether
quantitative change to missile defense systems would affect the
fundamental circumstances underlying the treaty. If we see that
developments do indeed represent a fundamental change in circumstances,
we would have to raise the issue with our American partners. But I
would not want to create the impression that any changes would be
construed as grounds for suspending a treaty that we have only just
signed.''
39. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, do you
believe that the Russians view the deployment of 10 GBIs in Poland as a
threat?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. The plan to deploy 10 GBIs
in Poland was part of the previous administration's 2007 program for
U.S. missile defense deployments in Europe. The plan was replaced by
the European PAA to U.S. missile defense deployments in Europe,
announced by President Obama on September 17, 2009, which does not
include this deployment option.
40. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, why did
the Russians voice concern about the deployment of advanced versions of
the SM-3 missiles in Europe?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. Russia has expressed concern
that the SM-3 version slated to be deployed under Phase 4 of the
European PAA, which is designed to be capable of defending against
ICBMs launched from the Middle East, could pose a threat to Russia's
strategic nuclear deterrent.
The administration has explained that U.S. missile defenses,
including those to be deployed during all phases of the European PAA,
will not pose a threat to Russia's strategic deterrent. In an effort to
address Russian concerns, we have provided, and will continue to
provide, policy and technical explanations regarding why U.S. BMD
capabilities such as those associated with the European PAA will not
undermine Russia's strategic nuclear deterrent.
41. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, do we
know what the Russians think constitutes a ``qualitative'' or
``quantitative'' improvement in U.S. missile defense capabilities that
could impact their strategic capabilities and allow them to withdrawal
from the treaty?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. We do not know what Russia
would consider to be a level of U.S. missile defense capability that
would give rise to a threat to Russia's strategic nuclear force
potential and thus could justify its withdrawal from the treaty.
However, the U.S. unilateral statement made in response to the Russian
unilateral statement makes clear that U.S. missile defense systems are
not intended to affect the strategic balance with Russia and that the
United States intends to continue improving and deploying its missile
defense capabilities in order to defend the U.S. Homeland from limited
ballistic missile attacks and to defend U.S. deployed forces, our
allies, and partners from growing regional ballistic missile threats.
At a press conference on April 6, 2010, just prior to the signing
of the treaty, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov stated that the Russian
Federation would have the right to withdraw from the treaty if a
quantitative and qualitative buildup of U.S. strategic missile defense
began to have a significant impact on the effectiveness of Russian
strategic nuclear forces, and that Russia would make such a
determination on its own.
President Medvedev explained the Russian view regarding ``a
qualitative or quantitative build-up in the missile defense system
capabilities of the United States'' during a television interview on
April 12, 2010 in which he said: ``That does not mean that if the USA
starts developing missile defense the treaty would automatically be
invalidated, but it does create an additional argument that binds us
and that makes it possible for us to raise the question of whether
quantitative change to missile defense systems would affect the
fundamental circumstances underlying the treaty. If we see that
developments do indeed represent a fundamental change in circumstances,
we would have to raise the issue with our American partners. But I
would not want to create the impression that any changes would be
construed as grounds for suspending a treaty that we have only just
signed.''
verification
42. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller, I am perplexed by your
statement describing the New START verification procedures as simple
and less costly. I remain concerned that the verification process
contained in this treaty does not ensure treaty obligations can be
monitored, and that cheating is not only discouraged but also caught,
especially in later years. My concerns were reinforced during every
hearing to this point when it was fully disclosed that the Russians
have violated every agreement we have ever had with them. Your response
to Senator McCain's questions on this topic during our hearing did
little to assuage my concerns. Why have you not provided Congress with
any information on Russian compliance or noncompliance with any of our
previous treaties?
Secretary Gottemoeller. On July 1, 2010, the administration
provided to the Senate a comprehensive report on the Adherence to and
Compliance with Arms Control Nonproliferation, and Disarmament
Agreements and Commitments. The report covered the period from January
2004 through December 2008 with an update for 2009. The Report
addressed Russian compliance with the START treaty. In April 2010, the
administration submitted its annual report on Russia's implementation
of the Moscow Treaty.
43. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, what are
the Russian violations of arms control agreements?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. [Deleted.]
44. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, what is
being done to ensure that we can catch Russian violations of
agreements?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. The New START treaty
verification regime ensures that the United States would be aware of
militarily significant violations of the treaty by Russia in time to
respond appropriately, and will also provide insights that would help
us detect troubling patterns of marginal violations.
45. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller, what is our recourse if
we determine there are violations of an arms control treaty, beyond a
statement of concern or executive-level discussion?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. Although the New START
treaty is less complex than the START treaty, different interpretations
by the Parties might arise regarding how to implement the inspection
activities and other verification provisions of the New START treaty.
Should such a situation arise, the Parties will seek to resolve their
differences in the treaty's BCC. If necessary, we would take an issue
to a higher political level to resolve.
The New START treaty verification regime ensures that the United
States would be aware of militarily significant violations of the
treaty by Russia in time to respond appropriately, and will also
provide insights that would help us detect troubling patterns of
marginal violations.
Any cheating in relation to this treaty would be deemed politically
significant, due to what such cheating would indicate regarding
Russia's intent, and its perception of U.S.-Russia bilateral relations.
The United States could respond in a variety of ways to Russian
cheating or breakout. Depending on the nature and extent of Russian
cheating or breakout, the U.S. responses could range from raising the
issue in diplomatic channels, to changing the posture of U.S. strategic
forces (e.g. by increasing alert levels), to exercising our right to
withdraw from the treaty, to increasing the size of deployed U.S.
strategic forces by uploading additional warheads on SLBMs, ICBMs, and/
or heavy bombers.
46. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, why does
the New START only have 18 inspections per year, or 180 inspections in
10 years when, during START I, we conducted on the order of 600
inspections during the 15 years of START I?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. Although it is true that the
New START treaty provides for fewer inspections in a given year--18,
rather than the annual quota of 28 permitted under the START treaty--
the number of facilities for which Russia provided site diagrams and
will therefore be subject to inspection is 35, substantially lower than
the 70 facilities belonging to the four successor states to the former
Soviet Union that were subject to inspection at entry into force of the
START treaty. There are fewer facilities primarily because Belarus,
Kazakhstan, and Ukraine no longer have strategic offensive arms and
therefore are not parties to the New START treaty, and because Russia
has eliminated or consolidated a number of facilities where strategic
offensive arms had been located and had been subject to inspection
under START. Thus, there are fewer facilities that we need to inspect,
and we need fewer inspections to achieve a comparable level of
oversight. In addition, Type One inspections combine many of the
aspects associated with two different types of inspections that were
conducted separately under the START treaty; specifically, reentry
vehicle onsite inspections and data update inspections. Thus, we can
achieve many of the results of the previous START treaty inspection
regime with a smaller number of annual inspections.
The U.S. Government assessed the number of Type One and Type Two
inspections needed annually to meet U.S. inspection objectives as the
nature of these inspection types emerged during the New START
negotiations. These assessments ultimately concluded that an annual
quota of 18 such inspections would be adequate to meet U.S. inspection
needs.
47. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, why does
New START eliminate continuous monitoring of mobile ICBM production,
reduce data exchanges and notifications, weaken telemetry exchanges to
only five flights per year, and allow the Russians to pick which ones
they share, and eliminate cooperative measures?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. The New START verification
provisions are tailored to verify the requirements of the New START
treaty, which are different from the START treaty requirements.
Continuous perimeter and portal monitoring at the Votkinsk
Production Facility began as part of the INF Treaty and was one of the
verification measures used to monitor mobile ICBM production under the
START treaty. During the last administration, the United States and
Russia agreed that neither side wanted to extend the START treaty.
Preparations for ending the monitoring at Votkinsk began in 2008 so
that the United States would be able to depart in an orderly way when
the START treaty expired on December 5, 2009.
The New START treaty contains a new, simplified provision to track
and account for new solid-fueled ICBMs and SLBMs exiting the production
facility at Votkinsk. The New START treaty specifically requires Russia
to notify the United States 48 hours in advance every time a solid-
fueled ICBM or SLBM is scheduled to leave its production facility. The
United States agreed to provide this same notification regarding the
exit of any solid-fueled ICBM or SLBM from its production facility.
Like the START treaty, the New START treaty also requires that each
side notify the other of completion of a missile's transit and of its
new location. These provisions will facilitate monitoring through
national technical means of verification. In addition, the New START
treaty requires the application of unique alpha-numeric identifiers on
all ICBMs and SLBMs as well as heavy bombers to help track and account
for them from the time they are produced until they are eventually
eliminated or converted, or otherwise removed from accountability.
Regarding on telemetry, the START treaty had limits, prohibitions,
and obligations that required the analysis of telemetric information to
ensure that a Party was complying with the treaty. Under the New START
treaty, there are no obligations, prohibitions, or limitations that
require the analysis of telemetric information in order to verify a
Party's compliance with the treaty. For instance, the treaty does not
limit the development of new types of missiles, so there is no
requirement to determine the technical characteristics of new missiles
such as their launch weight or throw-weight in order to distinguish
them from existing types.
Nevertheless, to promote transparency and predictability, the
Parties agreed to allow for the exchange of telemetric information on
an agreed equal number (up to five annually) of launches of ICBMs and
SLBMs, with the testing Party deciding the launches on which it will
exchange information. The specifics of the annual telemetry exchanges
will be worked out in the treaty's implementation body, the BCC.
Cooperative measures, under which heavy bombers or mobile launchers
of ICBMs were, upon request, placed in the open for viewing by national
technical means of verification, are not required by the New START
treaty. During the development of the New START treaty's verification
regime, the U.S. and Russia decided not to retain cooperative measures
under New START. The New START treaty's verification regime, which
includes onsite inspections, a comprehensive database, a wide range of
notifications, and unique identifiers, is designed to permit
verification of each Party's compliance with the treaty's provisions,
including the three central numerical limits contained in Article II of
the treaty.
In light of the end of the Cold War and building upon the extensive
START treaty implementation experience, the obligations and
prohibitions of the New START treaty are fewer and less complicated
than those of the START treaty. Accordingly, the verification
provisions are simpler and less costly to implement than those in
START, but will ensure effective verification of the New START treaty.
48. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, why have
short-notice verification inspections been eliminated?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. Short-notice verification
inspections have not been eliminated. The New START treaty provides for
the conduct of up to 18 short-notice, onsite inspections each year to
aid in verifying each Party's compliance with its treaty obligations.
These inspections have specific provisions to provide each Party with
18 opportunities per year to select from among declared strategic
forces facilities of the other Party to verify the accuracy of data
declarations and deter cheating.
49. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, why have
mobile launchers of ICBMs located at a maintenance facility been
designated as non-inspectable items under the New START? This seems to
me to have the potential to exempt a portion of, and even the entire,
mobile ICBM force from inspections.
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. Mobile launchers of ICBMs
located at a maintenance facility are inspectable items under the New
START treaty. If an ICBM base for mobile launchers of ICBMs is
designated by a U.S. inspection team for a Type One inspection, during
the pre-inspection briefing Russia will provide U.S. inspectors with a
site diagram of the ICBM base that will depict the locations of all
deployed and nondeployed road-mobile ICBM systems located at the base
at the time. The site diagram will also specify the boundaries of the
maintenance facility, which is an inspectable part of the ICBM base.
All deployed and nondeployed mobile ICBMs or ICBM mobile launchers
located at the maintenance facility when the inspection team arrives at
the base are subject to inspection in order to confirm the accuracy of
the data on numbers and types of declared launchers and ICBMs that were
provided to inspectors during the pre-inspection briefing.
A mobile launcher of ICBMs located at a maintenance facility may
not, however, be designated for inspection to confirm the number of
reentry vehicles emplaced on a deployed ICBM contained on such a mobile
launcher of ICBMs. This is analogous to the practice for reentry
vehicle onsite inspections under the START treaty.
50. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, why do
New START procedures regarding the elimination of delivery vehicles not
require inspectors present during final stages of elimination and only
require inspectors to observe debris of only half the missiles subject
to New START protocols?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. The standard for elimination
of strategic offensive arms under the New START treaty requires that
they be rendered inoperable, precluding their use for their original
purpose. It should be noted this is a uniform standard, applied equally
to all accountable strategic offensive arms. With regard to solid-
fueled ICBM, solid-fueled SLBM, and mobile ICBM launcher eliminations,
the ``accumulation rules'' set forth in Part Five of the Protocol
provide convenient opportunities to observe the results of significant
numbers of eliminated items during a single inspection. Unique
identifiers also will assist in accounting for eliminated ICBMs and
SLBMs.
The verifiability assessment of the New START treaty is conveyed in
the State Department's classified Section 306 report, which addresses
the determinations of the U.S. Government as to the degree to which the
limits of the New START treaty, including the elimination provisions,
can be verified. The Section 306 report was published on July 12, 2010,
and has been provided to the Senate.
deterrence
51. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, the
cornerstone of our national defense has been our ability to maintain
our nuclear arsenal in order to deter attacks on our Nation and over 30
international allies that are protected by our nuclear umbrella. I
firmly believe that deterrence reduces proliferation by their continued
reliance on our nuclear deterrent rather than to develop their own, and
deters our enemies from using weapons of mass destruction against our
country or our allies. Secretary Gates stated back in October 2008,
``As long as others have nuclear weapons, we must maintain some level
of these weapons ourselves to deter potential adversaries and to
reassure over two dozen allies and partners who rely on our nuclear
umbrella for their security, making it unnecessary for them to develop
their own.'' New START focuses on reducing the strategic nuclear
arsenals of Russia and the United States and fails to address
proliferation of nuclear weapons in other countries, the large number
of tactical nuclear weapons and the increased threat of a nuclear
terrorist attack. How does New START ensure that our nuclear
capabilities continue to offer enough deterrence against our potential
threats?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. The NPR analysis and
deliberations concluded that the limits contained in the New START
treaty would be sufficient to support our deterrence requirements,
including extended deterrence for our allies and partners, in the
current and projected international security environment. Specifically,
the NPR determined that the United States should retain a nuclear triad
and determined the appropriate number of strategic delivery vehicles
based on four requirements:
(1) supporting strategic stability through maintenance of an
assured second-strike capability that is able to meet the national
nuclear deterrence guidance;
(2) retaining sufficient force structure in each leg to allow the
ability to hedge effectively by shifting weapons capabilities from one
triad leg to another, if necessary, due to unexpected technological
problems or operational vulnerabilities;
(3) retaining a delivery capability margin above the minimum-
required nuclear force structure for the possible addition of non-
nuclear, prompt-global strike capabilities that would be accountable
within the treaty limits; and
(4) providing the basis for maintaining the needed strategic
offensive capabilities over the next several decades or more, including
retaining a sufficient cadre of trained military and civilian personnel
and adequate infrastructure to support the strategic nuclear deterrence
mission.
The NPR clearly attests to the commitment of the executive branch
to sustain an effective nuclear deterrent for the long term--and New
START preserves our ability to do so. The inclusion in the New START
treaty of the definitions of ``deployed'' and ``nondeployed'' ICBMs and
SLBMs as well as provisions for excluding conventional--only B-1B
bombers and U.S. SSGN submarines from accountability against treaty
limits, the converting of individual SLBM launch tubes on U.S. SSBNs,
and the converting of a subset of the B-52H fleet to a conventional-
only capability, all contribute to the U.S. ability to sustain a robust
nuclear triad under the New START treaty's central limits.
52. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, how does
New START protect us against the threat of nuclear terrorism and
proliferation?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. The New START treaty is just
one element of a comprehensive strategy to implement the President's
nuclear security agenda. The New START treaty mandates lower limits on
deployed strategic warheads and delivery vehicles in the U.S. and
Russian arsenals.
Our renewed focus on improving our relations with Russia, including
the negotiations on the New START treaty, has led to a greater
understanding and increased cooperation between the United States and
Russia in a number of areas, including in working toward the
President's goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear materials
worldwide. Enhanced cooperation between the United States and Russia in
the nuclear arena contributes to the positive international environment
needed to reinforce programs to secure and safeguard nuclear material
stockpiles worldwide, and to strengthen the NPT. More generally,
improved U.S.-Russian relations help in achieving critical U.S. foreign
policy objectives related to U.S. security, including efforts to
address the nuclear programs of Iran and North Korea.
The New START treaty positions the United States to continue its
international leadership role in advancing the goals of the NPT regime.
The conclusion of the New START treaty with Russia strengthened the
U.S. position during the NPT Review Conference in May 2010, and helped
aid our efforts to conclude a consensus final document, which did not
occur at the previous Review Conference in 2005. The New START treaty
set the stage for engaging other nuclear powers in fulfilling the goals
of the NPT, and expanding opportunities for enhancing strategic
stability.
Together with DOE nonproliferation programs, the Nunn-Lugar
Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program has contributed to the
upgrading of physical security systems at Russia's nuclear weapons
storage sites, as well as provided training facilities for guard
forces, equipped an emergency response force, and helped the Russian
Ministry of Defense to establish a personnel reliability program. In
tandem with the eliminations under the New START treaty, these past and
continuing efforts will support the objective of keeping nuclear
weapons and delivery systems out of the hands of terrorists.
53. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, is the
U.S. force capable of carrying out our deterrence and extended
deterrence missions now and in the future, based on Russian strategies
and development plans?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. Yes. Strategic force
analysis and deliberations that occurred during the NPR concluded that
U.S. strategic forces fielded at the limits contained in the New START
treaty would be sufficient to support U.S. deterrence requirements,
including extended deterrence for our allies and partners, in the
current and projected international security environments.
54. Senator Inhofe. Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner, how does
New START ensure that all existing nuclear weapons remain secure?
Secretary Gottemoeller and Dr. Warner. Our renewed focus on
improving our relations with Russia, including the negotiations on the
New START treaty, has led to a greater understanding and increased
cooperation between the United States and Russia in a number of areas,
including toward the President's goal of securing all vulnerable
nuclear materials worldwide. This renewed relationship is a key factor
as we work toward curbing nuclear threats around the globe. The New
START treaty demonstrates the continuing commitment of the United
States and Russia to reduce our respective nuclear arsenals consistent
with obligations under the NPT. Enhanced cooperation between the United
States and Russia in the nuclear arena will contribute to the positive
international environment needed to reinforce programs to secure and
safeguard nuclear material stockpiles worldwide, and to strengthen the
NPT.
Clearly, the responsibility for Russia's implementation of the New
START treaty and for maintaining the security of its nuclear weapons
will belong to the Government of the Russian Federation. Nevertheless,
the U.S. CTR program, in concert with the nonproliferation programs of
the DOE, has historically played a very significant role in assisting
the Russian government in securing Russian nuclear weapons and stocks
of fissile materials. The role of these programs will be, as it was
throughout the implementation of the START treaty, to incentivize the
Russian Government to continue the excellent cooperation it has had
with the United States in eliminating Russian strategic delivery
systems and in enhancing the security of its nuclear weapons storage
and transportation.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
vehicle and warhead limits
55. Senator Vitter. Dr. Warner, do you believe that the levels set
forth by the New START are enough of a deterrent to maintain the levels
of security that the U.S. currently has with its arsenal, given the
rising number of nuclear states?
Dr. Warner. Yes. The United States, and our allies and partners,
will not assume any additional security risk due to the fact that the
United States would reduce its strategic nuclear forces to comply with
the limits of the New START treaty. The 2010 NPR concluded that the
United States could sustain stable deterrence with Russia and meet its
deterrence requirements vis-a-vis other potential adversaries with
significantly fewer deployed strategic nuclear warheads and lower
limits on deployed as well as nondeployed U.S. strategic delivery
vehicles (SDVs). Mindful of the NPR analysis, the United States agreed
with the Russian Federation to limits of 1,550 strategic warheads, 700
deployed SDVs, and 800 deployed and nondeployed ICBM and SLBM launchers
and nuclear-capable heavy bombers. The United States agreed to these
limits only after DOD validated, through rigorous analysis conducted
during the NPR, that a U.S. strategic force fielded within these
limits, as defined in the treaty, could meet the full range of
objectives desired for the U.S. nuclear deterrent.
56. Senator Vitter. Dr. Warner, under the New START, the U.S. and
Russian deployment delivery vehicles are limited to 700 and nuclear
warheads to 1,550. What concessions were given, since Russia is already
below the 700 level, and they are only required to stay below these
levels?
Dr. Warner. The decision to agree to a limit of 700 deployed
strategic delivery vehicles did not result from a change in the
security environment or any concessions to the Russia side, but from an
assessment of U.S. requirements conducted in the 2010 NPR, and force
deployment options in the light of key elements of the New START treaty
that emerged in the course of the negotiations. The relevant elements
that helped make a limit of 700 deployed strategic delivery vehicles
acceptable included:
The definitional difference between deployed and
nondeployed ICBM and SLBM launchers: This will allow the United
States to count the SLBM launchers on two SSBNs, which will be
in extended overhaul during most of the treaty, as nondeployed
rather than deployed strategic delivery vehicles (SDVs).
The agreement to the right to convert individual SLBM
launchers on SSBNs: We plan to convert four tubes on each of
our 14 SSBNs in this manner so that those launchers will not be
counted against the treaty limits.
Provisions for the conversion of heavy bombers to
conventional-only capability: This provision will remove all of
the converted B-1Bs and some B-52Hs from accountability under
the treaty limits.
Once these provisions were agreed, it became clear that we could
sustain a strong nuclear triad and meet deterrence and hedging
requirements within a limit of 700 deployed ICBMs, deployed SLBMs, and
deployed heavy bombers.
57. Senator Vitter. Dr. Warner, did we concede important deployment
capabilities in order to come to the number of delivery vehicles and
warheads required by the New START?
Dr. Warner. No. The treaty allows the United States to retain and
deploy a strong nuclear triad and does not constrain important
conventional capabilities (including conventional prompt global strike)
or missile defenses. As stipulated in the report submitted with the New
START treaty pursuant to section 1251 of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010,
the United States will pursue a future force structure under the New
START treaty that will preserve adequate flexibility, including
possible accountable conventional prompt global strike systems
currently under study by DOD. In addition, NPR analysis concluded that
New START treaty strategic delivery vehicle and warhead limits will
allow retention of a margin above the minimum required nuclear force
structure for the possible addition of non-nuclear prompt global strike
capabilities--conventionally-armed ICBMs or SLBMs--that would be
accountable under the treaty.
58. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gottemoeller, do you believe that the
reductions in New START will incite other nuclear nations to increase
their arsenals to attempt to achieve parity with the United States or
Russia?
Secretary Gottemoeller. No. The only nation that could potentially
compete with the United States or Russia in the size of its nuclear
weapons arsenal is China. The New START treaty limits will permit the
United States to maintain forces well above China's. Chinese spokesmen
have stated that China does not seek to attain numerical parity with
Russia or the United States, and China's nuclear arsenal remains much
smaller than the U.S. and Russian arsenals. As a declared nuclear
weapon state under the NPT, China's restraint in its nuclear
modernization is important to nuclear disarmament and global
nonproliferation efforts. We look to China to be more transparent about
its strategic programs and to show restraint in them.
tactical nuclear weapons
59. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gottemoeller, have any of our allies
expressed any concerns to DOS about the New START and its failure to
address tactical nuclear weapons?
Secretary Gottemoeller. No. Allies have not expressed concerns with
the New START treaty. To the contrary, the response from our allies to
the conclusion of the New START treaty has been overwhelmingly
positive, with many seeing it as an important step forward in global
nonproliferation efforts. For example, on behalf of NATO allies, NATO
Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen welcomed the agreement as an
important contribution to arms control and an inspiration for further
progress.
With regard to nonstrategic/tactical nuclear weapons, during
consultations throughout the development of the 2010 NPR and since the
release of the NPR report and the signing of the New START treaty,
allies have told us they are comfortable with our planned nuclear force
posture, which is consistent with NPR recommendations and the New START
treaty. More recently, at Tallinn in their initial discussions on the
role of nuclear weapons in NATO, allied foreign ministers welcomed the
principle of including nonstrategic/tactical nuclear weapons in any
future U.S.-Russian arms control talks.
60. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gottemoeller, why were tactical
nuclear weapons not addressed in New START?
Secretary Gottemoeller. From the outset, the New START treaty was
intended to replace the START treaty, which was about strategic
offensive forces. The desire to conclude the New START treaty quickly
in light of the pending expiration of the START treaty, combined with
the need to consult closely with our allies before addressing
nonstrategic/tactical nuclear weapons, did not support broadening the
scope of the New START treaty to address tactical nuclear weapons.
Furthermore, because of their limited range and very different roles,
the vast majority of nonstrategic/tactical nuclear weapons do not
directly influence the strategic balance between the United States and
Russia. Deferring negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons until after
a START treaty successor agreement had been concluded was also the
recommendation of the Perry-Schlesinger Congressional Strategic Posture
Commission. We intend to raise strategic and nonstrategic/tactical
nuclear weapons, including nondeployed nuclear weapons, in future
nuclear arms reduction discussions with Russia.
61. Senator Vitter. Secretary Gottemoeller, according to DOS,
Russia is able to cheat on the New START. The treaty also failed to
address tactical nuclear weapons, and a new follow on treaty is needed
to address the issue of tactical nuclear weapons. If Russia is allowed
to cheat on the New START, what will deter them from doing so in a
follow-on treaty that deals with tactical nuclear weapons?
Secretary Gottemoeller. The United States would view any deliberate
effort by Russia to exceed the New START treaty's limits or circumvent
its verification regime with great concern. The United States takes
very seriously the prospect of cheating. Should the United States find
that Russia was cheating with respect to the New START treaty, the
executive branch would immediately raise this matter through diplomatic
channels, and if not resolved, raise it promptly to higher levels. We
would also keep the Senate informed. No treaty or agreement can prevent
cheating; but as was the case under the START treaty, onsite
inspections and other elements of the treaty's verification regime will
allow the Parties to confirm the declared numbers of missiles, mobile
launchers, and deployed warheads on a spot-check basis, thereby helping
to detect and deter cheating.
[Whereupon, at 11:49 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
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