[Senate Hearing 111-824]
[From the U.S. Government Printing Office]
S. Hrg. 111-824
NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW
=======================================================================
HEARING
before the
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
UNITED STATES SENATE
ONE HUNDRED ELEVENTH CONGRESS
SECOND SESSION
__________
APRIL 22, 2010
__________
Printed for the use of the Committee on Armed Services
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Available via the World Wide Web: http://www.fdsys.gov/
__________
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
63-689 PDF WASHINGTON : 2011
-----------------------------------------------------------------------
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing
Office Internet: bookstore.gpo.gov Phone: toll free (866) 512-1800; DC
area (202) 512-1800 Fax: (202) 512-2104 Mail: Stop IDCC, Washington, DC
20402-0001
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES
CARL LEVIN, Michigan, Chairman
ROBERT C. BYRD, West Virginia JOHN McCAIN, Arizona
JOSEPH I. LIEBERMAN, Connecticut JAMES M. INHOFE, Oklahoma
JACK REED, Rhode Island JEFF SESSIONS, Alabama
DANIEL K. AKAKA, Hawaii SAXBY CHAMBLISS, Georgia
BILL NELSON, Florida LINDSEY GRAHAM, South Carolina
E. BENJAMIN NELSON, Nebraska JOHN THUNE, South Dakota
EVAN BAYH, Indiana ROGER F. WICKER, Mississippi
JIM WEBB, Virginia GEORGE S. LeMIEUX, Florida
CLAIRE McCASKILL, Missouri SCOTT P. BROWN, Massachusetts
MARK UDALL, Colorado RICHARD BURR, North Carolina
KAY R. HAGAN, North Carolina DAVID VITTER, Louisiana
MARK BEGICH, Alaska SUSAN M. COLLINS, Maine
ROLAND W. BURRIS, Illinois
JEFF BINGAMAN, New Mexico
EDWARD E. KAUFMAN, Delaware
Richard D. DeBobes, Staff Director
Joseph W. Bowab, Republican Staff Director
(ii)
C O N T E N T S
__________
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Nuclear Posture Review
april 22, 2010
Page
Miller, Hon. James N., Principal Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy......................................................... 4
Chilton, Gen. Kevin P., USAF, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command.. 9
Tauscher, Hon. Ellen O., Under Secretary of State for Arms
Control and International Security............................. 13
D'Agostino, Hon. Thomas P., Administrator, National Nuclear
Security Administration, Department of Energy.................. 17
The Nuclear Posture Review Report................................ 62
(iii)
NUCLEAR POSTURE REVIEW
----------
THURSDAY, APRIL 22, 2010
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Armed Services,
Washington, DC.
The committee met, pursuant to notice, at 9:35 a.m. in room
SD-G50, Dirksen Senate Office Building, Senator Carl Levin
(chairman) presiding.
Committee members present: Senators Levin, Lieberman, Reed,
Bill Nelson, Ben Nelson, Udall, Hagan, Burris, Bingaman,
Kaufman, McCain, Sessions, Chambliss, Thune, Wicker, LeMieux,
and Collins.
Committee staff members present: Richard D. DeBobes, staff
director; and Leah C. Brewer, nominations and hearings clerk.
Majority staff members present: Madelyn R. Creedon,
counsel; and Jessica L. Kingston, research assistant.
Minority staff members present: Joseph W. Bowab, Republican
staff director; Christian D. Brose, professional staff member;
Michael V. Kostiw, professional staff member; and Daniel A.
Lerner, professional staff member.
Staff assistants present: Paul J. Hubbard, Jennifer R.
Knowles, and Christine G. Lang.
Committee members' assistants present: Christopher Griffin,
assistant to Senator Lieberman; Carolyn A. Chuhta, assistant to
Senator Reed; Greta Lundeberg, assistant to Senator Bill
Nelson; Ann Premer, assistant to Senator Ben Nelson; Patrick
Hayes, assistant to Senator Bayh; Gordon I. Peterson, assistant
to Senator Webb; Roger Pena, assistant to Senator Hagan;
Jonathan Epstein, assistant to Senator Bingaman; Halie Soifer,
assistant to Senator Kaufman; Rob Soofer, assistant to Senator
Inhofe; Lenwood Landrum and Sandra Luff, assistants to Senator
Sessions; Clyde A. Taylor IV, assistant to Senator Chambliss;
Jason Van Beek, assistant to Senator Thune; Erskine W. Wells
III, assistant to Senator Wicker; and Brian Walsh, assistant to
Senator LeMieux.
OPENING STATEMENT OF SENATOR CARL LEVIN, CHAIRMAN
Chairman Levin. Good morning, everybody.
Today, the Armed Services Committee will hear from James
Miller, Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; General
Kevin Chilton, Commander of the U.S. Strategic Command
(STRATCOM); Ellen Tauscher, Under Secretary of State for Arms
Control and International Security; and Thomas D'Agostino,
Administrator of the National Nuclear Security Administration
(NNSA). The topic this morning is the recently released Nuclear
Posture Review (NPR).
This is the third NPR since 1994, and the first to be
completely unclassified. I commend each of our witnesses this
morning for working to achieve that result. An unclassified NPR
should allow discussions on the role and the future of nuclear
weapons to be held publicly, which will help to demystify an
often technically complex subject.
As the Senate considers the New Strategic Arms Reduction
Treaty (START), an open discussion on nuclear weapons policy
will help assure the American people that ratification of this
new treaty will strengthen U.S. national security and enhance
U.S. nonproliferation goals.
There are five key objectives of the new NPR: first,
preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism; second,
reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons and U.S. national
security strategy; third, maintaining strategic deterrence and
stability at reduced nuclear force levels; fourth,
strengthening regional deterrence, and reassuring U.S. allies
and partners; and fifth, sustaining a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear arsenal.
This new NPR allows for continued reductions in deployed
nuclear weapons, and also lays the foundation for substantial
future reductions in the total nuclear weapons stockpile.
Having fewer nuclear weapons reduces the danger that these
weapons and nuclear materials might fall into the wrong hands.
Preventing proliferation and nuclear terrorism, and maintaining
a strong deterrent are all important parts of nuclear policy
and this NPR.
In addition to the commitment for modern nuclear weapons
complex needed to maintain an even smaller total stockpile,
this NPR makes other significant decisions. It will eliminate
nuclear Tomahawks and would finally implement a decision from
the 1994 NPR, to remove multiple warheads from land-based
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM). This NPR will also
change the way the United States thinks about nuclear weapons,
by reducing their role in U.S. policy. It will strengthen
nonproliferation and take a broader, more balanced approach to
deterrence. It affirms that the United States will not return
to nuclear testing, in that there is no technical need and no
military requirement for a new nuclear weapon. It also
recognizes that supporting our non-nuclear allies and partners
is an important element of regional security, and strengthens
the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT).
Some think that this NPR does not go far enough down the
road to zero, while others think the reductions are too
dramatic, and the policies are unrealistic.
These are the topics that we'll discuss and debate in the
coming months as the Senate considers the New START treaty and,
hopefully, at some not-too-distant point, the Comprehensive
Test Ban Treaty.
Just last week, this committee held a hearing on Iran,
where we discussed that government's refusal to give up its
nuclear program, in defiance of its international obligations.
North Korea withdrew from the NPT, demonstrated its nuclear
weapons capability, and fails to live up to its commitments in
the Six-Party Talks.
Intelligence assessments tell us that terrorists continue
to seek nuclear materials and technologies, and would most
likely use a nuclear device if they had one. But, with 90
percent of the world's nuclear weapons, the United States and
Russia must lead the world in the direction of zero. This NPR
is the roadmap for the United States to move in that direction,
which is not only sound policy, but one required by the NPT, to
which we're a party.
Senator McCain.
STATEMENT OF SENATOR JOHN McCAIN
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I thank our witnesses for their service to our country and
for joining us today to discuss this very important issue.
This month has seen some significant changes to our
Nation's nuclear policy. Today's hearing on the 2010 NPR is the
first of a number of important upcoming opportunities to assess
and review the current and future role of our nuclear
deterrent. I look forward to engaging with our witnesses today
and addressing some of the concerns that appear to arise from
this NPR.
This year's review appropriately reiterates the widely
acknowledged need to maintain a credible nuclear deterrent, to
pursue a sound stockpile management program, to modernize our
aging nuclear facilities, and to invest in human capital.
Unfortunately, the NPR seems to limit, inappropriately, the
ability of our nuclear complex to ensure the highest level of
safety, security, and reliability.
In their analysis of the stockpile, the bipartisan Perry-
Schlesinger Strategic Posture Commission recommended that a
full spectrum of options be available for stockpile
modernization. The Commission recommended that life-extension
programs be ``guided by the principle of finding the optimum
approach for each unique weapon.'' The NPR appears to constrain
the ability of our scientists to utilize the full range of
options by asserting that refurbishment and reuse techniques
are the methods of choice for life extension. Instead, we
should not rule out any stockpile modernization options that
are achievable, including replacement, which may be the best
option in some cases.
Another concern raised by this NPR is its change to our
Nation's longstanding nuclear declaratory policy of calculated
ambiguity, which has been embraced by past administrations on a
bipartisan basis. This declaratory policy has successfully and
effectively deterred aggressors by preserving the use of all
options in response to an attack on the United States or our
allies. The Perry-Schlesinger Commission advocated maintaining
this declaratory policy as a ``critical element for reinforcing
restraint and caution on the part of a potential aggressor.''
This administration has now overturned that policy, and I look
forward to hearing from our witnesses on why they believe that
less ambiguity, as proposed by the President, will be as, or
more, effective than the previous policy, and how this makes us
safer.
Another concern stems from the assumption made in the NPR
that the development of conventional capabilities, such as
Prompt Global Strike, will lead to the reduction of the role
that nuclear weapons play in our deterrence posture. To be
sure, conventional weapons can augment or support our
deterrence posture, but they are no substitute for nuclear
weapons. Again, I look forward to the witnesses' explanation
for why this planning assumption was made and why it's
effective.
I'm also significantly concerned that no one has yet
addressed the overall affordability of the course set out in
this NPR. The cost, alone, for modernizing both the nuclear
weapons complex and the triad is substantial; and as we move to
reduce our nuclear stockpile, this modernization effort becomes
all the more important.
Factoring in the cost of missile defense and Prompt Global
Strike, both essential and critical, but also costly programs,
the overall budget outlook becomes daunting. I look forward to
discussing the notion of affordability, both in the near-term
and the long-term, and further exploring how committed this
administration is to resourcing these costly, albeit essential,
modernization and development efforts.
Finally, I would just reiterate that the key test of our
Nation's credibility on nuclear issues is not whether, or how
much, we reduce our nuclear arsenal, but whether we meet the
nuclear proliferation threats posed by regimes like Iran and
North Korea.
I agree with the NPR's conclusion that the two primary
threats to international security are nuclear terrorism and
nuclear proliferation. Unfortunately, when it comes to Iran and
North Korea, this administration has little to show for 15
months of effort. Meeting the proliferation threats posed by
rogue states like these must be our top priority as we
determine our nuclear posture and work to shore up the global
nonproliferation regime. Otherwise, all of our efforts to
reduce our nuclear arsenal, as well as our reliance on it, will
be for naught.
I thank you, Mr. Chairman, and I thank the witnesses.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator McCain.
We'll start with Secretary Miller.
STATEMENT OF HON. JAMES N. MILLER, PRINCIPAL UNDER SECRETARY OF
DEFENSE FOR POLICY
Dr. Miller. Thank you.
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. It's
a pleasure to join my esteemed colleagues in discussing the
U.S. nuclear policy and capabilities, and to have worked with
them closely throughout the NPR.
The 2010 NPR provides a roadmap for implementing the
President's Prague agenda of reducing the role and numbers of
nuclear weapons, with the ultimate goal of a world free of
nuclear weapons. Because we recognize that this goal will not
be reached quickly, perhaps not in our lifetimes, the NPR
outlines specific steps needed to sustain a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist.
The fiscal year 2011 budget requests from the Department of
Defense (DOD), Department of Energy (DOE), and Department of
State (DOS) are important installments in this long-term
effort.
The 2010 NPR identified the most urgent nuclear dangers
today as nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism, and has
outlined a comprehensive approach to deal with these challenges
that includes policy initiatives and increased investments in a
number of areas.
As the chairman noted, more broadly, the NPR identified
five key areas and five key objectives for U.S. nuclear policy.
First, it is a top priority, preventing nuclear proliferation
and nuclear terrorism. Second, reducing the role of U.S.
nuclear weapons in our national security strategy. Third,
maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced
nuclear force levels. Fourth, strengthening regional deterrence
and reassuring U.S. allies and partners. Fifth, sustaining a
safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.
Given that the committee has received the NPR report, I
will not summarize all of its conclusions, but will focus my
remarks on declaratory policy and on the plans for nuclear and
conventional forces.
The 2010 NPR aims to make clear to other countries the
benefits of complying with the NPT, and the potential
consequences of not doing so. It strengthens the U.S. Negative
Security Assurance associated with the NPT by stating that:
``The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states that are party to the
NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation
obligations.''
A bit of historical context is useful here. The United
States first offered a Negative Security Assurance associated
with the NPT not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-
weapons states in 1978. This pledge was reiterated by
subsequent administrations in 1995 and in 2002. This NPR
includes a critical change in this assurance. Unlike previous
pledges, the revised assurance stipulates that a state must not
only be party to the NPT, but that it must be in compliance
with its nuclear nonproliferation obligations. This is a
determination that will be made by the United States.
For non-nuclear-weapon states that are in compliance with
their nuclear nonproliferation obligations, which include the
vast majority of countries in the world, the United States is
reiterating and clarifying its longstanding pledge not to use
or threaten to use nuclear weapons against them.
At the same time, the NPR is clear that if any such non-
nuclear-weapon states were to make the grave error of attacking
the United States or allies and partners with chemical or
biological weapons, it would face a devastating conventional
military response and their leadership would be held fully
accountable. This pledge is backed by the most formidable
military in the world, and the administration is committed to
not only sustaining, but strengthening, our conventional
military power.
The NPR also makes clear that states that do not meet their
nonproliferation obligations, such as North Korea and Iran, are
not covered by this Negative Security Assurance. For these
noncompliant states, and for nuclear-weapon states such as
Russia and China, U.S. nuclear weapons still play a role in
deterring, not only nuclear attack, but also conventional
chemical and biological attack against the United States, our
allies, and partners.
These clear declaratory statements strengthen our
nonproliferation efforts and reinforce our ability to deter
potential adversaries with precise and credible statements,
backed by the full strength of the U.S. military.
One of the first tasks of the NPR, which continued
throughout the review, was to define positions for the New
START treaty negotiations, including appropriate limits on
delivery vehicles and on nuclear warheads, and the DOD NPR team
reached the following conclusions:
First, the United States should retain a nuclear triad of
ICBMs, submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and dual-
capable heavy bombers under New START treaty.
Second, as the chairman noted, all U.S. ICBMs should be
deMIRVed to a single warhead each, in order to reinforce
strategic stability.
Third, an ability to upload nondeployed nuclear weapons on
delivery vehicles should be retained as a hedge against
technical or geopolitical surprise, and preference should be
given to bombers and strategic submarines over ICBMs for
upload.
The administration will provide additional details on plans
for U.S. Strategic Forces under the New START treaty soon, when
we submit a report required by Congress, under section 1251 of
the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA), associated
with submission of the treaty for advice and consent of the
Senate.
The NPR also concluded that the United States should retain
the ability to provide extended deterrence to allies and
partners.
First, we'll retain the capability to forward-deploy U.S.
nuclear weapons on tactical fighter bombers and dual-capable
heavy bombers.
Second, we propose to proceed with full scope life-
extension study and follow-on activities for the B-61 bomb, to
ensure that first production can occur in 2017.
Third, we will retire the nuclear sea-launched cruise
missile, or Tomahawk Land Attack Missile-Nuclear, as a
redundant capability.
Fourth, we'll continue our extensive consultations with
allies and partners to ensure the credibility and effectiveness
of the U.S. extended deterrence.
Fifth, decisions about the future of the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO) nuclear weapons will be made through
the NATO processes, and not unilateral decisions. That
consultative process is now underway.
I'd like to say just a couple of words about long-range
strike capabilities, and then conclude.
Today, the United States has a wide range of non-nuclear
long-range strike capabilities, including conventional-only and
dual-capable heavy bombers in both sea-launched and air-
launched conventional cruise missiles. Of these systems, only
dual-capable heavy bombers are accountable under the New START
treaty. The NPR concluded that the United States should also
develop non-nuclear Prompt Global Strike capabilities, and
should focus such capabilities on regional threats, while not
undermining strategic stability, vis-a-vis Russia and China.
Conventional Prompt Global Strike capabilities are allowed
under the New START treaty.
In closing, a key premise of the 2010 NPR was that reducing
nuclear dangers to the United States, including sustaining
effective deterrence, is a long-term challenge that will
require support from a long succession of U.S. administrations
and Congress. Laying the groundwork for a sustainable
bipartisan consensus was, and is, a central purpose of this
NPR.
I'd ask that my prepared statement be entered into the
record, and I look forward to your questions.
Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Dr. Miller follows:]
Prepared Statement by Dr. James N. Miller
Mr. Chairman, Senator McCain, distinguished members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to testify today. It is a
pleasure to join Commander of U.S. Strategic Command, General Kevin
Chilton, National Nuclear Security Administrator Thomas D'Agostino, and
Under Secretary of State Ellen Tauscher in discussing U.S. nuclear
policy and capabilities. I will focus my remarks on the recently
completed Congressionally-mandated Nuclear Posture Review ( NPR).
The 2010 NPR provides a roadmap for implementing the President's
Prague agenda of reducing the role and numbers of nuclear weapons, with
the ultimate goal of a world free of nuclear weapons. Because this goal
will not be reached quickly, perhaps not in our lifetimes, the NPR
outlines the specific steps needed to sustain a safe, secure, and
effective nuclear deterrent as long as nuclear weapons exist. The
fiscal year 2011 budget requests from the Departments of Defense and
Energy demonstrate our commitment to this essential effort.
The 2010 NPR identifies the most urgent nuclear dangers today as
proliferation and the potential for nuclear terrorism, and outlines a
comprehensive approach to cope with these challenges that includes
policy initiatives and increased investment in a number of areas. More
broadly, the NPR identifies five key objectives for U.S. nuclear policy
and posture:
1. Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism;
2. Reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in U.S. national
security strategy;
3. Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced
nuclear force levels;
4. Strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring U.S. allies
and partners; and
5. Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.
Given that the committee has received the NPR report, I will not
summarize all of its conclusions. I will focus my remarks on preventing
proliferation and nuclear terrorism, declaratory policy, and force
structure issues.
preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism
The 2010 NPR places the prevention of nuclear proliferation and
nuclear terrorism at the top of the administration's policy agenda. The
recent Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, DC, the upcoming Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference in New York, and our
continued efforts to reverse the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and
Iran are critical to this effort and to U.S. national security. The
administration has proposed significantly increased funding in fiscal
year 2011 to reduce proliferation risks, and to improve our
capabilities to detect and interdict smuggled nuclear materials or
weapons. Examples include:
Expanding funding for the Cooperative Threat Reduction
program, including an increase of $75 million in fiscal year
2011 to address nuclear security efforts worldwide;
Increasing funding in fiscal year 2011 for the
National Nuclear Security Administration's nuclear
nonproliferation programs to $2.7 billion, an increase of more
than 25 percent;
Enhancing U.S. Special Operations Command's ability to
conduct counter-WMD operations by increasing funding by $60
million in fiscal year 2011; and
Improving capabilities for national technical nuclear
forensics technologies and the fielding of new capabilities for
ground and air collection. This includes increased funding
requests for DOD and DOE.
u.s. declaratory policy
The 2010 Nuclear Posture Review makes clear the benefits to other
states of complying with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)--
and the potential consequences of not doing so. It strengthens the U.S.
``negative security assurance'' associated with the NPT, by stating
that:
The United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear
weapons against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to
the NPT and in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation
obligations.
The United States first offered a ``negative security assurance''
associated with the NPT in 1978, which was reiterated by subsequent
administrations in 1995 and 2002. This NPR provides a critical change.
The previous U.S. negative security assurance had a caveat focused on
the Warsaw Pact, stipulating that the assurance would not apply to non-
nuclear weapons states allied with a nuclear weapons state.\1\ With the
Warsaw Pact long gone, this caveat is no longer needed. In its place,
the revised assurance provided in the NPR stipulates that a state must
not only be a party to the NPT, but also that it must be in compliance
with its nuclear non-proliferation obligations--a determination that
will be made by the United States. This new policy makes clear that
signing the NPT is necessary but not sufficient: states that do not
meet their nonproliferation obligations, such as North Korea and Iran
today, are not covered by the U.S. negative security assurance.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
\1\ In 1978, at the first U.N. special session on disarmament,
Secretary of State Cyrus Vance stated: ``The United States will not use
nuclear weapons against any non-nuclear-weapon state party to the NPT
or any comparable internationally binding commitment not to acquire
nuclear explosive devices, except in the case of an attack on the
United States, its territories or armed forces, or its allies, by such
a state allied to a nuclear weapon state, or associated with a nuclear-
weapon state in carrying out or sustaining the attack.'' Similar public
statements were made by subsequent U.S. administrations in 1995 and
2002.
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Recognizing that effective deterrence is based on both credibility
and capability, the NPR makes clear that any use of chemical and
biological weapons (CBW) by non-nuclear weapons states in compliance
with their nuclear non-proliferation obligations face a highly credible
and extremely capable U.S. conventional response. It affirms that:
. . . any state eligible for the assurance that uses chemical
or biological weapons against the United States or its allies
and partners would face the prospect of a devastating
conventional military response--and that any individuals
responsible for the attack, whether national leaders or
military commanders, would be held fully accountable.
This pledge is backed by the most formidable military in the world,
and the administration is committed to not only sustaining but
strengthening our conventional military power. In addition to ongoing
investments, DOD is currently studying potential additional
improvements to long-range strike capabilities, with specific proposals
planned in the fiscal year 2012 budget request.
Given the catastrophic potential of biological weapons and the
rapid pace of bio-technology development, the NPR notes that the United
States reserves the right to make any future adjustment in declaratory
policy that may be warranted by the evolution and proliferation of the
biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to counter that threat.
For nuclear weapons states, and states not in compliance with their
non-proliferation obligations, the NPR makes clear that U.S. nuclear
weapons still play a role in deterring not only nuclear attack, but
also conventional or CBW attack against the United States or its allies
and partners. As Secretary of Gates noted recently, for states such as
North Korea and Iran, ``all options are on the table.''
Finally, to address the potential nexus of terrorists and weapons
of mass destruction, the NPR renews the U.S. commitment:
. . . to hold fully accountable any state, terrorist group,
or other non-state actor that supports or enables terrorist
efforts to obtain or use weapons of mass destruction, whether
by facilitating, financing, or providing expertise or safe
haven for such efforts.
Nuclear weapons have not been used in conflict since 1945, and it
is strongly in the interests of the United States that this nearly 65-
year record of nuclear non-use continue forever. This NPR acknowledges
the reality that the United States would use nuclear weapons only in
extreme circumstances to protect our vital interests or those of our
allies and partners.
These changes in U.S. declaratory policy reinforce our
nonproliferation efforts at a critical juncture, while simultaneously
maintaining and indeed strengthening deterrence of attacks on ourselves
or our allies and partners.
strategic force structure
One of the first tasks of the NPR, which continued throughout the
review, was to define positions for the New START treaty negotiations.
The DOD-led NPR team reached the following conclusions about U.S.
strategic nuclear force structure:
The United States should retain a nuclear Triad of
ICBMs, SLBMs, and dual-capable heavy bombers under New START
treaty, in order to preserve strategic stability and hedge
against any unexpected technical problems or operational
vulnerabilities in one leg of the Triad. The fiscal year 2011
budget request includes funding for each leg of the triad.
All U.S. ICBMs should be ``deMIRVed'' to a single
warhead each, in order to reinforce strategic stability.
An ability to ``upload'' non-deployed nuclear weapons
on delivery vehicles should be retained as a hedge against
technical or geopolitical surprise. Preference will be given to
upload capacity for bombers and strategic submarines.
The Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and General
Chilton supported New START treaty reductions in deployed warheads, and
limits on deployed as well as non-deployed strategic delivery vehicles
(SDVs). New START treaty limits were validated by rigorous analysis in
the NPR.
The administration intends to provide additional details for
strategic forces under New START treaty in the report required by
section 1251 of the 2010 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA).
This report will include a 10-year estimate of budgetary requirements
for sustaining delivery platforms, the nuclear weapons stockpile, and
the nuclear weapons complex.
nonstrategic nuclear weapons
The NPR concluded that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United
States should retain the capability to ``extend'' nuclear deterrence to
allies and security partners. Its recommendations:
Retain the capability to forward-deploy U.S. nuclear
weapons on tactical fighter-bombers and dual-capable heavy
bombers.
Proceed with full scope life extension study and
follow-on activities for the B-61 bomb to ensure first
production begins in fiscal year 2017.
Retire the nuclear sea-launched cruise missile (TLAM-
N), as a redundant capability.
Continue and expand consultations with allies and
partners to address how to ensure the credibility and
effectiveness of the U.S. extended deterrent.
Decisions about the future of NATO nuclear weapons
should be made through NATO processes, and not unilateral
decisions.
non-nuclear long-range strike capabilities
The administration is currently examining the appropriate mix of
non-nuclear long-range strike capabilities over the long-term. Today,
these capabilities include conventional-only and dual-capable heavy
bombers, and both sea-launched and air-launched conventional cruise
missiles. Of these systems, only dual-capable bombers are accountable
under New START treaty. NPR analysis concluded the United States should
develop non-nuclear Prompt Global Strike capabilities, which are
allowed under the New START treaty--and should focus such capabilities
on regional threats while not undermining strategic stability with
Russia or China.
toward a sustainable long-term approach
A key premise of the 2010 NPR was that an effective national
strategy for reducing nuclear dangers and sustaining the U.S. nuclear
deterrent are long-term challenges that will require support from a
long succession of U.S. administrations and Congresses. Laying the
groundwork for a sustainable bipartisan consensus is a central purpose
of this NPR.
Chairman Levin. All these statements will be made part of
the record.
Next, General Chilton.
STATEMENT OF GEN. KEVIN P. CHILTON, USAF, COMMANDER, U.S.
STRATEGIC COMMAND
General Chilton. Thank you, Chairman Levin, Ranking Member
McCain, and members of the committee. Thank you for the
opportunity to meet with you today. It's a pleasure to join my
distinguished colleagues here, in this panel.
STRATCOM was closely consulted throughout the development
of the NPR and during negotiations on the New START treaty, and
I look forward to discussing them with you today.
I would like to note at the outset how proud I am of the
extraordinary work that STRATCOM performed in support of both
of these efforts. We have an amazing team in Omaha, and their
diligence, expertise, and tireless work continue to ensure our
ability to deliver global security for America.
The NPR reflects a current assessment of the global
security environment, one which is markedly, but not entirely,
different from the one we faced in the Cold War. It recognizes
the need to confront global threats, including nuclear dangers,
through the twin prongs of deterrence and nonproliferation. The
NPR includes several key recommendations that will serve to
both sustain and strengthen STRATCOM's ability to conduct our
deterrence mission.
Specifically, the NPR recommends moving forward with a
number of nuclear enterprise sustainment projects, including
strengthening our nuclear command-and-control structure;
continuing development and deployment of our triad of delivery
systems; maintaining a safe, secure, and effective stockpile;
and revitalizing the NNSA's aging infrastructure.
America's triad of diverse and complementary delivery
system provides unique synergies that make our deterrent highly
credible and resilient in the face of a variety of potential
technological and geopolitical developments. The NPR endorses
DOD's efforts to explore future triad systems, specifically to
extend the Minuteman III ICBM through 2030 and conduct studies
now to inform decisions on a follow-on ICBM; to replace the
Ohio-class ballistic missile submarine at the existing ships'
end of life; and to study future long-range bomber
capabilities.
It also supports moving forward with full-rate production
for the W76-1 warhead for our submarine leg of the triad; full-
scope non-nuclear, and, importantly, nuclear, life extension of
the B-61 bomb to sustain its strategic deterrence and extended
deterrence roles; and initiating studies to develop life-
extension options for the W-78 ICBM warhead, including the
possibility of also adapting the resulting warhead for SLBMs,
and thereby reducing the number of warhead types.
Additionally, the NPR and the President's budget recognize
the need to improve the Nation's nuclear infrastructure and
address the challenges of human capital recruitment,
development, and sustainment. These investments are required in
order to confidently reduce the overall U.S. stockpile while
sustaining the credibility of our nuclear stockpile, which is
absolutely fundamental to nuclear deterrence.
Investments that revitalize the NNSA's aging infrastructure
and intellectual capital strengthen our security with the
facilities and the people needed to address technological
surprises, geopolitical changes, and a range of cutting-edge
national security challenges. The administration's request for
a 13 percent increase in NNSA funding for fiscal year 2011 is
an essential first step in this process.
With regard to the New START treaty, the nuclear enterprise
remains, today and for the foreseeable future, the foundation
of U.S. deterrence strategy and defense posture. As the
combatant command responsible for executing strategic
deterrence operations, planning for nuclear operations, and
advocating for nuclear capabilities, at STRATCOM we are keenly
aware of how force posture and readiness changes can affect
deterrence, assurance, and overall strategic stability. The New
START treaty agreement, in my view, retains the military
flexibility necessary to ensure each of these for the period of
the treaty.
In support of the New START treaty negotiation effort,
STRATCOM analyzed the required nuclear weapons and delivery
vehicle force structure and posture to meet current guidance,
and provided options for considerations by DOD. This rigorous
approach, rooted in both deterrence strategy and assessment of
potential adversary capabilities, supports both the agreed-upon
reductions in the New START treaty and recommendations in the
NPR.
In closing, every day STRATCOM remains focused on providing
the President, and future presidents, with the options and
flexibility needed for deterrence. Today, our deterrent is
safe, secure, and effective; our forces are trained and ready;
and STRATCOM is faithfully and fully carrying out its mission,
each and every day. I am confident that the NPR and New START
treaty outline an approach that continues to enable the men and
women of STRATCOM to deliver global security for America, today
and in the future.
Thank you again for the opportunity to testify before this
committee, and I look forward to your questions.
[The prepared statement of General Chilton follows:]
Prepared Statement by Gen. Kevin P. Chilton, USAF
introduction
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and members of the
committee, thank you for the opportunity to meet with you today. U.S.
Strategic Command (STRATCOM) was closely consulted throughout the
development of the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) and during negotiations
on the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), and I look forward
to discussing them with you today. I would like to note at the outset
how proud I am of the extraordinary work the Command performed in
support of these efforts. We have an amazing team, and their diligence,
expertise, and tireless work continue to ensure our ability to deliver
global security for America.
nuclear posture review
The NPR reflects a current assessment of the global security
environment, one which is markedly, but not entirely, different than
the one we faced in the Cold War. It recognizes the need to confront
global threats, including nuclear dangers, through the twin prongs of
deterrence and nonproliferation. The NPR includes several key
recommendations that will serve to both sustain and strengthen
STRATCOM's ability to conduct our deterrence mission
Specifically, the NPR recommends moving forward with a number of
nuclear enterprise sustainment projects, including strengthening our
nuclear command and control structure; continuing development and
deployment of our triad of delivery systems; maintaining a safe,
secure, and effective stockpile; and revitalizing the National Nuclear
Security Administration's aging infrastructure. America's triad of
diverse and complementary delivery systems provides unique synergies
that make our deterrent highly credible and resilient in the face of a
variety of potential technological and geopolitical developments. The
NPR endorses DOD efforts to explore future triad systems, specifically
to extend the Minuteman III ICBM through 2030 and conduct studies now
to inform decisions on a follow-on ICBM; to replace the Ohio-class SSBN
at the existing ships' end of life; and to study future long-range
bomber capabilities. It also supports moving forward with full-rate
production for the W76-1 warhead for our submarine leg of the triad;
full-scope (nuclear and non-nuclear) life extension of the B61 bomb to
sustain its strategic deterrence and extended deterrence roles; and
initiating studies to develop life extension options for the W78 ICBM
warhead, including the possibility of also adapting the resulting
warhead for sea launched ballistic missiles and thereby reducing the
number of warhead types.
Additionally, the NPR and the President's Budget recognize the need
to improve the Nation's nuclear infrastructure and address the
challenges of human capital recruitment, development, and sustainment.
These investments are required in order to confidently reduce the
overall U.S. stockpile while sustaining the credibility of our nuclear
stockpile, which is fundamental to effective deterrence. Investments
that revitalize NNSA's aging infrastructure and intellectual capital
strengthen our security with the facilities and people needed to
address technological surprises, geopolitical change, and a range of
cutting-edge national security challenges. The administration's request
for a 13 percent increase in NNSA funding for fiscal year 2011 is an
important first step in this process.
new start treaty
The nuclear enterprise remains, today and for the foreseeable
future, the foundation of U.S. deterrence strategy and defense posture.
As the combatant command responsible for executing strategic deterrence
operations, planning for nuclear operations, and advocating for nuclear
capabilities, we are keenly aware of how force posture and readiness
changes can affect deterrence, assurance, and overall strategic
stability. The New START treaty agreement, in my view, retains the
military flexibility necessary to ensure each of these for the period
of the treaty.
In support of the New START treaty negotiation effort, STRATCOM
analyzed the required nuclear weapons and delivery vehicle force
structure and posture to meet current guidance, and provided options
for consideration by DOD. This rigorous approach, rooted in both
deterrence strategy and assessment of potential adversary capabilities,
supports both the agreed-upon reductions in New START treaty and
recommendations in the NPR.
assessment
In Prague last year, President Obama emphasized that, ``As long as
these weapons exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure,
and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that
defense to our allies . . . `` Meeting these demanding goals means that
a strong and enduring deterrence enterprise remains indispensable to
U.S. and international security. Accordingly, STRATCOM's contributions
to both the NPR and New START treaty focused on ensuring America's
ability to continue to deter potential adversaries, assure our allies,
and sustain strategic stability for as long as nuclear weapons exist.
Based on our analysis and through continued discussions with Department
of Defense leadership, my view is that these documents and associated
budgetary investments continue to support these deterrence
requirements, and that the New START treaty agreement warhead and
platform numbers provide appropriate military flexibility.
Finally, to ensure all necessary elements of a safe, secure, and
reliable deterrence enterprise, including weapons, delivery systems,
warning and communications capabilities, and their supporting human
capital and technological infrastructures, we must make sustained
investments to adequately preserve our capabilities for the foreseeable
future. In order to sustain the deterrent and implement the NPR, we
must make long-term investments that begin with several increases
outlined in the President's fiscal year 2011 budget. These investments
are not only important--they are essential.
closing
Every day, STRATCOM remains focused on providing the President and
future presidents with the options and flexibility needed to deter and
respond to threats to our Nation and its allies. Today, our deterrent
is safe, secure, and effective; our forces are trained and ready; and
the Command is faithfully and fully carrying out its mission each and
every day. I am confident that the NPR and New START treaty outline an
approach that continues to enable the men and women of STRATCOM to
deliver global security for America today and in the future. Thank you
again for the opportunity to testify before this committee.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, General Chilton.
Secretary Tauscher, it's always great to see you back in a
congressional setting. It just warms my heart to see you here,
and we hope you're happy in your relatively new home. I suppose
it's not so new anymore to you.
Ms. Tauscher. Well, it's been almost a year, Senator. But,
thank you very much, Chairman Levin. It's an honor to be back
here.
Chairman Levin. Secretary Tauscher.
STATEMENT OF HON. ELLEN O. TAUSCHER, UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR ARMS CONTROL AND INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
Ms. Tauscher. Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and
distinguished members of the Senate Armed Services Committee,
thank you for the opportunity to discuss DOS's role in
protecting the United States and our allies from today's most
pressing threats. I am honored to appear today with my
distinguished colleagues.
Last year, President Obama outlined several steps to
strengthen our national security by reducing the role and
numbers of nuclear weapons. In the past months we have advanced
that agenda by releasing the NPR, signing the New START treaty,
and hosting the Nuclear Security Summit. Let me say a few words
about the New START treaty and missile defenses.
I spent much of March in Geneva, to help conclude the New
START treaty. It will enhance our security by reducing and
limiting the U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces. Those
limits were guided by rigorous analysis in the NPR.
The new treaty will promote strategic stability by ensuring
transparency and predictability. It will advance our
nonproliferation agenda by demonstrating that we are meeting
our NPT obligations.
The New START treaty does not constrain U.S. missile
defense programs. The United States will continue to improve
our missile defenses, as needed, to defend the U.S. Homeland,
our deployed forces, and our allies and partners.
Russia's unilateral statement on missile defense is not
legally binding. It won't constrain U.S. missile defense
programs. As the administration's Ballistic Missile Defense
(BMD) Review and our budget plans make clear, we will deploy
the most effective missile defense systems possible, and the
New START treaty does not impose any additional cost or
inconvenience to those efforts.
At this time, Mr. Chairman, I would ask permission to
submit, for the record, the U.S. and Russian unilateral
statements on missile defenses associated with the New START
treaty.
Chairman Levin. That will be made part of the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, sir.
In addition to reaffirming our commitment to missile
defenses, the NPR also supports the goal of bolstering
nonproliferation. We want to give more incentive to non-nuclear
states not to seek or acquire nuclear weapons. So, we updated
our Negative Security Assurance to make it clear that non-
nuclear-weapon state parties to the NPT who comply with their
nuclear nonproliferation obligations, do not have to fear a
U.S. nuclear attack.
I want to clarify what this new Negative Security Assurance
does, and does not, do. For non-nuclear-weapon states to the
NPT, in compliance with their nuclear nonproliferation
commitments, we are removing only the possibility of nuclear
retaliation. For such states, we retain the prospect of using
devastating conventional force to deter and respond to any
aggression, especially if they were to use chemical or
biological weapons. No one should doubt our resolve to hold
accountable those responsible for such aggression, whether
those giving the orders or carrying them out.
Deterrence depends on the credibility of response. A
massive and potential conventional response to non-nuclear
aggression is highly credible. We also reserve the right to
readjust the Negative Security Assurance, if warranted, by the
evolution and proliferation of biological weapons and their
threat. The updated Negative Security Assurance does not alter
our current policy on the use of nuclear weapons toward
nuclear-armed states or non-nuclear-weapon states not in
compliance with the NPT and their nuclear nonproliferation
obligations, such as North Korea and Iran. In other words, for
this group of states, we have retained calculated ambiguity.
But, I want to stress that the NPR states that the United
States would only consider the use of nuclear weapons in
extreme circumstances to defend the vital interests of the
United States or its allies and partners.
Nuclear weapons have not been used in nearly 65 years. The
bar for their use is high, and this NPR recognizes that fact.
It is in the U.S. interest, and that of all other nations, that
the long record of nuclear non-use be extended forever.
Let me close by noting that former Secretaries of Defense
William Perry and Jim Schlesinger, the leaders of the
Bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission, wrote, recently, that
the NPR approach on declaratory policy was sensible. They
concluded that the NPR provides a comprehensive and pragmatic
plan for reducing nuclear risk to the United States.
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member McCain, I look forward to
working with this committee and the Senate on these important
matters, and I look forward to answering any questions you
might have.
[The prepared statement of Ms. Tauscher follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Ellen O. Tauscher
Chairman Levin, Ranking Member McCain, and distinguished members of
the Senate Armed Services Committee, thank you for the opportunity to
discuss the State Department's shared role in protecting the United
States and our allies from today's most pressing threats. I am honored
to appear with my colleagues Jim Miller, Tom D'Agostino, and General
Chilton.
President Obama outlined several concrete steps last year in a
speech in Prague to strengthen our national security by reducing the
role and numbers of nuclear weapons.
In the past few weeks, the Obama administration has advanced some
of those goals even as we reaffirm our commitment to maintain a safe,
secure, and effective deterrent to protect the United States and our
allies so long as nuclear weapons exist.
Last week, the President brought together 46 world leaders to
advance his goal of securing all vulnerable nuclear material over the
next 4 years. At the Nuclear Security Summit, President Obama worked
with allies and partners to help secure vulnerable nuclear material and
prevent nuclear smuggling.
Earlier this month, President Obama and President Medvedev signed
the New START treaty, which upon entry into force will make verifiable
and mutual cuts in the U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear arsenals.
Finally, the Obama administration issued the Nuclear Posture
Review, which we are going to discuss today.
This review constitutes a clear break from past reviews, both in
terms of process and scope. The administration took a broad, whole-of-
government approach to addressing our nuclear policy and identifying
concrete steps to enhance our national security.
The Department of Defense led the Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), but
for the first time the Department of State fully participated in
discussing the issues and making recommendations to the President.
For the first time, the NPR is an unclassified document. There is
no classified version.
I want to address the diplomatic implications of the Nuclear
Posture Review as well as the rationale behind some of the most
discussed issues, including the updated Negative Security Assurance.
But I first want to say a few words about the New START treaty and how
it relates to the NPR.
The United States and Russia can safely reduce our nuclear forces
because the threat environment has changed. The relationship between
the United States and Russia has improved and today's most pressing
nuclear threats come from terrorists and additional countries seeking
nuclear weapons. A large-scale nuclear attack is no longer the most
pressing threat. The conclusions of our recent NPR reflect that
reality.
I spent much of March at the table in Geneva to help conclude the
New START treaty. It will improve U.S. and international security by
reducing and limiting U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces. It
will promote strategic stability by ensuring transparency and
predictability regarding U.S. and Russian strategic nuclear forces over
the life of the Treaty. It will advance our nuclear nonproliferation
agenda.
The U.S. push for meaningful, lower limits on deployed warheads and
their delivery vehicles and launchers was guided by rigorous analysis
in the early months of the NPR. The Treaty's verification regime will
provide each side confidence that the other is upholding its
obligations. The new Treaty gives our military the flexibility to
structure, deploy, and maintain our forces in ways that best meet U.S.
national security interests.
The Treaty does not constrain U.S. missile defense programs or
long-range conventional strike capabilities.
The United States will continue to improve our missile defenses, as
needed, to defend the U.S. homeland, our deployed forces, and our
allies and partners. Russia's unilateral statement on missile defense
is not an integral part of the New START treaty. It's not legally
binding. It won't constrain U.S. missile defense programs. As the
administration's Ballistic Missile Defense Review and our budget plans
make clear, we will deploy the most effective missile defenses
possible, and the New START treaty does not impose any additional cost
or inconvenience to those efforts.
Of course, under the new Treaty, the United States will continue to
maintain a safe, secure, and effective strategic nuclear force to
protect ourselves and our allies and partners.
The President also set forth a goal to bolster our nonproliferation
efforts and the NPR identifies many of the steps this administration is
taking and will pursue to achieve that objective. One of the ways to do
that is to show non-nuclear weapon states that there are security
benefits to complying with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT)
and other nonproliferation obligations.
We want to reinforce and enhance the global nonproliferation regime
and to give greater incentives to non-nuclear states not to seek or
acquire nuclear weapons. To do this, we have updated our Negative
Security Assurance to make it clear that non-nuclear weapon states
party to the NPT who abide by their nuclear nonproliferation
obligations do not have to fear a nuclear attack from the United
States.
Some have suggested that the new policy might lead some states to
be less fearful of the consequences of using chemical and biological
weapons against us.
Others have alleged that the new policy takes options off of the
table to deal with states like Iran or North Korea, as well as nuclear-
armed states.
Let me address both starting with the first critique. For non-
nuclear-weapon states-parties to the NPT in compliance with their
nuclear nonproliferation commitments, we are removing only the
possibility of nuclear retaliation. We retain the option and
willingness to use devastating conventional force to deter and respond
to any aggression, especially with chemical or biological weapons,
against the United States, our forces, or our allies and partners by
such states.
No one should doubt the resolve and conventional military
capabilities of the United States to respond to such aggression with
devastating effect and to hold accountable those responsible whether
national leaders giving the orders or military officers carrying them
out. Deterrence depends on the credibility of a possible response. A
massive and potent U.S. conventional response to such non-nuclear
aggression is highly credible. By reducing unnecessary ambiguity in our
declaratory policy, we lose little if nothing in terms of our
capabilities or our deterrent posture, and gain a critical tool in
pursuing a more robust and effective nonproliferation system.
Furthermore, we prudently reserve the right to readjust the
Negative Security Assurance if warranted by the future evolution and
proliferation of the biological weapons threat and U.S. capacities to
counter that threat.
Second, the updated Negative Security Assurance does not alter our
current policy on the use of nuclear weapons toward nuclear-armed
states or states not party to the NPT or not in compliance with their
nuclear nonproliferation obligations, such as North Korea and Iran. In
other words, for this group of states, we have left all options on the
table.
I want to stress that our updated assurance does not suggest an
increased threat of using nuclear weapons against countries not covered
by this pledge. In the NPR, we state the United States would only
consider the use of nuclear weapons in extreme circumstances to defend
the vital interests of the United States or its allies and partners.
Nevertheless, there remains a narrow range of contingencies in
which U.S. nuclear weapons may still play a role in deterring a
conventional, chemical, or biological attack against the United States
or its allies and partners. We therefore are not prepared to adopt a
policy declaring that the ``sole purpose'' of nuclear weapons is to
deter nuclear attack. But we will work toward creating the conditions
that would enable such a policy to be safely adopted. There is no
timetable for such a step and, as President Obama has said, while we
move forward on our vision of a world without nuclear weapons, we must
confront the world as it is.
Nuclear weapons have not been used in nearly 65 years. The bar for
their use is high and this NPR recognizes and seeks to reinforce that
fact. It is in the U.S. interest and that of all other nations that the
long record of nuclear non-use be extended forever.
Let me close on this issue of declaratory policy by noting that
former Secretaries of Defense William Perry and Jim Schlesinger, the
leaders of the bipartisan Strategic Posture Commission, said the NPR
approach was ``a sensible variation on a theme that the United States
should support nonproliferation while preserving deterrence for itself
and its allies.''
In general, they noted that the NPR was ``compatible'' with their
commission's recommendations and that the review provides a
``comprehensive and pragmatic plan for reducing nuclear risks to the
United States.''
Our commitment to defend our national security interests and our
allies and partners in Europe, the Pacific and elsewhere has never been
stronger.
In this regard, the NPR reaffirms the principle of close
cooperation with our allies around the world and maintains our firm
commitment to mutual security.
We will work with our partners to reinforce regional security
architectures, such as missile defenses and other conventional military
capabilities.
I want to repeat what I said earlier, the United States will
continue to maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent
for ourselves and our allies so long as these weapons exist anywhere in
the world.
Mr. Chairman and Ranking Member McCain, I look forward to working
with this committee and the Senate on these important matters.
Thank you for holding this important hearing and I look forward to
any questions you might have for me.
Chairman Levin. Thank you so much, Secretary Tauscher.
Now, Administrator D'Agostino.
STATEMENT OF HON. THOMAS P. D'AGOSTINO, ADMINISTRATOR, NATIONAL
NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
Mr. D'Agostino. Thank you, Mr. Chairman, and members of the
committee.
I'm very pleased to appear before you today with such a
distinguished panel as my colleagues here, General Chilton, the
Honorable Ellen Tauscher, and Dr. Jim Miller. My remarks will
focus on the DOE's equities included in the NPR.
NNSA is actively engaged in direct support of the first NPR
objective, preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear
terrorism. The most important steps we can take to keep
terrorists from developing and using an improvised nuclear
device or radiological ``dirty bomb'' is to prevent them from
acquiring nuclear material. This job is not new to the NNSA. We
have led this effort, over several years, and now we are
accelerating and broadening the scope of these efforts.
Current NNSA programs include securing nuclear materials,
technology, and expertise, including the most vulnerable
nuclear materials worldwide within 4 years; disposing of excess
U.S. and international fissile materials; strengthening the
international safeguard system by developing new safeguards,
technologies, expertise, policies, concepts, and partnerships;
developing an active nuclear and radiological security dialogue
and cooperation with key domestic and international partners;
and developing highly sensitive and wide-area nuclear material
detection technologies.
The NNSA is also actively engaged in direct support of the
fifth NPR objective: sustaining a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear arsenal. For more than 65 years, our program has been
able to do just that; assure the Nation that the nuclear
weapons stockpile is safe, secure, and effective, and meeting
the nuclear deterrent needs of the United States.
To that end, the United States will not conduct underground
nuclear testing; we will not develop new nuclear warheads for
new missions; we will study options for ensuring the safety,
security, and effectiveness of the nuclear warheads, on a case-
by-case basis.
Applying these principles, the NNSA will fully fund the
ongoing life-extension program for the W76 submarine-based
warhead, and the full-scope life-extension study and follow-on
activities for the B-61 bomb. We will participate with the
Nuclear Weapons Council, as well, on a new study of life-
extension options for the W-78 ICBM warhead.
The NPR also concluded that the NNSA needed to recapitalize
the aging infrastructure and to renew our human capital: the
critical cadre of scientific, technical, and engineering
experts who carry out our stockpile management work and support
other vital nuclear security missions. To that end, the NNSA
will strengthen the science, technology, and engineering base,
including supporting computational and experimental
capabilities needed for weapon-system life extensions, the
weapon surety work, certification without nuclear testing, and
providing annual stockpile weapon surveillance.
The NNSA will also fund two key research--or, two key
facility projects, the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Replacement Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory, for work
on plutonium to replace the existing 58-year-old facility, and
a Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-12 Plant in Oak Ridge,
TN.
The NPR also sustains the strategic triad. This drives the
recent DOD decision to recapitalize the sea-based strategic
deterrent. The Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, the
most survivable leg of our Nation's deterrent, are reaching the
end of their operational life. In support of the NPR, the Naval
Reactors Program will continue reactor plant design and
development efforts for the procurement of long-lead reactor
plant components, in support of Navy procurement of the first
Ohio-class submarine replacement.
Responsible stockpile management requires not only the
supporting infrastructure, but also a highly capable workforce
with the specialized skills needed to sustain the deterrent and
to support the President's nuclear security agenda.
The NPR noted the importance of recruiting and retaining
the human capital needed in the NNSA for the nuclear security
missions. In order to succeed in these missions, we need to be
able to recruit and retain the next generation of nuclear
security professionals, because our highly specialized
workforce is our greatest asset.
The President has now clearly outlined the importance of
nuclear issues for our national security and of keeping the
U.S. nuclear deterrent safe, secure, and effective for the
foreseeable future. The administration's commitment to a clear
and long-term plan for managing the stockpile, and its
comprehensive nuclear security agenda, ensures the scientists
and engineers of tomorrow will have the opportunity to engage
in challenging research and development activities.
I want to share with the committee a statement from our
national laboratory directors that provides their view on the
NPR. The directors universally state that:
``We believe the approach outlined in the NPR, which
excludes further nuclear testing and includes the
consideration of the full range of life-extension
options, provides the necessary technical flexibility
to manage the nuclear stockpile into the future with an
acceptable level of risk. We are reassured that a key
component of the NPR is the recognition of the
importance of supporting a modern physical
infrastructure comprised of the national security
laboratories, and a complex of supporting facilities,
and a highly capable workforce.''
This NPR is an important step towards adopting a 21st
century approach to nuclear weapons and a broader array of
nuclear security issues. This path forward will require a long-
term commitment to provide the support and the resources
necessary to sustain our deterrent and enable future arms
reductions.
Finally, our approach towards maintaining the stockpile
described in the NPR is wholly consistent with, and was
informed by, the Stockpile Management Program principles passed
into law through the 2010 NDAA.
With the committee's endorsement, the nuclear security
enterprise will have the science, technology, and engineering
expertise to manage the stockpile and to also carry out the
full range of nuclear security missions, which include nuclear
nonproliferation, nuclear counterterrorism, and nuclear
forensics, among other activities.
Secretary Chu recently stated that DOE must discover and
deliver those solutions to advance our national priorities. The
NNSA and our nuclear security enterprise are poised to provide
these solutions.
I'll be pleased to respond to your questions. Thank you.
[The prepared statement of Mr. D'Agostino follows:]
Prepared Statement by Hon. Thomas P. D'Agostino
Thank you Mr. Chairman and members of the committee. I am pleased
to appear before you to discuss the Department of Energy's (DOE) key
elements included in the administration's Nuclear Posture Review,
released on April 6, 2010.
The Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) reaffirms President Obama's
commitment to providing DOE and its National Nuclear Security
Administration (NNSA) the resources required to support the President's
nuclear security agenda and maintain the safety, security and
effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear deterrent without underground
testing. The NPR reflects the fact that protecting our Nation's nuclear
security is an enduring Government-wide responsibility. I am proud of
the role the DOE played in what was the first, truly interagency NPR in
our Nation's history.
The NPR lays out five key objectives that provide a comprehensive
path forward for implementing the President's nuclear security agenda
for reducing nuclear dangers and pursuing the peace and security of a
world without nuclear weapons. The five objectives are:
1. Preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear terrorism;
2. Reducing the role of nuclear weapons;
3. Maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at reduced
nuclear force levels;
4. Strengthening regional deterrence and reassurance of U.S.
allies and partners; and,
5. Sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal.
preventing nuclear proliferation and terrorism
DOE and the NNSA are actively engaged in direct support of the
first objective, ``preventing nuclear proliferation and nuclear
terrorism.'' The Department's fiscal year 2011 budget request includes
a nearly 26 percent increase in funding for NNSA's nuclear
nonproliferation programs. These programs encompass the first line of
defense, second line of defense, and additional programs aimed at
securing vulnerable nuclear materials within 4 years and providing key
technical support to prevent proliferation in other nuclear arenas. The
most important thing that can be done to keep terrorists from
developing and using an improvised nuclear device or a radiological
dispersion device (an RDD or a so-called ``dirty bomb'') is to prevent
them from acquiring nuclear material. The NNSA is accelerating and
broadening the scope of its efforts to improve the security of nuclear
materials in the United States and globally to achieve the President's
priorities first articulated in Prague. Current NNSA programs include:
Securing nuclear materials, technology, and expertise,
including the most vulnerable nuclear materials, worldwide
within 4 years and disposition of excess U.S. and international
fissile materials;
Working with the Office of Nuclear Energy to support
the development of a new framework for peaceful nuclear energy
to promote civil nuclear power and nonproliferation objectives;
Strengthening the international safeguards system by
developing new safeguards technologies, expertise, policies,
concepts, and partnerships;
Developing an active nuclear and radiological security
dialog and cooperation with key domestic and international
partners; and,
Developing highly sensitive and wide-area nuclear
materials detection technology.
NNSA programs are also supporting the President's arms control and
nonproliferation agenda by using the technical capabilities within the
Nuclear Security Enterprise to demonstrate the technical ability to
support, monitor, and comply with the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban
Treaty (CTBT), the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty, and any follow-on
arms control requirements.
managing the u.s. nuclear stockpile
DOE and NNSA are also actively engaged in direct support of the
fifth NPR objective, ``sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
arsenal.''
The need to maintain the safety, security and effectiveness of an
aging stockpile without resuming nuclear testing has been a bipartisan
national policy for nearly 20 years under both Democratic and
Republican administrations. As the President said in Prague, we will
sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal as long as
nuclear weapons exist.
This NPR reflects that commitment and our budget request, if
approved, would provide the resources required to make that possible.
The NPR is based on several key principles that will guide future U.S.
decisions on stockpile management.
The United States will not conduct nuclear testing,
and will seek ratification and entry into force of the CTBT.
The United States will not develop new nuclear
warheads. The NPR makes clear that the United States will only
use nuclear components based on previously tested designs, and
will not pursue new military missions or provide for new
military capabilities for our stockpile.
The United States will study options for ensuring the
safety, security, and effectiveness of nuclear warheads on a
case-by-case basis, consistent with the congressionally-
mandated Stockpile Management Program. The full range of life
extension program (LEP) approaches will be considered:
refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components
from different warheads, and replacement of nuclear components.
Finally, in any decision to proceed to engineering
development for warhead LEPs, the United States will give
strong preference to options for refurbishment or reuse. The
NPR makes clear that replacement of nuclear components would be
undertaken only if critical Stockpile Management Program goals
could not otherwise be met, and if specifically authorized by
the President and approved by Congress.
Using these principles, the United States will extend the life of
nuclear warheads required for the smaller force structure identified
under the follow-on START agreement. Consistent with this approach, the
NPR recommended that:
The administration fully fund the ongoing LEP for the
W76 submarine-based warhead for a 2017 completion, and the full
scope LEP study and follow-on activities for the B61 bomb to
ensure first production begins in 2017.
The Nuclear Weapons Council initiate a study in 2010
of LEP options for the W78 ICBM warhead to be conducted jointly
by the NNSA and the Department of Defense (DOD). This study
will consider, as all future LEP studies will, the possibility
of using the resulting warhead also on multiple platforms in
order to reduce the number of warhead types.
The NNSA, in close coordination with the DoD, will provide a new
stockpile stewardship and management plan to Congress, consistent with
the increases in infrastructure investment requested in the President's
fiscal year 2011 budget request. A more robust and modernized
infrastructure will enable the United States to shift away from
retaining large numbers of nondeployed warheads as a technical hedge,
allowing additional reductions in the U.S. stockpile of nondeployed
nuclear weapons.
This consolidated approach will ensure high confidence in the
technical performance of warheads retained in the stockpile. It will
guarantee that their safety and security are aligned with 21st century
requirements (and technical capabilities). This approach sets a high
standard for the safety and security of U.S. nuclear weapons and, in
support of nonproliferation goals, positions the United States to
encourage other nations to maintain the highest levels of surety for
their nuclear stockpiles.
These activities are also consistent with the principles of the
Stockpile Management Program outlined by Congress in the National
Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2010.
recapitalizing critical infrastructure and renewing human capital
The NPR concluded that DOE needed increased funding to recapitalize
the aging infrastructure used to support the stockpile and conduct a
full range of nuclear security missions, and to renew our human
capital--the critical cadre of scientific, technical, and engineering
experts who underpin our stockpile management work and support our
nuclear nonproliferation and counterterrorism missions.
In order to sustain a safe, secure, and effective U.S. nuclear
stockpile as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States must
possess a modern physical infrastructure--comprised of the national
security laboratories and a complex of supporting facilities.
The NPR concluded that the following key investments were required
to sustain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear arsenal:
Strengthening the science, technology, and engineering
base needed for conducting weapon system LEPs, maturing
advanced technologies to increase weapons surety, qualification
of weapon components and certifying weapons without nuclear
testing, and providing annual stockpile assessments through
weapons surveillance. This includes developing and sustaining
high quality scientific staff and supporting computational and
experimental capabilities.
Funding the Chemistry and Metallurgy Research
Replacement Project at Los Alamos National Laboratory to
replace the existing 50-year old Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research facility by 2021.
Developing a new Uranium Processing Facility at the Y-
12 Plant in Oak Ridge, TN, to come on line for production
operations by 2021. Without an ability to produce uranium
components, any plan to sustain the stockpile, as well as
support for our naval nuclear propulsion programs, will come to
a halt.
More broadly, the administration supports the needed
recapitalization of the nuclear infrastructure through fully funding
the NNSA. These nuclear security facilities will be sized to support
the requirements of the Stockpile Stewardship Program mandated by
Congress and to meet the multiple requirements of dismantling warheads
and eliminating material no longer needed for defense purposes,
conducting technical surveillance, implementing life extension plans,
and supporting naval propulsion requirements. Increased investments in
the nuclear security enterprise are needed to ensure the long-term
safety, security, and effectiveness of our nuclear arsenal and to
support the full range of nuclear security work to include
nonproliferation, nuclear forensics, nuclear counterterrorism,
emergency management, intelligence analysis, and treaty verification.
Responsible stockpile management requires not only infrastructure,
but also a highly capable workforce with the specialized skills needed
to sustain the nuclear deterrent and to support the President's overall
nuclear security agenda. Like our physical infrastructure, over the
last decade our human capital base has been underfunded and
underdeveloped. The decrease in funding for the science and engineering
basis of stockpile assessment and management meant that technical
issues might remain unresolved and the best and brightest scientists
were therefore less attracted to the endeavor. A number of leaders
noted that a national consensus on the approach to sustaining warheads,
and adequate funding of those challenges, was essential to sustaining
our nuclear technical capabilities. The cumulative loss of focus,
expertise, and excellence on nuclear matters in the United States
remains a significant challenge, but one that we can now address.
The President has now clearly outlined the importance of nuclear
issues for our national security, and the importance of keeping the
U.S. nuclear deterrent safe, secure, and effective at the minimum
numbers required. Further, the administration's commitment to a clear
and long-term plan for managing the stockpile ensures the scientists
and engineers of tomorrow will have the opportunity to engage in
challenging research and development activities that are essential to
their recruitment and retention.
A modern nuclear security infrastructure and highly skilled
workforce are also essential to arms control and nonproliferation
objectives. For example, by certifying the reliability of each weapon
type we retain, the United States can credibly assure non-nuclear
allies and partners they need not build their own, while we seek
greater stockpile reductions than otherwise possible. We also enhance
our ability to assess and render safe potential terrorist nuclear
devices and support other national security initiatives, such as
nuclear forensics and attribution, and to understand the technical
challenges associated with verifying ever deeper arms control
reductions, which is critical for managing risks on the path to zero.
recapitalizing the sea-based strategic deterrent
The NPR sustains the Strategic Triad. This drives the recent DOD
decision to recapitalize the sea-based strategic deterrent. The Ohio-
class ballistic submarines, the most survivable leg of the Nation's
strategic deterrent, are reaching the end of their operational life. In
support of the NPR, the Naval Reactors program will continue reactor
plant design and development efforts begun in 2010 for procurement of
long-lead reactor plant components in 2017, in support of Navy
procurement of the first Ohio-class submarine replacement in 2019.
conclusion
We are already implementing the principles in the NPR. For example,
the President's fiscal year 2011 budget request for NNSA includes $11.2
billion (a 13 percent increase from 2010) to manage the stockpile,
recapitalize the NNSA infrastructure, and support the full range of
nuclear security missions--including NNSA's role in preventing nuclear
proliferation, powering the nuclear navy, and promoting effective
nuclear counterterrorism capabilities.
This NPR is an important step toward ending Cold War thinking and
adopting a 21st century approach to nuclear weapons and nuclear
security issues. The administration's substantial fiscal year 2011
budget request begins the turnaround to this NPR path. With the
committee's help, we can sustain our nuclear deterrent and enable
future arms reductions.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Mr. D'Agostino.
Let's try an 8-minute first round.
I want to thank Senator Ben Nelson, by the way, for taking
over at around 10:30 a.m., when I have to leave. I very much
appreciate that, Senator Nelson.
General, let me start with you. You indicated in your
testimony that STRATCOM was a full participant in the NPR
process, and that you're satisfied with the outcome. When
STRATCOM performed the analysis to support the NPR, you also
said that the force structure decisions were based on existing
nuclear guidance, which has existed since 2008. If I understand
that statement correctly, you're implying that the force
structure in the NPR is more than enough to meet future
requirements, because, in part, it meets current requirements.
Is that correct? Do I have that straight?
General Chilton. Senator, as we got into the last-year time
period and realized with the NPR being due, the Quadrennial
Defense Review being due, START expiring, we knew we needed to
fix the playing field on how we could proceed forward on this.
Dr. Miller can add to this, as well. So, one of the things that
we decided we needed to fix, as we went forward with START
negotiations, in particular, was what we were going to base our
negotiating strategy on. What guidance should we assume is
applicable to this? It was decided, rather than work through,
which is normally a year-long process to develop new strategies
and guidance, we would just fix that for our analysis of the
force structure for the START negotiations. That's how we moved
forward.
That is the context of my statement, there, is that, it was
more about how we went forward. Yes, I am comfortable with the
force structure we have. I believe it is adequate for the
mission that we've been given, and is consistent with NPR.
The only assumptions we had to make with regard to the new
NPR, which was, of course, in development at the time, was that
there would be no request for an increase in forces. There was
also an assumption that I think is valid, that the Russians, in
the post-negotiation time period, would be compliant with the
treaty, should they ratify that, and that we would, too. Those
were really our going-in positions.
Chairman Levin. During the Cold War, the force structure
was based largely on the number of targets and the certainty
required to hold those targets at risk, and to eliminate the
targets. Without a specific adversary, I understand that the
philosophy has changed so that the force structure is based on
the capabilities to address types of targets rather than
specific targets. If that is accurate, does the change in
philosophy provide you with the confidence that you can go to
lower levels and still meet any new nuclear guidance policy?
General Chilton. Mr. Chairman, a couple of points. One,
parity was a driving factor at one point during the Cold War,
which is why we still had continuous growth in stockpiles back
and forth between the Soviet Union and the United States, at
the time. It wasn't so much driven by specific targets as it
was how big your force structure was. We've steered away from
that, for sure.
One thing that is similar is that what STRATCOM--then
Strategic Air Command, in the Cold War--was told to plan
against, was types of categories of targets, and then the
Command would plan against and present the results of those
efforts up for approval. That process is pretty much still in
place. Again, we're not told specifically what to do. We're
told categories, as you described, for our deterrence, we
develop a plan, and then push that forward for Secretary of
Defense approval.
Chairman Levin. Let me ask both Dr. Miller and you, General
Chilton, the NPR does not identify how the 800 strategic
nuclear systems are going to be allocated amongst the legs of
the triad--the 800 coming from the New START treaty. What's the
process for determining how many nuclear-capable bombers, how
many SLBMs, and how many land-based ICBMs are going to be in
the force structure? Let me start with you, Dr. Miller, when's
this process going to be completed?
Dr. Miller. Mr. Chairman, this process began during the
NPR, and we looked at a wide range of alternative force
structures. It will be completed shortly, as we provide the
Section 1251 report to Congress. Along with that, we'll provide
a recommended baseline force structure.
Chairman Levin. When is that?
Dr. Miller. It will be provided, sir, with the submission
of the New START treaty, hopefully in the next several weeks.
Chairman Levin. Okay.
Dr. Miller. If I could add, the treaty provides and allows
the freedom to mix, for both sides, their strategic forces,
under these limits. Our intention would be to provide a
baseline plan, understanding that it could be modified later,
if there were a challenge with one leg of the triad or another.
Mr. Chairman, if I could add very briefly, with respect to
the question of guidance, during the NPR we looked at a very
wide range of possible nuclear scenarios and found that the
force structure and the numbers that had become part of the New
START treaty, provided a very robust capability across that
wide range. We are in the process of reviewing and revising
classified guidance, and are confident that this force
structure will provide more than enough capability for that
revised guidance.
Chairman Levin. Do you agree with that, General?
General Chilton. I do, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Okay.
Secretary Tauscher, one of the key objectives of the NPR is
to strengthen the NPT regime. Now, the review conference for
that treaty is going to be held in May, with a commitment to
support the regional allies and partners, as this NPR does,
with the reductions in deployed nuclear forces, and increased
emphasis on nonproliferation. Do you believe that the NPR will
have a positive effect on the review conference?
Ms. Tauscher. Yes, Mr. Chairman, we do. The President has
made the NPT a central pillar in his nonproliferation agenda,
and strengthening the NPT, both through the review conference
and ongoing efforts, is a very important opportunity. Both the
Negative Security Assurance in the NPR, which makes very clear
the exemption for non-nuclear-weapon states that are in
compliance with the NPT obligations. This, once again, not only
makes clear what our position is on the exemption, but it also
strengthens the NPT and countries' acsession to it and
adherence to it. What it says is that, if you are a member of
the NPT, and are clearly in compliance, then you have this
exemption.
I think that the President's agenda, when it comes to the
NPT review, is one--because it's a consensus-driven exercise,
for over a month in New York at the U.N., with hundreds of
countries coming, there are many different parts of this that
we want to work collaboratively. But, at the same time, it's
not just the review conference, but an ongoing effort, working
with key partners, to make sure that the NPT is strengthened,
and that there is great adherence to it.
Chairman Levin. There are also commitments, are there not,
in the NPT for the nuclear powers to reduce their nuclear
inventories? Is that not correct?
Ms. Tauscher. Yes, sir. That's Article 6 of the NPT.
There are three pillars to the NPT: peaceful uses,
disarmament, and nonproliferation. We believe, in the United
States, certainly with the New START treaty and other efforts
that we have made unilaterally, that we have made a strong
commitment to Article 6 of the NPT. You won't be surprised to
find out that not everyone believes that, but we strongly
assert that we, certainly with Russia, because we have 90
percent of the weapons in the world are reducing those numbers,
and we are working very seriously to maintain a very strong,
safe, and effective stockpile.
Chairman Levin. If we expect others to maintain their
commitments to the NPT, it is important, won't you agree, that
we keep our commitments, as well, relative to reductions?
Ms. Tauscher. As usual, Mr. Chairman, there are issues like
Iran, which are a significant challenge for us, and have been
for various administrations. The Iranians' lack of commitment
to the NPT and their abuse of U.N. Security Council resolutions
cause us to look for arrows in our quiver that will remind
people of these obligations. Certainly, the NPT is the best
example we have of Iranian noncompliance.
Chairman Levin. Okay, thank you.
Senator McCain.
Senator McCain. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Dr. Miller, a lot of us have been very unhappy about the
fact that there is no cohesive--or, coherent policy towards the
Iranian nuclear buildup and their inexorable movement towards
the acquisition of nuclear weapons capability, which is the
view of all intelligence agencies throughout the world. At last
week's hearing on Iran, Secretary Flournoy and General
Cartwright said, in direct response to questions, that all
options regarding Iran were on the table.
Yesterday, in Singapore, Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy, Secretary Michele Flournoy said during a press
briefing, ``Military force is an option of last resort;''
Michele Flournoy said, ``it's off the table in the near term.''
Now, which is it? Which is it, Dr. Miller? Is it off the table
for the near-term, as Secretary Flournoy says, in direct
contradiction to her testimony before this committee? What is
the near-term, if it's off the table in the near-term? Do you
think the American people have a right to know that?
Dr. Miller. Senator McCain, I had the opportunity to talk
to Under Secretary Flournoy yesterday, and I have not seen a
transcript, nor has she, to confirm which is the case. But, she
was either misquoted or misspoke; the administration's policy,
as Under Secretary Flournoy said before, is that all options
are on the table.
The administration has also made clear that the strong
preference is to work through diplomatic channels, and now as
we move to the so-called ``pressure track,'' to apply sanctions
to Iran so that they will change their policy.
But I will, again, state for the record, and on behalf of
the administration, that all options are on the table, sir.
Senator McCain. So, now we're treated to our Under
Secretary of Defense for Policy going to Singapore and saying
``It's off the table in the near term.'' No wonder our friends
are dispirited and our enemies are encouraged.
Secretary Tauscher, why did the decision made concerning
the elimination of the nuclear option in cases of nations that
are in compliance with the NPT? What was the rationale behind
that reversal of what has been a national policy of deliberate
ambiguity since the beginning of the Cold War?
Ms. Tauscher. Senator McCain, I don't think it's a
reversal. I think what it is, is an articulation of the reality
of the 21st century. What we have----
Senator McCain. Excuse me, it's not a reversal of the
previous policy of ambiguity concerning what the U.S. action
would be, in case of attacks on the United States and our
allies?
Ms. Tauscher. With all due respect, Senator, I don't know
how you reverse ambiguity. Ambiguity is what it is, it means
that you were not specific----
Senator McCain. Oh no, ambiguity was clearly a policy,
Madam Secretary. It was clearly a policy so that our enemies
would not be clear as to what actions we would take in case of
attacks. That----
Ms. Tauscher. Senator, you're making my point.
Senator McCain:--that is a policy, Secretary Tauscher. If
you allege that it's not, then we might as well move on to the
next question.
Ms. Tauscher. Senator, you're making my point for me.
Senator McCain. Pardon me?
Ms. Tauscher. You're making my point for me; we were not
clear. We were not clear to countries, that----
Senator McCain. Now we are clear.
Ms. Tauscher.--we would never use nuclear weapons against,
that we would not use nuclear weapons against them. That's what
this policy says. This policy says that, for non-nuclear-weapon
states that are in compliance with their NPT obligations, we're
not going to either threaten or use nuclear weapons against
them.
Senator McCain. That's not a change in our policy.
Ms. Tauscher. It is an articulation of our policy. It is
moving our policy to a more clear point of view. It is more
clear than ambiguity. Yes, that's right.
Dr. Miller. Senator, could I perhaps add, briefly----
Senator McCain. I'll be glad to.
That's one of the more bizarre statements I've ever heard
made before this committee.
Go ahead.
Dr. Miller. Senator McCain, the United States first made a
Negative Security Assurance associated with the NPT in 1978,
and that's by Secretary of State Cyrus Vance. The statement
said that the United States would not use nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear-weapon states that were party to the NPT.
Same pledge was made in 1995, and again in 2002 by
subsequent administrations, so this Negative Security Assurance
is not new. What the change is, in the NPR, is that we've added
the condition that a state must also be compliant with its NPT
obligations. So, we've added a condition. In order to get into
that group, that is provided an assurance that the United
States will not use nuclear weapons, we've added a condition.
Under the old assurance, that Iran, today, would be provided
that assurance and under the new assurance it is not.
Sir, the other part of that, I think you were refering to
it as calculated ambiguity, at various points in time in the
past, the United States has hinted that nuclear weapons might
be used in response to chemical or biological weapons, even if
by a non-nuclear-weapon states. Our view was that the
credibility and capability of our deterrence posture is the
determinative factor, in that--both with respect to non-
nuclear-weapon states and nuclear-weapon states or noncompliant
states, that a clear posture that distinguishes between those
two was likely to be more effective for deterrence.
Senator McCain. I guess that's in the eye of the beholder,
Dr. Miller.
So, let's have this scenario. There's a biological and
chemical attack on the United States of America, inflicting a
great deal of devastation on the United States of America, and
we know who did it. So, then the decision is made as to whether
we consider the use of nuclear weapons to be directly guided by
and dictated by whether that nation is in compliance with the
NPT?
Dr. Miller. Sir, the policy would be that the use of
nuclear weapons would be contemplated if that state were either
a nuclear-weapon state, or a state that was not compliant with
its nuclear nonproliferation obligations.
Senator McCain. So, if there is a massive attack on the
United States, we decide whether nuclear weapons are used, or
will not be used, not because that might be the best way to
respond or not, but whether that nation is in compliance with
the NPT?
Dr. Miller. Senator McCain, the----
Senator McCain. That is really remarkable.
So, we are telling the American people, now, that if
there's a chemical or biological attack on the United States of
America, and it is of devastating consequences, we will rule
out the option of using a nuclear weapon, even though that may
be the most effective course of action, if that country is in
compliance or noncompliance with the NPT.
Dr. Miller. Sir, if you look at the countries today that
have any significant capacity to develop chemical and
biological weapons, you will find that those are states that
are either nuclear-weapon states or that are not in compliance
with their nuclear nonproliferation obligations, such as----
Senator McCain. Today.
Dr. Miller.--North Korea and----
Senator McCain. Today, that's the case. Maybe not a year or
5 years from now. But, if they are in compliance with the NPT,
they are free to launch attacks on the United States of
America, and be assured that there will not be a response with
nuclear weapons, even though that may be, in the view of our
military leaders, the best way to respond to it.
Dr. Miller. Sir, if you look at the experience of, to take
one example of Saddam Hussein, I think you can see that the
conventional capabilities of the United States ought to be
sufficient to provide a very significant deterrent. We've made
it clear, in this NPR, that both political and military leaders
would be held accountable for the use, or the transfer, of
weapons of mass destruction.
Might I very briefly add, with respect to your point, that
conditions could change. I absolutely agree. That's
specifically why the NPR stated that the United States reserves
the right to modify this assurance if, in the future, the
threat posed by biological weapons proliferation and technology
advancement would make that appropriate.
Senator McCain. Of course, I got a non-answer from
Secretary Tauscher. Why we even got into this is beyond me . .
. is beyond me. But, the fact is that we have now sent a
message: Stay in compliance with the NPT, and you will be
immune from the response, if necessary, of a nuclear weapon, in
order to save and minimize losses or most effectively respond
to a chemical or biological attack on the United States of
America. It's a remarkable circumstance.
My time has expired.
Senator Ben Nelson [presiding]. Senator Lieberman.
Senator Lieberman. Thanks, Mr. Chairman.
Secretary Tauscher, I think you were leaning forward to the
microphone. I wanted to give you another chance to answer the
question from Senator McCain, because it's an important
question, which is, why is this section in here? In other
words, before I give you the chance, I'll just say, really
briefly, it does seem to me that this provision in the NPR
takes the previous calculated ambiguity, removes a lot of the
ambiguity, but, frankly, then restores some of the ambiguity,
in the language that Mr. Miller just quoted. Dr. Miller, which
is that we reserve the right to review this at any time. So,
it's a curious part of this, of the review, which I, overall,
think is a very constructive and significant document. So, why
is it there?
Ms. Tauscher. Senator Lieberman, it's there because the
decision, I think rightly, was made that the great balance of
countries, many of whom are our allies that don't have nuclear
weapons and that are in compliance with their NPT obligations,
are not targets of the United States to use nuclear weapons.
The bar for using nuclear weapons is extremely high.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Ms. Tauscher. The deterrence of nuclear weapons is
extremely successful. We have not used a nuclear weapon in 65
years. We have used conventional weapons, with great success,
great force, and great devastation, in the recent decade.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Ms. Tauscher. So, we have decided that we would deter
activities by non-nuclear-weapon states in good compliance with
the NPT, with conventional weapons. Knowing that, we believe,
since we have the finest military in the world and the most
significant conventional weapons, that that deterrence suits
the kind of threat that they pose to us.
We have added the caveat that, if those states should use
chemical or biological weapons, that we would make very clear
to them, we specifically say that we would use a devastating
conventional force, and that we would hold all of those
accountable. That makes it very clear, to any leadership in
those countries, what the consequences of these kinds of
aggressions would be.
Senator Lieberman. Okay, so that helps to clarify this, Dr.
Miller, you said earlier that this was ``explicitly not
intended'' as a removal of ambiguity, in the case, for
instance, of Iran and North Korea.
Ms. Tauscher. That's right, because what we did----
Senator Lieberman. Because they're not in compliance with--
--
Ms. Tauscher. That's right.
Senator Lieberman. Or they're not signatories. So, this is
a reassurance to our allies.
Okay, I'd just ask one last question. Maybe you've answered
it, but just to give you a real-life example, as I recall it.
In 1991, during the lead-up or the beginning of the Gulf
War, I can't remember the exact timeframe, but Secretary of
State Baker issued a public warning to Saddam Hussein that, if
the Iraqis used chemical weapons on our troops, they would
suffer, I believe he said something like devastating
consequences. That was widely interpreted to include nuclear
weapons.
In the aftermath of the NPR, would you say that a current
Secretary of State or President, in a similar circumstance,
could issue the same warning?
Dr. Miller. Senator Lieberman, the answer to that is yes.
Iraq, at the time, was not in compliance with its nuclear
nonproliferation obligations, in precisely the same words, and
an associated calculated ambiguity would be applicable.
Senator Lieberman. Very good. I appreciate that.
Let me go on to another point, which was the main concern I
had about the NPR, as I said; and most of it, I think, is
really constructive and important. I was surprised by the
statement that, when weighing options for the life-extension
programs for our nuclear arsenal, which become more important
as we go forward with the New START treaty, because we're going
to have fewer nuclear weapons. This is a quote from the NPR:
``There's a strong preference for the refurbishment or reuse of
nuclear components, rather than their replacement.'' The NPR
continues to state, ``replacement of nuclear components would
be undertaken only if critical stockpile management program
goals could otherwise not be met.''
I was surprised by that, because I think the overall goal
is, what you've said and we all agree with, that we wanted to
maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear stockpile. That
was the goal of the nuclear stockpile program, the goal of
setting up of the NNSA. It's consistent with--I'm looking at a
document that reported, the 2009 Jason Advisory Report to the
NNSA, it describes reuse and replacement. Frankly, the language
of the replacement seems most forward-leaning. This is actually
a quote from their report of, what they said, the definitions
given to them by NNSA. I'll quote from the definition of
warhead replacement. ``Some, or all, of the components of a
warhead are replaced with modern design that are more easily
manufacturable, provide increased warhead margins, forego no-
longer-available or hazardous materials, improve safety,
security, and use control, and offer the potential for future
overall stockpile reductions.''
So, here's my concern, I'm puzzled about why that language
is in there, because I fear that it will send, both to NNSA
and, most important, to the extraordinary scientists who are
working for us, a kind of discouragement to use replacement,
when, to me, it should be equal with reuse and refurbishment.
The choice would be, which one helps us most to have a safe,
secure, and effective, reliable nuclear stockpile?
Dr. Miller and Mr. D'Agostino, or maybe both?
So, can you reassure us that replacement is equal, as an
alternative, to keep our stockpile as we want it to be?
Dr. Miller. Senator Lieberman, I'll answer very briefly,
and then turn it over to Mr. D'Agostino.
Senator Lieberman. Okay.
Dr. Miller. The NPR stipulates that, in considering life-
extension programs, that the full range will be considered and
studied, from refurbishment, to reuse, to replacement, and that
only at the point of moving forward to engineering development
would a preference be given, or first consideration be given,
to refurbishment or reuse.
It does note that the presidential authorization would be
required to go forward with replacement. Senator, speaking from
my perspective, one of the reasons for this provision is that
the administration noticed that the Reliable Replacement
Warhead (RRW) Program had been canceled by Congress, and
understood there would be an important threshold involved with
moving forward with a replacement option. I wanted the
President to have a specific look at that and to understand the
case for it, when it should occur.
Senator Lieberman. Okay.
Mr. D'Agostino? To me, it creates some confusion. I hope,
perhaps in the 1251 report that you're going to submit, you can
clarify this.
I'll ask you first; you're the expert. The RRW Program
doesn't mean building a big, new warhead. Not necessarily. It
mostly means replacing component parts, doesn't it?
Mr. D'Agostino. It means replacing component parts, sir.
The most important thing, from our standpoint, because we have
a commitment to maintain our stockpile and our deterrent
without underground testing, is it's based on previously tested
designs.
Senator Lieberman. That's very important, I appreciate your
mentioning that, right. Not a big, new design.
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, sir. It's based on previously tested
designs. We have a tremendous test history, test database that
we want to exploit and use all that information in order to
move forward.
The principles of the Stockpile Management Program have
really guided us here, as I said in my oral statement. We want
to increase stockpile safety, security, and reliability. We
obviously want to reduce the likelihood of conducting an
underground test and we want to enable reductions in future
stockpile sizes. The approach outlined in the NPR, as Dr.
Miller said, allows that full study.
There's actually no confusion, I've talked to the lab
directors. They are very comfortable with the language here,
that it will allow them to study all options and provide to us
the decisionmakers, policymakers, and ultimately, as it
proceeds through authorization and appropriation to Congress,
provides us the opportunity to make sure that we have full
insight into that best combination of safety, security,
reliability, cost, use of that test history and database, all
together in one package.
Senator Lieberman. Yes. Okay, I appreciate the
clarification from both of you. I'm interested in what you
described as a potential reason this was in here, Dr. Miller,
because of the history that Congress canceled the RRW. But,
this is a different kind of replacement. I think, as you said,
it's based on existing design.
At this moment--not that I or former Congresswoman Tauscher
would ever say that Congress might alter its opinions on
matters, or need clarification, but I think it might help to
define ``replacement'' and assure us, and those working with
you, that this kind of replacement is on equal footing with
``reuse and refurbishment.''
I thank you, my time is up.
Dr. Miller. Senator, if I could just add one thing, to just
clarify my comment. It's based on existing component design;
components that we've tested.
Senator Lieberman. Right.
Dr. Miller. Yes, sir.
Senator Lieberman. Thank you. Understood.
Dr. Miller. Thank you.
Senator Ben Nelson. Senator Thune.
Senator Thune. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I, too, want to thank the members of our panel today for
being here, and for their service to our country, and
especially want to welcome my former colleague from the House
of Representatives, Secretary Tauscher. Very nice to have you
with us today, as well.
I would like to associate myself with some of the comments
that Senator McCain made with regard to the calculated
ambiguity. I, too, think that our military leadership would
want to have all elements of national power available to them
in the event of attack by an enemy of the United States. I
won't belabor the point, because I think he covered it pretty
well, let me also add that I'm not satisfied with the response
to that question.
Dr. Miller and Secretary Tauscher, 9 months ago, General
Cartwright, the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and
former head of STRATCOM, testified before this committee that
he would be very concerned about endangering the triad if the
number of strategic delivery vehicles dropped below 800. Yet,
the newly signed START treaty limits the number of delivery of
vehicles to only 700.
What is the rationale for the agreement on only 700
delivery vehicles included in the New START treaty? What
justifications and analysis did you rely on to come to that, to
arrive at that number?
Dr. Miller. Senator Thune, I'll give the first answer, and
General Chilton may wish to join in, as well as Secretary
Tauscher.
We conducted extensive analysis during the NPR of various
force structures, including combinations of different balance
with each leg of the triad, ICBMs, SLBMs, and heavy bombers. We
found that there were a range of possible outcomes that would
be satisfactory and that would meet the requirements for
STRATCOM.
As the negotiations proceeded, we continued that analysis,
and looked at the combination of the limit of 700 deployed
strategic delivery vehicles or launchers, and a cap of 800
deployed and nondeployed launchers, and determined that that
combination allowed us to do virtually everything that would
have been possible under a single limit of 800 strategic
delivery vehicles.
We will provide a specific force structure; I think you'll
see it's a balanced force structure, associated with the New
START treaty when we submit the section 1251 report as the
treaty is provided for advice and consent of the Senate.
General Chilton. Senator, I would only add that, of course,
time has passed since General Cartwright testified, and we had
the opportunity to do a lot more analysis during this time
period. As we looked at it, it not only made sense
strategically, but it certainly is doable, to continue to
sustain the triad at these current numbers and, I believe, at
lower numbers. The triad will still be a viable and important
area, even if there are future considerations for that, should
they come up. The flexibility provided by those three legs are
still important to us today.
Senator Thune. Will the Russians have to cut their number
of delivery vehicles to get to 700?
Dr. Miller. Senator Thune, relative to their current
accountable levels under START, it will be a slight reduction.
We would expect them to be going down in any case over time,
however.
Senator Thune. Okay, my understanding is that they're
already going to be at or below that level. For us to drop down
to that level, I guess my next question would be, what, if
anything, do we get in return for that concession?
Ms. Tauscher. Senator Thune, I wouldn't call it a
concession. In the negotiations for the New START treaty
agreement, as you can imagine there are many, many different
variables and many, many different things. The NPR, which was
congressionally mandated in this administration, began early
last year, was actually designed to deal with the guidance for
the New START treaty negotiations, first and primarily. So, all
of the guidance that went into the START negotiations came out
of what was the beginning of the NPR. Those limits were limits
that the entire interagency agreed to.
So, I wouldn't call it a concession. These were decisions
that we made, that we believe were the right numbers for our
side and the Russians made the same decisions on their own
side.
Senator Thune. You answered this, General Chilton, and go
ahead and respond to that question, if you'd like, but I also
want to know if you could elaborate a little bit on what the
implications are for each leg of the nuclear triad under these
reductions. How many bombers, land-based missiles, or
submarines will we have to cut in order to be compliant with
the treaty?
General Chilton. Right. Those numbers, and the decisions on
that, will come forward in the next couple of weeks, as Dr.
Miller said, and there's still some work to be done by the
Services on how to balance that out.
But, back to your other point, Senator, one thing I was
pleased to see in the treaty were these limits. Although Russia
may be close to, or slightly below them, already, when you look
to the future, we certainly don't want them to grow. They would
have been unrestricted, otherwise, without these types of
limits articulated in the treaty. So, having that limit there,
and with the knowledge that what we negotiated to is absolutely
acceptable to the STRATCOM for what we need to do to provide
the deterrent for the country, made me comfortable with that
approach.
Dr. Miller. Senator, if I could add, very briefly, that the
New START treaty has provisions that should allow us to do
three things that will reduce the requirement for the number of
strategic delivery vehicles while still keeping the same force
structure.
The first one is, it eliminates what we've called the
``phantom'' strategic delivery vehicles, those that are
accountable under the old START treaty, but that are no longer
associated with the nuclear mission. That includes the
strategic submarines that were converted to conventional-only
and it includes our B-1 bombers that have been converted to
conventional-only. Those changes allow us to take a number of
delivery vehicles off the books.
Second, the treaty also allows further conversion of
current dual-capable bombers to a conventional-only role that
would take them off the books, as well. We are looking at that
possibility for some B-52Hs.
Finally, the treaty allows the elimination of launchers
from accountability for submarines, through a variety of means,
including the simple removal of the gas generator that would
eject the SLBM. As we look at the overall requirement, we
determined that we wanted to keep 14 strategic submarines in
the nuclear mission, at least for the near-term, as we see how
they do as they get toward the later part of their lives. But,
there's not the same requirement for all the tubes associated
with those. So, we are looking at the possibility of removing
some of those, through a relatively simple operation.
Senator Thune. The NPR emphasizes the development of
conventional Prompt Global Strike capabilities. Will these
Prompt Global Strike systems count against the New START treaty
limits and require further nuclear cuts to accommodate them?
Dr. Miller. Senator Thune, that is a two-part answer. The
first part is that, if we were to put a conventional warhead on
an ICBM with a traditional ballistic missile trajectory, or on
an SLBM with a traditional ballistic missile trajectory, then
it would be accountable. When the DOD previously proposed the
conventional Trident modification, that system had this sort of
trajectory, and would have been accountable. The numbers
associated with that were 2 missiles per boat times 14 boats;
it would be 28. The NPR explicitly looked at the, as it did
force structure analysis, potential for further reductions,
under the 700 and 800 combined limit. That would leave room for
that, and indeed, would leave room for a small number of
conventional ICBMs, if that were the determination made than
that was desirable. That would be a very small number. That
analysis is underway as part of our broader long-range strike
study, we expect to conclude that in the coming months, and
provide any recommendations in the fiscal year 2012 budget.
There are a wide range of conventional systems that would
be considered Prompt Global Strike that will not be accountable
under the New START treaty, including, for example, the work
that's ongoing now on hypersonic-boost glide vehicles, longer-
term work on hypersonic cruise missiles, and so forth.
Senator Thune. My time is up, if I could get General
Chilton to respond to--as the nuclear weapons are reduced, and
conventional Prompt Global Strike capabilities are developed,
to what degree can those conventional capabilities substitute
for nuclear capabilities when it comes to providing deterrence?
General Chilton. Senator, I consider the Prompt Global
Strike capability as a niche capability, another weapon in the
quiver, if you will, of the United States to address
warfighting concerns. I do not see it as a replacement for the
nuclear deterrent in that role, specifically. Not to say that
all of our conventional capabilities have some deterrent role.
But, you don't replace the nuclear deterrent with that, 1 for
1; or, not even 10 for 1.
Senator Thune. Okay. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you, Senator. I guess it's my
turn.
Mr. D'Agostino, the new treaty between the Russian
Government and ours to further reduce the number of strategic
nuclear forces places a premium on our ability to maintain an
infrastructure in the technical capacity to provide for that
stockpile that's safe, secure, and effective into the
foreseeable future. Do you have adequate funding? Are you
asking for adequate funding to make certain that the weapons
programs, the facilities, and the improvements to the
facilities and workforce are funded?
Mr. D'Agostino. Senator Nelson, absolutely. I do have
adequate funding. The fiscal year 2011 President's budget
request picks a total 5-year stream that provides the funding
for this first 5-year slice of the program.
As Dr. Miller described, the 1251 report will describe a
full 10-year period. This funding stream, and the support by
future administrations and future Congresses, will be required
over multiple years, because the work that we have will happen
over many years.
Senator Ben Nelson. As I asked you in our subcommittee
hearing, is the budget backloaded? In other words, are we
anticipating higher costs in the out years, therefore,
underfunding for the current and the foreseeable years?
Mr. D'Agostino. Absolutely not. The budget is not
backloaded. The budget that we have for the first 5 years
represents exactly what we need to do, what the NRP has asked
us to do. It also recognizes the reality that, in the early
stages, particularly for large construction projects, and of
which we have two in this proposal, that the early years of
those construction projects, we spend time doing the design
work. Then, after a few years of making sure we know exactly
what we want to build, we'll shift into the construction
effort. We won't have those baselines established until about
the year 2012, 2013. Though I do expect some adjustments but,
this is natural, in a fairly complicated, long-range plan.
Senator Ben Nelson. Thank you.
General Chilton, you've stated that you fully support the
NPR and the New START treaty. Is that accurate?
General Chilton. That's correct, Senator.
Senator Ben Nelson. As the combatant commander of STRATCOM,
perhaps it would be helpful if you could discuss the role that
you had in the development of the NPR.
General Chilton. Senator, both with the NPR and with the
START negotiations, STRATCOM was closely consulted and part of
the team that was working in the background to support the
dialogue and the preparation for negotiators, going forward.
So, we were always asked for our input. We stood up a team
almost a year and a half ago, anticipating this work, back at
STRATCOM headquarters, of some very great Americans, with
exceptional talent, who studied and prepared for this, and put
the models in place to be able to answer questions quickly to
support negotiations and also support the dialogue we had with
policy folks, with Dr. Miller's staff, along the way. We
certainly appreciate the close cooperation we were offered.
Senator Ben Nelson. There have been criticisms raised
regarding whether or not the verification aspects of ``trust
but verify,'' to use some very famous words, is inadequate in
this treaty. Could both you and Dr. Miller tell us what your
belief is about what the verification requirements, or lack of
requirements, in this treaty really mean? Then, has anybody
from the Intelligence Community (IC) been consulted in
connection with these verification issues?
General Chilton. Senator, you bring up a good point at the
end. Really the question on whether verification regimes are
adequate or not is a question for the Director of National
Intelligence and his staffs, because, they're going to be the
ones that we will turn to throughout the treaty regime to say,
``Are the Russians compliant?''
A couple of points I'd make, though, is, one, throughout
our participation at STRATCOM, in support of START, these types
of questions were asked frequently and, I believe, addressed
throughout that time period. But, again, the question, I think,
is more appropriate for the IC.
One final point. There were no verification opportunities
for us, given the expiring of the previous START agreement,
back in December. Of course, the Moscow Treaty did not allow
for any verification. What we were faced with was going forward
with no verification, no insight into what the Russians would
be doing with their strategic force structures. So, I'm
encouraged by the fact that we do have that now included in
this treaty.
Senator Ben Nelson. You believe it's adequate at this point
in time?
General Chilton. All indications, from what I've been told,
and my observations throughout the development were that they
were adequate for the period of the treaty.
Senator Ben Nelson. Dr. Miller?
Dr. Miller. Senator Nelson, I would, first, just reiterate
that this is, ultimately, an IC judgment, and that we expect to
have a National Intelligence Estimate provided to the Senate
right about the same time that the treaty is. The Office of the
Director of National Intelligence and different elements of the
community were very much involved as we went forward with the
negotiations. As the negotiators considered steps to take, in
terms of the priorities for U.S. negotiating positions, the IC
played a very important role.
I'll just say, on a couple of items in particular, I think
we have very strong provisions. There is a provision for 18
onsite inspections per year that will be able to cover both
deployed and nondeployed systems. We have a robust data
exchange process in place that along with a number of other
provisions, are quite detailed, help support our ability to
collect intelligence through national technical means that also
support verification.
Again, it's an IC assessment, but I share with General
Chilton the view that, based on everything that I've seen to
date, I have great confidence that this treaty will be
verifiable.
Senator Ben Nelson. Do you have any reason to believe that
the intelligence position will be any different than what
you've just stated, right now? In fact, they were included in
the discussions and negotiations, so I'm assuming that you
don't believe that they would have a different opinion than
yours, right now.
Dr. Miller. Sir, I don't believe that, but I won't speak
for the IC. That'll be their judgment.
Senator Ben Nelson. Yes. I intend to talk to them about it,
as well. But, thank you.
Secretary Tauscher, the criticism I've seen from time to
time is that, if this treaty doesn't really require us to do
certain things, it's more of a statement that this is what we
intend to do, as long as it's in our national interest. If it
ceases to be in our national interest, we reserve the right to
either withdraw from the treaty or change our actions. The same
thing would be true of our counterparts.
Perhaps in a few words, you could give us, then, the value
of entering into an agreement of that kind, that is not really
binding per se, because either party may change its behavior or
withdraw from the treaty.
Ms. Tauscher. Senator Nelson, that's true of all treaties.
Most treaties have a national-interest exit clause. In fact,
the United States decided to abrogate the Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty in the last administration.
Senator Ben Nelson. That's true.
Ms. Tauscher. Because we wanted to build limited regional
missile defenses.
I think the important parts about this New START treaty
agreement that are salient and specific to the timing is that
we had the unfortunate circumstance of the previous START
treaty expiring last December. While both parties agreed to
move forward while we were negotiating, to keep the spirit of
the previous treaty, what we ended up having was a treaty that
expired. Frankly, in the Moscow Treaty, there was no
verification at all.
So, we have verification that is specific. It is robust in
many different areas; certainly, onsite inspections and a
number of the elements that we had in the previous START
agreement. There are fewer inspections, but there are also
fewer places to inspect. During the Soviet time, we had many,
many different facilities, including other countries, other
than Russia. A lot of those facilities have been closed down
over time, and there are fewer weapons and fewer places to go
to inspect them.
I think the amalgam of what we have here is a strong treaty
on disarmament. We have a strong treaty on verification. We
have better technical means now than we've ever had. We have a
smaller footprint to visit. But, I think that, in the end, this
is a treaty that will serve the American people and add to our
national security interests.
Senator Ben Nelson. It can serve as an example for others
for nonproliferation. Is that fair, too?
Ms. Tauscher. It serves significantly for nonproliferation.
That's one of the reasons why the combination of our Negative
Security Assurance, which makes clear that we're putting a lot
of onus on belonging to the NPT, and being in compliance to it.
As Dr. Miller said, up until we changed this policy, in the
previous policy, Iran and North Korea may have qualified, under
certain readings of a Negative Security Assurance. What we have
said is that we will not use nuclear weapons against countries
that are in compliance with their NPT obligations. That is an
important difference, and it certainly carves out countries
like Iran and North Korea, who are clearly not in compliance.
Senator Ben Nelson. Senator Wicker.
Senator Wicker. Thank you very much.
Let me begin by following up on an area that Senator McCain
touched on.
Dr. Miller, this statement in Singapore yesterday by
Secretary Flournoy stated: ``Military force is an option of
last resort. It is off the table in the near term.'' I
understand you spoke to Secretary Flournoy yesterday, and her
position is that she was either misquoted or that she misspoke.
Is that correct?
Dr. Miller. That is correct. I have known the Under
Secretary for some time, and I would lay money that she was
misquoted.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Well I hope----
Dr. Miller. It is, sir, if I could, Senator, very quickly.
It is fair and appropriate to say that the use of military
force should be a last resort. But, this administration has
also made clear that it is on the table.
Senator Wicker. That we don't take options off the table. I
think that's a problem you get into when you start answering
questions of this type. I hope it's a misquote. Alex Kennedy is
the Associated Press reporter. Perhaps there's a transcript of
that. Reporters are human, and so are public officials, people
do make mistakes and do misspeak occasionally.
But, Secretary Tauscher, do you agree that this needs to be
clarified, and if, indeed, Secretary Flournoy did say this,
that she should issue a statement, retracting that?
Ms. Tauscher. I think, once again, we have to get to the
bottom of exactly what happened. But, what is clear is this
administration's policy. This administration's policy,
regardless of who says it or when it is said, the President has
made very clear that all options are on the table. While the
military option may be the one of last resort, it is certainly
on the table when it comes to Iran.
Senator Wicker. If she said otherwise, which she's quoted
as doing, then she should clarify that and retract that
statement.
Ms. Tauscher. Under Secretary Flournoy is one of the most
respected members of DOD, and I'm sure that she will take the
responsibility seriously.
Senator Wicker. All right.
I'll just say this, Mr. Chairman. I would hope that this
could be clarified. I view it as a serious matter, as did
Senator McCain. If she said it, we're all human, but she should
retract it.
Now, let me ask, then, with regard to this replacement and
reuse and refurbishment issue, clearly we have made it harder.
The NPR makes it more difficult to go to the replacement
option, by saying that that would be a last resort and that it
should be specifically authorized by the President and approved
by Congress.
Mr. D'Agostino, does this make it more difficult for us to
recruit the top scientists to work on a nuclear stockpile, if
they know that the replacement option faces these additional
hurdles, or there's confusion for their professional career? If
you could, give us an example of what is off the table at this
point, unless we have specific presidential authorization and
specific approval by Congress.
Mr. D'Agostino. Senator Wicker, it does not make it more
difficult to recruit scientists. The scientists at our
laboratories now, the lab directors at our laboratories now,
understand the policy. They understand that they have a free
rein to study all options associated with extending the life of
the stockpile. That's the most important thing. This NPR is
very clear on that.
Senator Wicker. They're studying all options, and they're
equally studying the replacement option at the same time.
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, Senator, they are equally studying the
replacement option. The key is to make sure that, in the
studies of how do we approach extending the life of a
particular warhead that we understand the benefits associated
with each of the particular options. The most important thing,
as the NPR makes clear, is that our desire is to do so in a way
that maximizes the safety, security, and effectiveness of the
deterrent without underground testing. The replacement option,
the policies that put forward here allow us, specifically, to
be able to do that.
Senator Wicker. Okay. We're limited in time today. I'm
going to ask you to provide an example of what we're talking
about on the record, as a response. Will you do that?
Mr. D'Agostino. Senator, I'd be glad to provide that for
the record.
[The information referred to follows:]
During the Cold War, designers at the national laboratories
optimized each nuclear weapon system for military utility and minimized
cost by designing small, light systems. As the threat environment has
evolved, the emphasis has shifted. Now our designers are working to
maintain military capabilities while optimizing the safety, security,
and reliability features in the system. Replacement and reuse life
extensions provide the greatest opportunity to modify previously tested
designs to include modern safety and security components, and to
increase our confidence in the reliability of the system.
The use of reuse and replacement to extend the life of a weapon and
to improve surety and safety will also challenge future designers. The
full suite of Stockpile Stewardship Program tools will be required to
design, develop, and certify changes based on existing tested designs.
This will help maintain the most important part of our deterrent, the
skilled scientist, engineers, and technicians that design, build, and
sustain the stockpile. This is also the same skill set needed for
nuclear forensic and counterterrorism.
A replacement life extension would replace either the pit or
secondary with a design based on previously tested designs but not used
previously in the stockpile. This would require specific presidential
authorization and funding approved by Congress. An example of a
replacement life extension is a design that adds advanced safety,
security, or reliability features and requires greater modifications to
either the pit or secondary than reuse designs.
Examples of new warhead or military missions off the table for the
life extension options of replacement, reuse, and refurbishment include
enhanced radiation weapons, electromagnetic pulse weapons, or nuclear
explosive-driven x-ray weapons.
Senator Wicker. Okay. Because I think it would take all of
our time.
Let me ask the panel this, with regard to missile defense
and Russia. I asked this question to Secretary Gates in January
2009. What about a possible missile defense program with Russia
and the United States partnering up? The idea would be a joint
missile defense system. Secretary Gates said there's nothing in
writing. But there have been some inferences and some
discussions, and maybe if we got political baggage out of the
way, that might be a possibility.
I had a conversation with a leading Russian legislator just
this week. I can tell you that he was open to this possibility.
As a matter of fact, he brought it up before I did.
Starting with Dr. Miller, others might be able to
interject, what about this? Is there a place for Russia in this
issue? Has there been any work with Russia on any of our
missile defense concepts?
Dr. Miller. Senator Wicker, the answer is most emphatically
yes. I had the opportunity to meet with, I expect, the same
delegation that you did with Senator Margelov from the Russian
Federation--pardon my butchering of the pronunciation--and had
a similar conversation.
Senator Wicker. Senator Nelson taught me how to pronounce
that word: ``Mar GAY' luv.''
Dr. Miller. Thank you very much.
We've had an ongoing conversation with the Russian
Federation for some time on the possibility of cooperation in
missile defense, and have begun a joint threat assessment of
missiles that could affect both Russia and the United States.
Secretary Gates and DOD believe there's a tremendous amount of
possibility for significant cooperation moving forward.
If I could, Secretary Tauscher has led some of our
discussions with the Russian Federation on this topic. I think
it would be helpful to hear from her, both about what's been
accomplished and about plans which I think are going to
continue in the very near term.
Senator Wicker. That would be great.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Dr. Miller.
Senator Wicker, you're absolutely right. Obviously, while
there are concerns that we address very often about the phased
adaptive approach and what exactly it means to the Russian
Federation, and we have constantly asserted that the phased
adaptive approach is neither targeted toward the Russian
Federation nor, frankly, capable to deter its many, many
offensive weapons. We have had ongoing strategic dialogue with
the Russians. I began it last summer, and we actually are
having a meeting again next month.
There is interest on the part of the Russians. There are
many threats and many opportunities, where we view the world in
the same way. We have a warming relationship with the Russians.
We don't have a close relationship yet, but it certainly is one
where we are establishing much more of a dialogue, especially
when it comes to threats and trying to assume that we can look
at threats the same way.
So, as Dr. Miller said, we're looking at a joint threat
analysis. We're looking at common platforms like radars, things
that the Russians have that are strategically located that
could be part of a larger network that we would have.
I think that there is the possibility for and certainly, we
are going to have ongoing conversations. The idea of working
cooperatively on missile defense is an agenda item of President
Obama. He has talked to President Medvedev about it. I think
that we will continue to see how we can work together and find
those common areas of common agreement where we can come
together.
Senator Wicker. I hope so. I hope that our relationship
with Russia is, indeed, warming. This is a concept that goes
back all the way to President Ronald Reagan, who very famously
and publicly announced, ``If we can learn a way to defend
ourselves against a missile attack by a rogue nation, we would
certainly be willing to share that and let others defend
themselves.'' I'm encouraged by this and I hope we can get
further reports.
Thank you, ma'am.
Senator Ben Nelson. Senator Udall.
Senator Udall. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. Good morning.
It's always wonderful to see my former colleague from the
House, Secretary Tauscher. Thank you for what you're doing.
Secretary Miller, you're making an appearance here almost
every day. Look forward to seeing you again next week, I'm
sure.
Secretary Miller, you talked about tactical nukes and the
fact that they're not included in the limitations addressed in
both the New START treaty and in the NPR. Could you address the
quantities of these tactical, or nonstrategic, as some might
call them, nuclear weapons that we possess, that Russia
possesses, the function of these weapons, and why they weren't
limited in START and the NPR. Then, General Chilton and
Secretary Tauscher, if you'd care to comment as well after
Secretary Miller does, I'd appreciate it.
Dr. Miller. Senator Udall, I will not get into precise
numbers, because they're classified. But, I'll say, in general
terms, that we have some, and the Russians have a lot more
tactical nuclear weapons. As we note in the NPR, we'd like to
see them move their tactical nuclear weapons deeper back into
Russia, and to continue the steps that they've taken over the
past couple of decades, since the end of the Cold War, to
continue to improve the security associated with them.
These weapons were not included in the New START treaty
negotiations, quite simply because, at this point in time,
Russia was not interested in including them. We believed it was
appropriate and important to move forward with significant
reductions in our strategic nuclear forces on both sides, and
that this would have an important effect on strategic stability
and also help move the relationship forward, as well.
We have proposed, and noted in the NPR as well, that after
ratification and entry into force of the New START treaty,
assuming Senate advice and consent for ratification, that we
would intend to pursue further reductions that would include
both strategic and nonstrategic weapons, and both deployed and
nondeployed weapons, so that we really get after the overall
number of nuclear weapons on both sides.
As Under Secretary Tauscher said, even after the New START
treaty comes into place, the United States and Russia will,
together, have approximately 90 percent of the world's nuclear
weapons. So, we think it's appropriate to take another
bilateral step after the New START treaty.
Senator Udall. Secretary Tauscher, would you care to
comment?
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Senator. It's always good to see
you, too.
Dr. Miller's right, first things first. START was aptly
named a long time ago. But, it is the start, not only as
Senator Wicker mentioned, of the warming of the relationship,
but it is the start of a bigger opportunity to move not just on
strategic offensive weapons, which is all that the START treaty
encompasses, but on to tactical weapons. There is a larger
agenda, too, of conventional forces in Europe and many other
things that are intertwined with the 21st century force
structure and perception of threats and the evolution of
threats. So, there are many opportunities here, once the Senate
gives it's advice and consent on the New START treaty, to move
forward on a bilateral basis with the Russians, but then move
into a multilateral opportunity on many of these different
elements. I think that first things first.
Senator Udall. Sure. It has to be expensive for the
Russians to maintain all of those tactical nukes. You'd think
that there might be a sweet spot where they're amenable to
these future conversations. Is that a fair assumption?
Ms. Tauscher. That may be a stretch, Senator, but I think,
certainly, one of the reasons why the President's Nuclear
Security Summit, I believe, was such a success for having 47
heads of state here in Washington, talking about nuclear
terrorism and the importance of nonproliferation. This issue of
having weapons that are out there that are not only difficult
to secure, but that are the targets of organized crime and,
certainly, terrorism. So, smaller number of weapons, easier to
secure, while we are still, obviously, maintaining our
stockpile at the highest levels. So, I think that there will be
increased interest, and perhaps some pressure from the world
community, for the nuclear powers to look at, specifically,
tactical substrategic nuclear weapons, and to get the numbers
down to a more controllable number.
Senator Udall. General Chilton, did you want to add
anything to the conversation?
General Chilton. I think that adequately covers it,
Senator. I'd agree that the next topic of discussion ought to
be the large disparity and the large Russian stockpile of what
we would call tactical weapons. There will be a dialogue that
needs to start as soon as both sides are ready to come together
on it. It will be, as mentioned, one that will be a complicated
one that will take time. But, we won't get there if we don't
start talking about it.
Senator Udall. I'm not a lawyer, so I can ask questions I
don't know the answer to. I'm curious, the size of a tactical
nuke, would it be much bigger than those two desks that you're
sitting at there?
General Chilton. Physically in size?
Senator Udall. Yes, physical size.
General Chilton. They can be much smaller than this desk.
Senator Udall. It can be much smaller. I'm mindful of that
very powerful documentary that the Nunn-Lugar group put
together and the couple at the Canadian border with what they
said was a statue in a desk-sized box, and, instead, it was a
tactical nuke inside that box.
Let me turn to China. I know their arsenal is much smaller
than ours in the States here, but they also have a lack of
transparency, and so, you could raise questions about their
strategic intentions.
Secretary Miller, Secretary Tauscher, could you talk about
your analysis of their intentions, and what are we doing in the
realm of more military-to-military discussions that might
create more transparency and a better relationship?
Ms. Tauscher. You're right, Senator, I think that
confidence-building and a sense of transparency and the kind of
visibility that we're looking for, not only among the nuclear
powers, but generally to strengthen the NPT, is an area of
conversation that we have with the Chinese.
Once again, we are mindful of the fact that China is a
signatory to the NPT. But, at the same time, I think there are
concerns about their force posture and the way that they manage
their weapons that would cause concern, not necessarily
significant concern, certainly. But people want to have a sense
of confidence and more of a visibility into the Chinese
program. More of a sense of confidence-building would be
welcome.
Dr. Miller. Senator Udall, I would just add that the
Chinese have indicated that they're not seeking numerical
parity with the United States or with Russia. At the same time
that, as Secretary Tauscher has indicated, they've had a lack
of transparency about their plans and programs for nuclear
weapons and delivery systems. We would hope to engage with them
in a discussion on strategic stability that includes increased
transparency, not just on numbers of weapons, but on their
thoughts about both plans and policies associated with them.
Senator Udall. The NPR calls for bilateral talks, I
believe, with both Russia and China, with an emphasis on more
stable and resilient, transparent strategic relationships. When
would you anticipate those talks might start?
Ms. Tauscher. President Obama put together a strategic
dialogue between both China and the United States, and Russia
and the United States. There are 13 or 14 subgroups. All of
them have met in both the Chinese and the Russian engagements.
These are talks that are meant to, once again, assert what our
positions and our principles are on many issues, but at the
same time, to listen and to work together and develop
relationships. So, I think we're well on our way to developing
those kinds of relationships. But, once again, the Chinese will
make their own decisions as to the kinds of transparency they
will have. I think that we and many others are on notice that
the lack of transparency causes us to ask for more confidence-
building. We are very interested in having conversations that
would create that kind of confidence.
Senator Udall. I'm confident, as I finish my questioning
here, that, Secretary Tauscher, you will lead the effort ably,
as you have. Congratulations on the New START treaty. I look
forward, as one Senator, to supporting it when it comes to the
floor of the Senate. I see no reason that we shouldn't be able
to find, easily, the 67 votes to ratify the treaty.
So, thank you for your hard and important work.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you, Senator. Thank you very much.
Senator Udall. Thanks.
Senator Ben Nelson. Senator Sessions.
Senator Sessions. Thank you, Chairman Nelson.
It's great to see each of you. We thank you for your
service to the country and look forward to working with you on
some very important issues that we'll be dealing with in the
months to come.
Secretary Tauscher, we worked together on funding a lot of
defense issues over the years, and I hope that relationship can
continue.
I'll ask Secretary Miller and Secretary Tauscher this
question. It seems to me that the President has stated an
improvident policy. That is that we would eliminate nuclear
weapons entirely. I say it's improvident because it's not going
to happen. Sometimes bad goals can get you in trouble. Second,
the administration seems to be committed to the view that if
America leads in reducing our weapons significantly, that this
will cause others to want to follow.
What evidence do you have, and what facts can you cite,
that this so-called moral leadership argument will actually
impact countries that present the greatest immediate threat, it
seems, to us, Iran and North Korea, from pursuing nuclear
weapon systems?
Dr. Miller. Senator Sessions, I'll answer first, and then
turn it to Secretary Tauscher.
The goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons from the Earth
has been a goal of U.S. administrations, starting with the
Truman administration, and has been embraced by every one--
every administration but one since then, including, very
famously, President Reagan.
What the President said as he announced this objective for
the United States, or reiterated this objective for the United
States, was that this is an important objective and that he, at
the same time, realized that it was something that may not
occur during his lifetime, or during our lifetimes. The fact
that we are pursuing this objective and taking steps in this
direction, consistent with our NPT obligations, but, at the
same time, sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear
deterrent for ourselves, our allies, and partners, is a
fundamental part of the policy.
With respect to the reduction of nuclear weapons, we didn't
assume that if we reduced it, others would. Indeed, that's why
we had a bilateral negotiation with Russia to reduce their
nuclear weapons as we reduced ours. We believe that while exact
parity in numbers of nuclear weapons is not as important as it
was, perhaps, during the Cold War, it's still important to have
approximate parity on both sides, so that neither side has any
confusion about the intent of the other.
Finally, with respect to the question of the impact on
nonproliferation of our statements, including our declaratory
policy, the intent is to make very clear that there are
benefits to states that will adhere to the NPT--not just join,
but fulfill their nuclear nonproliferation obligations and
there are potential risks to states, such as Iran, that do not.
Ms. Tauscher. Senator Sessions, as Dr. Miller says, the
idea of eliminating nuclear weapons has been a goal and an
aspiration of American administrations for over 50 years. It is
also a key pillar of the NPT, something that we are not only a
depository state but a signatory to, that is for nuclear-weapon
states to disarm.
But, the President has balanced those commitments and those
ambitions with a very sanguine set of national security
priorities, which include increasing budgets, in both the NNSA
and in the nonproliferation budget, to make sure that until
that time, as the President has said may not happen in his
lifetime, that will take patience and persistence. The United
States will have the strongest, most effective, and the safest
nuclear stockpile in the world, and that our deterrent that we
use to protect ourselves and, certainly, our allies is extended
deterrence which is as strong as ever.
Senator Sessions. Thank you.
I'm just not sure that this kind of political leadership is
going to work in the way that it's projected. I do worry that
if we draw our numbers too low, a lot of nations might well
consider that they could, with a little investment and a period
of years, be a peer-competitor of us with nuclear weapons and
alter the balance of power in the world. We do have problems
with that.
Secretary Tauscher, I believe you were asked about
Secretary Flournoy's comments recently, that need to be backed
off on. But, it was reported in the Information Telegraph
Agency of Russia-Telegrafonyc Agentstvo Svazii Soobshchenyu,
February 15, that you told journalists in Russia that the
United States had no plans to deploy missile defense elements
in the Black Sea, to include Aegis ships and sea-based missile
defense components. The Aegis BMD capability is currently
installed on 4 cruisers and 16 destroyers, all Arleigh Burke-
class destroyers, and 9 Ticonderoga-class cruisers are planned
to receive the capability. A significant portion of our fleet.
Aegis-class ships have sailed into the Black Sea seven times
over the past 5 years. The last such deployment was, however,
in July 2009. Your comments are disturbing, because it would
seem to indicate a new policy on deployments in the Black Sea.
Certainly, we received Russian demands on missile defense that
I think go beyond anything we should acquiesce in.
So, are there any restrictions on the deployment in the
Black Sea? Are you aware of any changes in the policy?
Ms. Tauscher. No, Senator. There are no restrictions, and I
was very clear. The question asked me if there was any
permanent deployment of Aegis ships in the Black Sea, and I
said, ``There are no--there isn't.'' There is not a policy to
do that. I was very clear that we have had deployments of Aegis
ships, most recently last summer, and that this is a decision
that is going to go forward with cooperation. I think it's the
Montreux Treaty.
Senator Sessions. Are there any----
Ms. Tauscher. But, there are no constraints.
Senator Sessions. Including Aegis ships with missile
defense systems.
Secretary Miller? Dr. Miller? DOD, what's your
understanding?
Dr. Miller. Senator Sessions, that's correct. We have no
plans to permanently deploy Aegis cruisers in the Black Sea but
we have the option to position ships there, as consistent with
the Montreux Convention.
Senator Sessions. I certainly can understand that you don't
always get well-quoted in foreign press, not even in American
press. Sometimes you can be misquoted. It's important that we
maintain that right. But, I have to say that we also were told
that there would be no connection on missile defense deployment
to the START negotiations. Before they even started, we,
basically, undermined our ability to work with the Poles and
Czechs and have been, from my perspective, on a very uncertain
course, with regard to that.
Maybe, Dr. Miller, first, you've also indicated that we are
committed to ``the long-term goal of a world free of nuclear
weapons,'' and that's in the NPR, and that the President has
``directed a review of potential future reductions in--below
the New START treaty levels,'' even further down. Can you
assure us that an objective and careful analysis will be made
before such decisions are made?
Dr. Miller. Senator Sessions, yes. To reiterate what is
stated in the NPR, the intention would be to conduct this
analysis, have a hard look at deterrence requirements and a
number of other factors, to consider any future reductions only
after ratification and entry into force of the New START
treaty.
Senator Sessions. My understanding is that the Russians
have absolutely no vision that nuclear weapons will be
eliminated from the world. This is not something on their radar
screen. So, we're not going to influence them, I think, by
unilateral actions.
With regard to our huge disparity in tactical weapons, and
they are not covered at all in this treaty, it seems to me that
proliferation the danger of a terrorist obtaining a nuclear
weapon would be at least as great, if not greater, with regard
to a tactical weapon than one that's in a strategic situation.
Would you agree?
Dr. Miller. Senator Sessions, in general, I would agree. We
do think it's still important to move forward with the New
START treaty and to strengthen strategic stability. At the same
time, we would look forward not just to further reductions in
tactical nuclear weapons, as you suggested, but also would look
forward to Russia taking further steps to improve the security
of its tactical nuclear weapons, including their movement
deeper back into the interior of the country.
Senator Sessions. These are very serious matters, and I
want to be sure that our minds are clear that the agreements
and treaty-signings, and happy days that those produce, don't
color our view of the reality of the dangerous world that we
live in. In my view, one of the certain ways to expand nuclear
proliferation to a host of nations in the world, if they lose
confidence in the willingness of the United States to utilize a
nuclear umbrella to protect them. We have allies and friends
who could build nuclear weapons easily. If they feel, at any
point, that we've lost our will to maintain sufficient numbers
or to use them in their defense, they will have no choice,
probably, but to decide to build systems of their own. So, the
danger is that the risk we could have is that policies hoping
to reduce weapons and reduce proliferation could actually
create the other.
I guess you've thought about that? Dr. Miller? Ms.
Tauscher?
Dr. Miller. Senator Sessions, yes, we certainly have. We
consulted extensively with allies and partners during the
conduct of the NPR, as well as during the New START treaty
negotiations. We have expressions of support for both the NPR
and New START treaty from allies and partners across the world.
I'd be happy to provide some of those for the record, if you'd
like.
Senator Sessions. I think there are some that are nervous.
I'm aware of that. Would you not agree?
Dr. Miller. Sir, we certainly have allies and partners who
are nervous about the security situation in which they find
themselves. I believe that the expressions that we've heard
from both allies and partners, from multiple regions, have been
to increase their confidence in the U.S. commitment to their
security, including the U.S. nuclear umbrella.
Senator Sessions. I understand that some are nervous.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Sessions.
Senator Bingaman.
Senator Bingaman. Thank you very much.
I appreciate all of your being here.
Let me just revisit one issue that General Chilton talked
about earlier. My understanding is that when President Bush
entered into the Moscow Treaty, you referred it, back in 2003,
there were no verification measures contained there. The
thinking was that the verification measures in the START treaty
would apply or would meet the need. Now START has expired, so
we have no verification measures, at the current time, with
regard to the Moscow Treaty. Am I right in that?
General Chilton. That's correct, Senator. That's my
understanding.
Senator Bingaman. Yes. So, one of the necessities that we
need to think about, in regard to the New START treaty, is the
need to put back in place these verification measures, or a new
set of verification measures, and that's what I understood
Under Secretary Miller to talk about, in your comments earlier.
Let me just go to another issue. I think one of the goals
in the NPR is to increase the decision time for launch that the
President would have. I would ask, Dr. Miller, if you could
explain what reviews are underway or what actions might be
possible to accomplish that. Is there really something
happening to increase the decision time the President would
have before he would have to decide whether to launch or not?
Dr. Miller. Senator Bingaman, there are two elements to
thinking about increasing decision time and thinking about how
to improve the quality of information available, whatever the
decision time.
The first is that we are looking at improvements at our
nuclear command-and-control system. We are making some
investments now that were decided during the NPR, and are
considering additional steps that it would be more appropriate
to discuss in a classified setting.
The second is that as we move forward with a possible ICBM
follow-on, we will look at options that have the possibility of
survivability without requiring launch-under-attack or launch-
on-warning, as would be the case with our current silo-based
ICBMs. We think the current ICBMs are extremely stable and
stabilizing, particularly as we deMIRV to one warhead each.
But, we will look at concepts that would make them even more
survivable over time, which would allow them to be part of a
Reserve Force.
Senator Bingaman. Okay.
Dr. Miller. Those are really the two principal areas that
we have--that we've looked at.
Senator Bingaman. Dr. Miller, my understanding is that NATO
is currently debating whether or not the deployment of this B-
61 gravity bomb, how will decisions by NATO affect the life-
extension program that NNSA is engaged in with regard to that?
How will it affect NNSA's budget going forward?
Dr. Miller. Senator Bingaman, you are correct that NATO is
currently discussing the future of the NATO nuclear deterrent.
Irrespective of the decisions that are taken at NATO, the
United States will continue to have a requirement for the B-61,
both for our heavy bombers associated with the strategic
deterrent, also for the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) that is
moving forward now, and we're planning on a dual-capability for
that aircraft that would be available in the 2017 timeframe.
General Chilton. Senator, if I could add to that. There has
been a lot of, I think, misunderstanding here. We need the B-
61, as Dr. Miller said, both for the B-2 bomber and for our
current dual-capable aircraft. Folks have tried to make a
linkage between the B-61 life-extension program and NATO
decisions and F-35 JSF schedule. They are not linked. We need
to move out on the B-61 life-extension program. That includes
current year fiscal year 2010 reprogramming that will be
required to get us on schedule so that we can complete the B-61
in time to then, in 2017, move on to the next problem we know
we will have to address, which will be the W-78 warhead. We are
up at a tipping point here, a critical time--and I'll defer to
Mr. D'Agostino on this schedule-wise, infrastructure-wise, and
funding-wise, and it's time for action on the B-61.
I would close by saying it will be the first real
opportunity to add the enhanced security and safety features,
as well as increasing the effectiveness of the warhead, that
are in line with the President's statements that we've seen
here in the NPR.
Mr. D'Agostino. If I could just add.
Senator Bingaman. Mr. D'Agostino, did you have a comment?
Mr. D'Agostino. Absolutely. To back up what the General
said, the B-61 requirement still exists for me to maintain and
take care of this warhead, as you've heard, from a requirements
standpoint. It is one of our oldest warheads in the stockpile.
It's the mainstay of our bomber leg of the deterrent. We know
we have components that are aging out, and they have to be
addressed.
The sequencing, as the General described, is very
important. The plan is clear: finish the production work on the
W-76, look at what we need to do at the B-61 concurrently.
That's why we need to start now on that. When the production
work on the W-76 warhead tails off, the sequencing is perfect
for taking care of our aging issues and concerns on the B-61.
That'll pick up in 2017.
Senator Bingaman. Let me ask, on this W-78, I gathered from
Dr. Miller's comments that one of the things being considered
is developing that as a common warhead for the ICBM and the
SLBMs. How much more complicated is that than just a straight
life extension of the W-78?
Mr. D'Agostino. Why don't I start, and then if General
Chilton would like to add, that'd be fine.
It clearly is going to be more technical work than just
doing one life-extension. But, we do know, in the aggregate,
it's better for us to look at this opportunity to consolidate,
because there are, potentially, some very significant savings
associated with costs of only doing one life-extension to take
care of two warheads. Real opportunities to reduce the numbers
and types of warheads, when we look at commonality and the cost
piece, and the real opportunity, frankly, to put the types of
safety and security pieces in. It's going to be a little bit
more challenging technically, but absolutely worth the study.
In fact, that's what our 2011 budget proposes to do, is start
that effort to study options that we have to do with
the W-78.
General Chilton. I would just echo the point that the study
is very important and the promise of the study, with an
adaptable-type warhead like this, is that, if we can
successfully do this, that I would be comfortable, and I'm sure
future STRATCOM commanders would be comfortable, with reducing
the number of warheads we retain in the nondeployed hedged
status. So this is proceeding forward. Being able to look
across the spectrum of refurbish, reuse, and replace is what
enables this type of study to go forward.
Senator Bingaman. Thank you very much.
My time is up.
Chairman Levin. Thank you, Senator Bingaman.
Senator Bill Nelson.
Senator Bill Nelson. Good morning.
General Chilton, after having some conversations with
General Cartwright, the Vice Chairman, and General Kehler, the
head of Air Force Space Command, they are quite concerned about
the recent decision by the National Aeronautics and Space
Administration (NASA) budget, which originated with the science
advisor having not consulted DOD. They suddenly proposed the
elimination of the testing of the solid rocket motor, known as
the Ares 1-X. It is a derivative of the solid rocket motor of
the Space Shuttle, which has four segments. It adds a fifth
segment. There has been one flight test. There is another
rocket that is prepared for test. The question before us is
whether or not to continue the testing through fiscal year 2011
of the Ares 1-X, instead of canceling it, as the President's
budget proposes.
The concern, as expressed by General Cartwright and General
Kehler, is that by shutting down a major part of solid rocket
production, it then exponentially increases the cost of the
remaining solid rocket motors that DOD has to acquire for the
SLBMs and other ballistic missiles that we have in silos.
Since you're the STRATCOM commander, I'd like for you to
give your opinion.
General Chilton. Thank you, Senator Nelson. Senator Nelson,
as you are well aware, the solid rocket motor--large solid
rocket motors, are very complicated devices. They appear to
work quite simply, but, indeed, they give us a great advantage,
having the technology and industrial base that we have today,
to be able to produce them. As the STRATCOM commander, my
concern, that I know acquisition, technology, and logistics is
taking a close look at in DOD, is what impact this decision
might have on the industrial base as we look to the future.
We're committed to look at a follow-on to the land-based
strategic deterrent, the Minuteman III. Although the Navy right
now has decided to continue with the D-5 missile during the
transition to the follow-on Ohio-class, I would anticipate in
the future there will be requirements for a follow-on to that
missile at some point, as well.
Are we postured correctly, from an industrial-base
standpoint, to sustain this technology that I believe will be
important for the strategic deterrent for many years to come.
That's a question that I think we need to take a hard look at,
Senator.
It goes beyond just cost, in my view, though. Although cost
would certainly, I would imagine, transfer over towards those
other programs. But, it is really bigger than cost, in my view.
Senator Bill Nelson. In response to your answer about
industrial base as well as cost, help me understand someone who
might say that the diameter of the continued testing on Ares 1,
since it's a big rocket, is not the same as the diameter on a
D-5 or a follow-on to a Minuteman III. Does that have any
bearing? Because, would it not still affect the same industrial
base that you're talking about?
General Chilton. Senator, I guess I don't understand the
argument. Again, a large solid rocket motor has the issues of
getting the chemistry right and the production of a solid
propellant. It has issues with liners, it has issues with
inhibitors, it has issues with guidance and control. Thrust-
vectoring systems with the solid rocket motor are not simple to
do, casing issues, et cetera. All of these are very complicated
components of any large solid rocket motor, whether it be the
D-5, the Minuteman III, the Shuttle SRBs, or any follow-on to
that. This is what I'm worried about, that we don't lose that
formula and expertise for being able to address all the
engineering challenges associated with all of those things, not
to mention the joints between segments, as we go forward.
Senator Bill Nelson. I think the overall DOD has been taken
by surprise in this NASA announcement to cancel. I have clearly
let it be known my displeasure. Here it comes back to one hand
of the Government not knowing what the other hand of the
Government is doing. There should have been this kind of
consultation.
I would encourage you, as one of the major commanders, to
weigh in your feelings about this, because there's going to
have to be a decision made very soon, with regard to whether or
not this industrial base is going to continue. When I say very
soon, I have put additional money in the budget resolution,
that we are in committee today on, to give some flexibility for
the future that NASA could continue this testing. But,
decisions are going to be made come June in our authorizing
committee. They're going to be made come July in the
Appropriations Committee. So, this is upon us. I urge you, use
all deliberate dispatch.
Madam Secretary, I just want to say that, for any one of
our colleagues to ascend to the heights of power and prestige
that you have, my compliments to you. I want to ask you about
what progress you thought was made, in this recent Nuclear
Security Summit, on the goal of a nuclear lockdown on the
proliferation.
Ms. Tauscher. Thank you very much, Senator. It's good to
see you. I'm honored to be here.
I think that, first of all, this was an historic summit. It
was the first time in decades that we've had so many heads of
state come. This is an issue that, when your former colleague,
President Obama, was in the Senate, was something that he
believed to be a primary threat to the American people and the
stabilization of the world community. The idea that there were
more states acquiring nuclear weapons than ever before, and
that nuclear security has become an issue that we all have to
deal with. It's not just the responsibility of the P5 nuclear-
weapon states, but it's everyone's responsibility, because
everyone has to patrol their borders, everyone has to deal with
export controls, everyone has to deal with the ambitions of
terrorists and others that are around the world.
I think that the deliverables at the summit were very
significant. There were two big baskets of deliverables. The
first one was, the United States and Russia, after 10 years,
signed the Plutonium Disposition Agreement, which commits both
countries to moving toward elimination of plutonium, enough
plutonium to make 17,000 nuclear weapons. So, this is a sizable
commitment, to eliminate this plutonium.
The second was a basket of highly-enriched uranium (HEU)
offerings from countries like Chile, Canada, Mexico, and
Ukraine, where they will eliminate their HEU and actually have
both the United States and Russia work to eliminate that HEU.
I think that it was significant, from a policy standpoint.
It was significant, from the fact that there were real
deliverables, of lessening significantly both plutonium and HEU
that is in the world.
I think, probably most significantly, it added to the
debate and heightened the sense of awareness, to average
Americans and people all over the world, that this is, indeed,
a 21st century problem that is going to take lots of people
and, frankly, a lot of political will to abate. But, these
ambitions of states to get nuclear weapons, and making sure
that we have secured both the know-how, the material, and the
weapons themselves, significantly, both by diminishing their
numbers but also by making investments in keeping them secure,
is a priority of the President and, certainly, those heads of
state were there and many others.
I think it was a very big success. The Republic of Korea
has agreed to host the 2012 Nuclear Security Summit. This was
originally an idea that was meant to be a one-time thing. But,
it was such a big success and, I think, accrued to the American
people such big national security gains, that we're very happy
to see the Republic of Korea host the 2012 Nuclear Security
Summit.
Senator Bill Nelson. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Chairman Levin. Thank you very much, Senator Nelson.
You don't have any additional questions, I don't either.
We are very grateful to this panel for your terrific work
in this area. You have proposed a number of documents here and
important treaties and reviews, which will set the direction of
this country for decades, in an area that is of critical
importance to the world, to world security, to the fight
against terrorism. Your involvement, all of you, is a major
contribution to our security, and we're grateful for it. We're
grateful for your being here today.
We will stand adjourned.
[Questions for the record with answers supplied follow:]
Questions Submitted by Senator Roland W. Burris
strategic arms reduction treaty
1. Senator Burris. Secretary Tauscher, Dr. Miller, General Chilton,
and Mr. D'Agostino, the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
agreement addresses the nuclear stockpile levels and the number of
weapons each nation can maintain. Does the new START agreement address
the enforcement of this agreement?
Secretary Tauscher and Dr. Miller. The New START treaty limits
numbers of deployed warheads and their delivery vehicles. The treaty
contains a comprehensive verification regime to monitor compliance with
its requirements. The New START treaty created the Bilateral
Consultative Commission (BCC) to support implementation of the treaty
provisions. The BCC will provide a forum for discussion and resolution
of compliance issues, implementation questions, and continued strategic
dialogue. Ultimately, a party may withdraw from the treaty if
extraordinary events jeopardize its supreme interests. This could
include a material breach by the other party's noncompliance with
obligations imposed by the treaty.
General Chilton. Yes. The New START treaty establishes the BCC as a
compliance and implementation body that will meet at least twice each
year, unless otherwise agreed. Compliance and implementation questions
may be raised by either party in the BCC.
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, the New START treaty establishes central
limits for strategic offensive arms that must be met within 7 years
after entry into force, and provides a comprehensive regime to verify
each party's compliance with these limits and with the other provisions
of the treaty. The central limits are: 1,550 for deployed strategic
warheads; 700 for deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM),
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM), and heavy bombers
equipped for nuclear armaments; and 800 for deployed and nondeployed
ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy bombers. The verification
regime to assess compliance is based in part on the experiences gained
by the United States and Russia through the implementation of the 1991
START treaty, and includes elements that are specifically tailored to
verify the limitations and provisions of the new treaty. Any concern
identified regarding a party's compliance with its treaty obligations
can be raised by the other party through the treaty's BCC, which is the
compliance and implementation body that will meet at least twice each
year, unless otherwise agreed.
2. Senator Burris. Secretary Tauscher, Dr. Miller, General Chilton,
and Mr. D'Agostino, has there been any discussion about how nations who
are party to the agreement will ensure all parties are meeting their
obligations?
Secretary Tauscher and Dr. Miller. The New START treaty contains
detailed monitoring and transparency provisions that supplement
National Technical Means (NTMs) to form an effective verification
regime. There are provisions for data exchanges and notifications
regarding strategic offensive systems and facilities covered by the
treaty, up to 18 onsite inspections each year, and exhibitions of new
systems entering treaty accountability. The Protocol to the treaty
further elaborates the rights and obligations associated with the
verification measures set forth in the treaty, while annexes to the
treaty lay out key details of how each of the verification measures is
to be implemented.
The New START treaty created the BCC to promote the objectives and
implementation of the treaty provisions. The BCC will provide a forum
for discussion and resolution of compliance issues, implementation
questions, and continued strategic dialogue. Issues that are not
resolved in the BCC can be escalated to diplomatic channels and if
necessary to the highest levels of government. If there were a material
breach by the other party arising from noncompliance with obligations
imposed by the treaty, international law provides that a party can
suspend its obligations in whole or in part. Ultimately, a party may
withdraw from the treaty if extraordinary events jeopardize its supreme
interests.
General Chilton. Yes. Verification measures have been built into
the New START treaty to monitor compliance. The treaty contains a
verification regime that builds on lessons learned from 15 years of
implementing START. This regime includes unencumbered use of NTMs, data
exchanges and notifications regarding strategic systems and facilities,
two types of onsite inspections, exhibitions, and, as a transparency
measure, telemetry exchanges. Specifically:
NTM - The treaty provides for the use of and non-
interference with NTM of verification (e.g., satellites). There
are explicit provisions that prohibit interference with NTM and
the use of concealment measures than may impede monitoring by
NTM.
Data Exchanges and Notifications - The United States
and Russia will exchange data on numbers, locations, and
technical characteristics of strategic weapon systems and
facilities that are subject to the treaty. Additionally, each
side will provide regular notifications and data updates.
Onsite Inspections - There are two types of
inspections.
Type One inspections focus on ICBM bases,
submarine bases, and air bases; that is sites
containing both deployed and nondeployed strategic
systems.
Type Two inspections focus on sites with only
nondeployed strategic systems.
Inspections include:
confirming the number of reentry
vehicles on deployed ICBMs and deployed SLBMs,
confirming numbers related to
nondeployed launcher limits,
counting nuclear weapons onboard or
attached to deployed heavy bombers,
confirming weapon system conversions
or eliminations as well as facility
eliminations.
Each side is allowed to conduct 18 inspections
annually: 10 Type One and 8 Type Two.
Unique Identifiers - Each ICBM, SLBM, and heavy bomber
will be assigned a unique identifier (alphanumeric number),
which will be included in the applicable notifications and
database which may be confirmed during inspections.
Telemetric Information - During ICBM and SLBM flight
tests, measurements of various technical parameters are made to
monitor missile performance. To enhance transparency and
supplement verification provisions, the parties have agreed to
an annual exchange of telemetric information on a parity basis,
for up to five ICBM and SLBM launches per year.
Mr. D'Agostino. Yes, the verification regime developed for the New
START treaty provides the United States and Russia the means to verify
each other's compliance with their treaty obligations. The verification
regime includes data exchanges and notifications regarding strategic
offensive arms and facilities covered by the treaty, two types of
onsite inspections, exhibitions, and provisions to facilitate the use
of NTMs for verifying compliance with provisions of the treaty. Either
party may raise questions relating to treaty compliance through the
BCC, which is the treaty's compliance and implementation body that will
meet at least twice each year, unless otherwise agreed.
iran and north korea
3. Senator Burris. Secretary Tauscher, Iran and North Korea have
been pursuing technology for nuclear weapons. Was there any discussion
about the fact that Iran and North Korea are trying to develop nuclear
weapons?
Secretary Tauscher. While the United States and Russia frequently
discuss the problems of Iran and North Korea pursuing development of
nuclear weapons, this was not a topic of discussion in the negotiation
of the bilateral New START treaty.
4. Senator Burris. Secretary Tauscher, will the New START agreement
change if Iran and North Korea manage to develop nuclear weapons?
Secretary Tauscher. No. The New START treaty is a bilateral
agreement designed to stabilize the strategic balance between the
United States and the Russian Federation at lower levels of nuclear
forces. It is not linked to development of nuclear weapons by other
countries, including Iran or North Korea. The United States will
sustain safe, secure, and effective nuclear forces to deter any
potential adversary as long as nuclear weapons exist.
national nuclear security administration
5. Senator Burris. Mr. D'Agostino, you mentioned that the National
Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) intends to coordinate with the
Department of Defense (DOD) in order to develop a new Stockpile
Stewardship and Management Plan (SSMP) to Congress. When do you
anticipate being able to present this plan, and what key points will it
address?
Mr. D'Agostino. The NNSA SSMP was delivered to Congress on June 16,
2010. This plan details our approach for modernizing the
infrastructure, managing the stockpile, and sustaining the science and
technology base that underpins the nuclear security enterprise. The
SSMP is aligned with the 2010 Nuclear Posture Review (NPR) Report, the
congressionally mandated Stockpile Management Program, and U.S.
nonproliferation goals, and is the NNSA plan for maintaining a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear stockpile without a need to resume
nuclear testing.
As identified in the NPR and detailed in the SSMP, our long-term
strategy is to manage our aging stockpile through infrastructure
modernization, warhead life extensions, and a world-class science and
technology base. Two major production facilities are essential to the
infrastructure modernization effort: the Chemistry and Metallurgy
Research Replacement nuclear facility at Los Alamos for plutonium
research and development and the Uranium Processing Facility at Y-12 in
Tennessee where we carry out HEU operations. Warhead life extensions
will be carried out on a case-by-case basis, seeking to increase
stockpile safety, security, and effectiveness. This plan does not
pursue new military capabilities or missions for our warheads, nor will
we perform nuclear tests. Finally, accomplishing these SSMPs requires a
highly capable Federal and contractor workforce with the specialized
skills needed to sustain the nuclear deterrent and support-related
national security goals.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator John McCain
affordability of implementing the nuclear posture review
6. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller, General Chilton, and Mr. D'Agostino,
the NPR sets forth a broad vision that must not be viewed outside of
the realm of affordability. As I mentioned earlier, the cost alone for
modernizing, both the nuclear weapons complex and the triad, is
substantial. As we move to reduce our nuclear stockpile, this
modernization effort becomes all the more important. Factoring in the
cost of a missile defense and a prompt global strike--both essential
and critical, but also costly, programs--the overall budget outlook
seems to suggest steady increases for the foreseeable future. What is
the near-term and long-term affordability of implementing the NPR?
Dr. Miller. The cost of implementing the NPR is affordable. Current
best-estimates are provided in the administration's report prepared in
response to section 1251 of the National Defense Authorization Act
(NDAA) for Fiscal Year 2010.
General Chilton. The NPR clearly articulates the enduring value of
the triad in our nuclear posture. At the same time, we are facing a
significant period of recapitalization of the nuclear enterprise. It
will take the commitment of the administration and Congress to ensure a
safe, secure, and effective (albeit smaller) deterrent force. We are
working very hard to carefully study the requirements and tradespace to
make the most cost-effective investments, while looking for leveraging
opportunities and innovative ways to meet our national security
commitments.
Mr. D'Agostino. The President's budget request for fiscal year 2011
provides the resources for NNSA to accomplish its mission in fiscal
years 2011-2015. This funding is both essential and necessary for
regaining key NNSA nuclear weapons capabilities and sustaining the core
workforce and infrastructure that underwrite the nuclear mission. The
President's submittal demonstrates a long-term, executable commitment
to a safe, secure, and effective nuclear deterrent. I recommend the
long-term program outlined in the SSMP be adopted by Congress; it will
put NNSA on the path to delivering a safe, secure, and effective
nuclear deterrent.
7. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller, General Chilton, and Mr. D'Agostino,
does the administration intend to upgrade or modernize each leg of the
triad?
Dr. Miller. DOD plans to invest in each leg of the triad to ensure
that existing capabilities are adequately sustained with essential
upgrades and modifications. Additionally, DOD will seek to modernize
systems, as needed, to ensure continuing deterrent capability over the
long-term.
General Chilton. The Services are making investments to maintain a
credible nuclear force. Specific actions will be reported to Congress
as directed by section 1251 of the 2010 NDAA. U.S. Strategic Command
(STRATCOM), with the assigned mission of nuclear deterrence,
participates in the process of identifying requirements and advocating
for funding for modernization and sustainment of triad forces and
weapons. The President's fiscal year 2011 budget provides adequate
initial funding to address our Nation's most critical needs to update
and modernize our deterrent and global strike capabilities.
Mr. D'Agostino. Over the next 3 decades every nuclear warhead now
in the stockpile will require some level of technical attention in
order to ensure their continued safety, security, and effectiveness.
The technical attention required for each warhead type will vary. Some
will require a full life extension while others will only involve the
exchange of limited life components. The NNSA will sustain the warheads
for every leg of the nuclear triad through a comprehensive process of
life extension programs. For each of these life extensions the full
spectrum of options will be studied on a case-by-case basis, and the
national laboratories will offer their best technical advice for
extending the life of a warhead and improving it's safety, security,
and effectiveness without adding any new military capabilities, as
outlined in the NPR.
future of the triad
8. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller and General Chilton, the NPR states
that the United States should retain a smaller nuclear triad. With the
exception of the next generation ballistic missile submarine, the NPR
says very little about long-term modernization efforts. It recognizes
that decisions need to be made on the next generation ICBM and the next
generation bomber, but cites little urgency in making those decisions.
Given the guidance set forth in the NPR, do you believe our nuclear
force structure will include bombers, ICBMs, and ballistic missile
submarines 25 years from now? If so, when must a decision be made on
pursuing a follow-on ICBM and a follow-on bomber?
Dr. Miller. U.S. nuclear force structure 25 years from now will
depend greatly on any changes to the geopolitical situation, and any
future arms control agreements. That said, a diverse force structure
has significant advantages for hedging against potential technical
problems or vulnerabilities. The Air Force plans to sustain the
Minuteman III through 2030 as directed by Section 139 of the John
Warner NDAA for Fiscal Year 2007, and will initiate studies of possible
ICBM follow-on systems in fiscal years 2011-2013. Similarly, the Air
Force will retain the B-52 for nuclear mission requirements through
2035 and will provide plans for a follow-on bomber along with the
President's budget submission for fiscal year 2012. The Navy has
already initiated research and development for the next generation
ballistic missile submarine, funding for which began in fiscal year
2010.
General Chilton. The NPR validates the enduring value of the triad
and its complementary capabilities in securing the peace and preventing
major conflicts. As we sustain and modernize the triad, our Nation will
continue to require a nuclear-capable bomber leg's inherent flexibility
to address a wide variety of possible adversaries and contingencies. We
are participating in the Office of the Secretary of Defense's (OSD)
Long-Range Strike study to identify and assess necessary attributes and
capabilities for the next long-range bomber that will meet combatant
commanders' needs and ensure no gap in capabilities. We anticipate that
the long-range strike study will be completed in time to inform
decisions for the upcoming fiscal year 2012 budget submission.
Regarding an ICBM follow-on system, we anticipate initial studies will
begin in fiscal year 2011 and an analysis of alternatives will follow
shortly thereafter. We are working to ensure life extension upgrades
and technology development efforts required to support the Minuteman
III from 2020 through 2030 will leverage into a follow-on system.
f-35
9. Senator McCain. General Chilton, the NPR confirms that the Air
Force will retain a dual, nuclear and conventional, capable fighter as
it replaces the F-16s with the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter. How critical
is the timely delivery of the dual-capable F-35 to the extended
deterrence mission?
General Chilton. It is important to preclude a gap in our extended
deterrent capabilities. I support Service efforts to field the dual-
capable version of the F-35 before end-of-life for the current dual-
capable version of the F-16. This is a top priority for both STRATCOM
and U.S. European Command. I also support Service efforts to move
forward with a limited life extension program of the F-16 fleet, which
will provide options to mitigate F-35 schedule risk. The NPR clearly
articulates that nuclear-capable fighter aircraft forward-based in
Europe are enduring, visible manifestations of our Nation's extended
deterrence commitment to NATO, and a key component of a broader
strategy to accomplish U.S. nonproliferation and deterrence goals.
new strategic arms reduction treaty limits and force structure
10. Senator McCain. General Chilton, when will Congress be provided
the details of the new nuclear force structure as it relates to the New
START?
General Chilton. Force structure details were provided to Congress
as part of the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010 1251 report and as part of the
submission package when New START was presented for ratification.
11. Senator McCain. General Chilton, has the analysis been done to
support this new force structure and can the committee be provided such
analysis?
General Chilton. Analysis was done throughout the NPR and New START
process. I defer to OSD for release of the analysis.
12. Senator McCain. General Chilton, in order to meet the force
structure levels for the New START, I assume DOD will need to adjust
levels within one or more legs of the triad. If so, which aspects and
why?
General Chilton. Yes, some changes in each leg of the triad will be
necessary. We need to continue the conversions of the B-1B to
conventional use only and then exhibit those changes and conduct
exhibitions of the SSGNs and missile defense silos at Vandenberg to
remove from New START accountability. We must also eliminate other
delivery vehicles (e.g., 50 Peacekeeper silos, 50 MMIII silos at
Malmstrom and B52G and B52H at Davis Monthan) which have been
previously removed from the nuclear forces but which were accountable
under START I. Beyond these issues, minor force modifications maybe
required. This information was provided to Congress as part of the NDAA
for Fiscal Year 2010 1251 report and as part of the submission package
when New START was presented for ratification.
consultations with allies
13. Senator McCain. Secretary Tauscher and Dr. Miller, please
describe the consultation that we had with our allies and friends
before determining our nuclear posture, force reductions, and extended
deterrence.
Secretary Tauscher and Dr. Miller. International perspectives on
U.S. nuclear policy and posture were significant components in the NPR
analysis and are reflected in the final document. The NPR's
International Dimensions Working Group was created to engage with our
allies and partners regarding their perceptions of the U.S. nuclear
policy and posture. The NPR team held more than 60 consultations with
more than 38 individual countries as well as the North Atlantic Council
of the NATO alliance, and 11 other countries provided written input.
Allies and partners were engaged frequently during the NPR process.
14. Senator McCain. Secretary Tauscher and Dr. Miller, did any of
our friends and allies raise any concerns about our new nuclear posture
and proposed cuts to our nuclear arsenal?
Secretary Tauscher and Dr. Miller. Allies and partners were engaged
frequently during the NPR. International reactions to the NPR since its
publication have been very positive, and the administration has
received broad support for the recommendations of the NPR as well as
proposed reductions under the New START treaty.
15. Senator McCain. Secretary Tauscher and Dr. Miller, please
describe how and in what way the NPR was shaped by the ideas and
concerns of our allies who depend on the U.S. nuclear umbrella for
their own security.
Secretary Tauscher and Dr. Miller. In terms of process,
international perspectives on U.S. nuclear policy and posture were
significant components in the NPR's analysis and are reflected in the
final document. The NPR 's International Dimensions Working Group was
created to engage with our allies and partners regarding their
perceptions of U.S. nuclear policy and posture. The NPR team held more
than 60 consultations with more than 38 individual countries as well as
the North Atlantic Council of the NATO alliance, and 11 other countries
provided written input.
In terms of product, the NPR report reflects a strong commitment to
the U.S. nuclear umbrella. ``Strengthening regional deterrence and
reassuring U.S. allies and partners'' is one of the NPR's five pillars,
and two of the NPR's key recommendations are retaining the capability
to forward-deploy U.S. nuclear weapons on tactical fighter-bombers and
heavy bombers, and to proceed with full-scope life extension for the B-
61 bomb.
nuclear proliferation review and new weapon design
16. Senator McCain. Mr. D'Agostino, the NNSA's British counterpart,
the Atomic Weapons Establishment, cites maintaining a capability to
design a new weapon as a cornerstone of its mission. Why do you suspect
the British view that maintaining the capability to design a new
warhead is critical?
Mr. D'Agostino. The known capability to design a workable nuclear
weapon is an essential aspect which underpins the credibility of both
U.S. and the U.K. nuclear deterrence. Our position on this topic is the
same as the United Kingdom's: we will unambiguously retain this
ability. Instead of honing and demonstrating these skills through an
ongoing program to design, develop, and test new nuclear weapon
designs, such as was done during the Cold War, the NNSA and the United
Kingdom have both invested in strengthening our science, technology,
and engineering (ST&E) capabilities to sustain these core skills.
As the stockpile decreases in size, the deterrence role of ST&E
increases in importance. Our credibility relies on the active
engagement of scientists and engineers to understand the aging
stockpile in all its complexities, and their ability to respond to
future technical and global events. The vigorous engagement of ST&E
enables us to annually assess the stockpile, resolve significant
finding investigations (discovered departures from design and/or
manufacturing specifications), extend nuclear weapon lifetimes, assess
other Nations' nuclear capabilities, and dismantle retired weapons.
This very challenging technical program and the modern facilities that
are supported in the President's budget will serve to attract and
maintain the highly-trained and motivated workforce needed to sustain
nuclear deterrence, as well as other nuclear and energy security
missions.
17. Senator McCain. Mr. D'Agostino, in contrast to the British, the
recently released NPR states that the ``United States will not develop
new nuclear warheads.'' Do you believe that this statement would
foreclose all future considerations to design a new weapon if the need
arose?
Mr. D'Agostino. The United States has made the decision not to
design and produce new warheads; however, we will preserve our
capability for doing so. The capabilities needed to design a new
warhead include knowledgeable designers, along with a responsive,
capable research and development and manufacturing infrastructure.
These are the same capabilities and skill sets utilized when completing
weapon life extensions. The NPR recognized the need for increased
investment in the Nuclear Security Enterprise stockpile,
infrastructure, and ST&E. The decision not to design new warheads
should not imply the United States would be unable to do so should
national security require it in the future.
18. Senator McCain. Mr. D'Agostino, are there any concerns that as
a result of this declaration that we will no longer maintain the
ability to design a new weapon?
Mr. D'Agostino. See response to question 17. I am confident that
the Stockpile Stewardship and Management path upon which we have
embarked sustains our capabilities to respond to future world events if
necessary.
19. Senator McCain. General Chilton, in your best military judgment
and advice, do you believe that it is prudent to advocate for
eliminating the capability to design a new weapon?
General Chilton. In the context of sustaining a safe, secure, and
effective stockpile, I believe all options should be validated during
concept, design, and cost studies. Both the NPR and the
congressionally-directed Strategic Posture Review support considering
the full range of life extension approaches to ensure the safety,
security, and effectiveness of our stockpile. I believe we must
preserve sufficient flexibility to meet mandated stockpile management
goals. Ultimately, replacement with a new design that uses previously
tested components might be necessary to maintain a safe, secure, and
effective stockpile. As the United States continues to reduce its
nuclear arsenal, we must maintain effective capabilities to support
nuclear weapons nonproliferation activities, and provide expert
assessment of other nations' nuclear weapons programs in support of
non-proliferation goals.
department of defense infrastructure contribution
20. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller and Mr. D'Agostino, with the release
of the NPR, the Secretary of Defense announced that DOD will be
transferring $5 billion over the next 5 years to the Department of
Energy (DOE) to address infrastructure modernization needs. This
increase is both welcome and absolutely necessary to supplement
significant long-term increases in DOE's own budget. How will DOD
funding be utilized by the NNSA?
Dr. Miller. The DOD transfered $4.6 billion of its topline to the
NNSA's Weapons Activities appropriation over the period of fiscal years
2011-2015. By mutual agreement, this transfer will support funding for
the following:
Design and initial construction of the Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility at Los Alamos
and the Uranium Processing Facility at Oak Ridge;
Increased plutonium manufacturing capacity at the PF-4
facility at Los Alamos;
Restoration of production rates for the W76 SLBM
warhead to meet Navy requirements;
A B61 bomb life extension program that meets safety,
security, and reliability requirements on DOD timelines;
Initiation of a life extension program for the W78
ICBM and warheads; and
A revitalized warhead surveillance effort and
associated science and technology support.
In addition, the DOD transferred another nearly $1.1 billion of its
top-line over fiscal year 2011-2015 for Naval Reactors, to support
reactor design and development.
Mr. D'Agostino. The DOD transferred almost $4.6 billion in top-line
over the period fiscal years 2011-2015 to the NNSA's Weapons Activities
for infrastructure enhancement, life extension programs, and enhanced
stockpile stewardship. The DOD also transferred almost $1.1 billion to
Naval Reactors to support reactor design and development for the next
generation ballistic missile submarine.
The President's budget request, if appropriated, will fund:
Design and initial construction of the Chemistry and
Metallurgy Research Replacement Nuclear Facility at Los Alamos;
Design and initial construction of the Uranium
Processing Facility at Oak Ridge;
A sustainable plutonium pit manufacturing capacity at
the PF-4 facility at Los Alamos;
Restoration of full production rates for the W76 SLBM
warhead by the end of fiscal year 2013 to meet Navy
requirements;
A life extension program study and follow-on
activities for the B61 bomb that meet safety, security, and
reliability requirements and DOD timelines;
Initiation of a study of life extension program
options for the W78 ICBM warhead; and
A revitalized warhead surveillance effort and
associated science and technology support.
21. Senator McCain. Dr. Miller and Mr. D'Agostino, can you confirm
that DOE will not reduce its future years spending requests for the
NNSA as a result of the DOD contribution?
Dr. Miller. The administration, including both DOE and DOD, is
committed to sustaining full funding for the NNSA. Our plan, described
in the report submitted in response to the NDAA for Fiscal Year 2010,
section 1251, calls for sustained investments at higher levels so that
over the next decade the United States will have invested about $80
billion in the NNSA nuclear weapons activities. This plan shows
investments for NNSA continuing to grow above the fiscal year 2011
request; DOE is committed to continuing to make spending requests that
represent full and adequate funding.
Mr. D'Agostino. The DOD funding contribution to NNSA is not
expected to be an annual practice. The NNSA will submit budget requests
in the future that reflect NNSA needs. The NNSA will not rely on
supplementary funding from other agencies to execute its mission.
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Saxby Chambliss
deterrence
22. Senator Chambliss. General Chilton, you comment in your written
statement that, ``The nuclear enterprise remains, today and for the
foreseeable future, the foundation of U.S. deterrence strategy and
defense posture.'' I am pleased to hear you say that because, with all
the talk about nuclear weapons over the last several months, the
overwhelming emphasis has been on reducing their number, and perhaps
rightfully so. However, the fact remains that our nuclear weapons have
served an extremely valuable purpose for decades, and that purpose is
to guarantee the security of the United States and our allies, and no
other weapon in our arsenal provides that security the way nuclear
weapons do. I hope your perspective is not lost on those in the
administration making these recommendations. What are your comments on
this issue?
General Chilton. I am confident that this perspective has not been
lost. The NPR delineates this perspective well and if the concepts
articulated in it are carried out, especially regarding the nuclear
infrastructure, I believe our nuclear enterprise and the associated
deterrence and assurance it provides will remain strong and credible.
nuclear nonproliferation treaty
23. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Tauscher and Dr. Miller, under the
declaratory policy outlined in the new NPR, would the United States
have been able to make the same threats directed against Saddam
Hussein's Iraq with regards to their potential employment of chemical
and biological weapons against Israel or Saudi Arabia during the
Persian Gulf War, given that Iraq was a signatory to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NNPT) and that we believed, at that time, that
Iraq was in compliance with their NNPT obligations?
Secretary Tauscher and Dr. Miller. Yes, the United States would
have been able to threaten possible use of nuclear weapons against
Saddam Hussein's Iraq at the time of the Gulf War. The revised Negative
Security Assurance described in the NPR is applicable to non-nuclear
weapons states that are party to the NPT and in compliance with their
nuclear nonproliferation obligations. This was not the case for Iraq.
The joint resolution passed by the U.S. Congress on January 1991
authorizing the use of military force against Iraq specifically noted
Iraq's nuclear weapons program as a grave threat.
24. Senator Chambliss. General Chilton, in your responses to
advanced policy questions for your nomination to be Commander of
STRATCOM in 2007, you stated the following: ``A credible U.S. nuclear
deterrent . . . assures allies that the United States will deter,
prevent, or limit damage to them from adversary attacks. This removes
incentives for many of them to develop and deploy their own nuclear
forces, thereby encouraging nonproliferation.'' Do you still agree with
your statement of 2007 and, in your opinion, does our most recent NPR
continue to assure allies that the United States will deter, prevent,
or limit damage to them from adversary attacks?
General Chilton. Yes, I still agree with that statement and that
the most recent NPR supports it. If the concepts articulated in the NPR
are carried out, especially regarding the nuclear infrastructure, I
believe our nuclear enterprise and the associated deterrence and
assurance it provides will remain strong and credible.
u.s. and russian intercontinental ballistic missiles
25. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Tauscher and Dr. Miller, how does
de-MIRVing of the U.S. ICBMs increase stability if, in turn, the
Russians do not do the same?
Secretary Tauscher and Dr. Miller. The increased stability achieved
by removing Multiple Independently-targetable Reentry Vehicle
capability (de-MIRVing) from U.S. ICBMs is not dependent on Russia de-
MIRVing its nuclear force. Stability is increased because single
warhead ICBMs in geographically dispersed hardened silos require an
adversary contemplating attack to use more warheads in attacking ICBMs
than the number of U.S. warheads they would destroy.
b-52 under strategic arms reduction treaty
26. Senator Chambliss. Dr. Miller and General Chilton, the NPR
recommends modifying some of our B-52s into conventional only
platforms. How many B-52s does DOD plan to modify and to what extent
might it be necessary to disable bombers at the Air Force boneyard at
Davis-Monthan Air Force Base to ensure they are not deployable and do
not count under the New START?
Dr. Miller. Force structure plans under the New START treaty call
for up to 60 deployed nuclear-capable heavy bombers, including 18
deployable B-2s for the nuclear mission. The Air Force currently has 76
operational B-52Hs in the strategic nuclear force structure. The Air
Force will study options for the number of B-52s to convert to a
conventional only role. The Department plans to eliminate 51 B-
52Gs, 12 B-1Bs, and 13 B-52Hs currently stored at Davis-Monthan Air
Force Base once the New START treaty enters into force.
General Chilton. NPR guidance is to retain both the B-2 and B-52,
and convert some of the latter to a conventional-only role to meet the
New START treaty central limits for deployed and non-deployed strategic
delivery systems. No final decision has been made on force structure.
We are working with OSD, the Joint Staff, and the Services to identify
options and will report at the earliest opportunity. It is likely that
some number of the platforms previously accountable under START I (e.g.
bombers at the Aerospace Maintenance and Regeneration Group facility at
Davis-Monthan AFB, AZ) will be eliminated. The conversion of a portion
of the B-52 force to conventional-only will allow the Air Force to
retain sufficient dual-capable B-52s to support conventional
requirements while providing extended nuclear deterrence to our allies,
deter our adversaries, and maintain a hedge against future uncertainty.
new nuclear warheads
27. Senator Chambliss. Secretary Tauscher and Dr. Miller, the NPR
states clearly that the United States will not develop any new nuclear
warheads. If developing a new nuclear warhead could offer a means of
making our nuclear weapons more secure, reliable, effective, and safe,
and doing so did not create a warhead with any new military
capabilities, why would the administration not consider doing so?
Secretary Tauscher and Dr. Miller. We are confident that the full
range of life extension programs--refurbishment of existing warheads,
reuse of nuclear components from different warheads, and replacement of
nuclear components--will allow the United States to sustain a safe,
secure, and effective nuclear arsenal. This policy to not develop new
nuclear warheads means that life extension programs will only use
nuclear components based on previously tested designs, and the
laboratory directors have stated: ``We believe that the approach
outlined in the NPR, which excludes further nuclear testing and
includes the consideration of the full range of life extension options
(refurbishment of existing warheads, reuse of nuclear components from
different warheads, and replacement of nuclear components based on
previously tested designs), provides the necessary technical
flexibility to manage the nuclear stockpile into the future with an
acceptable level of risk.''
______
Questions Submitted by Senator David Vitter
nuclear enterprise sustainment projects
28. Senator Vitter. General Chilton, you mentioned the need to move
forward with nuclear enterprise sustainment projects. Among these you
specifically mention the need to maintain a safe, effective stockpile,
which I take to mean, not just the nuclear warheads but the missiles as
well, and extend production of the Minuteman III and begin studies to
develop a replacement ICBM for the Minuteman III. In your opinion, does
the President's decision to cancel National Aeronautics and Space
Administration's (NASA) Constellation Program and move to reliance on
commercial providers for launch vehicles for manned space flight, which
effectively removes NASA as a customer for large rockets and solid
rocket motors, have a negative impact on our Nation's ability to move
forward with one or all of those nuclear enterprise sustainment
projects you mentioned?
General Chilton. NASA has always been a very large part of the
solid rocket motor industrial base. We anticipate the Constellation
program cancellation will impact the cost to recapitalize our Air Force
and Navy ballistic missile forces in the future; however, the extent of
this impact is unknown at this time. We look forward to the results of
Secretary Carter's Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (AT&L)-led
task force study on this issue.
29. Senator Vitter. General Chilton, it is my understanding that
the President's plans to remove NASA as a primary customer for large
rockets and solid rocket motors would lead to an increase in costs for
DOD missiles and solid rocket motors, jeopardize the viability of
single-source suppliers for certain components used on both space
launch vehicles and ICBMs, and also put us in great risk of losing the
remainder of our Nation's already greatly-reduced large rocket and
solid rocket motor workforce, leaving us with few, if any, of the
engineers who know how to build and maintain these complex machines. Do
you agree with those assessments? If so, could you elaborate on them in
detail?
General Chilton. Until the OSD/AT&L study is complete, it is
premature to speculate on the extent of the impact to our industrial
base and intellectual capital as the solid rocket motor industry
adjusts to the Constellation program cancellation. We look forward to
the results of Secretary Carter's AT&L-led task force study on this
important issue. I do think it is important that prudent investments
are made in propulsion to ensure we can meet our Nation's strategic
needs.
30. Senator Vitter. General Chilton, in your estimation, do the
President's plans for NASA present a direct challenge to and
potentially jeopardize the viability of our Nation's nuclear deterrent,
specifically to our ICBM fleet?
General Chilton. We do not believe the President's decision to
terminate the Constellation program presents a direct challenge to the
viability of our ICBM force. The Air Force is completing a series of
programs to sustain the ICBM force and we are confident Minuteman III
is viable and sustainable through 2030. Looking ahead, we anticipate
new challenges across the entire industrial base which will impact both
the capacity and costs associated with supporting the Minuteman III in
the future. A viable solid rocket motor industrial base is a critical
part of the broader industrial base needed to maintain a safe, secure,
and effective ICBM force and we look forward to the results of
Secretary Carter's AT&L-led task force study on this important issue.
u.s. and chinese stockpiles
31. Senator Vitter. Secretary Tauscher, Dr. Miller, General
Chilton, and Mr. D'Agostino, the NPR expresses the intention to further
reduce our nuclear deterrent below the START follow-on levels. The NPR
also highlights the lack of transparency of China's nuclear program. Is
there a concern that further U.S. reductions could prompt China to
increase their nuclear stockpile?
Secretary Tauscher and Dr. Miller. China's military modernization
programs, including its nuclear modernization, are a significant
concern which we watch closely. However, China presently does not
appear to be seeking parity with either the United States or Russia,
and its nuclear arsenal remains much smaller than the U.S. and Russian
arsenals. As a declared nuclear weapon state under the NPT, China's
restraint in its nuclear modernization is important to the nuclear
disarmament and global nonproliferation efforts. We look to China to be
more transparent about its strategic programs and to show restraint in
them.
As the United States and Russia conduct bilateral negotiations to
reduce nuclear arsenals further, the United States will seek greater
transparency and assurances from China that it will restrain its
nuclear modernization.
General Chilton. Until the scope of the ``further reductions'' is
understood, it is difficult to speculate on how China would view
further reductions. However, I believe that whether or not China
chooses to increase their arsenal is dependent upon a much broader
geopolitical context than just the size of the U.S. and Russian
arsenals.
Mr. D'Agostino. The NPR states,
``The United States and China are increasingly interdependent
and their shared responsibilities for addressing global
security threats, such as WMD proliferation and terrorism, are
growing. The United States welcomes a strong, prosperous, and
successful China that plays a greater global role in supporting
international rules, norms, and institutions.
``At the same time, the United States and China's Asian
neighbors remain concerned about the pace and scope of China's
current military modernization efforts, including its
quantitative and qualitative modernization of its nuclear
capabilities. China's nuclear arsenal remains much smaller than
the arsenal of Russia and the United States. But the lack of
transparency surrounding its programs--their pace and scope as
well as the strategy and doctrine guiding them--raises
questions about China's future strategic intentions.''
______
Questions Submitted by Senator Susan Collins
nuclear nonproliferation treaty
32. Senator Collins. Secretary Tauscher, the proposed Negative
Security Assurance policy states that the United States will not use
nuclear weapons against non-nuclear countries which have signed the
NNPT and are in compliance with the NNPT. Who decides if a country is
in compliance with the NNPT?
Secretary Tauscher. As part of the NPR, the United States
strengthened its longstanding Negative Security Assurance by declaring
that the United States will not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons
against non-nuclear weapons states that are party to the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) and in compliance with their nuclear
nonproliferation obligations, which would include, inter alia, a
state's obligations under its safeguards agreement with the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
The United States renders its own independent compliance judgments.
In this regard, we note that, pursuant to section 403 of the Arms
Control and Disarmament Act, as amended, the administration submits a
detailed annual assessment of other nations' adherence to their NPT
obligations and other nuclear nonproliferation agreements or
commitments to which the United States is a participating state.
33. Senator Collins. Secretary Tauscher, is the administration
prepared to make assessments of each country's compliance with the NNPT
separately from the IAEA, or will we rely on the judgments of the IAEA
Board of Governors, which currently includes Russia, China, Venezuela,
and Cuba in its membership, to determine which countries are in
compliance with the NNPT?
Secretary Tauscher. The Board of Governors of the IAEA plays a role
in determining noncompliance with safeguards agreements, but not
regarding the NPT itself. Although our compliance findings may be
informed by information from other entities, such as the IAEA, the
United States renders its own compliance judgments. In this regard, we
note that, pursuant to section 403 of the Arms Control and Disarmament
Act, as amended, the administration submits a detailed annual
assessment of other nations' adherence to their NPT obligations and
other nuclear nonproliferation agreements or commitments to which the
United States is a participating state.
34. Senator Collins. Secretary Tauscher, if the United States
relies on the assessment of the IAEA, are we putting the countries
which sit on the IAEA Board of Governors in a position to dictate how
we can respond to certain attacks?
Secretary Tauscher. Although our compliance findings may be
informed by information from other entities such as the IAEA, the
United States renders its own independent compliance judgments,
including with respect to compliance with IAEA safeguards agreements.
35. Senator Collins. Secretary Tauscher, if the United States will
establish its own assessment of each country's compliance with the
NNPT, does this undermine U.S. credibility in working with our allies
and other nations in reducing nuclear proliferation?
Secretary Tauscher. No. The United States has been assessing other
nations' compliance for as long as the NPT has been in force. That
practice has in no way undermined our credibility in working with our
allies and other nations in reducing nuclear proliferation.
[The Nuclear Posture Review Report follows:]
[GRAPHIC(S)] [NOT AVAILABLE IN TIFF FORMAT]
[Whereupon, at 11:51 a.m., the committee adjourned.]
|
NEWSLETTER
|
|
Join the GlobalSecurity.org mailing list
|
|
|
